Graphs are wondeful things aren't they....
Without any underlying documentation and out of context its not worth pursuing a dialog on but i'll certainly look at the source (book that is). It's certainly a better reality then "28" combat losses over 50 some days...
Using the "graphs" we have a total of 272 fighter losses in theater for april thru june. So if nothing else its relatively easy to conclude that the "28/45" number is obviously fiction.
Statistically the numbers dont add up in my mind for april/may. We know the germans were flying 1500+ sorties a day early and the russians were flying 1500+ sorties a day late (within that time frame). Those types of sorties levels are obviously not sustainable however this was a battle that had relatively limited lulls and air action was constant.
Now if we look at the numbers for the Med we see 247 fighter losses and a total of 572 for april alone. The main focus of fighting in the Med was obviously Tunisia and the convoy routes from Italy. I'm not aware that the german order of battle for the area could even field these numbers...let alons sustain those losses. II/JG 51 and II/JG 2 were the 1st luftwaffe units deployed to tunisia in response to torch. JG 27 had been moved back to Sicily after it got mauled at El Alamein leaving JG 77 as the only unit actually in N africa before the above mentioned arrivals. From my recollections March was actually the worst month for the luftwaffe with the fighting dragging on thru april and the last luftwaffe {JG 77} unit leaving for Sicily in May 1943.
Given the focus on the Kuban/Kursk battles in the East and the emerging threat of the 8th airforce in the west the claim that the luftwaffe (which I assume is the actual german not axis totals) lost more planes in the Med then in either the east or west during mid 1943 does not apprear factually sustainable under the german deployments. According to the charts the luftwaffe suffered just under 2000 combat losses from April to July in the Med?
Further the graph shows very low #'s for may/june in the east when we know for certain (historically) that the luftwaffe issued a general standdown order on June 7th due to heavy losses around Kuban. No question that Kursk was another blood bath. Historically the migration of luftwaffe fighter units west occured AFTER Kuban not before.
One of the real problems here is the unquestioned acceptance of relatively suspect source material. alot of whats been written for consumption is tailored to a specific audience. Here is a quote from a respected military historian on this issue "And, unfortunately, most of the monographic literature on the Russo-German air war reflects Germany’s point of view."
This comes from an interesting and unbiased "review" of a book on the subject at hand
source BTW, take a look at the footnotes....
Alot of the "real" analysis is available thru maxwell and other online sources. Its a much more even handed and analytical overview of a complex subject. not just a "historian" who wants to sell guys like Viking a book.