Pacific war question to ponder...

[Kevin14]

Yeah, it did the allies a favor, by bringing the US into the war of course, bit mistake for Japan

[Jack55]

An intact BB fleet might have been able to rescue the tens of thousands of troops trapped on the Philippine Islands, which would have really helped the war effort if they could have pulled it off.

[Oldman731]

Originally posted by Jack55
An intact BB fleet might have been able to rescue the tens of thousands of troops trapped on the Philippine Islands, which would have really helped the war effort if they could have pulled it off.

I think this was what both sides were planning before the war - the great battleship engagement somewhere around the Phillippines.  I do not hold much confidence that the US would have done well.

- oldman

[Sikboy]

Originally posted by Oldman731


I think this was what both sides were planning before the war - the great battleship engagement somewhere around the Phillippines.  I do not hold much confidence that the US would have done well.

- oldman

What are you talking about oldman? So long as the engagement took place in daylight, perfect weather, and the enemy didn't manuever, the US would have kicked the crap outta the IJN!

-Sikboy

[Mathman]

Carrier doctrine and its effective use were already being studied and devolped by the USN long before Pearl Harbor.  There were 2 exercises in the 30's that really proved the potential of carrier power.  There was a mock raid on the Panama Canal by planes from the Saratoga and an eerie mock raid on Pearl Harbor by planes from Lexington and Saratoga (I think those were the two carriers) that was very similar to what happened on December 7.

The loss of the battleships at Pearl only accelerated the development of the carrier doctrine used by the USN.  It did not cause it to actually occur.  There were many men in the upper echelons of the USN that were fighting to prove that the carrier was the capitol ship of the future, and this was well before the start of the war with Japan.

If you want to know more about this, I suggest reading "The Fast Carriers: the forging of an air navy."  It gives a lot of insight into what was going on behind the scenes in the USN prior to the start of the war and during the war.

[Sikboy]

In support of Mathman's contention that Carrier Warfare was being well thought out pre-WWII, In his book Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice Wayne, Hughes states that many of the Airdales had even overestimated the killing power of the CV before the war.

[from memory]
Prior to the outbreak of war, elements of the US Naval command considered that a CV would contain the offensive firepower to sink 3 carriers. That is, a Carrier had an offense/defense of 3/1. In the end though, it turned out to be closer to 1/1. In this case, Naval command hadn't underestimated the utility of the CV, but rather, overestimated it.

Sorry I don't have page number citations, but that book is packed away in a box at home lol.

-Sikboy

[Mathman]

As important as the carrier battles of '42 were, it was not until late '43 and '44 though that the power of the carrier was truly realized and appreciated.  As a matter of fact, Spruance was still thinking that there was going to be a major surface action as late as Operation Forager (the Marianas Campaign).

As interesting as this argument is, what I find even more interesting is the fact that given the impact that the 4 CV battles of '42 had on the course of the war, the admirals were still planing on a major surface engagement.  The reason for this seems to stem from the fact that major admirals (like Nimitz and Spruance) were the ones that were shaping doctrine and they had little personal experience with the air arm.

The political infighting between the brown shoes (airmen) and the black shoes (traditional navy) during the war was very bitter and deep.  Some very interesting conflicts (particularly concerning Admiral King) arose.  Some of them even seem so bad as to make me wonder how the war in the Pacific was won as quickly as it was (relatively speaking).

Anyways, this is a cool topic.

-math

[Sikboy]

Originally posted by Mathman
As important as the carrier battles of '42 were, it was not until late '43 and '44 though that the power of the carrier was truly realized and appreciated.  As a matter of fact, Spruance was still thinking that there was going to be a major surface action as late as Operation Forager (the Marianas Campaign).

Surigao Straight. Old School bellybutton kicking, Big Iron style. Also, while the CV battles of 42 can not be dismissed as unimportant, neither can the surface actions off Guadalcanal. Both elements were very important, and both contributed to the outcome of the campaign. Both sides also tended to overstate their cases as well. We can see this just by reviewing the missunderstanding of CV offensive power I noted above, as well as the Insistance on maintaining "plan orange" as the likely head of a IJN USN clash.

Air Vs. Surface power is a constantly changing animal. In 1941 Air held all the cards. The BBs lost at Pearl were not designed to defend themselves from Air Attack. But the new battleships coming out were. By the time we got to the Iowa, fugettaboutit.
!!!WARNING!!! COUNTERFACTUAL, REHTORICAL QUESTION AHEAD!!!
I'd be interested to see how the attack would have gone had the BBs at Pearl had adiquate AA defenses. And we're not just looking at shear number of guns, but also at things like proximity fuses on AA shells.

This point-counterpoint advance of Air vs. Surface power has yet to abait. In the late 70's Air power once again held all the cards. But by the 1986 launching of the USS Bunker Hill (The only ship I ever served on, had to work it in here somehow lol). the SPY-1 Radar/SM2 Missile/Verticle launch system had taken the lead. Since then, Airpower has been working to regain superiority. New Air-launched missiles coming out of Russia have been desigined to get past Aegis. But not to worry, the race continues, as the next generation of Air Defense system is developed.

I guess that my whole point is that these things change much faster than Beauracracy does. And while our technology may be ready to fight todays war, often our policy is ready for yesterdays.

-Sikboy