The British ordered their Lightnings without "handed" engines and counter rotating props. This caused several problems with flight characteristics. Further, the U.S. forbid Lockheed to sell Lightnings to the British with turbochargers. That killed performance at altitudes. Engineers at Lockheed told the sales staff to turn down the invitation to bid for the contract with the RAF because of the specifications and the turbochargers. However, the U.S. government in fact actually pressured Lockheed to sell P-38s (then called the Atlanta by Lockheed) to the British, and sales and management of Lockheed, eager to sell anything, willingly followed the desires of the government. The British called the P-38 "Lightning", by the way.
Regarding Spit vs. Lightning mock combat there were TWO incidents and not one.
Tony Levier, Lockheed chief TEST pilot, challenged and British COMBAT pilot. They merged co alt, and the experienced British combat pilot handed Levier his ass. Test pilots only knew what could be done with the plane, not how to fight with it. Levier was there for TWO reasons. The first was to teach the poorly trained pilots how to fly on one engine. The second was to find out what the combat pilots thought the P-38 needed.
John Lowell challenged a British ace to a mock duel, and they merged co alt and co E at 5K. Lowell proceeded to get on the British pilot's tail and could not be shaken, he handed the British pilot his ass, by no small margin. Eventually, the British pilot did a 45 degree Split S and ran like Hell, Lowell follwed, reportedly almost hitting the ground, and broke off as the British pilot ran. There were dozens of witnesses.
Regarding Galland and his opinion of the P-38, John Lowell handed Galland HIS bellybutton too. And Galland engaged with altitude and speed advantages. Read the account in "Top Gun", by CMH winner General Joe Foss. Galland acknowledged the event in front of dozens of witnesses.
Lawrence Blumer shot down 6 German planes in a span of under 15 minutes, his kills are believed to include German ace Rudi Dassau (sp?). Blumer and his unit were also lower and slower than their opponents.
No one ever claimed there was any titanium in P-38s, but they did have a massive stainless steel spar, and were noted for their ability to withstand collisions with other planes and with telephone poles etc.
Yes, a few P-38L-5-Lo Lightnings were deployed to Europe.
The truth is that many missions in the Pacific included altitudes in excess of 25,000 feet in their profile. It's no warmer at 25-30K over Rabaul, than it is at 25-30K over Bremen.
The Merlin would not have been an improvement for the P-38, in fact, high altitude performance would have been significantly REDUCED. Further, the early Merlin P-51 was no more reliable than the Allison in the P-38. And at least you had two of them. Merlins were notorious for cracking heads and dumping their coolant. If the head cracks on a Merlin in a P-51, the engine will sieze within about 5 minutes in most cases. They were also notorious for fouling plugs.
The P-38s overall record in Europe, even with the 8th AF, was 4 to 6 German planes destroyed for every Lightning lost. Hardly a failure.
The biggest problem for the P-38 in Europe, aside from poor pilot training, was the general staff of the 8th AF. The 8th AF as a whole was less than stellar until after Doolittle took over from Spatz, after Spatz had already replaced another poor performer, whose name escapes me. Doolittle's biggest complaint with the P-38 was its need for more maintenance than the P-47 and P-51, and the fact that the Pacific theatre was getting so many P-38s that there were not enough for the 8th AF to get enough. This was because the War Production Board had assigned Lockheed to handle second source production and development of the B-17. Then they assigned Consolidated Vultee to second source production of the P-38. The logic behind this decision is obviously flawed. There was no valid reason to cut Lockheed's capacity to produce P-38s, and then ask a company geared towards the production of bombers and flying boats to produce the most complex fighter of the era. Unfortunately, the combination of poor leadership and management by the 8th AF, the poor training of pilots, and the lack of available P-38s reduced the effectiveness of the P-38 in Europe.
The USAAF and the War Production Board often forced substandard parts on Lockheed and other companies, and also denied them the opportunity to make improvements. Early on, the WPB and the USAAF provided the wrong turbochargers for the P-38. Later, when it was proven that the Hamilton Standard props offered significant performance and reliability gains on the P-38, along with a reduction in maintnenace needs, the WPB refused to allow Lockheed to use them. Further, the poor performance of Consolidated Vultee as a second source for the P-38 (they only produced 113), prevented Lockheed from shutting down production for short periods, and hence running changes could not be made. The P-38 was in such high demand, the WPB would not allow Lockheed to stop production even for a few days.
The later versions of the P-38 (from J-20-Lo on) had solved almost every significant problem the P-38 had. However, most, if not all, of those problems had already been solved by the P-38K, in EARLY 1943. However, again, the WPB refused to allow Lockheed ANY time to stop production to bring the P-38K into production. Note that K comes AFTER J, and in fact the J was ready far earlier than when it entered production. The J should have begin production in late 1942, and the K should have been in production by April of 1943 at the latest. However, the J was just barely approaching production.
The P-38 should have entered service with the 8th AF in August of 1943 at the LATEST, with at least FOUR groups , not ONE, hastily rushed into service in October. They should have been flying the P-38J-10-Lo (at least, if not the K), and not the P-38G and P-38H models. In fact, by mid 1943, or late 1943 at the latest, the P-38 being produced should have been the K model, or an L version that was an improvement on the K. As it was, the K is actually superior in performance to even the L-10-Lo model. And further upgrades available at the time the K SHOULD have been in production would have been even better props.
Regarding the complexity of flying the P-38, as far back as EARLY 1943, Lockheed had made several improvements.
The first was thermostatic control of the doors for the oil coolers, the intercoolers, and the radiators. Because pilots were poorly trained, they were flying the P-38 in cruise conditions with the oil cooler doors open, the throttles set to full rich, and the radiators set for near maximum cooling. This caused the P-38 to: foul plugs, have runaway turbochargers (because the turbo is controlled by oil, and the cold oil congealed in the regulators), stumble and lose power on throttle application, detonate, burn valves, burn excessive fuel, and be unable to respond to pilot input attempting to transition from cruise to combat. Operating the P-38 at the correct temperature solved all of those problems, and even improved cockpit heating.
The second was dive flaps, allowing the P-38 to follow the German planes in dives above 20,000 feet.
The third was a second generator on the #2 engine. The sorry Curtiss Electric props supplied to Lockheed by the USAAF and the WPB, despite vehement protest by Lockheed, overloaded the electrical system of the P-38, one generator was not truly capable of supplying enough power to operate the props and the rest of the electrical equipment.
Fourth was a "combat master control", for lack of a better term. This system allowe the pilot to switch all systems on both engines from cruise operation to combat in one easy motion with one hand.
Fifth was the replacement of the Curtiss Electric props with the Hamiloton Standard hydrostatic high activity paddle prop. Not only was the Hamilton Standard prop more reliable, but it offered significant increases in all areas of performance, tops speed, climb, acceleration, and fuel efficiency
Sixth was the K-14 "no miss um" gun site.
Despite several requests by commanders in the field, who practically BEGGED for them, items 4, 5, and 6 were NEVER allowed on the P-38 due to the WPB and the USAAF.
Regarding the "quality of the opponent and his equipment" arguement comparing the Germans to the Japanese, SEVERAL pilots who flew against BOTH German AND Japanese opponents considered the Japanese to be AT LEAST equal to the Germans. These were experienced veteran combat pilots with kills against BOTH opponents.
The difference in the leadership between the 5th AF in the Pacific under Gen. Kenney vs. the 8th AF under Spatz and his predecessors. Kenney LOVED the P-38 and his "mission", and he instilled confidence in his pilots and his staff regarding the P-38, and did not blame the shortcomings of the 5th AF and its personnel on the P-38. Kenney also continually went stateside and fought to get P-38s. Spatz, and his predecessors, on the other hand, blamed all of their problems on the P-47 at first and then the P-38, despite the fact that the P-38 performed admirably everywhere but under the 8th.
No, the P-38 was not a glowing success in Europe with the 8th AF, but neither was it a failure, nor a pushover for its German opponents, when flown by pilots properly trained and skilled. There were plenty of P-38 aces in Europe, and they didn't all pad their scores with inexperienced and poorly trained Germans either. John Lowell, Jack Ilfrey, Robin Olds, Larry Blumer, and many others did just fine in the P-38 against the best the Luftwaffe had to offer in men and equipment.
