Author Topic: Why would we help?  (Read 1413 times)

Offline Gunslinger

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Why would we help?
« Reply #15 on: July 26, 2005, 09:16:42 PM »
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Originally posted by lasersailor184
I say we stop the shipments right on the border of international waters and demand they give up nukes and Communism.


Then tell the NK people that it's the Government holding the food back.

The NK will never revolt.  Not in our lifetime anyways.  They have been "educated" by their govt that it is America that is evil.  America invaced NK in the 50's and it's America's fault they are starving.  I saw a pretty good documentry on DSC. and it was amazing at the amount that these people are snowed......at least the ones the filmaker showed.

On another note the reporters that have gone into NK have reported that there is an erie lack of elderly in the country and the people look like scare crows.

Offline Siaf__csf

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« Reply #16 on: July 27, 2005, 02:57:11 AM »
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The hungrier they get, the more they'll hate their current system right?


Don't you know that the people are brainwashed to believe the hunger, power cuts, lack of medicine etc. are ALL blamed on americans?

People seriously think that when the electricity goes off, it's because you guys are stealing it from them.

I saw a document with secret camera footage and the place is just surreal. Like russia only 100 times worse..

Offline Simaril

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« Reply #17 on: July 27, 2005, 06:03:28 AM »
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Originally posted by soda72
International blackmail...   Pay us or we will Nuke you...

I think we will live to reget the day we didn't let Douglas MacArthur finish the job....



I seem to remember that the Chinese Army stopped "MacArthur's boys" more effectively than Truman ever could...

Army and Marine elements were practically spittin in the Yalu (hmmm... sounds like a classic big band tune....) after chasing the NKs up country. When the chinese came in, it was like trying to hold back water with your fingers.

 MacArthur was blinded by his egotism, and sucked quite a few along with him.
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storch

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« Reply #18 on: July 27, 2005, 06:12:40 AM »
nothing a few nukes couldn't have handled.  truman was an idiot for not cutting dugout doug loose.

Offline Captain Virgil Hilts

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« Reply #19 on: July 27, 2005, 07:22:33 AM »
Quote
Originally posted by Simaril
I seem to remember that the Chinese Army stopped "MacArthur's boys" more effectively than Truman ever could...

Army and Marine elements were practically spittin in the Yalu (hmmm... sounds like a classic big band tune....) after chasing the NKs up country. When the chinese came in, it was like trying to hold back water with your fingers.

 MacArthur was blinded by his egotism, and sucked quite a few along with him.


I'm not all that sure you're right. My father was there, and he certainly did not agree. When China first entered they were a real problem. After that, the problem was Truman refusing to turn MacArthur loose and commit the supplies necessary. I'd say Truman was unwilling to risk going down in history as having used nuclear weapons twice. Dad complained bitterly for years that we had what it took to do the job, and Truman intentionally held back resources to the point where lack of supplies put men at serious risk or just plain got them killed.

Korea was fought with a political handicap, just like Vietnam, but not as bad. Washington was selecting targets and strategy once U.S./UN forces got out of the hole they started in. In fact, it was Truman's reservations and refusal to commit increased forces that emboldened the North Koreans enough to attack, and further allowed the Chinese to assume (correctly because they judged Truman well) that they could get involved without fear of anytihng happening to them.
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Offline soda72

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« Reply #20 on: July 27, 2005, 07:23:19 AM »
Quote
Originally posted by Simaril
I seem to remember that the Chinese Army stopped "MacArthur's boys" more effectively than Truman ever could...

Army and Marine elements were practically spittin in the Yalu (hmmm... sounds like a classic big band tune....) after chasing the NKs up country. When the chinese came in, it was like trying to hold back water with your fingers.
 


How do you stop a flood of soldiers when you can only bomb "half a bridge"?  

Instead of ending the war it went on for years, with no end in site.  Ike finally put an end to it, but the only reason that happen was he threated to escalate the war, saying it would no longer be confined to the Korea peninsula.   Amazing how they wanted to talk about peace after that.....

Offline lazs2

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« Reply #21 on: July 27, 2005, 07:51:38 AM »
sci... I don't get it..  "100 times worse than russia" ??  Boroda assures me that soviet russia was a paradise for all.

lazs

Offline Toad

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« Reply #22 on: July 27, 2005, 12:00:09 PM »
Quote
Originally posted by Simaril
I seem to remember that the Chinese Army stopped "MacArthur's boys" more effectively than Truman ever could...
 


Hardly. Here's a quick review.

Quote


25 January 1951
 Eighth Army counterattacks in Operation THUNDERBOLT, which starts in the west and gradually expands eastward.
 
10 February
 In the west, Inch'on is recaptured, as I Corps approaches the Han River
 
11-12 February
 Chinese forces attack X Corps, forcing advancing ROK units to fall back toward Wonju.
 
13-15 February
 Battle of Chip’yong-ni.
 
18 February
 Reports confirm an enemy withdrawal along the entire central front.
 
21 February
 Eighth Army launches Operation KILLER, a general advance north by IX and X Corps
 
28 February
 Enemy resistance south of the Han River collapses.
 
7 March
 General Ridgeway begins Operation RIPPER; the objective is Line Idaho, just south of the 38th Parallel.
 
14-15 March
 UN troops enter Seoul, the South Korean capital.
 
31 March
 Eighth Army is positioned along the Idaho line.
 
2-5 April
 General Ridgeway puts Operation RUGGED into motion; the objective is Line Kansas, some ten miles above the 38th Parallel.
 
9 April
 The I and IX Corps and the ROK I Corps reach the Kansas line; the two U.S. corps continue to advance farther north.
 
11 April
 General MacArthur is relieved as UNC commander; General Ridgeway succeeds him.
 
14 April
 General Van Fleet assumes command of Eighth Army.
 
22 April
 The expected Chinese and North Korean spring offensive begins, with the strongest attacks in the west, toward Seoul.
 
30 April
 The enemy offensive is stopped just north of Seoul.
 
15-20 May
 The Chinese and North Koreans resume the offensive, focusing on the east-central region; General Van Fleet begins a counterattack.
 
31 May
 The Eighth Army advances nearly to Line Kansas.
 
1 June
 General Van Fleet strengthens the Kansas line and sends forces farther north, toward Line Wyoming.
 
23 June
 The Soviet Union calls for armistice talks.
 
PHASE 5: 9 July 1951-27 July 1953 (UN Summer-Fall Offensive 1951)
 
10 July 1951
 Armistice talks begin at Kaesong.
 
23 August
 Communist side breaks off negotiations.
 
5 September
 North Koreans abandon Bloody Ridge, after UN forces, led by U.S. 2d Infantry Division’s 9th Infantry, outflank it.
 
12 September-
13 October
 2d Infantry Division, using the 72d Tank Battalion to tactical advantage, seizes Heartbreak Ridge.
 
3-19 October
 Five UN divisions advance to Line Jamestown, some four miles beyond the Wyoming line, to protect the Seoul-Ch’orwon railway.
 
25 October
 Armistice talks resume, now at P’anmunjom.
 
12 November
 General Ridgway, the UNC commander, instructs General Van Fleet to cease Eighth Army offensive operations and to assume an "active defense."
 


Communist Chinese Forces (CCF) offensive operations begin north of Unsan  on October 25th 1950. The CCF held the offensive from then until mid-January of 1951. After that, the UN Command steadily drove them back.

The truth of how it was going appears on 23 June 1951 when the SU calls for an armistice. It's obvious why they did.  The phrase " beat him like a red-headed stepchild" springs to mind.

Quote
After duty as commander of the Second Army in the United States, Van Fleet was sent to Korea in April 1951, to command the American Eighth Army as the replacement for General Matthew B. Ridgway, who had succeeded General Douglas MacArthur as Far East commander.

The Eighth Army was more or less straddling the 38th Parallel. Van Fleet arrived just as the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans were preparing to launch their single greatest military effort of the Korean War.

In a fierce battle that lasted from April 22-29, he skillfully withdrew the Eighth Army's front line, shifted the IX and X Corps to prevent an enemy breakthrough to Seoul, and inflicted 70,000 casualties on the enemy.

Following the rebuff of another Communist attack in May, Van Fleet took the offensive and inflicted 200,000 casualties on the Communists in a drive north of the 38th Parallel to the Iron Triangle area of North Korea.

There Ridgway concluded that a deeper advance into North Korea would be too costly, and had Van Fleet construct fortifications on the "Kansas" and "Wyoming" lines while the United Nations (U.N.) Command pursued cease-fire talks.
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Offline Hangtime

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« Reply #23 on: July 27, 2005, 12:11:34 PM »
ain't it grand? even the kids that know there was a Korean War figure we had our tulips handed to us... that it was a 'draw' at best.

*sigh*

Students of intellectual laziness; rather than students of military history abound... far easier to watch the history channel than it is to read, I guess.
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Offline Simaril

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« Reply #24 on: July 28, 2005, 05:41:17 PM »
Quote
Originally posted by Toad
Hardly. Here's a quick review.



Communist Chinese Forces (CCF) offensive operations begin north of Unsan  on October 25th 1950. The CCF held the offensive from then until mid-January of 1951. After that, the UN Command steadily drove them back.

The truth of how it was going appears on 23 June 1951 when the SU calls for an armistice. It's obvious why they did.  The phrase " beat him like a red-headed stepchild" springs to mind.


Sorry, I guess I based my impressions on readings of the hard fought withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir (not a defeat, but clearly evidence of overwhelming numerical inferiority -- my favorite book was Breakout by Martin Russ), and of Pork Chop Hill (which I realize occured after the "active defense" oxymoron kicked in -- particularly like On hallowed Ground by Marshall).

However, even when the defense was particualrly active, the story seemed to come down to our superior tactics and firepower vs teh Chinese' sheer numbers. While superior tactics and firepower can certainly kick the baddies' tushies, those numbers mean that any mistake can be punished mercilessly. The US Army in particular did not have its current polish, and even during the aggressive advance phase was pretty sloppy -- according to the marines who were there, not my interpretation. During Chosin, the nearby army units were essentially wiped out while the marines made their epic fighting withdrawal.

Stalin showed that sheer numbers can win battles, particularly when commanders put no value on the lives of their troops. The same conditions held in Korea, and I would argue that the cost of aggressively fighting the CCF's would have been prohibitive, even if we would have "won."

In the context of the mid 1950s, nukes were actively considered by cabinet hawks. However, Ike repeatedly refused their use against China simply because again the consequential cost -- politically and in terms of eventual likely retaliation -- was far too high.


Many besides me have argued -- based  on military history, not politics or lack of education -- that MacArthur was entirely ego - driven, out of touch with combat conditions, and not particularly adept at combat management from the 1930s onward. He built his reputation by literally writing his own theater's press releases, claiming credit for any good outcome while many times outright lying about bad outcomes. Hsi management of the Phillipines battle was directly responsible for the horrors of the Bataan fight.



Quote
Originally posted by Hangtime
ain't it grand? even the kids that know there was a Korean War figure we had our tulips handed to us... that it was a 'draw' at best.

*sigh*

Students of intellectual laziness; rather than students of military history abound... far easier to watch the history channel than it is to read, I guess.



I suppose intellectual laziness extends to those who mistake different opinions for ignorance; but then, some seem particularly prone to making that mistake in multiple contexts...
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Wisdom is realizing I will be an idiot in the future.
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Offline Hangtime

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« Reply #25 on: July 28, 2005, 06:09:27 PM »
and whitewash coupled with pro-active dodgeball doesn't excuse ignorance, regardless of venue.
The price of Freedom is the willingness to do sudden battle, anywhere, any time and with utter recklessness...

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Offline Gunslinger

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« Reply #26 on: July 28, 2005, 06:41:53 PM »
Quote
Originally posted by Simaril
I seem to remember that the Chinese Army stopped "MacArthur's boys" more effectively than Truman ever could...

Army and Marine elements were practically spittin in the Yalu (hmmm... sounds like a classic big band tune....) after chasing the NKs up country. When the chinese came in, it was like trying to hold back water with your fingers.

 MacArthur was blinded by his egotism, and sucked quite a few along with him.


read about the "frozen chosin" sometime.

EDIT:

You responded after I posted but I hardly think the chinese stopped the Marines at the Chosin.  THis is a huge part of Marine Corps history when Chesty puller bloodied the nose of an army that was nearly 12 times his size.  Grunts and cooks alike were fighting with dropped army equipment because they couldnt be resupplied.  Walking wounded were joining the line.  The Marines were fighting on all sides yet the situation was at hand.  

I hardly feel them boys were stopped in any way.....even if they were it took an army 10 times there size to do so.

My biggest question through all of this is why didn't the US go to war with China if we were fighting her troops in Korea?
« Last Edit: July 28, 2005, 08:11:59 PM by Gunslinger »

Offline Toad

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« Reply #27 on: July 28, 2005, 06:55:07 PM »
Quote
Originally posted by Simaril
However, even when the defense was particualrly active, the story seemed to come down to our superior tactics and firepower vs teh Chinese' sheer numbers. While superior tactics and firepower can certainly kick the baddies' tushies, those numbers mean that any mistake can be punished mercilessly. The US Army in particular did not have its current polish, and even during the aggressive advance phase was pretty sloppy -- according to the marines who were there, not my interpretation. During Chosin, the nearby army units were essentially wiped out while the marines made their epic fighting withdrawal.



Well, it really should be it's own thread.

The NK's, which had pinned 8th Army in the Pusan perimeter in ~ 6 weeks from their initial invasion of the South, couldn't "close the deal".

However, MacArthur's 15 Sep 1950 Inchon landing pretty much reversed the way the war was going in short order. The "breakout" from Pusan commenced the next day and by 1 October.... 2 short weeks.... ROK I Corps is across the 38th parallel. By Oct 7 ROK II Corps is across the 38th; by 9 Oct 8th Army is across the 38th.

So as far as that goes, Inchon stands as a masterful stroke.

Then on Oct 25, the CCF jumps in because the NK's are essentially toast. The CCF did indeed come in huge numbers. They pretty much destroyed 2nd Inf Div as it covered the 8th Army withdrawal. Now was the Army so much inferior to the Marines? I don't know. You tell me how the Marines would have fared had they traded places with 2nd Inf Div.

The point, however, is that the massive invasion by CCF was halted and completely reversed by 18 Feb when the CCF withdrew along the entire central front. By 31 March, UN Forces are again on the 38th parallel. This while MacArthur still held command; in fact, UN Forces were about 10 miles North of the 38th with the Chinese still in a fighting retreat when MacArthur was removed from command on 11 April.

The Chinese and NK's made one more Spring Offensive and Van Fleet, commanding 8th Army made them pay a horrendous price for it. He then attacked and  pushed the NK/CCF back past the Wyoming line, more then 10 miles North of the 38th. Van Fleet was ordered to halt offensive operations there. You can read Van Fleet's opinion of that order in a few places around the 'net.

Quote
...embittered by the strategy of limited war in Korea followed by the Truman administration and then by Eisenhower's administration, Van Fleet relinquished his command of the Eighth Army in February 1953, and two months later retired from the Army. On his return to the United States, he sparked controversy by charging that he had been denied the opportunity to achieve total victory in Korea by political decisions in Washington, D.C., and by the failure of Washington to provide him with adequate quantities of ammunition.


To sum up, here's what you said the caused me to post:

Quote
I seem to remember that the Chinese Army stopped "MacArthur's boys" more effectively than Truman ever could...

Army and Marine elements were practically spittin in the Yalu (hmmm... sounds like a classic big band tune....) after chasing the NKs up country. When the chinese came in, it was like trying to hold back water with your fingers.

MacArthur was blinded by his egotism, and sucked quite a few along with him.
[/b]

1. MacArthur, after reeling back under the initial huge Chinese onslaught, reversed the situation (again) and had pushed the Chinese and NK's back North of the 38th parallel in a little over three months, inflicting incredible casualties on the Chinese. Pretty amazing, really. At least IMO.

2. While there's no doubt 2nd Inf Div was sacrificed to save 8th Army, the withdrawal itself, including the Marines at Chosin was pretty well done considering the size of the Chinese forces.

3. MacArthur, from Inchon to the repulse of the Chinese back past the 38th did a pretty masterful job with the forces he was given. There is no doubt the US was completely unprepared for the Korean War; troops were green and supplies were hard to come by at first.

Slam him all you like, but there's a lot of folks, military historians included, that think Mac did a masterful tactical job in Korea.

And as to the idea that the US/UN forces got whipped.... well, battles were lost for sure. But the war was won and if one compares casualties it's clear the US/UN did WAY better than the NK/CCF.
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Offline FalconSix

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« Reply #28 on: July 28, 2005, 10:05:31 PM »
Yes we were really kicking the Red's butts. I think the only reason we didn't push on or use the bomb was that if we were to threaten the very existence of NK the Soviets would probably have gotten directly involved (overtly). And the Soviets had the bomb too.

Hi btw. I'm FalconSix :) I've been following your discussions for the last few months. Great forum you've got here despite the recent problems.

Offline TimRas

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« Reply #29 on: July 29, 2005, 07:06:00 AM »
Quote
Originally posted by Gunslinger

On another note the reporters that have gone into NK have reported that there is an erie lack of elderly in the country


Hmm...
Lack of elderly....shortage of food ---> Soylent Green !