Walid Phares on the Current Crisis

[Seagoon]

I was just emailed a great analysis of the current situation in the middle east from Walid Phares. Phares is someone I've been reading and listening to for some time now, and I've grown to respect his ability to interpret what is going on strategically and then forecast what will happen next. For instance, he has been spot on in his analysis of the global Jihadist movement and has helped Westerners to understand its complexities especially vis a vis the relationship between Jihadist movements and states like Syria and Iran.

Dr. Phares, who is Lebanese, is a professor of Conflict and Middle East Studies at Florida Atlantic University, as well as being an advisor on terrorism to the US and Dutch Governments, he is currently a Terrorism analyst and Mideast expert with MSNBC-CNBC-NBC.  If you haven't yet read his book, Future Jihad, go get it.

Please be warned, the following analysis will disappoint idealogues and people looking for a two dimensional "America always right/America always wrong" answer. You'll find he notes that the West utterly failed to act in Lebanon in 2005-2006 and that as a result only countries that are really turning this conflict to their own advantage are Iran and Syria.
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Part 1 -

Kathryn Jean Lopez: What is "Future Jihad"? Are we seeing it in the
Mideast now?

Walid Phares: "Future Jihad," which has already begun, refers to a new
and potent form of Islamic terrorism, characterized by a
Khumeinist-Baathist axis. These are the two trees of jihadism, so to
speak — the Salafism and Wahabism embodied in al Qaeda and the sort of
jihadism led by Iran and also including Syria, Hezbollah, and their
allies in Lebanon.

The alliance has not been in entire agreement as to strategy. The al
Qaeda branch began its "Future Jihad" in the 1990s; its efforts
culminated on 9/11 and have continued explosively since then. The
international "Salafists" aimed at the U.S. in the past decade in
order to strengthen their jihads on various battlefields (Chechnya,
India, Sudan, Algeria, Indonesia, Palestine, etc.). "Weaken the
resolve of America," their ideologues said, "and the jihadists would
overwhelm all the regional battlefields."

As I argue in Future Jihad, bin Laden and his colleagues miscalculated
on the timing of the massive attack against the U.S. in 2001. While
they wounded America, they didn't kill its will to fight (as was the
case, for instance, in the Madrid 3/11 attacks). I have heard many
jihadi cadres online, and have seen al Jazeera commentators on
television, offering hints of criticism about the timing. They were
blaming al Qaeda for shooting its imagined "silver bullet" before
insuring a strategic follow up. But bin Laden and Zawahiri believe
9/11 served them well, and has put a global mobilization into motion.
Perhaps it has, but the U.S. counter strategy in the Middle East,
chaotic as the region currently appears, has unleashed counter jihadi
forces. The jury is still out as to the time factor: when these forces
will begin to weaken the jihadists depends on our perseverance and the
public understanding of the whole conflict.

The other "tree" of jihadism, with its roots in Iran, withheld fire
after 9/11. They were content to watch the Salafists fight it out with
the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan and Iraq, not to mention within
the West, as terror cells were hunted down. Ahmedinejad, Assad, and
Nasrallah were analyzing how far the US would go, and how far the
Sunnis and Salafis would go as well.

The fall of the Taliban and of the Baath in Iraq, however, changed
Iran and Syria's patient plans. The political changes in the
neighborhood, regardless of their immediate instability, were strongly
felt in Tehran and Damascus (but unfortunately not in the U.S.,
judging from the political debate here), and pushed the Khumeinists
and the Syrian Baathists to enter the dance, but carefully. Assad
opened his borders to the jihadists in an attempt to crumble the U.S.
role in Iraq, while Iran articulated al Sadr's ideology for Iraq's
Shiia majority.

A U.S.-led response came swiftly in 2004 with the voting of UNSCR
1559, smashing Syria's role in Lebanon and forcing Assad to withdraw
his troops by April 2005. In response, the "axis" prepared for a
counter attack on the Lebanese battlefield by assassinating a number
of the Cedar Revolution leaders, including MP Jebran Tueni. In short,
the attacks by Hamas and Hezbollah and the kidnappings of soldiers
were the tip of an offensive aimed at drawing attention away from
Iran's nuclear weapons programs and Syria's assassination of Lebanese
Prime Minister Hariri. Hezbollah was awaiting its moment for revenge
against the Cedar Revolution too.

What we see now is 1) a Syro-Iranian sponsored offensive aimed at all
democracies in the region and fought in Lebanon; 2) Israel's counter
offensive (which it seems to have prepared earlier); and 3) an attempt
by Hezbollah to take over or crumble the Lebanese government.

Lopez: So…did the Cedar Revolution fail?

Phares: Actually, it would be more accurate to say that the Cedar
Revolution was failed. The masses in Lebanon responded courageously in
March 2005 by putting 1.5 million people on the streets of Beirut.
They did it without "no-fly-zones," expeditionary forces, or any
weapons at all, for that matter, and against the power of three
regimes, Iran, Syria, and pro-Syrian Lebanon, in addition to Hezbollah
terror. The "revolution" was for a time astoundingly successful; since
then it has been horribly failed, and first of all by Lebanon's
politicians themselves. One of their leaders, General Michel Aoun,
shifted his allegiances to Syria and signed a document with Hezbollah.
Other politicians from the "March 14 Movement" then stopped the
demonstrations, leaving them with the support of God knows what. They
failed in removing the pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud and brought
back a pro-Syrian politician to serve as a speaker of the house, Nabih
Berri. Meanwhile, even as they were elected by the faithful Cedar
Revolution masses, they engaged in a round table dialogue with
Hezbollah, a clear trap set by Hassan Nasrallah: "Let's talk about the
future," he said — with the implication, of course, that they forget
about the Cedar Revolution and the militia's disarming. While
political leaders sat for months, enjoying the photo ops with Hassan
Nasrallah, he was preparing his counter offensive, which he unleashed
just a few days before the Security Council would discuss the future
of Iran's nuclear programs.

The Lebanese government of Prime Minister Seniora also abandoned the
Cedar Revolution. His cabinet neither disarmed Hezbollah nor called on
the U.N. to help in implementing UNSCR 1559. This omission is
baffling. The government was given so much support by the
international community and, more importantly, overwhelming popular
support inside Lebanon: 80 percent of the people were hoping the Cedar
Revolution-backed government would be the one to resume the liberation
of the country. Now Hezbollah has an upper hand and the government is
on the defensive.

The U.S. and its allies can be accused of certain shortcomings as
well. While the speeches by the U.S. president, congressional leaders
from both parties, Tony Blair, and Jacques Chirac were right on target
regarding Lebanon, and while the U.S. and its counterparts on the
Security Council were diligent in their follow up on the Hariri
assassination and on implementing UNSCR 1559, there was no policy or
plan to support the popular movement in Lebanon. Incredibly, while
billions were spent on the war of ideas in the region, Lebanese NGOs
that wanted to resume the struggle of the Cedar Revolution and
fighting alone for this purpose were not taken seriously at various
levels. Policy planners thought they were dealing with the "Cedar
Revolution" when they were meeting Lebanon's government and Lebanese
politicians. The difference between the high level speeches on Lebanon
and the laissez-faire approach from lower levels is amazing. Simply
put, there was no policy on supporting the Cedar Revolution against
the three regimes opposing it and the $400 million received by
Hezbollah from Iran.

The Cedar Revolution was basically betrayed by its own politicians and
is now essentially without a head. Nevertheless, as long as the
international support remains, the Revolution will find its way and
will face the dangers. The one and a half million ordinary citizens
who braved all the dangers didn't change their minds about Hezbollah's
terror. The resistance and counter-attack was to be expected.
Unfortunately, thus far Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah have outmaneuvered
the West and are at the throats of the Cedar Revolution. The
international community must revise its plans, and, if it is strongly
backed by the U.S. and its allies, including France, the situation can
be salvaged. The good seeds are still inside the country.

[Seagoon]

Part 2 -

Lopez: Is Israeli bombing in Lebanon getting Israel anywhere?

Phares: I would ask the larger question: What is Israel's plan in
Lebanon? If its plan is mainly to bomb the infrastructure until a
major political change occurs, it is unlikely to succeed. Analysts do
not assume that this is the Israeli plan, since Hezbollah's strategic
ability to reemerge won't be eliminated from the skies. Besides, all
competent experts on Lebanon know that bombing until the Lebanese
government does something also won't work. This government, which
failed to request international intervention when the conditions were
favorable and has included Hezbollah and pro-Syrian ministers in its
cabinet, is completely paralyzed.

A continuous "bombing-only" approach would hugely degrade Hezbollah's
infrastructure, but would also lead to the collapse of this government
and the formation of a radical pro-Syrian, pro-Iranian government in
Beirut. There would be a cease fire then, and Israel would get a year
of respite, maybe less, before the Iranians and the Syrians would
re-arm the new Hezbollah-led government in Lebanon. Meanwhile, the
Cedar Revolution would be massacred and regional pressures would
revert to Iraq.

Israel's war with Hezbollah is not about the kidnapped soldiers or
Katiushas. It is about Hezbollah's attempt to remain a state within a
state, and, along with Syria, to threaten Israel with missiles while
Iran completes its nuclear armament. The rest can be easily imagined.
And as long as there is no strategic change in Lebanon, starting with
Hezbollah's disarming and having international forces taking the
control of the Lebanese-Syrian and Lebanese-Israeli borders, the
bombings may give Israel some time, but will eventually transform
Lebanon into an extension of Iran.

Israel is stating that its war with Hezbollah is part of the war on
terror, and it has many convincing arguments for the American public
that support this. But many Lebanese can't see this, especially when
they see bombings and destruction and can hear only the propaganda
machine of Hezbollah. It is simple: if there is no voice to explain
this to the Lebanese, if there is no radio station and no TV station
to reach out to them on a daily basis, they will hear only what al
Manar, al Jazeera, and local pro-Syrian TVs are saying. The Lebanese
People need to hear strong words from the international community
about the reasons and hopes for which these forces have been
dispatched and Hezbollah is being disarmed.

Lopez: Is there really any hope that the Lebanese, in the long run,
will understand why Israel had to bomb?

Phares: First, consider what the Lebanese want. They are under
tremendous pressures today, and they have multiple opinions about what
has been happening to their country over the past decades. Last year
the demonstrations revealed that a popular majority of Lebanese —
mostly Sunnis, Druses, and Christians — opposed for a variety of
reasons the Syrian occupation of their country and the arms of
Hezbollah. The signs in support of UNSCR 1559 are clear evidence of
what Lebanon's majority — which massed 1.5 million people on the
streets — wanted and still wants. But keep in mind that Hezbollah and
the pro-Syrian groups have direct militia control over the large Shiia
community. With the support of Iran, Syria, and the Lebanese regime of
Lahoud, Hezbollah put about 300,000 people on the streets of the
capital. Thousands of Syrian and Palestinian persons were part of the
pro-Syria demonstration.

Nevertheless, the majority of the Lebanese people have spoken, and
they were seen and heard by the world in 2005. In short, free Lebanon
is not with Hezbollah but is a hostage to it. The Lebanese would have
preferred to see their government and army disarm Hezbollah with the
support of an international coalition. Indeed, there was no other
option. Had this been implemented in 2005-2006, the Israel-Hezbollah
war wouldn't have happened, and the Lebanese wouldn't have needed to
understand these Israeli air raids.

As far as what the Lebanese feel about these strikes, here is the
simple answer: Those in support of Hezbollah and Syria and their
respective ideologies haven't changed their view of Israel and will
consider it an enemy whether there are bombings or not. The strikes
only increase the hatred, especially since Hezbollah controls the media.

However, with regards to those who marched in the Cedar Revolution on
March 14 and who constitute the majority in Lebanon, it is a more
complex issue. There are a variety of related positions.
Unfortunately, the world cannot see every nuance through the lenses of
international media, especially while Hezbollah security is around.
Generally speaking, the popular majority still wants Hezbollah
disarmed and is concerned that what they see so far is not an
indication that this will be done. Simply put, they don't see the link
between the air strikes and their being able to get rid of Hezbollah
once a cease fire takes effect. Many Lebanese we speak to, including
politicians, social and spiritual leaders, NGOs, etc., tell us that
they don't understand what the relation is between taking out bridges
in northern Lebanon or blowing up a manufacturing plant in Mount
Lebanon and the disarming of Hezbollah.

Most Lebanese aren't naïve; they try to understand the process, but no
one is explaining it to them. Their basic sentiment is this: If these
bombings — which were provoked initially by Hezbollah's action — will
lead to the implementation of 1559, and an international intervention
in this sense, so be it; but Lebanon was destroyed several times by
the Syrians, the PLO, and in several confrontations since 1975,
including fighting among the Lebanese themselves, and 185,000 people
have been killed without Lebanon obtaining real freedom; striking
Hezbollah and pushing it to the north of the Israeli-Lebanese borders
without disarming it will leave the country to Syria and Iran; but if
this war — initiated by Iran and Syria — is the one to end the wars in
Lebanon, we need to hear it from the international community today —
this is what all the Lebanese leaders I've spoken with are telling me.

Lopez: Will the Lebanese people reject Hezbollah, realizing it puts
them on the wrong side of the good guys in the war against terrorism?

Phares: Again, the Lebanese already rejected Hezbollah during the
Cedar Revolution. They started demonstrating while they were under
Syrian occupation and threatened by Hezbollah and other militias.
Alone, without international support, with no military invasions and
no funding, the youth, women, and elderly of Lebanon stood
courageously, unarmed, with the world campaign against terrorism.
Their determination was so powerful that Assad himself was shocked and
vowed revenge. Hassan Nasrallah promised Assad he would double the
marchers with his Iranian-dollars and lined up an army on the streets,
just to be shocked again by the massive response by the people of
Lebanon. The Cedar Revolution emptied every single village outside of
Hezbollah's control and gathered them in front of the world cameras to
send the forceful message: No to Syria's occupation and no to
Hezbollah's weapons and terror.

After the Syrian withdrawal, many leaders were assassinated because of
their role in the anti-Hezbollah resistance, among them Samir Qassir,
George Hawi, and Jebran Tueni, the charismatic leader of the youth and
liberal MP. The areas that supported the anti-Hezbollah uprising were
subjected to several bombings, leaving many citizens killed and
maimed. May Chidiac, the leading female anchor covering the protests,
lost a leg and an arm in a car bombing. Lebanon's resistance to
Hezbollah has paid a tribute in blood and tears, and one should not
overlook that.

The Lebanese have been unlucky with many of their politicians, but a
second generation of leaders is ready to move forward. In addition,
the Lebanese Diaspora, four times the size of Lebanon's population,
has not only sided with the coalition against terrorism worldwide but
has provided many talents in this war on many levels. Lebanese abroad
are at the forefront of the war of ideas, along with other Mideast and
Arab democracy activists. And it was thanks to the actions of
Lebanese-Americans that the Syria Accountability Act was passed in
Congress, just as it was thanks to the lobbying efforts of world
Lebanese Diaspora leaders that the idea of UNSCR 1559 was put forth.

When a U.S. official asked me in March 2004 if I thought the Lebanese
people would dare reject the Syrian occupation if a U.N. resolution
were passed, I told him: "You come half way and issue the resolution
and the Lebanese masses will meet you half way." And this is what
happened a year later. And today again, I have the same estimate: Let
the multinational force show its flags over the shores of Lebanon, and
you'll see a Cedar Revolution rejecting Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran.
Don't ask an unarmed population to do what neither Afghans, Iraqis, or
for that matter any other people have done: fight terror with bare hands.

[Seagoon]

Part 3 -

Lopez: Is there really any way for Israel to defeat terrorism?

Phares: Terrorism is not the responsibility of one nation or one
government to defeat or find a solution to. Each country has its own
views on and public understanding of the problem, and its own
strategies for dealing with it. Israel has its own policies; so do,
for example, Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt, as well as Europe, India,
Russia, and the United States. Even some Arab countries, such as Saudi
Arabia and the new Iraq, have their own struggle with the terror
forces they are confronting. International terrorism, however, is
fighting all these governments and nations as one global force, and it
benefits from the divisions among its enemies. The Saudi wants to
achieve one objective, which is to take out al Qaeda's cells from
their midst, and they criticize the U.S.'s approach to the global war
on terror. So does Russia, even though it would do anything to resist
the Chechen Wahabis. Pakistan wants to uproot those al Qaeda who
planned on assassinating its president, but would raise protests if a
U.S. missile missed the same wanted terrorists. Obviously many
countries, including all Arab countries, criticize Israel on its own
war on terror, but would go after the same threat if it faced them.
What is lacking here is an international agreement on what the war on
terror is. That will only come about as progress is made in the war of
ideas.

Lopez: What should/can be done about Syria and Iran?

Phares: What should have been done about these two regimes is one
thing; what can be done about them now is something else. Bad advice
has been given by Western and American academic elites, beginning in
the 1980s, about jihadism and the regimes that supported it. In my
book Future Jihad I argue that the international community and the
West are paying the price of bad decisions or indecisions in the
1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In American classrooms,
instructors who were supposed to be the experts on the region praised
the Assad regime and considered Hezbollah a resistance movement, not a
jihadi terror group. Many businessmen and diplomats viewed Iran's
leadership as realist and capable of engagement in the 1990s. A
complete myopia was dominant in our international policy, with
implications for our national security. This began to change after
9/11, but not without an astounding debate revealing weaknesses in our
political establishment's vision of the world. Nevertheless, at this
point in time the two regimes have revealed to the world that they are
a real axis of menace. Two things are to be done at this point: First,
defeat this axis in Lebanon at any price and with the support of the
Lebanese people. That is crucial because Tehran and Damascus have
decided to make their stand in Lebanon. Then, isolate these regimes
and provide endless support to the reformists in their countries until
change is initiated by the people.

[detch01]

Excellant post Seagoon - ty



asw

[bozon]

very good, I agree with pretty much all he says.

The Lebanese
People need to hear strong words from the international community
about the reasons and hopes for which these forces have been
dispatched and Hezbollah is being disarmed.

I doubt the "international community" will ever make it happen.

[RedTop]

Great Read Seagoon...Thanks

[Toad]

Thanks, Sea.

Two things are to be done at this point: First,
defeat this axis in Lebanon at any price and with the support of the
Lebanese people. That is crucial because Tehran and Damascus have
decided to make their stand in Lebanon. Then, isolate these regimes
and provide endless support to the reformists in their countries until
change is initiated by the people.

Well, we'll see won't we?

[Captain Virgil Hilts]

This guy needs a job at the WhiteHouse. YESTERDAY.