100/150 grade use in the USAAF

[Crumpp]

Here is why some historians are skeptical of widespread use of 100/150 Grade in the 8th USAAF:

Here are the Technical Orders covering the fuels USAAF aircraft are permitted to use.  I have the complete order with all revisions from Oct 1944 until May 1945 covering the period in question when 100/150 grade was adopted.

First the orders.  I have scanned the title page from each order.  The underlined portion of the notes specifies that a copy of each TO will be included in every Pilot's Handbook of Flight Operating Instructions.  

Every type of fuel used by the USAAF had to have a Technical Order specifying it's conditions of use by specific model number engine and type of airplane.  You can see in the USAAF derating instructions that TO 03-5A-66  is the specific instructions for 91/96 octane.

There should have been thousands of these TO's printed for 100/150 grade fuel instructions use if the fuel became the standard for the 8th USAAF.  As such no TO was ever issued.






This fact cast's serious doubt onto the claim of any widespread use of 100/150 grade in the 8th USAAF.  It cannot be explained away with "it was locally acquired" or a "local command" order.  That explanation would be reasonable ONLY for a very short period of time in an emergency. The USAAF requires a TO be published and included in all Pilots Handbook of Flight Operating Instructions.

As for the wealth of supply division documentation.  All fuels require a specification order from supply.  This order lays out not only the technical details defining the specific fuel but allocates who gets what and how much they are authorized to have on hand.  It is the supply regulations on the fuel governing everything dealing with procurement, storage, allocations, etc..

The presence of documentation from supply detailing or outlining these parameters has no bearing on operational use.  It is perfectly natural to expect information to flow back and forth as these details are gathered and the groundwork laid for proper supply when the fuel is adopted.  A Technical Order not documents from supply division covers operational use.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Squire]

So whats new here that hasn't been covered in the last 4 threads (at least) on the exact same subject?

I dont see anything you have not already claimed. Why are we going here again?

Shall we all cut and paste the other pages?, we can save ourselves a lot of typing.

I looked at your docs, they dont contradict anything, they just point out Air Force Wide "typical fuels" for the entire USAAF. Nobody said that P-51s in CBI used it, or that P-38s in the PAC used it, or that P-47Ds in PAC used it.

The topic is specific to USAAF 8th AF, Fighter Command , post 6-44 , P-51s and P-47s, UK based.

Im gone from this one untill I see something really new, but Im sure others will jump on in.

[Sable]

I've got to agree with Squire.  While these docs show no sign of 150 octane being approved on global basis, they also don't contradict any of the evidence from the other threads.  Notice that table A only provides "Fuel grade recommended".  Taking into account that the evidence presented in the other thread all came from sources much closer to the event in question, I would say that the case for 150 octane use by the 8th AF is still exceedinly strong.  We are after all talking about a fuel that was locally aquired, and was used by only part of one of the 16 air forces for less then a year.

This is like hearing a prison warden say "Sodomy isn't on my list of approved activities in my prison", then hearing prisoner Bob say "Big Jimmy raped me the other day in the shower", then hearing prisoner Jimmy say "Man, I cornholed little Bobby the other day", then looking at the medical report from the prison's doctor saying that prisoner Bob had to spend the night in the infirmiry due to rectal trauma, then seeing the security tape from the shower showing the man on man action, and concluding from all of that: "The Warden said sodomy isn't approved, so I doubt it's ever occured here.  Bob, Jimmy and the Doctor are all just making stuff up - and they were just wrestling for the soap in that video".

[Crumpp]

While these docs show no sign of 150 octane being approved on global basis,

They show no sign of it being approved for general use anywhere.  There is no TO!!  

You could not just shove fuel into a USAAF aircraft.  While alternative fuels could be used, there was set proceedure that includes securing a TO for an adopted fuel.  

The claim of locally acquired thru local command authority does not fly except for a very short duration.

The USAF historians are not making a judgement because they have a "Luftwaffe bias".   The facts are simply different and only one side is being presented on these boards.

It was not optional what grade of fuel you could use on a continual basis in the USAAF.
 

All the best,

Crumpp

[justin_g]

SO what are all those other docs about then? Are they mere fabrications? What use of 150 octane do you believe occured in the 8th AF FC?

[Crumpp]

SO what are all those other docs about then?

As for the wealth of supply division documentation. All fuels require a specification order from supply. This order lays out not only the technical details defining the specific fuel but allocates who gets what and how much they are authorized to have on hand. It is the supply regulations on the fuel governing everything dealing with procurement, storage, allocations, etc..

The presence of documentation from supply detailing or outlining these parameters has no bearing on operational use. It is perfectly natural to expect information to flow back and forth as these details are gathered and the groundwork laid for proper supply when the fuel is adopted. A Technical Order not documents from supply division covers operational use.

Are they mere fabrications?

Certainly not.  Nor are they being presented with an intention to deceive either.

What use of 150 octane do you believe occured in the 8th AF FC?

In my personal opinion it's use was much more extensive that I originally thought.  The quick answer is I think they very much tried to adopt it but just ran into more trouble than it was worth in the end.  It was stockpiled throughout the summer of 1944 in anticipation of it's adoption, the fuel came into use for operational testing, peaked in late 1944 and finally died out in early 1945 with the "pep" solution being the straw that broke the camels back.  When the solution to fixing the "pep" issues became "return to the original problems" and the war was in the final stages of ending, all thoughts of formally adopting 100/150 grade were put aside.  Hence it was not used in the post war period.  The United States certainly had the capacity to do and in fact discussed it.  It was not chosen to be produced in any form during or post war.

First some quick background on some of what I have uncovered in my research.  It is evident from reports on the state of aircraft fuel that high octane fuel was very much desired by all sides.   It is equally evident that all sides were experiencing technical difficulties with octane levels above around 148 octane.  I say that number because the Germans using hydrogenation experimented with 148 octane fuels but ran into the similar problems with fouling, separation, etc..  They even tried various oil-tar mixtures to overcome some these problems and it just did not work.

I found it very interesting that the United States in discussing the same topic and considering the state of engine technology, mission profiles, fuel development, production capacity, basically the whole picture settled on 100/145 grade as the next major aircraft fuel.  The Germans settled on the equivalent to 100/143 for C3.  So independently both nations came to the same conclusions on the state of fuel technology.

Here is an example of how these high-octane fuels were pushing the limits of engine technology:

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/p-38-75inch-wer.jpg

The conclusion is the engine failed because it was being operated at the limits of the metallurgy not the fuel.

Now lest look at were our MAP limits come from.

This is preliminary flight testing to estabilish MAP limits for actual testing.

A Material Command Memorandum dated 13 May 1944 on "Preliminary Flight Tests of Fighter Aircraft Using PPF 441 Fuel at Increased War Emergency Rating" concluded:

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/150-grade-fuel.html

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/eng295.jpg

In the actual service test no recommendations were made!

An Army Air Force Proving Ground Command Report “Service test of Nominal 100/150 Grade Fuel” dated 7 July 1944 determined the effect of nominal 104/150 grade fuel on the performance and maintenance of P-51B, P-47D, and P-38J airplanes.

Conclusions:

    a. In view of the inconclusive nature of test results, it is not possible to make any definite decision concerning the operational use of nominal grade 104/150 fuel and the attending higher emergency power ratings.
    b. Only three of the nine original test aircraft finished the specified test.
    c. At this station, only very minor malfunctions and failures were traced specifically to the action of the nominal grade 104/150 fuel.
    d. Maximum performance of all three types of aircraft was aided materially by the new power settings permitted with the new fuel.

Only 3 of the 9 aircraft tested completed the testing and no recommendations were made as to operational use.  

Here we see 7 stations received an unknown quantity of fuel:

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/150-fuel-13-june44-b.jpg

And a memo from one of those stations:

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/361st-24june44.jpg

7 stations are not even close to the entire 8th AF FG's.  It's a good number for operational testing though.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Sable]

Originally posted by Crumpp

Here we see 7 stations received an unknown quantity of fuel:

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/150-fuel-13-june44-b.jpg

And a memo from one of those stations:

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/361st-24june44.jpg

7 stations are not even close to the entire 8th AF FG's.  It's a good number for operational testing though.

Those 7 stations and their units as of June 44 are:

375 - Honington - 364th FG - P-38 (switched to P-51 in July 44)
377 - Wattisham - 479th FG - P-38 (switched to P-51 in Sept 44)
373 - Leiston - 357th FG - P-51
378 - Fowlmere - 339th FG - P-51
356 - Debden - 4th FG - P-51
357 - Duxford - 78th FG - P-47 (switched to P-51 in Dec 44)
374 - Bottisham - 361st FG - P-51

That's 7 of 15 fighter groups of the 8th AF.  The very next line of that first report states that the rest of the fields will be supplied June 12th, but doesn't list them by number.

We have pics and statements from groundcrew of the 357th talking about using the fuel.  We have the same for the 78th - a pic of a Mustang, as well as a statement from groundcrew describing converting their new mustangs to use the fuel (this would indicate that it was in use from June through at least the rest of 1944).  We also have a document from the 361st describing how the 150 octane replaced their existing fuel.  This all corroborates those fuel deliveries.

We also have pictures of 352nd and 353rd FG aircraft remarked for 150 octane, which would indicate that the report was correct in saying that the fuel was delivered to the rest of the FC fields.  And we also have Freeman's book which mentions the 355th FG carrying out the operational testing of the 150 PEP grade in Feb of 45.

So we're looking at between 9 and all 15 fighter groups using the fuel, probably from June '44 until at least to March '45 (when the 150 PEP grade was introduced), if not all the way to V-E day.  In July and August of 1944 alone 8th FC flew over 30,000 sorties, and claimed 500+ aerial kills.

Just to put that in perspective, by early 1945 the VVS only had 398 La-7s in front line air force units, and only 291 were combat ready.  By May of 45 over 2000 La-7s had reached the front, but only 115 were lost in combat.  That gives you an idea of how much action they saw before the end.  The Japanese only built around 400 N1K2-Js!  The Typhoon and Tempest were only credited with 246 and 239 aerial kills respectively FOR THE ENTIRE WAR!

So even at the low end, we are looking at widespread use in combat - far more so then many of the popular planes in AH.  And (wink-wink HTC) certainly more then enough to justify their inclusion for ToD as well as perk rides in the MA I would think.

[Crumpp]

That's 7 of 15 fighter groups of the 8th AF. The very next line of that first report states that the rest of the fields will be supplied June 12th, but doesn't list them by number.

Ok.  This is certainly backs up the attempt to adopt the fuel.  We know the fuel was available from the supply side.  Where is the specification order?

It's not optional and one would have been done if it was officially adopted.  Once more there would be thousands of references to it available.  

So we're looking at between 9 and all 15 fighter groups using the fuel, probably from June '44 until at least to March '45 (when the 150 PEP grade was introduced),

However, your leaving out the whole period of fatal accidents which led to need for "pep" in the first place.  The consumption of 100/130 fuel increases during this time not decreases.  This indicates the fuel was put aside until the technical difficulties were worked out.  The lack of a Specification Order and Technical Order back this up.

All of the documentation gathered from the supply side deals solely with the time period before problems occurred.

Once again we return to the lack of a TO on the fuel.  It was not optional either nor could any USAAF commander just "float" on the emergency use clause.  One would have been done and issued with every aircrafts operating instructions.

All the best,

Crumpp

[ShortyDoowap]

Neat pic:

[Crumpp]

We've seen it before shorty.

It does not prove large scale operational adoption.  It proves at least one plane used it during an unknown time period.

All the best,

Crumpp

[ShortyDoowap]

I found it very interesting that the United States in discussing the same topic and considering the state of engine technology, mission profiles, fuel development, production capacity, basically the whole picture settled on 100/145 grade as the next major aircraft fuel. The Germans settled on the equivalent to 100/143 for C3. So independently both nations came to the same conclusions on the state of fuel technology.

115/145 (not 100/145) was a compromise fuel.  Higher octane fuel was desired.  
 
"In June 1944 the Industrial Planning Committee of the Aeronautical Board issued its compromise proposal for improved aviation fuel.  This proposal was based on engine performance, engine performance, production capacity, requirements and logistics.  All factors considered, the best compromise fuel was 115/145, although the future availability of 120/150 was desired."  

Aviation Gasolin Production and Control
AAF Historical Study 65

[ShortyDoowap]

Originally posted by Crumpp
We've seen it before shorty.

It does not prove large scale operational adoption.  It proves at least one plane used it during an unknown time period.

All the best,

Crumpp

Generally, some kind of TO, or order from the AAF Commanding General,  is required before painting new fuel requirements on planes.  

Your "No TO" is sort of like the coelacanth.  Sort of taking a chance saying it doesn't exist just because you haven't seen it.

[Crumpp]

115/145 (not 100/145) was a compromise fuel. Higher octane fuel was desired.

Of course it was desired.

[ShortyDoowap]

If it was too problematic, why would it have been desired?

BTW, the TOs you posted refer to only US manufactured gasoline.  Have you given any though to the fact that 100/150 was brewed only in GB, and was not US fuel.  Manufacturers did not rate their planes and engines on foreign fuel, only US fuel.   Manufacturers would have had to import fuel solely for the purposes of rating their planes and engines on it.  Ratings on 100/150 were generally set by the AAF HQ of the Material Command.    

It wouldn't make any sense to print ratings on 100/150 fuel in POHs for planes that served in regions where it wasn't available.    100/150 fule was too limited in availability - only in England, and only to VIII FC fighters.

The US Navy experienced this in 1947 when 115/145 became the primary AV fuel.  Printed ratings on 115/145 were circulated to units with only 100/130 and a rash of blown engines occurred.  There was a virtual stand down on modifying planes to use 115/145 fuel until it was made very clear under what circumstances the plane could use the new ratings.

[Crumpp]

If it was too problematic, why would it have been desired?

The atom bomb was desired in 1939.  Took a little longer to get though.

Ratings on 100/150 were generally set by the AAF HQ of the Material Command.

Exactly, there would be both a TO and an SO for the fuel as per USAAF regs.  It had to be done.

All the best,

Crumpp