Well .... you can take the "East" out of Germany but you apparently can't take the "East" out of some of it's citizenry.
THE STASI
AND TERRORISM
A SWIFT U.S. REACTION
The U.S. government's verbal reaction to the massacre was immediate: President Ronald Reagan called Qaddafi a "flaky barbarian." The State Department charged that the East German government could have prevented the bombing. The U.S.
Ambassador to West Germany, Richard Burt, said radio intercepts by U.S. intelligence proved that the attackers had come from East Berlin.
Damage control became a matter of the highest priority for the East German government. On April 9, Wiegand received an unsigned top secret document from General Kratsch. The colonel surmised that the paper had originated with Honecker, the chief of state and party boss. It said:
Based on the unusually sharp political reaction of the USA toward the DDR and the USSR shortly before and after the attack in West Berlin, as well as the initial public announcements by the USA ambassador in Bonn, Richard Burt, it can be concluded that this incident will be used to strengthen the lies about terrorism. It must be expected that "evidence" will be produced.
Attempts by the USA to enlist their West European allies in a united front against Libya having failed, it appears now that the intention is to use the "West Berlin example" for a new effort. The activities of the imperialist media (film requests from ARD/ZDF [West German TV networks] and requests for interviews from Reuter [the British news agency] point to the preparation of a
major campaign to discredit the DDR and its socialist allies.
The document concluded that "further escalation must be expected" and therefore, that "possible action [on the part of the DDR] toward the Libyan side must be considered." In addition, DDR reaction, "especially toward the USA, must demonstrate that the relations between the DDR and third countries are its own
sovereign affair."
Honecker was correct in saying that the European countries had refused to join an economic embargo or any other action against Libya, as had been urged by various U.S. missions, including one headed by Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead. They were undoubtedly influenced in that decision by their own economic ties with Libya. Italy was Libya's largest trading partner, with trade amounting to US$4.353 billion annually, followed by West Germany with US$2.881 billion. In total, the European Common Market imported Libyan oil and gas valued
at US$6.4 billion a year and exported US$3.8 billion worth of varied goods. There were 40,000 Europeans living in Libya at the time.
Wiegand realized that his country's leadership feared a severe American reaction to their coddling of terrorists. The colonel read on and was astounded that he was being ordered to "take necessary action against militant forces within the Libyan People's Bureau only after such action will no longer convey the
impression that it is a reaction to the demands of the USA."
Wiegand noted with satisfaction that Mielke had finally agreed that it was "urgently necessary to stop the misuse of diplomatic immunity by representatives of Arab embassies." Nevertheless, the schizophrenia of the East German communist leadership came to fore once more in this paragraph of the document: Considering
the fact that effective interstate relations commenced only at the beginning of 1986 but have already resulted in considerable economic advantages for the DDR, necessary political steps in connection with the LPB must be in the form of friendly and frank talks. Any impression that the DDR is giving the slightest consideration to American interests must be avoided. All necessary political steps toward the Libyans must be explained as DDR measures designed to guarantee the safety of the People's Bureau and to prevent anti-Libyan activities by the
imperialists.
Honecker's anger over the political fallout resulting from the policy that had made the bombing possible was perceptible. Yet, Wiegand noted, ambiguities remained in that policy. Wiegand interpreted the instructions as saying, "Go ahead and wash the bear, but don't get his fur wet." General Kratsch telephoned
him to ask whether he understood the situation, and before hanging up, he admonished Wiegand to follow instructions to the letter: "For heaven's sake, don't do anything that would make the Libyans think we are allying ourselves with the Americans," he told Wiegand. "Remember, the main enemy is the American
imperialists. They are attacking; Libya is not attacking the USA." Wiegand repeatedly heard Mielke say the same thing many times. Now Kratsch was using the Stasi chief's words verbatim.
The East German government had realized that it was being adversely affected by its alliance with extremist politics and terrorism, and the leadership was distressed. Facing the leadership, however, was the sacrosanct basic political and ideological position of solidarity in the "battle against imperialism and support of national liberation movements." This position did not provide the impetus to pursue consequent and clear actions to disassociate the government from dangerous entanglements.
It was in character, therefore, that Honecker would issue a statement on April 10 in which he condemned terrorism, and in a blatant attempt to shift blame, urged that West Berlin police and customs exercise proper border controls. He knew, of course, that the Western allies had never recognized his wall as a
legal border, and adhering to the right of free and unhindered access, would never check anyone who was crossing from the East.
