I think that conditions dictated the operation tempo of CVs in the USN during the war. Most of all until 1943 when the first Essex class CVs started turning up and the war took a turn.
Fly during Day, fly at night, fly to support ground Ops, launch attacks groups, recover groups, launch spotters, and on and on...the tempo of operations were controlled by the tempo of battle and the amount of flat tops and airplanes operational. No they couldnt launch and recover at the same time but if there was an operational doctrine set in stone then Im unaware of it. They did what they had to do, even if it meant ditching airplanes or bulldozing them off the deck.
The air war of the central Pacific was a war of attrition. Ships, airplanes, trained pilots, and in such a war the IJN never stood a chance. And it wasnt just the numbers, the USN also evolved into an overwhelmingly superior technological foe. From superior airplanes, to superior radars, proximity fuses, "smart torpedos".
By 1944 we were sending huge CV groups into battles, both fleet and escort types. I dont remember any one plan other then to sortie the enemy into the graveyard.