Author Topic: More MAX information  (Read 35313 times)

Offline Vraciu

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Re: More MAX information
« Reply #30 on: March 15, 2019, 10:13:58 PM »

um, just to keep things straight, that was Puma who posted the Graves blog.  Mine was the AOPA thing, apparently by a different pilot.  I just thought his/her comments on the MAX handling issues were interesting.

Given that grounding the MAX isn't as economically drastic as cancelling all, or even a lot of airline flights, I'm unsure why people would not want to err on the side of caution.  May be the plane, may be the pilots, may be the maintenance people (my own guess), but there are enough issues out there to raise some questions.

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Offline Oldman731

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Re: More MAX information
« Reply #31 on: March 15, 2019, 10:28:54 PM »
The cost is in the billions before all is said and done.


I could probably work out the math on the payouts for another 150 dead people, if the "let's wait to see the results" position turns out the be the wrong move. 

But I think that might be counter productive.  The world will not end if everyone just takes a time-out.

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Offline DaveBB

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Re: More MAX information
« Reply #32 on: March 16, 2019, 06:29:06 AM »
FAA has some evidence that connects the two crashes.  Like everyone else is saying, the software kept trying to put the plane nose down.  See attached YouTube link for the CNN interview.

Currently ignoring Vraciu as he is a whoopeeed retard.

Offline Toad

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Re: More MAX information
« Reply #33 on: March 16, 2019, 07:41:45 AM »
My apologies to Puma for failing to correctly attribute the Graves comments to him as original poster.

Here's some interesting stalled aircraft data (admittedly from WIKI. Oh...and I'm not picking on Airbus, it's just one example):

"On 27 November 2008, XL Airways Germany Flight 888T, a test flight of an A320-232 stalled in a low speed test and control could not be regained, causing the aircraft to crash into the sea off the southern French coast. The aircraft was on lease by XL Airways and scheduled to be returned to Air New Zealand. All seven people aboard died."

"On 28 December 2014, Indonesia AirAsia Flight 8501, using an Airbus A320-216, from Juanda International Airport, Surabaya to Changi International Airport, Singapore, crashed into the Java Sea between the islands of Belitung and Borneo, killing all 162 on board. The cause was initially a malfunction in two of the plane's rudder travel limiter units which caused the plane to stall while encountering a thunderstorm. The crew ignored the recommended procedure to deal with the problem and disengaged the autopilot which contributed to the subsequent loss of control."

"On 5 November 2014, Lufthansa Flight 1829, an Airbus A321 was flying from Bilbao to Munich when the aircraft, while on autopilot, lowered the nose into a descent reaching 4000 fpm. The uncommanded pitch-down was caused by two angle of attack sensors that were jammed in their positions, causing the fly by wire protection to believe the aircraft entered a stall while it climbed through FL310. The Alpha Protection activated, forcing the aircraft to pitch down, which could not be corrected even by full stick input. The crew disconnected the related Air Data Units and were able to recover the aircraft.[41] The event was also reported in the German press several days before the Germanwings crash.[42] The German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU) reported on the incident on 17 March 2015 in a Bulletin publishing the flight data recorder and pitch control data in English and German. As a result of this incident an Airworthiness Directive made mandatory the Aircraft Flight Manual amended by the procedure the manufacturer had described in the FOT and the OEB and a subsequent information of flight crews prior to the next flight. EASA issued a similar Airworthiness Directive for the aircraft types A330/340."

Three stalls in the same basic aircraft type, A320/321. Two of those fatal/hull loss accidents. In two of those the programming appears faulty, in the other the crew did not use procedural knowledge to apply the correct procedure.

Anyone remember the A-320 family of aircraft getting grounded for these > seemingly <  related accidents/incident? I don't.

After the last one, there was an AD and a change to the AFM for the A321 that was expanded to the A330/340. Software issue anyone? Any groundings? The AirAsia and the Lufthansa were mere days apart.

Worthwhile to note that Boeing issued a similar type Flight Crew Ops Bulletin the day after the Lion Air crash.

From Boeing: "Boeing’s 737 MAX Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM) already outlines an existing procedure to safely handle the unlikely event of erroneous data coming from an angle of attack (AOA) sensor. The pilot will always be able to override the flight control law using electric trim or manual trim. In addition, it can be controlled through the use of the existing runaway stabilizer procedure as reinforced in the Operations Manual Bulletin (OMB) issued on Nov. 6, 2018."
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Offline Mister Fork

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Re: More MAX information
« Reply #34 on: March 16, 2019, 08:02:53 AM »
I was speaking to my sister-in-law yesterday. She’s a FA with WestJet which has 14 MAX 737’s. She was talking to a couple of her pilot friends and mentioned that they never use the AP for takeoff in the MAX because sometimes it gets a bit ‘wonky’. (Her words, not mine) and that they were just waiting for Boeing to fix the issue. They thought grounding them was kinda stupid as other aircraft had serious issues (before mentioned Airbus) and were never grounded and were flabbergasted why Europe was quick to join on the ban Boeing MAX and thought perhaps it was a political jab rather than a common sense approach.

Just food for thought - WestJet only hires x-military pilots or experienced civil with over 1000 commercial hours.

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Offline Oldman731

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Re: More MAX information
« Reply #35 on: March 16, 2019, 08:22:14 AM »
Three stalls in the same basic aircraft type, A320/321. Two of those fatal/hull loss accidents. In two of those the programming appears faulty, in the other the crew did not use procedural knowledge to apply the correct procedure.

Anyone remember the A-320 family of aircraft getting grounded for these > seemingly <  related accidents/incident? I don't.

After the last one, there was an AD and a change to the AFM for the A321 that was expanded to the A330/340. Software issue anyone? Any groundings? The AirAsia and the Lufthansa were mere days apart.


...er...isn't that an observation that perhaps there should have been...?

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Offline Toad

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Re: More MAX information
« Reply #36 on: March 16, 2019, 09:09:31 AM »
No, I don't think so.

I guess because air travel has become SO safe, people tend to forget that they are miles above the earth, in an environment in which they normally would not survive, ensconced in a thin, thin, thin aluminum tube made up of tens of thousands of parts manufactured by the lowest bidder and, now that we are so far advanced, in a machine which depends on millions of lines of computer code to get them safely to their destination.

I mean...what could possibly go wrong?

Take the Lufthansa flight; an AOA sensor problem (sound familiar?) quickly handled by the crew with good systems knowledge and procedural knowledge. Ground the fleet? No, issue an AFM change and keep on flying. Pretty much exactly what Boeing has done, right? The key here? The crew.

Now look at the AirAsia accident. The rudder travel limiters malfunctioned. "The crew ignored the recommended procedure to deal with the problem and disengaged the autopilot which contributed to the subsequent loss of control." This potential problem (rudder limiter) had been foreseen and a procedure developed and trained. The key here is again the crew. Ground the fleet? No, ensure the crews are properly trained and keep on flying. Pretty much exactly what Boeing has done, right?

Note, I am absolutely NOT (at this point) placing blame on the Lion Air or Ethiopian crews. There is NO DATA at present that would delineate all the causal factors in those two accident chains. Was it a runaway MCAS? No one knows yet. If it was runaway MCAS, did the crews apply the appropriate procedure? No one knows yet.

What do we know? Well, we know there have been about 350 (total) Boeing MAX deliveries, starting in 2017. We can guesstimate those aircraft are put into service almost immediately and given the type routes they fly, they probably fly 6 or more legs (cycles) a day. So maybe in the last 12 months a huge number of cycles have been flown, maybe 700,00 or 800,000 cycles. (350 aircraft, 6 cycles per day, 365 days per year). A guesstimate but you get the idea. Since introduced there have probably been well over a million cycles of this aircraft type.

Then you have two accidents and suddenly the aircraft is totally unsafe. Uh...yeah.

As mentioned there are a very large number of potential causal factors. Assume for one moment (and I'm not saying it is true or pointing fingers at these two crews) that it WAS the failure of the crew to apply appropriate procedural knowledge. Are we going to blame Boeing and the aircraft for a crew failure to act correctly? Is there no "pilot error" anymore? (I realize "pilot error" is the go-to in just about every investigation.) Should we ground the fleet for pilot error? As pointed out in the Lufthansa AOA problem, there was just an AFM change and the fleet kept flying. Again, Boeing has already put out a FCOB that reinforces crew knowledge of an already existing procedure to counter the runaway MCAS problem.


 
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Offline Vraciu

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Re: More MAX information
« Reply #37 on: March 16, 2019, 09:20:57 AM »
FAA has some evidence that connects the two crashes.  Like everyone else is saying, the software kept trying to put the plane nose down.  See attached YouTube link for the CNN interview.



That's what it is SUPPOSED to do.

If you get it when you don't want it you follow the procedure in the NNC.  EVERYONE knows this.  If they don't they've no business in that cockpit.

« Last Edit: March 16, 2019, 09:24:36 AM by Vraciu »
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Offline Vraciu

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Re: More MAX information
« Reply #38 on: March 16, 2019, 09:22:15 AM »
My apologies to Puma for failing to correctly attribute the Graves comments to him as original poster.

Here's some interesting stalled aircraft data (admittedly from WIKI. Oh...and I'm not picking on Airbus, it's just one example):

"On 27 November 2008, XL Airways Germany Flight 888T, a test flight of an A320-232 stalled in a low speed test and control could not be regained, causing the aircraft to crash into the sea off the southern French coast. The aircraft was on lease by XL Airways and scheduled to be returned to Air New Zealand. All seven people aboard died."

"On 28 December 2014, Indonesia AirAsia Flight 8501, using an Airbus A320-216, from Juanda International Airport, Surabaya to Changi International Airport, Singapore, crashed into the Java Sea between the islands of Belitung and Borneo, killing all 162 on board. The cause was initially a malfunction in two of the plane's rudder travel limiter units which caused the plane to stall while encountering a thunderstorm. The crew ignored the recommended procedure to deal with the problem and disengaged the autopilot which contributed to the subsequent loss of control."

"On 5 November 2014, Lufthansa Flight 1829, an Airbus A321 was flying from Bilbao to Munich when the aircraft, while on autopilot, lowered the nose into a descent reaching 4000 fpm. The uncommanded pitch-down was caused by two angle of attack sensors that were jammed in their positions, causing the fly by wire protection to believe the aircraft entered a stall while it climbed through FL310. The Alpha Protection activated, forcing the aircraft to pitch down, which could not be corrected even by full stick input. The crew disconnected the related Air Data Units and were able to recover the aircraft.[41] The event was also reported in the German press several days before the Germanwings crash.[42] The German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU) reported on the incident on 17 March 2015 in a Bulletin publishing the flight data recorder and pitch control data in English and German. As a result of this incident an Airworthiness Directive made mandatory the Aircraft Flight Manual amended by the procedure the manufacturer had described in the FOT and the OEB and a subsequent information of flight crews prior to the next flight. EASA issued a similar Airworthiness Directive for the aircraft types A330/340."

Three stalls in the same basic aircraft type, A320/321. Two of those fatal/hull loss accidents. In two of those the programming appears faulty, in the other the crew did not use procedural knowledge to apply the correct procedure.

Anyone remember the A-320 family of aircraft getting grounded for these > seemingly <  related accidents/incident? I don't.

After the last one, there was an AD and a change to the AFM for the A321 that was expanded to the A330/340. Software issue anyone? Any groundings? The AirAsia and the Lufthansa were mere days apart.

Worthwhile to note that Boeing issued a similar type Flight Crew Ops Bulletin the day after the Lion Air crash.

From Boeing: "Boeing’s 737 MAX Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM) already outlines an existing procedure to safely handle the unlikely event of erroneous data coming from an angle of attack (AOA) sensor. The pilot will always be able to override the flight control law using electric trim or manual trim. In addition, it can be controlled through the use of the existing runaway stabilizer procedure as reinforced in the Operations Manual Bulletin (OMB) issued on Nov. 6, 2018."

#Burn

Quote

What do we know? Well, we know there have been about 350 (total) Boeing MAX deliveries, starting in 2017. We can guesstimate those aircraft are put into service almost immediately and given the type routes they fly, they probably fly 6 or more legs (cycles) a day. So maybe in the last 12 months a huge number of cycles have been flown, maybe 700,00 or 800,000 cycles. (350 aircraft, 6 cycles per day, 365 days per year). A guesstimate but you get the idea. Since introduced there have probably been well over a million cycles of this aircraft type.

Then you have two accidents and suddenly the aircraft is totally unsafe. Uh...yeah.

As mentioned there are a very large number of potential causal factors. Assume for one moment (and I'm not saying it is true or pointing fingers at these two crews) that it WAS the failure of the crew to apply appropriate procedural knowledge. Are we going to blame Boeing and the aircraft for a crew failure to act correctly? Is there no "pilot error" anymore? (I realize "pilot error" is the go-to in just about every investigation.) Should we ground the fleet for pilot error? As pointed out in the Lufthansa AOA problem, there was just an AFM change and the fleet kept flying. Again, Boeing has already put out a FCOB that reinforces crew knowledge of an already existing procedure to counter the runaway MCAS problem.

Exactly. 
« Last Edit: March 16, 2019, 09:28:10 AM by Vraciu »
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Offline zack1234

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Re: More MAX information
« Reply #39 on: March 16, 2019, 09:56:54 AM »
Anyone who believes anything on the news is a retard :old:

Fat is the new thin

I rest my case

If US planes are like their cars i rather not :old:
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Offline Puma44

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Re: More MAX information
« Reply #40 on: March 16, 2019, 10:48:22 AM »
FAA has some evidence that connects the two crashes.  Like everyone else is saying, the software kept trying to put the plane nose down.  See attached YouTube link for the CNN interview.



Hard to believe anything from CNN is factual vs agenda drivien.   “Like everyone is saying.....”. Nothing factual in a rumor that everyone is spreading.

There’s no link attached.
« Last Edit: March 16, 2019, 10:59:17 AM by Puma44 »



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Offline Puma44

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Re: More MAX information
« Reply #41 on: March 16, 2019, 10:54:11 AM »
My apologies to Puma for failing to correctly attribute the Graves comments to him as original poster.

Here's some interesting stalled aircraft data (admittedly from WIKI. Oh...and I'm not picking on Airbus, it's just one example):

"On 27 November 2008, XL Airways Germany Flight 888T, a test flight of an A320-232 stalled in a low speed test and control could not be regained, causing the aircraft to crash into the sea off the southern French coast. The aircraft was on lease by XL Airways and scheduled to be returned to Air New Zealand. All seven people aboard died."

"On 28 December 2014, Indonesia AirAsia Flight 8501, using an Airbus A320-216, from Juanda International Airport, Surabaya to Changi International Airport, Singapore, crashed into the Java Sea between the islands of Belitung and Borneo, killing all 162 on board. The cause was initially a malfunction in two of the plane's rudder travel limiter units which caused the plane to stall while encountering a thunderstorm. The crew ignored the recommended procedure to deal with the problem and disengaged the autopilot which contributed to the subsequent loss of control."

"On 5 November 2014, Lufthansa Flight 1829, an Airbus A321 was flying from Bilbao to Munich when the aircraft, while on autopilot, lowered the nose into a descent reaching 4000 fpm. The uncommanded pitch-down was caused by two angle of attack sensors that were jammed in their positions, causing the fly by wire protection to believe the aircraft entered a stall while it climbed through FL310. The Alpha Protection activated, forcing the aircraft to pitch down, which could not be corrected even by full stick input. The crew disconnected the related Air Data Units and were able to recover the aircraft.[41] The event was also reported in the German press several days before the Germanwings crash.[42] The German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU) reported on the incident on 17 March 2015 in a Bulletin publishing the flight data recorder and pitch control data in English and German. As a result of this incident an Airworthiness Directive made mandatory the Aircraft Flight Manual amended by the procedure the manufacturer had described in the FOT and the OEB and a subsequent information of flight crews prior to the next flight. EASA issued a similar Airworthiness Directive for the aircraft types A330/340."

Three stalls in the same basic aircraft type, A320/321. Two of those fatal/hull loss accidents. In two of those the programming appears faulty, in the other the crew did not use procedural knowledge to apply the correct procedure.

Anyone remember the A-320 family of aircraft getting grounded for these > seemingly <  related accidents/incident? I don't.

After the last one, there was an AD and a change to the AFM for the A321 that was expanded to the A330/340. Software issue anyone? Any groundings? The AirAsia and the Lufthansa were mere days apart.

Worthwhile to note that Boeing issued a similar type Flight Crew Ops Bulletin the day after the Lion Air crash.

From Boeing: "Boeing’s 737 MAX Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM) already outlines an existing procedure to safely handle the unlikely event of erroneous data coming from an angle of attack (AOA) sensor. The pilot will always be able to override the flight control law using electric trim or manual trim. In addition, it can be controlled through the use of the existing runaway stabilizer procedure as reinforced in the Operations Manual Bulletin (OMB) issued on Nov. 6, 2018."


No apology necessary, Toad.  I’m honored to be in the same room with Oldman.

To ground or not to ground.  Suggests the aroma of stinking politics where it obviously has no place.
« Last Edit: March 16, 2019, 10:59:54 AM by Puma44 »



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Offline Puma44

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Re: More MAX information
« Reply #42 on: March 16, 2019, 11:08:12 AM »
I was speaking to my sister-in-law yesterday. She’s a FA with WestJet which has 14 MAX 737’s. She was talking to a couple of her pilot friends and mentioned that they never use the AP for takeoff in the MAX because sometimes it gets a bit ‘wonky’. (Her words, not mine) and that they were just waiting for Boeing to fix the issue. They thought grounding them was kinda stupid as other aircraft had serious issues (before mentioned Airbus) and were never grounded and were flabbergasted why Europe was quick to join on the ban Boeing MAX and thought perhaps it was a political jab rather than a common sense approach.

Just food for thought - WestJet only hires x-military pilots or experienced civil with over 1000 commercial hours.



She most likely misunderstood what her pilot friend was saying.  The autopilot is never used for takeoff in the 737, or any other aircraft for that matter.  Far too many variables and instant control inputs for that to be considered safe.  What the pilot friend was most likely referring to was autopilot use during the climb at some point after takeoff.  My last flying gig required gear and flaps up and no earlier than 1,000 feet agl for autopilot engagement. 

As to “wonkeyness”, I never experienced anything of that nature, unless it was something I or the other pilot induced.  In that case, it was autopilot “OFF” (i.e., dummy down) and fly the jet.
« Last Edit: March 16, 2019, 11:14:50 AM by Puma44 »



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Offline Vraciu

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Re: More MAX information
« Reply #43 on: March 16, 2019, 11:50:04 AM »
Anyone who believes anything on the news is a retard :old:

Fat is the new thin

I rest my case

If US planes are like their cars i rather not :old:

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Offline ACE

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Re: More MAX information
« Reply #44 on: March 16, 2019, 12:11:58 PM »
Anyone who believes anything on the news is a retard :old:

Fat is the new thin

I rest my case

If US planes are like their cars i rather not :old:

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