The following is a chart summarizing the previously presented tabular data of German single-engine fighter production vs. planned production programs. Faced with the overwhelming numbers of aircraft produced by the US and the UK, Milch and the RLM sought to counter by increasing German aircraft production. As a result peak production increased by 50% from 1941 to 1942, and doubled from 1942 to 1943. Peak monthly single engine fighter production rose to a high of 1,000 aircraft per month.
The combined bomber offensive in summer and autumn of 1943 blunted this production resulting in a decline of monthly output mid-year to a low point of 560 fighters per month in December. However In 1944 fighter production recovered dramatically peaking at 3,031 fighters a month in September. The question is how did the Reich achieve this while under the punishing bomber offensive that resumed in 1944?
There are several major reasons for the startling increase in fighter production throughout 1944: the rationalization of the aircraft industry and increases in planned production prior to 1944, dispersion of aircraft production factories, re-allocation of key raw materials and resources, and the increase in labor and productivity.
Aircraft Industry Rationalization & PlanningAs we’ve seen Milch and the RLM rationalized the German aircraft industry in an effort to bolster production. As a result fighter production Increased production from 1941 to 1943. But Milch didn’t intend to level off production at just the peak 1943 levels. The RLM also planned for continued increases in aircraft production well into 1944.
The RLM production program change in Aug 1943 (Program 223/1) called for fighter output of 1,646 fighters starting in Jan 44 and peaking at 3,418 in Dec 44. This is an important point. The minimum time for manufacturing an aircraft from raw material to finished product was 6 months which meant materials and labor had to be planned for and acquired at least 6 months in advance of projected productions. The materials and labor were already in the pipeline in late 1943 to produce the necessary fighter output for 1944. The RLM had already put the machinery in motion for a dramatic increase in fighters in 1943, well ahead of when Speer and the Jagerstab took charge in March 1944. Thanks to prior planning the German fighter production in 1944 took advantage of the capacity already laid in place in preparation.
Dispersion of Aircraft ManufacturingThough the machinery was set in place for increased fighter production, the Allied Combined Bomber Offensive in the summer and fall of 1943 greatly reduced fighter production in the 2nd half of 1943. The RLM rationalization programs resulted in the physical concentration of aircraft manufacturing facilities which left it vulnerable to air attack. The Allies certainly took notice and targeted it to good effect though the RAF and USAAF also paid dearly in bombers and crews lost in the effort.
The Germans also took notice as well. RLM production Program 223/1 increase in Aug 15, 1943 was in partial response to massive air threat that the Reich faced as the RAF and USAAF aimed at crippling the German industry. Dramatic increases in numbers of fighters were needed to counter the Allied threat. Besides increasing fighter output the RLM also planned for the dispersion of the aircraft industry to reduce the vulnerability to Allied air attack. The plan called for the dispersion of the main 27 aircraft plants to 729 smaller plants. By then end of 1944 the actual number of plants moved to was about 300. Similarly the aero-engine industry was dispersed from 51 plants to 249 locations.
Some novel concepts of dispersion also included the use of underground facilities. The Mittelwerke facility, the Daimler-Benz’s Goldfischewerke near Heidelburg, and the Junkers plant at Tarthun near Magdeburg were examples of these facilities. Plants were also dispersed and moved to forests in an attempt to hide them though they were built and mainly available only in the last months of the war.
Speer, Raw Material Allocation, and the JagerstabDispersion of aircraft manufacturing plants reduced vulnerability to attack in 1944, but these factories could not have produced the dramatic increase in fighter output in 1944 without the input of key raw materials. The war continually placed increasing strain on the German economy. To manage the strain throughout the war the German economy was increasingly rationalized overtime until it was centrally directed by a smaller and smaller group of people organized under Albert Speer. Speer became the Armaments Minister in 1942 after Fritz Todt died in an airplane accident. Speer developed increasing control of the basics of supply and production in Germany, namely the allocation of labor and raw materials.
The German war economy operated under the same principles that exist today, namely production is a function of capital, labor, and raw materials. The following chart compares German ammunition production to the steel allocated for ammunition production demonstrating how ammunition output correlated to the amount of steel allocated for production of ammunition.
Speer’s control of Germany’s raw material allocation was a major factor in his “armaments miracle”. What Speer accomplished with the rationalization of the steel industry typifies the methods he used to affect armaments production. In 1942 Speer effectively averted a crisis in the availability of steel. In early 1942 the realization that Germany needed to mobilize the economy for a long war resulted in major increases needed in armaments production. These drastic changes created major havoc in the availability of steel to meet the new demands. The drastic increase in steel demand created chaos in the supply chain. Arms producers were given even more entitlements to steel than there was actual supply. Steel producers provided steel to various arms producers without a coherent view of what programs were priority for the Reich.
Something had to be done. Speer formed the Reichsvereiningung Eisen (RVE) to tackle the problems of insufficient steel production and incoherent steel allocation. Through the RVE all steel allocations were to be based on 90% of steel production with a 10% left to be diverted to priority contracts. Steel allocation was redistributed. Allocation for non-armaments was cut by more than a quarter to the consternation of the civilian economic administration. Moreover associated industries and labor were also harnessed under the Armaments Ministry.
Further changes in steel allocation were coming as Speer focused attention onto tank production. Increases in tank production had already been planned in 1941 for. In 1942 the target was further increased calling for 600 Panthers, 50 Tigers, 150 light tanks, and 600 assault guns and self-propelled artillery per month by early 1944. After Stalingrad Hitler doubled this figure. It was through the leverage of the RVE that Speer was able to announce the infamous Adolf Hitler Panzer Programme in Jan 1943. To meet the demand Speer created the Panzer Programme and used the RVE and his increased powers to prioritize steel allocation to Tanks. Thus was born the concept of “Panzer priority” with steel allocations prioritized for contracts so labeled. Tank production received priority on steel allocation over other parts of the war economy. Even the Luftwaffe resorted to applying “Panzer priority” to aircraft production to circumvent issues with aero-engine crankshaft deliveries in competition with tank manufacturing.
At the beginning of 1944 desperately needing more fighters to combat the Allied air offensive. Under these circumstances and facing ever increasing aircraft production difficulties Milch swallowed his pride and threw in the Air Ministry’s lot with Speer and the Armaments Ministry. The Jagerstab (Fighter Staff), was formed. From February 1944 the aircraft industry also became benefactors of Speer and the Armaments Ministry’s powers of prioritization in raw materials, labor, food, and transport capacity. This unfettered allocation of these resources allowed fighter production to continue to increase throughout 1944. For instance aluminum allocation to the aircraft industry was 45% in 1939 and ramped up to 60% in 1944. Thus Speer was a factor and contributed to the rising fighter production in 1944. Of course the Speer legacy paints a very different account of the contribution. However in a rare moment Speer admitted in an interview in June 1944 stating “I have to add…that here an alteration in the system has taken place on the quiet, in that from February we have, as we have done in the other industries, brought in capacities from the armour and Panzer industries into the aircraft industry. This is the reason, in my opinion, for the speedy recovery.” As Adam Tooze states, “…it was Speer’s jealously guarded control over key resources and his ability to confer “Panzer priority” that was the truly decisive factor.”
