Excellent Article on How Well the Republican Guard Fought Last Time

[Dune]

I agree with the author's intro, too many people (inluding me to some extant) have gotten the idea that Coalition Forces just rolled up the Iraqis in the First Persian Gulf War.  As you will read about combat between the US VII Corp and the Iraqi Tawakalna Division, the Iraqis fought hard and died bravely.  It was not the walk over it perhaps has become in our minds.  And now we expect it to be again.

This is the intro the article "CORRECTING MYTHS ABOUT THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: THE LAST STAND OF THE TAWAKALNA" by  Stephen A. Bourque.

Several myths about the Persian Gulf War still linger years after its conclusion. One is that the ground war was a relatively simple, high-tech campaign; another is that the air campaign essentially destroyed the Iraqi Army; and the third and most important is that the Iraqi Army did not fight, but simply surrendered at the approach of the coalition's forces. This paper argues that the Iraqi Army, and especially the Republican Guard, fought bravely but ineptly against the overwhelming combat power of a better trained and equipped US Army.

This article attempts to dispel a number of myths about the way the Iraqi Republican Guard fought during the Gulf War of 1991. The Republican Guard has been President Saddam Husayn's premier striking force and one of the pillars upon which the continuation of his regime has depended. It was formed in the 1970s as a small force to defend the capital and the president. At that time, only men from Saddam Husayn's hometown of Takrit were eligible for membership. During the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, the regime opened the Guard to college students from throughout Iraq. Most of these recruits, who had enjoyed college deferments, had never been part of the grueling defensive warfare on the Iranian front. Trained only in offensive warfare, their high motivation was obvious in the decisive victory over Iran on the Faw Peninsula. The Iraqi High Command retrained, re-equipped and enlarged the Republican Guard so that by 1990 it had grown to three armored-mechanized divisions and five infantry divisions. The three armored mechanized divisions included the Tawakalna Division, which fought against the entire US 7th Corps as described in this article; the Medina Armored Division, which battled the 1st US Armored Division on the afternoon of 27 February 1991 west of the Al-Ruqta oil field; and the Hammurabi Armored Division, which fought against the 24th US Mechanized Division at Al-Tawr al-Hammar, on 2 March 1991, after the cease-fire.

Here is the rest of the article.

[Toad]

Interesting read.

[Suave]

Good article.

To find out what was going on, the Tawakalna commander sent his reconnaissance battalion towards the approaching enemy.8 Initial reports, which the Iraqi commander received from various sources, indicated that the approaching force was from the French 6th Light Armored Division.9 By the early morning of 26 February, however, the Tawakalna commander had received enough information to know that he was not facing the French.

Tojours Pret

[Fuzzybunny]

thanks for the post, interesting read.

[Raubvogel]

In my recollection of 73 Easting, they got their tulips thoroughly kicked. They might have tried  to fight hard, but they were totally out-fought, out-gunned, and out-classed.

[Toad]

I don't think the article disputes your view Raub. It just points out that in a relatively hopeless situation.. basically 3 US divisions against 1 Iraqi RG division, they did not just cut and run.

[Raubvogel]

True, they fought back. My point is this: 1 armored cavalry troop destroyed a whole Iraqi armored battalion. That pattern repeated itself throughout the war. I'd expect no less, and probably more this time around.

[Dune]

I agree.  The US units were better trained, equiped and led.  They used their advantages as a force multiplier and destroyed units with greater numbers at the point of attack (even though the overall numbers in the general battle favored the US).  What the article does show is that
1. The RG just didn't drop their guns and go running back to Baghdad.  They had to be defeated.  In many cases, killed at their weapons.
2. The US depended on suprise and numbers to aid them.  Two things they don't have as much of this time.

I posted this just to prove the point that many of the Iraqis will fight, just as they did last time.  We have a better army and we'll win, but to underestimate them is foolish.

[Monk]

Hmmmmmm.............. Dejavu?