How good were German a/c radios?

[Bruno]

Same garble only louder.

'Garble' in the this thread was an invention of you.

Guess you and General Schmid will just have to disagree.

Schmid hasn't typed anything in this thread. First off read your scan, no where does Schmid mention range. You say that its implied in 'B' when it's clearly not.

 Second, Schmid didn't dictate that section of the book. The information was compiled from post war interviews / interrogations contained in Schmid's file. The data is compiled, filtered and interpreted by the author. That's the some total of Schmid's contribution. Until I receive my copy of the book that's all I can say. However, it is comical that you keep claiming 'Schmid' said such and such. No direct quote from Schmid is included in this thread nor in your scan.

Not according the Schmid. see comment (b) in the documents posted in my last reply.

B states (from your scan):

The absence of small. modern wireless sets and, resulting from it, the lack of a simple procedure making possible a simultaneous exchange of communications with all crews.

Nothing about range...

Your own source lists the range of two-way communications with the FuG16 series.

Of course it does. I also stated that range wasn't an issue because there were multiple ground control stations. Fighters in the air were simply passed on to the next station. Those stations were part of the command and control structure and linked back up through the chain of command. The range limitation of VHF was well known and planned for.

A late war 109 would be lucky to be able to fly 600 miles or stay in the air much longer the 2 1/2 hours at  min power. They didn't need radios with range much greater then 200km.

Nowhere has the argument for all fighters using radios came up in this thread.

Sure it has, by you and in your scan (part B, see above: all crews

You wrote:

While the allies could communicate with all of their aircraft, the Luftwaffe could not.

and

The Germans could not control all the aircraft intercepting to have real time co-ordination in the air attacking at once.

Now go look at a map of Europe. It's much bigger than 200km's.

No you go look at a map of Europe that has LW radio ground sattions placed. There wasn't a single LW radio station in downtown Berlin broadcasting orders to every LW aircraft on the planet.

As I pointed out in the very same post you keep pointing too as "proof" I was denying receiver amplifiers did not exist,

What?

The phrase 'no such thing' is as clear as it gets...

Receiver Amplifiers are far from magic and the antenna is the best bet for good reception.

As I said mulitple times of course antenna desgin is important. Antenna at the ground stations were well desgined and functional. You claimed that due to range the fighters in the air couldn't communicate with ground stations because their transmission power wasn't strong enough. In repsonse I said the ground stations could use an amplifier to boost that signal. You assume that any amplification means either instant static and thus the transmission will impossible to make out or that 'longer range' automatically means 'garble' at best, or no signal at worst.

Your source explains how an amplifier can be used to:

In our case, this means that AM signal is led at input of the HF amplifier, and on its output the same shaped signal is obtained, only with bigger amplitude.

I never said anything about 'magic amplifiers'. Quote where I said otherwise.

Umm the 8th USAAF did coordinate its efforts among multiple Fighter/Bomber Groups and could coordinate a response to the developing defensive conditions in the air. The Germans had little or no capability to do this.

When the individual groups were in the air they weren't lead from the ground. A coordinate effort is what the LW did, see my examples. Mulitple Geschwadern from mulitple divisions were directed against a single section of an attacking bomber stream using the maximum amount of forces available with in range.

Over on AAW2 Kurfürst wrote:

I'd very much argue about massed Allied formations, from what I've seen they operated at Group strenght as well for the simple reason that's was about the maximum the flight's leader could handle. Difference was, they had more Groups present, this was simply due to their greater resources, not any technological factor.

He is right

The Group and individaul flight leaders directed the flight. They had planned partrol areas and/ or sections of the bomber stream. Escorts could be distributed along the bomber stream covering more of the stream and reducing the time it took for the fighters to respond to an attack at any given point. Those fighter groups responding to LW attacks along the stream weren't directed by ground control but from the bombers calling for help in air. Allied air to air range had to be greater to cover those streams. The allied   aircraft had the range to cover those distances.

Just like the LW the allies or their respective 'air forces' (8 th 9 th etc...) did not have one ground station directing all aircraft in the air. This also true once the allies liberated France. Stations were scattered about and linked up the chain just like the Germans did.

You contend that it was a great reliable system on par with what the allies used.

What I said was in terms of radios:

German, RAF and AMI radios are very comparable to each other.

Ask the Finns they used all 3 as well as VVS equipment. In fact Fins kept FuG 7s in their G-2s and they weren't upgraded with FuG 16 like their G-6s. Everything I have read said they preferred the German and Ami sets over all others. Maybe a Finnish member ofthis forum can add something.

and this in terms of command and control:

The LW command and control from the ground was very sophisticated and they could easily maintain control and direct the Gefechtsverband to sections of the bomber stream the were least protected by escort even very late in the war. This information came from recce, ground observers and various stations through out WETO. All relayed through the command and control structure and relayed to the pilots even in flight.

My examples show that.

I never used the words:

great reliable system on par with what the allies used.

In reference to either. Quote where I said otherwise...

[Crumpp]

And the wheel goes round and round.....

On range, wonder why the radios were an issue if they worked reliably and could talk whenever needed??

I think you have it all figured out.

Generalleutnant Schmid was just extremely unlucky not have you to tell him how reliable and wonderful the German Fighter Control system was in truth.

The German radios were wonderful and just misunderstood pieces of technology.  

Quartz really does not give you a better radio.  The engineers are wrong and Bruno is right.

Buy the book and read it yourself.

David C Isby is the author.  According to him, the book is just:

Rather, these are a selection of immediate post-war interrogations and writings by a number of key figures in the Luftwaffe.

What is written by him is clearly defined in the book.  I certainly agree with this reviewer:

I agree with both reviews previousl published here. David Isby is the editor of this volume, and he's done a magnificent job. The individual pieces by former Luftwaffe officers tell compelling stories, although more could be done to annotate each piece to explain technical details that were familiar to the speakers, but no longer command any common knowledge some sixty years after the end of the war. All too often, current histories of this sort lack essential groundings in the times and circumstances of events that are related, and all too often, they are "dumbed down", supposedly to appeal to the widest range of readers. This book does not do so, and readers should be encouraged to read the material, and then to ask questions. Granted, this is an area for specialists, but for those who want to see what first-hand information looks like, this is a good place to start.

Instead of attacking it just because you do not like the information.

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1853675326/102-8219486-0993745?v=glance&n=283155

All the best,

Crumpp

[Crumpp]

The statement:

No such thing. The best you can do to receive is built a good antenna. However it is subject to the law of reciprocity.

Is true.

Little theory for you Bruno as it is obvious you do not understand.

All antennas are judged in relation to the "isotropic" or Doublet in Free Space.  This is a theoretical antenna with perfect electrical characteristics.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isotropic_antenna

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isotropic_radiator

However, thru careful antenna construction you can easily construct an antenna with many times more power than the isotropic.

For example, an antenna with a diameter of 2 m and an efficiency of 0.55 would have a gain of 8685 at the C-band uplink frequency of 6 GHz and wavelength of 0.050 m. The gain expressed in decibels (dB) is
10 log(8685) = 39.4 dB. Thus the power radiated by the antenna is 8685 times more concentrated along the boresight direction than for an isotropic antenna, which by definition has a gain of 1 (0 dB).

http://www.aticourses.com/antennas_tutorial.htm

And of course applying the law of reciprocity we know that this same antenna will receive 8685 times more concentrated in that direction.

Which is a significant increase in our ability to communicate.  Much more effective than just doubling our power out.  

Of course if we just increase the power on the receiving end past a certain point it begins to interfere with the actual signal we are trying to pick up in the first place!  Diminishing returns from an engineering viewpoint.

Radio Shack is laughing all the way to the bank when they sell you that reciever amplifier that you go home and hook up to the same exact antenna you had before.

Frequency selection and antenna selection are much more important to communications than power out or power received.

There are literally thousands of Amateur Radio Operators who communicate thousands of miles on 1 watt.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Bruno]

I haven't attacked the book, I haven't even read it. You keep posturing this debate between me and Schmid. I haven't seen Schmid post anything yet. If he has please quote it .What we have is you posting a scan then you telling  us 'what it really means'. 'B' really refers to 'range' for example. Well 'B' could mean many things. Until the book arrives and the context of that scan is put into perspective I have no judgment of the book.

The German radios were wonderful and just misunderstood pieces of technology.

Quartz really does not give you a better radio. The engineers are wrong and Bruno is right.

Quote one place I said any of that. I quoted for you the exact words I used, should I do it again?

As for your second posts:

Nothing you posted in regards to 'antenna' automatically means LW air to ground communication was 'garbled' or there was 'no signal'. Nothing you posted proves that an amplifier would mean nothing but 'interference'.

I said antenna design is important several times.

I don't shop at Radio Shack so I don't care what they sell. However, as it says in the quote I provided from your source:

The only thing that can be done is either to increase the length of the antenna, which, of course, does have its limits, or to insert an amplifying stage into the receiver.

You may not like that, or the fact Radio Shack 'laughing all the way to the bank', so email the web master of that site and start a consumer group to let the public know how evil Radio Shack is.



The book should arrive sometime early next week and once I get it and read it I will comment.

[MiloMorai]

Thanks for all your input Bruno.

[Crumpp]

The only thing that can be done is either to increase the length of the antenna, which, of course, does have its limits, or to insert an amplifying stage into the receiver.

The limits they are talking about are physical room.  

The limits of size/cost limits are much wider for a government agency than a private individual.

Not many people have the room on their property to erect an 8 wavelength terminated long wire cut to 2.5 MHz.

The most important element in a radio circuit is the antenna. You may have a powerful transmitter and a frequency, but without the correct antenna, communication will be less than desirable, if not impossible.

http://www.radiowavz.com/html/antennas_and_propagation.HTM

Frequency used matters more than power out too.

Nothing you posted in regards to 'antenna' automatically means LW air to ground communication was 'garbled' or there was 'no signal'.

Bruno,

I have not posted any absolutes.  I have no made the claim LW radios did not work.  They did.  It is a matter of reliability and being able to use your fighter control system as a force multiplier.  Because of the technological and training limits, it appears they could not do so reliably.

However Schmid says in his portion of the book which according to the author is a reprint of Schmid's statement explaining the Dayfighter System of Ground Control from Sep. 1943 until the End   :

a.  lack of space in SE German fighters did not permit to carry several or bulkier or more modern wireless sets in the airplane.

Here Schmid relates that German communications technology was not up to par with the allies.  They needed both more modern equipment and the room to carry it.

Least that is what I get out of it.  Maybe it means something else to you Bruno??

b.  absence of small, modern wireless sets and resulting from it, the lack of a simple procedure making possible a simultaneous exchange of communications air ground with all crews.

I wonder what simple procedure he is talking about?
 
Looks to me like he is talking about pushing the "push to talk" button on the handset and speaking into the microphone to the ground controller.  He is talking about radios used for communications, not beacons or IFF, unless of course we assume he was senile, crazy, or simply an idiot.  

In that case there is the possibility he is talking about bus rides or something else.

Either way if you cannot talk to all the people you need too when you need too, then your communications system is not reliable.

c.  The difficulty in tuning in of German Radio sets involving bad R/T connections, in contrast to the quartz controlled enemy radio sets affording very clear R/T connections.

Wonder what bad R/T connections means to you?  It means to me that you’re not communicating when you need too.  Your communications system is experiencing the inability to talk and garbled or unreadable transmissions.

Otherwise you would have good connections as opposed to bad ones.

Maybe your thinking the wires fall off the radio?  If that was the case then the lack of quartz would hardly be the issue. Good solder and guns would be the focus.

I still have to wonder though how the bad connections equal the good reliable communications in your mind?




All the best,

Crumpp

[Angus]

So, the oarsman complains about his boat.
I don't find it hard to belive that the LW had a quality problem, but it affecting their overall strategy in such a big manner, I find harder to belive.

Well, just me maybe....

[Crumpp]

Well, just me maybe....

To me it is pretty obvious that their control methods were not ideal and had to be adapted to the equipment issues.

In the very first line of Schmids discussion he states:

In contrast to Nightfighting, the means of control for fighter control by day were by necessity much simpler. Reasons for this were:

http://img131.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc69&image=af1c6_German_fighter_Control.jpg

Night fighter control involves controlling one fighter onto one target or to an area where the targets are the most dense.  The fighter then takes over to locate the target visually or with it's own onboard sensors.

Day fighter control involves controlling massed formations against massed formations.  In order to win the war of percentages, the Germans needed a system that could control multiple units precisely to place them were the numerically superior enemy was the weakest and the Germans were positionally and numerically advantaged in a coordinated effort.  The equipment simply was not available to them to do this.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Bruno]

The limits they are talking about are physical room.

Ya think..?

I have not posted any absolutes. I have no made the claim LW radios did not work.

What have you have said over and over is 'no signal' and 'garble' and stuff like the following:

Unfortunately this meant that they could rarely attack in mass nor were they flexible in their response. While the allies could communicate with all of their aircraft, the Luftwaffe could not.

However Schmid says in his portion of the book which according to the author is a reprint of Schmid's statement explaining the Dayfighter System of Ground Control

If you read the top of your scan it isn't a 'list of issues that Schmid says cost the LW the war'

It states:

Means of Control
In contrast to night fighting, the means of control for fighter control by day were by necessity much simpler. Reason for this were:

The word used used is simpler and then goes on to the list the reasons why.

The words:

inadequate
unreliable
costly

aren't used...

However, I don't have the book to put your scan into any sort of context.

the lack of a simple procedure making possible a simultaneous exchange of communications air ground with all crews.

The above certainly doesn't mean 'range' as you claimed. It could mean any number of things and I won't speculate until I have read the book.

In regards to Schmid it may be just as Angus said:

So, the oarsman complains about his boat.

This wouldn't be unique, you find this same sort of thing from many of the leading LW (Galland), Wehrmacht and NSDAP personalities following their defeat. I will find out when the book arrives.

Either way if you cannot talk to all the people you need too when you need too, then your communications system is not reliable.

The LW 'communication system' wasn't reliable late in the war due many issues. Allied ECM that made communication impossible at times and at other times more of a risk to the LW. This has nothing to with the reliability of the LW on board radio design. Had the LW had the same resources as the allies they would have mounted their own ECM on the same scale and affect.

Wonder what bad R/T connections means to you? It means to me that you’re not communicating when you need too. Your communications system is experiencing the inability to talk and garbled or unreadable transmissions.

It could mean any number of things. I already listed several through out this thread. Again the fighters in the air didn't need to keep a running conversation with the ground or vice versa.

I said German materials, production and quality all suffered as the war progressed. I said the the allies were able to listen in on LW communications and were able to jam then, to pass false info, to triangulate etc...

The problem is that you assume any 'communication' issues that Schmid speaks of, or any any other 'communication' obstacle the LW faced, was simply due to inadequate design of their equipment. The LW would have faired no better had they had AMI radios in all their aircraft. As I said many times the LW flew with their R/Ts ordered turned off rather then risk giving away their position to the allies.

For example even in Bodenplatte, when JG 53 was bounced, no one had their radios on. They couldn't warn each other or be contacted by GCI to warn them of the presence of allied fighters. The radio at that point in the war were more a hazard to them then the any benefit they could have gained through 'clear communication with the ground'.

I still have to wonder though how the bad connections equal the good reliable communications in your mind?

I never said that. I said the LW radios were reliable enough. You claim bad radios cost the LW the war. No radio, however advanced, would have made any difference.

[Bruno]

Day fighter control involves controlling massed formations against massed formations. In order to win the war of percentages, the Germans needed a system that could control multiple units precisely to place them were the numerically superior enemy was the weakest and the Germans were positionally and numerically advantaged in a coordinated effort. The equipment simply was not available to them to do this.

Sure it was and they did, I gave examples. A little later tonight I will post more if you like.

[Bruno]

One thing about Isby's book. When I said the reviews were not that great I didn't mean the ones on the Amazon site.

I meant the reviews for others on various forums from knowledgeable folks who bought and read the book.

David Isby posts over at TOCH and here's a link to a thread where he announced a new book:

NEW BOOK - LUFTWAFFE & THE WAR AT SEA

Not necessarily a review of 'Fighting the Bombers: The Luftwaffe's Struggle against the Allied Bomber Offensive' but one of the more fair treatments of Isby's work.

[Angus]

Then there is always the possibility of asking living pilots from the era about the stuff. Well, ... still, if any TomDick&Harry always says they didn't know doodly-squat, - then what's the use?

[Crumpp]

Hardly a fair treatment of David Isby's work.

I encourage anyone to read the entire thread.  Instead what we have is a case of academic snobbery on the part Richards or Anton.  He gets called out on it as well.

David Isby does not edit the documents for content.  He remains faithful to what was contained in them to the point of repeating errors.  The value is one can see what was expected or thought at the time.  This is stated numerous times in the book.

The errors mainly have to do with Professor Willi Messerschmitt's report on the state of Me 262 development.

Sure it was and they did, I gave examples.

You have held up a handful of individual pilots generalizations and some anecdotes made under unknown conditions.  They could have been circling the controller station for all we know.

Using this paltry evidence you have attempted to refute the conclusions of a man with years of experience commanding a JagdKorps.  He used the Luftwaffe Fighter Control daily commanding units in the air.

Once more all the technical facts and science backs up Schmids conclusions.

Galland also recognized the weakness of the system.  According to him, commanding just 10 units in the air from the same HQ was a "serious problem" to control.  Had the war continued, equipment was in development which would have allowed for up to 50 units to be controlled at short notice.  However this never made it into operation.

While the Allies were controlling thousands of bombers with thousands of fighters escorting, the Luftwaffe had difficulty with a few hundred in the air.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Angus]

If this is in the book, "die ersten und die letzten" It happens to be beside my pillow right now.
I can dig it up if you give me a chapter or page, then I'll type it up, risking the wrath of my wife though

[Crumpp]

It's not IIRC.  Gallands comments are reprinted directly from the transcripts of his post war interrogations and debriefs.  They are printed in Isby's book.

All the best,

Crumpp