Point is that production would have increased vastly more without the bombing:
"At the end of January 1945 Albert Speer and his ministerial colleagues met in Berlin to sum up what bombing had done to production schedules for 1944. They found that Germany had produced 35 per cent fewer tanks than planned, 31 per cent fewer aircraft and 42 per cent fewer lorries as a result of the bombing."
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"By 1944 one-third of all German artillery production consisted of anti-aircraft guns; the anti-aircraft effort absorbed 20 per cent of all ammunition produced, one-third of the output of the optical industry, and between half and two-thirds of the production of radar and signals equipment...The Bombing also ate into Germany's scarce manpower: by 1944 an estimated two million Germans were engaged in anti-aircraft defence, in repairing shattered factories and in generally cleaning up the destruction."
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"The combined effects of direct destruction and the diversion of resources denied German forces approximately half their battle-front weapons and equipment in 1944. It is difficult not to regard this margin as decisive."
From Overy, Richard, "Why the Allies Won," Norton, New York 1996, pages 130-131.
- oldman
This is all true, what you say.
But, if you look at what I'm saying in response to the poster above.... all of this was not decisive in germany's defeat. Meaning, yes it contributed, but airpower was not the decisive blow to the industrial complex.
All of what I'm saying comes right out of the Army Air Corp's Post-war assessment. The effect of the strategic bombing campaign and the airwar in general cannot be pulled out as being causal to the defeat of Germany. Yes it helped,
especially the destruction of refinery capabilities. But it was not
decisive, which was the gentleman's point that I replied to, who in turn was replying to someone saying that "airpower is never decisive in conflict".
