Spitfire Vb: Did it carry 120 rnds OR 240 rnds of Cannons?

[Crumpp]

If the LW reports conflict actual documented events, I tend to belive the actual events, if you see what I mean.

Tell me, how did the RAF get an accurate count in the air over London?


All the best,

Crumpp

[Angus]

"Tell me, how did the RAF get an accurate count in the air over London?"

Definately post war figures of sorties.

Tell me how instead how would aircraft from Scotland and Wales join the fray

BTW, they intercepted with some 250 aircraft. (John Keegan's second World War), - 11th group and some of 12th group.
Oh and he too lists the LW with some 800 109's available to concentrate on FC's TOTAL force of roughly 600.

[Crumpp]

Tell me how instead how would aircraft from Scotland and Wales join the fray

This is getting tiresome.

Do you see Scotland or Wales on these maps from the RAF?

Poised to defend against incursions from Norway.  Those to the south are in easy reach of the fighting.

http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/13group.html

Same with 10 Group.  Those stationed in the East are in easy reach of the fighting.

http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/10group.html


The distances are only a couple of hundred miles at the most.  Remember the Spitfire Mk I had a 395 mile combat radius. It could easily land and refuel over it's home territory.  Using ultra intercepts and EW the RAF had plenty of advanced warning.

http://www.england.travelmall.com/country_images/England.gif

Definately post war figures of sorties.

I would be interested in knowing how he got the sortie figures.  That would be Historical first.  Especially since they were destroyed or missing.

The data needed to answer the question are operational strength, losses, and sortie rates. (A sortie is one combat mission by one airplane.) Luftwaffe research has always been hampered by a lack of data.

http://jg26.vze.com/

More likely he found the plans and assumed that plans always go according to plan.  

The Operational Strengths do exist for part of the BoB but not the sortie information AFAIK.

Perhaps the most significant development in prewar planning was the introduction of the War Potential programme in 1938 that sought to give Britain the capability to produce 2,000 aircraft a month by the end of 1941. As Sebastian Ritchie pointed out, this provided the basis for planning aircraft production in much greater depth and for developing a comprehensive state production organisation. [16] Although an output of 2,000 aircraft a month would not be achieved until the end of 1942, actual production soon exceeded planned targets (Table 1). By comparison, German aircraft production languished in the early part of the war. Thus, while Britain produced 4,283 Hurricanes and Spitfires in 1940 against a planned total of 3,602, Germany produced 1,870 Bf 109s against a planned total of 2,412. [17] Incredibly, Germany did not mobilize its aircraft industry at the outbreak of war and did not seek to expand the Luftwaffe's repair capability. In September 1940, when attrition was at its highest, Britain produced 467 Hurricanes and Spitfires while Germany only produced 218 Bf 109s. [18] The relative performance of the British and German aircraft industries was critical to both the size and sustainability of the front line.

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_2

Luftwaffe Order of Battle--August 1940 [33]
                        Establishment  Strength  Serviceability

Single-engine fighters      1,011         934          805

          Fighter Command Order of Battle--11 August 1940 [35]
            Establishment  Strength  Serviceability
Hurricanes        723         721         656
Spitfires         366         374         334
Total           1,089       1,095         990

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_5

It is arguable that the Battle of Britain was lost long before the Second World War started. Luftwaffe doctrine, so successful in establishing a powerful synergy between air and land operations, was deeply flawed in its understanding of the fundamentals of airpower. The causes were various, but the result was inadequate provision for the industrial investment and resources necessary to sustain operations in the face of high wastage rates that war would bring. By contrast, the Royal Air Force (RAF) was well placed to defend Great Britain, notwithstanding its perceived doctrinal emphasis on strategic bombing. As Richard Overy recently pointed out, the contest the country faced after Dunkirk had been anticipated and prepared for in the 1930s. [1] The Air Ministry, planning the rapid expansion of the front line, had clearly understood the lessons of the First World War, in particular, the high cost--in human and materiel terms--of sustaining air operations. [2] By providing the proper economic and logistics basis for realizing these plans, the air staffs had also established the foundation for increasing Allied air superiority as the war progressed. This is not to say their prewar planning was without flaws. Indeed, at a tactical and operational level, the Luftwaffe enjoyed self-evident advantages. However, by getting the fundamentals right and being prepared to learn from painful early reverses, the Royal Air Force placed itself in a significantly stronger position than the Luftwaffe to fight the Battle of Britain.

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443#continue

Such experiences were not unique to the Royal Air Force. Anecdotal evidence indicates the Luftwaffe suffered no less seriously from high operational attrition. Feldwebel Eric Bartel, who served as a Jagdgeschwader mechanic for much of the war, recalled that after just 17 days' action his staffel of 12 Bf 109Es from JG 77 had been reduced to just 5 or 6, including spares, mainly through mechanical failures and normal wear and tear, rather than enemy action. [23]

In quality and general professionalism, it would be hard to fault the Luftwaffe maintenance organisation. It was certainly a match for the Royal Air Force. However, it was not organised for an attritional war and had made little provision for timely repair and salvage. It is also arguable that it was less flexible and had far more difficulty responding to changing circumstances.

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_3

Other sources give slightly different figures, but most agree that the Luftwaffe deployed an effective strength of slightly more than 900 Bf 109 fighters out of some 1,000 aircraft. This comprised the bulk of their single-seat fighter force. Approximately 150 aircraft remained in other theatres, including Germany, to defend against possible Bomber Command attacks. [34] By comparison, Fighter Command could field 52 squadrons of Hurricanes and Spitfires, nearly 1,100 aircraft (Table 3). Thus, in terms of single-seat fighters, the opposing air forces were fairly evenly matched, albeit Fighter Command was outnumbered more than 3:1 overall.

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_3

Fighter Command clearly possessed an increasing advantage in single-seat fighters as the battle continued, notwithstanding higher aircraft and pilot attrition.

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_3

The simple answer is that losses were never greater than production.

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_4

The Battle of Britain was a contest that the Luftwaffe had neither prepared for nor envisaged. Created as a strategic instrument, the Luftwaffe had become a superb tactical weapon. However, the expectation of a short war meant there were neither the industrial resources nor the necessary logistics arrangements in place to sustain operations in the face of a determined enemy. These shortcomings were never properly addressed and, coupled with the huge resources available to the Allied air forces, would ultimately seal the Luftwaffe's fate.

Too much can perhaps be made of the Luftwaffe's doctrinal weakness and flawed decision making. It was the creation of a strategic air defence force, in the form of Fighter Command, with the necessary equipment, organisation, and resources- underpinned by a comprehensive and highly effective logistics system-that defeated the Luftwaffe. Fighter Command's victory was founded on the vision, determination, and hard work of the prewar planning staffs. As Dempster and Wood concluded in their authoritative study of the Battle of Britain, "The outcome was the combination of the preparation, good judgement, and error, made in the preceding seven years." [55]

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_4

All the best,

Crumpp

[MiloMorai]

Originally posted by Crumpp
This is getting tiresome.

Sure is getting tiresome with your know-it-all, always right atitude. That is why I basically quite posting.

Do you see Scotland or Wales on these maps from the RAF?

Poised to defend against incursions from Norway.  Those to the south are in easy reach of the fighting.

Same with 10 Group.  Those stationed in the East are in easy reach of the fighting.

Sure leave areas undefended. Then there is the problem of those squadrons arriving before the air battle had ended. Even those squadrons in 11 Group had troubles getting to altitude before the Germans arrived.

The distances are only a couple of hundred miles at the most.  Remember the Spitfire Mk I had a 395 mile combat radius. It could easily land and refuel over it's home territory.  Using ultra intercepts and EW the RAF had plenty of advanced warning.

Combat radius and range are not the same. What you give is the range, Crumpp. Combat radius is less than half of the range. Yup Ultra was so good, the Brits did not know they were winning BoB.

All the best,

Crumpp

Bletchley Park
The Government Code and Cipher School at Bletchley Park initially broke Enigma by hand. In August 1940, they started using their own Bombe, designed by Alan Turing and Gordon Welchman. It was also a rotary electro-mechanical device but it worked on an entireley different principle. All information, retrieved by cryptanalysis had the codename “Ultra” and played a very important and sometimes decisive role during the entire war, mainly in the Battle of the Atlantic. All Ultra information was used very careful, to avoid suspicion in German forces. Special liaison officers, trained to deal with this valuable but delicate knowledge, were placed in Headquarters and other strategic places. Moreover, Ultra was never used, unless it could be confirmed by a second source. This to avoid that the German Command came up with the idea that their communication might be broken.

[Angus]

Hey Crumpp. Tired?

"

This is getting tiresome.

Do you see Scotland or Wales on these maps from the RAF?

Poised to defend against incursions from Norway. Those to the south are in easy reach of the fighting.

http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/13group.html

Same with 10 Group. Those stationed in the East are in easy reach of the fighting.

http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/10group.html

The distances are only a couple of hundred miles at the most. Remember the Spitfire Mk I had a 395 mile combat radius. It could easily land and refuel over it's home territory. Using ultra intercepts and EW the RAF had plenty of advanced warning"

Of course Scotland is on MY maps and I have many. Try google-earth for once also loads of fun.
13th group is therefore equally in the equation as the Luftflotte in Denmark and Norway.
Anyway, included in the RAF figures are squadrons in N-Ireland as well
Now, luftflotte III (?) you said was totally out of the picture. Well, the area is only some 140 miles from London (Cherbourg) while Inverness is a whooping 445 miles away, Belfast 323 and so on. The range to Luftflotte III is the same as up to Newcastle or thereabouts - so that's still only 12th group. Even Manchester is further away and that's not yet Wales. Try Cardiff the closest part of S-Wales - it's still as far from London as Luftflotte III. Try Cornwall, say Exeter - same distance.

As for the combat radius you quote, that is the RANGE. Milo pointed that out. So divide range with 2.
Somewhat the same range as the one of the 109, - unless you take Izzy's word of a much higher figure.

So the point is, that a good proportion of the RAF first class fighters was, as you point out by "Poised to defend against incursions from Norway" and other odd sides. Meanwhile the LW has their whole fleet of 109's in short distance from London - the max being about 140 miles by Luftflotte III. If you rule out Luftflotte III you rule out all of 10th group and most of the 12th. And the LW could move nearer if they wanted.....

Got some order of battle number and other goodies cooking

[Squire]

I cant beleive you guys are still on about this.

We have all enough decent books to know what the respective ratios are. The LW was comprised of He-111, Do-17, and Ju-88 KGs, 110 and 109 JGs, a Jabo ZG and Stukagruppen. To suggest they didnt have a numerical advantage vs Fighter Command is just not correct.

That being said, if you are going to try and invade a country and gain air superiority, you do it with a force that is stronger than your opposition, not weaker. The LW needed what it had to throw at the British, who had the benefit of being the defender. The LW was the attacker, and the burden was on them to have some striking power. Which they certainly did.

The reason the BoB is an interesting campaign is because it was hard fought, and one of the purer air campaigns fought in WW2, with the Channel being the dividing line.

Also, it is true that no air force ever sorties its entire fleet at the enemy at once, this happens rarely, and as such, a defending force with a smaller # of fighters can last. That happened in BoB, Malta certainly, Guadalcanal 1942, and the 8th AF vs the LW. As long as one side can replace fighters and aircrew, it can hold out, as air combat is attritional in nature, at the end of the day you return to your safe bases to begin anew again.

Imho, the biggest drawback to the preparation for Sealion was the very tight schedule the LW faced, they were reorganising after France still in July 1940, and were not able to really start ops vs Britain proper untill August 1940, with "Adler Tag" being Aug 13th. Thats about 6 weeks max to do the job, before the weather changes in the Channel in October, and makes an invasion impracticle. They ran out of time more than anything, and were let down by Berlins bad handling of the strategy, who underestimated  British a/c production, and the ability to replace pilots lost, it had little to do with wether a Spit was 10mph faster than a 109 at 12k.

As for the # of 109s available, I will give what I have, and leave it at that, do what you like with the info:

"Bf 109E Aces 1939-41" by John Weal

I will list the bases, and serviceable #s for each unit August 13th, 1940 "Eagle Day":

Luftlotte 2 109Es (JG3, JG26, JG51, JG52, JG54):

Stab JG3 Wierre-au-Bois 3
I/JG3 Grandvillers 32
II/JG3 Samer 22
III/JG3 Le Touquet 29

Stab JG26 Audembert 4
I/JG26 Audembert 34
II/JG26 Marquise 35
III/JG26 Caffiers (Gallands unit) 38

Stab JG51 Wissant (Molders) 4
I/JG 51 Calais 32
II/JG 51 Marquise 33
III/JG 51 St Omer 30

Stab JG52 Coquelles 1
I/JG52 Coquelles 33
II/JG52 Peuplingues 32
III/JG52 Zerbst 11
I/LG2 St Omer 30

Stab JG54 Campagnel-les-Guines 2
I/JG54 Guines 24
II/JG54 Hermelingen 32
III/JG54 Guines 40

Total serviceable fighters: 513 (590 total ac) placed opposite No.11 Group.

Luftlotte 3 109Es (JG2, JG27, JG53):

Stab JG2 Beaumont 3
I/JG2 Beaumont 32
II/JG2 Beaumont 28
III/JG2 Le Havre 28

Stab JG27 Cherbourg 4
I/JG27 Plumetot 32
II/JG27 Crepon 32
III/JG27 Arcques 32

Stab JG3 Cherbourg 6
I/JG3 Guernsey (A British Channel Island) 37
II/JG3Guernsey (A British Channel Island) 34
III/JG3 Brest 35

Total serviceable fighters: 334 (386 total ac) placed opposite No.10 Group.

*And there were the Bf 110s as well, which I dont have any exact info on*

All of the above groups took part in ops vs the RAF. They are not in Norway, nor are they in Germany.

Regards.

[Crumpp]

Milo says:
Sure is getting tiresome with your know-it-all, always right atitude. That is why I basically quite posting.

You quit posting because your wrong.  At least according to both the RAF and USAF.  

All Ultra information was used very careful, to avoid suspicion in German forces.

Sure most intelligence agencies guard their source and take measures to ensure it does not become compromised.  The actionable intelligence is not the same thing however.  Fighter command was instructed to act without knowing why or where the information came from.

The British were very good at deception operations as well.  These operations severely hampered the Luftwaffe and cost them heavily.

It is a very naive assumption to think the English just went "gosh that is nice to know but we cannot act on it because the Germans might think we know what we are not supposed to know."

Poised to defend against incursions from Norway.

Which the RAF had hours of warning before a raid and plenty of time to react.

There were no single engine fighter stationed in Norway which could even reach England for the Luftwaffe.  Some 109's were stationed there, mostly from JG 77 but at it's height Luftflotte V had around 100 single engine fighters.

The Luftwaffe only tried the Norway approach a couple of times.  It was too hard to co-ordinate fighter cover from France.  Each time they tried it their losses of unescorted bombers were too high.


http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/luftflotteV.html

Angus says:
Well, the area is only some 140 miles from London (Cherbourg) while Inverness is a whooping 445 miles away, Belfast 323 and so on. The range to Luftflotte III is the same as up to Newcastle or thereabouts - so that's still only 12th group.

Exactly, those units stationed in Cherbourg could not reach London.  125-mile combat radius is less than 140 miles distance.  Essentially Luftflotte III could reach the coast of England if they took off and directly flew to target.

So in Less than 2 hours the entire RAF could in theory be in the combat area.  As England had a ring of radar stations they could tailor their response based on advanced warning..

That is with a 395 mile "combat radius".  The normal flying radius of the Spitfire Mk I was 575 miles.

You should probably reread this:

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443#continue

It comes from:

http://www.aflma.hq.af.mil/lgj/Afjlhome.html

The primary mission of the Office of the Air Force Journal of Logistics is to publish the Air Force Journal of Logistics, the Air Force's only professional journal for logistics, engineering, and services.

I will list the bases, and serviceable #s for each unit August 13th, 1940 "Eagle Day":

Your numbers are the same ones that have been repeated ad nauseum in this thread.  They are the same one used in the Air Force article as well and by Boyne.

I tend to believe a professional Military Logistical Journal's conclusion backed up by several noted Historians conclusions over the junk history posted on this BBS.

Many of the Luftwaffe mistakes can be attributed to this statement Squire:

Richard Overy commented that prewar air theory largely avoided the difficult question of the appropriate level of supply to sustain airpower.

Which you touch on your post.  A purely air campaign had never been waged before.  There was no military theory or doctrine in place for the Luftwaffe to draw upon.  The hard lessons of the campaign ultimately contributed to them losing the war.  Lessons the Allies would take to heart 4 years later in their campaign to win air superiority for the Invasion of Europe.

All the best,

Crumpp

[MiloMorai]

See Rule #4

[Angus]

Crumpp: I don't get your radius number, or even range numbers into something that makes sense, neither do I see any sense in your "ample warning time over the North sea".
Firstly, the Spits and Hurris as well as the 109's had very similar RANGES, - RADIUS being the half, EFFECTIVE RADIUS, being a certain number subtracted from the Radius.

As for the warning time from over the North sea (Which I, BTW, think came mostly from Denmark), It was as ample as on the south coast. Radar range from the coast of Britain, and no more. Very well something else than the alert time the LW had when the USSAF started hitting in daylight,- they had to cruise over a "friendly set" of countries before getting into Germany. I have posted some distances, AFAIK, on this thread before.

Now, there are some things you post, that really leave me baffled. Such as:
"There were no single engine fighter stationed in Norway which could even reach England for the Luftwaffe"

Of course not!!!!!! The 109's were ALL on the SE front, where they could get at the RAF, while the RAF FC's fighters had to be on the whole island circle to counter what they were supposed to, the German BOMBERS, which could reach every corner of the island, be it from Belgium, Bretagne, Calais, Denmark or Norway.

No matter how it's twisted, the numbers give something like 1.5 to 2 109's for each Spit+Hurry on the whole southern of England, counting 10th, 11th and 12th group versus the 2 luftflotten. Actually, Squire's summary in this thread gives a very nice view on this, - I have something I wrote down today as well, and I will post it, - but Squire put it much nicer. Will post it anyway

So be it for now, I'm tired and off to bed. Keep pondering though, (I told you that the BoB is more than it seems), - and Milo, - patience is a virtue, - cool off and post

Nightie folks

[Crumpp]

I don't get your radius number,

Radius is the distance an aircraft can fly and return on best cruise.

Combat radius is the distance an aircraft can fly and still be able to use full boost or a higher boost setting.  It is usually set at 20 minutes of "combat time".  This increases the fuel consumption and shortens the aircrafts ranges.

While the Bf-109 and the Spitfire might have had similar a similar radius, obviously the DB601 was thirsty at higher manifold pressures.

The Spitfires did not have to return to their assigned base after a sortie.  They always had the option to land at the nearest friendly field and refuel.  One of the big advantages of fighting over your own territory.

No matter how it's twisted, the numbers give something like 1.5 to 2 109's for each Spit+Hurry on the whole southern of England, counting 10th, 11th and 12th group versus the 2 luftflotten. Actually, Squire's summary in this thread gives a very nice view on this, - I have something I wrote down today as well, and I will post it, - but Squire put it much nicer. Will post it anyway

Squires numbers are the same I have been using.  Nothing is twisted, Angus.

Maybe you should let the USAF know they are drawing the wrong conclusions after gathering all the facts.

This article seeks to clarify the part played by logistics in the Battle of Britain and how it shaped the outcome. For brevity, the analysis focuses primarily on the single-seat fighters deployed by the respective air forces. It was in this arena that the Luftwaffe needed to prevail if it were to achieve air superiority over southern England and, in so doing, defeat the Royal Air Force.

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443#continue

The figures for Fighter Command are somewhat higher than those quoted in other sources but have been taken directly from PRO AIR 20/2307.

Only 400 repaired Bf 109s were accepted by the Luftwaffe in 1940, equivalent to just 21 percent of new production. Harold Faber, Ed, Luftwaffe, Sidgwick and Jackson, 1979, 203.

 

Single-Seat Fighter Production [19]
      Germany  Great Britain
1939   1,541       1,324
1940   1,870       4,283
1941   2,852       7,064
1942   4,542       9,849
1943   9,626      10,727

Luftwaffe Order of Battle--August 1940 [33]
                        Establishment  Strength  Serviceability
Bombers                     1,569       1,481          998
Dive-bombers                  348         327          261
Single-engine fighters      1,011         934          805
Twin-engine fighters          301         289          224
Reconnaissance                246         195          151
Ground attack                  40          39           31
Coastal                        94          93           80
Total                       3,609       3,358        2,550

Fighter Command Order of Battle--11 August 1940 [35]
            Establishment  Strength  Serviceability
Hurricanes        723         721         656
Spitfires         366         374         334
Total           1,089       1,095         990

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_5

All the best,

Crumpp

[Angus]

Lol, we all have differnt data.
Well, I've been looking into the books and got some goodies coming.
Here are some little facts.
1. 10th group had to fight Luftflotte III. Southhern units saw quite some action from the first phase on  to the shift when LW turned to London.
2. 11th group saw the full action of all phases against Luftflotte II, as well as some from Luftflotte III in the channel fights.
3. 13th group had to guard the side against Luftflotte V. They saw little action.
4. 12th group missed quite a bit of the party untill the LW turned on London.
5. 11th group shot down roughly as many aircraft as all the other groups PUT TOGETHER.

My numbers on the LW strength are basically the same as squires. I'll post them anyway, as well as compiled kill claims. I also have some day-to day engagement figures brewing.
All of the sources are on print, I rely on Shores quite a bit, but I have Deighton, Gilbert, J.Johnsson and some more. Oddly enough they all give mostly the same account, - RAF being heavily outnumbered and not being able to balance the numbers until late in the autumn.
LW's policy of raiding all airfields is oddly as well, considered to have brought them quite close to victory, not the contrary.

[Crumpp]

11th group shot down roughly as many aircraft as all the other groups PUT TOGETHER.

We all know the reliability of Battle of Britain claims.  Too attempt to draw any conclusions from either sides claims is rather silly.

I rely on Shores quite a bit, but I have Deighton, Gilbert, J.Johnsson and some more.

Question becomes when these references were written and did they have access to:

The figures for Fighter Command are somewhat higher than those quoted in other sources but have been taken directly from PRO AIR 20/2307.

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_5

All the best,

Crumpp

[Angus]

Lol Crumpp, are you indicating that the 11th group then overclaimed while the others did less of that. In relation, I mean. That looks like a straw to me.
Anyway, the numbers I used were from Shores, a list of confirmed claims BTW.
I forgot to name John Alcorn as a source, he has been researching the scores and their reliability since 1970. It's the best piece of work put together that I have yet seen.
His numbers are relatively close to Shores, hard to see, for they don't use the same timeframe. (Shores uses July to November). But Alcorn goes further, he lists the days engaged for each squadron their losses, and the reliability of the claims.
No way getting around it really, half the BoB seems to be 11th group, be it claims, kills, losses or days in the air.
I looked at your link. The PRO is not unaccessible at all and I bet Shores spent quite some time there. Heck even I have been there! I was actually looking for something particular and did not find it but Shores seems to have dug it up somewhere else! But yes the PRO is a great source indeed, although there is still informatin about that isn't there.
Anyway, I haven't been able to find any evidence of bigger interceptions than some 250 RAF fighters - while 100 seems already to be quite big news.
All the best till next post ...

[MiloMorai]

Originally posted by Crumpp
We all know the reliability of Battle of Britain claims.  Too attempt to draw any conclusions from either sides claims is rather silly.

Question becomes when these references were written and did they have access to:
All the best,

Crumpp

Does not matter since the 10, 12, 13  and 11 Group claims are contemperary. (10G claims + 12G claims + 13G claims = < 11G claims). Your problem rears its head again. No conclusions are being drawn.

Shore is the standard refererence for any researcher worth his salt.

[MiloMorai]

The normal flying radius of the Spitfire Mk I was 575 miles.

Radius is the distance an aircraft can fly and return on best cruise.

Angus, Crumpp is confused, to use a nice word, again. If one uses the number and definition Crumpp gives above, then the Spitfire has a range of 1150 miles. Wait till Kurfy sees that claim.

2 x radius = diameter, or 'range'.

Normal range, not radius, of the Spit I was 575mi.