Interesting read on 38

[Devil 505]

Using the exact same logic as everyone here.   

You cannot make a blanket statement that the P-38 was inferior to the Mustang just because the 8th AF alone had trouble with it. 

Don’t lecture me about statistics.   I used to do that for a living.   Why do you think I am objecting to the knee jerk 38 bashing?   Because it’s based on broad strokes purely devoid of context to explain them—nevermind ignoring contradictory evidence. 

(Also, off the top of my head I think the 479th went from the P-38 to the P-51 with no change in their performance.   I will have to check on that though as it may have been someone else.)

MTO Lightning’s were in the fight from basically day one (North Africa) of the 38’s full scale entry into the fight against the Germans and they outperformed (and outscored) fellow 47 and 51 units (combined) throughout the war.   The top scoring P-38 outfit in the MTO would have ranked in the top three (or four-ish) in the ETO, AHEAD of just about every 47, 51, and Spitfire equipped group.    The same context you’ll use to negate this achievement is the same one I’ll use to defend the airplane in the 8th.

I actually agree with your overall defense of the P-38. I just think that specific piece of evidence is weak for the reasons I gave. You may find that it does not actually support your argument if you dig into the specific details that you alluded to.



FYI, If you read Johannes Steinhoff's "Messerschmitts over Sicily, you will find that the German pilots, including Steinhoff himself, were of the opinion that the P-38 was superior to the 109G-6 in every regard.

[Vraciu]

I actually agree with your overall defense of the P-38. I just think that specific piece of evidence is weak for the reasons I gave. You may find that it does not actually support your argument if you dig into the specific details that you alluded to.

More specific details are difficult to type with two thumbs on a cellphone.

The general point is that for every 8th AF 38 group someone wants to bash we can point to one in the MTO having success with the same mission.  This means the truth lies beyond simply saying the P-38 was no good. 

FYI, If you read Johannes Steinhoff's "Messerschmitts over Sicily, you will find that the German pilots, including Steinhoff himself, were of the opinion that the P-38 was superior to the 109G-6 in every regard.

Much respect for his opinion, and I am not entirely surprised to hear it, but I’ll go against my own argument by saying his assertion isn’t monolithic.   However, Galland also ultimately considered the 109’s days over and advocated cessation of production.   

The P-38 was like a rock thrown into a pond.   The ripples it cast radiated out long after the rock was no longer plainly visible.   

[bozon]

...
This means the truth lies beyond simply saying the P-38 was no good. 
...

No one is saying simply THAT.
The argument is very specific to the special conditions in the ETO and the role of a high altitude escort fighter. P-38 records are pretty uniformly accepted to be steller regarding everything else it did.

[drgondog]

Using the exact same logic as everyone here.   

You cannot make a blanket statement that the P-38 was inferior to the Mustang just because the 8th AF alone had trouble with it. 

The only blanket statement that is still worthwhile based on the past exchanges is the P-38 failed to meet expectations for long range escort in the ETO - for a myriad of reasons (not 'ideas') as noted above. For your benefit, the emergence of the P-38 as the fighter everyone expected occurred after D-Day, specifically in July when the P-38 had a great day over Leipzig with Landers leading a sweep on July 7. The J-15 w/o dive flaps proved to be a nice airplane after months of thrashing aroung the engine/turbo/aftercooler issues and simplifying the fuel selection and installing the second generator for cockpit heating and redundancy. Had That airplane been available in that configuration October 1943 through D-Day, we wouldn't be having this discussion.

Don’t lecture me about statistics.   I used to do that for a living.   Why do you think I am objecting to the knee jerk 38 bashing?   Because it’s based on broad strokes purely devoid of context to explain them—nevermind ignoring contradictory evidence.

Prefer not to debate the statistical discussions here. I devoted a significant body of attention to the ETO focusing on the relative 'experience' of the P-38H/J, P-47C/D and P-51B through June 5, 1944 where my first volume ends. The primary sources were a.) 8th AF Operational Mission Summary Reports (a lot of reading and transcribing day to day 8th FC summaries imbedded, b.) Freemans 8th AF Mighty Eighth War Diary (Day by day compilation summary of the 8th mission reports), c.) Don Caldwell's Day Fighters - In Defense of the Reich which is a day by day LW mission summary as well as the credits and losses of the LW defending against the 8th and the 15th. 

For us to have a meaningful and historically accurate dialogue on the P-38's operational experience/wins/losses in the ETO, I feel that you have to at least absorb Freeman's War Diary and look carefully at the summary VC/loss data for each mission. He distilled the 8th AF Mission Summary Data to get there. He made some mistakes, I know I will also, but they won't be 'feelings or emotional' based on my admiration for the Mustang. 

(Also, off the top of my head I think the 479th went from the P-38 to the P-51 with no change in their performance.   I will have to check on that though as it may have been someone else.)

The 479th flourished in August/September 1944 under Zemke's leadership, and continued when the 479th converted to P-51 even after Zemke went down in T-Storm. By the way, as long as anecdotal references are made, consider that Zemke as a superb combat CO leading P-47/P-38 and P-51 FG a.) was 'irritated' that Schilling/Landry made decision Not to convert to P-51 while he was on leave in April/May and b.) stated that the Mustang was the superior escort fighter compared to the P-38/P-47 on basis of range and maneuverability/performance versus the LW fighters. See Freemans book "Zemke'.

Back to the 479th - In my book "Our Might Always", I show that the 479th emerged as the best air to air FG in context of VCs to air to air loss rate, It was far better statistically than the other 3 P-38 FGs and was at the top in Mustang comparisons.

MTO Lightning’s were in the fight from basically day one (North Africa) of the 38’s full scale entry into the fight against the Germans and they outperformed (and outscored) fellow 47 and 51 units (combined) throughout the war.   The top scoring P-38 outfit in the MTO would have ranked in the top five-ish in the ETO, AHEAD of just about every 47, 51, and Spitfire equipped group.    The same context you’ll use to negate this achievement is the same one I’ll use to defend the airplane in the 8th.

Actually, the P-38s operationally did Not outscore the Mustang FGs when they (31st, 52nd, 325th and 322nd) converted to Mustangs. See USAF 85, Olynyk's or my VC data base. One shocking statistic is the even the 332nd outscored the 1st, 14th and 82nd FG from their conversion date to P-51B/C in July 1944 through VE day. The P-38 groups were slower to have an all 'J-15, then -25, then P-38L' TO&E compared to 9th AF but were equipped with LE tanks on J-15s in May/June to be able to escort to Ploesti, for example. If you need  additional proof, pull the USAF 85 and do it the hard way, day by day, squadron by squadron to make the comparisons.

Those three FGs, which started in 8th and were ripped from Eaker in Fall 1942, carried the load in 1943 for 12th AF, before the formation of the 15th - and they carried the load in long range escort for the 15th until April 1944 when the 31st and 52nd converted from Spits, then the 325th from P-47s, then the 332nd from P-40/P-47s.

Last but not least. I'll have to go back and re-read Galland's various books for both the quote and context of Steinhoff comments about the P-38. My recollection is that during a Fighter Conference of Galland and his Gruppenkommodore/Gruppe leaders that all the Kanalfront/Germany leaders were expressing derision of the P-38 as an air fighter, Steinhoff demurred and stated that the P-38 was a 'dangerous foe' in the Med. I don't believe that he ever stated that the P-38 was better than the Bf 109G in every way.  That said, the P-38 with functioning engines Was a 'dangerous foe' in the hands of a good pilot. But, for all the reasons I stated above, including its large size and compressibility issues in the ETO, the 109 could frequently take advantage of the P-38 by choosing fight or flight, or simply split-ess in an unfavorable situation.

[Vraciu]

No one is saying simply THAT.
The argument is very specific to the special conditions in the ETO and the role of a high altitude escort fighter. P-38 records are pretty uniformly accepted to be steller regarding everything else it did.

I am seriously about to bang my head on the desk here.

You can not dismiss doctrinal mistakes and OPERATOR ERROR specifically by the 8th AF when airplanes in other commands PERFORMING THE SAME ROLE did just fine. 

The myriad reasons for this are not excuses as some people wish to believe.   They are valid REASONS.   The P-38 wasn’t the only airplane to suffer boneheaded decisions by commanders, either.   Yet despite all this, it’s mere presence made a tremendous difference. 

The reason the Lightning is claimed to not have lived up to its potential early on in the ETO (a claim that is accurate but more nuanced than it appears) is because it had so much potential to begin with. 

[Vraciu]

Actually, the P-38s operationally did Not outscore the Mustang FGs when they (31st, 52nd, 325th and 322nd) converted to Mustangs. See USAF 85, Olynyk's or my VC data base. One shocking statistic is the even the 332nd outscored the 1st, 14th and 82nd FG from their conversion date to P-51B/C in July 1944 through VE day. The P-38 groups were slower to have an all 'J-15, then -25, then P-38L' TO&E compared to 9th AF but were equipped with LE tanks on J-15s in May/June to be able to escort to Ploesti, for example. If you need  additional proof, pull the USAF 85 and do it the hard way, day by day, squadron by squadron to make the comparisons.

Those three FGs, which started in 8th and were ripped from Eaker in Fall 1942, carried the load in 1943 for 12th AF, before the formation of the 15th - and they carried the load in long range escort for the 15th until April 1944 when the 31st and 52nd converted from Spits, then the 325th from P-47s, then the 332nd from P-40/P-47s.

Last but not least. I'll have to go back and re-read Galland's various books for both the quote and context of Steinhoff comments about the P-38. My recollection is that during a Fighter Conference of Galland and his Gruppenkommodore/Gruppe leaders that all the Kanalfront/Germany leaders were expressing derision of the P-38 as an air fighter, Steinhoff demurred and stated that the P-38 was a 'dangerous foe' in the Med. I don't believe that he ever stated that the P-38 was better than the Bf 109G in every way.  That said, the P-38 with functioning engines Was a 'dangerous foe' in the hands of a good pilot. But, for all the reasons I stated above, including its large size and compressibility issues in the ETO, the 109 could frequently take advantage of the P-38 by choosing fight or flight, or simply split-ess in an unfavorable situation.

Good timeline.  I haven’t read some of this stuff in over two decades, unfortunately.  I’ll have to re-absorb it and fashion a response.   An analysis of these numbers would require other info to be precise (and I already have a dozen variables in my head that I would have to account for) but I am curious to know the comparative exchange rate once MTO Groups with Mustangs were fully involved compared to their Lightning brethren.

As to the rest...   Your inline quotes and some of this above makes many of my points and destroys oldman’s claim that these are “excuses”.

And yes, I agree, had the airplane of 1944 been around in 1942-43 the discussion would be different.    Ultimately, however, the Germans were at their nadir in November-December of 1943 or so.   In another six months they would be throwing 100-hour pilots into the fray. 

(Forcing a 109 to Split-S and run is a victory in and of itself, btw.   He’s out of the fight.   Those numbers cannot be accounted for anywhere except perhaps bomber loss rates.)

When a P-38 group is jumped, winds up fighting outnumbered 12:40 then 24:40, and takes down 16 Germans for the loss of 7 you cannot call that a failure by any measure.   You’ve just knocked a JG out of the war with losses you can replace but he cannot.   Sure, the LW can perhaps stick someone in the seat but that person is not as capable as the man he replaced. 

The P-38 in the 8th AF didn’t have to be a world-beater to be successful, it simply had to be there, but it was a lost opportunity to bend the curve further caused in part by self-inflicted wounds.

[hazmatt]

Utoh. I just found this:

Designated NA-99, the P-51A Mustang was ordered in numbers of 1,200 by the U.S. Army in August 1942. No ground attack here, no dive brakes, just pure fighter. This was the best fighter the U.S. had below 22,000 feet. This according to the AAF School of Applied Tactics at Orlando, FL.

http://www.mustangsmustangs.net/p-51/variants/p51a

[Vraciu]

Utoh. I just found this:

Designated NA-99, the P-51A Mustang was ordered in numbers of 1,200 by the U.S. Army in August 1942. No ground attack here, no dive brakes, just pure fighter. This was the best fighter the U.S. had below 22,000 feet. This according to the AAF School of Applied Tactics at Orlando, FL.

http://www.mustangsmustangs.net/p-51/variants/p51a

Which brings up another point.   Allison-powered airplanes of all kinds suffered performance problems at altitude.  The P-38 was the only one that ever solved it sufficiently until the advent of the F-82 (which itself took a performance hit compared to its Merlin-powered P-82 predecessors).

[mikeWe9a]

The reason all the Allison-engined fighters (except the P-38) did rather poorly at altitude was that the AAF was all-in on turbosuperchargers to the point that they never specified a two-stage mechanical supercharger for the Allison engine.  Only the P-38 and P-47 carried turbosuperchargers, and only the P-51 ended up with a two stage mechanical supercharger (mated to a British engine).  The P-39 was originally designed with a turbo for its Allison, but it was removed from the design by the AAF.

Mike

[drgondog]

Good timeline.  I haven’t read some of this stuff in over two decades, unfortunately.  I’ll have to re-absorb it and fashion a response.   An analysis of these numbers would require other info to be precise (and I already have a dozen variables in my head that I would have to account for) but I am curious to know the comparative exchange rate once MTO Groups with Mustangs were fully involved compared to their Lightning brethren.

As to the rest...   Your inline quotes and some of this above makes many of my points and destroys oldman’s claim that these are “excuses”.

And yes, I agree, had the airplane of 1944 been around in 1942-43 the discussion would be different.    Ultimately, however, the Germans were at their nadir in November-December of 1943 or so.   In another six months they would be throwing 100-hour pilots into the fray. 

(Forcing a 109 to Split-S and run is a victory in and of itself, btw.   He’s out of the fight.   Those numbers cannot be accounted for anywhere except perhaps bomber loss rates.)

When a P-38 group is jumped, winds up fighting outnumbered 12:40 then 24:40, and takes down 16 Germans for the loss of 7 you cannot call that a failure by any measure.   You’ve just knocked a JG out of the war with losses you can replace but he cannot.   Sure, the LW can perhaps stick someone in the seat but that person is not as capable as the man he replaced.

Vraciu - the very Best victory credit day for the P-38FGs in the ETO before July 7, 1944 was 11-3-1 vs 5 losses on March 18, 1944, another 11 vs 5 on 2-10-44. For 2-10-44 it was 20th 6 vs 4, 55th 5 vs 1.

For 3-18-44 it was 20th 7 vs 4, 55th 3 vs 1, 364th 1 vs 0.

As to LW losses, a high % bailed out and lived to fight another day. Zero % of the P-38 losses returned to fight, save some that ditched and were rescued by Allies.

The 'operational exchange' for P-38s in Nov/Dec 43, Jan 44 was 17 vs 17 for Nov; 4 vs 5 for Dec (with 2 FG); and 18 vs 22 (with 2 FG). In Feb 1944 prior to Big Wee it was 20 vs 19. Big Week through enf of Feb was 17 vs 6 (best month for combined P-38 FG's).

What day before July 7 did you have in mind for your '16 vs 7' scenario?   

The P-38 in the 8th AF didn’t have to be a world-beater to be successful, it simply had to be there, but it was a lost opportunity to bend the curve further caused in part by self-inflicted wounds.

Well, No. 'Success' was well defined by Spaatz/Doolittle for 8th FC based on D-Day imperatives - namely destroy the LW in the air and on the ground. Absolute air superiority over the Beach head was demanded by Eisenhower as a critical cusses factor - and air to air losses were insignificant to that imperative.

In contrast to first the shorter ranged P-47D, it was deficient by comparision to that metric. In comparison to the P-51B, both the P-47D and P-38J fell far behind the P-51B. By D-Day, the P-51B VC's over LW in air was close to the combined totals of both the P-47D and P-38J, and the comparisons became more pronounced as the P-51B/D dominated the long range escort role and P-38s started shipping to 9th AF and 15th AF in the MTO.

One cannot place the blame even largely on 8th AF leadership. They weren't 'trying to make the p-38 fail to meet expectations'.  If you want to find the root causes to the ETO high altitude issues, point to both Lockheed and Material Command for poor pre-operational testing for High Altitude cold engine and cockpit conditions in 1939 through 1943.

The Eglin Air Proving Ground yanked that testing away from Wright Field - but far too late to wring the P-38, P-47C/D and P-51B out BEFORE Cass Hough was handed 'buggy airplanes' in the ETO. The P-51B by comparison sorted out the primary engine/aftercooling issues in weeks, although the engine mount bolts and occasional man gear door opening in a dive were nasty surprises. A note here: The AAF never contemplated using the P-51B as long range escort until the crisis of Blitz Week made it clear that the B-17 could not really defend itself.

As to forcing a 109 or 190 to split ess as 'plus' - yeah but they simply out dove the P-38 and climbed back to get in the game again. When the P-38 went into compressibility control lock to evade, it was simply shot down by a faster chasing pilot with superior dive speed and controllability.

Summary, Arnold was not as previously noted. sanguine on the P-38 to perform the job in the ETO but he also had zero choice in July 1943 and issued the command that ETO/8th BC had priority on all subsequent P-38s produced, and ordered the P-51B to route to the ETO, then over rode Vice Air Marshall Leigh Mallory (via Portal) in making the P-51B, then  tasked to 9th AF as TAC, to be re-assigned TDY to 8th AF. He also ran roughshod over his TAC command at AAF-HQ by yanking the P-51B from battlefield supremacy to air supremacy - All Theatres.

On your question about MTO operations, I have all the VC's by all US operated a/c for 12th and 15th AF but do not have an accurate count on losses. I read and compiled data from 2000+ MACRs to get my ETO stats. Not enough years left to do the same for MTO.  If you doubt my bold comments that the 332nd Mustangs outscored each of the 15th AF P-38 FG's, pull your USAF 85 (not quite as good as Olynyk or my files - but the new stuff is synch'd with USAFHRC current data).
.

[Vraciu]

I cannot keep doing this if we are going to do inline responses.   It’s too hard to keep up and I lose track of all the things I have to refute.   Much of your info is simply wrong.   

"16 vs. 7" pre-July 07?  I'll do you one better.  29 January 1944, 20th FG went 10-1-1 for the lost of zero (or one, depending on the source).   

07 July, 1944, 20FG downed 25 of the 77 LW aircraft destroyed that day, the highest of any Group.

These seem to me to be examples of the potential for the airplane when flown by good pilots with capable leaders.  (This is not to say the 20th didn’t have its hands full any way, because it did.  It was taking on a formidable opponent and holding serve.)

The leadership doesn’t have to TRY to screw up, it simply has to make bad decisions.  This was done in spades for a long time until drop tanks were finally used to their potential and Doolittle started making changes to tactics.     This is common knowledge.   For someone writing a “history” book I am shocked that you seem oblivious to this.  The 8th AF’s record relative to their brethren in the MTO lies directly at the feet of its leadership along with other factors that are dismissed as “excuses” rather than resolvable causes.

The fight against the JG I mentioned resulted in their WITHDRAWAL.    (One of the German pilots said it was an absolute slaughter.  They were no match for the P-38s in their 190s.)   If German pilots were not lost then there would be no need to have done this—nor to ultimately put sub-100-hour noobs and bomber pilots into JGs to replace losses.   [I am not limiting my discussion to the ETO, either, so your attempt to discredit me doesn’t apply.]

The Germans could not replace their losses with equal pilots.   The Americans could. 

A 109 diving out of the furball is not going to “simply climb back up into the fight” but so be it.   Let him.  He'll just be that much closer to bingo and further out of position than where he started.  The reduction in bomber loss rate to 4% from a far higher average proves it worked.   The inability of the LW to do anything about it also proves it. 

Say what you want.  The P-38 WAS effective and anyone who says it wasn’t simply can’t do math or is driven by another agenda.     

(And nobody “simply” shoots down a P-38.   This isn’t an arcade game.  Outnumbered 5:1 and holding, for the sake of argument, a kill ratio around parity shows you’re not an easy kill.)

The P-38 was taking on peak-level opponents.   The Mustang came in as a relief pitcher with the benefit of a weakened foe, better ROE, and overwhelming numerical superiority, things the P-38 never had up to that point—if ever.


As for victory totals, the Jug flew twice as many sorties.  The P-51 nearly three times as many.  If both didn’t ultimately outscore the P-38 then something would seem dreadfully wrong.

[save]

It is interesting to look into victory claims compared with actual downed planes during the 43-45 time frame, the only book I can find that actually compare this is : The Lufwaffe over Germany, Defence of the Reich, ISBN 978-1-85367-712-0

"I am seriously about to bang my head on the desk here"
-film or it didn't happen 

[drgondog]

I cannot keep doing this if we are going to do inline responses.   It’s too hard to keep up and I lose track of all the things I have to refute.   Much of your info is simply wrong. 

Oh, did we take our white inspection gloves off and start thumping your chest? OK. 

"16 vs. 7" pre-July 07?  I'll do you one better.  29 January 1944, 20th FG went 10-1-1 for the lost of zero (or one, depending on the source). 

Not quite true. 29th claim of 10-0-1 reduced to 7-2-2. That said - I was pointing out that 11 VC was the Top combined Daily scores of all four operational P-38 Fighter Groups until July 7 - which I mentioned above (BTW the 19 of the total 26 score for P-38s belonged to the 55th FG led by Landers that day. The 20th had 7 and lost their top ace (7.33) James Morris to an Me 410.

As to sources, on VC's I use USAF 85 as publicly available for debates, but Olynyk and mine are exactly in line with current USAFHRC totals.  For losses I use the 7000+ MACRs for ETO VIII FC. For quick Bomber losses I use Freeman's M8 WD. For quick Fighter VCs and Losses I use Kent Miller's Fighter Units and Pilots of 8th AF. Kent also sifted through MACRs but our individual assignments vary - but largely agree.

Roger Freeman's compilations of VC's and losses for VIII BC far more accurate than his fighter data - because he used the Mission Summaries which correctly included CLAIMS but the 8th AF Victory Credits Board sifted them into AWARDS.  

07 July, 1944, 20FG downed 25 of the 77 LW aircraft destroyed that day, the highest of any Group.

Nope, BTW the next best day for the ETO P-38 was September 26th when the 479th scored 18 w/P-38 and 7 w/P-51 during their transition. The next best after that were the 11 score days - in 11 1/2 months of combat ops since October 15, 1943,

These seem to me to be examples of the potential for the airplane when flown by good pilots with capable leaders.  (This is not to say the 20th didn’t have its hands full any way, because it did.  It was taking on a formidable opponent and holding serve.)

On July 7, the 20th scored 2 Me 410a and 5 FW 190A-8 Sturms - heavily armored and 'sluggish' at high altitude - and the 8th AF top P-38 ace (Morris w/7.33) was shot down by the formidable Me 410 that he shot down. BTW, Morris was the Only P-38 pilot in ETO to shoot down four German fighters in a day.

As an aside, the top P-38 ace score in the MTO was 12 (Brezas 14thFG and Sloan 82nd FG) against combined Italian and German aircraft. 

The leadership doesn’t have to TRY to screw up, it simply has to make bad decisions.  This was done in spades for a long time until drop tanks were finally used to their potential and Doolittle started making changes to tactics.     This is common knowledge.   For someone writing a “history” book I am shocked that you seem oblivious to this.  The 8th AF’s record relative to their brethren in the MTO lies directly at the feet of its leadership along with other factors that are dismissed as “excuses” rather than resolvable causes.

Ahh no - and I devoted a considerable amount of print on this topic in my new book. First, the P-38E was first modified to carry 150 and 165 gallon tanks (and pressurize them) in 1941. All succeeding production P-38s were so equipped. The P-38H that arrived in ETO in Aug/September 1943 (20th and 55th) were so equipped. Doolittle didn't assume command of 8th AF until January 1944. Doolittle issued the 'Pursue and destroy' order in mid January and it formally went into effect on January 24th. Both Schmid and Galland stated separately that this was as close to a formal 'turning point' for the LW as could be dated. At this time there was one operational P-51B Fighter Group and two P-38 FG's operational in Dec and Jan, 1944. In those two months the 354th FG destroyed 52 and the 20th/55th Combined destroyed 37. The ratio for the next month with the 357th coming on board mid month prior to Big Week was 89.5 (P-51) to 32.5 (P-38). The ratio in March with 4 P-51 Groups and 3 P-38 Groups was 251 to 26. March is the very first month when P-51 sorties equaled the P-38 sorties.

Please be specific if you have 'bad leadership' in mind? Pretty serious accusation, isn't it?

The fight against the JG I mentioned resulted in their WITHDRAWAL.    (One of the German pilots said it was an absolute slaughter.  They were no match for the P-38s in their 190s.)   If German pilots were not lost then there would be no need to have done this—nor to ultimately put sub-100-hour noobs and bomber pilots into JGs to replace losses.   [I am not limiting my discussion to the ETO, either, so your attempt to discredit me doesn’t apply.]

Hmm - don't know what your sources are but I choose Prien, Caldwell and Muller for sanity checks. On January 29 during the Frankfurt mission, JG 1 was GROUNDED due to weather. The LW lost a total of 45 fighters as follows: Jagdivision lost 30 (no Fw 190s) - 19 Me 110s and 11 Bf 109s from JG 3 and JG 27 and JG106. Jagddivision 4 lost 11-  9 Fw 190s from JG2, 5 FW 190s from II./JG 26 and one Bf 109E from JG 107. If you wish to further avoid 'discrediting' please look to page 190 of Caldwell's "Day Fighters in Defense of the Reich". I recommend it as single best compilation of LW units defending against 8th and 15th AF.

The Germans could not replace their losses with equal pilots.   The Americans could.

Yep, true. That said (and you need to dig on this) the LW in defense of Germany drew on experienced units mostly by stripping the Russia and Med forces and moving them west - approximately 30 Staffeln between December and April alone - as well as re-trained bomber and transport pilots for replacement pool.

A 109 diving out of the furball is not going to “simply climb back up into the fight” but so be it.   Let him.  He'll just be that much closer to bingo and further out of position than where he started.  The reduction in bomber loss rate to 4% from a far higher average proves it worked.   The inability of the LW to do anything about it also proves it. 

Say what you want.  The P-38 WAS effective and anyone who says it wasn’t simply can’t do math or is driven by another agenda.     

(And nobody “simply” shoots down a P-38.   This isn’t an arcade game.  Outnumbered 5:1 and holding, for the sake of argument, a kill ratio around parity shows you’re not an easy kill.)

The P-38 was taking on peak-level opponents.   The Mustang came in as a relief pitcher with the benefit of a weakened foe, better ROE, and overwhelming numerical superiority, things the P-38 never had up to that point—if ever.

And yet you keep babbling on without sources and data for everyone to see what in hell you are talking about. Tell us when the peak level opponents disappeared' - was it like overnight on November 30th , 1943 - never to be seen again? Or what?  Please cite the sources for "5:1", define 'relief pitcher' - (normally brought in when the starter can't cut it - otherwise if the batting order is weak, why change)? ROE the same for P-38 and P-51 after December 1st but I have documented disparate results favoring equal Mustang sorties in December through March - against the same competition, same odds over the same targets, with same or LESS combat experience for the P-51 pilots until the 4th converted in late February after Big Week. 

Say again, what Didn't the P-38 have up 'to that point' - BTW, what is 'that point' - can you tell me which date(s) you are talking about?


As for victory totals, the Jug flew twice as many sorties.  The P-51 nearly three times as many.  If both didn’t ultimately outscore the P-38 then something would seem dreadfully wrong.

Vraciu - it seems that you are more 'comfortable' dealing in generalities.  Between October 15th 1943 and June 5th 1944 the P-38 flew APPROXIMATELY the same sortie total as the P-51B - both were initially 1:6 (P-38 October 1943 to P-47); 2 to 8 (P-38 to P-47), 1:8 (P-51 to P-47) on December 31, 1943; 2 to 9 for P-38, 1:9 for P-51 at end of January; 3 to 11 on the 1st of March for both the P-38 and P-51.  Are you still with me on this 'ratio thingy'?

March brought a ramp up of P-51 and 9th AF P-47s. April brought more P-51, P-38 and P-47 FGs into ops.

At the end of May the  combined 9th and 8th AF TO&E for P-38, P-47 and P-51 - ALL flying escort to the VIII BC - were six P-38 (20, 55, 364, 367, 370, and 479FGs); eight P-51 (4, 339, 352, 354, 355, 359, 361 and 363FGs); Fourteen P-47 (56, 78, 353, 356, 358, 362, 365, 366, 368, 371, 373, 404, 405 and 406FGs).  Sources Maurer-Maurer and Frank Olynyk. (They match)

So pick the months you want to whine about sortie balance, 'equal and relentless foe', 'foe with diminished capacity', target assignment mix, fighter pilot quality, etc.  Or as you are prone to do, whimper and say that 'there you go again - discrediting me'.

[drgondog]

It is interesting to look into victory claims compared with actual downed planes during the 43-45 time frame, the only book I can find that actually compare this is : The Lufwaffe over Germany, Defence of the Reich, ISBN 978-1-85367-712-0

"I am seriously about to bang my head on the desk here"
-film or it didn't happen 

Don C did an excellent job in his "Day Fighters in Defense of the Reich" - much better than LWOG, although I cite both' extensively in my new book.

Claims vs Credits vs Actuals study has been a significant part of my Historical research over the past 30 years.  I find that a best guess of 'actual 8th AF VC' vs 'recorded and published LW Losses, including Damaged and Damaged/repaired' yield about 85% of Awards.

I found two categories of discrepancy; The famous 'last seen smoking in a spin for Fw 190 - a favorite and documented evade maneuver by LW pilots, as well as a/c chased into ground for a crash landing. If that sucker didn't burn out it was liable to be back in service.

That said, IMO the 8th and 9th AF were Far more rigorous than all the other Air Forces (or USN for that matter). 

[save]

Trying to reproduce the spin-on-demand 300mph in the FW190-A8 in AH only produce a full roll to the left - losing 50mph, something I try to avoid since netlag produce an impossible target that settles behind the higher speed chaser that will become a target instead. I was not aware of that before Pervert told me, after his D9 got radiator hit during our melee sessions.