Assuming Crumps Numbers of 18 and 15.8 Degrees per sec.
Oops! Did not convert to time. That is at 1.2ata @ 2300U/min power btw.
That is still close enough that a shallow yo-you will easily make up the difference as Oscar and the other FW190 pilots experienced during the war.
Your data is still wrong as well on the FW190 Hitech. You are modeling almost as much of a weight difference between the FW190A8 and the FW190A5 as the entire series gained form the FW-190A0 to FW190A9!
You want the loadout sheets and CG datum from Focke Wulf, Bremen?
I sent you the FW190A5 and FW190A8 information almost two years ago.
When the LW came over on mass, 11 Group was the where the fighters came from to oppose them. Some units from 10 and 12 Groups helped when the 11 Group a/c had to return to base. 10 and 12 Groups were support Groups to take up the slack.
Ummm,
Milo when the Luftwaffe came over in Mass....
The RAF responded in kind to defend. However they did not fall into the trap of defending everything.
You obviously know this as you state it above!
How did you arrive at such a conclusion?
By your attempt to say because the Luftwaffe was limited to Group 11's area, the rest of the RAF was too and could not participate in the BoB.
Here:
Please look at the Group maps and tell me how many of those airfields could supply fighter a/c to the air battles over south-east England (11 Group area).
The RAF clearly says all of them could and did respond to air battles over south-east England.
Nice to see you are using better reference sources, the ones I supplied.
Actually if you read and comprehend, your source did not break the numbers down into the types of aircraft.
Which fits your agenda.
Milo says:
Glad you agree that the LW used the 787 to 891 109s they had available in Luftflotte 2 and 3. I would call that full use.
Sure and according to the
RAF, they responded with:
By the beginning of July 1940, the RAF had built up its strength to 640 fighters
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/background.html Some of the reasons why the Germans lost the BoB:
1. Lack of Persistance and a clear strategy to win:
The Germans set out in the summer of 1940 to win air superiority over Britain. During the course of their two-month campaign, they continually changed their objectives, never identified a real center of gravity, and demonstrated a remarkable lack of patience and persistence. Of particular note was the short-lived thrust against Royal Air Force (RAF) bases. Starting in the second week of August, the Luftwaffe made RAF bases one of their primary objectives. Part of their effort was wasted, because it was directed against forward operating bases used only for quick refueling and rearming. These bases were relatively easy to repair. Another part of their base attack program, however, was directed against main bases, and it lasted until 6 September 1940.
The Germans launched coordinated attacks on British radar stations early in August and succeeded in destroying one. The British, however, sent false signals from the location of the destroyed radar station to make the Germans think their efforts had been for naught. The Germans responded precisely as the British hoped and dropped attacks on radars on express orders from Field Marshal Goering, the political and military chief of the Luftwaffe.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/warden/wrdchp03.htm2. RADAR gave the RAF the ability to mass and the tactical advantage of manuvering forces so that they could defend where needed without the need to defend everything.
The second is to accept the fact that it is not possible to defend everywhere and everything: He who tries to defend all defends nothing. Penetrations are going to take place. When that fact is accepted, it becomes easier to do the concentrating which will permit significant victories with acceptable defender losses.
In the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe initially targeted fighter bases and aircraft production facilities. Since these bases and facilities were scattered over the southeast corner of Great Britain, the British had difficulty knowing exactly where a raid might be headed, when it was first detected on radar. The Germans were concentrating their offensive forces. The more they did so, the better their success. For a variety of reasons, the Germans in early Septemberswitched their efforts to London, removing doubt as to where raids were headed, and making the job of concentrating the defense that much easier. Also, the end of Luftwaffe attacks on British fighter bases made operations from the bases simpler.
3. Tied to the principle of mass is loss ratio. The Luftwaffe simply did not have enough of a numerical advantage. 2:1 is not enough given the force multiplier of Radar.
Loss rates vary disproportionately with the ratio of forces involved. Two forces equal in numbers (and reasonably close in equipment and flying capability) will tend to have equal losses when they meet.
The most important ratio being the aircraft designed to win the skies, fighters. The USAAF rediscovered this in late 1943. By mid 1944 they came back in force with fighters to spare.
In the end, the Luftwaffe High Command was Germany's biggest factor in defeat.
Nowhere have I seen a professional historian or military force conclude it was the Spitfire or Hurricane flying circles around the 109 that led to the Luftwaffe losing the battle. Only from game players in these kinds of forums do we see that kind of silly claim.
It's the same silly claim that is made about the P51!
From "Spitfire Special" by Ted Hooton:
Spitfire vs. Bf 109 : 219 to 180 lost.
Hurricane vs. Bf 109 : 272 to 153 lost.
Looks like the 109 gave as good as it got according to the facts. The 109 would have probably done much better as it had the advantage of point defense and altitude. Goering interfered by tying them to the bombers removing the 109 units freedom of manuver. Essentially a reversal of Doolittles Jan. 1944 order to the 8th USAAF FG's. The tactical initiative Doolittle gave the USAAF fighters, Goering took away from the Jagdwaffe.
All the best,
Crumpp
