Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => Aircraft and Vehicles => Topic started by: iTunes on November 06, 2008, 06:13:05 PM
-
Hi guys :)
I was reading about the Allied Air raids over Germany and it got me thinking about how on earth did the Axis powers manufacture anything? When you see the photos of the desctruction the Bombers made, It makes you wonder.
And what sort of production times where the Axis pushing for gettting an Aircraft from the Factory to the front lines?
-
The used railway tunnels, old mines, and alot of other underground locations. Even at the last the Germans were turning out alot of fighters.
-
This is just for new built 109s.
1944
Jan - 932 > 30/day average
Feb - 715 > 24.7/day average
Mar - 804
Apr - 1006
May - 1065
June - 1230
Jul - 1043
Aug - 1374
Sept - 1718
Oct - 1793 > 57.8/day average
Nov - 1558
Dec - 1147
1945
Jan - 1221
Feb - 876
Mar - 716
Total - 17017 for 456 days or 37.3 per day average or 1.56 a/c per hr average
I'll let you do the calculations for the other months.
The K-4 was produced for 7 months. In that time 1593 had been produced. That is an average of 227.6 per month.
Mtt Regensburg produced 3812 in 14 months (Jan 44 to Feb 45) or an average of 272.3 per month.
Bf 109 Neubau
Subtype Factory 1944 1945 > Totals
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar
G 5 Erla 50 63 56 6 2 * * * 60 * * * * * * > 237
G 5/R2 Erla Scheduled-not built * * * * * * * * * * > 0
G 6 Mttr 430 309 135 343 550 659 662 260 242 50 53 109 1 9 * > 3812
G 6 Erla 291 270 203 200 319 300 305 * * 106 295 * 64 * * > 2353
G 6 WNF Scheduled-not built > 0
G 6/R2 WNF * * * * * * * * * * 130 * 2 * > 132
G 6/U2 Erla * * * * * * * 38 3 1 1 * * * > 43
G 6/U4 WNF 119 51 303 404 118 144 240 33 40 14 * * * * > 1466
G 6/U4 Györ * * * * * * * 16 15 * * * * * > 31
G 6AS Mttr * * * * * * * * 1 * * * * * > 1
Ga 6 Györ 42 6 50 14 17 17 30 * * * * * * * * > 176
G 8 WNF * 16 57 39 * * * * * * * * * * * > 112
G 8/R5 WNF * * * * 59 110 111 208 92 77 21 67 * 63 107 > 915
G 8/R5 GYör * * * * * * * 29 2 * * * * * > 31
G 8/U3 WNF * * * * * * * * * 1 * * * * > 1
G 10 Erla * * * * * * * 1 52 279 67 103 38 4 > 544
G 10 Mttr * * * * * * * * 4 108 62 3 * * > 177
G 10/R6 Erla * * * * * * * * * * 49 191 269 178 284 > 971
G 10/U4 WNF * * * * * * * * * * * * 129 132 95 > 356
G 14 Mttr * * * * * * 440 144 30 59 11 1 157 47 > 889
G 14 Erla * * * * * * 232 472 339 25 * 78 * * > 1146
G 14/U4 WNF * * * * * * * 59 148 219 98 56 11 2 > 593
G 14/U4 GYör * * * * * * * * 32 * * * * * > 32
G 14/U4 KöB * * * * * * * * * 9 20 * * * 29
G 14AS Mttr * * * * * * * * 303 379 101 203 211 62 11 > 1270
G 14AS Erla * * * * * * * * 95 9 3 * * * > 107
K 2 Erla Scheduled-not built * * * * * * * * * * * > 0
K 2 WNF Scheduled-not built * * * * * * * * * * * > 0
K 3 Erla Scheduled-not built * * * * * * * * * * * > 0
K 3/R2 Erla Scheduled-not built * * * * * * * * * * * > 0
K 4 Mttr * * * * * * * 15 293 221 325 338 233 168 > 1593
Totals 932 715 804 1006 1065 1230 1043 1374 1718 1793 1558 1147 1221 876 716 > 17017
-
1, They were Germans. Ever been to Germany?
2, They used slave labor, and stolen resources, from an entire Industrialized continent they over-ran.
3, Albert Speer. The man was an organizational genius. He wrote a book that is must reading for anyone interested in the war.
The really fascinating thing is the fact that German production didn't even begin fully mobilizing for war until 1942. Hitler gave Speer vast power over war production and he turned out to be the right guy at the right time for the Nazi war machine.
Add to that the fact that reducing such a vast Industrialized empire was a tall order for Yank and Brit bomber crews whom were also basically inventing the doctrine of the strategic air offensive at the very same time they were fighting it. They had to deal with a lot of bad weather, fierce opposition, and lastly the fact that dropping bombs from 25,000' in B-17s, while your being shot at, wasn't exactly precision work.
We tend to view history thru the foggy lenses of modern times. Nowdays we can send 100 bombers in, each armed with dozens of 2,000 lb JDAMs, and wreck any kind of target or Industrial base. Back then it was far harder to do.
But the real answer to your question would be the reorganization/mobilization of German industry under Albert Speer.
-
They would have been better off to centralize their production in what worked as well. They spent alot of effort amd manufacturing to build an attachment to thee MP40/MP43/MP44 which allowed them to be shot around corners...
-
Speer?
The ONLY book to be read is this one:
"The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe: The Life of Field Marshal Erhard Milch". If you've read it, you know what I mean, if you haven't, get it.
-
This is just for new built 109s.
1944
Jan - 932 > 30/day average
Feb - 715 > 24.7/day average
Mar - 804
Apr - 1006
May - 1065
June - 1230
Jul - 1043
Aug - 1374
Sept - 1718
Oct - 1793 > 57.8/day average
Nov - 1558
Dec - 1147
1945
Jan - 1221
Feb - 876
Mar - 716
Total - 17017 for 456 days or 37.3 per day average or 1.56 a/c per hr average
I'll let you do the calculations for the other months.
The K-4 was produced for 7 months. In that time 1593 had been produced. That is an average of 227.6 per month.
Mtt Regensburg produced 3812 in 14 months (Jan 44 to Feb 45) or an average of 272.3 per month.
Bf 109 Neubau
Subtype Factory 1944 1945 > Totals
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar
G 5 Erla 50 63 56 6 2 * * * 60 * * * * * * > 237
G 5/R2 Erla Scheduled-not built * * * * * * * * * * > 0
G 6 Mttr 430 309 135 343 550 659 662 260 242 50 53 109 1 9 * > 3812
G 6 Erla 291 270 203 200 319 300 305 * * 106 295 * 64 * * > 2353
G 6 WNF Scheduled-not built > 0
G 6/R2 WNF * * * * * * * * * * 130 * 2 * > 132
G 6/U2 Erla * * * * * * * 38 3 1 1 * * * > 43
G 6/U4 WNF 119 51 303 404 118 144 240 33 40 14 * * * * > 1466
G 6/U4 Györ * * * * * * * 16 15 * * * * * > 31
G 6AS Mttr * * * * * * * * 1 * * * * * > 1
Ga 6 Györ 42 6 50 14 17 17 30 * * * * * * * * > 176
G 8 WNF * 16 57 39 * * * * * * * * * * * > 112
G 8/R5 WNF * * * * 59 110 111 208 92 77 21 67 * 63 107 > 915
G 8/R5 GYör * * * * * * * 29 2 * * * * * > 31
G 8/U3 WNF * * * * * * * * * 1 * * * * > 1
G 10 Erla * * * * * * * 1 52 279 67 103 38 4 > 544
G 10 Mttr * * * * * * * * 4 108 62 3 * * > 177
G 10/R6 Erla * * * * * * * * * * 49 191 269 178 284 > 971
G 10/U4 WNF * * * * * * * * * * * * 129 132 95 > 356
G 14 Mttr * * * * * * 440 144 30 59 11 1 157 47 > 889
G 14 Erla * * * * * * 232 472 339 25 * 78 * * > 1146
G 14/U4 WNF * * * * * * * 59 148 219 98 56 11 2 > 593
G 14/U4 GYör * * * * * * * * 32 * * * * * > 32
G 14/U4 KöB * * * * * * * * * 9 20 * * * 29
G 14AS Mttr * * * * * * * * 303 379 101 203 211 62 11 > 1270
G 14AS Erla * * * * * * * * 95 9 3 * * * > 107
K 2 Erla Scheduled-not built * * * * * * * * * * * > 0
K 2 WNF Scheduled-not built * * * * * * * * * * * > 0
K 3 Erla Scheduled-not built * * * * * * * * * * * > 0
K 3/R2 Erla Scheduled-not built * * * * * * * * * * * > 0
K 4 Mttr * * * * * * * 15 293 221 325 338 233 168 > 1593
Totals 932 715 804 1006 1065 1230 1043 1374 1718 1793 1558 1147 1221 876 716 > 17017
Milo, I'm just curious as to where you got this info. I've been looking for info relating to this.
Thanks, Choppit.
-
choppit, it was in a thread on this board, http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=2462&highlight=bf+109+neubau&page=3
post #28
-
Thank you very much Milo.
-
1944 Oct - 1793 > 57.8/day average
thats very impressive
-
Speer?
The ONLY book to be read is this one:
"The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe: The Life of Field Marshal Erhard Milch". If you've read it, you know what I mean, if you haven't, get it.
Well obviously you read it but didn't even attempt to answer the question.
The original poster asked for more then just aircraft production. But even aircraft production depended on the centralized principles, managed by competent experts, in the component production chain, that Speer's improvisations made possible. ALL of German war production benefited by Speer's genius.
-
Well obviously you read it but didn't even attempt to answer the question.
The original poster asked for more then just aircraft production. But even aircraft production depended on the centralized principles, managed by competent experts, in the component production chain, that Speer's improvisations made possible. ALL of German war production benefited by Speer's genius.
Wiki Erhard Milch. Where do you think Speer "looked"? Milch was the absolute backbone of the War Machine, but Hitler needed his hands in too many pies.
-
wiki
At the outbreak of World War II Milch, now with the rank of general, commanded a Luftwaffe wing during the Norwegian campaign. Following the defeat of France, Milch was promoted to field-marshal (Generalfeldmarschall) and given the title Air Inspector General. Milch was put in charge of the production of planes during this time, and his many mistakes were key to the loss of German air superiority as the war progressed[citation needed]. Due to changing the designs and aircraft requirements frequently, manufacturers like Messerschmitt were unable to focus on aircraft output. Germany produced fewer than 5,000 planes during 1942, whereas Russia increased its aircraft production to over 40,000, leading to a change of superiority on the Eastern Front. Interestingly, during 1944, when Allied bombers were razing German factories and cities, aircraft production moved up to over 40,000, comparable with the Soviets, but too late.
wiki
After Minister of Armaments and War Production Fritz Todt died in a plane crash in February 1942, Hitler appointed Speer as his successor to all of his posts.
Speer ranked higher than Milch.
-
I don't have time but to give a quick reply for the moment. For an outstanding discourse on the German war economy I would highly recommend "The Wages of Destruction" by Adam Tooze.
According to Tooze the time to manufacture an airplane from raw material to finished aircraft was a minimum of 6 months.
Regarding German aircraft production... the wiki reference that Milo quoted is patently incorrect. Milch is much more responsible for laying the groudwork for the increased production of aircraft than is Speers.
When I have more time I'll put together more details.
Tango, XO
412th FS Braunco Mustangs
-
I am just astounded at those production numbers, To think that they actually Increased in 1944 is amazing, Like Rich said, they must have been using Factories all over Europe to sustain that level of production, I just wonder how the heck they transported the sheer volume of new Aircraft around and then got them to where they should be.
-
Wiki Erhard Milch. Where do you think Speer "looked"? Milch was the absolute backbone of the War Machine, but Hitler needed his hands in too many pies.
I know who he is. He is one of the "experts" I referred to that Speer brought in. Speer was ruthless in rooting out hacks and bureaucrats from important positions in the war economy. Instead he relied heavily on weapons experts and other highly qualified individuals. To the end Speer fought for this type of leadership in the war economy and amassed himself considerable power over all aspect of German Industrial production. Hitler would sign Speer's requests without even reading them.
Thats how Speer was able to do the end around with Hitlers scorched earth orders. At least partially.
-
I know who he is. He is one of the "experts" I referred to that Speer brought in. Speer was ruthless in rooting out hacks and bureaucrats from important positions in the war economy. Instead he relied heavily on weapons experts and other highly qualified individuals.
Milch was definitely not one of the experts appointed by Speer. Milch who was the former head of Luftansa was appointed to lead the RLM in the early 1930’s. Goering eventually usurped Milch’s power with Ernst Udet. In 1939 Udet was given the responsibility for aircraft development and production in the RLM. However Udet eventually committed suicide in 1941 and Milch regained his leadership in the RLM.
Milch, and German Aircraft Production Efficiency
Speers has been popularly credited with the "armaments miracle" in Germany including the increase in aircraft production despite the Combined Bomber Offensive. Upon inspection this is a very inaccurate view of what happened.
Speers claimed that the aircraft production was inefficient until he and his Reich Armament Ministry were able to get control of it from Milch and the Reich Air Ministry (RLM). This is false.
It was Milch who was responsible for driving efficiencies in German aircraft production. This was primarily in response to the threatening strategic problem of the coming air war against the West. Roosevelt’s call in May 1940 for the US to produce 3,000 aircraft per month and reaching a production level of 50,000 per year shocked the RLM. Though the US was not at war with Germany yet, this air power could be leveraged by the UK. In the autumn of 1940 the RLM along with concerned German industrialists embarked on various schemes to increase the production of aircraft to counter the threat.
This threat only increased as time progressed with Western aircraft production becoming reality. Milch and the RLM responded throughout the course of the war changing the RLM production program to continually increase production time and again. The following table summarizes the RLM production plan summary for single engine fighters.
(http://thetongsweb.net/images/sefighterprogram.jpg)
As can be seen the RLM changed its single engine fighter production program multiple times throughout the course of the war. Just from March 1941 (Program 19) to December 1943 (Program 225/1) it planned for fighter production from a peak of 400 per month to nearly 3000 per month. This was planned all before the Jagerstab (Fighter Staff) was formed in Feb 1944 nominally headed by Speer to oversee fighter production.
To meet these planned production increases Milch took action. In May 1941 he created the Industrierat, the industrial council of the Air Mininstry. Milch placed William Werner, an efficiency expert from the auto-industry into BMW to supervise engine development after BMW suffered a series of disasters. Heinrich Koppenberg, Willy Messerschmitt, and Ernst Heinkel were all removed from managerial control of Junkers, Messerschmitt and Heinkel through various means. Thus the RLM gained direct control of the aircraft industry.
Milch also created the system of manufacturing rings to optimize aircraft manufacturing efficiency. The rings organized airframe, aero-engines, and aircraft equipment manufacturing under various managers (Frydag, Werner, and Heyne) with the objective of adopting more mass production practices and reducing waste. Frydag, Werner, and Heyne were all experts in their respective fields in mass production including time spent with Chrysler and General Electric.
With these instruments of rationalization of the aircraft industry in place, Milch could also focus the aircraft production on a few models to enable mass assembly and increase production output. For instance the Luftwaffe air staff was horrified by Milch plans to increase the production of the He-111 which they considered an outdated aircraft. Also the RLM dropped the Me-210 program and chose to focus on mass producing the Bf-109 instead. These were all expedients to increase production sacrificing quality for quantity.
Milch’s efforts to rationalize the German aircraft industry bore fruit. Between early 1942 to 1943 aircraft production more than doubled from 1,000 to 2,000 aircraft per month. Comparing single engine fighter production between Feb 1942 and Feb 1943 monthly output jumped from 273 to 725 fighters per month. And unlike the rest of the German armaments industry this was done with only a small increase in labor and no increase in raw material allocation, a real indication of production efficiency.
This however still doesn’t explain the increase in German fighter production under the USAAF and RAF Combined Bomber Offensive in 1944. I’ll explore this topic in a subsequent post.
Tango, XO
412th FS Braunco Mustangs
-
Tango's post is excellent, but it does invite a comparison for reference.
In March of 1945, Grumman rolled out 605 F6F-5s from a single production line (the F7F was in production too). This was the Allied record for a single type produced in a single factory. It's quite probable that it is the single greatest monthly delivery of a single type from one factory regardless of nation. That's 1.2 fighters per hour (over two 8 hour shifts). Grumman was, per employee, the most productive aircraft manufacturer in the U.S. during the war.
Lean manufacturing gurus still study Grumman's methods and often point to their production methods as being shining examples of maximum yield from available resources.
My regards,
Widewing
-
Cottage Industry taken to a whole new level.
Also bombing back then was a very inexact science.
It is said that 9 out of 10 bombs dropped landed 1/2 mile or more from their intended target.
Especially so early in the war.
-
Considering that USAAF bomber formations, depending on which year, could be from ~1000 to ~2000' across. No precision bombing their.
-
Also as a point of comparison, the US alone turned out 9,000 aircraft in March 1944.
The German's faced bigger problems in finding qualified pilots and fuel rather than production of airframes.
Regarding delivery of aircraft to their operational bases, the Germans used a little bit of everything. By late in the war, some aircraft were being shipped by horse-drawn wagons.
-
Milch was definitely not one of the experts appointed by Speer. Milch who was the former head of Luftansa was appointed to lead the RLM in the early 1930’s. Goering eventually usurped Milch’s power with Ernst Udet. In 1939 Udet was given the responsibility for aircraft development and production in the RLM. However Udet eventually committed suicide in 1941 and Milch regained his leadership in the RLM.
Milch, and German Aircraft Production Efficiency
Speers has been popularly credited with the "armaments miracle" in Germany including the increase in aircraft production despite the Combined Bomber Offensive. Upon inspection this is a very inaccurate view of what happened.
Speers claimed that the aircraft production was inefficient until he and his Reich Armament Ministry were able to get control of it from Milch and the Reich Air Ministry (RLM). This is false.
It was Milch who was responsible for driving efficiencies in German aircraft production. This was primarily in response to the threatening strategic problem of the coming air war against the West. Roosevelt’s call in May 1940 for the US to produce 3,000 aircraft per month and reaching a production level of 50,000 per year shocked the RLM. Though the US was not at war with Germany yet, this air power could be leveraged by the UK. In the autumn of 1940 the RLM along with concerned German industrialists embarked on various schemes to increase the production of aircraft to counter the threat.
This threat only increased as time progressed with Western aircraft production becoming reality. Milch and the RLM responded throughout the course of the war changing the RLM production program to continually increase production time and again. The following table summarizes the RLM production plan summary for single engine fighters.
(http://thetongsweb.net/images/sefighterprogram.jpg)
As can be seen the RLM changed its single engine fighter production program multiple times throughout the course of the war. Just from March 1941 (Program 19) to December 1943 (Program 225/1) it planned for fighter production from a peak of 400 per month to nearly 3000 per month. This was planned all before the Jagerstab (Fighter Staff) was formed in Feb 1944 nominally headed by Speer to oversee fighter production.
To meet these planned production increases Milch took action. In May 1941 he created the Industrierat, the industrial council of the Air Mininstry. Milch placed William Werner, an efficiency expert from the auto-industry into BMW to supervise engine development after BMW suffered a series of disasters. Heinrich Koppenberg, Willy Messerschmitt, and Ernst Heinkel were all removed from managerial control of Junkers, Messerschmitt and Heinkel through various means. Thus the RLM gained direct control of the aircraft industry.
Milch also created the system of manufacturing rings to optimize aircraft manufacturing efficiency. The rings organized airframe, aero-engines, and aircraft equipment manufacturing under various managers (Frydag, Werner, and Heyne) with the objective of adopting more mass production practices and reducing waste. Frydag, Werner, and Heyne were all experts in their respective fields in mass production including time spent with Chrysler and General Electric.
With these instruments of rationalization of the aircraft industry in place, Milch could also focus the aircraft production on a few models to enable mass assembly and increase production output. For instance the Luftwaffe air staff was horrified by Milch plans to increase the production of the He-111 which they considered an outdated aircraft. Also the RLM dropped the Me-210 program and chose to focus on mass producing the Bf-109 instead. These were all expedients to increase production sacrificing quality for quantity.
Milch’s efforts to rationalize the German aircraft industry bore fruit. Between early 1942 to 1943 aircraft production more than doubled from 1,000 to 2,000 aircraft per month. Comparing single engine fighter production between Feb 1942 and Feb 1943 monthly output jumped from 273 to 725 fighters per month. And unlike the rest of the German armaments industry this was done with only a small increase in labor and no increase in raw material allocation, a real indication of production efficiency.
This however still doesn’t explain the increase in German fighter production under the USAAF and RAF Combined Bomber Offensive in 1944. I’ll explore this topic in a subsequent post.
Tango, XO
412th FS Braunco Mustangs
I knew others out there realized Milch received less credit than he deserved. :devil
-
Actually its true that Speer didn't appoint Milch but something happened to him, he was sacked or something, and he ended up getting his career saved by Speer, "I forget the details". It was typical of Speer however that he would recognize such talent.
I said Speer was the driving force behind all of German war production. He was the guy in charge who appointed the people to run the different industries, and he was the one who set Policy. The original question I first answered went beyond just aircraft production. Or at least I thought it did. Obviously Speer wasn't himself directly responsible for the aircraft quotas reached.
-
Actually its true that Speer didn't appoint Milch but something happened to him, he was sacked or something, and he ended up getting his career saved by Speer, "I forget the details". It was typical of Speer however that he would recognize such talent.
I said Speer was the driving force behind all of German war production. He was the guy in charge who appointed the people to run the different industries, and he was the one who set Policy. The original question I first answered went beyond just aircraft production. Or at least I thought it did. Obviously Speer wasn't himself directly responsible for the aircraft quotas reached.
All Speer did, was get credit for Milch's work.
-
All Speer did, was get credit for Milch's work.
Speer got credit for a lot more then aircraft production.
-
The following is a chart summarizing the previously presented tabular data of German single-engine fighter production vs. planned production programs. Faced with the overwhelming numbers of aircraft produced by the US and the UK, Milch and the RLM sought to counter by increasing German aircraft production. As a result peak production increased by 50% from 1941 to 1942, and doubled from 1942 to 1943. Peak monthly single engine fighter production rose to a high of 1,000 aircraft per month.
(http://thetongsweb.net/images/exi-1e.jpg)
The combined bomber offensive in summer and autumn of 1943 blunted this production resulting in a decline of monthly output mid-year to a low point of 560 fighters per month in December. However In 1944 fighter production recovered dramatically peaking at 3,031 fighters a month in September. The question is how did the Reich achieve this while under the punishing bomber offensive that resumed in 1944?
There are several major reasons for the startling increase in fighter production throughout 1944: the rationalization of the aircraft industry and increases in planned production prior to 1944, dispersion of aircraft production factories, re-allocation of key raw materials and resources, and the increase in labor and productivity.
Aircraft Industry Rationalization & Planning
As we’ve seen Milch and the RLM rationalized the German aircraft industry in an effort to bolster production. As a result fighter production Increased production from 1941 to 1943. But Milch didn’t intend to level off production at just the peak 1943 levels. The RLM also planned for continued increases in aircraft production well into 1944.
The RLM production program change in Aug 1943 (Program 223/1) called for fighter output of 1,646 fighters starting in Jan 44 and peaking at 3,418 in Dec 44. This is an important point. The minimum time for manufacturing an aircraft from raw material to finished product was 6 months which meant materials and labor had to be planned for and acquired at least 6 months in advance of projected productions. The materials and labor were already in the pipeline in late 1943 to produce the necessary fighter output for 1944. The RLM had already put the machinery in motion for a dramatic increase in fighters in 1943, well ahead of when Speer and the Jagerstab took charge in March 1944. Thanks to prior planning the German fighter production in 1944 took advantage of the capacity already laid in place in preparation.
Dispersion of Aircraft Manufacturing
Though the machinery was set in place for increased fighter production, the Allied Combined Bomber Offensive in the summer and fall of 1943 greatly reduced fighter production in the 2nd half of 1943. The RLM rationalization programs resulted in the physical concentration of aircraft manufacturing facilities which left it vulnerable to air attack. The Allies certainly took notice and targeted it to good effect though the RAF and USAAF also paid dearly in bombers and crews lost in the effort.
The Germans also took notice as well. RLM production Program 223/1 increase in Aug 15, 1943 was in partial response to massive air threat that the Reich faced as the RAF and USAAF aimed at crippling the German industry. Dramatic increases in numbers of fighters were needed to counter the Allied threat. Besides increasing fighter output the RLM also planned for the dispersion of the aircraft industry to reduce the vulnerability to Allied air attack. The plan called for the dispersion of the main 27 aircraft plants to 729 smaller plants. By then end of 1944 the actual number of plants moved to was about 300. Similarly the aero-engine industry was dispersed from 51 plants to 249 locations.
Some novel concepts of dispersion also included the use of underground facilities. The Mittelwerke facility, the Daimler-Benz’s Goldfischewerke near Heidelburg, and the Junkers plant at Tarthun near Magdeburg were examples of these facilities. Plants were also dispersed and moved to forests in an attempt to hide them though they were built and mainly available only in the last months of the war.
Speer, Raw Material Allocation, and the Jagerstab
Dispersion of aircraft manufacturing plants reduced vulnerability to attack in 1944, but these factories could not have produced the dramatic increase in fighter output in 1944 without the input of key raw materials. The war continually placed increasing strain on the German economy. To manage the strain throughout the war the German economy was increasingly rationalized overtime until it was centrally directed by a smaller and smaller group of people organized under Albert Speer. Speer became the Armaments Minister in 1942 after Fritz Todt died in an airplane accident. Speer developed increasing control of the basics of supply and production in Germany, namely the allocation of labor and raw materials.
The German war economy operated under the same principles that exist today, namely production is a function of capital, labor, and raw materials. The following chart compares German ammunition production to the steel allocated for ammunition production demonstrating how ammunition output correlated to the amount of steel allocated for production of ammunition.
(http://thetongsweb.net/images/ammunition.jpg)
Speer’s control of Germany’s raw material allocation was a major factor in his “armaments miracle”. What Speer accomplished with the rationalization of the steel industry typifies the methods he used to affect armaments production. In 1942 Speer effectively averted a crisis in the availability of steel. In early 1942 the realization that Germany needed to mobilize the economy for a long war resulted in major increases needed in armaments production. These drastic changes created major havoc in the availability of steel to meet the new demands. The drastic increase in steel demand created chaos in the supply chain. Arms producers were given even more entitlements to steel than there was actual supply. Steel producers provided steel to various arms producers without a coherent view of what programs were priority for the Reich.
Something had to be done. Speer formed the Reichsvereiningung Eisen (RVE) to tackle the problems of insufficient steel production and incoherent steel allocation. Through the RVE all steel allocations were to be based on 90% of steel production with a 10% left to be diverted to priority contracts. Steel allocation was redistributed. Allocation for non-armaments was cut by more than a quarter to the consternation of the civilian economic administration. Moreover associated industries and labor were also harnessed under the Armaments Ministry.
Further changes in steel allocation were coming as Speer focused attention onto tank production. Increases in tank production had already been planned in 1941 for. In 1942 the target was further increased calling for 600 Panthers, 50 Tigers, 150 light tanks, and 600 assault guns and self-propelled artillery per month by early 1944. After Stalingrad Hitler doubled this figure. It was through the leverage of the RVE that Speer was able to announce the infamous Adolf Hitler Panzer Programme in Jan 1943. To meet the demand Speer created the Panzer Programme and used the RVE and his increased powers to prioritize steel allocation to Tanks. Thus was born the concept of “Panzer priority” with steel allocations prioritized for contracts so labeled. Tank production received priority on steel allocation over other parts of the war economy. Even the Luftwaffe resorted to applying “Panzer priority” to aircraft production to circumvent issues with aero-engine crankshaft deliveries in competition with tank manufacturing.
At the beginning of 1944 desperately needing more fighters to combat the Allied air offensive. Under these circumstances and facing ever increasing aircraft production difficulties Milch swallowed his pride and threw in the Air Ministry’s lot with Speer and the Armaments Ministry. The Jagerstab (Fighter Staff), was formed. From February 1944 the aircraft industry also became benefactors of Speer and the Armaments Ministry’s powers of prioritization in raw materials, labor, food, and transport capacity. This unfettered allocation of these resources allowed fighter production to continue to increase throughout 1944. For instance aluminum allocation to the aircraft industry was 45% in 1939 and ramped up to 60% in 1944. Thus Speer was a factor and contributed to the rising fighter production in 1944. Of course the Speer legacy paints a very different account of the contribution. However in a rare moment Speer admitted in an interview in June 1944 stating “I have to add…that here an alteration in the system has taken place on the quiet, in that from February we have, as we have done in the other industries, brought in capacities from the armour and Panzer industries into the aircraft industry. This is the reason, in my opinion, for the speedy recovery.” As Adam Tooze states, “…it was Speer’s jealously guarded control over key resources and his ability to confer “Panzer priority” that was the truly decisive factor.”
-
Increase In Labor and Productivity
As we have seen that the rationalization of the aircraft industry and RLM program changes laid the foundation for production increases, the dispersion of aircraft manufacturing plants reduced the destruction of production capability under bombing, and the re-allocation of raw materials fed the increases in fighter production in 1944. But it took manpower to actually produce aircraft. And in 1944 an increase in manpower and productivity also played a key factor in the rebound of German fighter production.
The following chart demonstrates the correlation between Germany’s arms production and the application of labor. As is demonstrated by the data there is a general correlation between the amount of labor applied and the amount of total armaments produced including aircraft. Labor is obviously an important factor in armaments production.
(http://thetongsweb.net/images/labor.jpg)
Here is data collected from two different sources on aircraft manufacturing manpower. Both indicate that between 1943 and 1944 the aircraft industry increased by roughly 100,000 workers, a significant jump in labor. According to data from the USSBS there is an increase of 23%.
(http://thetongsweb.net/images/rlm-labor.jpg)
Not only was manpower increased, but the work hours were increased as well. For the majority of the war the German war economy remained at basically one shift. However by the Spring of 1944 a 72-hour work week was instituted across the majority of the aircraft industry.
The increase in labor and productivity deserves some examination. So far our discussion of the German war economy has remained innocuous centering on rationalization of industries, fundamental economic concepts, and ministrial intrigues. However in exploring the question of German labor mobilization we will come face to face with the sinister realities of the German war economy which deserves retelling. I will address this in a follow up post.
Tango, XO
412th FS Braunco Mustangs
-
Good stuff dtango. :aok Thanks for taking the time and effort.
-
Speer got credit for a lot more then aircraft production.
I have to agree there. Milch layed the ground work and was pivotal in keeping fighter production up. Speer kept fighter production and the economy going through the bombs.
-
Actually Milch caught some heat over the air war in the east. If I remember my history correctly he was even sacked, " tho maybe I'm wrong". Frankly he needed allies in '44 if he was going to keep his say in the Luftwaffe and in production. The alliance with Speer was a natural to happen. And Speer? Speer just plain recognized talent. Both were remarkable men. And both flourished in a bureaucracy that was rife with its mean little Politics and infighting.
Course it didn't hurt that Hitler himself had publicly stated he would sign anything coming from Speer without even reading the request. And later generations of Germans should understand that it was Speer that helped grantee the post war German economic miracle by blocking Hitlers moronic self destruction orders for the German economy. But I digress, and probably overlook his involvement in war crimes. Of which he was guilty as sin. But none of this has any place in the discussion.
Im going from memory here and am to busy watching football to research. Do feel free to correct me. :salute
-
Gladly, Milch flew out to the Eastern Front and remedied the "logistical snafu" that happened. He corrected it, came home and they had another and that was the beginning of The End for the 3rd Reich.
-
Very Interesting reading guys, quick question, how did the Allies manage to come up with Axis production nunbers and do you think there was a team of Production experts sitting in an office in the UK working out how much damage was being done to Axis production by each bomb dropped?
-
...quick question, how did the Allies manage to come up with Axis production nunbers and do you think there was a team of Production experts sitting in an office in the UK working out how much damage was being done to Axis production by each bomb dropped?
Quick answer: yes, more or less. The USAAF Committee of Operations Analysis (COA), OSS Economic Objective Unit (EOU), and the British Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) all employed economists who studied various parts of the German war economy. They were the ones who came up with the target lists.
ULTRA, other signal intelligence, and human intelligence provided info regarding damage assessments. The backbone of assessments however came from photo interpretation which was conducted through the Allied Central Interpretation Unit (ACIU) in the UK. Usually 3 levels of photo intelligence was conducted with the 3rd level focusing on the strategic and economic impacts. It was all educated guesses requiring not only lots of data collected prior to the war but estimates throughout. Damage to the German aircraft industry was over optimistic while the it was spot on regarding damage to the oil industry.
Tango, XO
412th FS Braunco Mustangs
-
Not sure if this will work - taken from a site which presents text, tables and exhibits from the USSBS Aircraft Division report:
Table V-7
Comparison of Allied Intelligence Estimates of German Aircraft Production with Actual Production
(Average monthly figures for six month intervals)
Single-Engine Fighters Total Aircraft Production
Allied Intelligence Allied Intelligence
Estimate Actual Estimates Actual
1st half 1941 325 244 1575 880
2nd half 1941 360 232 1725 870
1st half 1942 410 323 1820 1115
2nd half 1942 435 434 1880 1341
1st half 1943 595 753 2030 1985
2nd half 1943 645 851 2115 2172
1st half 1944 655 1581 1870 2811
http://www.ordersofbattle.darkscape.net/site/sturmvogel/airrep.html
-
So after, "they had another" ,was he sacked? Your answer doesn't "answer" anything.
Gladly, Milch flew out to the Eastern Front and remedied the "logistical snafu" that happened. He corrected it, came home and they had another and that was the beginning of The End for the 3rd Reich.
-
So after, "they had another" ,was he sacked? Your answer doesn't "answer" anything.
Read Milch's book, if you had, then you would know the answer. Why would he "have been sacked"? He wasn't.
-
As we’ve seen an increase in labor and labor productivity played a factor in the rebound of German fighter production in 1944. Labor would be a crucial constraint for the Third Reich throughout the war.
(http://thetongsweb.net/images/ussbs-labor.jpg)
The table above is a summary of German labor and armed forces mobilization from the USSBS. The total civilian labor force was 39 million in 1939, with German males making up 62% of the civilian labor force at 24.4 million. As the war intensified the Wehrmact continued to mobilize men for the armed forces. The drain on labor for the war economy was dramatic. By Sep 1944 German males had dropped to 13.5 million making up only 37% of the total civilian labor for force.
The German war economy was already highly mobilized by 1939. From the early 1936 onward Germany dramatically ramped up for war. The Reich’s effort to rearm had stretched the labor pool thin. By 1938 the Labor Ministry reported an incredible unemployment rate of barely more than 1% of the total workforce. Of the 292,327 reported only 28,000 were deemed fully fit to work.
As the armed forces continued to mobilize men for war additional labor was needed to replace the outflow of men from the economy. Germany had already mobilized women for the workforce. In 1939 women made up 37% of the workforce. Comparatively Britain which was known to effectively mobilize women into the labor market during the same time period, women made up 25% of the total British labor pool. The total amount of women mobilized in the German economy was stable throughout the war.
Foreign Laborers in the Reich
To make up the increasing deficit of men in the labor force the Reich used foreign workers. Foreign laborers rose from 301,000 in 1939 to 7.5 million in 1944. Foreign laborers increased from <1% of the total German labor force to over 20% in just 4 years. Who were these foreign laborers? They consisted of voluntary and forced civilian workers from countries under the Reich’s occupation, prisoners of war and concentration camp laborers. Civilian labor exported from territories under German occupation was supplied by one of the largest coercive labor programs in history under Fritz Saukel and the GBA. Himmler and the SS provided laborers from concentration camps.
The numbers in USSBS table above for foreign laborers only represents the stock of laborers recorded available. It is only an accounting of inventory at a point in time. They don’t give an indication of the total number of foreign laborers mobilized and supplied to the German war economy. Recent studies shed light on this. The numbers mobilized are staggering.
(http://thetongsweb.net/images/foreign-labor-force.jpg)
The total foreign-labor force mobilized over 4 years is estimated to be 13.5 million made up of civilian laborers, POWs and concentration camp inmates. Of that total the German war economy consumed the lives of 2.5 million people, many of these literally worked to death producing aircraft and armaments for the Reich. Concentration camp laborers suffered the highest attrition of all foreign laborers with a survival rate of only 31%. The numbers are brutal but they also ignore a gap in the statistics for those unaccounted for between people exported from Eastern territories and those registered for work in Germany with rough estimates in the hundreds of thousands not accounted for.
-
Aircraft Industry Use of Foreign Labor
According to the Wagenfuehr index, the aircraft industry made up the largest proportion of armaments production throughout the war averaging 42% of total armaments output. It is no surprise therefore that a study of the German aircraft industry reflects this increased reliance on foreign laborers to produce aircraft.
A glance at the USSBS statistics shows that in Oct 1944 foreign laborers, POW’s and concentration camp inmates made up on average 48% of the total manpower for aircraft factories. The following table below highlights an example of the rate and run-up of all categories of foreign laborers at the Heinkel-Oranienburg facility which illustrates the increasing demand in the aircraft industry for foreign laborers.
(http://thetongsweb.net/images/hienkel.jpg)
“In the plants of the Reichswerke Hermann Goering and the Luftwaffe, the foreign share routinely exceeded 40 per cent. On individual production lines the percentage could be even higher. As State Secretary Milch boasted in June 1943, the Stuka Ju 87 was being ’80 per cent manufactured by Russians’.” (Tooze). A large portion of those laborers were also concentration camp inmates. Himmler opened up the camps to contract with businesses in 1942 in response to the growing manpower shortage. The Hienkel Oranienburg factory was one of the first to tap this labor pool followed by others in the aircraft industry. “Up to the end of 1943, the aircraft industry was certainly the chief industrial employer of inmate labour, with Heinkel, Messerschmitt, and BWM leading the way.” (Tooze) In 1943 the RLM obtained 317,000 foreign civilian laborers from Saukel for the aircraft industry. In addition to that the RLM claimed 100,000 concentration camp inmates supplied by the SS in 1943 and 1944. As we’ve seen earlier, the increase of labor manpower was one of the factors for the dramatic jump in single fighter production in 1944. At this point there should be no doubt where the increase of laborers came from.
-
Plight of the Foreign Laborers: Civilian Laborers
The sheer numbers alone are amazing but they only begin to hint at some of the brutality and horror faced by these foreign laborers. The survival rates start to give us some indication. The civilian labor survival rate estimated at 94% masks some of the horror experienced. Most of these laborers came from the occupied territories of the Soviet Union and Poland. The civilian Ostarbeiter suffered mass attrition before it stabilized later in the war. The influx of millions of civilian laborers overwhelmed the system. Thousands of them were arriving daily in major industrial centers and it was impossible to organize adequate housing and rations for them. Conditions were terrible in the Ostarbeiter camps.
Food was already in short supply in the Reich and it only got increasingly worse as the war intensified. Performance rationing of food was instituted which Speer eventually adopted as a best practice. The Ostarbeiter were grouped into three categories: 1) those achieving average performance would receive the ‘normal’ food ration, 2) those underperforming would receive less, 3) those achieving above average performance would get the deductions from those under performing plus their allowance. This resulted in a death spiral for those underperforming. Rations for foreign laborers were cut as food became more scarce. The Ostarbeiter were being slowly starved while they sat fenced behind barbed wire. As a result tens of thousands of half-fed Ostarbeiter had to be shipped back under horrific conditions. One account describes the conditions during transport: “There were dead passengers on the returning train. Women on the train gave birth to children that were tossed from the open window during the journey, while people sick with tuberculosis and venereal disease rode in the same coach. The dying lay in freight cars without straw, and one of the dead was…thrown onto the embankment”.
It was under these conditions that nearly half a million civilian laborers died. Only the expanded employment of the Hunger Plan brought stability to the situation. Of course this was at the expense of literally starving to death millions of Jews and other peoples in the eastern occupied territories as the food supply was drastically altered and millions were cut off from food allocation now redirected into Germany. Even at its best after the expansion of the Hunger Plan the mortality rate of the Ostarbeiter was still twice as high as normal Germans and a third higher than their counterparts in occupied territories.
The Suffering of POWs and Concentration Camp Inmates
The civilian laborers’ suffering pales in comparison with the suffering of the prisoners of war and concentration camp laborers. 2 million prisoners of war and concentration camp laborers died while building aircraft and armaments for the Reich. 30% of the prisoners of war employed died while a staggering 69% of concentration camp laborers perished working for the German war economy. The attrition of POW’s resulted mainly from the starvation and brutal treatment of prisoners from conquered territories in the East.
The concentration camp attrition resulted from the fusion of the Nazi ideology and twisted pragmatism. By 1942 the destruction of the Jews was violently underway. The SS was not blind to economic potentials as they exterminated the Jewish population. The practice of ‘Selektion’ which proceeded the massacres separated those deemed able to work from those unable meaning that the first to be killed were women, children, and old people. From there onward the Jewish population would continue to be progressively reduced to an ‘indispensable core’. Because of the shortage of laborers the minority of Jews and other unfortunates in concentration camps who survived ‘Selektion’, instead of being gassed they would be simply worked to death in the practice of ‘destruction through labor’ (Vernichtung durch Arbeit). Following this prescription “In all concentration camps, productive labour was coupled with a regime of ill-treatment, overwork, and starvation that resulted in mass death (Tooze).”
-
Human Tragedy Beyond the Numbers
A few examples specific to the aircraft industry will bring some meaning to these numbers and methods.
Germany became ever more desperate to produce key arms as the war progressed. The Speer’s V2 rocket program and the Milch’s Me-262 jet fighter program needed to be brought into mass production. In the aftermath of the Peenemuende raid in August 1943 Speer asked the V2 program be moved underground. Mass production of the Me-262 was being prepared at the same time and both the V2 and Me-262 production lines were brought into the infamous underground Mittelbau facility under the savage direction of General Hans Kammler. The Buchenwald and the spin-off Dora concentration camps supplied the labor for Kammler’s tunnels. Quoting Adam Tooze:
In a construction effort that combined ruthless brutality and speed, Hans Kammler got the Mittelbau tunnel complex into production by the end of the year [1943]. To honour this remarkable feat, Speer and his staff visited the site on 10 December. What they saw left a deep impression. In the dock at Nuremberg, Speer denied ever having seen the true conditions in a concentration camp. But in his memoirs he no longer hid the horror that he witnessed at the Mittelbau. To meet the timetable set by Speer’s Armaments Ministry, Kammler had sacrificed the lives of his inmate workforce. No time had been wasted building housing. The labourers slept on site, inside the tunnels, seeing daylight at most once a week, deprived access to clean water and sanitation. They died in their thousands. To encourage those still alive, Kammler strung recalcitrants from the rafters. Speer and his staff saw a factory littered with corpses…it did not dent Speer’s commitment to his alliance with Himmler and his admiration for the slave-driver in chief. A week after his inspection of Dora, Speer wrote to Kammler congratulating him effusively on his remarkable feat, ‘in transforming the underground installation on Niedersachsenwerfen (Mittelbau) from it’s raw condition two months ago into a factory, which has no equal in Europe and which is unsurpassed even when measured against American Standards.’
Not only did the Me-262 come into mass production at the expense of slave laborers, but the Fw-190’s and Bf-109’s jump in production in 1944 was a result of this malevolent system at work. Tens of thousands of concentration camp laborers were worked to death building Bf-109’s for the Messerschmitt Regensburg factory supplied by Flossenbuerg and Mauthausen concentration camps. As mentioned previously the Jagerstab was formed in early 1944 to further increase fighter production. In response Himmler quickly informed Milch that he planned to increase the Luftwaffe’s employment of concentration camp laborers from 36,000 to 90,000. Germany militarily occupied Hungary on March 19, 1944 and thus the Hungarian Jewish populous was sucked into the maelstrom of massacre to supply fighter production. Hungarians Jews were supplied at a rate of 12,000 – 14,000 a day in mid-May. Two-thirds would be immediately murdered under the process of ‘Selektion’ leaving a third to be fed to the aircraft industry. At the start of the deportation the Arms Ministry minutes notes their consternation with the first deliveries of Hungarian Jews. They had been only been offered ‘children, women, and old men with whom very little can be done’. The able-bodied had been kept by the Werhmacht in Hungary to initially to dig tank-traps against the Russians. At this stage no one should have any doubt what happened to these Jews in the first deliveries. A month later the deliveries improved. Of the estimated 509,000 Hungarian Jews deported only 120,000 survived the war.
Summary
In summary the “miracle” in single fighter production in 1944 was a combination of factors:
- Rationalization of the aircraft industry and pre-planning for increased production by Milch and the RLM
- Dispersion of manufacturing plants to reduce destruction from Allied bombing
- Re-allocation of raw materials and labor to focus on the aircraft industry
- Increase in productivity and labor for the aircraft industry
It is in this last category of labor manpower that we come face to face with the horrors behind the “miracle” in German fighter production. We marvel at the technical achievements in aircraft such as the Me-262’s delivered in mid 1944 or the Fw 190D-9’s and Bf 109K-4’s delivered in the Fall of 1944. Let us be sobered by the fact that hundreds of thousands were worked to death producing them and countless millions died in the deadly tempest that surrounded Germany’s foreign labor mobilization.
Tango, XO
412th FS Braunco Mustangs
-
Have to say Tango, that was very Interesting and also very sobering too.
Great posts and very very Infornative. I just wonder why the Aircrat Industry got all the support? Wonder why the Tank or Submarine Industries never got priority?
-
Not sure how accurate but tank production certainly increased.
http://www.battle-fleet.com/pw/his/Tank_Production_Germany_ww2.htm
-
The Atlantic wall was also mostly built with slave labour.
This was all the nazi way to counter damege from the field and from the bombings. After all, they had subjects that counted hundreds of millions (occupied nations etc),so....The Nazi way. Prolonging the fact that they had lost.