Originally posted by Sorrow[S=A]:
Dowding:
Some of the things you say are absurd
Well I am sorry if you think that, I didn't realise I was in the company of such a great Soviet historian, as your good self seems to be. I've stated throughout this thread that what I've written here is purely my opinion based on what I've read (ONE book). Perhaps I didn't say it, but this implies that I'm not exactly an expert on the subject. If we want to keep this discussion civilised, I suggest Sorrow that we refrain from labelling people's opinions as absurd.
On the subject of troop concentrations at the border and the forward airfields, the accepted version of events is that these were mistakes by Stalin. Even if the troops on the border are elite - if they are not ready for combined arms assault, it doesn't matter how good they are, they will not be able to provide an organinised defence against a well organised enemy. There are many examples in history of an inferior army routing a superior army, because of the element of surprise. I think this and Stalin's disbelief of the situation accounts for the rapid must contribute to the early success of Hitler's forces.
I've read elsewhere that Stalin was planning to attack Germany in 1942, Leonid. But surely this would involve the deployment of troops to the border, and the setting up of forward airfields, in the previous year? Its not such a tenuous extension of argument, to suppose that Hitler saw this (and all the other changes Stalin had made in the previous 5 years) and made a pre-emptive strike. He could see that an attack by Stalin was not so distant.
On the subject of Stalin's disappearance at the start of Barbarossa, there's an interesting theory. Why would a man whos was so energetic in his work (his holidays were nothing of the sort and he regularly worked 15+ hour days) suddenly take a week off at such a crucial time? Stalin was always playing for the long game, thinking several moves ahead - this allows no time for a 'rest'. Even if he was reeling from the Nazi's attack. If you look at his behaviour before the war, he would often resign from some position, knowing full well that he would be begged to return. This was his way of showing his henchmen that they could not operate without him. Shortly before his retreat to the nearer Dacha, he paid a visit to the People's Commissariat for Defence, where he found Zhukov amongst others. Stalin demanded information on the situation at Minsk. Timoshenko replied that he didn't have the information at hand yet, to which Stalin accused Timoshenko of being afraid to tell the truth. At this comment, Zhukov flared up angrily "Comrade Stalin, have we permission to get on with our work?" We must appreciate that such a response was unheard of.
At this point Beria has an angry confrontation with Zhukov, which is cut short by Stalin "You are making a crass mistake in trying to draw a line between yourselves and us..." Adding "...let them get it sorted out themselves first. Let's go comrades."
The unprecendented outburst by Zhukov must have confirmed Stalin's fears; they were no longer afraid of him. Now he does something that is strangely reminiscent of Ivan the Terrible, whom Stalin is infatuated. Ivan used to pretend to be dead, to see how his henchmen behaved, rise from his death bed and punish them all as an example. He also had a habit of dissapearing to remind his followers how helpless they were without him. Stalin himself described HIS closest followers as "blind kittens".
It seems he had chosen his closest comrades carefully, because they soon made a pilgrimage to the Dacha. He plays his favourite card here - he claims that there "...may be more deserving candidates [for leadership]." They duly loudly stated that there were none more worthy.
Soon afterwards he returns to the Kremlin and makes a glorious speech to the people.
Of course this is one interpretation of the events, and as Leonid points out, Radzinsky is not an Historian by profession. But his sources are primary and I think his theories here are plausible.
As for the winter preparation of German troops, if they were prepared for a winter campaign, why did so many freeze to death and why did Hitler's armies extend themselves to the point that supply lines were overstrtched? If they were prepared for winter conflict why did they die in their thousands?
On the question of the "bloody determination of the Russian people", Sorrow, are you saying that this wasn't a major factor in the victory of the Soviet forces? I've read eyewitness German accounts of a Soviet attack, which would receive "unheard of" losses but repeat the same attack, using the same route time and time again. At this point, the only thing that halted the attack was the mountain of Russian dead and burned out tanks blocking the way. If this is not bloody determination, then what would you call it, expertly executed tactics?
BTW guys, what books would you recommend on the subject of Stalin and the war etc. Cheers.
[This message has been edited by Dowding (edited 09-08-2000).]
