Read this on MSNBC. Now that the war is all but certain to occur in the next 2 weeks, it is interesting to think of the aftermath of the diplomatic events of the past couple months, particularly with regards to Chirac and France.
I think that the current US administration are very much smarting over what happened in Europe. This war is not for US interests but world interests and the actions of France and Germany have probably prevented a peaceful resolution by giving Saddam encouragement to continue to defy the UN resolutions. This war is not the end of the greater war against terrorism, and the US is going to be thinking about ways to reward those that are supporting it in its efforts and also ways to show the world that not supporting it also has consequences.
As I write this, onboard an airplane somewhere over Texas, the latest news makes war seem very likely, perhaps by the time you read this post. Of course, we’ve seen enough false starts and apparent deadlines vanish that such predictions may deserve a grain of salt, or maybe several.
But let’s assume that war is coming, and that the United States will win. Neither, of course, is certain — nothing is in war, or diplomacy — but both seem likely. It’s worth thinking about what Jacques Chirac has accomplished with his anti-American diplomatic offensive, which even France’s foreign minister is said to have called the equivalent of shooting the United States in the back. I think the answer is “nothing good for France.”
It seems pretty clear what Chirac wants: a decline in American influence around the world, and particularly in and around Europe. (Chirac is even said, in terms unattractively redolent of Milosevic, to favor a kind of “cultural cleansing” to eliminate American intellectual and aesthetic influences.)
So will he get what he wants? Likely, the reverse. Had France kept its promises of the fall, and not tried to impede an American invasion, it would likely have retained a good deal of influence in Iraq. The Bush Administration would probably have wanted to encourage French involvement, in order to avoid the appearance of American imperialism and unilateralism. Given France’s historical ties to the region, and demands on American attention elsewhere, France might have wound up with more power in the world than it possessed before.
Now, however, France is likely to face being shut out of the region after an American victory. The Bush Administration will want to send the signal that crossing America is expensive, which will mean that France will not be invited in, and other Arab nations will quickly get the message that French connections are disfavored. And with large numbers of troops in Iraq, and de facto control of Iraqi oil production, the United States will have the power to make that sort of thing stick.
The United States will also do its best to cause trouble for the French in Europe, a place where Chirac’s arrogance has already made him enemies. Having learned the lessons of the winter — don’t participate in multilateral arrangements that include France — the United States will likely seek to create and strengthen alternative organizations to the U.N. and the E.U., and to keep the French out of a position of importance in NATO. And, one hopes, the United States may undertake diplomatic efforts to separate France from its quasi-colonies in Africa. And, again, a victorious United States will have the clout to accomplish a lot along these lines.
The likely result is a France more marginalized than ever. This probably won’t make the French any more pleasant or cooperative of course. But it won’t matter. And, quite possibly, neither will France.
