Thks for the answer, Bubba

However, talking about this, Regensburg and Schweinfurt are the examples of unescorted buff raids.
August '43 raids (Regensburg and Schewinfurt) saw losses of 12 and 14%. This does not take into account write-offs, just planes shot down.
October '43 (Schweinfurt) saw losses of 25% of bombers. After this last one operation, the whole strategy was revamped.
From Juanuary 44 onwards P38's were assigned to escort duties and the whole objective of bomber raids switched from destroying military targets to provoke the answer of german fighters. In fact, destroying german fighters was a precondition for the bombardments to be effective.
German air defense peaked in February 44, but the fate was sealed. Allied air raids targeted Berlin to make german fighter defense engage, and have them destroyed by escorting fighters. Bombers alone can do very little to fighters, as it had previously been shown. Take a look at the
statistics of this period, and you will see that from march/april '44 onwards bombers losses are increasingly due to Flak, while the defense fighter's role is steadily decreasing.
After german air defense was destroyed, and only after that, B-17's and B-24's of 8th AF were allowed to pound hard Germany's industry. Even in this situation, the results were questionable, bearing in mind that Germany industrial output peaked in the second half of 1.944.
It is a personal opinion, but I think that aerial bombardment at those times was tremendously effective to break people's morale, but was quite inneffective when it came to effectively disrupt the weapons industry and war production.
Anyway, and back to the point, IMHO, World War II facts tend to prove that bombers were helpless against fighters and, especially, to interceptors, thus needed an escorting force with adequate proportions to answer to expected air opposition.
Of course, I am just a history aficionado, and ready to accept any correction of more qualified oppinions.
