Guppy and Angus: You are correct and I apologized for the mistake in a later post. I was going to look up the number of planes landing there and put, "No" as a place keeper until I looked it up. I couldn't remember how many at the time, and "No" seemed funny to me at the time. I got distracted and accidentally submitted it.
I did not say that this debate over the strategy used at Iwo Jima, or the measure of its importance, was my opinion, or that I agreed with all of it. There were people who disagreed with the strategy at the time. Some were using Iwo Jima as a call for elevating Gen. MacArthur to run the entire Pacific war, saying that under his leadership, better use of resources would reduce casualties and be more effective.
There was debate in Washington about court martials over what was perceived as a stubborn refusal to rethink the plan after the strength of the Japanese positions was known after the first assaults on the beach. There is a good case made that it could have been delayed a few weeks and larger scale bombing and more naval bombardment used to substantially reduce the Japanese capability and US casualties. Naval bombardment was for 3 days prior to landing - woefully too short.
There was criticism that Adm. Spruance failed to make it clear that the defense of Iwo Jima was nothing close to estimates and was politically unable to sell the need for more support. There were conflicting priorites between Gen. Arnold and Adm. Spruance. Gen. Arnold and Gen. Lemay were fixated on firebombing Tokyo and Yokohama and those raids occurred while the battle on Iwo Jima was still raging. Some said it was great for publicity, but killing Japanese soldiers and reducing capability on Iwo Jima would have saved more American lives than killing 100,000+ civilians in Tokyo did.
The courage of those landing on Iwo Jima was beyond words, especially since it was soon known that 1/3 would not make out of there unhurt. Even though the US outnumbered the Japanese 2:1, one American was killed or wounded for each Japanese defender killed. Securing Guam and the Mariannas was not easy, but far easier than Iwo Jima, and the lack of flexible thinking when faced with the Iwo Jima resistance and underestimation of Japanese forces is a common point used by those who analyze the past to make better decisions and be better leaders in the future.
It should be noted that the statistics about 'emergency' landings at Iwo Jima were part and parcel of a campaign to justify the human costs of the battle - after the battle was over and criticism began about the strategy.
The sole reason used by the planners of the Iwo Jima invasion was to seize the airstrips for use by long-range fighter escort for B-29s over Japan. The problem here is that only P-51s had that range - as long as they flew there, turned around and came straight back. There would be no fuel to engage any targets. Plus, pressurized B-29s flew too high for P-51 pilots to withstand the physical stress of 1,500 mile unheated, unpressurized flights at 30K.
Only 10 escort missions were ever launched from Iwo Jima before they were stopped.
They used all landings in the statistics and most were not 'emergency' landings where the crew faced certain death if they didn't land at Iwo Jima. Training missions, scheduled refueling stops and even layovers waiting for weather problems over Japan are included in the 2,2,00+ bomber landing statistic.
Saying 22,000 flyers owe their life to Iwo Jima is a fallacy. But, it sounded good and was, and still is, easily picked up and spread since it is almost as many as the Marine casualties on Iwo Jima. But, one cannot compare lives of one branch against lives of another as valid, even if it were true.
To Hangtime: I appreciate your intelligence to understand that I look beyond the obvious and dig toward the 'whys' of events or people. I, like you, may not always agree, but listening and weighing a variety of views cannot hurt us, it only makes us stronger.
This topic is still discussed today at the USNA and at the Naval War College. Not surprisingly, most start out with the obvious opinion we have all been led to believe from high school history texts, but, over time, they begin to understand the need to be critical in order to improve. One common result is that they reluctantly agree that very basic mistakes were made, but the net overall result that the patriotic images of sacrifice we live with today have unmeasurable value.
Here are 2 interesting sources.
"The Ghosts of Iwo Jima" by Robert S. Burrell (He is a former Marine officer and history instructor at the USNA)
"The Journal of Military History,"
