Midway, did you know...?

[Vraciu]

More like a trap than a diversion.   For Yamamoto, Midway was going to be the lure to draw the US into a trap and eliminate the Pacific fleet, leaving the Japanese the masters of the Pacific and the eventual capitulation of the US.  But he needed the support of the Imperial Japanese Army for his plan, and to get this support he had to go along with the IJA's plan of securing the Japanese home islands from bombers taking off from bases in the Aleutians. 

For a long time it was thought the Aleutian campaign was a diversion to draw out the USN but it is now considered to be it's own campaign.

Which then leaves Yammamoto with an island in the middle of nowhere that he has to supply or let his troops starve...   Meanwhile the USA builds 65 carriers of all kinds in 1943 to the Japanese's two (or three?).   

Good luck invading the USA with a rifleman behind every tree for 3000 miles.

[Rich46yo]

Wake has to be right at the outer limit of combat range for any IJN aircraft. The Marshalls or Kwajalein Atoll even further. Besides I always thought the land based planes of the 11'th air fleet only did scout missions at Midway and the USN CVs made sure they were right outside their range envelope. I may be wrong but I dont remember any shore based aircraft attacking at all.

Yes, the Japanese had more ships in the battle than the USN, even after splitting of the Japanese combined fleet (1 fleet to Midway, 2nd fleet to Aleutians).

As for aircraft, the USN had a very slight (by 15 planes) a numerical advantage in carrier planes but the Japanese were also able to muster over a 125 land based aircraft (fighters, bombers, scout/recce planes) in addition to the 233 carrier planes taking part in the battle.

[Rich46yo]

The actual plan made very little sense because different elements of the IJN command had different priorities. Some of them, and all of the army, thought the actual Island of Midway and then Hawaii were the targets and thought the CVs didnt matter. It never occurred to them that even if they were able to invade, which is doubtful, they had no way of supplying either. It was to far away and they had neither the transports or the ability to protect the transports.

OK so say they were all on board with Yamamato. The plan was still overly complicated, assumed way to much, and the command/control between their units sucked. They sent the old "S" boats as pickets and they were so slow they got on station a day late because they were such easy pickings for aircraft they were ordered to stay submerged during the day whenever they were within 500 miles of an enemy. So the entire USN CV group slipped right on by before the submarines made it to their stations.

Then they had so few Recce airframes they weren't able to search to the north of Midway very well, they had no radar and with the cloud cover they didnt know the USN dive bombers were there until just about when they dived.

But from A, and then to Z, the entire plan was unsound and poorly prepared for. Even their practice drills for the attack were a joke compared to the ones for PH which were fantastic. I was aware of some of this but I was not aware of what a total cluster the Midway plan was on the IJN side. And at the heart of it was this silly Japanese belief, which Yamamato bought into 100%, and that they bought into ever since a storm wrecked the invasion force of Kublai Khan, that one great battle will set up an end to the war. The Battle of Tsushima against the Russians in 1904 only strengthened this belief and it never occurred to them the USN was not The Russian navy. BTW Yamamato was a junior officer at Tsushima and was wounded in battle there. No wonder the "One Great Battle" strategy never left him.

If I recall the deployment of the Japanese ships was botched, which did not help matters.

Also, I believe Yamamoto's intent was to catch the American fleet by surprise by drawing them into a diversion and them closing in for the kill.  All of which would not happen due to the code being broken.

[Ack-Ack]

Which then leaves Yammamoto with an island in the middle of nowhere that he has to supply or let his troops starve...   Meanwhile the USA builds 65 carriers of all kinds in 1943 to the Japanese's two (or three?).   

Good luck invading the USA with a rifleman behind every tree for 3000 miles.

Yamamoto meant the battle to be the showdown in which Japan would destroy the Pacific fleet and force the US to capitulate and accept the new status quo.  He also planned on using Midway as a possible staging area for the invasion of the Hawaiian Islands.  Japan, at the onset of the war, did not expect to fight a protracted general war.  They envisioned their campaign would last no more than 6 months, in which they would deliver a series of sharp, strategic blows to the West and the West would give in and accept Japanese hegemony.

[Vraciu]

Yamamoto meant the battle to be the showdown in which Japan would destroy the Pacific fleet and force the US to capitulate and accept the new status quo.  He also planned on using Midway as a possible staging area for the invasion of the Hawaiian Islands.  Japan, at the onset of the war, did not expect to fight a protracted general war.  They envisioned their campaign would last no more than 6 months, in which they would deliver a series of sharp, strategic blows to the West and the West would give in and accept Japanese hegemony.

All of which were terrible assumptions given how the war started.   Short of total destruction America would have never surrendered.    Japan was doomed from the start of the first bomb drop on Hawaii, if not sooner.

[Ack-Ack]

Wake has to be right at the outer limit of combat range for any IJN aircraft. The Marshalls or Kwajalein Atoll even further. Besides I always thought the land based planes of the 11'th air fleet only did scout missions at Midway and the USN CVs made sure they were right outside their range envelope. I may be wrong but I dont remember any shore based aircraft attacking at all.

It was at the extreme end of their aircraft range, especially with a Zeke (Zeke land based squadrons were use to supplement carrier based squadrons for Fleet 1 and Fleet 2) but for planes like the Nell (based in Wake and the Marshalls) with a range of 3,500 miles, doable.  The Japanese scouts and bombers were able to provide the necessary air cover for the fleet as it made its way to Midway.

[Ack-Ack]

All of which were terrible assumptions given how the war started.   Short of total destruction America would have never surrendered.    Japan was doomed from the start of the first bomb drop on Hawaii, if not sooner.

It was the ultimate undoing of the Japanese High Command led by Tojo and the warhawks, the majority of them with very little, if any understanding of western thought or culture.  Those admirals and generals that had served time in western countries, like Britain, France and the US, were largely opposed to starting a war they knew they would eventually lose. Those Japanese military that spent time in the '30s in Axis countries like Germany and Italy were more likely to support the Japanese High Command into going to war with the US and other western countries.

But don't kid yourself, Yamamoto, despite his initial opposition to starting the war, did believe that the US, if hit hard enough, would seek peace.

[Vraciu]

It was the ultimate undoing of the Japanese High Command led by Tojo and the warhawks, the majority of them with very little, if any understanding of western thought or culture.  Those admirals and generals that had served time in western countries, like Britain, France and the US, were largely opposed to starting a war they knew they would eventually lose. Those Japanese military that spent time in the '30s in Axis countries like Germany and Italy were more likely to support the Japanese High Command into going to war with the US and other western countries.

But don't kid yourself, Yamamoto, despite his initial opposition to starting the war, did believe that the US, if hit hard enough, would seek peace.

He believed it, but he was horribly misguided.   

[Vraciu]

It was at the extreme end of their aircraft range, especially with a Zeke (Zeke land based squadrons were use to supplement carrier based squadrons for Fleet 1 and Fleet 2) but for planes like the Nell (based in Wake and the Marshalls) with a range of 3,500 miles, doable.  The Japanese scouts and bombers were able to provide the necessary air cover for the fleet as it made its way to Midway.

Don't think they had to cover for much.  We weren't really down there looking for them and the storm front KB was shadowing didn't hurt any.

In the order of battle the US had about a 100-plane edge on the Japanese, which, considering our early losses, was a necessary margin. 

[Skuzzy]

All of which were terrible assumptions given how the war started.   Short of total destruction America would have never surrendered.    Japan was doomed from the start of the first bomb drop on Hawaii, if not sooner.

Yamamoto, being schooled in the US, knew our industrial might would overcome Japan if the battle went too long.  He badly underestimated the American resolve to fight.  That was his major failing.

He really believed Americans did not have the stomach for war.

Although, after he heard of the communications failure of the Japanese embassy in Washington, he knew they were in trouble.  It did not help when the Japanese propaganda machine boasted Yamamoto declared he was going to march into Washington to be there for the US surrender.

They poked a sleeping bear and Yamamoto knew it.  This forced him into a timeline battle with the US.  One that he knew if they could not win in 6 months, it was over.  Midway was not his only blunder, but it was his final one, if I recall.

[Vraciu]

That sums it up pretty well, I'd say. 

I remember talking with Alex Vraciu about the war and to the last day I saw him the fire in his eyes over Pearl Harbor (and Butch O'Hare's death) still burned fiercely.

[Oldman731]

He badly underestimated the American resolve to fight.  That was his major failing.

True enough.  OTOH, were the same events to occur today, I'm not sure that the U.S. would say "Yes, whatever it takes, we're going to take back all those islands and conquer Japan."  Different times, different people.

- oldman

[TheBug]

Midway was not his only blunder, but it was his final one, if I recall.

I think touring the Solomons within the range of the 347th FG was his final blunder.   

[Vraciu]

I think touring the Solomons within the range of the 347th FG was his final blunder.   

Too soon?

 

[Mister Fork]

Yamamoto's famous quote predicted his success at Midway following Pearl Harbour:

"I can run wild for six months … after that, I have no expectation of success."