Russia, since about 2014, has relied heavily on the Battalion Tactical Group warfighting concept. This is no secret, it’s all over the internet. They continue to use it today in Ukraine.
What is incredibly interesting is that the Ukrainians appear to have cracked that nut and figured out to effectively counter it, and the Russians can’t do much about it due to baked-in vulnerabilities.
What is the Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) warfighting concept:
“The Russian battalion tactical group (BTG) is a modular tactical organization created from a garrisoned Russian Army brigade to deploy combat power to conflict zones. BTGs were typically effective in combat operations in Ukraine from 2013-2015, but on several occasions, BTGs were tactically defeated by Ukrainian regular-army units despite Russian overmatch in firepower, electronic warfare (EW) and air-defense artillery (ADA).“
“The BTG strategic imperative is to control terrain to shape post-conflict negotiations. When possible, the BTG commander will employ his strike assets to cause casualties to pressure his opponent to negotiate a settlement, but he must also preserve his own strength because it cannot be regenerated operationally and casualties are strategically expensive. To preserve combat power, BTGs employ a force of local paramilitary units as proxy forces to secure terrain and guard the BTG from direct and indirect attack. Although Russian tactical defeats were uncommon in 2014/2015 in Ukraine, and typically ended in an operational stalemate rather than decisive defeat, Ukrainian regular-army successes exist in sufficient number to suggest that Russian BTGs present tactical vulnerabilities that can be exploited by American brigade combat team (BCT) commanders:
1: Shortages in ready maneuver forces, especially infantry, significantly limit Russian maneuver capabilities. BTGs cannot simultaneously mass for offensive operations and maintain flank and rear security, and they struggle to concentrate artillery against attacks on multiple simultaneous axes.
2: Command-and-control (C2) limitations require the BTG commander to concentrate mission-command and intelligence assets to direct-fires and EW shaping efforts and strikes. These assets are employed selectively to substitute for offensive maneuvers, are not available across the entire BTG’s battlespace and can be overloaded by aggressive dispersion and displacement tactics.
3: BTGs cannot quickly regenerate combat power without cannibalizing other units in theater or garrison. Once BTG teams and units are degraded by casualties, they will rapidly lose effectiveness until completely reconstituted. In the face of a credible threat, BTG maneuver and support assets will likely be withdrawn and conserved for future use.” This is exactly what we’re seeing in videos out of Ukraine today, where Ukrainians show up on foot from the tree line or backyards, hit 3 or 4 vehicles, and then the BTG element turns around and withdraws.
Some specific vulnerabilities that were written about years ago, and we’re seeing today:
“BTG unit command is centralized but without a networked data set (real-time picture of the battlefield). Changes to the real-time picture are therefore difficult to disseminate. This can be countered by changing the battlefield as often as possible through deception, repositioning, and counter attacks.” – this is the hit the column and run back into the woods tactic that the Ukrainians are using.
“BTGs prefer to escalate contact only after thorough reconnaissance executed from behind a friendly proxy guard force, so as to conserve regular forces within the BTG, and retain the initiative.” – Ukraine 2022, the Russians have no friendly proxy. They had one in the Donbas in 2014 (the local Russian militias) and in Syria fighting ISIS in 2017 (the local Syrian militias and army). But not this time. They have zero proxy guard force. This is why the Russians are trying to import the Syrians into Ukraine. They need a proxy guard in order for the BTG concept to work.
“BTGs sustainment is ad hoc, under-resourced, and overburdened further by proxy forces. Medevac is extremely limited, if non-existent.” – This is why we’re seeing tank columns running out of gas, and Russian troops foraging for food.
“BTGs typically strike from behind a screen of proxy guard forces, because their strategic imperative is to control terrain to shape post-conflict negotiations. When possible, the BTG commander will employ his strike assets to cause mass casualties, pressuring his opponent to negotiate the settlement, but he must also preserve his own strength because it cannot be regenerated operationally and casualties are strategically expensive.” – hence, the shelling of civilians, with no headlong attack into Kyiv.
“The lack of infantry causes BTG commanders to prefer to isolate urban infantry strongpoints for prolonged sieges instead of assaulting to reduce them in the mode of Grozny (1999) or the American clearance of Fallujah (2004). BTGs address this shortfall by incorporating light-infantry militia from the local area.” – I.E. THE SYRIANS
“In the face of enemy penetrations on multiple axes, the BTG must withdraw to protect its fires and sustainment assets, which would abandon any proxy guard force. Opposing forces can then surround, isolate and reduce any proxy forces to seize their terrain. The combination of sustaining casualties, losing valuable equipment and abandoning territory would significantly erode the Russian negotiation position to an extent unacceptable to the BTG chain of command.” – The Ukrainians in 2022 are already halfway home on this point, because no proxy guard force was ever deployed.
In a nut shell, Ukraine appears to have the BTG concept by the throat. Yes, cities are getting bombed per doctrine, but the BTGs are not controlling much terrain, not over running Kyiv, and they’re getting shellacked from the tree line, from drones, and from behind sheds. Most critical is the fact that the Ukrainians are slowly eroding the Russians’ armored inventory, while losing nothing in return. In fact they're adding to their inventory. The Ukrainians are literally on foot in the woods, where the Russian armor can’t go to chase, and where the Russians won’t deploy infantry, because their warfighting concept says it’s too risky and they can’t afford the losses without support from the non-existent proxy guard.
And lastly, Putin’s inner circle of advisors are all pro-BTG men. They cooked up the idea. If it fails in 2022, there might be a lot of “turnover,” because their entire army is built around the BTG.
