Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => Aircraft and Vehicles => Topic started by: F4UDOA on January 19, 2004, 01:24:18 PM
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Gents,
Just did some quick looking into our Spit IX and found some odd things.
1. The Spit IX pilots manual shows it should only carry 102 Gallons US or 85 IMP gallons of fuel while ours carries 137 gallons US.
So ours carries more fuel so what. Maybe some later Spit IX's did. However where is the weight of the extra 35 gallons (210LBS) of fuel? Our Spit at 100% fuel weights 7400lbs and that matches the 7,445LBS shown here for the Spit IX with 102Gallons(85Gallons IMP) of fuel. So where is the extra 200+lbs??
(http://www.fourthfightergroup.com/eagles/ab197wl.gif)
Also the fuel consumption rate for plus +15lbs of boost is 130Gallons IMP (156Gallons US) per hour.
That is 102Gallons / 156gallons = .65 * 60minutes = 39.2minutes of duration at mil power. In the MA that should be 20minutes. Instead it fly's for 35minutes at that power setting.
So basically our Spit IX is 200LBS light and flys for almost twice as long as it should.
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1. The Spit IX pilots manual shows it should only carry 102 Gallons US or 85 IMP gallons of fuel while ours carries 137 gallons US.
So ours carries more fuel so what. Maybe some later Spit IX's did.
I've seen references (although the only one I can find at the moment is Spitfire: The History) to 2 x 18 gallon wing tanks on late production Spit IXs.
Also the fuel consumption rate for plus +15lbs of boost is 130Gallons IMP (156Gallons US) per hour.
That is 102Gallons / 156gallons = .65 * 60minutes = 39.2minutes of duration at mil power. In the MA that should be 20minutes. Instead it fly's for 35minutes at that power setting.
You aren't going by the boost guauge, are you?
The AH Spit IX shows 18lbs boost at WEP, but actually runs at 15lbs boost. I'm not sure what it runs at full throttle (without WEP), but judging from the performance it's just over max continuous power, 12lbs boost.
So AH Spit IX WEP = 15 lbs, full throttle = approx 12 - 13lbs
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Nashwan,
No I didn't even look at the MAP gauge. Our gauges are off at times.
I just looked at the Spit performace site at the Spit IX test that is closest to ours as well as checking the Spit manual for fuel consumptions at various power settings. Combat power being +18lbs, Mil power at +15lbs and max for 1 Hour climbing being +12lbs based on what I read. Max continious appears to be +7lbs.
In all honesty our Spit IX is a hodge-podge of different varients melted together and the performance is not overwelming for any varient. So while ours could be a better performer it still appears to be underweight and worst of all IMHO flying for way to long.
This puts A/C that carry much more fuel at a steep disadvantage when facing it if the durations of flight are made to be equal when they were not.
BTW, I have no objections to carrying the extra fuel. Just so long as the weight comes with it.
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Sorry, I meant 1 hour rating for full throttle, not max continuous.
I just looked at the Spit performace site at the Spit IX test that is closest to ours as well as checking the Spit manual for fuel consumptions at various power settings. Combat power being +18lbs, Mil power at +15lbs and max for 1 Hour climbing being +12lbs based on what I read. Max continious appears to be +7lbs
The AH Spit IX has a Merlin 61. Maximum boost was 15lbs.
The AH Spit IX climbs at 3700 ft/min at sea level, rising to about 3850 ft/min at approx 13,000ft (at WEP). If you compare that to BS 274, a Spit IX with Merlin 61, you find it is very similar:
http://www.fourthfightergroup.com/eagles/bf274.html
BS274 climbed at about 3650 ft/min at sea level, rising to 3,860 ft/min at 12,600 ft, under WEP, which was 15.2 lbs boost.
At "normal rating", 12 lbs boost, 2850 rpm, BS274 climbed at 3200 ft/min up to 13,500, the AH Spit climbs at 3300 ft/min at sea level, nearly 3500ft/min at 14,000ft. The AH Spit is at 3000rpm though, so I think boost is still 12 lbs, or very close to it.
So the AH Spit IX runs at 15 lbs at WEP, 12 lbs at full throttle.
In all honesty our Spit IX is a hodge-podge of different varients melted together and the performance is not overwelming for any varient. So while ours could be a better performer it still appears to be underweight and worst of all IMHO flying for way to long.
Performance is certainly modelled on the worst possible Spit IX, but I'm not so sure about it being underweight. Do you have the consumption at 12 lbs boost? Alternatively, is there any way to run offline at WEP for a lot longer than the 5 min cutout, to measure consumption at 15 lbs boost?
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Agreed add 200 lbs to the spitfire and cut its endurance. Isnt it it great when we all get along!!!!
:)
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It would be nice if they just decided on an actual Spit IX variant and modeled it correctly as it does have too much fuel for an IX. The VII and VIII had the extra 18 gallon wing tanks but the IX never really did.
Of course it could carry a 30, 45 or 90 gallon drop tank which made up the some of the difference.
But if they were going to do it right, they'd model the Merlin 66/266 LFIX/LFXVI with the E wing, tropical filter, broad chord rudder and potentially clipped wings that had the three hard points for the 500 pounder or drop tank on the centerline, and rockets or 250 pound bombs on the wings.
And if you really want to be picky about the Spit Vb, if what the HTC website says about it's ammo load is true, then the Vb actually has twice the cannon ammo it should have as the Vb had 60 round cannon drums in each wing. The Vc had 120 rounds per 20mm cannon, but what we are supposadly flying is a Vb if the look out at the wing is to be believed.
Not that I'm picky :)
Dan/Slack
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Guppy and Nashwan,
I agree our Spits are strange indeed.
The consumption for +12lbs is 105GPH IMP at 2850RPM.
However the engine in the POH chart shows +18lbs as combat power for 5 minutes. This is for the Merlin 61 and 63. Of course this does not correspond with AFDU doc. That would be to easy.
Grunherz,
Wait until I start on the 109 and 190
;)
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Yes they are horribly undermodeled and I would appreciate any data to pesruade HTC to adress this outrage. By any chance do you have the 1944 data where the Bf109G6 climbs at 10,000 fpm and has a 700mph level speed? :D
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I have some outstanding 109 and 190 data.
I just need an impartial translator.
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Good that we all agree, - then things will come to harmony.
So, HTC, please Delete our Spits, - Ia, Vb- IX AND XIV.
Instead, replace with Spit II (rotol airscrew), VC(universal wing), IX LF (clipped/unclipped option,25 boost), and then finally either the XIV-uber-boost teardrop canopy, or simply skip it and go all the way to the Mk 21 or so with a London-Berlin +return endurance
:D :D :D :D :D
I'm sure the 109 folks are gonna love it
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It's from a top notch engineer by the name of Goering...
Originally posted by GRUNHERZ
Yes they are horribly undermodeled and I would appreciate any data to pesruade HTC to adress this outrage. By any chance do you have the 1944 data where the Bf109G6 climbs at 10,000 fpm and has a 700mph level speed? :D
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Originally posted by F4UDOA
I have some outstanding 109 and 190 data.
I just need an impartial translator.
I'm that person!!! :D
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Post it here.
Enough folks here who can help. Failing that, we'll get at least a nice midweek flamefest. :D
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Here's a question, does anyone know if HT bases the 109G6 specs from the 109G6R6 as tested by Brown. The 109G6R6 had gondolas and roughly matches the AH 109g6 specs.
The speeds of the AH 109G6 in clean configuration are similiar to the speeds of the 109G6R6 original with gondolas.
The top speed of our clean g6 is around 635km/H at alt when it should be 650km/h.
It's not a big deal either way as 10 mph isn't that significant.
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It's not a big deal either way as 10 mph isn't that significant.
Who would not like to have 10mph extra when he needs to 'extend gracefully' while angry bish hordes slowly comming closer. :)
Ecke
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An extra 10mph at 22k isn't going make much of a difference at all.
Claiming Ht is biased against LW planes is the same crap that folks have been espousing for years and all but guarantees that these questions go ignored.
My post was a question not an accusation, for all I know I am completely off base.
I do know that even if the g6 is 10 mph to slow at 22k the g10 by HT's charts does 452 at alt. Now go a do a search and see if you can find any info that shows a g10 can hit 452. So it may be to fast.
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Batz,
please calm down.
I spoke in general. Sometimes, 10mph makes THE difference.
@Storch
That wasnt a good idea. Your SA sux a bit.
This thread started not that bad.
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Originally posted by F4UDOA
I have some outstanding 109 and 190 data.
I just need an impartial translator.
Well if you need, you can post those somewhere, or even email them to guys who speak German.. not a very hard task. Hell if u want even I can do it.
As for the Mk IX`s consumption, the manual says on page 37 130 imp. galls/h for 3000RPM/+15 lbs, and 105 imp.gall for 2850 RPM/+12 lbs . If I understand correctly we have this, the Merlin 61 variant here. Given the 85 liter internal tank, this should be enough for
40 mins of run at WEP (5 min limit)
74 mins of run at Max. Climb (1 hour limit).
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Originally posted by VO101_Isegrim
Well if you need, you can post those somewhere, or even email them to guys who speak German.. not a very hard task. Hell if u want even I can do it.
F4UDOA, taking your chances if you do that. That is like keeping a pet Rattlesnake. Better to find another who can translate for you.
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MiloMorai,
You are 100% right. I have been down that road before.
I have sent some to Pyro on Fuel consumption.
HTC does not favor Allied planes or Axis planes IMHO. I have issues with the fuel consumption of the F6F and F4U as well as stall speeds etc. HTC provides a resonable representation of each A/C without getting to essoteric about any one. Believe me I have been whining about the F4U for years. Also our Spit IX has very low performance for any late 1942 version of the Spit. Imagine if we a Spit IX LF from 1944. The whines would be endless.
Isegrim,
You are right about weight and duration of the IX. That was my original post is that it is to light and flys to long.
I will upload some Luftwaffe stuff for general consumption. It's all from the web but mostly from other sources. Who knows maybe it's all old news. I will let the inmates figure it out.
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I can read German.
+ Wife is German :D
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Fine with me to cut it's endurance, I usually only fly the spit when I'm not going far anyway. :)
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The Spitfire IX goes farther than my Mossie....
:(
sniff
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One thing that surprises me is how much more endurance a Spitfire or an La7 has on 3/4 fuel than a 109...
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Hmmm.
My books usually list a significantly shorter range for the Bf109 than for the Spitfire.
Spitfire IX : ~430 miles on internal
Spitfire XIV: ~460 miles on internal
Bf109E: ~450 miles on internal fuel
Bf109F/G/K: ~370 miles on internal fuel
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Your books look more detialed than mine, though I didn't look in the good Spitfire book for Spitfire numbers.
I need a good Bf109 book.
(I think that N1K2-J range includes drop tanks)
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An Fw190A-8 at a TO weight of 4365kg(no drop tank - 640L only) had a range of 615km(382mi) to 1035km(644mi) depending on what altitude flown at andwhat boost was used. Endurance was 1.2hr to 2.18hr.
With a 300L dt(940L total) and TO weight of 4683kg, the range was 915km(568mi) to 1470km(915mi). Endurance was 1.85hr to 3.10hr.
The Fw190A-3, 2 hrs and a range of 950km(590mi) at economy setting for 1000hp(1.1ata & 2100rpm??? > depends on altitude).
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I have JANE'S.
Frankly its only interesting for historical views on aircraft performance. It is wrong in so many places, but given it was first published in 1946 that is hardly surprising.
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To me the single most important variable in A/C performance other than speed is fuel consumption and weight. Why? Because if a 10,000lbs A/C carry's 1,500lbs of fuel is fighting a 5,000lbs A/C with 500lbs of fuel he can compete only if relative fuel and ammo loads are equal for endurance. Otherwise he is forced to fight with an extra 1,000lbs of weight which ruins climb/accleration and turning ability. In real life this truth was proven by the success of the heavy fighter. In AH the light fighter rules because it is unaffected by the limitations of it's short endurance.
There are many questions about various fuel consumption in AH A/C that don't make sense to me.
1. Typhoon- 190GPH IMP at +7 lbs of boost with 154 gallons imp of fuel internal. 47 minutes of endurance in the MA it should be 23.5 minutes.
2. The NIK2- A 2000HP engine with 190 gallons of internal fuel. This airplane had very poor fuel available and yet has 43minutes of flight time in the MA equaling 1 hour 26 minutes of duration at Mil power in real life. This is virtually impossible when compared to the Napeir Sabre or P&W R2800 which require over 200GPH to achieve the same HP for one hour. The NIK2 would have to be almost twice as efficient.
3. La-7- Again produces 1,850HP peak and 1,600+Hp sustained in mil power with only 122 gallons internal. I have two sperate documents showing that this A/C could only fly for very short durations.
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To me the single most important variable in A/C performance other than speed is fuel consumption and weight. Why? Because if a 10,000lbs A/C carry's 1,500lbs of fuel is fighting a 5,000lbs A/C with 500lbs of fuel he can compete only if relative fuel and ammo loads are equal for endurance. Otherwise he is forced to fight with an extra 1,000lbs of weight which ruins climb/accleration and turning ability. In real life this truth was proven by the success of the heavy fighter. In AH the light fighter rules because it is unaffected by the limitations of it's short endurance.
You certainly are obsessed with this "issue". Most wartime tests were conducted with full internal fuel. Most data you find reflects this. I would bet HT models the AH FM on such data. IMO all planes in AH should be forced to take off at normal TO weight. Use this as a minimum and work up from there. If some wants to fly around and burn off fuel then that’s up to them. With HT leaning to 512 x 512 maps make the fuel mod x1 and go through and match fuel consumption to the real data.
In AH the 152 always has fuel in its wing tanks, the a8 always has fuel in the 115-liter aft tank. The Soviets captured a "lightened a8" (W. -Nr. 580967) that weighed just 3986kg (normal take-off weight of 4360 kg).
If you are going open this can of worms I bet everyone who has a favorite plane can make a post describing instances where their favorite ride was "lightened".
Planes fought when they had to, whether like in Bodenplatte when US fighters had to up with full fuel to engage the incoming German attack or when low on fuel 262s were bounced when landing. You seem to argue that planes only fought after X amount of fuel has been burned off.
Heavy planes hold more E through a dive, they may accelerate slower but they will "zoom higher" and hold E as the pull out. In some instances there are advantages to "more weight". You may believe weight is the most important factor in your style of playing AH but I know many folks who fly with 100% every time in every plane they fly and don't think twice about it.
I would agree that with the density of planes and with the types of fighting in AH that in many instances being light has an advantage (I was/am a furballer) but that’s no more "real" then anything else in AH.
Here's a discussion they had over at AGW.
YMMV
http://agw.warbirdsiii.com/bbs/showthread.php?s=&threadid=26181&highlight=109g6
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I'll take that extra 10 mph. I have concluded that HTC heavily favors the allied side in all modelling. None of this info comes as a surprise.
The only thing HT hates more than LW planes are Silly Spitty drivers... go waste your perks on a Spit14 and tell me he loves ya! :lol
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Somewhat true.
We do not have the finest air-to-air 190's, and we do absolutely not have the finest air-to-air Spits.
The only post 1942 Spit we have is perked.
However, this is probably a well thought gameplay issue. I am pretty sure that F4UDOA does not want an overboosted clipped spit on his F4U's tail :D
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Saburo Sakai fully agreed with F4UDOA's assesment of the importantance of fuel endurance. He stated that (I paraphrase here) "he felt sorry for the German pilot having to fight over England with only a few minutes of fuel available and that the removal of that concern, had they been flying A6M2s, would have allowed them to focus much more effectively on combat"
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This is just a suggestion, but if HT seems to favor the allied planes in modeling, perhaps it is because during the war the axis (especially the Germans) tended to have superior equipment to the allies, which the allies countered with being able to produce larger numbers of equipment. In Aces High, where there is no numbers advantage, modeling the axis planes and allied planes according to their real-life specifications would probably tip the favor heavily to axis planes.
Just a thought, please feel free to tell me why I'm wrong if I am. :)
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Originally posted by Reaper5
This is just a suggestion, but if HT seems to favor the allied planes in modeling, perhaps it is because during the war the axis (especially the Germans) tended to have superior equipment to the allies, which the allies countered with being able to produce larger numbers of equipment. In Aces High, where there is no numbers advantage, modeling the axis planes and allied planes according to their real-life specifications would probably tip the favor heavily to axis planes.
Just a thought, please feel free to tell me why I'm wrong if I am. :)
HT overmodels the planes that each of us don't like :)
The LW guys say it's the Allied stuff overmodeled. The Allied fans say it's the LW or Japanese stuff overmodeled, etc etc.
Song's been sung forever, regardless of the flight sim :)
Dan/Slack
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Hmmm, I wonder how the LW would have done if they would have had A6M2's instead of Bf-109E's? No endurance problems and much more effective escorts indeed, meaning less bombers lost.
However, wouldn't be the Zero be at a disadvantage at high altitude? And what about overall performance? I don't want to look up the numbers but I guess the A6M2 would be slightly superior in speed to the Hurri I and inferior to the Spit I. Hurri and Spit probably significantly faster in the dive and better control at speed, however marginal it was in these planes too. But the Zero had no problems with negative G's. On the other hand Zero not well protected and vulnerable, even to .303's. Maneuverability would be interesting but the Zero will probably have the edge.
Anyone?
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The Zero would definately have suffered as an escort fighter if facing the Spitfires of the same time. Once that the Spit drivers would have put their tactics together that is. Why?
1. Even a .303 will be sufficient to down it. No protected fuel tanks.
2. The model in British use at the same time as the a6m2 would have been the Spitfire Mk V, even the overboosted variants, and with Spit IX just around the corner. Cannons there at will.
3. The Spit has a much better alt performance.
4. The Spits had a much better roll rate, especially at high speeds.
5. The Spit would have been very much faster
However in the case of Spit I and Hurry I it's a tough bet. We see that in the Burma sceario sometimes, - Hurry I and a6m match up closely ;)
And Reaper: I do not agree on HTC favouring the allies regarding plane modelling. Neither side really. But what we can say is that we do NOT have good late war Spits :D
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The Zeros could fly CAP over RAF bases. This would mean the southern bases would have to move north with all kinds of problems resulting. ie time to intercept, fuel usage.(less range),.......
The Spits and Hurries during BoB were not noted for their armour protection.;)
The Germans would have switched in the BMW801 and added armour to the Zero on all likelyhood.
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I would much rather see a spit IVX than an overmodeled spit V any day, they only carry about twice the ammo load that you really saw.
Storch, it's because of people like you it's no wonder so many Lw fans get labelled as "Luftwhiners"- the label fits for you atleast. Hitech probably thought "What a tard" when he read- I have concluded that HTC heavily favors the allied side in all modelling
I don't know which Spit V is modelled in AH but the Spit Vc had 120 rounds of 20mm. I'm sure you well know it had the capacity to have 4 hispanos. The Spit V also lacks a slipper droptank it could carry. and what is a Spit IVX- i guess you're not a huge fan of spitfires.
For every little minor fault or detail you can list for LW a/c i can list just as many for RAF a/c. In fact every country can probably do the same.
Get a grip on reality Storch. HTC favours no side or country.
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Indeed the A6M2 would have caused the Spit I a great deal of trouble. They gave the Spit V's and Hurri's all they could handle in the South Pacific.
There is a good artical on that matchup on the web and in several publications. Many BoB veterens found themselves on the wrong end of the A6M2.
Also I don't think the performance of the Spit I and the A6M2 was that far apart especially at sea level. Just check the AH performance data.
And again the AH data shows the Spit MKI with 137 gallons of internal fuel. I don't think this is right.
More to the point however look at a P-51D from the POH.
10,200lbs
269 gallons internal
No external fuel
80 gallons per hour
35,000FT
1,200miles range
3 hours flight duration at 408MPH!!
With 29 gallons of fuel remaining
Not including 68 gallons fuel for warmup takeoff and climb to 35,000FT
How can you even begin to compare the BF109 or FW190 performance to the P-51D with full fuel.
Also
F4U-1D internal fuel 12,100lbs 237gallons internal only
Max continous normal power
Range 370 miles 15,000FT 210 GPH / 210 gallons used.
Max range cruise internal fuel 945 miles 195MPH 5,000FT 42GPH
P-38L 17,400lbs 410 gallons internal only
Max continous normal power
450miles range 360 gallons used at 12,000FT
Max range cruise internal fuel 1,210Miles 6,000FT 173MPH 50GPH.
How do these aircraft compare? These numbers are max range not max continous power. Is this represented fairly in AH?
Bf 109F2 440 miles
Bf 109 G2 528 miles
Bf 109 K4 356 miles
Spit Vb 470 miles
Spit IX 434 miles
Seafire IIc 775 miles
Hurri IIc 460 miles
Fw190 A3 497 miles
Fw190 D9 520 miles
La5 475 miles
La7 395 miles
A6M5 1194 miles
N1K2-J 1293 miles
Ki-61-I 684 miles
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Also I don't think the performance of the Spit I and the A6M2 was that far apart especially at sea level. Just check the AH performance data.
AH doesn't have 100 octane in it's Spit I. With 100 octane and without mirror, the Spit I could do 300 mph+ at sea level. If AH has the correct performance figures for the A6M2, that's about 30 mph more than the Zero.
Storch: This is a thread on the Spit IX. Look at the Spit IX and you can see how much HTC "favours" the Allied side.
The AH Spit IX does 318 mph at sea level, approx the right speed for a 1942 Spit F IX without mirror.
That means it's one of the first 350 Spit IXs built, out of about 7,000 similar Spit IXs and XVIs. The next slowest Spit IX at sea level would be the HF, which did 331 mph at sea level (with mirror), and went faster than the AH Spit IX at altitude. By far the most common was the LF, which did 335 mph at sea level (with mirror). In 1944, they started using 100/150 fuel, and the Spit IX went about 360 mph at sea level, (with mirror).
The AH Spit IX is anywhere between 15 and 45 mph too slow at sea level, depending on what opponent it faces. And the next Spitfire up is one of the most expensive perks in the game. And you say HTC favours the allies? :rolleyes:
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*Show me any source that indicates the A6M2 was ever within 20mph of the Spit I at ANY alt.
A6M2 330mph top, 270mph sea level
Spit I 360mph top, 300mph sea level
If that upsets anybody thats just too bad I guess. In fact the Hurricane I was as fast at most alts. Why isnt anybody claiming the A6M2 is too slow vs the 109E? The 1943 A6M5 was as fast as a Spit I...took them a few years.
*Storch, sorry buddy but your statement above is hardly "proof" of anything. You can say "I do better on Fridays", is that supposed to mean something about how HTC models ac?
*As far as the fuel thing goes...its not modelled accurately, I just dont think that AH bothered to get that detailed into the whole fuel-range-burnrate-capacity thing. Maybe in AH2.
*F4UDOA, you make an assumption at the start of your thread that the weights of the ac on the data pages are what is actually in the game with that fuel load. Unless you have access to HTC and they can show you, or you have been told, its a guess only. Players cannot "weigh" ac, so we can't know for sure. I do completely agree that the issue needs to be looked at. The AH2 forums would be the place to make your case.
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Squire,
I did not assume the weights. In fact I know the F4U-1 weight at 100% fuel is not listed on the A/C information pages.
However the Spit IX performance matches charts where the weight is listed at 7400LBS (albeit poor performance).
And even if the weight is 7,700LBS as it should be the duration is still much to long.
I am far less concerned about the performance than I am with weight and duration. Why? because performance varies with weight and duration is the linear measure of an aircraft weight.
And I have not even mentioned ammo loads.
BTW, I have no problem with a clipped wing 1943 Spit LF IX. Do you have a problem with a 1945 F4U-4C(4 M3 20MIL) or a 1944 F4U-1A(430MPH at 20K)?
(http://www.vought.com/heritage/photo/assets/images/db_images/db_0429_023.jpg)
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Not at all, the more Hogs the better :) Its a squadron ride.
Some interesting info I dug up...it seems the Spit V and Spit IX had in some versions a 29 imp gallon auxiliary tank behind the pilot. 85+29 x 1.2 = 137 US gallons, Im sure thats where the # comes from. The Spit XIV had 36 gallons in the wings and a larger fuselage tank, so I think its listed 136 US gallons is right.
The Spit I did not have this 29 imp gallon tank however (Recce Spit Is had it), it only had the 85 imp gallon capacity in 2 forward tanks, so its range is wrong, IF in fact its modelled with it. Im sure its not the only AH ac that may be off.
...or perhaps all three Spits are modelled with the 85 imp fuselage tank but the burn rate for the fuel is off? I cant say.
I am hoping that AH2 will model the ac with the tanks they had, and rather than this "25-50-75-100" stuff...why not have the option of filling the exact tanks up? ie, the hanger shows the list for the fuel tanks, and you click wether you want them filled or not? more realistic I think.
I have to wonder if HTC "monkeyed" with some ac for balance purposes regarding range...I have no proof of this, and I cant say why they would bother either, but its odd that the Mosquito VI has such crappy range on internal fuel? same merlin engines too...strange. Its probably just glitches with AH as a sim, they are never perfect.
...finally I will say good luck trying to find the performance discrepancy for a fighter of 7400 or 7600 lbs, the #s just wont be that different.
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I have to wonder if HTC "monkeyed" with some ac for balance purposes regarding range...I have no proof of this, and I cant say why they would bother either,
I wonder that as well.
Fuel burn is adjusted higher because all bases in AH are close together relative to real world conditions. However, altering fuel burn affects vertical distance, which remains the same, and time, which also remains the same.
For example, a Spit IX in RL could climb to 40,000 in 20 minutes at 12lbs boost. After that, it would still have a substantiall amount of fuel left. In AH, if fuel consumption is twice as high during the climb, it will run out of fuel almost as soon as it reaches 40K.
Also, a fight lasting 5 minutes at WEP in AH would use as much fuel as a real life fight lasting 12 minutes or more (5 mins WEP, 7 mins+ at 12lbs).
So increased fuel burn compensates for shorter horizontal distances, but has an adverse and unrealistic effect on altitude and combat time. Obviously, the shorter the real life range, the greater the effect increased fuel burn has on altitude and persistence. Perhaps HTC has simply fudged fuel for this reason?
(BTW, the Spit should be able to carry more external fuel, the RAF used a 90 IMP gallon drop tank (410 litres), not a German 300 litre tank)
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The Spits get hosed on external tanks. The Spit V has no DTs where it had 3 different types in real life. The Spit IX had at least 3 if not more types of DTs. Look at the P-47 and P-51 types in comparison.
...also seems the late model IXs had a 72 imp gallon rear fuselage tank, but we would need a more definitive type of Spit IX in AH to have that added I think.
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Hi Hogenbor,
>Hmmm, I wonder how the LW would have done if they would have had A6M2's instead of Bf-109E's?
Having just read Winterbotham's "Ultra", I'd say the Luftwaffe would have lost worse than they did since Dowding tried to counter the Luftwaffe raids with small formations that were meant to kill at minimal losses to themselves.
(He was tremendously helped by Ultra telling him in advance about the Luftwaffe strategy - though usually not about the targets.)
With the Spitfire being considerably faster than the A6M2 and the Hurricane slightly faster, too, the British fighters would have had an even greater advantage with regard to the tactcal initiative than against the Me 109.
The A6M2 couldn't hunt down the British fighters like the Me 109 could, and hunting them down was just what the Luftwaffe had to do to gain air superiority.
>On the other hand Zero not well protected and vulnerable, even to .303's.
Good point, the British armament would have been much more effective against the A6M2 than it was against the Me 109E.
>Maneuverability would be interesting but the Zero will probably have the edge.
Certainly. That could have worked in the A6M's favour because historically, the biggest problem fighting the Zero was abandoning pre-war doctrine of dogfighting for the kill. Thanks to this doctrine, the Zero was considerably more effective than it would have been against enemies aware of its deficiencies.
(Chennault had presribed the Flying Tigers the perfect anti-Zero tactics, that's why they were so successful. OK, it looks like they mostly fought the Oscar, but the relative strengths are just the same :-)
It's the question whether the RAF would have been quick enough to adopt proper anti-Zero-tactics, too. The Australian Spitfire experience seems to indicate that they actually found this a bit difficult, but Dowding's cautious strategy would have certainly saved the RAF from being wiped out before they could figure out how to beat the Zero.
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
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High Gs? I dunno, no I have not noticed any big difference really.
The armament thing will go on forever (US 50 caliber, LW 20mm...), Im not touching it, I will say that there are many that think their favorite gun should blow ac away with 2 rounds though.
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The Spitfire and the Zero never really had a long, hard fought campaign against each other, Australia was a series of limited raids in 1943 only, which is the only place the two ac met.
As far as proper tactics, all the Allied flyers adopted what worked for them eventually, P-40, P-39, Spitfire, F4F, F6F, whatever. Seeing friends die is a great learning tool I would think. That was true for both sides, from 1939-45. None of them were stupid, they knew the limits of their ac.
Something else too, the RAF had plenty of experience fighting slower but more manueverable fighters before the "Flying Tigers" did anything. They fought MC200s and CR42s in Hurricanes in the Med from 1940-42. It wasnt like it was some "new" concept...SE5a pilots fought Fokker Dr1s in 1917.
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Originally posted by Nashwan
IFuel burn is adjusted higher because all bases in AH are close together relative to real world conditions. However, altering fuel burn affects vertical distance, which remains the same, and time, which also remains the same.
This effect may be minimized switching to lower or even 1:1 burn rate while autoclimb is enganged.
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storch,
Yes, you are wrong. G effects are the same and generic to the sim.
As to the MG/FF and Type 99 Model 1s, well, Hitech said something about redoing the way damage is calculated vis a vis velocity and explosive content so that explosives would more closely match historical performance.
200 yards would have been considered an insane range to fire their cannon at by Bf109E-4 or A6M2 pilots.
Squire,
The last dogfight of the war was between A6M5s and Seafires. The Seafires won, but not without taking losses.
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Spit IX overmodeled.
I think not.
(http://212.80.76.22/0078/img/09.jpg)
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Hey, good looking Yak you've got there! (j/k) :D
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Originally posted by storch
the only response i've seen is well we'll fix it in AHII (pfffffffffft) like thats about to happen soon.
HTC has said that ALL development on AH1 was stopped when they started on AH2. Live with it. AH2 seems to be a lot better.
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"BTW, I have no problem with a clipped wing 1943 Spit LF IX. Do you have a problem with a 1945 F4U-4C(4 M3 20MIL) or a 1944 F4U-1A(430MPH at 20K)? "
None, if you don't have a problem with the final 1945 Spits either :D
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Originally posted by Angus
"BTW, I have no problem with a clipped wing 1943 Spit LF IX. Do you have a problem with a 1945 F4U-4C(4 M3 20MIL) or a 1944 F4U-1A(430MPH at 20K)? "
None, if you don't have a problem with the final 1945 Spits either :D
Would that be the Mk21 with the 4 20mm cannons? Something like 450mph @ 25kft was it not?
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Something like that yes. I can try to find some data if you like :)
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Hi Squire,
>The Spitfire and the Zero never really had a long, hard fought campaign against each other, Australia was a series of limited raids in 1943 only, which is the only place the two ac met.
I could say the Battle of Britain was a series of limited raids in 1940 :-) Obviously, it was bigger than the Australian campaign, but it certainly was a rather short (yet intense) battle.
>As far as proper tactics, all the Allied flyers adopted what worked for them eventually, P-40, P-39, Spitfire, F4F, F6F, whatever. Seeing friends die is a great learning tool I would think. That was true for both sides, from 1939-45. None of them were stupid, they knew the limits of their ac.
Well, they didn't know the limits of the enemy aircraft though. It took quite a while before the weaknesses of the A6M were finally realized, so "eventually" is the keyword here.
I agree that the RAF would have adapted to the threat, and I do actually believe that the A6M would have fared worse than the Me 109, but I'm certain the RAF would have taken heavy losses early on, and there's no way of telling just how quickly they would have adapted.
>It wasnt like it was some "new" concept...SE5a pilots fought Fokker Dr1s in 1917.
Long-serving RAF experts like Sholto Douglas certainly knew about that, but I'd say the Camel school of thinking was just as influential as the SE5a school of thinking, and I'm not sure the WW2 pilots were trained according to any of them as the RAF expected the fighters to defend their home country by intercepting unescorted bombers.
Bringing the individual combat pilots up to Sholto Douglas' level of tactical expertise would have taken some time, especially if it were attempted during the Battle.
But with regard to Sakai's comment: The A6M was not the aircraft that would have won the Battle of Britain because endurance wasn't the factor that lost it. It were radar and Ultra that were decisive. Endurance could have helped the Luftwaffe to get a more favourable exchange ratio, and fitting drop tanks to the Me 109 would have done them better than equipping their combat squadron with the A6M in my opinion. However, the final outcome would have been just the same.
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
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The Decisive factor in the Battle of Britain was a German lack of strategic focus. Radar and Ultra definately prolonged the fight and allowed the RAF to make better use of their available forces but they didn't win it. The LW came with in days of winning the battle in spite of ultra/rader by attacking the airfields and grinding the RAF down. More pilots were being killed than the RAF could hope to replace. Their replacement pool came within just a few days of being completely empty. Same thing happenend to the LW in the final year of the war. They maintained and even tried a comeback with Bodenplatte but once they were losing pilots faster than they could replace them air superiority was lost. When the replacement pool dried up the breakdown was rapid. From Jan 45 til May 45 the Luftwaffe almost ceased to exist. In less than 4 months the LW collapsed.
Only when Hitler ordered the LW to shift to trying to bomb London into submission did the RAF turn the situation around.
War is all about perception and heart. The side with the perception its winning and the heart to see things through til the bitter end will win. Each side thinks they are about to win AND teetering on diasaster.
The Germans couldn't maintain their focus and their hearts wavered with the "last spitfire" being shotdown over England. Sort of like "the light at the end of the tunnel" and " the troops will be home by christmas". Hitler felt that England was a diversion from the real goal of Russia. In actuallity the 109's were ahead in fighter to fighter kills. 587 109's were lost in the Battle of Britain. 380 Hurricanes, 210 Spitfires, 18 Defiants, and 27 Blenheim fighters - a total of 635 A/C lost. Qualitatively the RAF single engine fighters and the LW 109's were about as even match as has ever met on the battlefield. Quanitatively the LW had a major advantage.
The British new they were in a fight for their survival and conducted themselves accordingly. Had the LW continued to bomb airfields and aircraft factories England would have been forced to capitulate. You just can't get blood from a stone. Given Breathing room after the German change in strategy the RAF continued to throw everything they had into the fight and broke the German will to conquer them. It truely was "Their finest hour". This is why the "few" are so celebrated today.
Crumpp
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Well I would hope the 109s were ahead in the f2f kills for they did not have bombers to shoot at unlike the Spit and Hurrie which had to split their target preferences between bomber and fighter.
The RAF was not near to being out of trained pilots, though the fighter pool was getting rather low.
The Germans still had to get across the Channel and the Germans had no way of stopping the RN.
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Crummp,
Remember the shift was from the British airfields to the cities. It doesn't mean the air engagements ended. The battle in the sky persisted. The difference was the ground losses were much less.
The reason the Luftwaffe lost the BoB was because they overclaimed kills dramatically causing the high command into thinking the Brits were down to their last aircraft and up came multiple squadrons. This was caused by pressure from above in the Nazi regime.
Point being if the Germans had an aircraft that could have stayed over the battlefield like the A6M2 for more time they could have done more to wear the Brits down.
Because of this the Germans lost much of the advantage in pilot quality to the depths of the Channel.
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Your version of history is laughable.
They lost the BoB because they over claimed. :rolleyes:
I guess if they only had been more honest with the paper work they would have won, eh?
You got to be kidding me.......lol
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The reason they lost the battle of britain is because they could not have won it unless the Brits gave up. With Radar and relitivly equeal planes and the home field advantage the germans had no chance to defeat the RAF. I think there was only one week in the whole event that the Brits lost more planes then they made. Modern war in the absense of a moral collaps is a battle of attrition. The Germans had become used to thier enemies collapsing.
I think FFUDOA is thinking of the battle for Guadicanal. Where the over claiming by the Japanese was definatly pivotal in thier inability to apply enought force to get the job done.
The Germans gave it everything they had in the Battle of Britain. And the Brits stoped them with half of what they had.
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Overclaiming was one of the reasons they lost. It convinced Luftwaffe intelligence that the RAF were down to very few operational fighters.
The Jagdwaffe alone claimed nearly 2,000 single engined fighters during the battle, out of a total of around 900 actually lost to all causes, including bomber defensive fire.
LW came with in days of winning the battle in spite of ultra/rader by attacking the airfields and grinding the RAF down.
The Luftwaffe certainly managed to "grind the RAF down", but at no point during the Battle did they do so at a faster rate than the RAF was inflicting on them.
More pilots were being killed than the RAF could hope to replace.
This is true for only 2 weeks of the battle, but the Luftwaffe were losing pilots faster than they could be replaced throughout the battle.
As of 29th June 1940, the 109 force was supposed to have a strength of 1171 pilots, but actualy had 1126 available, and 906 of those were fit for duty.
By the 28th September, established strength had fallen to 1132 pilots, but only 917 were available, and only 676 were fit for duty.
In contrast, RAF pilot strength grew throughout the battle, reaching over 1400 by late September 1940. The RAF has a list of pilots who fought during the battle, and those who were killed. Just over 500 were killed, but around 2800 actually flew at least 1 operational sortie with a fighter squadron during the BoB.
Their replacement pool came within just a few days of being completely empty.
Even if the RAF had no replacements available, and they did, they were still in a better position than the Luftwaffe. RAF pilot casualties (killed wounded and captured) were similar, or less, than Luftwaffe fighter pilot casualties. (The Luftwaffe of course losing far more as prisoners than the RAF).
Now, which do you think is going to break first, the force with 1400 pilots and 1000+ fighters, or the force with less than 900 pilots and planes? Especially considering that the smaller force was training pilots and building planes at a slower rate.
Only when Hitler ordered the LW to shift to trying to bomb London into submission did the RAF turn the situation around.
The Luftwaffe were pressuring the RAF with a very high sortie rate and attacks on airfields. They began those tactics in the last week of August, when they flew nearly 4000 fighter sorties. But they couldn't sustain it, flying only 3200 sorties in the first week of September, then dropping to only 1400 in the second week of September.
That sortie rate should tell you the strain the Luftwaffe were under. To fly 4000 sorties in a week with 675 pilots means each pilot flying 6 times in a week, and much longer sorties than the RAF flew. Little wonder they couldn't sustain it more than 2 weeks.
The British new they were in a fight for their survival and conducted themselves accordingly. Had the LW continued to bomb airfields and aircraft factories England would have been forced to capitulate.
Luftwaffe bombing of aircraft factories was so effective that of the planned 3,602 Spits and Hurris that were supposed to be produced in 1940, 4,283 were actually produced.
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It's a fact that Dowding was planning on reporting to Churchill that the BoB was lost since the RAF couldn't sustain the losses. By attacking the airfields the LW gave the RAF no wiggle room to rest/refit their planes and pilots. Pilots either took off and intercepted the raid or stayed on the ground to be bombed. Same with planes. By changing to attacking the cities the pilots could return to their fields and rest.
Overclaiming kills didn't lose the LW the BoB. In fact the RLM had one of the more stringent comfirmation processes in WWII. Sure they overclaimed but of all the allies the RAF was probably the worst at overclaiming on the Western front. Course I think it would be hard to beat the USAAF 8th Bomber Group Gunners. During Schweinfurt they claimed more German fighters shot down that even participated in the battle. For Morale purposes most of the claims were allowed to stand. In fact less than 10 German planes were damaged from B17 gunners.
The Luftwaffe under estimated the strength of the RAF single engine day fighters. The LW intelligence folks also didn't account for damaged/repaired A/C or the fact that pilots were often shot down but returned to fight within a few hours. These led to the "last spitfire" perception.
Same thing the US did in Vietnam. The Tet offensive broke the back of the VC movement in the South and forced the NVA to get involved in the fight. A major military defeat which N. Vietnam was able to turn into a strategic victory all due to the American publics perception of how the war was going. "Light at the end of the Tunnel" syndrome.
Crumpp
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The Luftwaffe had many problems going into the BoB. It was not designed for a strategic bombing campaign but as a close support weapon to move forward in support of ground troops.
At the beginning of the BoB the 109's main task was to engage the British fighters and shoot them down while making use of its advantages. When it became clear the 110 was incapable to fill the roll as a long range escort fighter the 109 had to fill that roll and could not fully utilize its advantages. The 109 loss rates escalated. Also, the 109 had limited range with only 20min actual combat time over Britain. At the start of the BoB the LW tried to draw out the RAF over the channel by attacking shipping but it wasn’t successful.
The 110 as a long-range escort fighter proved inadequate during the Battle of Britain. The 110 was a decent fighter when able to operate to its strength. Locked to bombers it ended up needing its own escort. If the RAF would have had 110s or something similar the BoB would have been over before it began.
LW bombers were also inadequate for the task.
LW fighter pilots were also being depleted and there was no change in the lengthy training periods to replace pilots.
Then there are the other difficulties such as inadequate local facilities to repair damaged aircraft. This forced the LW to send aircraft back to Germany for repair. The Luftwaffe had very little reserves throughout the battle and had not fully mobilized its industry to meet demand. The LW had no method of plotting the positions of RAF aircraft and it had no means of ground to air control. The RAF radar and ULTRA allowed time for the RAF to prepare and react.
In all, the RAF lost 1,173 planes and 510 pilots and gunners during the Battle of Britain. The LW lost 1,733 planes and 3,368 killed or captured. (These numbers vary with the source.) The problems of “over claiming” had more of an effect on the morale of LW then on deciding who won or lost. The reality was even if the Germans were 100% accurate with their claims they could not know how many aircraft and RAF airmen they killed.
While fighting over enemy territory planes that may have been considered actually “shoot downs” anywhere else could ditch and be recovered, repaired and sent back into battle. Pilots who bailed or ditched could be back in the air the same day. It’s just silly to claim that the LW lost the battle of Britain because of “over claiming”.
There’s a lot that has been written about how close the LW came to “winning” the BoB. Even if the LW had “won” the Germans would have had a tough time invading and conquering Britain. Some say 'Seelowe' was nothing but a bluff.
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Hi Crumpp,
>The Decisive factor in the Battle of Britain was a German lack of strategic focus.
That's the popularly accepted history :-)
However, in my opinion the truth is that the Battle of Britain was a fully strategic air war that was meant to make Britain collapse without an invasion.
Accordingly, when the Luftwaffe began bombing London, this wasn't a shift in strategic focus. It actually was the logical progression of the strategic air war after the RAF was believed to be worn down enough for the Luftwaffe to mount a raid for their real objective.
The Germans were confident that they could wear down the RAF so that the combined threat of the Luftwaffe razing London and the Wehrmacht landing on the British channel coast would force the British to sue for peace.
Hitler didn't want to invade Britain, what he really wanted was an invasion of the Soviet Union. His invasion threat was an instrument to attack the British will to fight, and the Luftwaffe actions were aimed at bombing the British out of the war without an invasion.
Not only did the RAF achieve an operative victory over the Luftwaffe, but the British nation as a whole achieved a strategical victory over the German war machine that was waging history's first pure strategic air war according to the 1930s' air power theories against them.
In my opinion, popular interpretation of the Battle of Britain fails to realize how great the British victory really was. European politics of the late 1930s had been dominated by international fear of the powerful Luftwaffe that could destroy every enemy's capital within a few days, and this fear had allowed Germany to occupy one country after the other.
According to what everyone believed in the 1930s, Britain would just have had to collapses when the Luftwaffe began to mount large-scale raids on London from bases in nearby France. Undoubtly, the German leadership who had successfully employed the Luftwaffe threat for so many years were expecting just that.
That the British determination to fight hardly suffered from the heavy Luftwaffe attacks had to be considered a miracle by what everyone at that time thought to know about air power.
I don't see think there were any crippling blunders in the way the Luftwaffe ran their campaign - the decisive error was to believe that the British would allow themselves to be defeated from the air alone.
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
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Gosh some of you guys make war sound so mathmatical. Wonder how many of you have fought one? Ever been in a big battle? No, not just showed up and banged on a typewriter in the rear, I mean closed with and destroyed another group of human beings who were bent on destroying you. Technology is nice and I'll take that A10 circling overhead anyday. But it is the individuals willingness to go up the mountain and crawl into a cave to shoot his enemy in the face that wins the fight. Heart without technology is better than all the technology in the world without the Heart, when it comes to warfare. Ask any infantryman.
Let's examine some wars....
Israeli Six day war - Why did Israel win?? The Arabs outnumbered them and had comparable equipment.
Vietnam War - Why did the US lose? We had the technology...radar/missles/jets vs a man with a rifle. Should have cleaned house.
Why did the Brits win Malaysia? It was primarily fought with a few SAS...
Why did the US win El Salvador? Again it was fought with a handfull of SOF forces on the sly...
Why did the Russian's lose Afghanistan?
Why would a fanatic with little to no technology attack the most technologically advance Military on the Planet on September 11th?
Cause he thinks we don't have the heart to fight him. Lots of technology but weak soft centers. Look at the message that was sent by our politicians after the Mog!!
Again....
It is a FACT Dowding was planning on reporting to Churchhill to start exploring the Diplomatic avenues cause the RAF would collapse IF the LW campaign against the airfields continued. A day or so before he was to report the LW changed strateagy.
Just like Ambrose says: "Hitler thought the western democracies were soft. The sons of Facism could beat the sons of democracy."
The Brits had the heart not to be conquered and the Germans didn't have the heart to conquer them. It wasn't planes, trains, or automobiles that won the fight, it was men.
Crumpp
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Do any of you long winded twits have jobs? Sheesh... some long rants about something that is neither here nor there. :p
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I sort of agree with you HoHun. It is obvious that a serious attack on England was not something the Germans considered when they began the French campaign. Even if they had won air superiority it would have been very difficult for the Germans to cross the channel in any real strength. Especially after letting the BEF go at Dunkirk.
The East was always on Hitler's agenda. This is spelled out in "Mein Kampf". It's my opinion that the German powers that be in 1940 didn't expect to win so suddenly and when it did happen sort of floundered around allowing the allies to gain the strategic intiative. Read an interesting article in WWII History Magazine about the plans for the Invasion of France falling into French hands just weeks before it was to commence. The led Hitler to scrap the plan which was pretty much the same as they used in WWI (attacking through Belgium). The outcome was the flanking manuver through the Argonne Forest which won them France.
The article goes on to address Dunkirk. Some people think that Hitler didn't want to completely destroy the British as a jesture towards peace. Some think It was because of Goerings assurance the Luftwaffe would do it from the air.
I tend to agree with the camp that thinks that Hitler didn't want to commit the Panzers and leave their flanks exposed to the bulk of the French Forces still intact in the South of France. They didn't have all of the French units accounted for and he played it safe rather than committing to a fight in which a powerful enemy force could suddenly appear in your rear area. Of Course the tactical commanders were pissed that they were halted with sight of the shattered BEF.
Crumpp
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It is a FACT Dowding was planning on reporting to Churchhill to start exploring the Diplomatic avenues cause the RAF would collapse IF the LW campaign against the airfields continued.
What is the source for this? I've never seen it suggested Dowding was ready to throw in the towel.
Dowding was certainly worried by this point, but don't forget he only had a complete picture of his own forces. Whilst the Germans had underestimated RAF strength, the British had vastly overestimated German strength.
Britain believed Germany was on track to produce 24,400 aircraft in 1940, and started the battle with a frontline strength of 5,800 aircraft. Actual German production was 10,250 aircraft in 1940, and front line strength was 3000.
Dowding knew his own strength exactly, but believed the Luftwaffe to be twice as strong as it actually was.
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Park may have told Churchill that the reserves where gone on September 15th. But that is not true.
There are some very simple numbers to show what happend to the Germans over England.
Single engine fighters is interesting.
July1 1940 LW 725 RAF 591
Oct 1 1940 LW 275 RAF 734
no real mystery there. A defender with simiular equipment and a 3 to 1 superiority and the home field advantage.
The RAF never had fewer then 2 trained fighter pilots available for each of those planes either.
Britain made 15000 aircraft in 1940 and the Germans 10000 or so.
"The Brits had the heart not to be conquered and the Germans didn't have the heart to conquer them. It wasn't planes, trains, or automobiles that won the fight, it was men. "
interesting statement. The Brits had the heart to withstand the germans attempt and the Germans lacked the military capability to force the issue. You cannot attribute it just to the mystical will of the British. You must recognise the incabablilty of the Germans to win the battle. Its not a heart thing. Both sides went at it to the best of thier abilities(with tactical mistakes on both sides) and the stronger side won.
Switching to cities from airfields only blurs the issue. With the relative capabilities of the two forces the RAF was defensivly supperior to the LW. So they won. The opposite was true of RAF offensive capabilities vs the Channel front for the following 3 years. Until the USAAF arrived with the capability and will to force the issue.
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I disagree. In any battle both sides feel they are about to lose. You only get to see your 25 yards of war.
It is very arguable whether or not the LW had the capability to win Air Superiority over England in 1940. I believe they could have done it. That is the view of many Historians too.
Crumpp
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It makes good drama I suppose. But the truth is pretty simple. If Churchill(the primary author of the history of WW2) had recorded it the simple way, it would have remained simple. But he didnt. He recorded it as a test of will and chance and destiny. The facts are pretty simple though. The LW would have had to create a 3-4 to 1 kill to death ratio to win that battle and there was nothing in thier previos engangments vs the RAF to indicate that was possible. With the defensive advantage of recovered pilots and aircraft it infact became impossible.
And comparing the RAF in the Battle of Britian to El Salvadoran death squads is in bad taste.
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Day by day report of BoB
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/calendar.html
among other info.
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HoHun
"I could say the Battle of Britain was a series of limited raids"
60 a/c raids vs 600?...for 3 months? you tell me.
"Well, they didn't know the limits of the enemy aircraft though. It took quite a while before the weaknesses of the A6M were finally realized, so "eventually" is the keyword here."
I think closer to the point was that they quickly learned its strengths.
"Long-serving RAF experts like Sholto Douglas certainly knew about that, but I'd say the Camel school of thinking was just as influential as the SE5a school of thinking, and I'm not sure the WW2 pilots were trained according to any of them as the RAF expected the fighters to defend their home country by intercepting unescorted bombers."
I think that idea went out the window at France and Dunkirk?
...I guess my point is that the air war in WW2 was all about air forces adapting quickly, modern war moved too fast for it to be otherwise. "What if they had a Zero"? they would have adapted.
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Originally posted by Karnak
Hmmm.
My books usually list a significantly shorter range for the Bf109 than for the Spitfire.
Spitfire IX : ~430 miles on internal
Spitfire XIV: ~460 miles on internal
Bf109E: ~450 miles on internal fuel
Bf109F/G/K: ~370 miles on internal fuel
That is because your books list Still air range (= no reserves, merely a theoretical absolut maximum reach number) for the Spitfires at their most economic cruise speed, whereas authors like Green probably took range data from captured German documents, which, however does not list the same thing as the British "Still Air Range" definition, but at the highest cruise speed (=non-economical) with significant reserves of fuel allowed for climbing, fighting and landing (about 25%). In other words, your books present the worst numbers possible, even though it`s not because of their bias, but the authors inability to find better numbers! I checked it now, your numbers refer to Spits doing economy cruise at 220-280 mph speed w/o reserves, and Bf 109s doing a max. speed cruise at 370-400mph with 1/4 of tank reserved - hardly a fair comparision, is it?
(sidenote, the latter figure is especially interesting, late Bf 109s could cruise as fast as the absolute maximum speed of the most common types of Spits in 44/45, the Mk IX/XVI. :aok ;) )
If you are interested, British intelligance doc lists the following ranges under the same definitions for the Spits and 109G, intenral or 90 gall/300 liter droptank:
Still air range
Spit F XIV :
460 mls / 112 imp. gall.
850 mls / 202 imp. gall.
Spit LF XVI :
434 mls / 85 imp. gall.
980 mls / 175 im. gall.
Bf 109 G :
615 mls / 88 imp. gall
1000 mls / 154 imp. gall
Well it shows the 109 had usually better range than the Spit on less fuel. Not very surprising, the Spit/Merlin may have had good performance otherwise, but speaking of effiency, it was a combination of an airframe with loads of drag and a fuel hog engine. 109s - perhaps with the exception of the pre-Friedrich series - needed much less horsepower to haul them around then Spitfires for the same or better speed, not to mention the Daimler-Benz engines were much more economical than the R-R Merlins. Again, no miracle, wonder, or black magic : higher compression ratios, direct fuel injection, plenty of displacement to work with.. Which means that on the same cruise horsepower, the 109 will travel faster, thus cover more range at the same time, under which the engine consumes a lot less fuel. Result : higher endurance and range effiency/effectiveness.
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Originally posted by Crumpp
I sort of agree with you HoHun. It is obvious that a serious attack on England was not something the Germans considered when they began the French campaign. Even if they had won air superiority it would have been very difficult for the Germans to cross the channel in any real strength. Especially after letting the BEF go at Dunkirk.
Indeed. One has merely look on the timeline. It`s worth to compare it to the Allied efforts and plans for D-Day. The 1940 campaign started in May, and in June the French were still fighting. Note that Eisenhowever in June 1944 decided to go with the operation because otherwise the wheater would give no opportunity for a successfull invasion until 1945 - the automn was coming.
The first clashes with the RAF started only in July, in fact the real thing was only in early August and brought the RAF to the edge of destruction by late August / early September. But all that hardly mattered - look at the date again. Even if the LW would be even remotely capable just putting the whole RAF to the last plane into past tense - which was something, as proven by the next 5 years of air war, an impossibility vs. an industrialized nation), it would be waaaay too late to start any seaborne invasion (hypothesizing of course the Germans could gather an invasion fleet in a few weeks from what was available, which took even the Allies a good 3 years to complete) without the weather intervening. This become appearant in the very first days for the German general staff, and they simply didn`t take the idea of an ivasion seriously. In Britiain, they took it serious of course, they were naked after Dunkirk, a single Panzer Division could wreak havoc on them with no heavy weapons to defend against.. But as told, Hitler`s attention was already on the East, as Stalin took advantage of the German commitments on the West and started expanding in Eastern Europe, like in the case of Rumania.. This alone made the area far more important for Hitler than to bother with the UK that was no longer in the position to seriously challange the Germans on the continent alone.
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Gosh some of you guys make war sound so mathmatical. Wonder how many of you have fought one? Ever been in a big battle? No, not just showed up and banged on a typewriter in the rear, I mean closed with and destroyed another group of human beings who were bent on destroying you. Technology is nice and I'll take that A10 circling overhead anyday. But it is the individuals willingness to go up the mountain and crawl into a cave to shoot his enemy in the face that wins the fight. Heart without technology is better than all the technology in the world without the Heart, when it comes to warfare. Ask any infantryman.
Let's examine some wars....
Israeli Six day war - Why did Israel win?? The Arabs outnumbered them and had comparable equipment.
Vietnam War - Why did the US lose? We had the technology...radar/missles/jets vs a man with a rifle. Should have cleaned house.
Why did the Brits win Malaysia? It was primarily fought with a few SAS...
Why did the US win El Salvador? Again it was fought with a handfull of SOF forces on the sly...
Why did the Russian's lose Afghanistan?
Why would a fanatic with little to no technology attack the most technologically advance Military on the Planet on September 11th?
Cause he thinks we don't have the heart to fight him. Lots of technology but weak soft centers. Look at the message that was sent by our politicians after the Mog!!
Again....
It is a FACT Dowding was planning on reporting to Churchhill to start exploring the Diplomatic avenues cause the RAF would collapse IF the LW campaign against the airfields continued. A day or so before he was to report the LW changed strateagy.
Just like Ambrose says: "Hitler thought the western democracies were soft. The sons of Facism could beat the sons of democracy."
The Brits had the heart not to be conquered and the Germans didn't have the heart to conquer them. It wasn't planes, trains, or automobiles that won the fight, it was men.
Crumpp
What's your source that Dowding was planning on advising Churchill to seek peace? Ever since the invasion of Poland the German and English were communicating and exploring various peace offers.
Its seems math was on the RAF's side and the RAF won despite what ever comparisons you conjure up it is not so much a miracle that the RAF "won". The miracle would have been if the LW had.
HoHun may have been correct in stating the LW were in fact conducting a fully strategic air war during the BoB. But they didnt have the numbers or the correct weapons that were required to win it.
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Originally posted by Nashwan
The Jagdwaffe alone claimed nearly 2,000 single engined fighters during the battle, out of a total of around 900 actually lost to all causes, including bomber defensive fire.
I`d like to see a source for this "2000 claimed by the Jagdwaffe" claim... Don`t really except it to turn up ! :cool
I believe Groehler`s numbers are far more credible (if I am reading his chart right), given they are taken right from the German archieves! Those 915 German claim from 10th July - 31st October, vs. 934 Spits/Hurris admitted by the British to be lost to enemy action.
Deighton also shows an interesting table in his book "Fighters", showing the RAF`s claims of 1940 vs. the real numbers recorded in the LW`s Kriegstagebuchs. , for 15th, 18th August and 15th and 27th September. The total number of British claims for are 678 (185+155+185+153), vs. only 196 German planes that lost in reality.
The Luftwaffe certainly managed to "grind the RAF down", but at no point during the Battle did they do so at a faster rate than the RAF was inflicting on them.
Well, the Luftwaffe was loosing something like 550 fighters in the whole BoB to all reasons, vs. 1960 British fighters to all reasons (combat, accidents, bombing etc.). Certainly the British were loosing a lot more fighters than the Germans, which was partly balanced out by the British advantage of returning pilots.
This is true for only 2 weeks of the battle, but the Luftwaffe were losing pilots faster than they could be replaced throughout the battle.
As of 29th June 1940, the 109 force was supposed to have a strength of 1171 pilots, but actualy had 1126 available, and 906 of those were fit for duty.
By the 28th September, established strength had fallen to 1132 pilots, but only 917 were available, and only 676 were fit for duty.
In contrast, RAF pilot strength grew throughout the battle, reaching over 1400 by late September 1940. The RAF has a list of pilots who fought during the battle, and those who were killed. Just over 500 were killed, but around 2800 actually flew at least 1 operational sortie with a fighter squadron during the BoB.
Lies, damned lies, statistics as they say... numbers don`t show everything, especially if selectively qouted. First, your numbers include British pilot reserves but ignore the German reserves - why? Second, in air combat, and this was proven hundreds of times, it was pilot quality that mattered. The British could only keep up with their pilot`s losses if they drastically reduced their training. The RAF took severe losses in experienced pilots over France and especially over Dunkirk, about 25% of the pilots being rookies at the start of BoB. However by early September, over 50% of British fighter pilots had only really marginal training 5-10 flying hours on their combat types, sometimes not even that much, vs. many hundred hours of their LW adversaries.
Wonders do not happen in war, the British were able to raise so many new pilots because they cut back on training. In fact, even pupils and whole classes were taken out of fighter schools and sent to the frontline units, which would mean the RAF would be in serious trouble with replacement pilots in a few months if the air battle continues. However it was correctly noted that if the LW breaks the RAF in the meantime, they would of little importance..
Now, which do you think is going to break first, the force with 1400 pilots and 1000+ fighters, or the force with less than 900 pilots and planes? Especially considering that the smaller force was training pilots and building planes at a slower rate.
Given that both parties are of equal quality, the more numorous should of course. But this wasn`t the case, it was quality vs. quantity again. 1000+ fighters, yes, but only 1/3 of them were equal to the 109s. The same goes to pilots : 1400 pilots, most of them rookies having great difficulity just taking off and landing their planes, with only a small core of veteran Wing Commanders who, if fell, could not be replaced, vs. 900 pilots, most of them veterans of Spain, Poland and France, already mounting up dozens of kills and gaining lot of experiance, and even the rookies have dozens of time of training time than their British adversaries. And there`s the human factor as well, the British rotated their pilots, the Germans did not (or at least not so often), however the LW was on it`s peak of power, and morale was very high, whereas the RAF was sustaining defeats after defeats, and their inexperienced rookies were often so scared as they refused to engage the enemy planes and fled (as happened with 92nd Squadron).
So the question is : 300 first rate and 700 second rate fighters, flown by 1400 pilots, mostly rookies with low morale (but rested), vs. 900 first class planes flown by 900 first class pilots, who are quite tired by now, but have very high morale and commitment to their cause? Well I don`t know the answer, there are just too many variables, but history showed that if the odds are near-even, then quality is the deciding factor.
The Luftwaffe were pressuring the RAF with a very high sortie rate and attacks on airfields. They began those tactics in the last week of August, when they flew nearly 4000 fighter sorties. But they couldn't sustain it, flying only 3200 sorties in the first week of September, then dropping to only 1400 in the second week of September.
... and similiarly, the RAF`s fighter sorties also dropped? Why?
Well, the weather:
7th September 1940 : Fair with some haze.
8th September 1940 : Fair early morning and evening, cloudy for the remainder of the day
9th September 1940 : Scattered showers, thundery in the east. Channel fair.
10th September 1940 : Generally cloudy, some rain.
11th September 1940 : Mainly fine with some local showers. Cloud in the Channel and Thames Estuary.
12th September 1940 : Unsettled, rain in most districts
13th September 1940 : Unsettled.
14th September 1940 : Showers and local thunder. Cloud in the Straits, Channel and Thames Estuary
That sortie rate should tell you the strain the Luftwaffe were under. To fly 4000 sorties in a week with 675 pilots means each pilot flying 6 times in a week, and much longer sorties than the RAF flew. Little wonder they couldn't sustain it more than 2 weeks.
It`s more like a simple case that the Automn was coming, and the weather turned bad, making flying impossible.
As the British themselves admit, ie. on 16th September :
16th September 1940 :
Weather: General rain and cloud.
Enemy action by day
An attack by some 350 enemy aircraft developed in Kent at about 0800 hours and formations flew in the direction of London, but the attack was not pressed home.
Other activity during the day consisted of a large number of reconnaissances off and over the Coast mostly by single aircraft, but one raid totalling 30 aircraft approached Dover. No attack, however, developed.
Weather largely hindered fighter action.
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Originally posted by Nashwan
Britain believed Germany was on track to produce 24,400 aircraft in 1940, and started the battle with a frontline strength of 5,800 aircraft. Actual German production was 10,250 aircraft in 1940, and front line strength was 3000.
No, that`s wrong. If Britain actually though the German front line strenght was 5800 planes, then it was quite correct. The actual German numbers for 11th April 1940 was 5298 planes, including 1356 s-e fighters, 1711 bombers and 414 dive bombers and others. This 5298 planes however do not include the reserves, liason, communications, night bombers, sea auxilarries and glider transport planes (these are only counted into the frontline strenght from August 1944 onwards). This grew to 5599 by 21st June 1941, including 1440 s-e fighters, 263 nihgt fighters, 1511 bombers and 424 dive bombers/attack aircraft.
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Isegrim,
The formula for success which finally won the allies Air superiority in essentially one big offensive that lasted ONE week was the same formula the Germans stumbled upon in the Beginning of the BoB.
The LW was able to maintain Air Superiority over Europe AND fight on two other fronts simply because they could chose when they fought until mid-43. In 1944 Doolitte freed up the fighters and launched Operation Argument forcing the LW into a battle of attrition they could not afford. In one week they lost Air Superiority setting the stage for the Normandy landings. The LW couldn't ignore the American heavies and had to intercept each mission. Once that reality occurred the LW lost the intiative and was doomed.
The LW in the BoB stumbled upon this. By attacking the Airfields they forced the RAF to come up and do battle whether they were prepared or not. Every raid had to be intercepted. Goering stepped in and chained the fighters to the bombers as the 8th AF did until Doolittle came along. This removed the tactical initiative from the LW but as long they maintained numerical superoirity AND the strategic initiative it was still working. When Hitler changed their targets to London the LW lost the Strategic initiative too.
Could the LW have destroyed the RAF to a plane...I seriously doubt it. At least not without landing forces on England itself. Could they have forced the RAF to pull back out of Range of the LW's reach and kept the Air over a Landing fleet clean of RAF attacks. Maybe, they certainly did it over and over in Russia.
The invasion didn't break down because the LW didn't have the resources to win the BoB. The invasion was a farce because the Army did not have the sealift capability to transport itself over the channel and make a beach landing. The Germans didn't have the higgins boat nor anything comparable. So yes it was a test of wills...AS ALL BATTLES ARE! Do you not know of Thermopylae?
Crumpp
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Its not a test of wills in any way except that the battle was Britiains to lose if they wished. There are many things that both could have done in hind sight or even common sence to perform better but only a french like capitulation by the Brits was going to win it for the Germans. And certainly it was considered by the British.
The Cult of military eliteism only works if the other side cant take the casualties or wont fight. That is one of the most overwhelming lessons of world war two. You appear to be trying to rewrite it.
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The Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain
13 Aug 40
Aircraft
Unit Airbase Type Strength Svcble
Luftflotte 2
I. Fliegerkorps
Stab/KG 1 Amiens-Glisy He 111H 4 4
I/KG 1 Montdidier 27 23
II/KG 1 Amiens-Glisy 31 29
III/KG 1 Rosières-en-Santerre 32 15
Stab/KG 76 Cormeilles-en-Vexin Do 17Z 5 5
I/KG 76 Beauvais-Tille 29 29
II/KG 76 Creil Ju 88A 36 28
III/KG 76 Cormeilles-en-Vexin Do 17Z 32 19
Lehrstaffel 11 7
Stab, I, III/KG 77 Laon Ju 88A 68 *
II/KG 77 Asch-Nord 38 *
II. Fliegerkorps
Stab, II/KG 2 St. Lèger Do 17Z 42 35
I/KG 2 Epinoy 43 27
III/KG 2 Cambrai-Sd 34 32
Stab, I/KG 3 Le Culot 43 31
II/KG 3 Antwerpen-Deurne 35 32
III/KG 3 St. Trond 30 25
I, II, III/KG 53 Lille-Nord He 111H 94 67
II/StG 1 Pas-de-Calais Ju 87B 38 30
IV (St.)/LG 1 Tramecourt 36 28
ErprGr 210 Calais-Marck Bf 109E-4B 10 9
Bf 110C-6 5 4
Bf 110D-0 21 17
9. Fliegerdivision
Stab/KG 4 Soesterburg He 111P 6 5
I/KG 4 He 111H 30 12
II/KG 4 Eindhoven He 111P 31 25
III/KG 4 Amsterdam-Schipol Ju 88A 35 23
Stab/KG 40 Brest-Guipavas 1 1
I/KG 40 Fw 200C 9 3
KGr 100 Vannes He 111H-1/3 41 19
KGr 126 Marx? He 111H 34 8
Jafü 2
Stab/JG 3 Wierre au Bois Bf 109E 3 3
I/JG 3 Grandvilliers 33 32
II/JG 3 Samer 29 22
III/JG 3 Desvres, Le Touquet 29 29
Stab, I/JG 26 Audembert 42 38
II/JG 26 Marquise-Ost 39 35
III/JG 26 Caffiers 40 38
Stab/JG 51 Wissant 4 4
I/JG 51 Pihen bei Calais 32 32
II/JG 51 Marquise-West 33 33
III/JG 51 St. Omer-Clairmarais 32 30
Stab, I/JG 52 Coquelles 42 34
II/JG 52 Peuplingues 39 32
III/JG 52 Zerbst 31 11
Stab, I/JG 54 Campagne-les-Guines 38 26
II/JG 54 Hermelingen 36 32
III/JG 54 Guines-en-Calais 42 40
Stab/ZG 26 Lille Bf 110C 3 3
I/ZG 26 Yvrench, St. Omer 39 33
II/ZG 26 Crècy, St. Omer 37 32
III/ZG 26 Barly, Arques 35 24
Nachtjagd-Division
Stab/NJG 1 Dusseldorf, Deelen Bf 110B? 3 3
I/NJG 1 Bönninghardt 4 3
Bf 110C 30 19
II/NJG 1 Dusseldorf Ju 88C-2 11 4
Do 17Z-10 7 6
Do 17Z-7 3 3
III/NJG 1 Köln-Ostheim Bf 110C 13 4
Bf 109D 3 1
Bf 109E 17 16
Luftflotte 3
VIII. Fliegerkorps
Stab, III/StG 1 Angers Ju 87B 41 28
Do 17M 2 1
I/StG 1 Ju 87R 39 27
Stab, I/StG 2 St. Malo Ju 87B 39 32
Do 17M 5 4
II/StG 2 Lannion Ju 87R 37 31
Ju 87B 2 2
I, II, III/StG 77 Caen 115 98
Do 17M 4 1
II (Sch.)/LG 2 Böblingen Bf 109E 39 31
V (Z.)/LG 1 Caen Bf 110C 32 21
Bf 110D 11 8
V. Fliegerkorps
Stab/KG 51 Paris-Orly Ju 88A 1 1
I/KG 51 Melun-Villaroche 30 21
II, III/KG 51 Etampes-Mondèsir 66 49
Stab, I/KG 54 Evreux 35 29
II/KG 54 St. André 31 23
Stab, III/KG 55 Villacoublay He 111P 42 34
I/KG 55 Dreux He 111H 21 18
He 111P 18 17
II/KG 55 Chartres He 111P 38 28
IV. Fliegerkorps
Stab/LG 1 Orlèans-Bricy Ju 88A 2 1
I (K.) , II (K.)/LG 1 67 47
He 111H 2 1
III (K.)/LG 1 Chateaudun Ju 88A 34 23
Stab, I/KG 27 Tours He 111P 20 13
He 111H 18 10
II/KG 27 Dinard-Bourges He 111P 26 18
He 111H 8 3
III/KG 27 Rennes He 111P 30 22
He 111D 1 1
KGr 806 Nantes, Caen-Carpiquet Ju 88A 33 22
Stab/StG 3 Bretigny Do 17M 1 0
Do 17Z 4 3
He 111H 2 1
Jafü 3
Stab, I, II/JG 2 Beaumont-le-Roger Bf 109E 73 63
III/JG 2 Le Havre 32 28
Stab/JG 27 Cherbourg-West 5 4
I/JG 27 Plumett 37 32
II/JG 27 Crèpon 40 32
III/JG 27 Arcques 39 32
Stab/JG 53 Cherbourg 6 6
I/JG 53 Rennes, Guernsey 39 37
II/JG 53 Dinan, Guernsey 38 34
III/JG 53 Brest, Sempy 38 35
Stab/ZG 2 Toussus-le-Noble Bf 110C 4 3
I/ZG 2 Caen-Carpiquet 41 35
II/ZG 2 Guyancourt 18 14
Bf 110D 23 20
Luftflotte 5
X Fliegerkorps
Stab/KG 26 Stavanger He 111P 6 6
I, III/KG 26 He 111H 56 55
Stab, I, III/KG 30 Aalborg Ju 88A 76 62
I/ZG 76 Stavanger-Forus Bf 110C 34 32
Stab/JG 77 ? Bf 109E 4 4
I/JG 77 ? 38 37
II/JG 77 Stavanger, Trondheim 43 38
KüFlGr 506 ? He 115B 8 7
He 115C 18 14
Seefliegerverbände
1./KüFlGr 106 Norderney He 115C 12 12
2./KüFlGr 106 Rantum Do 18 10 6
1., 2./KüFlGr 406 Stavanger 17 15
3./KüFlGr 406 Hörnum 10 10
KüFlGr 606 Brest Do 17Z 33 32
2./KüFlGr 906 Hörnum Do 18 9 8
TransOzeanSt. Brest Do 26 2 1
* KG 77 is converting to the Ju 88A
Strength Summary
Number Type Strength Svcble
42 1/3 Kampfgruppen 1482 1008
9 Stukagruppen 365 286
1 Schlachtgruppe 39 31
26 Jagdgruppen 976 853
9 Zerstrergruppen 244 189
3 Nachtjagdgruppen 91 59
14 Seefliegerstaffeln 240 125
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The Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain
7 Sept 1940
Courtesy of Johann Palsson
Aircraft
Unit Airbase Type Strength Svcble
Luftflotte 2
Long-Range Bombers
Stab/KG 1 Rosières-en-Santerre He 111 7 5
I/KG 1 Montdidier, Clairmont 36 22
II/KG 1 Montdidier, Nijmegen 36 23
III/KG 1 Rosières-en-Santerre Ju 88A 9 -
Stab/KG 2 St. Lèger Do 17Z 6 6
I/KG 2 Cambrai 19 12
II/KG 2 St. Lèger 31 20
III/KG 2 Cambrai-Süd 30 20
Stab/KG 3 Le Culot 6 5
I/KG 3 29 25
II/KG 3 Antwerp, Deurne 27 23
III/KG 3 St. Trond 28 19
Stab/KG 4 Soesterburg He 111 5 5
I/KG 4 37 16
II/KG 4 Eindhoven 37 30
III/KG 4 Amsterdam-Schipol Ju 88A 30 14
Stab/KG 26 Gilze-Rijen He 111 6 3
I/KG 26 Meirbeke, Courtrai 25 7
II/KG 26 Gilze-Rijen 26 7
Stab/KG 30 Brussels Ju 88A 1 1
I/KG 30 10 1
II/KG 30 Gilze-Rijen 30 24
Stab/KG 40 Bordeaux 2 1
Stab/KG 53 Lille-Nord He 111 5 3
I/KG 53 23 19
II/KG 53 29 7
III/KG 53 19 4
Stab/KG 76 Cormeilles-en-Vexin Do 17Z 6 3
I/KG 76 Beauvais-Tille 26 19
II/KG 76 Creil Ju 88A 27 21
III/KG 76 Cormeilles-en-Vexin Do 17Z 24 17
Stab/KG 77 Laon Ju 88A 1 1
I/KG 77 36 31
II/KG 77 Asch-Nord 32 25
III/KG 77 Laon 30 19
KGr 126 ? He 111 33 26
Dive-Bombers and Ground-Attack Aircraft
Stab/StG 1 St. Pol Ju 87, Do 17 7 5
II/StG 1 Pas-de-Calais Ju 87 43 29
Stab/StG 2 Tramecourt Ju 87, Do 17 11 9
II/StG 2 St. Omer/St. Trond Ju 87 27 22
IV (St.)/LG 1 Tramecourt 42 28
II (Sch.)/LG 2 St. Omer Bf 109E 33 27
Single-Engined Fighters
Stab/JG 1 Pas-de-Calais Bf 109E 4 3
Stab/JG 3 Pas-de-Calais 3 3
I/JG 3 23 14
II/JG 3 24 14
III/JG 3 25 23
Stab/JG 26 Pas-de-Calais 4 3
I/JG 26 27 20
II/JG 26 Northen France 32 28
III/JG 26 29 26
Stab/JG 27 Etaples 5 4
I/JG 27 33 27
II/JG 27 Montreuil 37 33
III/JG 27 Sempy 31 27
Stab/JG 51 St. Omer 5 4
I/JG 51 St. Omer, St. Inglevert 36 33
II/JG 51 22 13
III/JG 51 Pas-de-Calais 44 31
Stab/JG 52 Laon/Couvorn 2 1
I/JG 52 21 17
II/JG 52 Pas-de-Calais 28 23
III/JG 52 31 16
Stab/JG 53 Northen France 2 2
II/JG 53 Wissant 33 24
III/JG 53 Northen France 30 22
Stab/JG 54 South Holland 4 2
I/JG 54 28 23
II/JG 54 35 27
III/JG 54 29 23
I/JG 77 Northen France 42 40
Twin-Engined Fighters (Night-Fighters Excluded)
Stab/ZG 2 Toussous-le-Noble Bf 110 1 -
I/ZG 2 Amiens, Caen 20 10
II/ZG 2 Guyancourt/Caudran 28 10
Stab/ZG 26 ? 3 3
I/ZG 26 Abbeville, St. Omer 33 14
II/ZG 26 Crècy 25 17
III/ZG 26 Barly, Arques 25 17
V (Z.)/LG 1 Ligescourt, Alencon 23 19
ErprGr 210 Denain Bf 109E/Bf 110C/D 26 17
Long-Range Reconnaissance Aircraft
1(F)/22 Lille Do 17, Bf 110 13 9
1(F)/122 Holland Ju 88A 5 3
2(F)/122 Brussels/Melsbrock Ju 88A, He 111 10 9
3(F)/122 Eindhoven 11 11
4(F)/122 Brussels 13 9
Bf 110
5(F)/122 haute-Fontaine Ju 88A, He 111 3 3
Coastal Aircraft
1./KüFlGr 106 Brittany He 115 10 4
2./KüFlGr 106 Do 18 9 6
3./KüFlGr 106 Borkum He 115 9 6
Luftflotte 3
Long-Range Bombers
Stab/LG 1 Orlèans-Bricy Ju 88A 3 3
I/LG 1 27 13
II/LG 1 31 19
III/LG 1 Chateaudun 30 19
Stab/KG 27 Tours He 111 7 4
I/KG 27 35 13
II/KG 27 Dinard-Bourges 32 15
III/KG 27 Rennes 20 13
I/KG 40 Bordaux Fw 200 7 4
Stab/KG 51 Paris-Orly Ju 88A 1 -
I/KG 51 Melun-Villaroche 33 13
II/KG 51 Paris-Orly 34 17
III/KG 51 Etampes-Mondèsir 34 27
Stab/KG 54 Evreux 1 -
I/KG 54 30 18
II/KG 54 St. André 26 14
Stab/KG 55 Villacoublay He 111 6 6
I/KG 55 Dreux 27 20
II/KG 55 Chartres 30 22
III/KG 55 Villacoublay 25 20
KGr 100 Vannes He 111H 28 7
KGr 606 Brest, Cherbourg Do 17 33 29
KGr 806 Nantes, Caen-Carpiquet Ju 88A 27 18
Dive-Bombers
Stab/StG 3 Brittany Ju 87, Do 17 7 6
I/StG 3 Ju 87 37 34
Single-Engined Fighters
I/JG 53 Brittany Bf 109E 34 27
*Stab/JG 2 Beaumont-le-Roger 3 2
*I/JG 2 29 24
*II/JG 2 22 18
*III/JG 2 Le Havre 30 19
Twin-Engined Fighters (Night-Fighters Excluded)
Stab/ZG 76 ? Bf 110 2 2
II/ZG 76 Le Mans, Abbeville 27 12
III/ZG 76 Laval 19 8
Long-Range Reconnaissance Aircraft
7(F)/LG 2 ? Bf 110 14 9
4(F)/14 Normandy Bf 110, Do 17 12 9
3(F)/31 St. Brieuc 9 5
3(F)/121 North-West France Ju 88A, He 111 10 6
4(F)/121 Normandy Ju 88A, Do 17 13 5
1(F)/122 near Paris 10 7
2(F)/123 near Paris 10 8
3(F)/123 Buc 12 9
Luftflotte 5
Single-Engined Fighters
II/JG 77 South Norway Bf 109E 44 35
Long-Range Reconnaissance Aircraft
2(F)/22 Stavanger Do 17 9 5
3(F)/22 Stavanger 9 5
1(F)/120 Stavanger He 111, Ju 88A 13 2
1(F)/121 Stavanger, Aalborg Do 17 7 2
Coastal Aircraft
1/KüFlGr 506 Stavanger He 115 8 6
2/KüFlGr 506 Throndheim, Tromso 8 5
3/KüFlGr 506 Lista 8 6
* JG 2 Interchangeable between Luftflotten 2 and 3
Strength Summary
Number Type Strength Svcble
43 Kampfgruppen 1291 798
4 Stukagruppen 174 133
2 Schlachtgruppe 59 44
27 Jagdgruppen 831 658
8 Zerstörergruppen 206 112
18 Fernaufklärungsstaffeln 191 123
6 Seefliegerstaffeln 52 33
Source: The Defence of United Kingdom by Basil Collier as supplemented by more recent research.
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The Luftwaffe in the Battle of France
10 May 40
(onhand/servicable)
45 2/3 Kampfgruppen
West 1607/1093
Norway 143 80
Reich 10/7
total 1760/1180
10 Stukagruppen
West 378/316
Norway 39/25
Reich -/-
total 417/341
1 Schlachtgruppe
West 49/38
Norway -/ -
Reich -/ -
total 49/38
29 Jagdgruppen
West 1266/897
Norway 51/34
Reich 49/39
total 1366/970
10 1/3Zerstörergruppen
West 319/219
Norway 53/28
Reich -/-
total 372/247
9 Transportgruppen
476/438
grand total
4440/3214
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Cult of Military elitism!! LMAO!
Hey Pongo,
I am a soldier in Combat Arms. Been one for 17 years and have risen to the top of my profession. I know what it takes to win a battle. I have been in many pulling a trigger.
No matter who is involved or at what level they will only see their immediate surroundings. Whether your a General staring at a map or a joe lookin over the top of a gun.
Your will and belief matter immensely in combat. It wasn't some abstract thought that flew a hunk of aluminium over England in 1940. It was a man controlling that plane. One with a family, hopes, and dreams. His will to go after the enemy and place it all on the line to win is what carried the battle. The morale of the Jagdwaffe sagged as they became "chained dogs" to the bombers AND had to bear the humiliation of Goerings insinuations of cowardice. Combined with the "shooting down the last spitfire" began to crack the will of the LW. Loss of the strateagic initiative sealed their fate.
Certainly this was not the sole reason they lost but it is undeniably a major factor. Could the LW have pulled it off? Again I think so and many Historians agree. As to the "cult of Military elitism"many times in History a seemingly hopeless Military situation has been turned around by the will of those doing the fighting. If you ever served a day in a fighting unit you would know this.
Crumpp
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Batz,
You said
Your version of history is laughable.
They lost the BoB because they over claimed.
I guess if they only had been more honest with the paper work they would have won, eh?
You got to be kidding me.......lol
Actually it is laughable. Here is a another really funny quote from the JG26 War Diaries by Caldwell. Pages 66 and 67 on the Chapter "JG26 in the Battle of Britian." There are two entire pages about German and British over claiming in the conclusion of why the Germans lost the BoB.
Here is a quote from Adolf Galland, you have heard of him?
"Goering indeed suspected his pilots of submitting fraudulant claims"
Here from the conclusions section. (not from Galland)
Historians who have studied the battles claim and loss records in detail have concluded that both sides overclaimed to the same degree. However RAF commanders knew full well what the German's true losses were , from Ultra intercepts and simply by counting crashes. Theirs sides exagerated claims were allowed to stand to boost the morale of the fighter pilots and the civilian population, but had no effect whatsoever on the RAF's conduct of the battle. The German high command, on the other hand was led to believe by it's fighter pilots claims (and the under estimation of the British production rates) that the RAF was down to it's last few planes, only to have the Luftwaffe bomber formations smashed time after time by those "last fifty Spitfires"
And here again
Goerings insistance that the fighters remained chained to the bombers is said to have been the result of the bombers high loss rates. However, this was war, and high loss rates were acceptable, provided they led to victory. Furthermore, Goering was a former fighter pilot, and he certainly had no great emotional attatchment to the Kampfgeschwaders' "furniture vans" and their crews. There was another reason for Goerings anger. He felt personally betrayed by his fighter pilots. The Jeager were obviously exagerating their successes. But were their exagerations deliberate? Georing belived they were.
That is some funny stuff Batz I have to admit. I chuckling right now just think about it:rofl
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Luftwaffe Order of Battle
24 June 1941
Serviceable Aircraft Strengths
Single-engined fighters 898
Twin-engined day fighters 105
Night fighters 148
Fighter-bombers 124
Dive-bombers 260
Twin-engined bombers 931
Four-engined bombers 4
Long-range reconaissance aircraft 282
Short-range and army cooperation aircraft 388
Coastal aircraft 76
Transport aircraft 212
Total 3428
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No you are just a clown. I'll quote what you said
The reason the Luftwaffe lost the BoB was because they overclaimed kills dramatically causing the high command into thinking the Brits were down to their last aircraft and up came multiple squadrons.
The LW from the beginning to the end of the BoB had no method of plotting the positions of RAF aircraft and it had no means of ground to air control. The LW pilots knew what they faced everyday, so did the local commanders. They weren't fooled nor were they so confident because some bean counter said. "Well that's all of them, no need to worry about anymore RAF. Go ahead fly with your eyes closed"
The LW lost for many reasons the least of which was over claiming.
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Heart without technology is better than all the technology in the world without the Heart, when it comes to warfare.
Well...what if the guys with the technology are using nukes?
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Originally posted by VO101_Isegrim
Indeed. One has merely look on the timeline. It`s worth to compare it to the Allied efforts and plans for D-Day. The 1940 campaign started in May, and in June the French were still fighting. Note that Eisenhowever in June 1944 decided to go with the operation because otherwise the wheater would give no opportunity for a successfull invasion until 1945 - the automn was coming.
No, the next possible date was the next high tide in July and then in August.
.....
As usual Barbi you only tell part of the "story" with your loss numbers. Post war, the RAF claims were 258 (76, 71, 56, 55) compared to the German High command diary of 196. From the same table you took your twisted bias posting from.
German a/c losses
from July 10 to Aug 7
announced - 192(to British public)
LW - 188(per QMGen returns)
announced - 63(to German public)
from Aug 8 to Aug 23
announced - 755(to British public)
LW - 403(per QMGen returns)
announced - 213(to German public)
from Aug 24 to Sept 6
announced - 643(to British public)
LW - 378(per QMGen returns)
announced - 243(to German public)
from Sept 7 to Sept 30
announced - 846(to British public)
LW - 435(per QMGen returns)
announced - 243(to German public)
see the graph on pg 230
Seems the German government was just as untruthful.:aok
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Crumpp,
Please check the Army Air Forces Statistical Digest (http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/afhra/wwwroot/aafsd/aafsd_index_table.html). Note that USAF heavy bomber losses actually went up after February 1944 (April was hardest month for heavies). USAF claims also went up after February. The Big week was just a beginning for a huge material offensive against germany which in long term resulted air superiority. They did not won it in a week, Luftwaffe could put up strong opposition until autumn 1944.
gripen
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HTC Favors no side,nore does it ever change models for "balance" purposes.
To make acusation other wise is in effect calling me a lyier.
HiTech
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Cult of Military elitism!! LMAO!
Hey Pongo,
I am a soldier in Combat Arms. Been one for 17 years and have risen to the top of my profession. I know what it takes to win a battle. I have been in many pulling a trigger.
No matter who is involved or at what level they will only see their immediate surroundings. Whether your a General staring at a map or a joe lookin over the top of a gun.
Your will and belief matter immensely in combat. It wasn't some abstract thought that flew a hunk of aluminium over England in 1940. It was a man controlling that plane. One with a family, hopes, and dreams. His will to go after the enemy and place it all on the line to win is what carried the battle. The morale of the Jagdwaffe sagged as they became "chained dogs" to the bombers AND had to bear the humiliation of Goerings insinuations of cowardice. Combined with the "shooting down the last spitfire" began to crack the will of the LW. Loss of the strateagic initiative sealed their fate.
Certainly this was not the sole reason they lost but it is undeniably a major factor. Could the LW have pulled it off? Again I think so and many Historians agree. As to the "cult of Military elitism"many times in History a seemingly hopeless Military situation has been turned around by the will of those doing the fighting. If you ever served a day in a fighting unit you would know this.
Crumpp
Really.Well maybe so. But the story of WW2 is the story of 2 nations that thought that way getting thier tulips handed to them by several nations that were pretty sure it was just a war of attrition and logistics.
And no. No amount of service would convince me of your point as it regards the battle of britain. But keep repeating it. Ill keep showing you the simple numbers that prove you wrong.
As to my military service. You know nothing about it. And I know nothing about yours. Its relivence to this discusion is in your head. I suggest you read a few more books on the subject instead of watching re runs of Their Finest Hour.
No historian that I have ever read says the LW lost their nerve over Britain. Their actions in the air for 1941, 42 and 43 surely make it seem like a silly statment.
They were not up to the task at hand. Its simple. If there were 3000 more of them with fighters suited to the task and bombers that could carry a decent load it would still have taken years to attrit the RAF to a suitible level.
So your point is noncese. There were only 275 LW fighters left by october. VS 750 RAF one. No act of will could reverse that. It was predictable from the start. Only British capitulation could have changed it. Barring that the Germans would lose and they did.
AS to the effect on moral in combat. I do understand it but your seriosly missguided if you think its an important contributer to the BOB.
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Originally posted by MiloMorai
As usual Barbi you only tell part of the "story" with your loss numbers. Post war, the RAF claims were 258 (76, 71, 56, 55) compared to the German High command diary of 196. From the same table you took your twisted bias posting from.
Well I guess I have to reply to this claim of Mr. Flamer Troll. The number 258 is a postwar number, and the British were still overclaiming, even if they could check German archieves as well.
One can see the digital version of the original, official British reports during the BoB, that was intended for internal use and not propaganda purposes... so much for "twisted bias" and the other BS statements. The overclaim amount is there. In the official, 1940 British docs of kill claims. It`s not something to feed the public with (this happened on all sides in various forms of course, and frankly, I don`t understand what`s so special about it), it was what the British High Command was believing to be the correct number.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/august15.html
On August 15th, the British claim and believe 153 e/a shot down by fighters, further 8 by AAA, and an additional 55 + 6 "probably" shot down, plus 58 damaged. Incredibly, that means they actually believed during the BoB that they shot down no less than 222 German planes in one day... whereas the German records shows only 55 of their planes lost, and note that this includes the ones that were lost in ordinary, everyday accidents as well...
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Originally posted by Pongo
So your point is noncese. There were only 275 LW fighters left by october. VS 750 RAF one. No act of will could reverse that.
I don`t know where you took that from but that`s BS. 275 ?! Laughable. You should check your sources. It was 4 times as many as that.
For example, we have the LW`s order of battle for 28th September 1940. And it shows the following:
Counting s-e fighters (Bf 109E versions only), the LW had 920 fighters on strenght, out of which 712 was servicable. There were 917 fighter pilots available for them, out of whom 676 was ready for action. As sidenote, to the "Jagdwaffe was breaking in September" fanatics, it`s interesting to note that the German fighter strenght was increasing in Septmber, ie. the 7th state was 831 single engined fighters (increased to 920 by the 28th Sept), of which 658 was servicable (increased to 712 by the 28th). The RAF had 621 fighters servicable on the 7th of September, which fell slightly, to 604 servicable fighters on the 28th.
In brief, the change in servicable s-e fighter strenght from 7th September to 28th September:
LW : 658 -> 712
RAF : 621 -> 604
I can hardly see the LW breaking here, and neither the RAF, really.
The RAF`s own official strenght was the following according to the RAF`s site:
Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 28th September 1940
Blenheim - 57
Spitfire - 214
Hurricane - 390
Defiant - 12
Gladiator - 8
Total - 681
Which leaves us with 604 servicable British single engined fighters vs. 712 servicable single-engined German fighters on the 28th of September 1940. Hardly can one see if the Germans were "breaking", that`s quite laughable if we see the real numbers. Neither do I say the British were beginning to loose it, even they were closer to that point. British leaders readily admitted this at that time, I can`t remember any German leader from the BoB period who would even remotely was in such pessimistic mood. But that`s not the point. In summer 1940, a highly industrialized nation with large resources faced another highly industrialized nation with large resources... it was simply not possible, given the technical possibilities of the era, to completely defeat an airforce that has such backing up. The Allies tried this for 5 years and had vastly superior resources for that, but didn`t succed in that (ie. completely eliminating all opposition in the air). They could gain heavy aerial superiority, but it took 4 years to complete, and even that was a rather relative term, based on the fact that their air forces grew stronger, and not on the fact that the LW was beginning to weaken. (ie. from the eary war 4-5000 planes of 1939/40 the LW grew to 7-8000 planes by 1944/45.). So bascially, the goal to eliminate the RAF completely to allow for other operations was simply not possible given the industrialed nature of the UK, and the timeframe allowed for it (a month or two) was completely inaduquate for this task.. For as the facts go, there was no real difference in the numbers of aircraft available if one compares early August to early October, it was very much static. A trench warfare in the air.
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Gripen...
One week is a little simplistic, yes. The point however was in a very short time, once the USAAF found the right formula, They destroyed the LW and gained air superiority.
Pongo,
You seem to think I am saying the LW fighters pilots broke and ran. They did not. Their will alone did not carry the day by any means. However I am sure that is was a major contributing factor. Just look at the eastern front. Even late in the war the LW was able to grab local Air superiority over a battle field. Why because their comrades were on the ground and their homes were directly threatenend. They had the will. Something the RAF tried in '42 over Deippe and lost miserabley. In fact they abandoned the strategy of "local air superiority".
It's pretty complicated concept and I am not sure my vocabulary is up to the task of explaining it. I will try.
In combat the individual is faced with a constant series of tough decisions. Decisions which have a direct impact on his and his friends survival. Everyday you are faced with the reality that some principals matter more than your own personal safety. Warfare really is made up of long periods of boredom punctuated by moments of sheer terror. During these moments a man is brutally faced with the "stuff" he is made of. Many experiencing combat for the first time do not even see the enemy much less make an actual attempt to kill them. Statistically less than 10 percent of the rifleman in WWII actually fired a weapon with the intention of killing another Human Being. Read the book "On Killing". Some soldiers focus solely on their own survival, some focus on the non-killing tasks that need to be done, others just fire in the direction of the enemy and a very few actually aim to kill. This is universal truth when human beings are placed in the horror and fear of combat. This was very evident in both Afghanistan and Somalia. In both countries most of the "soldiers" would simply raise their weapons over their heads and "spray and pray" in your direction. One well aimed double tap would usually do the trick and end that particular guys career. Now was this poor guy doing his job as a soldier? Yes of course. Was he actively trying to kill you? Yes...did he have his entire heart in it? If you asked him ....maybe but I doubt it. In Afghanistan ALL the AQ I encountered took the time to aim at you. Simply put they wanted to kill you. The Taliban would spray and pray. If they got you great, if you ducked down and went away...well that was fine too. You have to remember that soldiers are not machines and not sociopaths. They are men. When you kill on the battlefield you are destroying the hopes, dreams, anything and everything that person was to become. You have just removed all of their tommorrows. It's a horrible thing to have to do. It's not a natural thing to do. Why do you think HTC removed the guncamera footage of the apache in Iraq? It wasn't particularly gorey but it sure brought home the reality of killing people.
When we felt our will falter, we missed our families, tired of the danger or working for months on end with no break, reading the grabage in the newpapers at home or any of the million things that make combat a miserable experience I know we would watch that Documentry on the firefighter recruits. The one were the second plane was filmed hitting the tower. It would remind us of what was at stake. Suddenly walking up a mountain in full kit to go rooting through a cave filled with guys who want to kill you didn't seem that bad. In fact it seemed a priviledge that we could go and get a little personal payback for all those innocent folks.
Maybe this helps to clear up what I am saying about the LW in the BoB. It's not a quantifiable quality. Few Historians will mention it, only guys like John Keegan or Stephen Ambrose. I bet the veterans deep in their hearts know. Every vet does. It's not a cult of military elitism. It's a man, making the decision that his principals are more important than his own personal safety to include steeling his will and taking anothers mans life.
The men in the RAF were not about to allow their families to grow up under Hitlers rule. That conviction was much stronger than the men of the LW's will to simply conquer.
Hope this clears it up some.
Crumpp
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Originally posted by VO101_Isegrim
Well I guess I have to reply to this claim of Mr. Flamer Troll. The number 258 is a postwar number, and the British were still overclaiming, even if they could check German archieves as well.
No one is saying the Brits did not over claim Barbi, but not as much as you tried to force on us with your bias, half 'story' post.:) It is in my post that the number was lowered post-war, but you can only see what you want to see because of your lack of reading comprehension and blind hatred for the Brits.:eek: Now post war, was that in June, July, Aug, Sept, Oct, Nov or Dec '45 or in some other year further down the 'road'? Claims are still being adjusted TODAY.
One can see the digital version of the original, official British reports during the BoB, that was intended for internal use and not propaganda purposes... so much for "twisted bias" and the other BS statements. The overclaim amount is there. In the official, 1940 British docs of kill claims. It`s not something to feed the public with (this happened on all sides in various forms of course, and frankly, I don`t understand what`s so special about it), it was what the British High Command was believing to be the correct number.
Since you like to quote Deighton so much, you know that the High Command knew the numbers were high.
We can see how honest the Germans were in their loss numbers announced to the German public. ~50% of the real number
Barbi, your bud Huckles got the boot from Ubi as well.:aok :rofl
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storch: How about you apologize instead of digging your hole deaper.
HiTech
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Luftwaffe Order of Battle
10 January 1945
Serviceable Aircraft Strengths
Single-engined fighters 1462
Night fighters 808
Ground-attack aircraft 613
Night harassment aircraft 302
Multi-engined bombers 294
Anti-shipping aircraft 83
Long-range reconaissance aircraft 176
Short-range and army cooperation aircraft 293
Coastal aircraft 60
Transport aircraft 269
Misc. aircraft (KG 200) 206
Total 4566
I don't see no 7-8000 a/c capable of combat Barbi.
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Did I miss something?!
What does Storch have to apologize for? You can't be refering to his comments on weapons performance?
Please let on what transgression has occurred.
Crumpp
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According to Isengrims numbers, The LW won the Battle of Britain!
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Crump, Like I said. Saying that the result of the battle of britian was a moral or will issue is incorrect and not supported by the results. It was the typical Hitler gamble not backed up by the laws of logistics and attrition and it failed as it was almost certain to do unless the Brits just packed it in.
Again. There is your will component. The Brits equiped themselves with modern fighters and production plans and Radar befor the war specifically to resist such an attack. The Germans never really considered how an air attack on Britian would work or how it might succeed or what was needed to do it. They had none of the components necessary to make it work.
So I dissagree with you. Your point has been raised befor and is in fact how Hitler himself viewed war. He was showed the true nature of war. If a materialy supperior enemy has the will to fight the individual military supperiority of your soldiers is irrelivent. All you can do is up the price and hope he quits. If he does not. You will lose.
Well isgram we agree on the nature of the battle anyway. The germans had the victory disease and it was worth a shot. Maybe if chamberlin had stayed in power or some pacifist or german leaning component of the aristocacy had been in power.
The germans coudnt even invade malta much less england.
The 275 servicable s-e fighters available to the LW on 1 oct was from a book that did not refrence a source. But simular data in the book comes from the LW war diaries and several other book credits.
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I checked it now, your numbers refer to Spits doing economy cruise at 220-280 mph speed w/o reserves, and Bf 109s doing a max. speed cruise at 370-400mph with 1/4 of tank reserved - hardly a fair comparision, is it?
So all the German pilots are lying when they say they only had a few minutes combat time over London?
We know Spitfires flew combat missions in support of bombers over France and the Low Countries in 1941, a reverse of the situation in 1940. So surely the much longer ranged 109 must have had ample combat time?
Indeed. One has merely look on the timeline. It`s worth to compare it to the Allied efforts and plans for D-Day.
There is no comparison. The allies had a wealth of experience for D Day, and knew they would be facing a large number of well equipped german divisions, including several panzer divisions.
The first clashes with the RAF started only in July, in fact the real thing was only in early August and brought the RAF to the edge of destruction by late August / early September. But all that hardly mattered - look at the date again. Even if the LW would be even remotely capable just putting the whole RAF to the last plane into past tense - which was something, as proven by the next 5 years of air war, an impossibility vs. an industrialized nation), it would be waaaay too late to start any seaborne invasion (hypothesizing of course the Germans could gather an invasion fleet in a few weeks from what was available, which took even the Allies a good 3 years to complete) without the weather intervening.
All this is assuming the conditions were the same in 1940 as they would be in 1944, which of course they weren't.
The allies knew they could not capture a port (Dieppe proved that), and knew they would have to support a large armoured force for months of combat. The Germans believed they could capture a port (Dover), and knew that they would have to support relatively small forces in Britain for a fairly short campaign.
Resupply across the channel is not a problem if you have an operational port, and is less of a problem the smaller the enemy you are fighting.
This become appearant in the very first days for the German general staff, and they simply didn`t take the idea of an ivasion seriously. In Britiain, they took it serious of course, they were naked after Dunkirk, a single Panzer Division could wreak havoc on them with no heavy weapons to defend against..
Not really true, of course, but you are just illustrating the flaw in your argument. The allies planned to land several divisions on day 1, and support an army of 40 or more divisions in combat. Yet you think the same level of logistical planning and complication is required for 1 panzer division?
But as told, Hitler`s attention was already on the East, as Stalin took advantage of the German commitments on the West and started expanding in Eastern Europe, like in the case of Rumania.. This alone made the area far more important for Hitler than to bother with the UK that was no longer in the position to seriously challange the Germans on the continent alone.
No, Hitler planned to knock Britain out of the war. You can see that from his orders for Sealion:
In order to establish the conditions necessary for the final conquest of England, I intend to continue the air and naval war against the English homeland more intensively than heretofore.
To this end I issue the following orders:
The German Air Force is to overcome the British Air Force with all means at its disposal and as soon as possible ...
After gaining temporary or local air superiority the air war is to be carried out against harbors, especially against establishments connected with food supply ... Attacks on the harbors of the south coast are to be undertaken on the smallest scale possible, in view of our intended operations. ...
The Luftwaffe is to stand by in force for Operation Sea Lion.
I reserve for myself the decision on terror attacks as a means of reprisal.
The intensified air war may commence on or after August 6 ... The Navy is authorized to begin the projected intensified naval warfare at the same time.
and
The C. in C., Navy, having reported on July 31 that the necessary preparations for Sea Lion could not be completed before September 15, the Fuehrer has ordered:
Preparations for Sea Lion are to be continued and completed by the Army and Air Force by September 15.
Eight to fourteen days after the launching of the air offensive against Britain, scheduled to begin about August 5, the Fuehrer will decide whether the invasion will take place this year or not; his decision will depend largely on the outcome of the air offensive ...
Haider recorded his meeting with Hitler in his diary. As late as September the 14th, Haider records Hitler's reflections
"Successful landing means victory, but for this we must obtain complete air superiority.
Bad weather has so far prevented our attaining complete air superiority.
All other factors are in order.
Decision therefore: The operation will not be renounced yet."
And the directive issued on 14th Sept:
"The start of Operation Sea Lion is again postponed. A new order follows September 17. All preparations are to be continued.
The air attacks against London are to be continued and the target area expanded against military and other vital installations (e.g., railway stations).
Terror attacks against purely residential areas are reserved for use as an ultimate means of pressure."
Then from the naval war diary, 17th Sept:
"The enemy Air Force is still by no means defeated. On the contrary, it shows increasing activity. The weather situation as a whole does not permit us to expect a period of calm ... The Fuehrer therefore decides to postpone "Sea Lion" indefinitely"
On the 12th October they finally called the invasion off:
"The Fuehrer has decided that from now on until the spring, preparations for "Sea Lion" shall be continued solely for the purpose of maintaining political and military pressure on England.
Should the invasion be reconsidered in the spring or early summer of 1941, orders for a renewal of operational readiness will be issued later "
This is the first mention of preperations being a bluff, and came after the failure of the Luftwaffe in the BoB. All the paperwork and recolections of the men around Hitler at the time show that until late September the invasion was a viable plan, to be carried out if Britain failed to seek peace.
I`d like to see a source for this "2000 claimed by the Jagdwaffe" claim... Don`t really except it to turn up ! :cool
Tony Wood's site:
http://tonywood.cjb.net/ It's a list of claims from the OKL microfilms.
I believe Groehler`s numbers are far more credible (if I am reading his chart right), given they are taken right from the German archieves! Those 915 German claim from 10th July - 31st October, vs. 934 Spits/Hurris admitted by the British to be lost to enemy action.
Tony Wood actually has the individual claims in the docs on his page. Incidentally, the Jagdwaffe seem to have claimed about 1250 Spitfires and 710 Hurricanes, whereas the RAF actually lost far more Hurricanes than Spitfires.
Groehler was a 70s East German "historian" who set out to prove the Luftwaffe lost more planes against the Russians than the west. Not only does that make his conclusions dubious, but the Luftwaffe archives have yielded a lot more information in recent years.
Well, the Luftwaffe was loosing something like 550 fighters in the whole BoB to all reasons
No, they lost around 600 on OPERATIONAL missions, plus hundreds of 110s, which the Germans did (laughably) call a fighter.
Wood and Dempster in The Narrow Margin give Luftwaffe fighter losses as 912 1st July to 31st Oct, all causes.
They give RAF day fighter losses, (which includes Blenheims) as 1140 1st July to 31st Oct, all causes.
Eagle in Flames by Hooton gives Luftwaffe fighter losses as 753 all causes 1st July to 6th Oct. In the same period he gives RAF day fighter losses (again inc Blenheims) as 874, all causes.
vs. 1960 British fighters to all reasons (combat, accidents, bombing etc.).
What's the source for this 1960 claim? Considering the RAF lost about 520 pilots to all causes in the BoB, 4 lost planes per pilot seems way out of line with any other air campaign, especially considering some 100+ of those losses were 2 crew aircraft.
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Lies, damned lies, statistics as they say... numbers don`t show everything, especially if selectively qouted. First, your numbers include British pilot reserves but ignore the German reserves - why?
Because the Luftwaffe had no pilot reserves. Even the RAF didn't have "reserves", as such.
An RAF squadron had an established strength of 20 pilots (this changesd at various times), and approx 18 - 20 aircraft. Established strength is not actual strength. The squadron would not fly 18 - 20 aircraft. Some aircraft are always in repair, or maintenance, pilots on leave, etc.
By early September, pilot strength had fallen and their were only around 16 per squadron (the number of squadrons had been expanded during the battle, diluting pilot strength), but a squadron is not supposed to fly more than 12 at a time anyway.
As to Luftwaffe reserves, if they had them where were they? Pilot strength had fallen to 200 or more below established strength, and operational pilots were 450 or so below established strength.
Second, in air combat, and this was proven hundreds of times, it was pilot quality that mattered. The British could only keep up with their pilot`s losses if they drastically reduced their training.
No. The RAF had the luxury of keeping a large part of their strength away from the battle. Pongo summed it up nicely:
"The Germans gave it everything they had in the Battle of Britain. And the Brits stoped them with half of what they had."
The RAF had around 53 operational Spit and Hurricane squadrons for most of the battle.
11 group, which bore the brunt of the battle, averaged 20 squadrons.
12 group, which was involved on occasion, had 12 squadrons.
10 group, which was again involved on occasion, had 9 squadrons.
13 group, which became involved only on 1 day, had 11 squadrons.
The RAF could afford to keep a large proportion of it's strength out of the battle at any one time, and new pilots were frequently posted to squadrons in quiet areas to gain experience.
However by early September, over 50% of British fighter pilots had only really marginal training 5-10 flying hours on their combat types, sometimes not even that much, vs. many hundred hours of their LW adversaries.
The problem with that claim is that a new pilot can only have 5 - 10 hours for a short time, before they begin to gain experience. Say a week before they get enough flight hours in. That means, according to your figures, the RAF was replacing it's force every two weeks. Around 700 pilots trained per week.
We know 500 or so RAF pilots were killed, and another 500 or so injured, so in the 4 months of the BoB they would have gained around 10,000 pilots, and lost 1,000 (assuming no injured pilots returned). Strangely, I've never heard such figures before (like most of your claims)
Wonders do not happen in war, the British were able to raise so many new pilots because they cut back on training.
That's the point, they did not raise so many new pilots. Total output of the training schools rose to 320 pilots per month, during the battle.
Given that both parties are of equal quality, the more numorous should of course. But this wasn`t the case, it was quality vs. quantity again. 1000+ fighters, yes, but only 1/3 of them were equal to the 109s.
Strangely they still managed to win. :rofl
The Luftwaffe were pressuring the RAF with a very high sortie rate and attacks on airfields. They began those tactics in the last week of August, when they flew nearly 4000 fighter sorties. But they couldn't sustain it, flying only 3200 sorties in the first week of September, then dropping to only 1400 in the second week of September.
... and similiarly, the RAF`s fighter sorties also dropped? Why?
They didn't. The RAF flew 5000 sorties the last week of August, 4900 the first week of September.
Well, the weather:
7th September 1940 : Fair with some haze.
8th September 1940 : Fair early morning and evening, cloudy for the remainder of the day
9th September 1940 : Scattered showers, thundery in the east. Channel fair.
10th September 1940 : Generally cloudy, some rain.
11th September 1940 : Mainly fine with some local showers. Cloud in the Channel and Thames Estuary.
12th September 1940 : Unsettled, rain in most districts
13th September 1940 : Unsettled.
14th September 1940 : Showers and local thunder. Cloud in the Straits, Channel and Thames Estuary
Trust me, that's good for a British summer. It also only covers the second week of Sept, not the first week, when the sortie rate was already dropping.
It`s more like a simple case that the Automn was coming, and the weather turned bad, making flying impossible.
But not for the RAF, apparently.
As the British themselves admit, ie. on 16th September :
16th September 1940 :
Weather largely hindered fighter action.
Isegrim, that's the 16th, the third week of September. Find a similar comment for the second week, when the sorties dropped. Let alone the first week of September, wjem they were down from the last week of August. You know, the weeks we are discussing.
No, that`s wrong. If Britain actually though the German front line strenght was 5800 planes, then it was quite correct. The actual German numbers for 11th April 1940 was 5298 planes, including 1356 s-e fighters, 1711 bombers and 414 dive bombers and others.
Those are the three plane types the RAF were refering to as frontline strength. The rest, the transports, recce aircraft etc were not considered front line strength. The RAF actually believed the Luftwaffe possesed 14,000 including transports, training aircraft etc.
As sidenote, to the "Jagdwaffe was breaking in September" fanatics, it`s interesting to note that the German fighter strenght was increasing in Septmber, ie. the 7th state was 831 single engined fighters (increased to 920 by the 28th Sept), of which 658 was servicable (increased to 712 by the 28th). The RAF had 621 fighters servicable on the 7th of September, which fell slightly, to 604 servicable fighters on the 28th.
Source? I think it's possible, however, because the Luftwaffe was suffering more from pilot shortages. Overy gives the following figures for Luftwaffe 109 pilots ready for duty:
1st june 906
1st aug 869
1st sept 735
1st nov 673
Without the pilots available, the mechanics had more time to work on getting planes serviceable.
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Originally posted by storch
Very well and eloquently said Crumpp. For those of you who may not know, Crumpp is currently active service in the US Army Infantry and was for some time the "point of America's spear" in Afganistan This is no mrblack here.
If silly.
Somone who sees the victory of the US of the Taliban tribesmen of one of gathering the will to walk up hills and not the overwhelming rediculous disparity of the two forces.
Soldiers are indoctrinated, some to believe they are the master race, some to believe the sun never sets on thier empire, some to belive they are the soldiers of god. Some to belive that killing talliban will save buildings in NYC from Saudis flying US aircraft. What ever the indoctrination it helps but the real issue comes down to cold steel. And there is no better example of that then the US military.
Anyway. in regards to the Battle of britain to say that the loss of will to fight on the side of the LW was an issue is just silly. Look at record that the LW wrote for the following 3 years.
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Pongo..Sounds like you must live in the fantasy world of coffee shop liberalism or you are not an american. French perhaps...
I know the good I've done. I am justifiably proud.
Taliban is not a tribe = they were a government.
The Taliban were harbouring Al Qaeda. A terrorist group composed primarily of Saudi's, other arabs, and Chechens.
Get your facts right bud.
Crumpp
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Canadian! Pongo! Alright....
Some of your governments Soldiers bled right alone side of us, literally. Great group of guys who know exactly what I'm talking about. I keep them in my prayers.
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Canadian! Pongo! Alright....
Some of your governments Soldiers bled right alone side of us, literally. Great group of guys who know exactly what I'm talking about. I keep them in my prayers.
Crumpp
Yup that is correct because of some gung-ho John Wayne type friendly forces.:( Won't mention where the drugged friendly forces were from.
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Well Milo,
Soldiering is a dangerous profession. Those men on the ground knew the risks just as those pilots did. It happens. If it was easy and safe, everyone would do it.
What a tradgedy for all involved. Imagine having to live with that mistake for the rest of your life. Imagine having a family member or friend killed because of it.
What is your point in bringing it up? You must know the pilots were found innocent?
You might do well to remember the words of Teddy Roosevelt:
"It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusiasms, the great devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor defeat."
Crumpp
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Nashwan: you're a good man. Your BoB summary was very good.
And Isengrim: You've just been spanked. :D
The BoB was an amazing occurrance. I must say that I agree with HoHun quite a bit, - it was perhaps not that an obvious British victory, things could have gone different, - but, might I add, in both directions.
The Germans made many tactical mistakes, such as their close escorts etc, but however the Brits made some mistakes also, typically scrambling or getting bounced at airfields so close to the front. That was however a political issue as well.
EVERY source I have seen (apart from Isengrim) gives the RAF a kill rate of approx 1.5 vs 1, at least. With the LW having the initiative, heavy escorts (in September the escorts were up to 4 for each bomber at times), good equipment, and very seasoned pilots, the outcome is amazing, - LW got spanked by the RAF.
The BoB, not being such a huge battle compared to many other events later in the war was quite a thing. The mighty LW suffered quite a bit, and in the follow up, the force of the RAF grew bigger.
Just a year or so after the BoB the RAF was executing 1000 bomber raids on Germany, - a remarkable feat, fot that ment cruising over observed enemy territory for HUNDREDS of miles, while the once mighty LW lost their upper hand raiding targets only an hours cruise from friendly territory.
Outcome: Decisive RAF victory. After the BoB, the LW was never again in any condition to show such an aggression to British airspace. And the little HTC overmodelled/favoured-by-HTC Spitty was giving the little undermodelled/unfavoured-by-HTC 109 a very tough time in territories of Europe that were well beyond its endurance
:D
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Crumpp,
When the invasion started June 1944, the strategic air war between 8th AF and LW was still unfinished business despite losses of the heavies started to decrease in May (mostly due to increased numbers of escort fighters). Activity in the air increased that time in all fronts, therefore we can't certainly say what would have been the outcome without combined pressure on all fronts (Normandy, East, Italy etc.).
Anyway, the 8th AF certainly damaged Luftwaffe badly during spring 1944 despite their own losses were also very high. The 8th AF could simply sustain losses better than LW during that period.
gripen
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Gripen,
According to Don Caldwell in "JG26 War Diaries: Vol II"
JG26 was able to get a grand total of TWO FW-190's to the beachhead. Pips Priller and his wingman made ONE strafing run at high speed.
5th Jagddivision (JG 26 and JG 2) flew 121 sorties on June 6th 1944 against the Beachheads. FleigerKorp II reported 51 sorties all made by SG 4.
The 8th AF and the AEAF flew 14,000 sorties that day with the 56th Fighter Group flying an unprecedented eleven combat missions.
I would say the Jagdwaffe was depleted.
Crumpp
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That one strafing run, wasn't that featured in the old movie: "The longest day" ?
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Ya crump. I come from that silly leftist pinko crowd that thinks that the LW was just beat in the Battle of Britain not that their warriors spirit failed. And thinks that the US (and my old unit 3PPCLI) won in Afganistan not because they had the supperior warriors spirit but because they totaly out classed thier opponents. You are the first person that I have ever heared state otherwise.
Its not the B52s and the A10s and the regiments of heavy arty and the spy satalites and the night visions gogles and the attack helicopters and the body armour and the 2km range sniper rifles and supperior coms and training. Its our warriors spirit that won.
For crist sake be proud of yourself. You fought for your country and you should be proud. But its got nothing to do with your warriors spirt bud. Thats crazy talk. However that got in your head you should re assess it. And then transposing it to the battle of britain. Really. Its the Hitler doctrin of war fighting.
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Really it's your spelling....
Crumpp
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No Pongo,
You come from the Supersized Fries gotta have it now fast food culture of N. America who thinks everything that isn't easy and quick must be bad.
Gosh if it's so easy why aren't you out there defending Canada? Oh yeah they didn't attack Canada so it's not your fight, huh?
Read some History. The Soviets had a major technological advantage over the Mujahaddeen. So why did they lose? If you ask the Mujahaddeen they will tell you. The Soviets never left the roads and with the exception of a few Spetnaz units never went into the hills or caves. Not only did the Soviets bomb the crap out of them which isn't very effective in the natural bunker systems of Afghanistan but they had massive Armour assets. We used Hummers with MG's/Mk-19's. After one ambush, my vehicle had 38 bullet holes in it. The M2 .50 I was shooting had two through the lower reciever. 8 guys on that vehicle with me, not one got hit! But the ones we didn't kill on the ambush line we were able to hop off and chase into the hills. The Soviets shot anyone who came close to them. We helped the afghans where ever we could. We played soccer with their children, took care of their sick, and brought in school supplies and aid. We respected their culture, religion, and country. Of the 40 nation coalition, the US is the ONLY country to have paid the money it pledged to rebuild Afghanistan.
Why don't you say that it's just Technology that won it. Here check out Anthony...
http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/soldierstories/noflash/story.php?story_id_key=5340
Nothing comes about from anyone's effort. It all just is meant to be huh?
Crumpp
"War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things. The decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling which thinks that nothing is worth war is much worse. The person who has nothing for which he is willing to fight, nothing which is more important than his own personal safety, is a miserable creature and has no chance of being free unless made and kept so by the exertions of better men than himself" -- John Stuart Mill
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Originally posted by storch
Apologize? to you!!! for having an opinion?? take some spelling lessons you tard. I quit your game. I pay to be here. kiss my ass.
You two geezers are a great example for the youngsters in here, aren't you.
Now I don't care who started it. I want it to stop. Both of you.
Geez. Kids these days.
- oldman
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Nashwan, I got Tony Wood's (and Bill Gunston's) book "Hitler's Luftwaffe", and it states that:
"By comparison with RAF claims of 755 German aircraft destroyed, the Luftwaffe actually lost 403 with a further 127 damaged throughout this period, and if somewhat less than was claimed, these figures were nevertheless extremely serious. But RAF Fighter Command's casualties were equally grievous with 94 pilots killed or missing and 60 wounded between 8-19 August and the losses in aircraft amounting to 54 Spitfires and 121 Hurricanes."
"Combined losses of Luftflotten 2, 3 and 5 (Norway) from 10 July until 31 October 1940, amounted to 1,733 aircraft destroyed compared with 915 aircraft lost (415 pilots killed or missing) by the RAF."
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Crumpp,
During that D-day there were not many LW fighter units around because most of the fighters were allocated for defence of the reich. But soon they allocated more to Normandy, June 7th, IIRC 500 sorties and even more later. LW lost something like 600 planes in the first two weeks over Normandy, most of them the were single engined fighters. In the end of June there were more LW single engined fighters in France than in the defence of the Reich. LW was still a dangerous opponent until oil shortage started restcrict operations in autumn. Generally the statement that the Jagdwaffe was depleted by 8th AF is a myth, real reasons are combined pressure on all fronts and fuel shortage.
gripen
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The Luftwaffe on the Eve of Overlord, 31 May 44
Luftflotte 3 (Fance, Belgium, Holland)
Unit Type Strength Svcble
Fighters
Stab/JG 2 Fw 190A 3 0
I/JG 2 19 14
II/JG 2 Bf 109G 13 11
III/JG 2 Fw 190A 29 19
Stab/JG 26 2 2
I/JG2 33 23
I/JG 2 32 25
III/JG 26 Bf 109G 37 21
Totals 168 115
Zerstörers
I/ZG 1 Ju 88G 30 25
III/ZG 1 22 12
Totals 52 37
Night-Fighters
Stab/NJG 4 Bf 110G 2 0
I/NJG 4 Ju 88 16 7
II/NJG 4 (Ju 88)/Bf 110G/Do 217 20 12
III/NJG 4 (Do 217)/Bf 110G 18 9
Stab/NJG 5 Bf 110G 15 9
III/NJG 5 18 8
part II/NJG 6 13 11
Totals 102 56
Bombers, Attack Aircraft and Transports
I/KG 2 Ju 188 12 9
II/KG 2 5 0
III/KG 2 Do 217 7 1
Stab/KG 6 Ju 188 1 1
I/KG 6 22 15
II/KG 6 Ju 88A 3 2
III/KG 6 Ju 188 25 5
II/KG 26 Ju 88A 37 27
III/KG 26 35 14
I/KG 30 2 1
part I/KG 40 He 177A 30 21
II/KG 40 30 26
III/KG 40 Fw 200C 29 1
II/KG 51 Me 410 24 17
Stab/KG 54 Ju 88A 1 1
I/KG 54 11 5
III/KG 54 14 8
I/KG 66 Ju 188 31 12
6./KG 76 Ju 88A 12 3
I/KG 77 28 17
II/KG 77 25 8
III/KG 100 Do 217 30 13
III/SG 4 Fw 190 34 29
I/SKG 10 33 19
IV/TG 4 LeO 451 31 13
Korps Transport Staffel 11 4
Ju 52 22 14
Total 551 293
Luftflotte Reich
Unit Type Strength Svcble
Day Fighters
Stab/JG 1 Fw 190A 2 2
I/JG 1 44 (43) 15
II/JG 1 42 20
III/JG 1 48 21
Stab/JG 3 Bf 109G 4 2
I/JG 3 26 9
II/JG 3 29 23
III/JG 3 31 9
IV (St.)/JG 3 Fw 190A 54 1
I/JG 5 Bf 109G 43 36
II/JG 5 44 36
Stab/JG 11 4 3
I/JG 11 Fw 190A 28 20
II/JG 11 Bf 109G 31 14
III/JG 11 Fw 190A 28 11
10./JG 11 Fw 190A/Bf 109G 10 7
Stab/JG 27 Bf 109G 4 4
I/JG 27 4 31
II/JG 27 24 12
III/JG 27 26 20
IV/JG 27 18 12
II/JG 53 31 14
III/JG 54 Fw 190A 23 8
I/JG 400 Me 163B 10 0
Totals 645 330
Zerstörers
II/ZG 1 Bf 110G 33 15
I/ZG 26 Me 410 20 6
II/ZG 26 52 24
III/ZG 26 Me 262 6 1
I/ZG 76 Me 410 47 25
II/ZG 76 Me 410 36 0
Totals 194 71
Wilde Sau (Day and Night Fighters)
Stab/JG 300 Fw 190A 2 1
I/JG 300 Bf 109G 29 19
II/JG 300 Fw 190A 32 24
III/JG 300 Bf 109G 27 25
I/JG 301 25 21
I/JG 302 27 11
Totals 142 101
Night-Fighters
Stab NJG 1 He 219A/Bf 110G 2 1
I/NJG 1 He 219A/Me 410 33 26
II/NJG 1 He 219A/Bf 110G 21 16
III/NJG 1 Bf 110G 17 17
IV/NJG 1 23 14
Stab/NJG 2 Ju 88 4 4
I/NJG 2 31 21
II/NJG 2 33 16
III/NJG 2 28 18
Stab/NJG 3 Ju 88/Bf 110 3 3
I/NJG 3 Bf 110G 26 22
II/NJG 3 Ju 88 37 13
III/NJG 3 Bf 110G 29 20
IV/NJG 3 Ju 88/Bf 110G 32 21
Stab/NJG 5 Bf 110G 3 1
II/NJG 5 19 13
IV/NJG 5 18 12
Stab/NJG 6 2 1
I/NJG 6 Bf 110G/(Do 217) 24 21
II/NJG 6 Bf 110G 10 8
III/NJG 6 18 13
IV/NJG 6 23 18
I/NJG 7 Ju 88 21 9
I/NJG 101 Ju 88/Bf 110 39 39
II/NJG 101 Do 217 38 28
I/NJG 102 Bf 110 39 14
II/NJG 102 19 16
NJGr 10 Various 25 16
Totals 634 421
Bombers, Attack Aircraft and Transports
III/SG 3 Fw 190 28 25
Stab/KG 1 He 177A 2 1
I/KG 1 30 11
II/KG 1 29 0
III/KG 1 30 12
III/KG 3 He 111H 35 21
II/KG 27 15 12
II/KG 77 Ju 88A 31 21
II/KG 100 He 177A 30 0
II/TG 2 Ju 52 12 9
Totals 242 112
Total LW
Serviceable Aircraft Strengths
Single-engined fighters 1063 Twin-engined fighters 151
Night fighters 572
Fighter-bombers 278
Ground-attack aircraft 352
Night harassment aircraft 305
Twin-engined bombers 840 Four-engined bombers 97
Long-range reconaissance aircraft 153
Short-range and army cooperation aircraft 210
Coastal aircraft 123
Transport aircraft 719 Kampfgeschwader 200 (misc. aircraft 65
Totals 4928
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GScholtz,
Only Luftflotte 3 was in any position to attempt a strike at the landings. Luftflotte Riech was still engaged with its primary mission of intercepting the bombers. Absolutely NONE of Luftflotte Riech's Aircraft made it anywhere close to the landing zone the entire battle. All the way through to the breakout at St Lo.
Galland was attempting to rebuild the Luftwaffe. He actually did it and by hording his forces and training new pilots. By December of 1944 the Luftwaffe was once again a mighty force. On paper at least. It was compromised mostly of very inexperienced pilots who were meat on the table for their allied counterparts and a few "old hats" who were extremely good. The one operation they conducted as a force they ended up smashing themselves to pieces and never again recovered.
Again 121 sorties vs 14,000 = The Luftwaffe was smashed and could only offer token resistance.
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Only Luftflotte 3 was in any position to attempt a strike at the landings. Luftflotte Riech was still engaged with its primary mission of intercepting the bombers. Absolutely NONE of Luftflotte Riech's Aircraft made it anywhere close to the landing zone the entire battle. All the way through to the breakout at St Lo.
Wrong-o.
By June 10 1944,
I.,II., and III./JG1 was based at LeMans, Flers and Beauvais-Tille
I. and II. /JG11 + 10./JG11 based at Rennes St.Jacques and Beauvais-Tille
II., III., and IV(Sturm)./JG3 bases at Evreaux-Fauville, StAndre and Dreux
Stab, I., III. and IV./JG27 based at Romilly-sur-Seine, Rhiems-Champagne and Champfluery
III./JG 54 based at Chartres
All these units came from Luftflotte Reich. Now when was the breakout at St.Lo? Well after D+4 when the LW had extra units in place.
As well as JGr 200 at Avignon.
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Crumpp, you got me mixed up with somebody, I was talking about the BoB.
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Milo as much as you would like to claim otherwise, The jagdwaffe was defeated by June 6, 1944 and the Allies had air superiority. The won it with the start of Big Week and kept up enough pressure that the Jagdwaffe couldn't recover it's losses. The contest was over.
For the period 6-30 June 1944 Jagdkorp II had on paper twenty single engine fighter Gruppen in it's two Jagddivisions It's table of organizations strenght was 1300 fighters and pilots; actual strength on the evening of 30 June was 233 airplanes and 419 pilots. Victory claims totaled 414 against 458 losses. The entire JagdKorps II flew 10,061 sorties during this period. Counting pure fighter, fighter bomber, and reconnaissance missions. The USAAF and the AEAF flew between 120,000 - 140,000 sorties during this period.
Attacks against heavy bomber formations were suspended during this time as there wer not enough fighters to do any significant damage to the bomber formations. Missions were launched exclusively against enemy fighter bomber and artillery spotters as these presented the greatest threat to the Army. Loss rates per mission were averaged 20-30 percent. For every one allied fighter shot down the Luftwaffe was losing three, pilots at a rate of 2 for 1.
For every mission the Luftwaffe launched, the allies had 11 - 13 missions in the air.
JG26 accounted for 15 percent of the fighter strength of Jagdkorps II and accounted for 30 percent of the kills. However if you examine the claim sheets you are hard pressed to find any enlisted pilots making claims. Only guys like Priller, Glunz, and Mietusch seem to reoccur on the sheets. Examine the casualty list's and the opposite is in effect. It is filled with NCO and enlisted pilots, Newbies who couldn't fly much less fight. Almost a 1/3 of them are killed in flying accidents which have nothing to do with combat.
Crumpp
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Do you have trouble remembering what you said? Let me refresh your memory:
"Absolutely NONE of Luftflotte Riech's Aircraft made it anywhere close to the landing zone the entire battle. All the way through to the breakout at St Lo."
There was a transfer of 1105 a/c, of which 998 were day fighters, to northern France between June 6 and 7 1944. Now 1105 is an awful lot of NONE.:eek::eek:
So tell me again when the breakout from Normandy happened. Surely not before June 10 1944 when units of LuftReich were transferrred to France. You did notice the airfield placenames.:rolleyes:
So tell me how did this non-existant LW mount 10061 sorties between June 6 and July 1 1944?
Now tell me again how the 8th AF had smashed the LW by June 1944.
The Luftwaffe on the Eve of Overlord, 31 May 44[/b]
Serviceable Aircraft Strengths
Single-engined fighters 1063
Luftwaffe Order of Battle
10 January 1945
Serviceable Aircraft Strengths
Single-engined fighters 1462
A 25% increase in sevicable a/c.:aok
Luftwaffe Order of Battle
9 April 1945
Serviceable Aircraft Strengths
Single-engined fighters 1305
Still above the May 31 1944 number when you claim the LW was in its death throws.
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I don't know were you get your numbers. Mine come from Don Caldwell's JG 26 War Diaries.
Just having forces in the Area doesn't mean a thing. Did you not understand the data I presented?
The Luftwaffe launched 10,061 missions against the Normandy Landings in June. They didn't reach the beachheads! The allies had 11-13 missions in the air on average to stop them for every one the Luftwaffe had up. 120,000 - 140000 sorties tops 10.061.
You seem to confuse The numbers a unit is supposed to have, actually has, and what actually works. This is basic info listed in a status report.
Whoopi do the Luftwaffe got another 998 single engine dayfighters, They would have needed 9,998 along with trained pilots to even make a difference.
We can try and experiment in the Arena If you like. I'll get 10 members of my squad. One less than the lowest ratio of planes in the air over Normandy...
You take off and try and bomb our airfield. See how successful you are at 10 to 1 against a known target.
Again, as most historians will atest, The Luftwaffe was crushed as a viable force by D-Day and the Allies had absolute Air Superiority. Do you think they would have launched the invasion without it? Ike was a lot more concerned with the weather and the men manning the Beach defenses than he was the Luftwaffe.
Galland was able though, with the help of Speer to pull off a miracle and rebuild the Luftwaffe by Dec 44. Numerically they had more planes and pilots than they had in Sept. '39. However they were a paper tiger at that time as the bulk of them were ridiculously undertrained "Nachtwuchs" or "New Growth". Hitler squandered all of Gallands hard work by commiting these new reserves to battle before they were ready in "Bodenplatte". That was the very last gasp of the luftwaffe's death throes.
Crumpp
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undertrained "Nachtwuchs" or "New Growth".
umm Nacht = Night you mean Nachwuchs
Nachwuchs = New Generation ie, Newbie
:D
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take some spelling lessons you tard.
kiss my ass.
Storch, in all seriousness. What the **** are you thinking?
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No confusion on my part, for the only one that is confused Crumpp is you, as we have seen in another thread. You go off on tangents like another poster here does.
LW OoB http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/2072/LW_OBs.html
You said no a/c came from LuftReich when there was (well before the StLo breakout) and the kaputski LW still managed to mount ~10000sorties in France in 3 weeks of June. :rolleyes: Did I say these were effective (dropped bombs, etc on the Allies) sorties?
Maybe you should ask my uncle were those bombs, that almost got him, came from. That was behind the lines.:eek: Well possibly those bombs could have been American 'friendly' fire.
"You seem to confuse The numbers a unit is supposed to have, actually has, and what actually works. This is basic info listed in a status report. "
:rofl No kiddin.:rofl
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Batz,
Your a moron in any language.
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So your original contention that the LW was still a viable Air force in June of 1944 is now gone? You just posted all that junk to correct some that detail...from a true statement that LW planes did not reach the beachheads?
Ok sure. I'll buy that.:rolleyes:
Your right I misread the entry in JG26 War Diary. It was that first week. However, They could have brought the planes in from the Moon and it wouldn't have mattered. NONE reached the Beaches.
Here check this out:
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj94/mccrabb2.html
Maybe you can come out with more things to say about this subject. Look real hard cause I bet you can come up with something equally stupid to contest?
Once Doolittle changed the mission of the 8th AF fighters and the Raids were launched that the LW had to intercept it was not long til they lost the war of attrition. A couple of months..Looks like around March of 44? When did Big Week start?? Feb 19-26th 1944?
Do we want to argue the Statement that within a very short period of time from the start of "Big Week" the Allies crushed the LW and gained Air Superiority? Seems like a fact not an assumption to me.
.Now tell me again how the 8th AF had smashed the LW by June 1944.
Any other requests?? :p
That brings up back to Aug '40.
Luftwaffe begins the battle using the same very successful strategy the 8th used in Operation Argument. Granted the LW had numerical superiority but not on the scale the Allies had over the LW in 1944. Basically the LW used raids the RAF must intercept (Airfield campaign) with fighters that are free to pursue the RAF to the deck in the begining. The RAF is being destroyed no matter how bad they want to defend their homes by this strategy. Along comes Goering and does the exact opposite of Doolittle and removes the tactical initiative from the LW fighters. Now the fighters can't pursue the RAF to the deck but must remain insight of the bombers just like the Allies did until Doolittle changed it. RAF gets some breathing room. The balance of the battle shifts to pretty much however wants it more. The RAF wanted it more than the LW. Then Hitler changes the target to London and now the RAF can pick and choose it's forces to commit. Even more breathing room for them. Enough in fact that it is now impossible for the Luftwaffe to win no matter what.
That's how I see it with the facts available.
Please don't even bother to reply Milo-Moran since you want to reduce this to flaming.
I go off on tangents? :rofl
Maybe you need to reread that thread or pass whatever your smokin around.
Crumpp
Thanks Batz....caught it after I hit submit button.
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Originally posted by MiloMorai
II., III., and IV(Sturm)./JG3 bases at Evreaux-Fauville, StAndre and Dreux
I disagree with 2 things : it's Eveux* and st André (I'm nitpicking here ;))
*you can trust me I'm living here :)
Wtf is your post F4UDOA ???
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Batz,
Your a moron in any language.
Maybe, but coming from a clown like yourself I don't put much stock into your opinions.
Your position that "over claiming" was the main reason the LW lost the BoB is just as comical now as when you first posted it. But not quite as funny as your "Allies good with 150 octane, lw bad with their C3 nitrous".
That's hilarious.
And so far you have yet to post any of that web based
outstanding 109 and 190 data.
That other thread where you posted data you couldn't even read it. Like I said, you play an excellent clown.
Now go make me a giraffe balloon animal.
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Batz,
Show me one peice of data you have ever posted. You have nothing and bring nothing. Worthless.
I quoted my source right from the JG26 war diaries. Learn to read and you might get a clue. But I doubt it.
You know what I tell you Bee-atch.
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Crump
Our for a long walk this morning after breakfast and thought about this debate.
Your a cool guy. I can see you in Afganistan thinking about the war you were in and the wars men have been in throughout our history and coming to conclusions about how your fight was just like many other fights. I dont aggree with your conclusions in regards BOB but I do admit that the will to fight and to work as a unit and an army and defend your country are amoungst inmportant of assets and factors in war. I think indoctrination takes a part in that asset.
Anyway. Hope to be able to talk over this with a beer some day. Infanteer to infanteer and talk over your experiances and thank you for your service.
Pongo.
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Crumpp,
The LW lost far more single engined fighters in Normandy than in the Big Week. Overall air war over Normandy was by far largest short period air battle of the war. Do not try to under estimate part of the Luftwaffe on it. And during May USAF still lost near 400 planes to enemy fighters, far more than during Big Week and it should be noted that activity in the other fronts raised that time too. Still Luftwaffe could maintain over 1000 single engined fighter force troughout summer and fought hard on several fronts. Statistics do not support Caldwell.
gripen
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Originally posted by F4UDOA
Batz,
Show me one peice of data you have ever posted. You have nothing and bring nothing. Worthless.
I quoted my source right from the JG26 war diaries. Learn to read and you might get a clue. But I doubt it.
You know what I tell you Bee-atch.
You posted a bunch of excerpts but the conclusion you made was your own.
All your LW stuff comes from Carson or Caldwell, big deal. Just posting other peoples data is nothing worth any mention.
You have given me all the clues I need to determine you are in fact a clown. Now get to work on those balloon animals.
I posted data damn it you Bee-atch
Nice rant kook. lol
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Originally posted by straffo
I disagree with 2 things : it's Eveux* and st André (I'm nitpicking here ;))
*you can trust me I'm living here :)
Wtf is your post F4UDOA ???
NP;) Forgive the lack of accents.
.........
No Crumpp, where did you get that idiotic idea from that I claim the LW was a viable force. :rolleyes: :rolleyes: :eek: Your are the one that is being the moron. No not viable but FAR from the spent force you claim it to be.
Did you suffer shell shock, for your brain seems not to be functioning properly.
You were the one that made the moronic statement that no LW a/c from LuftReich ever made it to France before the breakout at StLo., which was totally false. How they fared once they arrived is another matter.
You also claim that the LW was a spent force by June 1944. Well it did not do to bad for the next 11-12 months. How do explain the 2314 USAAF losses in the ETO and MTO to LW a/c with only noob pilots?:eek: :eek:
Nothing worse than a grunt with a little knowledge.:rofl
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Check out the link.
It's not Caldwell. It's the USAAF. Your right they lost more fighters in Normany because THAT is what the Luftwaffe was targeting. They were trying to punch through the fighter screen and get their Jabo pilots on target. At the same time they wanted to prevent the AEAF fighter bombers from attacking the German Army. So yes your absolutely right they lost more fighters in Normandy than in Big Week. In Big Week the LW was going after the Bombers and ignoring the fighters if possible.
However they didn't reach the beachheads or effect the ground conflict in anyway. It's a fact that the Allies not only had Air Superiority but Air Supremacy. The AEAF owned the sky by June '44.
Specifically the article for Aerospace Power Magazine is written by:
Lt Col Maris ("Buster") McCrabb (BA, Bowling Green State University; MS and MPA, Troy State University) is chief of the Warfare Studies Division at Air command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Immediately preceding this assignment, he was department chairman of the Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course of the Combat Employment Institute, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE), Maxwell AFB. Colonel McCrabb is a command pilot with more than 3,200 flying hours in the F-4 and F-16 aircraft. During Operation Desert Storm, he was a member of the Combat Plans Division, Joint Task Force Proven Force, Incirlik, Turkey. Colonel McCrabb is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air command and Staff College, Air War College, and the US Army Command and General Staff College.
He might know a little bit more about it than me or you.
You can also find it on several 8th AF veterans sites.
Hey Milo some food for thought...
They might have it all wrong. Maybe they just missed the LW at Normandy? You know "Big Sky, Small Plane" syndrome? :)
Crumpp
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...it would be nice if once and awhile some credit was given to the RAF and RCAF that formed the backbone of the 2nd ATAF from Normandy untill the End in the ETO.
Not to mention the USAAFs IXth AF efforts in the same regard.
"No LW at the beaches" maybe so, I seem to recall the drive to the Rhine taking more than a few days.
Im not taking any issue with the efforts of the 8th AF, but you guys need to read up on more than just the P-51.
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Milo I got the idiotic notion from the direct quote from your first reply on the subject. Here I will Post it again.
Quote from Milo-Moran
Now tell me again how the 8th AF had smashed the LW by June 1944.
See Above post for answer
Remember that?
by the way France is a big country....I said the beachheads not the country....:rolleyes:
The losses occurred no doubt but they did nothing to stem the tide. I believe Mick Spick put it like this...75 percent of all Allied AC downed by single engine day fighters were shot down by 10 percent of the LW dayfighter force. Not an exact quote but it gets the geist of it. The few surviving Experts where a handful to deal with and could take on any of the allied fighter pilots one on one. Throw in the Nachwuchs who got lucky, flak, mechanical problems, pilot error crashes, etc... And you will get your number.
Crumpp
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Hello, HiTech!
I've seen an awful lot of garbage on these boards, and that's why I rarely read 'em. Quite a few contributors take each other on personally and do a bunch of schoolyard name-calling, etc. That's fine I guess, but I'd rather fly.
It's my humble opinion that expecting an apology from STORCH- who is simply pointing things out in the best interests of the game and the players- is short-sighted, and inconsiderate of the other mountains of crap that go on in here. He's a consumer of what you sell! If the customers' opinions don't count, what DOES count? Some very good companies work hard and spend tons of money to get input from their customers, in hopes of making their products better. You get it from STORCH for free, yet it doesn't seem to mean as much to you as whether he says it properly, or whether he ruffles someone's feathers in the process.
Don't agree with the customers' opinions if you don't care too. Don't treat 'em as valuable ideas that could make what you sell better if you don't want to. Still, it might be good to at least respect them for what they are- honest opinions that are, perhaps, shared by many others who haven't spoken up (yet), or taken their business elsewhere (yet).
FWIW.
Best regards.
DedStk
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Well put DedStk.
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This thread is about the possible overmodelling of the Spitfire Mk IX from the beginning. Remember? Anyway, it's turned into a complicated artillery barrage of dirtbombs. So please be civilized before Pyro appears and locks it, ok!
Anyway, breaking away from the main topic in a semi-hearted manner, there has been a lively discussion about the BoB and the collapse of the LW.
Just wanted to point at 2 things:
GScholz: ""Combined losses of Luftflotten 2, 3 and 5 (Norway) from 10 July until 31 October 1940, amounted to 1,733 aircraft destroyed compared with 915 aircraft lost (415 pilots killed or missing) by the RAF.""
Very accurate, and I belive verified many times over. TY Scholzie ;)
The on to the LW status at D-Day. I think I may safely say that the were not nearly "finished" by then, however in a poor state. The allies were yet to lose more planes to the guns of the LW than the Germans lost in the BoB. I'd call that something.
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Just caught your thread Pongo.
Thank you. The support of the civilian populace means the world to a soldier.
I agree too that indoctrination can greatly influence the "will to fight" of a soldier. How else could the Germans have fought so hard for so long for such an evil cause? Sure many didn't know the full extent but by 1943 most had to have suspected they just didn't want to believe so they fell back on their indoctrination.
Crumpp
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Thats been the ratio since WW1...about 65 percent of the kills went to about 15 percent of the pilots, its true for all air forces.
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Milo I got the idiotic notion from the direct quote from your first reply on the subject. Here I will Post it again.
See Above post for answer
Remember that?
by the way France is a big country....I said the beachheads not the country....:rolleyes:
The losses occurred no doubt but they did nothing to stem the tide. I believe Mick Spick put it like this...75 percent of all Allied AC downed by single engine day fighters were shot down by 10 percent of the LW dayfighter force. Not an exact quote but it gets the geist of it. The few surviving Experts where a handful to deal with and could take on any of the allied fighter pilots one on one. Throw in the Nachwuchs who got lucky, flak, mechanical problems, pilot error crashes, etc... And you will get your number.
Crumpp
Well your a grunt and should know how to read a map. Look up the place names.:eek:
FYI, 2/3 of LW aces with 50 or more kills survived.
quote:Originally posted by Crumpp
Only Luftflotte 3 was in any position to attempt a strike at the landings. Luftflotte Riech was still engaged with its primary mission of intercepting the bombers. Absolutely NONE of Luftflotte Riech's Aircraft made it anywhere close to the landing zone the entire battle. All the way through to the breakout at St Lo.
Where does it say "beachheads"? I am glad you are calling my uncle a liar.
Just to refresh your faulty memory, this was my 1st post
quote:Originally posted by Crumpp
Only Luftflotte 3 was in any position to attempt a strike at the landings. Luftflotte Riech was still engaged with its primary mission of intercepting the bombers. Absolutely NONE of Luftflotte Riech's Aircraft made it anywhere close to the landing zone the entire battle. All the way through to the breakout at St Lo.
Wrong-o.
By June 10 1944,
I.,II., and III./JG1 was based at LeMans, Flers and Beauvais-Tille
I. and II. /JG11 + 10./JG11 based at Rennes St.Jacques and Beauvais-Tille
II., III., and IV(Sturm)./JG3 bases at Evreaux-Fauville, StAndre and Dreux
Stab, I., III. and IV./JG27 based at Romilly-sur-Seine, Rhiems-Champagne and Champfluery
III./JG 54 based at Chartres
All these units came from Luftflotte Reich. Now when was the breakout at St.Lo? Well after D+4 when the LW had extra units in place.
As well as JGr 200 at Avignon.
Yes Angus the LW was 'on the ropes' but was far from being the finished force our illustrious grunt thinks it was.
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JG26, flying 109g6 and fw190a8, maintained a 2 to 1 K/D ratio verses allied aircraft during summer 44.
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Roger that Grunherz.
It makes sense that LW A/C must have been competitive as far as performance goes. Otherwise how did even the Experten survive the odds?
Your right Milo-Moronic.....I said Landing Zones not Beachheads. Didn't mean to confuse you. Do you have trouble following stories when the main character is suddenly refered to by a pronoun? Bet that just throws your whole world off, huh?
I can see how easy it is to confuse "Landing Zones" with FR-AAA-NCE.
I should have cleared that up by using the term "BEACH Landing Zones" perhaps? Or "BEACH the ships were LANDING ON"? My fault entirely.
So you been making minimum wage long, Milo? You can go far with a GED.....I guess...
:lol
Crumpp
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Batz,
Seriously, take a position and defend it. Your only position in the entire thread is that you don't like me. Frankly I don't think we are going to be sharing a Latte any time soon so why don't you find something else to do.
BTW, you misquoted me in your post one paragraph after posting what I actually said.
Straffo,
Don't ask. I started this thread without the intention of having a name calling session with Batz. That's about all I can say about my last few post. Maybe I'll go back and delete them.
In anycase yes I am sharing (taking) Caldwells view on why the LW lost the BoB.
The start of this thread had to do with fuel consumption, flight endurance and peformance relative to weight, so much for that.
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I didn’t misquote you. I just filtered out all the rest of your BS and presented a clearer summation of what it is you were really trying to say.
Don't be so vain, I neither like, nor dislike you. I don't even know you. However, I do find a lot of what you post funny and expressed that.
How's my giraffe coming?
BTW Squire answered all the way back on the 1st page
Spit V and Spit IX had in some versions a 29-imp gallon auxiliary tank behind the pilot. 85+29 x 1.2 = 137 US gallons, I’m sure that’s where the # comes from.
When I 1st came to AH some one had brought up the issue of the spit 9 having 137 gal and I believe the conclusion was there were Spit 9s with the 29 gal tank behind the pilot. Since this issue doesn't really matter to me a bit I won't bother with a search. Good Luck with all that :p
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F4UDOA, Batz ... you're both right, you're both morons!
On the LW issue: The LW lost the air war over Western Europe in 1943, and their loss was not due to anything the allies did. The LW lost because they had been making grievous mistakes throughout the entire war. The German High Command was beset with organizational problems and internal power struggle. Their aircraft R&D and production authorities were even more inept at doing their job. That the LW offered resistance to such a level is astonishing and a tribute to the German fighting spirit. One can only shudder at the thought of what they could have done (to the world) if their leadership had been up for the task.
The single most grievous mistake they did was made long before the war .... operational training doctrine. The men of the LW fought until they fell, never getting the chance to pass on their experience to the green replacement pilots, except for "on the job training". Not until 1944 did the LW start to take this seriously, and by then it was too late, their teenage pilots with 10 hours of flight training were getting slaughtered in their high-tech super rides.
The LW didn't plan for a long war ... but that's what they got.
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You're welcome Angus. :)
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Originally posted by Crumpp
You can go far with a GED.....I guess...
:lol
Crumpp
Yes we all can see that grunt, you being a prime example....:rofl :aok
OBW, the Germans rated the American grunt at the lowest level of those it faced in combat. Could not even better the peasant soldier in 'Nam. Not much has changed in 60 years.:aok
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you're both morons!
There you go again. Now if I were to reply in turn you will end up whining again like you did with the quote below:
Ah of course, the inevitable ad hominem attack.
Won't ya.......?
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Actually that's not an ad hominem attack.
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Originally posted by GScholz
Actually that's not an ad hominem attack.
Well in my twisted mind it sounded like a twisted joke :)
please all resume name calling it's not the O'club here.
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Crumpp,
The statistics do not support conclusions presented in your source (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj94/mccrabb2.html) (USAAF statistical digest, USBBS and BBSU). Somehow writers draw a conclusion that Luftwaffe was finished that time despite USAAF still lost far more planes to enemy fighters in May than in February (given that then the 8th AF bombed targets also in France due to transportation plan). They also fail to realize that there were lot of air fighting in Normandy; LW lost all together about 800 planes there and they certainly challenged invasion force (their loss rate per sortie was about 5%).
Actually the article contradicts your claims above. It clearly states that reasons for low amount of LW sorties June 6-7th; the Gemans were not sure if the invasion was real and it took some time to move units to the front (also from the defence of the reich).
Otherwise the article is quite correct; The Allied air supermacy in Normandy was caused simply by numerical superiority of the allied air forces and well made preparations (combined effort by all allies). Cumulative effect also contain losses which LW suffered in BoB.
gripen
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Gripen,
The article supports the "claims" I've been making.
1. The allies gains Air Superiority in a fairly short time after Doolittle's doctrine change AND Big Week. True, by the end of March ,44 the Allies had Air Superiority over Europe. By June they had Air Supremacy. Fact, not an ansumption.
2. The LW efforts in Normandy were ineffective and resulted in absolutely no military gain. - Fact, not an assumption.
The AEAF produced enough planes and pilots by June '44 that the loss of even 800 planes WITH pilots probably wouldn't have been a major setback.
Gscholz,
Your absolutely correct in the mistakes the LW made listed in your Post. No doubt these sped up the demise of the LW considerably. Remember the Allies made some grievous mistakes. In war all sides make mistakes. It's the side that makes the fewest, maintains it will, and capitalizes on the enemies mistakes the most that wins.
I think it's a safe assumption to make that the LW could have continued to maintain Air Superiority over Europe for a lot longer time period had Doolittle not changed Doctrine and Launched Big Week. I think it would have taken years not weeks for the Allies to win IF they won it all.
Milo-Moronic,
Funny thing I have a quote from Erwin Rommel hanging in my office:
"War is made up of Confusion and Chaos. The American Army is so good at war because they practice Confusion and Chaos on a daily basis."
Rommel was trying to dig at the American Army. He does say that the American Army was the fastest learning Army he had ever encountered. The lessons learned at Kasserine were quickly incorporated to the frontline soldier. Your right though the conscript/class structured Army of World War II definately isn't the same as the all volunteer professional force we have today. Only 2 guys in my unit do not have a Bachelors degree and most of us have or are working on a Masters.
I think your talking about the British that the Germans rated the lowest. They took so many casualties in World War I that their doctrine in WWII did not risk taking many. Course I don't expect you to believe that since it's just a German soldiers opinion AND your Canadian. I know some of you guys are still sore at being thrown out of the Empire. Don't worry your still a British Something or other right...protectorate? Oh well doesn't really matter does it. Wouldn't be YOU protecting anything anyway. It's Ok though the world needs consumers.
Crumpp
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Hmm, when the US army entered the North African campaign, the Germans were already on the run.
I guess Rommel was surprized that he couldn't mop those newbies out :D
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Another ignorant, know-it-all, loudmouth Yank this Crumpp or is that Crisp. The reason Americans are not liked.:aok
And I have known several grunts who didn't even have a High school diploma.:)
"War is made up of Confusion and Chaos. The American Army is so good at war because they practice Confusion and Chaos on a daily basis."
Yes that describes perfectly, even to-day, the Americans, they don't know whether they are coming or going but you know were they are becuase of all the noise they are making.:rofl
Anyways, I will let you live in your fantasy dream world Crisp.
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Oh, and Crumpp:
"I think your talking about the British that the Germans rated the lowest"
They certainly did not rate the RAF as the lowest. Remember that the RAF dropped more bombs on Germany than the USAF. Many German Aces will tell you that their most dreaded foe was the RAF.
Hmm, what then? the Royal Navy? Hardly, for by the time the US Navy entered the fight against the Germans, the RN had already crippled and locked the German Surface fleet in, and were scoring nicely against German subs. At the time, the RN was also a bigger force than the US navy.
That leads us to the Grunts. The first fights between the US and the Germans were in N Africa, where the British had the Germans completely on the run. Hardly that location then? What about Normandy? Well, the British seemed to be doing just fine in and after the invasion, - no worse than the US.
May it perhaps be that after their initial success in the Blitzkrieg and the conquest of France, that the Germans took the opinion that the British were a weak force? Maybe, but it was their mistake to belive that it would stay that way.
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Mark, can you send me a full copy of that of what was in your first post?
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Didn't mean to bruise your feeling Angus!
If you notice most of my Post refer to the Allied Expediationary Air Force (both USAAF and RAF) which did the grunt work in Normandy.
Only when refering to Big Week do I use the USAAF. It was a USAAF operations after all.
Honestly I do not don't draw a very sharp line between Britian and the US. The British are the best friends anyone could ask for in today's world. No doubt their resolve stemmed the tide and allowed a combined effort to defeat the Axis powers in World War II. That same resolve and love of basic human freedoms is still strong today.
Today the British and the United States share operations on a unprecedented level of cooperation. Their were British Soldiers who could go ANYWHERE in our operations center unescorted ANYTIME. Same was true with us in their Operations Center.
Yeah once the Limey's realized we didn't give a rat's arze about a King or a Queen and wouldn't be some whippin boy protectorate "Commonwealth" we began to get along pretty good. Course, to me, Canada is kinda like New Jersey. Sure its in North America but nobody really cares. ;)
Crumpp
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Originally posted by GScholz
Actually that's not an ad hominem attack.
Did I say it was? Read what I wrote.
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RGR Crumpp :)
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Originally posted by Angus
The first fights between the US and the Germans were in N Africa, where the British had the Germans completely on the run.
Just the opposite effect when germans had some supplies there. That war was really won at sea, cutting all and every supply way to the enemy.
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Crumpp,
Well, if the allies had had reached air superiority over Germany in March then the losses of the heavies should have reduced in the deep penetration raids. That was not the case; losses increased in April and stayed higher than in February until invasion started. Basicly the Big Week proved that the 8th AF could do suistained high altitude deep penetration raids with tolerable losses and causing simultaneoysly untolerable losses to LW. This was pure material war, both sides suffered exremely heavy losses between February and June. But due to superior production capacity and training USAF could sustain this and actually their numbers increased most of this period. In the case of the LW number of planes and experienced pilots slowly decreased during this period; the LW was losing but was still far from finished when invasion started as losses over Normandy prove. Again it should be noted that LW fought on several fronts simultaneoysly.
No one has questioned LW's failure in Normandy here. There (and also in most France, Holland and Belgium) the allies had real air superiority ie capability do all kinds operations with low losses ( 1,14% per sortie) and capability to prevent most LW operations. The allies did not reach such air superiority over most Germany until autumn when tactical air forces could operate from the borders of Germany.
gripen
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You mean "IF" Godo.
Yes, it was won by the Sea Route mainly. The RN did an amazing job in the med. And also that was helped through Malta. Although the Germans took Crete, the losses were very heavy, and Malta would have been a lot tougher.
So, the Brits won the supply race, and used to its full. The big battle at El Alamein was a demonstration of that.
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Originally posted by Angus
You mean "IF" Godo.
No, I mean "WHEN". Just remember the first half of Rommel's campaign at Africa against the Commonwealth forces (everyone was running East). But, of course, with no control over the Mediterranean supply lines, it was only a matter of time.
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Gripen,
The Luftwaffe was forced to change it's response to the Heavies. The Jagdwaffe could no longer afford to respond to every raid that came over. This change in LW tactics did allow them to concentrate their combat power on the raids they did intercept thereby causing more casualties.
Galland pulled off a miracle and actually was able to rebuild the LW between Mar ' 44 and Dec '44. He tested tactics during this time period and was planning on hording his force til It was trained and could deliver his "knockout" blow. He didn't get the chance as Hitler intervened and squandered the rebuilt Luftwaffe in the ill concieved "Bodenplatte" in the Ardennes offensive. It's spelled out in Detail in "The Luftwaffe fighter force: A view from the Cockpit".
Crumpp
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Gsholz,
I would certainly have a hard time proving you wrong right now.
Batz,
Yes you did rearrange my quote.
You quoted me correctly in the upper part of your own post and then screwed it up in the second half of the same post :rolleyes:
So if I changed it how did you quote me? I thought so.
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I didn’t misquote you. I just filtered out all the rest of your BS and presented a clearer summation of what it is you were really trying to say.
I already answered you. Do you want to argue about it?
The first quote clearly says; Originally posted by F4UDOA.
The second quote wasn't directly attributed to you but was meant as I stated above. Had I wanted to "misquote" you with the intent to deceive others then I would not have included what it was you actually said and I would have attributed my "summation" directly to you by adding: Originally posted by F4UDOA. What did I say you changed?
You are getting sillier with each post. It seems Pyro is interested in your data. I would think that with his request it would bring this particular thread to an end. But we can go back and forth with the “yes you did”, “no I didn’t” if you want.
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Hey look the level of interaction in this thread is great 130+ posts for a single concept. Just a note the concept is...
Overmodeling of the Spit IX!!!
This isn't an issue of counting number in service/killed/active/regiment formation.
IS THE SPIT IX over modeled?!?!?
It has been noted time and again that the IX we have is a collage of the various Spit IX models in existence. In a sense this already points to over modeling of this design. OK the Spitfire was one of those models that was modified in a plethora of ways. Engine type, wing type (guns), wing type (short/long), fuel supply, under wing hard points, etc, etc, etc. It is easy to see why this montage exists.
Can we get back on point?
BTW Hitech... Go back and read the original point that Storch made. Then go and decide whether Storch actually called you a liar or stated that given available evidence that it is reasonable to assume that you might have made a mistake. Possibly. In some unusual universe in which mistakes can occur. Now decide that regardless of the content of the phone conversation that perhaps an apology might be in order.
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First of all the Allies and Germans respected each other in the European theatre (the notable exception being the Eastern Front). The US troops were certainly considered the least experienced, however I don't think this is the same as disrespect. Their fighting spirit was certainly not called into question.
Crumpp, the Allies never achieved air supremacy over Europe in WWII. Air superiority was achieved in early 1944, perhaps even as early as late 1943, but never air supremacy. Even in mid-April 1945, three weeks before the German surrender, the LW flew 1300 sorties per day. Most of these were against the Russians however as they were attacking Berlin.
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"I think your talking about the British that the Germans rated the lowest. They took so many casualties in World War I that their doctrine in WWII did not risk taking many"
It was the strategy of all the major armies not to repeat the mistakes of WW1, including the US Army, who was no more interested in large scale infantry battles as the French, Germans or British were. Unfortunately the scope of the war drew all of them into some horrific campaigns. Air power and armor (and huge expensive forts) was thought to make infantry clashes a thing of the past by some pre war thinkers, but it didn't work out that way.
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I'm just curious. Skuzzy told me he doesn't like people bashing other countries.Yet this **** Milo is allowed to bash the U.S.
Why hasn't Skuzzy booted this retard out yet?
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Maybe you should check out the O-Club board. That being said its kinda sad all round.
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Crumpp,
We are not talking about LW's response nor about (supposed) rebuild of the Luftwaffe. The statistics are clear; Luftwaffe was not finished in the June and they could still sustain very heavy losses in Normandy. During April Luftwaffe could still cause heaviest losses of 1944 to 8th AF (absolute and relative). Actually LW lost around 2-3 single engined fighters for one heavy bomber shot down (depending on data) which is very favorable rate to LW in absolute scale. But in relative scale it was a loss because USAF could sustain losses better. It's hard to say if the May was different because the transportation plan reduced amount of deep penetration raids. After June the LW fought hard on several active fronts through out summer. Rebuild started in october when activity in the air decreased, again this can be clearly seen from statistics.
GScholz,
If you mean numerical air superiority then the allies reached it far earlier, say 1941 when Russia joined war. If you mean ability to attack any target with some kind of accuracy in German occupied area (with possibly untolerable losses) then allies reached it say around late summer 1942. If you mean ability to do that with tolerable losses then the allies reached that early 1944. If you mean ability make LW locally ineffective, then they reached it say June 1944. And say June 1945 if you mean completely ineffective ;)
gripen
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No, I mean air superiority. To have air superiority means having sufficient control of the air to make air attacks on the enemy without serious opposition and to be free from the danger of significant enemy air incursions.
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Gripen,
Again I will cover the facts for you on this.
In March or '44 the Luftwaffe was forced to change tactics against the Heavy bombers. After March of '44 could they inflict casualties? Sure. Could they stop the bombing of their country during daylight? No. Could they influence operations on the ground? No
It's a fact that numerically the Luftwaffe was superior in Jan '45 than in Sept '39.
It's a fact that is due to Galland attempting to rebuild them for his planned "knockout" blow.
It's a fact that Hitler ordered "Operation Bodenplatte" and that the Jagdwaffe suffered it largest single day loss of the entire war.
The LW lost around 300 planes and almost as many pilots. Many of them experten it could not afford to lose. It's a fact that never again could the LW offer any offensive action.
It's a fact too that the Spit is overmodeled, ScJazz :D
Crumpp
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One thing in regard to Bodenplatte...
Many of the LW casualties were from their own Flak units. In order to maintain secrecy no coordination was made with the friendly units the LW overflew. Since the ground units were not used to seeing the LW in the skies they shot at everything in the air. They got it both leaving their lines and reentering them.
Crumpp
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Gscholz,
I would say that the Allies had Air Supremacy over Normandy. They were able to conduct unhindered operations in Normandy. Never was the LW a factor in the ground war.
Did they maintain Air Supremacy? That is arguable for sure. I would say NO. The fact is the LW went on the Offensive in Jan '44. Did the Allies regain it? Sure after that Offensive.
The allies gained Air Superiority after "Big Week" and maintained it throughout the war. The LW was never able to stop the AEAF operations. You can argue that it was lost for a few days during "Bodenplatte".
Crumpp
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Crumpp,
I have not argued about luftwaffe tactics nor about their ability to stop day (or night) raids nor about rebuilding of the luftwaffe late 1944 nor about Bodenplatte. All I have said that the allies did not reach real air superiority (this of course depends on definition) over all German occupied area until autumn 1944 and that Luftwaffe was quite far from finished in June 1944.
GScholz,
Well, it all depends on the definition of the air superiority. If we use as strict definition as you mentioned then the allies did not really had it over Normandy (and nearby), LW could still launch around 13800 sorties during first 25 days (vs around 160000 by allies). The loss rate per sortie for LW was about 5 times larger than for allies. IMHO it's better to look if the operations were effective and it that case LW effort over Normandy was quite little.
gripen
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The Allies never achieved air supremacy over Europe, except perhaps in the final week before the German surrender. The difference of air superiority and supremacy is well defined.
Air supremacy is defined as the condition when the enemy air force is in-capable of effective interference. Through the complete destruction of the enemy air forces, this condition is the ultimate goal of an air campaign. Yet, this condition may be difficult or even impossible to achieve. It may occur however, through the establishment of a diplomatic “no-fly zone”. Under the condition of air supremacy, the air commander employs all of his aircraft at will.
Air superiority is defined as the condition when the conduct of operations is possible at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the enemy. This is a necessary and obligatory condition to attain success in combat and overall victory in a war. The most efficient method of attaining air superiority is to attack enemy aviation assets close to their source at maintenance and launch facilities, early warning and C2 sites, and ground-based air defense sites.
Local air superiority, which is purely geographic in nature, is characterized by well timed air attacks to coincide with enemy aircraft downtime, re-turning sorties, aircraft rearming, or gaps in air defense coverage. This condition may also occur in sectors across the theater of military operations where the the enemy may not have adequate assets available to ensure air superiority. In certain situations or against certain enemies, local air superiority for a specified period of time may be a more realistic goal.
Air parity is defined as the functional equivalency between enemy and friendly air forces in strength and capability to attack and destroy targets. Under the condition of air parity, where neither side has gained superiority, some enemy capabilities affect friendly ground forces at times and places on the battlefield. Air parity manifests itself to the commander primarily in the amount of fixed-wing aircraft used for direct support of ground forces. More aircraft are dedicated to interdiction and strike missions to gain air superiority.
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What definition are you using?
USAAF definition is :
To be superior in the air, to have air superiority, means having sufficient control of the air to make air attacks on the enemy without serious opposition and be free from the danger of serious enemy air incursions..
Here are some more definitions of these terms recognized by Military professionals:
"Air supremacy is defined as the condition when the enemy air force is in-capable of effective interference. Through the complete destruction of the enemy air forces, this condition is the ultimate goal of an air campaign. Yet, this condition may be difficult or even impossible to achieve. It may occur however, through the establishment of a diplomatic “no-fly zone”. Under the condition of air supremacy, the air commander employs all of his aircraft at will."
IMO this condition was achieved by the Allies on a few occasions for a short period of time in a local geographic region. IE Normandy.
"Air superiority is defined as the condition when the conduct of operations is possible at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the enemy. This is a necessary and obligatory condition to attain success in combat and overall victory in a war. The most efficient method of attaining air superiority is to attack enemy aviation assets close to their source at maintenance and launch facilities, early warning and C2 sites, and ground-based air defense sites."
IMO the Allies got and maintained Air Superiority from Mar '44 til the end of the war.
"Local air superiority, which is purely geographic in nature, is characterized by well timed air attacks to coincide with enemy aircraft downtime, re-turning sorties, aircraft rearming, or gaps in air defense coverage. This condition may also occur in sectors across the theater of military operations where the the enemy may not have adequate assets available to ensure air superiority. In certain situations or against certain enemies, local air superiority for a specified period of time may be a more realistic goal."
IMO This is what the LW was able to do until late in the war over the Eastern Front and in such Operations as Bodenplatte in the West. The LW failed to recognize the threat of the Western Allies Air Power until it was too late. This threat was NOT lost on the pilots of the LW. The Leadership at the highest levels failed to recognize it.
"Air parity is defined as the functional equivalency between enemy and friendly air forces in strength and capability to attack and destroy targets. Under the condition of air parity, where neither side has gained superiority, some enemy capabilities affect friendly ground forces at times and places on the battlefield. Air parity manifests itself to the commander primarily in the amount of fixed-wing aircraft used for direct support of ground forces. More aircraft are dedicated to interdiction and strike missions to gain air superiority. "
IMO This condition did exist for short time periods after Normandy but was a tactical occurance over a specific point on the map and not a strategic one. IMO Strategic Air Parity existed from late '41 til Mar '44. During this time Niether side was able to launch an effective offensive and both sides pretty much equally attempted various offensive measures.
Here is another good article reference Allied Air Superiority over Europe. The Author uses the term Supremacy but I think it should read superiority.
http://www.butler98.freeserve.co.uk/thtrlosses.htm
Crumpp
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Eh .. you do realize that you posted the exact same quotes as I did, right?
There is no such thing as "local air supremacy" as the term "air supremacy" requires the "complete destruction of the enemy air forces". Air supremacy is an overall strategic situation never a local one.
That the LW offered little opposition at Normandy does not mean they couldn't have offered more if they had chosen to do so.
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Have to disagree there Gunther. It was not about the not choosing to do so at that time, - they were caught off guard and had nothing ready.Hehe, perhaps the LW was expecting Pas-de-Calais to be the spot.
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They though the Normandy invasion was a diversion for pretty much of the first day.
Had nothing ready? On June 3 1944, three days before D-day the operational strength of the LW in Western Europe for the defense of the Reich was 1098 fighters and Zerstörers. Most of them within operational range of Normandy, however they were tasked with the defense of the Reich and were not used against the invasion area until later.
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Spitfire IX must be overmodelled.. I mean, its not American so it must suck. That Johnnie Johnson killing 38 german fighters in it is just plain fantasy, he was really ben affleck in a P-40.
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The Spit9 may be the first and only plane to be overmodelled AND undermodelled at the same time! WTG Spit9! :D
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They tried to do something about it. They tried very hard and recognized the importance of stopping the invasion at the beaches. This was the German strategy and intent.
1. They suspended further attacks against the Heavies to divert ALL available fighters to go after Tactical asset's as these could effect the Army the most.
2. They divert as many forces as they could to the invasion area.
3. The flew as many missions as they could. 10061 sorties to be exact.
Nevertheless THEY COMPLETELY FAILED TO REACH THE INVASION beaches much less influence the outcome of the Invasion.
This is Air Supremacy over the Normandy. Fact
How long it lasted is debatable but the LW was unable to influence the Ground war for the rest of WWII. Where were they in the Falaise pocket? That ONE action in Normandy which caused the entire collapse of the German Army in France. Many US Army vets who were there believe the killing grounds of Falaise WAS the destruction of the German Army. After Falaise the battle of France became a race to stop the German retreat to the Siegfreid line. They lost too many of their experienced NCO's and junior officers in the pocket to recover. Ethnic Germans who gained experience throughout the war. After Falaise the German Army was no longer manned primarily by ethnic Germans but by conscripts from conquered nations. Ethnic Germans became the minority in their own army.
Crumpp
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This is pointless. You are obviously completely ignorant to the meaning of air supremacy, and the operations of the LW, and you are equaly unwilling to understand the realities.
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Originally posted by Furball
Spitfire IX must be overmodelled.. I mean, its not American so it must suck. That Johnnie Johnson killing 38 german fighters in it is just plain fantasy, he was really ben affleck in a P-40.
Well it seems I am not the only one to see this arrogance.
LW claims
See the JaFu II section
http://tonywood.cjb.net/
On June 7 the Allies lost 50 a/c in and around the beachhead, mostly P-51s and P-47s, many by the LuftReich units. That is alot for an AF that had air superiority.
Fighter losses - USAAF ETO
J - 111, F - 129, M - 272, A - 358, M - 475, J - 698, J - 469, A - 627, S - 418, O - 517, N - 382, D - 481
So the LW was down and out after Big Week???
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Gscholz,
The quotes are the same cause we posted them at the same time.
Ignorant is deteriorating into a name calling flamefest simply because you don't have the ability to show your argument.
Here then lets examine the definition of Air Supremacy we both agree on.
In Normandy:
"Air supremacy is defined as the condition when the enemy air force is in-capable of effective interference."
This was definately the case in Normandy.
"Under the condition of air supremacy, the air commander employs all of his aircraft at will."
This was also the case for the Allies.
"Through the complete destruction of the enemy air forces, this condition is the ultimate goal of an air campaign. "
This is arguable but I contend that while the LW still had planes and pilots it did not have a force that could do any damage to the allies in Normandy. Therefore the LW destruction as an effective fighting force was complete.
"It may occur however, through the establishment of a diplomatic “no-fly zone”."
The Normandy landings may not have been a Diplomatic "No-Fly" zone but they were unarguably a LW "No-Fly" zone.
Three out of four conditions unarguable and one that you can debate depending on your whether you take a tatical view or strategic. In my book it meets the definition.
Crumpp
:aok
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Originally posted by MiloMorai
Well it seems I am not the only one to see this arrogance.
LW claims
See the JaFu II section
http://tonywood.cjb.net/
On June 7 the Allies lost 50 a/c in and around the beachhead, mostly P-51s and P-47s, many by the LuftReich units. That is alot for an AF that had air superiority.
Fighter losses - USAAF ETO
J - 111, F - 129, M - 272, A - 358, M - 475, J - 698, J - 469, A - 627, S - 418, O - 517, N - 382, D - 481
So the LW was down and out after Big Week???
Milo,
Do you have the number of sorties flown by Allied AC during that time? How many German a/c were flying in relation to that?
I don't think the argument is that the LW didn't fly, but for the most part the Allies were dictating where the airwar was fought and not fought.
In terms of air support for the ground troops, it just wasn't there for the German troops on the ground. The Falaise Gap being a prime example of this.
There were an estimated 11,000 Allied sorties flown on D-Day alone. How many German sorties? You are stating that 698 USAAF fighters were lost during June of 44. How many to flak? And what percentage was this of total USAAF Fighter Sorties flown? Did it even make a dent?
Going through Roger Freeman's "Mighty Eighth War Diary" I added up the 8th AF fighter sorties for June 44. They totalled 23,500+. That means if we count those 698 LW fighter claims against just the 8th AF fighter sorties, it's a 2.9 percent loss.
Now add in the 30,863 Fighter sorties flown by the 9th AF during that same time frame(From Kenn Rust's book "9th Air Force in World War II".
You are talking about 698 Fighters lost in over 53,000 sorties. Roughly a 1.3 percent loss. Not much of a loss in the numbers game.
That's the point. The Allies could afford those kind of losses and fill the gaps with qualified pilots and aircraft.
No one is saying that the LW quit. They just didn't have the resources to combat that amount of Allied sorties. Yes I know aircraft production numbers certainly put the aircraft out there available, but pilots and fuel was also a major and larger consideration.
Allied pilot training had come a long way from the dark days of the Battle of Britain where those RAF fighter pilots were being thrown into combat with 10 hours on a Spit or a Hurri.
And it had come a long way for the LW in the other direction where the vets had been getting killed because they never got a break. And this was because they couldn't afford to be given a rest because the replacement pilots just weren't there.
The LW had to at times let the bombers come just so they could martial their resources for one good hit, in hopes of slowing the tide. They stayed down in any kind of numbers for much of in September and October 44 hoping for a big strike in November which was attempted on the 2nd when the LW got roughly 300 fighters in the air to oppose 1200 8th AF heavies escorted by 900 fighters. Makes the odds the RAF faced in the Battle of Britain look small doesn't it?
Bottom line is not that the LW lacked the desire or the courage, but they lacked the resources, and ability to combat those kind of odds.
Dan/Slack
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A book that might interest people is by John Foreman, called
"1944 Over the Beaches-The Airwar over Europe June 1st -30th"
It contains day to day sorties, claims and losses.
Quoting the author:
"My own impression of the massive Allied air operation in support of Overlord is one of total awe. It is difficult for the mind to comprehend the scale of the air war over Normandy. THe German fighters and fighter-bombers tended to be elusive. When they chose to fight they generally gave a good account of themselves in small air battles usually waged at tree top height. Except for the few big deep penetration raids by the 8th Air Force, German fighters were only found scudding along 'on the deck'.
Annoying as they were, the German fighter-bombers were but a pin salamander when compared to the other danger to the Allied air forces-Flak. The vast majority of Allied losses were due to flak. Yet by skill and courage, the Allied fighter bomber pilots made the whole of Northern France a 'no-go' area to the Germans during the hours of daylight.
When German fighters rose to attack, they were generally roughly handled by the overwhelming number of escort fighters. This level of Allied air supremacy-for such it was-was only to be equalled by the Isreali Air Force during the Six Day War of 1966 and latterly in the Gulf War of 1992. In 1944 such Allied air power was to remind the Germans of their own crushing superiority during the campaign in France and during the initial invasion of the Soviet Union. For the Luftwaffe, the bitter signs of defeat were made clear in the skies over the Normandy battlefield"
Dan/Slack
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If we want to put on the table the allied aircraft loses as a measure of he Luftwaffe air strength at Normandy, then we better substract the loses due ground fire.
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No Crumpp, "Air supremacy is defined as the condition when the enemy air force is in-capable of effective interference. Through the complete destruction of the enemy air forces, this condition is the ultimate goal of an air campaign."
"Local air supremacy" is an oxymoron. It's like saying you're master of the universe ... in a very localized area. AIR SUPREMACY IS A GENERAL STRATEGIC SITUATION WHERE YOUR OPPONENT'S AIR FORCE IS FOR ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES DESTROYED. There is a reason why "local air supremacy" isn't listed as a specific term while "local air superiority" is. The US/UK achieved air supremacy in Iraq, but never in Europe during WWII.
Your arguments that the LW was destroyed because it didn't interfere at Normandy in force is laughable. The LW still had more than a thousand operational fighters in Western Europe and even more on the Eastern Front. You are clearly ignorant or arguing for other reasons than finding the truth.
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From Luftwaffe War Diaries by Cajus Bekker
"Thus despite the output of machines, which mounted from month to month, the fighter defense of the Reich was finally a mere shadow of it's former self.. By May 24, 1944, it's operational strength had actually declined to the following:
North Germany (1,2, 3 Division) 174 Single engine fighters, 35 twin engine fighters.
South Germany (7 Division) 72 single engine fighters
Total 246 Single engine fighters, 35 Twin engine fighters.
By this date, the Americans, on their side, were in a position to put up 1,000 long range fighters at one time to roam at will over the whole of the Reich. Nothing could underline more clearly the complete air sovereignty, that the Allies, after so many fierce battles, had achieved."
There are 3 points specifically mentioned at this point as well from the Luftwaffe point of view:
"1-The increasing strength of the enemy was not matched by any increase in defensive operations.
2-The percentaqe loss to the enemy became so minimal that the defense ceased to have any deterrant effect.
3-Losses suffered by the defence in the long run pased the limit of endurance."
Gscholz, I think you are trying to tie in production numbers to actual combat operational aircraft and that doesn't work as the production far outpaced the amount of pilots, fuel etc needed to keep all those aircraft in the air.
Also from "War Diaries"
"Meanwhile the bulk of the Allied air forces was engaged in preparing for the invasion on June 6, 1944, and afterwards in support of the Allied armies in France. Against the overwhelming strength that the air forces could now bring to bear, the Luftwaffe could do virtually nothing. Field Marshall Sperrle and his Luftlotte 3 could put into the air 198 bombers and 125 fighters against the Allied forces of 3,467 bombers and 5,409 fighters."
Don't know how many ways it can be said. I don't care how you want to talk about production numbers. Operational numbers is the issue. Pilots, fuel etc.
Imagine that night in the MA when you are flying for a country that has about 20 pilots, getting attacked by about 100. You've got 5 super aces and 15 average joes against thier 25 aces and 75 average joes. No matter how you play it, you are going to lose. You may take some with you, but in the end you'd get overwhelmed.
And that's what happened, no matter how you crunch the numbers.
And yes the Allies had air superiority. They could move in daylight, the German Army could not without the risk of those cab ranks of fighter bombers coming down on them. Talk about demoralizing.
Dan/Slack
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Originally posted by GODO
If we want to put on the table the allied aircraft loses as a measure of he Luftwaffe air strength at Normandy, then we better substract the loses due ground fire.
Interestingly enough in the Foreman book I mentioned, it lists 104 Allied aircraft lost to all causes on the June 7th date mentioned by Milo where he says 50 fighters went down.
The 104 bombers, fighters and transport aircraft, number includes technical failures, running out of fuel etc. The majority were lost to Flak. There are Four listed as lost to fighters on June 7th, one Mustang, two P47s and a Spitfire.
Dan/Slack
On a day off, surrounded by info :)
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Defence of the Reich Day Fighters, 3 June 1944 (D-day - 3)
Unit / Types / Location / Strength
JG 1
Stab / 190A-8 / Lippspringe / 2
I / 190A-8 / Lippspringe / 46
II / 190A-8 / Störmede / 39
III / 109G-10 / Paderborn / 37
JG 3
Stab / 109G-10 / Salzwedel / 8
I / 109G-6AS / Burg / 28
II / 109G-6 / Sachau / 50
III / 109G-6 / Ansbach / 67
IV (Sturm) / 190A-8 / Salzwedel / 51
JG 5
I / 109G-10 / Herzogenaurach / 33
II / 109G-10 / Gardelegen / 41
JG 11
Stab / 190, 109G / Rothenburg / 1
I / 190A-8 / Rothenburg / 17
II / 109G-6AS / Hustedt / 36
III / 190A-8 / Rheinsehlen / 23
10. / 190, 109G / Aalborg / 9
JGr.zbV / 109G-14 / Ansbach / 5
JG 27
Stab / 109G-10 / Seyring / 5
I / 109G-6 / Fels am Wagram / 44
III / 109G-6 / Götzendorf / 23
IV /109G-6 / Szombathely / 21
II/JG 53 / 109G-6 / Öttingen / 65
III/JG 54 / 190A-8 / Oldenburg / 21
Einsatz JGr 104 / 109G-5 / Fürt / 4
Einsatz JGr 106 / 109G-5 / Lachen-Speyersdorf / 5
Einsatz JGr 108 / 109G-5 / Voslau /12
JG 2
Stab / 109G-10 / Creil / 3
I / 109G-10 / Cormeilles-en-Vexin / 23
JG 26
Stab / 190A-8 / Lille-Nord / 2
I / 190A-8 / Lille-Vendeville / 31
III / 109G-10 / Nancy-Essay / 37
II/ZG 1 / 110G-2 / Wels / 31
ZG 26
Stab / 410B-2 / Köningsburg-Neumark / 5
I / 410B-2 / Köningsburg-Neumark / 17
II / 410B-2 / Köningsburg-Neumark / 53
7. /110G-2 / Fels am Wagram / 10
Day and Night Fighters
JG 300
Stab / 190A-6 / Bonn-Hangelar / 2
I / 109G-6 /Bonn-Hangelar/ 42
II / 109G-6 / Dortmund / 25
III / 109G-6 / Wiesbaden-Erbenheim / 46
I/JG 301 / 109G-6 / Hölzkirchen / 39
I/JG 302 / 109G-6 / Fels am Wagram / 39
A total of 1097 fighters assigned to the defence of the Reich (against the allied bombing campaign). I don't know how many additional fighters there were that were responsible for local defence.
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I love to fly LW planes in AH. I fly for a LW only squad.
I can see why LW pilots in this community have been labeled Luftwhiners. Face the facts guys! The LW was defeated by Jun '44!
Crumpp
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Wrong. The LW was defeated in 1943. Why can't you get anything right?!
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GScholz,
How many of those were operational? Where are your numbers from?
Not trying to pick a fight, just wanting to learn where it's from.
If those are operational numbers, why were they not able to put up more of a fight?
I'm afraid that they may be assigned on paper numbers, but operational numbers would be a lot different.
Bottom line still remains that they didn't really even make a dent in the Allied airpower. Was there ever a day where all those 1000 plus LW planes got into the air to attack the bombers?
The Allies were sending over 1000 + raids to Germany on a consistant basis in daylight. This doesn't include the RAF raids at night with heavy bombers. It doesn't include the intruder flights of Mossies etc. It doesn't include the medium bomber raids and the fighter sweeps.
Show me something that tells me the LW ever got that many planes up. Give me an average of operational LW sorties vs Operational Allied sorties in 1944. Show me that it's even close to equal.
300 up on November 2, 44 after essentially sitting on the ground for September and October to build up the resources. This was to oppose 1200 bombers and 900 fighters. 7 to 1 odds? Kinda tough to win that way.
The Schwienfurt Raid in October 43 was considered the blackest day for the 8th, and on that day it was roughly 300 German fighters vs 270 US bombers.
In the book "Target Berlin" by Jeff Ethell and Alfred Price, they used official German records to total up the sorties flown that day when the 8th hit Berlin on March 6, 44. It totals roughly 500 sorties, with many of them second sorties.
This was to oppose 730 heavy bombers escorted by 801 fighters. 3 to 1 odds in favor of the attackers again. Where were those 1000 LW fighters? Once again we are talking about 250-300 fighters coming up with some flying second sorties.
I can't find anywhere, where the LW was putting up those 1000 planes. I can however find many many examples of where the Allies were putting up more then 1000 planes in 1944.
It still comes down to seperating the numbers on paper with those who were actually involved in the combat.
Imagine the numbers if we counted the replacement Allied aircraft waiting in depots etc to fill in the losses. Imagine the number of pilots waiting in the wings. They actually were cutting pilot training numbers in the US due to having too many pilots in the pipeline.
It still comes down to operational sorties.
Dan/Slack
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The numbers are from Tony Wood and Bill Gunston's book "Hitler's Luftwaffe". Those are operational unit strengths not sortie numbers. If you look at the locations you will see that they are spread out all over Western Europe defending separate areas, so only a limited number of those 1097 fighters would respond to any one air incursion by the USAAF. Remember that Galland campaigned for a concentration of defence fighters to use more of their total strength against a single incursion, this was not done and as a result only a fraction of the total LW strength could be used at a single incursion. That's why the LW was so outnumbered in their fights. The USAAF could send the majority of its escort fighters against a fraction of the LW's fighter strength.
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A thousand fighters total at the 7th of june in 1944, - or so, was not very much of a threat considering the force of the allies.
However, those were not the "last" thousand planes to appear.
Anyway, back to topic. Our Spit IX is a sort of a melting-pot spitty. With the guns of the E wing, speed of the HF, other specs of another one etc. If that is to be changed later on by HTC in AH2, we'll be getting a HF and LF with some slight corrections, and perhaps a wing-clipping option in the hangar.
Hell, maybe there will be an octane algorithm in the program also, -that used to be there in old Air WArrior, so why not HTC!
Overboosting like that could be perked or not available in the MA, don't really have an opinion about it, but it would surely enchance the CT.
Give it a thought HT :)
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Originally posted by GScholz
The numbers are from Tony Wood and Bill Gunston's book "Hitler's Luftwaffe". Those are operational unit strengths not sortie numbers. If you look at the locations you will see that they are spread out all over Western Europe defending separate areas, so only a limited number of those 1097 fighters would respond to any one air incursion by the USAAF. Remember that Galland campaigned for a concentration of defence fighters to use more of their total strength against a single incursion, this was not done and as a result only a fraction of the total LW strength could be used at a single incursion. That's why the LW was so outnumbered in their fights. The USAAF could send the majority of its escort fighters against a fraction of the LW's fighter strength.
The same use of numbers could be used by the Allies then as they had units stationed in other places that were not in the fight, or were taking the fight elsewhere. We'd better include the 15th AF strength then too as they were hitting Germany from the south. 21 Heavy bomber groups and 7 fighter groups. What about 12th AF, or the RAF flying in Italy. Coastal Command? They were tying up German units too.
The result is the same then. The Allies were controlling the fight, where, when and who could be involved, which let them controll the odds?
It still speaks to Allied air superiority right? :)
Dan/Slack
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Hmm
" Remember that Galland campaigned for a concentration of defence fighters to use more of their total strength against a single incursion"
Paralell to the "Big Wing Theory", which did not work to well
However the Germans had more radar coverage and depth of territory to be able to excercize this.
Do you have "the first and the last" btw, GScholz? Would love to get my hand on that one. Been looking for it when I've been in Germany, but yet without success.
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One final note on the LW thing: Mind you that those 1097 fighters were only those that were specifically used for the defence against the allied bombing campaign. The LW still had considerable more operational units in conventional roles for local air defence and ground support, in France, Italy and most notably in Russia. On the Eastern Front on 10 June 1944 the LW operated 2085 combat aircraft. 105 in Luftflotte 5 in Finland, 360 in Luftflotte 1 in the Baltic, 775 in Luftflotte 6 in the central sector covering the approaches to Poland, and 845 in Luftflotte 4 in the Balkans and Carpathian sector.
It is a matter of historical fact that the LW committed far more resources to fighting the Russians than they did the Anglo-American invasion in the west.
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No, sorry Angus, I don't.
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Originally posted by Guppy35
It still speaks to Allied air superiority right? :)
Dan/Slack
Indeed, but not supremacy. Distinct difference.
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Originally posted by GScholz
Indeed, but not supremacy. Distinct difference.
I missed where there is a difference? The Allies controlled the fight. What else did they need to do? When did the Luftwaffe stop them from what they wanted to do?
If your argument is that it wasn't air supremacy because the Luftwaffe could get planes off the ground, I'd suggest that's a bit of a weak argument.
And lets face it. Who won? Thats about as much supremacy as you can have right?
Go find a German Army vet from Normandy and ask him if he thinks that Allied airpower didn't control the skies.
What was the Wehrmacht joke from Normandy?
If the plane overhead was camoflaged it was RAF, if it was Silver it was USAAF and if it was invisible it was Luftwaffe?
Dan/Slack
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Do you not understand the concept of air supremacy yet?!!!! How dim are you?!!! The LW was not DESTROYED and continued to offer resistance i.e. THE ALLIES DID NOT HAVE AIR SUPREMACY!!!
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Haha, read the first quote by GScholz on page 5 and the one above. That's progress folks!
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LOL, I see, since they LW wasn't DESTROYED until May 8, 1945, then the Allies didn't have supremacy just superiority. Interesting distinction.
As long as someone in a LW uniform was breathing, then it was just superior not supreme.
LOL my mistake. I take it all back. You win, I lose. You've convinced me.
Does that mean you are superior or supreme now?
LOL
Dan/Slack
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Your meaning? (@ Hawker)
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Yes, air supremacy means that you're practically alone in the sky and can use all your aircraft for offensive air-ground operations. Air superiority means that you control the sky, but still have to allocate aircraft to interdict enemy air operations (in this context that means escort fighters and airfield denial operations by fighter-bombers).
Is this really so difficult to understand?
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Not by the Defintion YOU posted. Thought I answered that question for you, Gscholz. If you still got questions just scroll up a few post's and you will see where it was broken down for you.
Didn't you understand what Guppy has posted??
I've got "First and the Last". Matter of fact I got two brand new copies while I was in Afghanistan, Wife got it for my birthday cause she thought I didn't have it already. Bookshop sent me two copies. If you want one let me know and I'll slide it your way for the Postage. Ok book but kind of a propaganda piece and chest thumpeing session for Galland.
Gunther Ralls memoir and authorized autobiography is much better following the same non-technical lines without the chest thumpin and for some great inside technical/tactical info on the Luftwaffe check out "The Luftwaffe fighter force: A view from the Cockpit".
Some good reading on the General conduct of the Air War:
Clash of Wings - Great General overview of the ENTIRE WWII Air War both Western, Eastern and Pacific Theaters.
The Luftwaffe Diaries - Good overview of the LW High Command
Air War Over Europe - Concentrates on the Western Front.
All Great reading.
Gscholtz put out a great list for technical info. Got most on his list in my library especially the 109/190 material. Almost any of the Schiffer Military Histories are great technical references.
Crumpp
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Crumpp and GScholz: A suggestion :)
Next autumn, you travel to Iceland, stay at my place, bring yer books+your duty free, and we can all get pissed, discuss, and read a lot!
How about it :D
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"Air supremacy is defined as the condition when the enemy air force is in-capable of effective interference. Through the complete destruction of the enemy air forces, this condition is the ultimate goal of an air campaign. Yet, this condition may be difficult or even impossible to achieve. It may occur however, through the establishment of a diplomatic “no-fly zone”. Under the condition of air supremacy, the air commander employs all of his aircraft at will."
"Air superiority is defined as the condition when the conduct of operations is possible at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the enemy. This is a necessary and obligatory condition to attain success in combat and overall victory in a war. The most efficient method of attaining air superiority is to attack enemy aviation assets close to their source at maintenance and launch facilities, early warning and C2 sites, and ground-based air defense sites."
So tell me, did the allies have to escort their bombers? Did they attack German airfields? Did they attack German aircraft production and support facilities? If the answer is yes then the allies did not have air supremacy. In fact a sizable portion of the combined allied air forces were allocated to fighting the LW and to suppress German aircraft production and airfield operation.
You are wrong. If you don't see that then there is nothing more to do about it. Good night.
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You're on Angus. :D
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Originally posted by GScholz
Yes, air supremacy means that you're practically alone in the sky and can use all your aircraft for offensive air-ground operations. Air superiority means that you control the sky, but still have to allocate aircraft to interdict enemy air operations (in this context that means escort fighters and airfield denial operations by fighter-bombers).
Is this really so difficult to understand?
and this is your definition I take it? Where did this definition originate? I must have missed the source earlier in the thread.
Just looking around for other definitions of supremacy
SUPREMACY
WordNet Dictionary
Definition: [n] power to dominate or defeat; "mastery of the seas" (Or mastery of the air as the case may be)
Synonyms: domination, mastery
See Also: ascendance, ascendancy, ascendence, ascendency, control, dominance, superiority, transcendence, transcendency
Note the see also: Superiority.
So did the Allies not dominate, control, have mastery of the air? :)
Check this guy out:
http://www.butler98.freeserve.co.uk/thtrlosses.htm
Luftwaffe losses 43-44. He claims more losses in the Western front for the Luftwaffe.
He also states that "Allied Air Supremacy" facillitated the Allied invasion of France. And this guy is clearly a Luftwaffe fanatic.
He interchanges Air Superiority with Air Supremacy too.
So his definition is wrong and yours is the only one we can go by?
Oops it's Donald Caldwell's site on JG26. He must be wrong then :)
Dan/Slack
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It's the definition of the USAF.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/air.htm
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Air superiority and air supremacy are not synonymous. It is obviously a common mistake, just look at this thread.
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Here let me repost this AND let me once again say it. The Allies had Air Superiority from Mar ' 44 til the End of the War in Europe. In Only a few instances though did they have Air Supremacy. Normandy was one of those times. Right after Bodenplatte may have been another. The last few months of the war where another.
Here then lets examine the definition of Air Supremacy we both agree on.
In Normandy:
"Air supremacy is defined as the condition when the enemy air force is in-capable of effective interference."
This was definately the case in Normandy.
"Under the condition of air supremacy, the air commander employs all of his aircraft at will."
This was also the case for the Allies.
"Through the complete destruction of the enemy air forces, this condition is the ultimate goal of an air campaign. "
This is arguable but I contend that while the LW still had planes and pilots it did not have a force that could do any damage to the allies in Normandy. Therefore the LW destruction as an effective fighting force was complete.
"It may occur however, through the establishment of a diplomatic “no-fly zone”."
The Normandy landings may not have been a Diplomatic "No-Fly" zone but they were unarguably a LW "No-Fly" zone.
Three out of four conditions unarguable and one that you can debate depending on your whether you take a tatical view or strategic. In my book it meets the definition.
Crumpp
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For starters the term "Air Superiority" and "Air Supremacy" when used by authors of books on WW2 history, is interchangeable. What some post war USAF manual says is quite off topic, so you guys can end that arguement. English as a language is no that rigid.
Cherry picking one air campaign from 1944 as the "real end" to the LW is a flawed concept imho, there were too many pressures on the LW from many sources to pick one as the main cause. If I had to pick a "LW cannot win" date, I would pick December 1943, after that they were not going to have the #s of pilots and a/c to effectively repel a bombing offensive, or an invasion of France.
The LW continued to have impressive # of ac "on the roster"....but that was not the same as operational examples. My #s:
Luftlotte Reich as of June 1st 1944: 788 single engined day fighters of which 472 were operational. 203 twin engined day fighters of which 83 were operational. 991 day fighters of which 555 were ready for action. They continued to get deliveries of new ac in quantity, no doubt, but the bases, air crews, supplies and other infrastructure to sustain them was the problem.
Ah the Spitfire. Yes indeed. Its essentially a Spitfire F. IX with a merlin 61, and its #s match as close as other AH fighters. It has an upgraded E wing which was available either new or as a modification in 1944.
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LOL, GScholz, your defense reminds me of the Black Knight in Monty Python & the Holy Grail!
King Arthur: Look, you stupid bastard. You've got no arms left.
Black Knight: Yes I have.
King Arthur: Look.
Black Knight: Just a flesh wound.
LOL! Wait while I get more popcorn!
Mosca
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Well, it can be argued forever if the Allies had the full air superiority over Normandy. The LW could still launch quite large number of sorties there with questionable effect, some of them certainly got through. Otherwise the allies were then still quite far from overall air superiority in europe despite what ever definition we want to use, the LW could still cause large losses to allies.
gripen
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Originally posted by gripen
Well, it can be argued forever if the Allies had the full air superiority over Normandy. The LW could still launch quite large number of sorties there with questionable effect, some of them certainly got through. Otherwise the allies were then still quite far from overall air superiority in europe despite what ever definition we want to use, the LW could still cause large losses to allies.
gripen
What large losses are those? Compared to the sorties being flown, I can't find much more then a 1% loss rate for the Allies and that includes flak losses.
Coulda, shoulda, woulda, didn't. What might have been, doesn't really count does it?
Once again, the Allied Air Forces dictated the targets, the timing, the place etc of the attacks. Allied armies moved freely in daylight. German armies did not.
Talking about what the Luftwaffe could have done is pointless, cause they didn't do it.
Dan/Slack
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Guppy35,
There are several cases during summer 1944 where the LW could put up strong resistance and cause large losses if they really needed (like Ploesti). Anyway, these cases disapear to statistics due to scale of the air war. If we use as strict definition for air superiority as USAF appear to use, then the allies could reach only local superiority during summer.
My response was actually about Crumpp's statement that the allies had allready won air superiority over europe in March. This statement is not supported by statistics (absolute and relative, sources USAAF statistical digest and BBSU) because losses of the heavies (by enemy fighters) actually increased in April. The loss rate was then about 3,5% per sortie (about 75% of them by enemy fighters).
gripen
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Gripen, what's the point? It's like arguing with children. Just let it go buddy.
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The LW did often launch large gaggles of fighters (on many occations both 109's and 190's) in the summer of 1944. My great uncle was flying a P51 at the time, and once he wound up in a situation with 12 Mustangs facing about 50 German planes.
Now where is the supremacy in that condition?
Anyway, this debate is really haggling about pennies....:D
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Here Gripen,
Not only is my conclusion backed up by the facts IT is the Popular historical view.
Here is site from the USAF and one from a History Professor AND another Historian.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj94/mccrabb2.html
http://www.cebudanderson.com/europe.htm
http://www.butler98.freeserve.co.uk/thtrlosses.htm
Enjoy, but make sure you have a nice soothing cup of tea when you read it!
Crumpp
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if the allies had air supremacy so early why didnt they just go drop paratroops on the reichstag in 1943? :D
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Originally posted by GScholz
Gripen, what's the point? It's like arguing with children. Just let it go buddy.
Since we don't agree with you, that makes us children? LOL a priceless response on your part.
I'll be sure and pass it on to my kids.
Expressing your supremacy again are you? :)
Dan/Slack
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Crumpp,
Statistics do not support your sources, nor USSBS, nor BBSU.
gripen
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Originally posted by storch
Hmmm my reference books states
A6M5 1194 miles
wow
Only in friendly airspace:lol
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Post your Statistics....
Crumpp
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Crumpp,
I have all ready posted a link to them (http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/afhra/wwwroot/aafsd/aafsd_index_table.html) and conclusions are clear: The losses of the heavies increased after march and in May losses were still higher than in March, activity in other fronts increased in the spring, USAAF fighters claimed quite constant number of enemy planes in air through out spring and summer and increasing number in ground. Same story can be found from BBSU and USBBS with allready claimed numbers on LW activity.
I quess you will argue for ever but nothing on these statistics supports your (or your sources) statement that the air superiority was reached in May nor the statement that the LW was finished in June.
gripen
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Originally posted by gripen
Crumpp,
I have all ready posted a link to them (http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/afhra/wwwroot/aafsd/aafsd_index_table.html) and conclusions are clear: The losses of the heavies increased after march and in May losses were still higher than in March, activity in other fronts increased in the spring, USAAF fighters claimed quite constant number of enemy planes in air through out spring and summer and increasing number in ground. Same story can be found from BBSU and USBBS with allready claimed numbers on LW activity.
I quess you will argue for ever but nothing on these statistics supports your (or your sources) statement that the air superiority was reached in May nor the statement that the LW was finished in June.
gripen
How many sorties flown in March to go with the losses Gripen?
How many sorties flown in May to go with the losses?
I'll tell ya.
9,678 bomber sorties in March by the 8th AF
17,848 bomber sorties in May by the 8th AF.
Wonder if that had something to do with the numbers of losses increasing that you want to use out of context? Almost twice as many sorties. Where there twice as many losses? Or did losses actually drop percentage wise? Hmmm 178 Heavy bombers lost to fighters in March. 211 Heavy bombers lost in May. Looks like losses vs total number of sorties dropped to me. My math shows it to be a 1.8% loss in March vs a 1.1% loss in May. Losses actually dropped then didn't they?
Did the Luftwaffe ever dictate the battle in 44? Did they have any impact on the ground war in 44? Did they ever turn back the bombers? The answer is no.
The Allied Air forces were dictating the where, the when and the how of the air war.
As Gunther Rall said tonite on a special about the 357th FG and the long range Mustangs and the airwar in 44.
"They taught us a lesson".
Why were the fighter claims on the ground higher? Cause the increasing number of Allied fighters were having to go down on the deck to find them and were hitting the airfields.
"In the air and on the ground."
You keep wanting to somehow imply that the Luftwaffe was still and effective force late in the war. It wasn't. It was trying to put up a fight, but it didn't stand a chance against the might of Allied airpower, no matter how many ways you want to spin it.
That's not an insult to their courage, character, whatever.
No matter how you spin the numbers, the Luftwaffe dominated the Polish Air Force in 39. Did German planes still get shot down by the Poles? You bet. Did the Poles have couragous and talented pilots? You bet. Was the issue ever in doubt? Not a chance.
You are so caught up in somehow finding a number in some table somewhere that will convince us that the Luftwaffe was making a difference in 44 and it just isn't going to happen.
Once again, quoting from the "Luftwaffe War Diaries", referencing May of 44 and conclusions drawn about the Luftwaffe at that point.
"1-The increasing strength of the enemy was not matched by any increase in defensive operations.
2-The percentaqe loss to the enemy became so minimal that the defense ceased to have any deterrant effect.
3-Losses suffered by the defence in the long run pased the limit of endurance."
Show me somewhere in 44 where that doesn't ring true?
Dan/Slack
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Guppy35,
Well, in absolute scale the losses of the heavies increased in April and May if compared to March. In relative scale losses increased in April and decreased in May. It should be also noted that in May the transportation plan resulted more missions to France and also in May the P-51 became most numerous escort fighter (fighter claims increased).
Otherwise Crumpp and SCholz defined term "air superiority" above and based on losses and claims it can be easily seen that the allies did not have it March nor April nor May. And again based on losses and claims it can be easily seen that the LW was far from finished in June or summer. As an example study air war over Ploesti (Two P-38 squadrons doing defensive circle).
Why don't you read what I wrote above?
"Well, if the allies had had reached air superiority over Germany in March then the losses of the heavies should have reduced in the deep penetration raids. That was not the case; losses increased in April and stayed higher than in February until invasion started. Basicly the Big Week proved that the 8th AF could do suistained high altitude deep penetration raids with tolerable losses and causing simultaneoysly untolerable losses to LW. This was pure material war, both sides suffered extremely heavy losses between February and June. But due to superior production capacity and training USAF could sustain this and actually their numbers increased most of this period. In the case of the LW number of planes and experienced pilots slowly decreased during this period; the LW was losing but was still far from finished when invasion started as losses over Normandy prove. Again it should be noted that LW fought on several fronts simultaneoysly. "
I don't see much contradicts with Luftwaffe War Diaries. Do you?
gripen
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Originally posted by gripen
Guppy35,
Well, in absolute scale the losses of the heavies increased in April and May if compared to March. In relative scale losses increased in April and decreased in May. It should be also noted that in May the transportation plan resulted more missions to France and also in May the P-51 became most numerous escort fighter (fighter claims increased).
Otherwise Crumpp and SCholz defined term "air superiority" above and based on losses and claims it can be easily seen that the allies did not have it March nor April nor May. And again based on losses and claims it can be easily seen that the LW was far from finished in June or summer. As an example study air war over Ploesti (Two P-38 squadrons doing defensive circle).
Why don't you read what I wrote above?
"Well, if the allies had had reached air superiority over Germany in March then the losses of the heavies should have reduced in the deep penetration raids. That was not the case; losses increased in April and stayed higher than in February until invasion started. Basicly the Big Week proved that the 8th AF could do suistained high altitude deep penetration raids with tolerable losses and causing simultaneoysly untolerable losses to LW. This was pure material war, both sides suffered extremely heavy losses between February and June. But due to superior production capacity and training USAF could sustain this and actually their numbers increased most of this period. In the case of the LW number of planes and experienced pilots slowly decreased during this period; the LW was losing but was still far from finished when invasion started as losses over Normandy prove. Again it should be noted that LW fought on several fronts simultaneoysly. "
I don't see much contradicts with Luftwaffe War Diaries. Do you?
gripen
The two 38 Groups that hit Ploesti at low level were the 1st and 82nd. They were intercepted by Rumanian IAR 80s. They took them to be 190s but that was not the Luftwaffe involved that day.
The Allies were fighting on several fronts too. Your point?
No one has claimed that the LW couldn't put a plane in the air or that they didn't fight. But when they fought it had little to no outcome on the battle.
Once again. Did they ever turn back the bombers in 44 or ever for that matter? Did they ever impact on the ground war in 44? Did they ever dictate the fight?
Does this mean that Allied planes weren't going down? Nope. But many more of these were to flak as they were down low supporting the ground war.
And yes this was a war of attrition and Germany couldn't keep up. The Allies had the production and the trained pilots to do the job.
How isn't all of that Air Superiority? Where was the Luftwaffe having any sort of significant impact on the Allied war effort?
Dan/Slack
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Guppy35,
Luftwaffe was also present in Ploesti (JG 53) and took part on combat June 10th (and also other combats in Ploesti). But check the 492nd BG in July 7th if you want another example.
Otherwise I don't know what are you trying to argue? I have not stated that the LW could turn bombers back nor that 13800 sorties LW did around Normandy impacted ground war. I have just pointed out that statements like the allies reached air superiority in March or Luftwaffe was finished in June are not supported by statistics. Generally all efforts the Germans did after say Stalingrad or even earlier had no significant impact on outcome of the war; the allies were capable to beat them in all areas. It just took some time and effort and in the case of the LW certainly more of them than some people want's to believe. And not only USAAF effort..
gripen
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Gripen,
The Allies had Air Supremacy over Normandy.
That is supported and is a Fact. Not one single Historian or Luftwaffe/USAAF veteran will say otherwise. You might get Saddam's late Minister of Information to back you up.
"Der Luftwaffe will scrend dem back into der see...Right now dis very minute de pie-lots are kkeellin dees Allied Infandeils as we speck!"
:rofl :rofl :rofl :rofl :rofl :rofl :rofl :rofl
Crumpp
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Crumpp,
IMHO the allies certainly had local air superiority over Normandy in a form as I understand it and I don't mind if someone wants to use term air supremacy on it.
But the problem is that you, GScholz and apparently USAF define the terms "air superiority" and "Air supremacy" so strict that even local air superiority is somewhat questionable and air supremacy is about out of question. The LW could launch those about 13800 sorties with 5,84% loss rate per sortie.
At least your main source (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj94/mccrabb2.html) uses just term superiority about the battle, supremacy is claimed just as target on planning stage. Note also this part of the text: "For USSTAF, the issue was diversion of the heavies away from the critical battle for Germany and air superiority that was yet to be decided."
gripen
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Originally posted by gripen
Guppy35,
Luftwaffe was also present in Ploesti (JG 53) and took part on combat June 10th (and also other combats in Ploesti). But check the 492nd BG in July 7th if you want another example.
Otherwise I don't know what are you trying to argue? I have not stated that the LW could turn bombers back nor that 13800 sorties LW did around Normandy impacted ground war. I have just pointed out that statements like the allies reached air superiority in March or Luftwaffe was finished in June are not supported by statistics. Generally all efforts the Germans did after say Stalingrad or even earlier had no significant impact on outcome of the war; the allies were capable to beat them in all areas. It just took some time and effort and in the case of the LW certainly more of them than some people want's to believe. And not only USAAF effort..
gripen
You were speaking specifically of the P38 raid on Ploesti. For one, it didn't turn back, for two, the combat down on the deck was with the IAR 80s.
The bottom line is that finding numbers that say the Luftwaffe was still flying, doesn't change the fact that they were a non factor in the war in terms of stopping the strategic bombing campaign or in flying any sort of interdiction, ground support for the German Army.
The Allied Air Forces were in control of the skies. They dictated the air battle regardless of where it was. If that isn't air superiority/supremacy, then I don't know what is.
Did Allied planes still go down? Did people still get killed? Did the Luftwaffe still get in the air? Yep. But while that may have added to the 'statistics', it doesn't change the fact that in 44, in particular from May on, The Luftwaffe was left to make feeble attempts to stop the Allied onslaught, and in the end, they didn't do it.
There is no arguing that.
Dan/Slack
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Originally posted by Crumpp
JThank you. The support of the civilian populace means the world to a soldier.
Crumpp, you do know that Pongo served his country as a soldier in the Canadian Forces right?
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Guppy35,
There were several air combats during June 10th and JG 53 claimed 5 for one loss. But actually that defensive circle thing happened in June 14th (five P-38s lost) and overall the LW and Romanian AF could put up strong resistance in Ploesti during summer until Russians arrived. And as the case of the 492nd BG proves similar things happened elsewhere too (without support of Romanian AF).
The allied bombers did not turn back in the case of the Schweinfurt nor did 492nd BG; loss rate just was untolerable.
By using statictics (losses and claims by USAF) I have pointed out that there were no large changes in the activity of the Luftwaffe fighter forces in the ETO during spring and summer 1944 despite large losses. There were no signs of collapse and they could cause losses to allies through out this period. What changed during this period was that the allies created effective escort fighter force and the invasion forced LW to fight against numerically far superior tactical airforces. The LW was not finished but facing increasingly strong enemy which was capable to reduce the efficiency of the LW considerably (against bombers and ground forces or what ever). All this is response to Crumpp's statement that it took a week or bit more and the LW was finished in June; both statements are not true nor supported by statistics.
Otherwise the definitions of the air superiority and supremacy are discussed above and I can say only IMHO that allies reached real air superiority around autumn 1944 when the tactical AFs reached borders of the Germany and fuel shortage restricted operations.
gripen
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No thrawn I didn't know that.
My unit worked pretty closely with some Canadian Forces. In fact We shared the same shoothouse. Our Compound was co-located with them, the Germans, and the New Zealanders. Great group of guys.
Crumpp
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Originally posted by gripen
Guppy35,
There were several air combats during June 10th and JG 53 claimed 5 for one loss. But actually that defensive circle thing happened in June 14th (five P-38s lost) and overall the LW and Romanian AF could put up strong resistance in Ploesti during summer until Russians arrived. And as the case of the 492nd BG proves similar things happened elsewhere too (without support of Romanian AF).
The allied bombers did not turn back in the case of the Schweinfurt nor did 492nd BG; loss rate just was untolerable.
By using statictics (losses and claims by USAF) I have pointed out that there were no large changes in the activity of the Luftwaffe fighter forces in the ETO during spring and summer 1944 despite large losses. There were no signs of collapse and they could cause losses to allies through out this period. What changed during this period was that the allies created effective escort fighter force and the invasion forced LW to fight against numerically far superior tactical airforces. The LW was not finished but facing increasingly strong enemy which was capable to reduce the efficiency of the LW considerably (against bombers and ground forces or what ever). All this is response to Crumpp's statement that it took a week or bit more and the LW was finished in June; both statements are not true nor supported by statistics.
Otherwise the definitions of the air superiority and supremacy are discussed above and I can say only IMHO that allies reached real air superiority around autumn 1944 when the tactical AFs reached borders of the Germany and fuel shortage restricted operations.
gripen
We are clearly going to have to agree to disagree gripen :)
If I'm in an air race and my plane is going 150 MPH and the other guy is doing 500mph, the fact that I show up and start the race is irrelevant. I may be determined and unwilling to quit trying, but the fact the the other guy is that much more capable makes my presence somewhat pointless despite the fact that I'm there.
In essence that's the LW vs the Allied AF in 44, in particular from May on.
Dan/Slack
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Of course this is from the Allied Supreme Commander so it probably doesn't count as I would imagine the argument would be made that he wasn't the Supreme Commander, just the Superior Commander, but what the heck :)
Dan/Slack
http://www.ehistory.com/wwii/books/d-day1944/0044.cfm
No stronger endorsement of the air support in Normandy can be found than Omar N. Bradley's letter to AAF Commanding General "Hap" Arnold at the end of September 1944. "I cannot say too much for the very close cooperation we have had between Air and Ground," Bradley wrote. "In my opinion, our close
cooperation is better than the Germans ever had in their best days."
Over the decades, the Normandy invasion and breakout has become the classic example of Second World War combined-arms, mechanized, air-land, coalition warfare. Fortunately, the Allies possessed not merely air superiority, but air supremacy, making victory on the ground that much easier. The Allies had won the critical battle for air supremacy, not over the beachhead, but in
several years of air war that had gutted the Luftwaffe. To those inclined to minimize the value of air to the Normandy operation, the final word must come from Eisenhower himself.
In June 1944, John S. D. Eisenhower, Ike's son, graduated from West Point-ironically on the same day that Allied forces stormed ashore at Normandy. June 24 found the new lieutenant riding through Normandy with his father, observing the aftermath of the invasion:
The roads we traversed were dusty and crowded. Vehicles moved slowly, bumper to bumper. Fresh out of West Point, with all its courses in conventional procedures, I was offended at this jamming up of traffic. It wasn't according to the book. Leaning over Dad's shoulder, I remarked, "You'd never get away with this if you didn't have air supremacy." I received an impatient snort:
"If I didn't have air supremacy, I wouldn't be here."
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Guppy35,
Yes, we have just a bit different way to see things. Germany lost initiative in war sometime 1942, after that it was just matter of time (in fact I agree with Crumpp on this). Allied were going to be better in every field but the germans just keep trying until the end.
The analogy to the BoB is that I doubt if the LW had any possibilities to reach some kind of air superiority in short run because the RAF had more fighters and pilots in reserve. The comparison to spring 1944 is therefore unrelevant because the allies certainly had far more resources than LW, still they (LW) could put up strong resistance and keep on fighting. The long run scenario for BoB might have been something else but that's pure speculation.
gripen
edited: No comments on air superiority/supremacy ;)
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Originally posted by Crumpp
No thrawn I didn't know that.
I thought you might of missed this. ;)
"Anyway. Hope to be able to talk over this with a beer some day. Infanteer to infanteer and talk over your experiances and thank you for your service."
My unit worked pretty closely with some Canadian Forces. In fact We shared the same shoothouse. Our Compound was co-located with them, the Germans, and the New Zealanders. Great group of guys.
If you were serving in in Afghanistan at the start of Afghan war, you were working with his old regiment.
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I'd love to share a beer and talk about the "stan".
If either of you get down South on the East Coast, drop me a line.
Crumpp
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read shiller's "rise and fall of the 3rd reich." i'll leave it at that.
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Gripen,
The Point is the LW was using the same strategy that won the Allies Air superiority in '44 in '41 against the RAF. At least in the begining. Had the LW continued to use this strategy the popular view amoung historians is that they would have won.
To Quote Chaz Bowyer, author of "Air War Over Europe 1939-1945" on page 75:
"During the period of August 24 to September 6th the RAF lost more than 100 pilots killed and 128 seriously wounded or injured. Such figures represent roughly 25 percent of all available RAF pilots at any given date of the battle.
As the fighting potential of the Fighter Command ground inexorably less, the Luftwaffe-virtually within sight of ultimate victory in their prolonged offensive- was given fresh tactical directives from Goering.
............. The crass ignorance of both Hitler and Goering of Aerial Strategy robbed the Luftwaffe of any hope of victory."
This is a true statement. One month before Dowding reported that he would not be able to sustain his present losses in pilots. Bomber Command, Fleet Air arm, and even civilian agencies were stripped of every available pilot to man a fighter cockpit. Even this was not enough. Just like the Luftwaffe in '44 airframes were not the problem, trained pilots were the choke point of victory.
In 12 days the RAF lost 25 percent of its trained pilots. This was an average figure for the Airfield phase of the Battle and represented figures the RAF could never hope to sustain. The LW was taking casualties while large in number at the time represented a much smaller and sustainable percentage of their resources. It is very possible the LW could have won the BoB. It is probable IMO that it would severly depleted their combat power leaving "Barbarossa" an impossibility without years of reconstitution. It is also doubtful that the rest of the German Military could have capitalized on their victory and actually put German soldiers on English soil.
Crumpp
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To Quote Chaz Bowyer, author of "Air War Over Europe 1939-1945" on page 75:
"During the period of August 24 to September 6th the RAF lost more than 100 pilots killed and 128 seriously wounded or injured. Such figures represent roughly 25 percent of all available RAF pilots at any given date of the battle
It's quite simply wrong.
RAF operational fighter pilots in the UK, from "the battle" by Richard Overy:
17th Aug 1,379
31st Aug 1,422
14th Sept 1,492
If you don't believe the figures, look at the RAF roll of honour at http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/roll.html
2,927 pilots (including some Defiant gunners and Blenheim co-pilots) flew operational sorties during the BoB. 544 died, and several hundred were wounded and did not return to combat. It still gives a figure of around 2,000 operational fighter aircrew during the battle.
In contrast, German operational strength:
1st June 906
1st Aug 869
1st Sept 735
1st Nov 673
The LW was taking casualties while large in number at the time represented a much smaller and sustainable percentage of their resources.
No, the simple truth of the BoB is that the RAF suffered unsustainable losses only during the end of Aug/ beginning Sept. The Luftwaffe suffered unsustainable losses throughout August, September, October and into November.
The Luftwaffe needed to shoot down RAF fighters at better than 2:1 ratio, realisticly 3:1. They actually managed less than 1.5:1, and less than 1:1 in overall aircraft losses.
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Again,
You are saying that the majority of both the academic world is wrong AND that Western Air Forces that study that history and formed the doctrine in use today are wrong. :rolleyes:
YOU have figured it all out and are able to stand up and fly in the face of conventional thinking. Congratulations....you are obviously much smarter than them. :aok
Your right the LW didn't almost win the BoB. The RAF was just a little jumpy back then, especially Dowding.:lol
Nashwan please study the History behind those stats. The LW started it's main effort to destroy the RAF on 13 Aug with Aldertag. Yes the LW was sustaining losses before then and the ratio was in the RAF's favor during the Battle of the barges. However, the LW was never in short supply of FIGHTER PILOTS. The RAF was in such short supply that in the begining of August BEFORE the LW even launched Aldetag Dowding recieved EVERY available pilot to man a fighter cockpit from the other services. The LW maintained it's pre-war fighter pilot training on through '42 including frontline training staffles who took new pilots up into ocmbat under the watchful eye of an instructor.
Crumpp
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So all the German pilots are lying when they say they only had a few minutes combat time over London?
They didn`t lie. The RAF was spanked over London on the 7th of September, by Bf 109s. It appears even those few minutes were enough. ;)
Seriously answering the question, there were two main reason that limited the 109s ability to butcher the Fighter command :
a, Droptanks were not yet standardized (neither were on the Spitfire as far as I know, that`s why Spits had so limited time over Dunkerque)
b, Cooperation between bomber and fighter units were poor, and fighters often had to waste a lot of time cruising over the channel, waiting for the bombers to appear, effectively limiting their time over the land.
We know Spitfires flew combat missions in support of bombers over France and the Low Countries in 1941, a reverse of the situation in 1940. So surely the much longer ranged 109 must have had ample combat time?
Indeed you are right. The much longer ranged 109s could have spent a lot more time than Spitfires over enemy territory. I always wondered why didn the RAF just copy the 109 and scrap the Spit... ;) But it`s really not hard to understand. The Bf 109G had a still air range of 615 mils on internal fuel, the Spit IX 434 miles under the same conditions. You don`t have to be a math genius to get that 615 > 434.. I am not sure about the 109E, it was far worser aerodynamically, and the DB 601s had were thirstier than the more advanced DB 605s. The range given for it on internal tank is 460 miles, however I don`t know if it`s the same conditions.
It`s easy to understand why it this way, the Spit`s airframe was clean to start with and got progressively worser during the war, why the 109s just improved and improved. The 109 needed less power to obtain equal or even better speeds at the same power output, and as a bonus their DBs needed less fuel to burn HP per HP than the R-Rs... cruising at higher speed, consuming less fuel.. naturally this leads to better range and endurance.
Resupply across the channel is not a problem if you have an operational port, and is less of a problem the smaller the enemy you are fighting.
It could be a problem if you don`t have enough ships for it, and even the "ships" you have are mostly river bargues, unsuited for a stormy channel. The Germans would need to mount an assualt on a defended country, not just flee back on the channel on whatever vessel available, leaving all equipment behind in the haste, and loosing some 250 ships and 10 000 men during the trip like during the Dunkerque.
Haider recorded his meeting with Hitler in his diary. As late as September the 14th, Haider records Hitler's reflections :
"Successful landing means victory, but for this we must obtain complete air superiority.
Bad weather has so far prevented our attaining complete air superiority.
All other factors are in order.
Decision therefore: The operation will not be renounced yet."
Interesting. It appears the German High command is on the same opinion as the British High command : Bad weather in the 2nd week of September is restricting air operations.
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I`d like to see a source for this "2000 claimed by the Jagdwaffe" claim... Don`t really except it to turn up ! :cool
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Tony Wood's site:
http://tonywood.cjb.net/ It's a list of claims from the OKL microfilms.
... and not very surprisingly, the 2000+ claims by the LW don`t turn up anywhere. Thanks Naswan for admitting it.
I believe Groehler`s numbers are far more credible (if I am reading his chart right), given they are taken right from the German archieves. Those 915 German claim from 10th July - 31st October, vs. 934 Spits/Hurris admitted by the British to be lost to enemy action.
Tony Wood actually has the individual claims in the docs on his page. Incidentally, the Jagdwaffe seem to have claimed about 1250 Spitfires and 710 Hurricanes, whereas the RAF actually lost far more Hurricanes than Spitfires.
You refer to Tony Wood, however, NO-WHERE can I see ANYTHING on his site even slightly resambling your statements...
Groehler was a 70s East German "historian" who set out to prove the Luftwaffe lost more planes against the Russians than the west. Not only does that make his conclusions dubious, but the Luftwaffe archives have yielded a lot more information in recent years.
Groehler never claimed such BS (his numbers in the book prove the exact opposite my dear... Of course you haven`t read the book you comment on...), and you have never read anything from him. Regardless of you unfounded opinion, Groehler did so far the most detailed analysis and research on LW strenght.
quote:
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Well, the Luftwaffe was loosing something like 550 fighters in the whole BoB to all reasons
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No, they lost around 600 on OPERATIONAL missions,
Source?
plus hundreds of 110s, which the Germans did (laughably) call a fighter.
BS again, they never called it a fighter, they called it a Zestorer, or Destroyer, a multi purpose heavy fighter.
As for how laughable it was, ask those 55 000 dead corpses buried under the molten aluminium of Lancesters. :D
Or this guy :
(http://www.luftwaffe.cz/images/schnaufer2.jpg)
Oblt. Heinz-W. Schnaufer Staffelkapitän of 12./NJG 1 is showing his 47th victory bar on the rudder of his Bf 110 G, at St. Trond in February 1944.
Another of his Bf 110 college, Major Groth, knocked down 13 of the RAF in the BoB alone in his 110. :)
What was the highest score among Spitfire aces during BoB, again? :cool:
Wood and Dempster in The Narrow Margin give Luftwaffe fighter losses as 912 1st July to 31st Oct, all causes.
They give RAF day fighter losses, (which includes Blenheims) as 1140 1st July to 31st Oct, all causes.
Eagle in Flames by Hooton gives Luftwaffe fighter losses as 753 all causes 1st July to 6th Oct. In the same period he gives RAF day fighter losses (again inc Blenheims) as 874, all causes. [/b]
"Fighters?" 110s, 109s included? Only vs. Britain or in the whole LW ?
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vs. 1960 British fighters to all reasons (combat, accidents, bombing etc.).
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What's the source for this 1960 claim?
'Fighters' by Deighton, but alternatively you can go through of the Daily reports of the RAF, which lists all causes. Be sure to read what was lost in the hangars, to Stukas and co. British authors seem to "naturally" leave out the Spits that disappeared in a bomb crater, but counting 109s that was lost in a training field in East Germany.
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Because the Luftwaffe had no pilot reserves. Even the RAF didn't have "reserves", as such.
Oh, come on, Nashwan, should I remind you that last time you could even tell the difference between a Gruppe and a [/i]Staffel ? You actually believed that the German Gruppe is equivalent of a Squadron, whereas a Gruppe in reality consisted of 3-4 Staffeln (Squadrons).
You have no idea about how German air units are built up. That`s why you fail/refuse to understand that in the British system, the reserve planes/pilots were issued to the firstline Squadron,
whereas in the German system the replacements pilots came to the Jagdgeschwader from different named reserve units, which are of course are not counted in the first line strenght.
You count British Squadrons, which included the reserves in their structure, but only count the German first line units, that don`t include the reserves in their structure.
No. The RAF had the luxury of keeping a large part of their strength away from the battle.
The RAF even had the luxury to let itself spanked all over Norway, the Low Countries, France, Dunkerque, the German Bay, the Channel and it`s own airfields. :)
You call it luxury, I call it poor organisation.
"The Germans gave it everything they had in the Battle of Britain. And the Brits stoped them with half of what they had."
Source? Modern British history book for the elementary school classes ?
The RAF could afford to keep a large proportion of it's strength out of the battle at any one time, and new pilots were frequently posted to squadrons in quiet areas to gain experience.
A nice way to put how inflexible the British defense system was. No group was really allowed to interfere with the other group`s actions. Result : the group on the south was decimated, while the others were doing virtually nothing.
The problem with that claim is that a new pilot can only have 5 - 10 hours for a short time, before they begin to gain experience.
The problem with it for you that it is true. The RAF was throwing untrained rookies into the battle by September. Fact. Live with it.
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Given that both parties are of equal quality, the more numorous should of course. But this wasn`t the case, it was quality vs. quantity again. 1000+ fighters, yes, but only 1/3 of them were equal to the 109s.
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Strangely they still managed to win.
Uhm... win ? Surviving perhaps while being bombed every day and night at will by the LW.
The Luftwaffe were pressuring the RAF with a very high sortie rate and attacks on airfields. They began those tactics in the last week of August, when they flew nearly 4000 fighter sorties. But they couldn't sustain it, flying only 3200 sorties in the first week of September, then dropping to only 1400 in the second week of September.
... and similiarly, the RAF`s fighter sorties also dropped? Why?
They didn't. The RAF flew 5000 sorties the last week of August, 4900 the first week of September.
Sept
8 : 215
9 : 466
10 : 224
11 : 678
12 : 247
13 : 209
14 : 806
Total : 2845
Typical Naswhan`s.
Claim : The LW was breaking. Reason : Their fighter sorties were dropping in the 2nd week of September. (Typical selective thinking, comparing virtually all British - fighter - sorties vs. only a partition of all the German - fighter and bomber - sorties)
Claim : LW`s sorties were dropping, 4000 in last week of August, 3200 in 1st week of Sept, only 1400 in 2nd week of September. (wouldn`t swore on those numbers either).
And The Great Bluff: The magnicent RAF`s number don`t show any similiar.
Facts :
RAF daylight fighter sorties :
last week of August : 5009 sorties
1st week of Sept : 5284
2nd week of Sept : 2845
So much for Naswhan`s "RAF sortie numbers were not dropping in the 2nd week of September."
In fact they did. To their half... so, by Naswhan-standards, "the RAF was breaking". (I would merely say that the bad weather in September were preventing sorties, which is acknowledged by both High Commands as could be read above)
From : http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/calendar.html
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Well, the weather:
7th September 1940 : Fair with some haze.
8th September 1940 : Fair early morning and evening, cloudy for the remainder of the day
9th September 1940 : Scattered showers, thundery in the east. Channel fair.
10th September 1940 : Generally cloudy, some rain.
11th September 1940 : Mainly fine with some local showers. Cloud in the Channel and Thames Estuary.
12th September 1940 : Unsettled, rain in most districts
13th September 1940 : Unsettled.
14th September 1940 : Showers and local thunder. Cloud in the Straits, Channel and Thames Estuary
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Trust me, that's good for a British summer. It also only covers the second week of Sept, not the first week, when the sortie rate was already dropping.
German sortie rate was increasing, not dropping.
German sorties according to the RAF`s 1940 reports:
August :
26 : 400
27 : 75
28 : 400
29 : 360
30 : 600
31 : 800
Sept
1 : 450
2 : 850
3 : 600
4 : 650
5 : 450
6 : 720
7 : 700
8 : 170
9 : 400
10 : 50
11 : 500
12 : 50
13 : 90
14 : 400
So the facts:
1, German sortie rate was increasing in the 1st week of September, not decreasing.
2, Given the sudden drops to almost no offensive sorties on the 10th ("Generally cloudy, some rain."), 12nd ("Unsettled, rain in most districts"), 13rd of September ("Unsettled"), it is clear that the weather was restricting both side`s air activities greatly, which was advantagous to the RAF.
It`s more like a simple case that the Automn was coming, and the weather turned bad, making flying impossible.
But not for the RAF, apparently.
RAF daylight fighter sorties :
last week of August : 5009 sorties
1st week of Sept : 5284
2nd week of Sept : 2845
If weather was not the reason as you say, then only German fighters could have been.
Isegrim, that's the 16th, the third week of September. Find a similar comment for the second week, when the sorties dropped. Let alone the first week of September, wjem they were down from the last week of August. You know, the weeks we are discussing.
No, that`s wrong. If Britain actually though the German front line strenght was 5800 planes, then it was quite correct. The actual German numbers for 11th April 1940 was 5298 planes, including 1356 s-e fighters, 1711 bombers and 414 dive bombers and others.
Those are the three plane types the RAF were refering to as frontline strength. The rest, the transports, recce aircraft etc were not considered front line strength. The RAF actually believed the Luftwaffe possesed 14,000 including transports, training aircraft etc.
Well then I agree with you that British intelligence was damn near useless regarding the LW`s strenght.
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As sidenote, to the "Jagdwaffe was breaking in September" fanatics, it`s interesting to note that the German fighter strenght was increasing in Septmber, ie. the 7th state was 831 single engined fighters (increased to 920 by the 28th Sept), of which 658 was servicable (increased to 712 by the 28th). The RAF had 621 fighters servicable on the 7th of September, which fell slightly, to 604 servicable fighters on the 28th.
Source?
Source : Übersicht über Soll, Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft, Verluste und Reserven der fliegenden Verbänden
I think it's possible, however, because the Luftwaffe was suffering more from pilot shortages. Overy gives the following figures for Luftwaffe 109 pilots ready for duty:
1st june 906
1st aug 869
1st sept 735
1st nov 673
Without the pilots available, the mechanics had more time to work on getting planes serviceable.
A rather laughable explanation.... :rofl Does Overy also give the number of Spit/Hurri pilots? Strictly counting only those who are considered "Ready For Action", and not counting the actual strenght (just like Overy neglects German actual pilot strenght to arrive at the lowest number possible, not to mention he only counts firstline Jagdwaffe strenght w/o the reserves ("Erganzungseinheiten")? Considering that over 50% of the RAF pilot`s were having flown about 5-15 hours on their planes, "Ready to be Butchered" would be much more appropriate.
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Originally posted by gripen
Guppy35,
There were several air combats during June 10th and JG 53 claimed 5 for one loss. But actually that defensive circle thing happened in June 14th (five P-38s lost) and overall the LW and Romanian AF could put up strong resistance in Ploesti during summer until Russians arrived. .
gripen
Uhm, the 1944 June 14th P-38 defensive circle was actually vs. our 109s, not the Rumanian ones, and we kicked the lightnings really in the bellybutton on that day. ;) (one of the very-very rare circumstances we had numerical superiority).
PS: I have the details of it, there was some really wild claiming on the US side.
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Originally posted by Nashwan
It's quite simply wrong.
RAF operational fighter pilots in the UK, from "the battle" by Richard Overy:
....
In contrast, German operational strength:
1st June 906
1st Aug 869
1st Sept 735
1st Nov 673
Mr. Overy lists the "Ready for Comat" fighter pilots of Bf 109 first line units of the LW.
Which means he didn`t listed pilots :
-pilots present with the first line sqaudrons considered to be fit for limited duty. For example, his 1st June figures show only 906 pilots only.
By comparision, the full picture (for the 29th of June) is 1171 pilots established strenght, of whom 1126 (96%) is present, out of whom 906 is rdy for action. A good way to manipulate figures..
-reserve/replacement pilots, issued to non-first line LW replacement units
-and of course no pilots Bf 110 units, neither first or second line.
Unlike for the RAF, for which he listed all pilots present, first line or reserve, wheter ready for action or not, ie. the highest number possible.
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Your right the LW didn't almost win the BoB. The RAF was just a little jumpy back then, especially Dowding.
The RAF believed that just before Alder Tag, the Luftwaffe had 5,800 front line combat aircraft. They believed Germany was on course to manufacture 24,000 aircraft in 1940.
They actually manufactured 10,250 airaft in 1940, and their strength in August was just over 3000 front line aircraft.
The RAF believed the Germans were increasing in strength, not declining, and from a far larger starting force than they actually had.
Nashwan please study the History behind those stats. The LW started it's main effort to destroy the RAF on 13 Aug with Aldertag. Yes the LW was sustaining losses before then and the ratio was in the RAF's favor during the Battle of the barges. However, the LW was never in short supply of FIGHTER PILOTS.
I'll repeat the figures. The established strength for the 109 fighter force was 1132. That's how many fighter pilots they were supposed to have. By the 1st of Sept, they actually had 735 fit for duty, which was down 134 from the start of August.
Look at the RAF pilot figures. On the 27th July they had 1,377 fighter pilots. On the 31st Aug they had 1,422. Against the Luftwaffe losses of 135 pilots, the RAF had gained 43 pilots.
By late September, the RAF had double the number of fighter pilots of the Luftwaffe.
The RAF was in such short supply that in the begining of August BEFORE the LW even launched Aldetag Dowding recieved EVERY available pilot to man a fighter cockpit from the other services.
Because the RAF, unlike the Luftwaffe, were preparing for a battle of attrition.
The established strength of fighter pilots in the RAF was:
1,482 30th June
1,456 27th July
1,558 17th Aug
1,558 31st Aug
1,662 14th Sept
1,662 28th Sept
1,714 19th Oct
1,727 2nd Nov
That's the number of pilots they should have had. As you can see, the number expanded during early August. There was also an expansion in the number of front line squadrons. In mid July there were 44 squadrons of Spitfires and Hurricanes. By the end of August, that had expanded to 51 squadrons of Spits and Hurricanes.
The LW maintained it's pre-war fighter pilot training on through '42 including frontline training staffles who took new pilots up into ocmbat under the watchful eye of an instructor.
Which is why they couldn't replace their losses. That's why when they were supposed to have 1,132 109 pilots, they actually had only 735 available for duty at the start of Sept.
The RAF also rotated pilots during the BoB, frequently sending new and tired pilots to quiet areas in the North and West, which saw almost no combat. Luftwaffe fighter pilots remained with their squadrons and flew constant operations throughout the BoB.
There is also the number of operational sorties. Alder Tag was supposed to break the RAF, and in that week the Luftwaffe flew 3000 fighter sorties, up from 1500 the week before. The next attempt, the battle for the airfields, saw the Luftwaffe fly nearly 4000 sorties in the last week of August, but even though they attempted to sustain the pressure on the RAF, they could only manage 3200 sorties in the first week of September.
The RAF managed 5000 sorties in the last week of August, and over 4900 in the first week of Sept.
You are saying that the majority of both the academic world is wrong AND that Western Air Forces that study that history and formed the doctrine in use today are wrong.
I'm saying most popular histories of the RAF use mainly British sources, which isn't suprising given the state of Luftwaffe archives.
From a British perspective, the RAF was losing in the last week of August and first week of September. What wasn't realised at the time is that the Germans were losing more. Their strength was falling faster than the RAF's, and their fighter force was shrinking faster than the RAF's.
Try reading some of the more modern studies of the BoB, ones that have used Luftwaffe sources as well. Try Overy, or The Most Dangerous Enemy, by Stephen Bungay.
YOU have figured it all out and are able to stand up and fly in the face of conventional thinking. Congratulations....you are obviously much smarter than them
The only thing I have figured out is that history books can be wrong. I learnt that when I saw book after book after book tell me that the 109K4 had 15mm MG151 in the cowling, and that it climbed to 5000m in 3 minutes.
Far too many history books simply repeat previous authors research. Take your Chaz Bowyer book, for example. Hwat does he quote as sources for his figures? Does he even give actual pilot figures for the two sides? Overy lists AIR 22/296: Personnel, Casualties, Strength and Establishment of the RAF as his source for the RAF figures, for example.
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Originally posted by Nashwan
I'll repeat the figures. The established strength for the 109 fighter force was 1132. That's how many fighter pilots they were supposed to have. By the 1st of Sept, they actually had 735 fit for duty, which was down 134 from the start of August.
Look at the RAF pilot figures. On the 27th July they had 1,377 fighter pilots. On the 31st Aug they had 1,422. Against the Luftwaffe losses of 135 pilots, the RAF had gained 43 pilots.
By late September, the RAF had double the number of fighter pilots of the Luftwaffe.
You might as well quit using the same trick Overy does... You keep repeating only the number "Ready for action" 109 in the first line fighter squadron, and then list every RAF pilot... what a cheap trick, try comparing like with the like, even if you have little experience in that.
Let me put you story into context :
You, like Overy, don`t count German fighter pilots in reserve, but count the British the ones.
You, like Overy, don`t count present but not combat ready German pilots, but count the British ones.
You, like Overy, compare apples and oranges.
I am still waiting for an explanation that if the British were not running out of pilots as most authors state, then why was it neccesary to drain the fighter pilot schools for pupils to fill the battle ranks before they could even finish their training? The Germans did not do that in 1940.
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Don't forget Nashwan that Barbi, aka Isegrim, and his bud Huck, claims that late model 109s with the Erla Haube gave better visibilty from the cockpit for the pilot than 'bubble canopy' Spitfires, Tempests, Typhoons, P-47s and P-51s.:rolleyes: :rofl
Why should anyone believe what he has to say.
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Mindless Moron has just added his ouput. :lol
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Yeah I really like Milo-Moron...I'm sure he wears big floppy shoes and a red rubber nose when he post's. Nice orange hair, too.
His evaluations at work probably read things like:
"Is depriving a village somewhere of an idiot.."
"Subordinates follow him out of curiosity"
Nashwan you are showing me nothing. Your "stats" are pure manipulations in order to present a fantasy. Believe it, if you must. Just stay away from the folks with little cymbols on their fingers in the Airport, trust me! You don't want to fall for their manipulations of the truth.
Crumpp
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They didn`t lie. The RAF was spanked over London on the 7th of September, by Bf 109s. It appears even those few minutes were enough
If you call Luftwaffe losses of 37+, RAF losses of 27 the RAF being spanked. (The lowest source for the Luftwaffe gives 37, most are higher)
Indeed you are right. The much longer ranged 109s could have spent a lot more time than Spitfires over enemy territory. I always wondered why didn the RAF just copy the 109 and scrap the Spit... But it`s really not hard to understand. The Bf 109G had a still air range of 615 mils on internal fuel, the Spit IX 434 miles under the same conditions. You don`t have to be a math genius to get that 615 > 434.. I am not sure about the 109E, it was far worser aerodynamically, and the DB 601s had were thirstier than the more advanced DB 605s. The range given for it on internal tank is 460 miles, however I don`t know if it`s the same conditions.
I've asked you repeatedly for a source for your 109 consumption figures, I don't think one has ever been forthcoming, has it?
It could be a problem if you don`t have enough ships for it, and even the "ships" you have are mostly river bargues, unsuited for a stormy channel.
How many ships does it take to support your "1 panzer division"?
The Germans had enough ships to support an invasion, the barges were necessary for landing troops on the beaches. Resupply through a port is much easier, and the Germans were confident they could capture a port.
Interesting. It appears the German High command is on the same opinion as the British High command : Bad weather in the 2nd week of September is restricting air operations.
Isegrim, if you go back you'll notice I was talking about the Luftwaffe sorties dropping in the first week of September.
Tony Wood's site:
http://tonywood.cjb.net/ It's a list of claims from the OKL microfilms.
... and not very surprisingly, the 2000+ claims by the LW don`t turn up anywhere. Thanks Naswan for admitting it.
Try clicking the link, Isegrim.
You refer to Tony Wood, however, NO-WHERE can I see ANYTHING on his site even slightly resambling your statements...
OK, if you really can't see it.
It's halfway down the page, the first file under the heading
O.K.L. Fighter Claims : Chef für Ausz. und Dizsiplin Luftwaffen-Personalamt L.P. (A) V Films & Supplementary Claims from Lists
the file is called
West 1939-41, Issue 1
You have to click on the little Doc or PDF icons to the right of it.
As an example of the detail, the first listed claim on the 1st of sept is Ofw. Erich Rudorffer, 2./JG 2 over Dover at 12:45.
Don't bother reading the introduction, it says it covers claims up to the armistice with France, but it's been updated recently. (You'll notice it has little red dots beside it, which the key on the site says means it's new on the 7th or 24th of January.)
Groehler never claimed such BS (his numbers in the book prove the exact opposite my dear... Of course you haven`t read the book you comment on...), and you have never read anything from him. Regardless of you unfounded opinion, Groehler did so far the most detailed analysis and research on LW strenght
Sorry, I was going by what Les Butler and Don Caldwell have to say on their web page:
"It is clear from his text that Groehler's objectives were: (1) to show that the German-Soviet front was the most significant source of the Luftwaffe losses that ultimately led to Allied air supremacy, and (2) that the Luftwaffe could not afford to weaken its forces in the East, even when pushed hard by the USAAF strategic offensive and the Normandy invasion. Groehler did make these claims, to the undoubted pleasure of his Soviet masters, but his data, when examined carefully, don't back him up. "
http://www.butler98.freeserve.co.uk/thtrlosses.htm
No, they lost around 600 on OPERATIONAL missions,
Source?
Wood and Dempster, The Narrow Margin. Hooton, Eagle in Flames gives similar figures.
plus hundreds of 110s, which the Germans did (laughably) call a fighter.
BS again, they never called it a fighter, they called it a Zestorer, or Destroyer, a multi purpose heavy fighter.
No other answer needed, really.
As for how laughable it was, ask those 55 000 dead corpses buried under the molten aluminium of Lancesters.
Tastless, even for you.
Another of his Bf 110 college, Major Groth, knocked down 13 of the RAF in the BoB alone in his 110.
Of course he did.
According to the Tony doc that you claim doesn't exist, Groth got 2 Spits and a Hurricane on the 30th August, a day when the Jagdwaffe claimed 59 and the RAF lost 25, (including those lost to bomber fire). So, if Groth was typical, he probably got 1 on the 30th of Aug.
He got 4 Spitfires on the 4th Sept, a day when the Jagdwaffe claimed 52 and the RAF actually lost 17. So divide by 3 if you assume NO RAF aircraft were lost to anything other than the Jagdwaffe that day, but more realisticly divide by 4. Another 1 for Groth.
I can't find any other claims by Groth during the BoB, but he did claim another 6 over Poland and France before the BoB. I think Tony Wood says the files are incomplete, so either you've got it wrong, and Groth's 13 victories include Poland or France, or the Jagdwaffe claimed even more than the 2000 figure during the BoB suggested by Tony Wood's docs.
So Groth's 13 kills during the BoB actually become 2.
What was the highest score among Spitfire aces during BoB, again?
Not a clue, but I'm pretty sure it was more than Groth's 2 :rofl
Incidentally, Groth looks pretty typical for the Jagdwaffe during the BoB. They claimed 2000 single engined fighters, for total RAF single engined fighter losses of less than 1,000, and probably less than 700 lost to the Jagdwaffe. 3 to overclaiming looks about typical for the Jagdwaffe during the BoB.
What's the source for this 1960 claim?
'Fighters' by Deighton, but alternatively you can go through of the Daily reports of the RAF, which lists all causes. Be sure to read what was lost in the hangars, to Stukas and co. British authors seem to "naturally" leave out the Spits that disappeared in a bomb crater, but counting 109s that was lost in a training field in East Germany.
I wouldn't exactly describe a 109 lost in a training accident in Germany as an operational loss, and I don't think any of the historians mentioned would earlier.
RAF wastage might have been close to 2000, but that doesn't mean losses. Old planes being written off for fatigue reasons, fabric winged Hurricanes being sent back for scrapping/upgrading, old aircraft being sent to the maintenance schools for trainee fitters to practice on, all are counted into wastage. And when your factories are churning out a surfeit of planes, wastage is higher than when you haven't got enough planes to go around.
As an example, the Luftwaffe had 1024 109s on strength at the begining of 1940. by the end, they had 829. 1,870 were produced in 1940, which puts wastage at something over 2,050. That doesn't mean 2050 losses, it means a turnover of 2,050 aircraft.
You have no idea about how German air units are built up. That`s why you fail/refuse to understand that in the British system, the reserve planes/pilots were issued to the firstline Squadron,
That's what I said, Isegrim.
whereas in the German system the replacements pilots came to the Jagdgeschwader from different named reserve units, which are of course are not counted in the first line strenght.
Isegrim, where were the German reserves?
These are the figures from the Luftwaffe OOB at http://www.ww2.dk/oob/statistics/gob.htm
which are taken straight from the Luftwaffe records. Click on the Introduction at the top of the page and you will see the references.
The pilot strength of the sigle engined fighter force
Established Available
Dec 39 - 960 - 957
March 40 - 1160 - 1101
June 40 - 1171 - 1126
Sept 40 - 1132 - 917
Dec 40 - 1162 - 915
As you can see, the Jagdwaffe were decidedly under stregth by the end of 1940. You'd think that all these reserves would have been issued, if they existed. What numbers do your sources give for Luftwaffe reserves, Isegrim?
You count British Squadrons, which included the reserves in their structure, but only count the German first line units, that don`t include the reserves in their structure.
You're the only person I've ever seen claiming German reserves still existed by late 1940. Perhaps you can give us some figures, and a source? An explanation of why they remained in the reserves when the Jagdwaffe was so seriously under strength would be nice, too. Especially why reserves weren't sent to squadrons in Sept and Oct, when the Luftwaffe was engaged in combat and had only approx 50% of it's established strength fit for duty.
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The RAF even had the luxury to let itself spanked all over Norway, the Low Countries, France, Dunkerque, the German Bay, the Channel and it`s own airfields.
Which has what to do with the RAF squadrons based in Northern England in 1940, exactly?
Source? Modern British history book for the elementary school classes ?
The source is Pongo. That's why I said "Pongo summed it up nicely:" and followed it with the quote.
A nice way to put how inflexible the British defense system was. No group was really allowed to interfere with the other group`s actions. Result : the group on the south was decimated, while the others were doing virtually nothing.
Decimated means 10% losses.
The "inflexible" approach worked. 11 Group could call on other groups at any time, and anyway the tactic was to meet the Luftwaffe in small numbers, not with everything in one vainglorious battle.
Plus, of course, squadrons needed to be stationed around the country to defend areas other than the south east, and having squadrons in quieter areas allowed for on the job training and rest and recuperation.
The problem with it for you that it is true. The RAF was throwing untrained rookies into the battle by September. Fact. Live with it.
Sorry, you're claim was that half the British pilots had 5 - 10 hours on type. I note you're not repeating that.
No "untrained" pilot was ever thrown into battle. Pilots with innsuficient conversion training were sometimes sent to squadrons, but in most cases were posted out of the area of battle to gain experience. Also, with each squadron having 20+ pilots, yet usually flying just over half of that, pilots could usually be introduced to operations gradually.
Anyway, the numbers are not in doubt, the RAF lost around 420 Spitfire and Hurricane pilots, and maintainded a positive ratio against the Luftwaffe throught, including Sept and Oct.
Strangely they still managed to win.
Uhm... win ? Surviving perhaps while being bombed every day and night at will by the LW.
Isegrim, haven't you noticed everyone else is debating how close the Luftwaffe came to winning. No-one else is suggesting the Luftwaffe won, or even didn't lose. The Luftwaffe suffered higher casulaties than the RAF, and didn't fulfill it's objectives. The RAF did fulfill theirs.
Then again, you don't even accept the Nazis started the war, so why should I expect you to accept the Luftwaffe lost the BoB?
They didn't. The RAF flew 5000 sorties the last week of August, 4900 the first week of September.
Sept
8 : 215
9 : 466
10 : 224
11 : 678
12 : 247
13 : 209
14 : 806
Total : 2845
Typical Naswhan`s.
Typical Isegrim, more like. READ what I said. The sorties dropped in the FIRST week of September. You have given the figures for the 8th - 14th September. How can that be the first week of September? The first week is the 1st - 7th.
Claim : The LW was breaking. Reason : Their fighter sorties were dropping in the 2nd week of September. (Typical selective thinking, comparing virtually all British - fighter - sorties vs. only a partition of all the German - fighter and bomber - sorties)
Reason: their fighter sorties were down in the first week of September. And it's not a portion of German fighter and bomber sorties, it's the sorties of the Luftwaffe single seat fighter force against Britain, compared with the sorties of RAF Fighter Command in defence of Britain. Naturally it excludes fighter sorties elsewhere in the world, but what do Gladiator sorties in Egypt have to do with what we are talking about?
Claim : LW`s sorties were dropping, 4000 in last week of August, 3200 in 1st week of Sept, only 1400 in 2nd week of September. (wouldn`t swore on those numbers either).
And The Great Bluff: The magnicent RAF`s number don`t show any similiar.
Facts :
RAF daylight fighter sorties :
last week of August : 5009 sorties
1st week of Sept : 5284
2nd week of Sept : 2845
So much for Naswhan`s "RAF sortie numbers were not dropping in the 2nd week of September."
Isegrim, go back and read what I said.
"The Luftwaffe were pressuring the RAF with a very high sortie rate and attacks on airfields. They began those tactics in the last week of August, when they flew nearly 4000 fighter sorties. But they couldn't sustain it, flying only 3200 sorties in the first week of September, then dropping to only 1400 in the second week of September. "
The crucial part is that they dropped in the first week of Sept, when the campaign agaqinst the airfields was ongoing. The RAF's sorties did not drop then, and only dropped after the Luftwaffe turned on London.
In fact they did. To their half... so, by Naswhan-standards, "the RAF was breaking". (I would merely say that the bad weather in September were preventing sorties, which is acknowledged by both High Commands as could be read above)
From : http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/calendar.html
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Well, the weather:
7th September 1940 : Fair with some haze.
8th September 1940 : Fair early morning and evening, cloudy for the remainder of the day
9th September 1940 : Scattered showers, thundery in the east. Channel fair.
10th September 1940 : Generally cloudy, some rain.
11th September 1940 : Mainly fine with some local showers. Cloud in the Channel and Thames Estuary.
12th September 1940 : Unsettled, rain in most districts
13th September 1940 : Unsettled.
14th September 1940 : Showers and local thunder. Cloud in the Straits, Channel and Thames Estuary
Again, it's still the second week. I said the Luftwaffe sortie went to nearly 4000 in the last week of Aug, and dropped to 3200 in the first week of Sept, despite the fact the campaign against the airfields was still ongoing.
Trust me, that's good for a British summer. It also only covers the second week of Sept, not the first week, when the sortie rate was already dropping.
German sortie rate was increasing, not dropping.
German sorties according to the RAF`s 1940 reports:
August :
26 : 400
27 : 75
28 : 400
29 : 360
30 : 600
31 : 800
Sept
1 : 450
2 : 850
3 : 600
4 : 650
5 : 450
6 : 720
7 : 700
8 : 170
9 : 400
10 : 50
11 : 500
12 : 50
13 : 90
14 : 400
That's the RAF estimate of total German operations, and is far lower than the actual totals. The RAF explicitly states it's only an estimate.
Hooton gives the figures I posted as German fighter sorties.
It`s more like a simple case that the Automn was coming, and the weather turned bad, making flying impossible.
But not for the RAF, apparently.
RAF daylight fighter sorties :
last week of August : 5009 sorties
1st week of Sept : 5284
2nd week of Sept : 2845
If weather was not the reason as you say, then only German fighters could have been.
Isegrim, I said despite being engaged in the anti airfield campaign, the Luftwwaffe couldn't maintain the sortie rate of the last week of August on into the first week of September. You said it was the weather, and I pointed out the RAF did maintain it's sortie rate in the first week of Sept. Your figures say exactly the same.
Come the second week of September, the Luftwaffe had switched to attacking London, so the whole tactical picture had changed.
The common view is that if the Luftwaffe hadn't switched to London, they could have beaten the RAF. The fighter sorties in the first week of September show the Luftwaffe could not maintain that pressure, they were already dropping, the RAF's were not.
Well then I agree with you that British intelligence was damn near useless regarding the LW`s strenght.
Better to overestimate than underestimate.
The Americans estimated German front line strength at 11,000, with a similar number in reserve, and production at 26,000 in 1940.
The Germans estimated the RAF had just 177 operational fighters left, 300 total including reserves, on the 16th Sept. They estimated monthly production at 250. Actual figures were around 900 fighters including reserves, monthly output at 450.
Without the pilots available, the mechanics had more time to work on getting planes serviceable.
A rather laughable explanation....
Well, they're the Luftwaffe's figures, not mine. Only 735 single engined pilots available for duty on 1st Sept.
not to mention he only counts firstline Jagdwaffe strenght w/o the reserves ("Erganzungseinheiten")?
Where were the reserves, Isegrim? When the fat man was getting annoyed at lack of progress, and demanding the RAf be destroyed, and yet the Jagdwaffe was so understrength, why were they not deployed? Why didn't Galland say he'd like some of the reserve pilots released, for example, if they'd existed?
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Crumpp, go to http://www.ww2.dk/oob/statistics/gob.htm and look at the Luftwaffe pilot figures.
My figures aren't manipulations they're just the figures.
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Laugh all you want Crispy but Barbi will have to have a go a your claim that the LW was a finished force in early '44. If he does not then all his ranting and raving over at Ubi, and other forums, on how uber the LW and its a/c were, was just barnyard manure. It is just not me that visits here. It will not take long for it to get around the net forums that Barbi is full of manure with his uber claims for the excellance of the Nazi soldier and his equipement.
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Whatever your smokin Milo please don't operate heavy Machinery on it. For the Machines sake....you could break it.
What a bunch of baffle em with BS you've posted Nashwan. Unfortunately your still off on that RAF was never in danger during the BoB tangent. Only in your world son....
You can use the little wheel on the center of your mouse to scroll up. Nothing you've posted changes ANY conclusions from my previous post.
Crumpp
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Contrary to general belief and official reports, the enemy's bombing attacks by day did extensive damage to five of our forward aerodromes and also to six of our seven sector stations. There was a critical period when the damage to sector stations and our ground organization was having a serious effect on the fighting efficiency of the squadrons, who could not be given the same good technical and administrative service as previously.........The absence of many essential telephone lines, the use of scratch equipment in emergency operation rooms, and the general dislocation of ground organization, was seriously felt for about a week in the handling of squadrons by day to meet the enemy's massed attacks, which were continued without the former occasional break of a day.
Report by Air Vice Marshal Keith Park - 6th September 1940
For most of the phase [24 August - 6 September] the defending squadrons were flying and fighting singly. Only too often the units of combat were a British squadron of twelve aircraft at most and a German formation of twenty to forty bombers and up to 100 fighters. Some British squadron commanders attempted to contain the enemy escort with one flight, and with the other attack the bombers; but time after time there were sufficient German fighters to engage both British flights.
The Air Defence of Great Britain Vol II-The Battle of Britain
I watched as one by one our aircraft returned to base after yet another sortie. Most of the aircraft to our delight had returned unscathed, but then I saw this Hurricane coming in to land. His wings were tipping up, then down, then suddenly he hit the ground rather hard only for him to bounce right up again. Then at the second attempt, he finally kept the aircraft on the ground and taxied a short way and stopped in the centre of the airfield. Casualty procedures were put into action and crash tenders and ambulances rushed towards him only to find that the pilot fast asleep, he did not even have time to switch the engine off
Squadron Leaders remarks at 111 Squadron Croydon September 1940.
Towards the end of the Battle I had just taken about as much as I could bear. My nerves were in ribbons and I was scared stiff that one day I would pull out and avoid combat. That frightened me more than the Germans and I pleaded with my C.O. for a rest. He was sympathetic but quite adamant that until he got replacements I would have to carry on. I am glad now that he was unable to let me go. If I had been allowed to leave the squadron, feeling as I did, I am sure that I would never have flown again.
Sgt. J.H (Ginger) Lacey 501 Squadron Fighter Command
While the Luftwaffe were attacking more and more strategic targets under the cover of darkness, during daytime it was throwing everything it could into an all out effort to destroy the RAF day-fighter bases defending London. On the 30th and 31st August the day battle reached an unprecedented ferocity. The 31st was our blackest day.........
I was one of the casualties on the 31st. As Dornier bombers swept over Croydon, demolishing hangars and technical buildings, I led my squadron off through the smoke and dust against the attackers. Twenty minutes later, after a sharp cut and thrust combat with a swarm of escorting Messerschmitts, my Hurricane was hit. So was I. Once again my parachute saved me. That night in Croydon General Hospital, the surgeon took a 20mm cannon-shell out of my foot, As I passed out under the anesthetic I could faintly hear the sirens wailing. The Luftwaffe were closing in on London.
Group Captain Peter Townsend Duel in the Dark Harrap, London 1986
"I saw his contortions, then I saw him straighten and fly straight into the German aircraft; both crashed and Percy was killed. I was close enough to see his letters, as other pilots must have been and who also confirmed this incident, which in itself caused me to realize my young life and its future, if any, had jumped into another dimension"
Sgt. G.Pallister 249 & 43 Squadrons on P/O P.Burton ramming a German aircraft.
One section attacked Croydon and Biggin Hill. At the former airfield twelve bombers came in at 2,000 feet demolishing a hangar, damaging other buildings and causing casualties. At Biggin Hill, the bombing came from high altitude and to the long suffering occupants of the airfield it seemed that they must be the A1 priority target for the whole Luftwaffe. Further extensive damage was done to hangars and buildings, the married quarters and the officers' mess were bombed and the operations block received a direct hit, extinguishing the lights and filling the rooms with acrid fumes, dust and smoke from the fires which broke out. The temporary telephone lines and power cables put in after the raid on the 30th were destroyed.
Wood and Dempster The Narrow Margin Hutchinson 1961 p315
There was only one way of getting to the bombers without getting mixed up with the fighter escort. "Stand by for head on attack and watch out for those little fellows above," I called. Then I brought the squadron round steadily in a wide turn, moving it into echelon as we leveled out about two miles ahead on a collision course.
Ease the throttle to reduce the closing speed - which anyway allowed only a few seconds' fire. Get a bead on them right away, hold it, and never mind the streams of tracer darting overhead. Just keep on pressing the button until you think your going to collide - then stick hard forward. Under the shock of 'negative G" your stomach jumps into your mouth, dust and muck fly up from the cockpit floor into your eyes and your head cracks on the roof as you break away below.
S/L P.W.Townsend 85 Squadron R.A.F.
.......I do consider that these latest figures are a means of encouragement, but I feel compelled to look at the long term forecast. In a months time, how many pilots and aircraft will I have at my disposal
Air Chief Marshal Dowding to the War Cabinet
"The Cabinet were distressed to hear from you that you were now running short of pilots for fighters, and they now had become the limiting factor......Lord Beaverbrook has made a surprising improvement in the supply and repair of aeroplanes, and in clearing up the muddle and scandal of the aircraft production branch, I greatly hope that you will, be able to do as much on the personnel side, for it will indeed be lamentable for if we have machines standing idle for want of pilots to fly them"
Winston Churchill to the Secretary of State for Air June 3rd 1940
"I was worried daily from July to September by a chronic shortage of trained fighter pilots and it was not until the battle was nearly lost that Air Staff of the Air Ministry assisted by borrowing pilots from Bomber Command and from the Royal Navy. Incidentally, in December 1940 when I was posted to Flying Training Command, I found that the flying schools were working at only two-thirds capacity and were following peacetime routines being quite unaware of the grave shortage of pilots in Fighter Command........."
Air Vice Marshal Keith Park 11 Group relating to the battle and quoted in Paris 1965
. . . . . . . this day for instance, a lanky, nineteen year old boy called Cocky Dundas* flew with the wing for the first time. Exactly a month earlier Dundas had been with with 616 Squadron at Kenley; they were waiting at readiness for an evening visit from Winston Churchill when they had been scrambled and ran into a flock of 109s over Kent. It was Dundas's first fight and a 109 had "jumped" him, shot his controls to bits and put bullets in his engine and glycol tank. Smoke and glycol fumes filled the cockpit and he could not get his hood open. He spun out of control from 12,000 feet till finally he was able to jettison the hood and baled out at 800 feet, breaking his collar bone at the same time. Now only two of the old pilots were left in the squadron, and Dundas, still shaken, shoulder still weak, was going back for more. . . . .
Paul Brickhill - Reach for the Sky, Collins 1954 p227
* Flying Officer H.S.L.Dundas 616 Squadron RAF.
I drove over to Tangmere in the evening and found the place in utter shambles, with wisps of smoke still rising from the shattered buildings. Little knots of people were wandering about with dazed looks on their faces, obviously deeply affected by the events of the day. I eventually tracked down the Station Commander standing on the lawn in front of the Officers Mess with a parrot sitting on his shoulder. Jack was covered with grime and the wretched bird was screeching its imitation of a Stuka at the height of the attack! The once immaculate grass was littered with personal belongings which had been blasted from the wing which had received a direct hit. Shirts, towels, socks and a portable gramophone - a little private world for all to see.....Rubble was everywhere and all three hangars had been wrecked.
Squadron Leader "Sandy" Johnstone 602 Squadron
This led to 'a hell of a donny' over Dover, with some 200 aircraft milling about in numerous dogfights. In this area, the Luftwaffe were little more distant from their bases than the RAF squadrons, and for once were prepared to mix it instead of making the one pass and then diving for home, waiting for the red-light blink warning of fuel shortage. No. 615 Squadron lost two pilots, and three of 32 Squadron's pilots, unhurt themselves, made forced landings, while JG26 and JG52 each lost a 109 in the mêlée.
Richard Hough & Denis Richards Battle of Britain Hodder & Staughton 1989 pp163-4
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....Two further pilots have come to us straight from a Lysander squadron with no experience whatsoever on fighter aircraft. Apparently demand has now outstripped supply and there are no trained pilots available in the Training Units, which means that we will just have to train them ourselves. However, it remains to be seen whether we can spare the hours, as we are already short of aircraft for our own operational needs. It seems a funny way to run a war.......
Squadron Leader A.V.R.(Sandy) Johnstone 602 Squadron Fighter Command RAF *
"Contrary to general belief and official reports, the enemy's bombing attacks by day did extensive damage to five of our forward aerodromes, and also to six of our seven sector stations." Manston and Lympne were unfit for operations 'on several occasions for days' and Biggin Hill was so severely damaged that for over a week it could operate only one squadron. Had the Luftwaffe continued to attack these sectors, 'the fighter defences of London would have been in a parlous state during the last critical phase when heavy attacks have been directed against the capital."
Sector operation rooms suffered both from direct hits and damage to landlines. They all had to use emergency rooms, though these were too small and poorly equipped to cope with the normal control of three squadrons per sector.
Air Vice Marshal Keith Park, C-in-C 11 Group
"It was burning all down the river. It was a horrid sight. But I looked down and said 'Thank God for that', because I knew that the Nazis had switched their attack from the fighter stations thinking that they were knocked out. They weren't, but they were pretty groggy"
Air Vice Marshal Keith Park AOC 11 Group on the switch to attack London.
".....All we could see was row upon row of German raiders, all heading for London. I have never seen so many aircraft in the air all at the same time.... The escorting fighters saw us at once and came down like a ton of bricks, when the squadron split up and the sky became a seething cauldron of aeroplanes, swooping and swerving in and out of the vapour trails and tracer smoke. A Hurricane on fire spun out of control ahead of me while, above to my right, a 110 flashed across my vision and disappeared into the fog of battle before I could draw a bead on it. Everyone was shouting at once and the earphones became filled with a meaningless cacophony of jumbled noises. Everything became a maelstrom of jumbled impression - a Dornier spinning wildly with part of its port mainplane missing; black streaks of tracer ahead, then I instinctively put my arm up to shield my face; taking a breather when the haze absorbed me for a moment ...
SQUADRON LEADER 'SANDY' JOHNSTONE, 602 Squadron, 7 Sept. 1940.
The position was grim in the extreme as from August 24th to September 6th. 295 fighters had been totally destroyed and 171 badly damaged, against a total output of 269 new and repaired Spitfires and Hurricanes. Worst of all, during the fortnight 103 pilots were killed or missing and 128 were wounded, which represented a total wastage of 120 pilots per week out of a fighting strength of just under 1,000.
Experienced pilots were like gold dust, and each one lost had to be replaced by an untried man who for some time would be vulnerable, until he acquired battle know-how. Fresh squadrons, moved in to replace tired units, very often lost more aircraft and pilots than the formations they replaced. For instance, 616 Squadron lost twelve aircraft and five pilots between August 25th and September 2nd and had to be retired to Coltishall in No.12 Group.
No. 603 Squadron, newly arrived in 11 Group on August 28th, had by September 6th lost sixteen aircraft and twelve pilots, while 253 Squadron at Kenley lost thirteen Hurricanes and nine pilots in the seven days they were in battle, from August 30th.
Wood and Dempster The Narrow Margin McGraw Hill 1961 p332-3
By 1630hrs, all twenty one squadrons around London were in the air or taking off. The sight that they encountered east of Sheppy astounded them: a formation one and a half miles high, covering 800 square miles of sky.
Len Deighton - Battle of Britain Jonathon Cape 1980 p169
.....Ray looked eastward downstream towards the estuary. Never had he seen such a terrifying sight; the sky was dotted with a mass of specks which seemed quite motionless. Then he realized they were approaching, he recognized them as Heinkels and Dorniers, flanked by escorts of Messerschmitt 109s and 110s. The boys could not imagine there could be so many at once. In fact the Luftwaffe had amassed nearly four hundred bombers and more than six hundred fighters - over a thousand aircraft - for this all out attack.
Peter Townsend - Duel in the Dark Harrap 1986
A black day for Fighter Command was September 11 with combat losses exceeding those of the Luftwaffe. Two major co-ordinated attacks by the Luftwaffe were launched, both in the afternoon. The first, comprising He 111s of KG 1 and KG 26 headed up the Thames Estuary towards London, with a fighter escort 200 strong. The defending squadrons made little impression on the escorts at first and lost heavily; some of them had been scrambled too late and were caught on the climb. As on the 7th, the 110s formed a holding pattern in the Croydon area, while the single-seaters ran themselves low on fuel. As a result, the Heinkels were quickly left without an escort and suffered in consequence, losing 10, plus four more which force landed in France, while a further 120 were damaged.
Meanwhile Luftflotte 3 mounted a raid on Portsmouth and Southampton, causing little damage. Luftwaffe combat losses for the day totaled 21, and another six force landed. Of these, only four were Bf 109s, although a fifth crashed as a result of a midair collision over France. Collisions were not that unusual; four Ju 87s were lost to this cause on a training mission also. Six Spitfires and nineteen Hurricanes were lost and a further six fighters crash landed. Twelve pilots were killed and four severely injured. This was an exchange rate that Fighter Command could not afford.
Mike Spick Battle of Britain Salamander 1990 p134
... and finally the incontestable truth about the Battle of Britain:
In Park’s mind, 7 September was always the turning point. Three years later, he flew to London from Malta and gave his first press interview on the Battle of Britain. He explained how close the Germans came to victory and how they threw it away by switching their main attack to London.
Vincent Orange Sir Keith Park Methuen 1985 pp107-108
Now Nashwan please ... continue! :rofl
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Ding, Ding!!
It's Gscholz by a knockout!
Did you see that left hook?
Crumpp:lol
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Originally posted by VO101_Isegrim
Uhm, the 1944 June 14th P-38 defensive circle was actually vs. our 109s, not the Rumanian ones, and we kicked the lightnings really in the bellybutton on that day. ;) (one of the very-very rare circumstances we had numerical superiority).
PS: I have the details of it, there was some really wild claiming on the US side.
Hmmmm, which June 14th, 1944 we talking about. The 1st FG History and the 82nd FG history don't mention the 14th at all and the listing for losses in both books show no losses on the 14th. Whose bellybutton got kicked? Don't see anything for the 14th FG either and that covers the 38 Groups.
Dan/Slack
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Guppy35,
According to Ethell it was 14th FG and date was june 14th, but this comes from a pilots memories so date might be wrong.
GScholz,
There is not much sense to selectively pick up quotes which happen to support your view. Similar quotes can be collected from other side too to support what ever one wants to argue.
Otherwise so far I have not seen any statistics which supports the argument that the LW was actually winning BoB. Both sides suffered heavy losses and it appears that the RAF was more worried about their losses than LW; Dowding wanted to save fighters for possible invasion. Still to establish somekind of air superiority the LW would have needed far better than 1:1 ratio on fighters and none of the above statistics support that.
gripen
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Yeah Gripen and the allies never had Air Supremacy over Normandy either....Geez.
Gripen shifts along the perch in his elegant, golden cage.
"Rooooaaaaack, Polly want a cracker...."
HOW many times do the same stats have to be posted and refuted?
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Yeah Gripen and the allies never had Air Supremacy over Normandy either....Geez.
Gripen shifts along the perch in his elegant, golden cage.
"Rooooaaaaack, Polly want a cracker...."
HOW many times do the same stats have to be posted and refuted?
Crumpp
LOL and this Crispy claims to be a professional dirt eater. Some of that dirt he ate while crawlimg around on his belly like a snake was full of pollutants for it has effected what is suppose to be between his ears.
This is the mature(?????:rolleyes: ) person you have defending the USofA, Americans?:aok :rofl
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GScholz, did you read what I posted to Crumpp?
I'm saying most popular histories of the RAF use mainly British sources, which isn't suprising given the state of Luftwaffe archives.
From a British perspective, the RAF was losing in the last week of August and first week of September. What wasn't realised at the time is that the Germans were losing more. Their strength was falling faster than the RAF's, and their fighter force was shrinking faster than the RAF's.
You've posted a very long list that does exactly that. It speaks only of the RAF, and their view of the battle. Nobody is denying the RAF were under intolerable pressure in late August/ early September.
But you can't judge a battle of atrition by looking only at one side
The RAF was weeks away from breaking, only if the Luftwaffe could keep up the same amount of pressure. Yet their fighter sorties fell from 4000 to 3200 in the first week of Sept, their serviceability fell, and their diminishing number of pilots had to fly more sorties per man, and longer sorties, than the RAF.
Where in your long list of quotes are the ones that tell of the Luftwaffe?
Contrary to general belief and official reports, the enemy's bombing attacks by day did extensive damage to five of our forward aerodromes and also to six of our seven sector stations. There was a critical period when the damage to sector stations and our ground organization was having a serious effect on the fighting efficiency of the squadrons, who could not be given the same good technical and administrative service as previously.........The absence of many essential telephone lines, the use of scratch equipment in emergency operation rooms, and the general dislocation of ground organization, was seriously felt for about a week in the handling of squadrons by day to meet the enemy's massed attacks, which were continued without the former occasional break of a day.
Report by Air Vice Marshal Keith Park - 6th September 1940
Don't you think it would have been more honest if you'd included the next line as well when you copied and pasted?
When asked later about the general situation, Park simply stated "...we are holding our own...just".
Or perhaps you copied and pasted it from the second page it appears on, where it is followed by a different line:
On the German side, even though no was prepared to admit it, the state of affairs was in reality even worse.
Either way, you should have been honest enough to put the following line in.
Look at the date. The Luftwaffe turned on London on the 7th. The whole tone of this is that the critical period was already over by the 6th. Which fits in exactly with what I'm saying, the Luftwaffe launched an all out attack on the airfields in late August, but could not sustain the same level into September.
"Contrary to general belief and official reports, the enemy's bombing attacks by day did extensive damage to five of our forward aerodromes, and also to six of our seven sector stations." Manston and Lympne were unfit for operations 'on several occasions for days' and Biggin Hill was so severely damaged that for over a week it could operate only one squadron. Had the Luftwaffe continued to attack these sectors, 'the fighter defences of London would have been in a parlous state during the last critical phase when heavy attacks have been directed against the capital."
Sector operation rooms suffered both from direct hits and damage to landlines. They all had to use emergency rooms, though these were too small and poorly equipped to cope with the normal control of three squadrons per sector.
Air Vice Marshal Keith Park, C-in-C 11 Group
Dowding, in his despatch, responded by pointing out that 11 Group had survived 40 attacks on 13 airfields, and had briely lost only 3.
The position was grim in the extreme as from August 24th to September 6th. 295 fighters had been totally destroyed and 171 badly damaged, against a total output of 269 new and repaired Spitfires and Hurricanes. Worst of all, during the fortnight 103 pilots were killed or missing and 128 were wounded, which represented a total wastage of 120 pilots per week out of a fighting strength of just under 1,000.
Experienced pilots were like gold dust, and each one lost had to be replaced by an untried man who for some time would be vulnerable, until he acquired battle know-how. Fresh squadrons, moved in to replace tired units, very often lost more aircraft and pilots than the formations they replaced. For instance, 616 Squadron lost twelve aircraft and five pilots between August 25th and September 2nd and had to be retired to Coltishall in No.12 Group.
No. 603 Squadron, newly arrived in 11 Group on August 28th, had by September 6th lost sixteen aircraft and twelve pilots, while 253 Squadron at Kenley lost thirteen Hurricanes and nine pilots in the seven days they were in battle, from August 30th.
Wood and Dempster The Narrow Margin McGraw Hill 1961 p332-3
Again, it looks only at the sustainability of RAF losses, as if the Luftwaffe was a constant force. Total Luftwaffe losses in the same period were around 370, and the RAF were producing more than twice as many replacements as the Luftwaffe, and the RAF had large reserves.
RAF Spitfire and urricane strength, including reserves, on th 23rd August was 1225. By the 6th Sept that had declined to 1040. A reduction of 185. But at that rate it would take 6 weeks just to deplete the reserves, without cuting into frontline strength. And thats only if the Luftwaffe could keep up the same rate, and if the weather had turned worse by mid October.
While the Luftwaffe were attacking more and more strategic targets under the cover of darkness, during daytime it was throwing everything it could into an all out effort to destroy the RAF day-fighter bases defending London. On the 30th and 31st August the day battle reached an unprecedented ferocity. The 31st was our blackest day.........
I was one of the casualties on the 31st. As Dornier bombers swept over Croydon, demolishing hangars and technical buildings, I led my squadron off through the smoke and dust against the attackers. Twenty minutes later, after a sharp cut and thrust combat with a swarm of escorting Messerschmitts, my Hurricane was hit. So was I. Once again my parachute saved me. That night in Croydon General Hospital, the surgeon took a 20mm cannon-shell out of my foot, As I passed out under the anesthetic I could faintly hear the sirens wailing. The Luftwaffe were closing in on London.
Group Captain Peter Townsend Duel in the Dark Harrap, London 1986
Again, it supports exactly what I am saying. The Luftwaffe effort had already begun to trail off in early September.
.......I do consider that these latest figures are a means of encouragement, but I feel compelled to look at the long term forecast. In a months time, how many pilots and aircraft will I have at my disposal
Air Chief Marshal Dowding to the War Cabinet
Again, like all your accounts, it's looking at the strength of the RAF, not the balance of forces. Only the balance matters. If the RAF lost 30% of it's strength, it wouldn't matter if the Luftwaffe lost 50%. In fact, it wouldn't matter if the Luftwaffe lost 30%, because Fighter Command by late August was much larger than the Jagdwaffe.
. . . . . . . this day for instance, a lanky, nineteen year old boy called Cocky Dundas* flew with the wing for the first time. Exactly a month earlier Dundas had been with with 616 Squadron at Kenley; they were waiting at readiness for an evening visit from Winston Churchill when they had been scrambled and ran into a flock of 109s over Kent. It was Dundas's first fight and a 109 had "jumped" him, shot his controls to bits and put bullets in his engine and glycol tank. Smoke and glycol fumes filled the cockpit and he could not get his hood open. He spun out of control from 12,000 feet till finally he was able to jettison the hood and baled out at 800 feet, breaking his collar bone at the same time. Now only two of the old pilots were left in the squadron, and Dundas, still shaken, shoulder still weak, was going back for more. . . . .
Paul Brickhill - Reach for the Sky, Collins 1954 p227
* Flying Officer H.S.L.Dundas 616 Squadron RAF.
Which implies 616 lost all but two pilots. In fact, 616 lost 5 pilots throughout the battle. 616 was based away from the fighting for most of the battle, and was one of those squadrons that took inexperienced pilots, trained them, then sent them on to new squadrons.
In Park’s mind, 7 September was always the turning point. Three years later, he flew to London from Malta and gave his first press interview on the Battle of Britain. He explained how close the Germans came to victory and how they threw it away by switching their main attack to London.
Vincent Orange Sir Keith Park Methuen 1985 pp107-108
And Park was under the impression the Luftwaffe was twice as strong as it actually was, and had twicee the replacement rate. Park thought the Luftwaffe could do what it did in the last week of August on into September and October, but it couldn't.
GScholz, I said most history books present only the British viw of the battle, and make judgements without looking at the condition of the Luftwaffe. You have responded with a very long list of mainly pilot accounts, that look only at the British side of the battle. How do you judge a battle of atrition by looking at only one side?
Edited to clean up quote brackets
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Now, from the same site you copied and pasted all the quotes from:
(http://www.battleofbritain.net/germloss-1.jpg)
"Although the above graph shows that German losses during this month were very high, they appear even worse when we take the total German strength and convert the above figures into percentages. The single engined Bf109 figures represent 24% of the total fighter strength while the bombers represent a total of 19% of the bomber strength. Concern to the Luftwaffe was the high casualty rate of pilots and crew, which had to have an impact on morale of aircrew of the German Air Force.
The month previous, when the Luftwaffe was content on attempting to draw the Royal Air Force into combat over the English Channel, figures were far fewer than those shown above for the month of August 1940 when more serious attempts were being made on targets over Britain itself. "
"But things were not to get any better. In a later document, when looking at the total damages and losses of the Luftwaffe, we shall see that as the Battle of Britain wears on, things do not improve for the Luftwaffe, and it was not just the German fighter strength that suffered. "
Casualties for August
RAF 130 Spitfire and Hurricane pilots killed and captured
Luftwaffe 145 109 pilots killed and captured. (And the Luftwaffe were training less pilots, and had a smaller number of single engined pilots)
It's much worse when you look at total fighter pilot casualties, inluding the twins.
Luftwaffe, 335 killed and missing
RAF 146 killed and missing
Even if you count in the wounded, and assume that none returned to combat, the RAF are still well ahead.
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OK,
After some extensive research this argument is unwinnable for both sides. It is the current "rage" among WWII scholars. The real ones who get paid to teach in Universities.
There is a debate as to whether or not the Luftwaffe could have sustained the level of casualties it was taking. The RAF was producing more planes than the RLM. Counter - RLM didn't put Germany on a Wartime production plane til much later in the war. German workers still worked 8 hours /day 5 days/week.
I personally think the "planes" scholars are wrong as the amount of airframes was never an issue. Pilot replacement is and the LW was under some strain.
I also personnally feel that with that said they never had to "dig" for pilots nor did they change their replacement policy like the RAF. The LW didn't lower it's training standards to fill cockpits the RAF did AND robbed other services for trained pilots. Counter - RAF could have withdrawn to the Northern Airfields. IMO this would have resulted in a defacto LW victory.
So in the academic world two schools of thought:
1. The Luftwaffe was capable of winning the BoB and almost did as the British Leadership feared in Sept '40.
2. The LW was incapable of winning the BoB from the begining
As such there is plenty of material out there to support both sides of the argument. No one will solve it here.
Crumpp
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If you call Luftwaffe losses of 37+, RAF losses of 27 the RAF being spanked. (The lowest source for the Luftwaffe gives 37, most are higher)
Facts :
7th September
14 Bf 109s lost and 2 damaged (RAF claims 21 destroyed, + 13 probable, 6 damaged)
27 Spits/Hurris lost (25 of these to 109s), further 10 damaged, 14 pilots killed or missing
So to be more precise, it was the Fighter Command who was spanked by the Jagdwaffe on the 7th September. Possibly one of the reason why the highest rate of alert of invasion was initiated by the British on that day.
I've asked you repeatedly for a source for your 109 consumption figures, I don't think one has ever been forthcoming, has it?
I really can`t remember you asking for such figures, especially not repeatadly. Otherwise the consumption figures of the 109 are well known to you, it was discussed a couple of times. But be more precise in what you are interested in, I don`t feel like typing whole pages.
Until that it remains that the 109 had more range than the Spit, especially if late models are compared, and this is supported by simple reasoning, technical data and intelligence documents vs. some errors in books.
How many ships does it take to support your "1 panzer division"?
You mean a single Pz Div, say some 10 000 men, plus 2-250 tanks can easily conquer the whole UK, defended by some 25-30 divisions...? British land forces weren`t that bad.
The Germans had enough ships to support an invasion, the barges were necessary for landing troops on the beaches.
Uhm, like 168 steamers, 419 tugs, 1600 motorboats and 1910 barges...? A mere 700 000 tons in total ? Protected by two light cruisers, and nine destroyers plus some S-boots? Scharhorst and Gneisenau in repair, Bismarck and Tirpitz not yet finished it` trials?
Somebody in the German general staff summerized the capabilities of the "invasion fleet" nicely: He could send his troops right into a sausage filler machine for the same results.
The only reason British history writing wants us to believe that Seelowe had any real chance to be commenced is because the need to make up for the poor British record in WW2 with a relatively successfull period.
Isegrim, if you go back you'll notice I was talking about the Luftwaffe sorties dropping in the first week of September.
Changing the argument, Naswhwan? OK, fine... still not true. LW sorties were not dropping in the first week of September compared to the previous week, in fact the pressure on the RAF was increasing, 50% sorties were flown in the 1st week of September than in the last week of August.
German daylight sorties according to the RAF`s 1940 reports:
August :
25 : 250
26 : 400
27 : 75
28 : 400
29 : 360
30 : 600
31 : 800
----------
2885 in last week of August
Sept
1 : 450
2 : 850
3 : 600
4 : 650
5 : 450
6 : 720
7 : 700
----------
4420 in 1st week of September
8 : 170
9 : 400
10 : 50
11 : 500
12 : 50
13 : 90
14 : 400
----------
1660 in 2nd week of September
So you better give up that BS about the 1st week of September, for the sake of your own credibility.
OK, if you really can't see it.
It's halfway down the page, the first file under the heading
O.K.L. Fighter Claims : Chef für Ausz. und Dizsiplin Luftwaffen-Personalamt L.P. (A) V Films & Supplementary Claims from Lists
etc...
Still can`t see anywhere Caldwell stating the LW claiming 2000+, 3000+ (etc... your numbers always vary when you talk about LW claims) in BoB. And I am bit lazy to collect it as whole into an excell table, and delete all non-claim lines such as the date, exlude the nightfighter results over the Reich, France etc. Not to mention this is a list of the filed claims by pilots, and NOT the officially accepted list of kills by the Abschusskomission.
Sorry, I was going by what Les Butler and Don Caldwell have to say on their web page:
"It is clear from his text that Groehler's objectives were:
(1) to show that the German-Soviet front was the most significant source of the Luftwaffe losses that ultimately led to Allied air supremacy, and
(2) that the Luftwaffe could not afford to weaken its forces in the East, even when pushed hard by the USAAF strategic offensive and the Normandy invasion. Groehler did make these claims, to the undoubted pleasure of his Soviet masters, but his data, when examined carefully, don't back him up. "
http://www.butler98.freeserve.co.uk/thtrlosses.htm
Oh, great. Frankly I agree with that with Butler and Caldwell. The question was, however, not how much valid are Groehler`s conclusions, but wheter his data is valid or not. Not even Butler or Caldwell, or anybody else questions the validity of his data. Groehler is a great source if one just concentrates on the raw numbers and ignores the political BS, that was BTW, absolutely neccesary to be added in any book in socialist era. Besides, I believe he added the propaganda stuff to allow the book pass the censor, and who could read between the lines could find the reality presented in the many-many tables.
quote:
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No, they lost around 600 on OPERATIONAL missions,
Source?
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Wood and Dempster, The Narrow Margin. Hooton, Eagle in Flames gives similar figures.
Give an exact qoute then which supports your claim that 600 "fighters" were "lost" under strictly "operational" missions, they don`t include non-combat related losses, they don`t include accidents etc.
As for how laughable it was, ask those 55 000 dead corpses buried under the molten aluminium of Lancesters.
Tastless, even for you.
Can I take that as an agreement that the Bf 110 wasn`t exactly laughable in it`s own class? In fact, it was a very good machine in the twin engined category. Let`s compare it to the Blenheim, Beufighter... :)
Incidentally, Groth looks pretty typical for the Jagdwaffe during the BoB. They claimed 2000 single engined fighters, for total RAF single engined fighter losses of less than 1,000, and probably less than 700 lost to the Jagdwaffe. 3 to overclaiming looks about typical for the Jagdwaffe during the BoB.
According to Naswan at least... :rofl
RAF wastage might have been close to 2000, but that doesn't mean losses. Old planes being written off for fatigue reasons, fabric winged Hurricanes being sent back for scrapping/upgrading, old aircraft being sent to the maintenance schools for trainee fitters to practice on, all are counted into wastage.
The interesting part of that while you seem to be aware of this fact, you refuse to apply the same standards to LW losses. Double standards.
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whereas in the German system the replacements pilots came to the Jagdgeschwader from different named reserve units, which are of course are not counted in the first line strenght.
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Isegrim, where were the German reserves?
Let`s start with the basics. Do you admit that German organisation was different than British one, and reserves were not atteched directly to the Staffeln ? Therefore, German reserves don`t show up in a table that deals only with the 1st line units...?
These are the figures from the Luftwaffe OOB at http://www.ww2.dk/oob/statistics/gob.htm
which are taken straight from the Luftwaffe records. Click on the Introduction at the top of the page and you will see the references.
These show the first line fighter units only.
They don`t show any of 2nd line units.
First line fighter units don`t have reserve planes/pilots attached.
For this reason, no reserves are shown in this table, just the strenght immidiately available to the fighter units.
Note that Olaf Groehler in The History of Air War 1910-1970 also gives the strenght of the LW s-e fighters for April 11 1940. His list includes the reserves as well it seems, and lists 1356 s-e fighters. Naswan`s source gives for a similiar date 1258 fighters.
The fact that Groehler`s table includes the reserve fighters is proven by RL2III/1158 (Nashwan`s favourite :D ), provided by Richard T. Eger, see below:
On 31 January 1945 the combat units of the Luftwaffe and their associated Erganzungs Einheiten, had the following strength in Bf109 types.
These are on hand totals, they include both 'frontline' and 'other' units. Included are all aircraft operational and non-operational at the time. (combat/Erganzungs):
Bf109G1/5 (0/1)
Bf109G12 (0/5)
Bf109G6 (71/328)
Bf109G14 and G14U4 (431/190)
Bf109G10, G10/U4 and G14/AS (568/3)
Bf109K4 (314/0)
Bf109G10/R6 (51/0)
-----------------------
Total (1435/527)
Other Jagd types totaled (1058/359)
Of those 3379 were single engine fighters, but of those only 2493 were in actual combat units.
Notice the following :
1, There were 314 in LW service of coolest fighter of WW2 . ;)
2, The first number gives the 1st line units, the second gives the reserve units (Erganzungseinheiten means 'Replacement units').
3, Most importantly , note that the total fighters ('Jagd types') avaiable amount 3379 on the 31st January 1945. These include reserve though, the first line units hold only about 2/3 of this, 2493 planes.
Compare with the number Groehler gives as "S-e fighter strenght" on the 1st January 1945 : 3328 fighters. This is very close as given the total (combat/reserve units) fighter strengt of the LW by Richard as 3379. Obviously, given the great similiarity Groehler`s figures include the fighter reserves .
In the same table, Groehler gives the LW s-e fighter strenght on 11 April 1940 as 1356. These also include reserves.
What Nashwan listed for a similiar date is 1258 s-e fighters. Some 100 fighters less. His list only show the first line units, and do not include the reserve planes.
As you can see, the Jagdwaffe were decidedly under stregth by the end of 1940. You'd think that all these reserves would have been issued, if they existed.
It doesn`t work this way. The RAF-FC had an established strenght of some 1400 or so fighters (roughly). Only about 6-700 of these were servicable. Using your logic, the RAF didn`t have any reserves, because if it had, it would surely issue all those reserves to raise the number of operational planes. But things in real life don`t follow your logic.
What numbers do your sources give for Luftwaffe reserves, Isegrim?
I don`t have exact numbers for the full Bf 109. However it`s quite clear from the above, that you only list the first line Bf 109 strenght, and not include the reserves. You do include, however, reserves of the RAF.
You're the only person I've ever seen claiming German reserves still existed by late 1940. Perhaps you can give us some figures, and a source?
You're the only person I've ever seen claiming German reserves didn`t existed by late 1940. Perhaps you can give us some figures, and a source?
An explanation of why they remained in the reserves when the Jagdwaffe was so seriously under strength would be nice, too.
'The JW was seriously understrenght' - this is your claim, unproven, and frankly, BS. I don`t feel o give any explanation to it.
However, it`s interesting to compare the loss rate of pilots (as according to David Baker):
% of fighter Pilot strenght lost:
RAF - LW
August 26% - 15%
September 28% - 21%
Especially why reserves weren't sent to squadrons in Sept and Oct, when the Luftwaffe was engaged in combat and had only approx 50% of it's established strength fit for duty.
Tell us how could there be RAF reserves at all, if the established strenght was supposed to be some 1400 planes, out of which no more than 6-700 were fit for duty during September October? These are facts, and hard to dismiss. It was already proven that the RAF had less servicable fighters than the LW by the date you mentioned (ie. on 28th Sept 712 servicable Bf 109s vs. 604 Spits/Hurris).
Why didn`t they just call up the reserves, if they existed ? You say the RAF didn`t have any reserves left, as they would surely fill up the ranks if they had.
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Originally posted by Guppy35
Hmmmm, which June 14th, 1944 we talking about. The 1st FG History and the 82nd FG history don't mention the 14th at all and the listing for losses in both books show no losses on the 14th. Whose bellybutton got kicked? Don't see anything for the 14th FG either and that covers the 38 Groups.
Dan/Slack
I am talking about the 14th FG`s combat vs. the 101st Group Pumas on the June 14th, 1944 over Hungary.
That was 15 P-38s vs. 31 Bf 109 G-6s (US pilots reported some 60-65 109s+190s)
Results :
US side lost 5 P-38s, 2 heavily damaged ones, plus other got light damage. Claimed 13 Bf 109s destroyed, 1 probable, 5 damaged.
Hungarian side lost 1 109 in air combat (pilot KIA), another in emergency landing (pilot alive). 1 109 was damaged in landing, pilot alive. 1 109s RTB due to overheating coolant.
Pilots claim 9 P-38s, only 5 are accepted as valid.
Truth to be told, even though they kicked the 14th`s butt on their first mission, they missed the bombers due to the error of ground control, so effectively a mission failure despite tactical success. On the otehr hand, even if they find the bombers in time, little could they have done against the horde.
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300!
-
Pilots
The critical problem faced by the Fighter Command was the loss of trained fighter pilots. In phase one of the campaign, (8 to 18 August), the RAF lost 154 pilots (killed, seriously wounded, missing). Only 63 new fighter pilots were available from the training schools for the same period. During phase two, 24 August to 1 September, the figures were even worse as losses reached 231 pilots, or about 20 percent of the total combat strenght of the command! Combat strenght in the month of August decreased by almost one third, from 1434 to 1023. The Squadron avarage fell from 26 to 16 operational pilots. Naturally, combat experience was similiarly reduced.
In July and August, roughly one-fourth of the Squadron Leaders and one-third of the Flight Leaders had been killed or removed from flying due to injuries. Experienced pilots numbered no more than 500 - less than one half of the Fighter Command`s strenght - with the remainder often having less than 20 hours flying time on fighters. Daily sortie rates were high and it was not uncommon for pilots to fly three of four sorties a day. Stress was also high. "One Squadron, No 85, based at Croydon, had fourteen of it`s eighteen pilots shot down in two weeks, two of them twice.".
From "The Battle of Britain - A German Perspective" by Lt. Col. Earle Lund, USAF, Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course, Campaign Analysis Study. Page 25
" For Dowding, it was the pilot supply that was causing a headache. The week following Adlertag, he lost almost 80 % of his Flight- and Squadron Leaders (KIA, MIA, or denied from flying). Flights that met the enemy were often led by officers with no experience whatsoever. There was one Squadron Leader who was put in charge without ever being in a Hurricane; he had three takeoffs and landings before leading his unit into combat.
But it wasn`t only the commanders lacking experience, the subordinate pilots often had a mere 10 hours in single seat fighters. It took extreme courage for such flyers to land in high-speed fighters, not to mention air combat. Moreover, on the 10th August Dowding agreed to reduce pilot training even more. It took a mere two weeks between training the pilot and his first combat engagement. Until July, the course was six months long."
page 195
...
"Johnny Kent, who was a professional officier and test pilot in the RAF, managed to transfer himself to a combat unit in the spring of 1940. He wasn`t keeping his mouth shut about the short combat course he took. He had to fire at ground targets near the river Dee with the eight machineguns of his Hurricane. After a half second burst, the guns become silenced. Cursing his jammed guns after landing, he was told that he merely used up the amount of ammunition issued for the practice. Kent stated that "many of the new boys went into his frist combat without ever firing his guns". Few of Kent`s instructors ever flew in combat, but there were also some who was not serving with a flying squadron for years."
page 115
"The Fighter Command had sustained heavy losses, and morale was incredibly low. After arriving to the airfield, the new assigned commander of the 92nd Squadron, sit among his pilots in the canteen without uncovering his identity. His first impressions were unfavourable. "Their whole behaviour and rudeness showed the lack of self-discipline." He stated that they were "a disorderly, undisciplined, and demoralized group made of first-class material".
This Squadron sustained almost twice as many losses as the 303rd, from where the new commander was transferred from. In a short period, it lost 4 of it`s commanders, 3 of them in the previous month (August). One of them was alive for only 2 days.
Combat effectiveness of the squadron was refelcting it`s demoralized state. One one occasion, during combat air patrol in their Hurricanes, a small group of Bf 109s made diving attacks agaisnt them. Johhny Kent, the new commander, met them head to head with his unit. The Germans however turned away every time from direct engagement. After several such occasions, Kent noticed that many Hurricanes were turning back and attempting to return to base. Kent called this phenomenon the "109 disease". "These pilots no longer believed that they could stand fast against the German fighters." "When we returned to our base, I called the pilots together, and told them that if I see just once again that any of them flees, and thus endangers himself and the whole unit, I won`t wait until the Germans get him, I will shoot him down myself."
Page 236
Len Deighton, Fighters (pages as in Hungarian edition)
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So to be more precise, it was the Fighter Command who was spanked by the Jagdwaffe on the 7th September. Possibly one of the reason why the highest rate of alert of invasion was initiated by the British on that day.
The Jagdwaffe were supposed to be escorting the bombers. The RAF were supposed to be targeting the Bobers. Total RAF losses were lower than Luftwaffe losses.
How many ships does it take to support your "1 panzer division"?
You mean a single Pz Div, say some 10 000 men, plus 2-250 tanks can easily conquer the whole UK, defended by some 25-30 divisions...? British land forces weren`t that bad.
Of course not, I was repeating your claim. Hence the quotes.
The Germans had enough ships to support an invasion, the barges were necessary for landing troops on the beaches.
Uhm, like 168 steamers, 419 tugs, 1600 motorboats and 1910 barges...?
It's only a 20 mile crossing. Hell, the Italians had enough to support several panzer divisions and tens of thousands o their own troops in North Africa, over much larger distances. I'm sure the Germans could manage o rustle up enough shipping in Europe.
Protected by two light cruisers, and nine destroyers plus some S-boots? Scharhorst and Gneisenau in repair, Bismarck and Tirpitz not yet finished it` trials?
Of course not. The Kriegsmarine couldn't hope to stand up to the RN. That was the Luftwaffe's job. The Germans felt the Luftwaffe would be able to protect the invasion fleet, although I very much doubt they could have, even if they' been able to defeat the RAF.
Isegrim, if you go back you'll notice I was talking about the Luftwaffe sorties dropping in the first week of September.
Changing the argument, Naswhwan?
No, repeating the argument. That's what I've been saying all along, even though you have consistently tried to change it to the second week of September.
German daylight sorties according to the RAF`s 1940 reports:
Isegrim,I'm talking figures taken from Hooton, who got them from the Luftwaffe archives. You areusing figures that the RAF puts every time as "estimates"
Given a disparity between Luftwaffe records o sorties and RAFestimates of Luftwaffe sorties, I'd choose the original Luftwaffe figures every time.
But, as you think the RAF figures of Luftwaffe activity aremore accurate than Luftwaffe figures, then we'd better use them. From the same page you trust above Luftwaffe figures, Jagdwaffe losses 7th Sept: 43 109s and 110s destroyed, 18 probable, 12 damaged. As you can see, the RAF spanked the Jagdwaffe over London on the 7th Sept.
In total, the Luftwaffe lost 2,500 aircraft during the battle, the RAF less thn 1,000. Or don't you want to use RAF figures in preference to the Luftwaffe's own figures anymore?
So you better give up that BS about the 1st week of September, for the sake of your own credibility.
Isegrim, for the sake of your own credibility, you need to decide wether you trust RAF estimates over Luftwaffe records. I am using a consistent line, Luftwaffe records for the Luftwaffe, RAF records for the RAF.
O.K.L. Fighter Claims : Chef für Ausz. und Dizsiplin Luftwaffen-Personalamt L.P. (A) V Films & Supplementary Claims from Lists
etc...
Still can`t see anywhere Caldwell stating the LW claiming 2000+, 3000+ (etc... your numbers always vary when you talk about LW claims) in BoB.
Caldwell? It's Tony Wood's site, I didn't mention Caldwell in connection with it. My mention of Caldwell was in relation to Caldwell's site, and his opinions of Groehler.
The claims are all listed. Nobody "mentions" 2000, thats just the number of claims made. You can count them if you don't trust me. I used a spreadsheet, which does the work in seconds.
And I am bit lazy to collect it as whole into an excell table, and delete all non-claim lines such as the date, exlude the nightfighter results over the Reich, France etc. Not to mention this is a list of the filed claims by pilots, and NOT the officially accepted list of kills by the Abschusskomission.
It's easy to do with a spreadsheet. Strangely, their seem remarkably few claims of Spitfires etc over the Reich during the BoB ;)
As to the officialy listed claims, we can try a few comparisons.
We already know Groth has 13 claims listed, and you say he is acknowledged to have 13 kills by the end of the BoB.
Helmut Wick is supposed to have got 42 victories during the BoB. I can find 42 claims by Wick from July to the end of December 1940. This actually goes outside the British timeframe, but I'll assume those 42 are in the German timeframe for the battle.
Adolf Galland. Because of the problem with the dates, eg is July counted as BoB by the Luftwaffe? Is December? Is January? I looked at Galland in detail. He is supposed to have had 50 kills when he took command of JG26 on 1st Nov 1940. Tony Wood's doc lists his 50th kill as being on the 30th Oct, and his 51st as the 1st of Nov with JG26. Again, an exact match.
Walter Oesau. The info I found says he got his first victory on the 13th May, his 20th on the 18th Aug. Again, Tony Wood's doc gives exactly the same figures. It then says he got his 40th on the 5th Feb 41, and again Tony Wood's doc gives his 40th on 5th Feb.
So, either this doc contains the confirmed kills, or kills were confirmed as a matter of course.
Oh, great. Frankly I agree with that with Butler and Caldwell. The question was, however, not how much valid are Groehler`s conclusions, but wheter his data is valid or not. Not even Butler or Caldwell, or anybody else questions the validity of his data. Groehler is a great source if one just concentrates on the raw numbers and ignores the political BS, that was BTW, absolutely neccesary to be added in any book in socialist era. Besides, I believe he added the propaganda stuff to allow the book pass the censor, and who could read between the lines could find the reality presented in the many-many tables.
His data is quite obviously wrong if he saidwhat you claimed. Tony Wood has posted each individual claim, and hey check ou with what the pilots are supposed to have scored. They amount to 2000 claims for single engined fighters.
Give an exact qoute then which supports your claim that 600 "fighters" were "lost" under strictly "operational" missions, they don`t include non-combat related losses, they don`t include accidents etc.
They do include accidents, they include accidents on operational missions, for both sides. They do not include accidents on non operational mission, eg a checkout flight after engine troubles, a ferry flight from manufacturer to airfield etc.
According to Naswan at least..
According to the Luftwaffe archive documents published on Tony Wood's site.
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The interesting part of that while you seem to be aware of this fact, you refuse to apply the same standards to LW losses. Double standards.
No Isegrim, I am applying exactly the same standards.
Lets look at the Luftwaffe OOB again:
29th June 1107 109s on srength
28th Sept 920 on strength
Production of 109s
220 July, 173 August, 218 Sept, 611 total
611 produced, on strength number went down 187, total 798 less 109s by the end of Sept, and the Bob went on for another month, and some 109s would have been repaired.
Wastage is always higher than losses.
And I'd be willing to bet, in late 44 when the Luftwaffe had lots of aircraft, but operations were curtailed for other reasons, wastage would be much higher as a percentage of overall losses.
Let`s start with the basics. Do you admit that German organisation was different than British one, and reserves were not atteched directly to the Staffeln ? Therefore, German reserves don`t show up in a table that deals only with the 1st line units...?
Yes
These show the first line fighter units only.
They don`t show any of 2nd line units.
First line fighter units don`t have reserve planes/pilots attached.
For this reason, no reserves are shown in this table, just the strenght immidiately available to the fighter units.
Where were the reserves? What source have you got that tells you there were reserves at all?
In the same table, Groehler gives the LW s-e fighter strenght on 11 April 1940 as 1356. These also include reserves.
What Nashwan listed for a similiar date is 1258 s-e fighters. Some 100 fighters less. His list only show the first line units, and do not include the reserve planes.
Then what figures does Groehler give for the period of the battle? You're skirting around the issue, Isegrim. You haven't shown they had any reserves during the battle.
Hell, they only had a 100 aircraft reserve before the battle of France. That would have been gone before the BoB started. You still haven't shown anything that says they had reserve pilots, ever.
As you can see, the Jagdwaffe were decidedly under stregth by the end of 1940. You'd think that all these reserves would have been issued, if they existed.
It doesn`t work this way. The RAF-FC had an established strenght of some 1400 or so fighters (roughly).
Possibly, if you include all the other types, but I doubt it was that high. Spit and Hurri establishment was around 900.
Using your logic, the RAF didn`t have any reserves, because if it had, it would surely issue all those reserves to raise the number of operational planes. But things in real life don`t follow your logic.
Squadrons were supposed to have 18 odd fighters. The RAF purposely oversupplied the squadrons knowing that some planes would always be undergoing repair, overhaul etc.
In effect, the RAF had two levels of reserve, some with the squadron, others in storage depots.
A squadron was expected to be able to fly 12 aircraft at a time. They had more, but they allowed for some always being unserviceable. Only if less than 12 planes were serviceable would the squadron be below strength.
If you look at the RAF reports, you will see they maintained 600 or so serviceable Spits and Hurricanes.
But for the Jagdwaffe, it's not even serviceable planes. Look at the figures for end Sept. 1132 establishment, only 920 on hand. Forget serviceable aircraft, the Jagdwaffe had 212 less aircraft in total than they should have. That's nearly 20% below strength, yet still none of the reserves you claim existed were issued.
In fact, if you look at the figures you've posted from Groehler, even before the bale of France, the reserves wereonly 100, so if the reserves had never been touched they would still make up less than half the shortfall
I don`t have exact numbers for the full Bf 109. However it`s quite clear from the above, that you only list the first line Bf 109 strenght, and not include the reserves. You do include, however, reserves of the RAF.
So to sum up, the Luftwaffe had 100 fighters in reservebefore the battle of France. They then fought two major air campaigns, fighter strength fell to more than 200 below establishment, no one has given figures claiming they still had reserves. Isegrim, you are the only person who thinks they did.
'The JW was seriously understrenght' - this is your claim, unproven, and frankly, BS. I don`t feel o give any explanation to it.
It's from the Luftwaffe's own figures. Established strength en Sept 1940 1132, actual strength 920. They were short 212 fighters.
However, it`s interesting to compare the loss rate of pilots (as according to David Baker):
% of fighter Pilot strenght lost:
RAF - LW
August 26% - 15%
September 28% - 21%
54% in two months? So at 60% over the whole battle. Problem is, Fighter Command lost 1 in 6 pilots killed, and another 1 in 6 pilots wounded. 3000 took part, approx 500 each killed and wounded. That's a total casualty rate, for the whole battle, including wounded, of 33%.
Especially why reserves weren't sent to squadrons in Sept and Oct, when the Luftwaffe was engaged in combat and had only approx 50% of it's established strength fit for duty.
Tell us how could there be RAF reserves at all, if the established strenght was supposed to be some 1400 planes, out of which no more than 6-700 were fit for duty during September October?
Firstly, 1400 is a made up figure
Because the squadrons were up to strength with 600 or more sericeable Spits and Hurricanes. And RAF established srength never fell, planes were issued from storage at times.
What you want us to believe is that strength of the Luftwaffe single engined fighter force fell almost 20% below establishment, and the reserves existed but weren't issued.
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Oh dear, oh dear, Isengrim again
Get one thing straight about the basics bud, the Germans LOST the Battle of Britain. And just a year later, the "pathetic Brits" were launching much bigger air-raids at the German Reich then the Germans ever managed to put together, - 1000 two and four engined bombers in a raid is far more than the Germans ever put together. Bear in mind also, that in the final stages of the BoB, the German escorts were up to 4 for each bomber. This was in daylight and the RAF had practically no cannon armed fighters, and the bombers were only 30-60 minutes away from friendly territory!
Yet again to remember, for the Brits on the offensive, that included cruising over enemy territory for hundreds of miles.
Cruising to Berlin meant that the British aircraft were over German airspace for at least 3-4 hours, - London - Berlin is about 1100 miles with return, while London-Paris is close to 400.
Aces like Schnaufer had a nice opportunity for targets, - if one would get into the stream of bombers, kills would rack up quickly.
Actually, the Brits were already ahead in NF technology, with some pilots racking up many kills over German occupied territory, many of te victims being German night fighters!
I also find it quite funny to look at your figures about the nice range of the 109 compared to the Spitfire, while the Spitfires of the RAF were already streatching much further into the Luftwaffe's reagion in the low countries in 1941 or so, than ever the 109 into Britain. You may calculate at will, but this was actually the case. The RAF's (Spitfire) operational radius seems to have been reaching much further than the operational radius of the 109. So eat yer numbers!
Better still, I'll give you mine. From Calais to central London, the airline is only 85 miles, while from Central London to Rotterdam we have 192 miles.
:D
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Yeah Gripen and the allies never had Air Supremacy over Normandy either....Geez.
Gripen shifts along the perch in his elegant, golden cage.
"Rooooaaaaack, Polly want a cracker...."
HOW many times do the same stats have to be posted and refuted?
Thank you for your kind words. It's not my problem if your statements are not supported by your own definitions or sources. Neither it's not my problem if your statements actually contradict the sources you have selected to use.
gripen
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The Statements are supported and what is more are the popular Historical view. Simply because you don't want to admit to being wrong doesn't mean I am going to repost them EVERY time you lamely attempt to refute the facts.
Crumpp
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Supremacy, Superiority, local or not local, it's all down to penny haggling lads. No need to be childish Crumpp :D
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This is all quite entertaining! Please continue! :D
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Originally posted by Angus
And just a year later, the "pathetic Brits" were launching much bigger air-raids at the German Reich then the Germans ever managed to put together, - 1000 two and four engined bombers in a raid is far more than the Germans ever put together.
I do not wish to waste time on the rest of your patriotic nonsense, just this one. The "1000 bomber raid", Operation Millennium, was the great hype of the Bomber Command serving for propaganda purposes. Let`s get it straight : the "pathetic Brits" (your words) could not not summon 1000 bombers together for the operation, not to mention they didn`t have 4 engined ones in any meaningful numbers. Let me enlighten you, my dear. There were no 1000 British bombers, there were only little more than 1000 bomber sorties on that day, which was possible only because the British bombers flew two sorties at that night (they didn`t have more than 600 or so operational bombers IIRC). The bombing itself was rather unimpressive, the LW was mounting such sortie rates on a daily basis during BoB (mind you, the LW could mass as much of 1300 bombers vs. England in 1940, and in fact they had around 1500-1700 in total).
Actually, the Brits were already ahead in NF technology, with some pilots racking up many kills over German occupied territory, many of te victims being German night fighters!
So? How many German nightfighters were lost? 100? 200? How many British bombers? 10 000+ . The LW gladly accepted this exchange rate.
I also find it quite funny to look at your figures about the nice range of the 109 compared to the Spitfire, while the Spitfires of the RAF were already streatching much further into the Luftwaffe's reagion in the low countries in 1941 or so, than ever the 109 into Britain.
So ? What`s so miraculus about that the Spit in 1941 WITH droptanks could reach further than the 109 in 1940 WITHOUT droptanks? It doesn`t change anything about the 109 having more range and endurance than the Spit.
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Pssst! I hate to break it to ya, but the Allies won. It was in all the papers you know :)
Dan/Slack
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Hehe, tsk tsk tsk, Isengrim is back, gladly, was worried about this thread becoming too boring:D
Beginning "I do not wish to waste time on the rest of your patriotic nonsense,"
Isengrim, Isengrim, I am NOT British, nor even American :D
Secondly:" The "1000 bomber raid", Operation Millennium, was the great hype of the Bomber Command serving for propaganda purposes."
I'll look it up better, for I do not trust your statements.
Thirdly: "So? How many German nightfighters were lost? 100? 200? How many British bombers? 10 000+ . The LW gladly accepted this exchange rate. "
You silly clot! The exchange was a whole lot of bombers for the 955 THOUSAND TONS OF BOMBS. Haggle at will, the German Reich was bombed relentlessly for many years. It was not just the LW who bled, but the whole nation and the whole war machine.
To top this up a bit, the US 8th dropped 693.000 tonnes.
And fourthly:"What`s so miraculus about that the Spit in 1941 WITH droptanks could reach further than the 109 in 1940 WITHOUT droptanks?"
I'll look deeper into it, but the first of the so-called rhubarb sorties were flown in Mk II's without drop tanks, then later on in MK V's. I know that the MK V had them in 1942, which allowed the to fly straight from Gibraltar to Algiers, but that's another story.
Anyway, everything I have read so far apart from your stuff, gives the Spitfire a very similar range band to the 109, with the RAF seemingly stretching further with it.
Best regards.
Angus the non-Brit
:D
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Gee Barbi, the LW Kampfgruppen only had, for BoB, 1482 of which only 1008 were servicable on Aug 30 1940 and 1291 of which only 798 were servicable on Sept 7 1940.
"the LW could mass as much of 1300 bombers vs. England in 1940, and in fact they had around 1500-1700 in total"
Were those extra numbers you state in the LW reserve?:rofl
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It's a good idea never to take Isegrim's numbers at face value.
I do not wish to waste time on the rest of your patriotic nonsense, just this one. The "1000 bomber raid", Operation Millennium, was the great hype of the Bomber Command serving for propaganda purposes. Let`s get it straight : the "pathetic Brits" (your words) could not not summon 1000 bombers together for the operation, not to mention they didn`t have 4 engined ones in any meaningful numbers. Let me enlighten you, my dear. There were no 1000 British bombers, there were only little more than 1000 bomber sorties on that day, which was possible only because the British bombers flew two sorties at that night (they didn`t have more than 600 or so operational bombers IIRC).
Bomber Command despatched 602 Wellingtons, 131 Halifaxes, 88 Stirlings, 79 Hampdens, 73 Lancasters, 46 Manchesters, 28 Whitleys. 1047 aircraft in total, 1 sortie each.
There were a number of sorties by Blenheims and Havocs against German airfields on the same night in support.
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The Jagdwaffe were supposed to be escorting the bombers. The RAF were supposed to be targeting the Bobers. Total RAF losses were lower than Luftwaffe losses.
LW`s task was to escort the bombers to allow them fullfill their task and in the meanwhile, inflict maximum casulties to British fighters. British goal was to stop the bombers.
German bombers fullfilled their task. They weren`t stopped (frankly I can`t remember any day the British could prevent the bombers doing what they wanted). And the RAF lost twice as manyt fighters.
What next, Nashwan, the RAF`s glory day over Dieppe...?
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The Germans had enough ships to support an invasion, the barges were necessary for landing troops on the beaches.
Uhm, like 168 steamers, 419 tugs, 1600 motorboats and 1910 barges...?
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It's only a 20 mile crossing. Hell, the Italians had enough to support several panzer divisions and tens of thousands o their own troops in North Africa, over much larger distances.
Did you forget the part they were shipping troops to their own ports, with real ships, and not attempting an invasion with a ragtag "fleet"...?
I'm sure the Germans could manage o rustle up enough shipping in Europe.
Yeah, by 41 or 42. Fact they couldn`t in 1940.
Of course not. The Kriegsmarine couldn't hope to stand up to the RN. That was the Luftwaffe's job. The Germans felt the Luftwaffe would be able to protect the invasion fleet, although I very much doubt they could have, even if they' been able to defeat the RAF.
Well at least we agree that not only they were far from having a acceptable quality invasion fleet, they had no serious hope protecting it for months... that`s why they would never launch it, unless England was already bombed back into stone age, and all they had to do was to raise the flag over the Tower of London.
No, repeating the argument. That's what I've been saying all along, even though you have consistently tried to change it to the second week of September.
Uh, yeah, sure-sure.. :D
Isegrim,I'm talking figures taken from Hooton, who got them from the Luftwaffe archives. You areusing figures that the RAF puts every time as "estimates"
They could count radar signitures on the screen, wasn`t that the core of the whole brit defenses? What was Hooton`s number for LW fighter sorties, 1800 or so? They had already done about of those sorties on a single day (7th) of the 1st Week of september. Not to mention by that time every bomber sortie was supposed to be followed by 3 fighter sorties... Hooton`s numbers are plain BS.
Given a disparity between Luftwaffe records o sorties and RAFestimates of Luftwaffe sorties, I'd choose the every time.
Care to post those " original Luftwaffe figures" day by day then for the 1st week?
Isegrim, for the sake of your own credibility, you need to decide wether you trust RAF estimates over Luftwaffe records. I am using a consistent line, Luftwaffe records for the Luftwaffe, RAF records for the RAF.
Nah-nah-nah.. You came up with somebody`s numbers for sorties that don`t jibe with any other detailed data, and later added that these were Very Original Luftwaffe Sortie Numbers With Goering`s Stamp On It From a Newly Discovered Secret Vault in Freiburg.
Forgive I don`t belive a word. Smells like those Indian spits of yours.
Caldwell? It's Tony Wood's site, I didn't mention Caldwell in connection with it. My mention of Caldwell was in relation to Caldwell's site, and his opinions of Groehler.
Then let`s stick to the fact : Caldwell does not questions the validity of Groehler`s numbers. Only you do, and you don`t even know his works.
The claims are all listed. Nobody "mentions" 2000, thats just the number of claims made. You can count them if you don't trust me. I used a spreadsheet, which does the work in seconds.
I used a spreadsheet, too, and realized there are hell of a lot of spaces in it, it includes all other types, like nightfighter claims, the Recih, France area etc., not to mention these are claims list, some of them were accepted, others were not, which simply puts your claim about the "official Jagdwaffe claims being 2000+" right into the trashcan.
It's easy to do with a spreadsheet. Strangely, their seem remarkably few claims of Spitfires etc over the Reich during the BoB
Uhm, wasn`t the Spit an ultra long range thing, roaming over the Reich all day and night, as I was told here...? ;)
....
So, either this doc contains the confirmed kills, or kills were confirmed as a matter of course.
Kills were not confirmed "as a matter of course" in the LW. The procedure was rigid and rigorous, and I don`t want to repeat it again which you refuse to see.
As for the doc, it`s collection of the fighter pilot`s claims. It list all claims, accepted and refused as well, and you can see the reference to the Anerkennung document on the right, which may show it was accepted, denied, postponed, or simply missing. For example, Uffz Schlig claimed a Spit on the 30th Septmber, but it wasn`t accepted for him, being an "ASM" remark, which mean they might acknowladge the claim later on. However, the vast majority is not acknowladged at all (No Anerkennungs number), which means it was either refused or the original doc was lost or missing.
You, dear Naswan, managed to find something that shows the claims, but doesn`t really give much clue about how many were accepted by the LW.
His data is quite obviously wrong if he saidwhat you claimed.
Classic sentence for bias.
Tony Wood has posted each individual claim, and hey check ou with what the pilots are supposed to have scored. They amount to 2000 claims for single engined fighters.
These are the pilot`s claims, many of those were never acknowladged by the Jagdwaffe. As you were told about 1000 times by now, it mattered little how much the pilots in the LW overclaimed, if the strict confirmation procedure didn`t allow it to be accepted as real kills (unlike in the RAF).
They do include accidents, they include accidents on operational missions, for both sides. They do not include accidents on non operational mission, eg a checkout flight after engine troubles, a ferry flight from manufacturer to airfield etc.
Prove.
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Originally posted by MiloMorai
Gee Barbi, the LW Kampfgruppen only had, for BoB, 1482 of which only 1008 were servicable on Aug 30 1940 and 1291 of which only 798 were servicable on Sept 7 1940.
"the LW could mass as much of 1300 bombers vs. England in 1940, and in fact they had around 1500-1700 in total"
Were those extra numbers you state in the LW reserve?:rofl
LOL, I stated the LW could mass 1300 bombers vs. england. You come and underline it with actual strenght. (1482 and 1291). :D
You know, Mindless Moron, the best thing is about you that you don`t need any help from me to make a clown out of yourself. You do it all by yourself. Saves a lot of time for me. :rofl
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I did some job on the LW claims vs RAF FC losses in 1942.
Pretty accurate, overclaiming was only in the area of 20% or so:D
(Honestly, that is quite accurate)
Both sides refined their statistics after the BoB, although some propoganda was of course still going on. But it was vital for the commands of both sides to know the real losses. British realised that they had overclaimed by looking up wrecks and so on. The Germans had a tougher deal there, but since the RAF should have been down to nil had their figures matched, something had to be wrong.
Now and this:"German bombers fullfilled their task. They weren`t stopped"
They were...after a while. The losses they sustained lead to the inevitable end of the BoB. The winter came, they Blitzed London in the cover of darkness, but next year it was over. The British were too strong to be bothered properly over the homeland, and soon they were to stab the heart of the Reich with a thousend bomber raid. Write at will, Barbi-doll, this is what actually happened.
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Barbi, I have seen no mention of 109 recon missions over GB after the D-day landings. Spits were roving all over "Fortress Europe" with relative impunity before D-day.
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How could the LW have massed more aircraft than they had servicable? Who's the clown :rofl
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Originally posted by VO101_Isegrim
You know, Mindless Moron, the best thing is about you that you don`t need any help from me to make a clown out of yourself. You do it all by yourself. Saves a lot of time for me. l
1008 bomber on Aug 30 capable of attacks on GB is just a few numbers short of the 1500-1700 you claim.:)
Even the 1180 bombers total (Fr. Nor. Reich) sevicable a/c available for the BoF is less than your 1500-1700 claim.
Tell me, how did those un-sevicable a/c get in the sky to fly over GB?
We miss the mirth you providedl over at Ubi since your banning.:rofl :rofl
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No Isegrim, I am applying exactly the same standards.
That would be an awfully great change in your posts, but it`s yet to come.
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Let`s start with the basics. Do you admit that German organisation was different than British one, and reserves were not atteched directly to the Staffeln ? Therefore, German reserves don`t show up in a table that deals only with the 1st line units...?
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Yes
Oh that`s a huge leap forward! Then you only have to think about
Your quoted figures show the first line fighter units only.
They don`t show any of 2nd line units.
First line fighter units don`t have reserve planes/pilots attached.
For this reason, no reserves are shown in this table, just the strenght immidiately available to the fighter units.
Where were the reserves? What source have you got that tells you there were reserves at all?
That`s laughable.. "Absence of proof is not proof of absence." :D After all, it you who claim there were no German reserves at all. Go ahead and prove it. He who claims has to prove..
A squadron was expected to be able to fly 12 aircraft at a time. They had more, but they allowed for some always being unserviceable. Only if less than 12 planes were serviceable would the squadron be below strength.
If you look at the RAF reports, you will see they maintained 600 or so serviceable Spits and Hurricanes.
Out of the ~1400 they supposes to have... great.
But for the Jagdwaffe, it's not even serviceable planes. Look at the figures for end Sept. 1132 establishment, only 920 on hand. Forget serviceable aircraft, the Jagdwaffe had 212 less aircraft in total than they should have.
Oh my, oh my, you really don`t use your head at all, do you? What the heck this table shows? The number of fighters available on a given day.. NOTHING ELSE! The next day it could increase as reinforcments arrived, and the day after that it would decrease again...
Let me rehearse: Your rather laughable claim, that the LW had no reserves at all, is solely based on that on two given days the number of fighters is somewhat less. Based on that, you claim no reserves has existed, because if they had, the numbers would be the same all the time.
Right, let`s apply your own logic to the 2nd TAF`s Typhoon Squadrons in 1944. They had 2-3 planes at hand out 20, each by the end of the year. They were almost full a month before.
So by your logic, there was absolutely no aircraft British reserves in 1944, because they let the numbers fell on a given day.
That's nearly 20% below strength, yet still none of the reserves you claim existed were issued.
You claim, you prove:
1, Prove that reserves weren`t issued
2. Prove that reserves didn`t exist.
It's from the Luftwaffe's own figures. Established strength en Sept 1940 1132, actual strength 920. They were short 212 fighters.
From the RAF`s own figures. Established strenght 1400, actual strenght around 1000. They were short by 400 fighters. No British reserves existed (Nashwanian logic).
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However, it`s interesting to compare the loss rate of pilots (as according to David Baker):
% of fighter Pilot strenght lost:
RAF - LW
August 26% - 15%
September 28% - 21%
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54% in two months? So at 60% over the whole battle. Problem is, Fighter Command lost 1 in 6 pilots killed, and another 1 in 6 pilots wounded. 3000 took part, approx 500 each killed and wounded. That's a total casualty rate, for the whole battle, including wounded, of 33%.
Go back and do the math/stat part again, `cos you`re doing it wrong.
Firstly, 1400 is a made up figure
Because the squadrons were up to strength with 600 or more sericeable Spits and Hurricanes.
Nah, the RAF`s established fighter strenght was around 1400 planes. They had only 1000. The RAF fell well below established strenght, thus they had no reserves.
And RAF established srength never fell, planes were issued from storage at times.
Let me know what you smoke, I wanna try it out. :)
What you want us to believe is that strength of the Luftwaffe single engined fighter force fell almost 20% below establishment, and the reserves existed but weren't issued.
Let`s apply this to the 2nd TAF`s Typhoon squadrons.
The Squadron`s strenght fell to 1-3 planes from the established strenght of 20, as shown on a single day`s strenght report, yet, despite piles of planes waiting is reserve, they weren`t issued...
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He who claims has to prove..
That's right Barbi. You claimed LW reserves, so what are the numbers.:rolleyes:
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Originally posted by Angus
The British were too strong to be bothered properly over the homeland, and soon they were to stab the heart of the Reich with a thousend bomber raid.
The Brits were "too strong"? Too strong for what ? Too strong to be bombed at will between July 1940 till May 1941, until the bombers were sent against Russia? Face it, Angus-Bangus, the Brits could simply couldn`t stop it happen. And they were not even recognised as a threat big enough to bother about. Face the facts, even if they are unpleasant. The whole bombing of the Reich, wasting 60 000 Englishman in the process, was due to the fact that the UK had absolutely no chance at all to challange the Germans on the continent, and they knew it. Pityful sadism on civillians all that remained for them. The Americans nicknamed the AEF ("Allied Exp. Force") in 1944 as "After England Failed", and with a good reason. In their desperation they tried those senseless terror raids which cost them dearly and made them totally bancrupt for no gain (unless you count they were allowed to sign a piece of paper just like the French). I doubt this really worth loosing practically all their overseas belongings, food rationinig up to the `50s, and being indepted with billions towards the USA.
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Originally posted by MiloMorai
Barbi, I have seen no mention of 109 recon missions over GB after the D-day landings. Spits were roving all over "Fortress Europe" with relative impunity before D-day.
That`s because the Germans didn`t use the 109s as anything else as a tactical recon fighter. It`s kinda like blaming the Spit for being unable to mount additional large caliber cannons if needed, or operate during the night.
But the question arises, if the Spit was sooo long ranged, then why was the Bomber Command unable to operate bombers during 99% of the war over Germany because the fear of enemy fighters...? Maybe because 109s were over Germany day and night.
You Spit dweebs hatto put down the pink glasses some day. It was a short range fighter, shorter legged than the Bf 109. Perhaps if they had some nice, economic Daimler Benz to play with... :)
BTW, I always wondered what if they would have put a DB 605 into a Mustang. For the same bulk and weight, range could be increased by 1/3, making the troublesome rear tanks completely unneccesary.
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Originally posted by MiloMorai
He who claims has to prove..
That's right Barbi. You claimed LW reserves, so what are the numbers.:rolleyes:
No, that`s a lie, Mindless Moron. I did not claim anything about LW`s reserves, nor give any number. I told Nashwan his tables don`t include the fighter reserves, which he denied than admitted, then claimed the reserves didn`t exist during BoB, and failed to prove it.
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Originally posted by VO101_Isegrim
I did not claim anything about LW`s reserves, nor give any number.
" ............... whereas in the German system the replacements pilots came to the Jagdgeschwader from different named reserve units, which are of course are not counted in the first line strenght."
"-reserve/replacement pilots, issued to non-first line LW replacement units"
"These show the first line fighter units only.
They don`t show any of 2nd line units.
First line fighter units don`t have reserve planes/pilots attached.
For this reason, no reserves are shown in this table, just the strenght immidiately available to the fighter units."
That is correct you never gave any reserve a/c number but keep yapping about reserve a/c.:rolleyes:
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Originally posted by VO101_Isegrim
Pityful sadism on civillians all that remained for them.
This would be funny, if I didn't think that you actually meant it.
- oldman
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Originally posted by Oldman731
This would be funny, if I didn't think that you actually meant it.
- oldman
Oh but he is terribly serious. What he forgets is that the Germans showed the rest of the world how to do it, starting in Spain with Geurnica.
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Umm...so...like, is the Spit IX overmodled or not?
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Originally posted by Grits
Umm...so...like, is the Spit IX overmodled or not?
Yes. It's too durable. it should explode with just one burst of my guns, not two...:lol
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"That`s because the Germans didn`t use the 109s as anything else as a tactical recon fighter."
It had the range to get over G.B. from France, im not sure how many such sorties were attempted, I recall the Arado 234 was used a few times as Recon over southern England. Recon 109s were used on missions over G.B. during the war. Pierre Clostermann shot one down a Recon 109G over Scotland (Scapa Flow) while flying a Spit VII.
"But the question arises, if the Spit was sooo long ranged, then why was the Bomber Command unable to operate bombers during 99% of the war over Germany because the fear of enemy fighters...? Maybe because 109s were over Germany day and night."
Bomber Command, last I checked, bombed Germany from 1940-1945 despite the presence of night fighters, of which the 109 was the least important type, after the Bf 110G and Ju88G. Obviously, a Spitfire could not escort bombers to Germany and back from bases in G.B.
In addition both the Hurricane and Spitfire were employed as night fighters in 1941, but the RAF chose to develop the Beaufighter and Mosquito, for the same reason the LW went with the 110, endurance and 2 crew members.
"shorter legged than the Bf 109."
Well, thats just plain incorrect. For starters what version of the Spitfire are you talking about? what version of the 109? on internal fuel? drop tanks?
Its kinds ez to look up the #s, as an example the 109G-10 had a range of 356 miles on internal fuel, which is not greater than a Spit IX or a Spit XIV. So it depends on what you are comparing.
"It`s kinda like blaming the Spit for being unable to mount additional large caliber cannons if needed"
The Spitfire VIIIs in RAAF service had some with 4 x 20mm cannon in the wings, Spitfire VCs also had some with 4 x 20mm cannons.
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Originally posted by VO101_Isegrim
From "The Battle of Britain - A German Perspective" by Lt. Col. Earle Lund, USAF, Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course, Campaign Analysis Study. Page 25
It can be found here:
"The Battle of Britain - A German Perspective" by Lt. Col. Earle Lund, USAF, Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course (http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ww2/batlbrit.pdf)
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Isegrim,I'm talking figures taken from Hooton, who got them from the Luftwaffe archives. You areusing figures that the RAF puts every time as "estimates"
They could count radar signitures on the screen, wasn`t that the core of the whole brit defenses?
No, counting numbers on a radar screen was not easy at the time. Raid after raid the strength was miscalculated.
What was Hooton`s number for LW fighter sorties, 1800 or so?
No, Hooton's numbers were around 4000 last week of Aug, 3200 first week of Sept for purely fighter sorties. Add some fighter bomber sorties to those, and bomber sorties.
They had already done about of those sorties on a single day (7th) of the 1st Week of september. Not to mention by that time every bomber sortie was supposed to be followed by 3 fighter sorties... Hooton`s numbers are plain BS.
So you say they did over 1800 sorties on the 7th Sept? The RAF estimates you want to rely on say 700 Luftwaffe sorties on the 7th Sept.
Make your mind up.
Care to post those " original Luftwaffe figures" day by day then for the 1st week?
I don't have them day by day, I have the weekly totals. Note you are contradicting your own source, by claiming 1800 sorties on the 7th Sept when the RAF estimate 700.
Nah-nah-nah
So I take it you'll accept RAF estimates of Luftwaffe losses from now on then?
Then let`s stick to the fact : Caldwell does not questions the validity of Groehler`s numbers. Only you do, and you don`t even know his works.
No, Caldwell and Les Butler have the following on their joint site:
"It is clear from his text that Groehler's objectives were: (1) to show that the German-Soviet front was the most significant source of the Luftwaffe losses that ultimately led to Allied air supremacy, and (2) that the Luftwaffe could not afford to weaken its forces in the East, even when pushed hard by the USAAF strategic offensive and the Normandy invasion. Groehler did make these claims, to the undoubted pleasure of his Soviet masters, but his data, when examined carefully, don't back him up. Most Luftwaffe losses between mid-1941 and mid-1943 were, of course, incurred on the Eastern Front - that's where most of the fighting was! But starting in late 1943 the number of losses in the West increased sharply. Half of these losses were day fighters, the single weapon most responsible for the maintenance or loss of air superiority."
Regardless, Tony Wood has every single claim listed.
I used a spreadsheet, too, and realized there are hell of a lot of spaces in it, it includes all other types, like nightfighter claims, the Recih, France area etc., not to mention these are claims list, some of them were accepted, others were not, which simply puts your claim about the "official Jagdwaffe claims being 2000+" right into the trashcan.
Spreadsheets exist to organise data.
Open the Doc from Tony Wood's site.
Scroll down to the 10th of July
Select the first claim on the 10th of July. It's by Ludwig Lenz
Scroll down to the 30th Oct, and holding down shift, select the last claim, by Leo Matserer.
If you held down shift, the whole block between the 10th July and 30th Oct should be selected. Right click and select copy.
Open up a spreadsheet application (I'll assume Excel). Select the first 7 columns and select paste.
You should now have a list of all the claims during the BoB in your spreadsheet.
Select all 7 columns, and click the data menu (this might be different if you have a different version of Excel). Select Sort, and choose to sort by the fourth column, aircraft type.
This will give you a list of all claims sorted by victim tpe. It should begin with Oskar Strack claiming an albacore, and end with Hans Georg Mandelsdorf claiming a Whitley.
All the headings that bothered you so much will now be beneath the last claim. You now have an unbroken list of claims from the BoB.
It begins at row 1 and goes down to 2127
Go back to the top and scroll down past the Blenheims until you reach the Curtis'. It should be on line 99 (we'll ignore the Bloch the Luftwaffe claim they shot down on the 17th Oct over Faversham (wtf?)) However, no less than 14 claims are made for Curtis fighters, despite none being used (AFAIK). Galland, Wick and Molders all have claims in for "Curtis".
Select the lines with the Curtis' and Defiants, it should go from 199 to 135. Select copy. Click on sheet 2, and select paste.
Now scroll down to the Hurricanes, which begin at 149. (It's Ludwig Lenz' claim)
Scroll down to the end of theHurricane list, and continue down with the 7 or so Moranes. Thatshould take you down to 870.
Copy these and paste them to the end of the list on sheet 2.
Go back to sheet 1 and select the first Spitfire kill, at number 874. (We'll ignore the Skua and the "sperrballon") Scroll down to the end of the Spitfire claims, at 2112 Copy and paste them on to the end of the list on sheet 2.
Sheet 2 should now have a nice long list of claims between the dates selected (10th July to 30th Oct). It should have 5 types of single engined fighters claimed, Curtis, Defiant, Hurricane, Morane, Sitfire. It begins at row 1, ends at row 1998.There are no headers, spaces etcin the list, just a solid list of 1998 claimed kills of single engined fighters.
So, either this doc contains the confirmed kills, or kills were confirmed as a matter of course.
Kills were not confirmed "as a matter of course" in the LW. The procedure was rigid and rigorous, and I don`t want to repeat it again which you refuse to see.
As for the doc, it`s collection of the fighter pilot`s claims. It list all claims, accepted and refused as well, and you can see the reference to the Anerkennung document on the right, which may show it was accepted, denied, postponed, or simply missing.
Isegrim, I've already given you a comparison from the list with Galland, Wick, Oesau, even Groth, who you brought up. Everyone has exactly the same number on this list as their acknowledged kills during the BoB.
Lets try a couple more.
Josef Priller. 14 Kills during the BoB, 6 kills during the battle of France. Tony Wood's doc lists 14 kills during the BoB, 6 during the BoF
Heinz Ebeling. Supposed to have 18 victories before being captured in Nov 1940, including 10 during August 1940. Tony Wood's doc gives him 18 victories in total, 10 in August.
I've only looked at the pilots I've heard of before, because it's easier to find kill records for them. In every case, they've had exactly the same number of acknowledged kills as appears in that doc on Tony Wood's site.
For example, Uffz Schlig claimed a Spit on the 30th Septmber, but it wasn`t accepted for him, being an "ASM" remark, which mean they might acknowladge the claim later on. However, the vast majority is not acknowladged at all (No Anerkennungs number), which means it was either refused or the original doc was lost or missing.
Never heard of him. What's his first name?
Obviously on a list of well over 3000 claims (it covers 39 - 41) there are going to be 1 or 2 discrepancies. However, look at the cases I have been through.
Galland is supposed to have had 50 kills when he joined JG 26. There are exactly 50 "claims" on that document for Galland prior to the date he joined JG26.
Either that document is listing acknowledgements rather than claims, or Galland didn't have a single one of his first 50 claims turned down.
And it's the same story for Oesau, Wick, Priller, Ebelling, even Groth. Either it's listing confirmed kills, or none of them had a claim turned down in 1939/1940. Not one between them.
You, dear Naswan, managed to find something that shows the claims, but doesn`t really give much clue about how many were accepted by the LW.
Give me the names of some well know Luftwaffe aces and how many kills they scored on the west front in 1940, and I will check them against these "claims". Let's see if we can find any "claims" the Luftwaffe turned down, shall we? By the way, they have to be well know pilots so I can verify their acknowledged totals elsewhere, I'm not going to trust the numbers you come up with.
That`s laughable.. "Absence of proof is not proof of absence." After all, it you who claim there were no German reserves at all. Go ahead and prove it. He who claims has to prove..
So in other words you've found proof of 100 reserve fighters before the Luftwaffe got involved in the BoF and BoB, and nobody ever mentions the reserve again in 1940?
Isegrim, you are probably the only person in the world who believes the Luftwaffe had reserves of 109s during the BoB. But then again you believe the Luftwaffe won the BoB, the Nazis didn't start the war, etc.
Go ahead and prove it. He who claims has to prove..
Prove the numbers on the Luftwaffe OOB don't include the reserves. Go ahead, prove.
Out of the ~1400 they supposes to have... great.
Got a source for the 1400 established strength?
The Battle Of Britain by Bickers gives established strength on the 6th September as 816 Spits and Hurris. That's for 51 Spit and Hurri squadrons, 16 aircraft per squadron.
The Right of the Line, by Terraine, gives 19 squadrons of Spitfires, 25 with Hurris, 2 with Defiants and 6 with Blenheims on 7th July, with "an establishement of over 800 aircraft", 644 available for operations.
That's 52 squadrons, 16 aircraft per squadron would be 832 aircraft, Terraine says "over 800 aircraft"
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Oh my, oh my, you really don`t use your head at all, do you? What the heck this table shows? The number of fighters available on a given day.. NOTHING ELSE! The next day it could increase as reinforcments arrived, and the day after that it would decrease again...
Okay, so you are saying the Luftwaffe lost 212 109s in such a short period that reinforcements didn't have time to arrive? Shall we say a week to get replacement 109s to squadron? 212 109s lost in a week? Is that what you're claiming? Isegrim, apply the test of logic before you post something.
Let me rehearse: Your rather laughable claim, that the LW had no reserves at all, is solely based on that on two given days the number of fighters is somewhat less. Based on that, you claim no reserves has existed, because if they had, the numbers would be the same all the time.
Not the same, no. But you are claiming less than 600 109s lost to all causes, yet 212 lost in such a short period they didn't even have time to issue reserves? It defies all logic, Isegrim.
Right, let`s apply your own logic to the 2nd TAF`s Typhoon Squadrons in 1944. They had 2-3 planes at hand out 20, each by the end of the year. They were almost full a month before.
Source?
That's nearly 20% below strength, yet still none of the reserves you claim existed were issued.
You claim, you prove:
1, Prove that reserves weren`t issued
2. Prove that reserves didn`t exist.
Prove that reserves existed. It's you who's claiming they did.
What we know for facts:
The Luftwaffe had 100 109s in reserve before the Battle of France began.
No-one has come up with a figure for Luftwaffe reserves during the rest of 1940
The Luftwaffe was some 20% below strength in 109s by late 1940, more than double the reserves that existed before the Luftwaffe started taking major casualties.
From the RAF`s own figures. Established strenght 1400, actual strenght around 1000.
You've been claiming 1400 established strength for years. I've just given you two sources that state established strength was 16 per squadron, 800 - 850 Spits and Hurricanes in Aug, Sept, Oct. Got any sources that back up your 1400 claim? Thought not.
Established strength 800 - 850, actual strength 800 - 850, serviceable (7th Sept) 621 (Spits and Hurris only) Plus approx 200 in reserve.
54% in two months? So at 60% over the whole battle. Problem is, Fighter Command lost 1 in 6 pilots killed, and another 1 in 6 pilots wounded. 3000 took part, approx 500 each killed and wounded. That's a total casualty rate, for the whole battle, including wounded, of 33%.
Go back and do the math/stat part again, `cos you`re doing it wrong.
Sorry, that's the sortof Maths they teach in the rest of the world. 1000 dead and wounded out of 3000 = 33%.
Nah, the RAF`s established fighter strenght was around 1400 planes. They had only 1000. The RAF fell well below established strenght, thus they had no reserves.
Been studying Goebbels again? Tell a lie,tell a big lie, repeat it often enough people will believe it.
Established strength was 800 - 850 Spits and Hurris.
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Crumpp,
As an example how well an your statement is supported by you own source (which is supposed to be "popular history"):
You: " The allies gains Air Superiority in a fairly short time after Doolittle's doctrine change AND Big Week. True, by the end of March ,44 the Allies had Air Superiority over Europe."
Your source:"For USSTAF, the issue was diversion of the heavies away from the critical battle for Germany and air superiority that was yet to be decided."
In addition statistics are clear; heavies suffered highest loss rate (absolute and relative) in April.
gripen
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Bump.
o.O
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Great link Batz.
If you read it seals the argument. No doubt the Luftwaffe could have won the BoB if they had stuck to the Aldertag strategy of hitting the Airfields. The RAF couldn't replace it's losses fast enough and the Luftwaffe could afford to take the losses it suffered at the rate the RAF was dishing it out.
End of Story
Crumpp
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Gripen,
Quit floggin a dead horse. You lost that one. Yes the Heavy Bombers took a few more casualties in April. The Germans were forced to change their strategy and tried to attack bomber formations en mass. Higher concentration of fighters = more bombers shot down. Before Big Week the LW attacked 100 percent on the incoming Heavy Raids. After Big Week this was no longer possible. So now you had 25 percent of the raids being intercepted and that raid recieved high causalities but 75 percent of the raids got through unscathed. In short the LW could not stem the tide and could only attack a much smaller percentage of the raids coming over the Reich. They did not turn a single raid back NOR were they destoying a high enough percentage to make the raids prohibitive. There were now too many allied bombers over German skies. You were much safer flying a B17 in April '44 than you were in April '43. It's all detailed by Galland himself in "Luftwaffe fighter Force: A view from the cockpit". He was no dummy and knew exactly the position the Jagdwaffe was in.
Again, the Allies had Air Superiority. It is just a fact.
Crumpp
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Originally posted by gripen
Crumpp,
As an example how well an your statement is supported by you own source (which is supposed to be "popular history"):
You: " The allies gains Air Superiority in a fairly short time after Doolittle's doctrine change AND Big Week. True, by the end of March ,44 the Allies had Air Superiority over Europe."
Your source:"For USSTAF, the issue was diversion of the heavies away from the critical battle for Germany and air superiority that was yet to be decided."
In addition statistics are clear; heavies suffered highest loss rate (absolute and relative) in April.
gripen
2.1% vs 1.8 from March? Come on gripen :) you are grasping at straws here. 314 losses out of over 14,000 sorties. In the numbers game, and with the ever increasing number of replacment aircraft and aircrew, that was a drop in the bucket for the Allies.
Was the Luftwaffe having any measurable effect on the conduct of the airwar? Did they stop anything or impact at all on operations?
I'm still figuring Eisenhower's comment must count for something too since he was in charge and was there :)
Dan/Slack
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Crumpp,
According to your source, allies did not have air superiority over Germany as quoted above. No one has stated that the LW could turn bombers back; loss rate per sortie just increased as well as actitivity of the LW (as indicated by USAF claims).
gripen
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What are you smokin? It clearly states if you read it that the Allies won Air superiority.
Crumpp
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Guppy35,
If you need something measurable, count USAAF losses to enemy fighters after March 1944.
Question is not if they could turn bombers back, I have not made such argument. Questions is when the allies won air superiority over Germany? And based on statistics it can be clearly seen that certainly not in March and in May the USSTAF still claimed that it was not yet reached (see Crumpp's' source).
gripen
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Crumpp,
Well, I don't smoke. Please read your own source.
gripen
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I've read it through three times and don't see anything like your claims.
Crumpp
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Crumpp, I wouldn't put too much faith in that.
For example, the figures he gives are way off, and frequently contradictory.
On 1 August RAF Fighter Command
strength stood at 570 Hurricanes and
Spitfires (two- thirds of these were
Hurricanes), and of the total only 367 were
operational.
page 15
From the RAF's own BoB site:
Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 1 August 1940
Spitfire - 245
Hurricane - 341
For the 18th of August he gives the following:
By the 18th, Luftwaffe
losses from all causes stood at 350 versus
171 for Fighter Command. Fighter
Command’s ability to generate defensive
sorties remained essentially unchanged. An
intelligence report on the 18th "estimated that
the British had lost 770 fighters in the period
from 1st July to 16th August and that only
300 were still operational, whereas in reality
214 had been destroyed and seventy-one
damaged in combat, and more than 600 were
still operational.
Then he gives the following loss figures:
The highest total losses of the battle
occurred on the 18th; 68 British and 69
German.
RAF losses on the 18th were 22.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/august18.html
On page 19 he makes the following ridiculous assertion:
The resultant war of attrition
was one that Fighter Command could not
hope to win. The higher concentration of
fighters in the German raids reduced the edge
that Fighter Command had previously
enjoyed: the Germans could afford to trade
Me109s, one for one, with Spitfires and
Hurricanes!
The RAF was producing more fighters than the Luftwaffe, by a factor of more than 2 to 1. RAF pilots also frequently escaped, whereas 109 pilots were usually captured if they bailed out. And yet he thinks the Luftwaffe can trade fighters 1 for 1?
Again on page 19:
Between 8 August and 6
September, 657 fighters had been lost. By
using replacement aircraft (from repairs and
storage) Fighter Command managed, until 1
September, to keep frontline strength at
about the same levels as were available at
the end of July. But, those reserves had
dwindled from 518 Spitfires and Hurricanes
(in maintenance and storage) on 6 July, to
only 292 by 7 September.
British production figures were no
more encouraging. In the last week of
August, for example, only 91 Spitfire and
Hurricanes were produced while losses
reached 137 destroyed and 11 seriously
damaged. With losses at these rates,
Fighter Command estimated that reserves
would be exhausted in three weeks followed
by steady depletion of the frontline
squadrons.
So by the 7th of Sept, at the end of the period of pressure, he admits reserves still contained nearly 300 Spits and Hurris. And in the last week of August, around 140 were lost, whilst 91 were built, a net loss of 50 in a week. At that rate, the reserves would last 6 weeks from Sept 7th, ie until mid - late October. Presumably fighter command would at least be getting some respite from the wether by then.
In phase one of the
campaign (8 to 18 August), the RAF lost
154 pilots (killed, seriously wounded or
missing). Only 63 new fighter pilots were
available from the training schools for the
same period. During phase two, 24 August
to 1 September, the figures were even
worse as losses reached 231 pilots, or
about 20 percent of the total combat
strength of the command! Combat strength
in the month of August decreased by
almost one-third, from 1,434 to 1,023. The
squadron average fell from 26 to 16
operational pilots.
Replacement pilots, by his reckoning, were about 180 in August. Most sources give 260 - 300. By his reckoning, strength fell by 411 in August, with 180 new pilots, that means pilot losses in August of at least 600, 700 if you use other sources replacement rates. Actual losses were 1000 killed and injured in July, August, Sept and Oct.
Also page 20:
Therefore, the Luftwaffe ended
Phase two with a capability to field 623
operational Me109s against a force of only 350
RAF fighters.
Phase 2 ended on the 7th Sept. By his own admission, the RAF still had 292 Spits and Hurris in storage at this point.
Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 7th September 1940
Spitfire - 223
Hurricane - 398
Total = 621 (and this doesn't include the reserves)
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/september7.html
He seems to have based his entire thesis on the RAF only having 350 Spits and Hurris operational at one time, when in actual fact the figure was almost double that.
The RAF had 44 Spit and Hurri squadrons operational on the 14th July. By the 1st of Sept that had risen to 51 (which in part explains the shortage of pilots, 7 extra squadrons require a lot more pilots)
There were 53 operational Spit and Hurri squadrons by the end of September.
51 squadrons, with a serviceable strength of 350 planes, would be less than 7 per squadron. Why keep reserves when your front line is so under strength?
Truth is, serviceability hovered between 600 - 650, which is approx 12 planes per squadron, the normal strength a squadron is expected to put into combat.
Try reading some of the squadron diaries at http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/briefing.html
They're full of 12 aircraft patrols and scrambles, 610 squadron even sending 14 aircraft on 1 occasion
303 (Polish) squadron's makes good reading, spending almost all of August on training, before being sent into action for the first time on 30th August.
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Originally posted by gripen
Guppy35,
If you need something measurable, count USAAF losses to enemy fighters after March 1944.
Question is not if they could turn bombers back, I have not made such argument. Questions is when the allies won air superiority over Germany? And based on statistics it can be clearly seen that certainly not in March and in May the USSTAF still claimed that it was not yet reached (see Crumpp's' source).
gripen
That's what I'm counting vs sorties flown gripen. It's a tiny number when you compare losses to sorties. It wasn't having an impact in any sort of numbers sense. Were people still dying? Yes and it was tragic to see those lives lost on both sides. But in a ledger of wartime, the losses to LW fighters was miniscule compared to the sorties flown
Dan/Slack
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What a funny thread. Crumpp, Nash, Gripen, and Isengrim.
Well, Isengrim seems to be living in fantasy, so I aim at him yet again. Here is a cookie for you ISENGRIM:
First:
"The Brits were "too strong"? Too strong for what ? Too strong to be bombed at will between July 1940 till May 1941, until the bombers were sent against Russia? Face it, Angus-Bangus, the Brits could simply couldn`t stop it happen. And they were not even recognised as a threat big enough to bother about."
The tables turned from heavy raids on Britain into even heavyer raids on Germany in just above a year. Looks like the Germans did their maths wrong.
Second:
"Face the facts, even if they are unpleasant. The whole bombing of the Reich, wasting 60 000 Englishman in the process, was due to the fact that the UK had absolutely no chance at all to challange the Germans on the continent, and they knew it."
So I presume those nearly MILLION TONS of bombs dropped on the Reich was a proof of Britains lack of compitence?
Third: "Pityful sadism on civillians all that remained for them."
Well, now eat yer hat. The Germans themselves practically invented terror-bombing, and exercized it from the beginning of WW2, starting with undefended polish towns crowded with people. They did Warshaw, Rotterdam, Coventry, London, etc, with the incendiary method, sometimes successful, sometimes not. The method undoubtedly worked though, since they came close to buckling the British backbone in 1940 as you have already pointed out.
However, the Brits kept dropping leaflets for the first months of the war, then reverted to raids on isolated targets, preferrably industrian, then into bigger and bigger raids. in 1940 the German population lost more people in car accidents than in air-raids, and the casualties amongst the raiding british airmen were also higher, - high indeed as you have also pointed out. A rather funny campaign from the English side from a practical point of view, - it would have been so much easier to just dump incentiaries all over the easiest targets, - however there was still some humanism left at the controls. That was to change as history goes, and yet again to remind the ignorant, the British showered the Reich with bombs, the USAF topped that up. Major German cities were destroyed up to 95%, the bodycount was close to a million, the industries were in ruins, there was hunger, disease, lack of shelter, any horror available to the civilian of the reich as their own former method turned against them. No laughing matter, but a very effective way of winning a war.
Then the final:
" In their desperation they tried those senseless terror raids which cost them dearly and made them totally bancrupt for no gain (unless you count they were allowed to sign a piece of paper just like the French). I doubt this really worth loosing practically all their overseas belongings, food rationinig up to the `50s, and being indepted with billions towards the USA."
Yumm, silly Englishmen. They should have surrendered and gone hand in hand with Hitler, right?
Well, for your info, I belive that the world should be grateful for the British staying in their boots. They recognized the "beast" ahead of all others, and they turned out to be correct about it.
They did go bankrupt, already in 1940. They may still be paying to the US and the food rationing was there at least into the 50's all right. Also in my country, which was not a warring nation (Iceland), but alas, I do not know about Hungary.
Anyway, that line of yours is out of bounds, so just stuff it lad
:mad:
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No, no Angus, the Germans started in Spain during the Civil War. Remember Guernica where the Germans claimed they were after the stone bridge. Problem was the bridge was untouched but the town was well danmaged. Iirc there was also bombings of other cities as well.
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Here I will post that source again to you can more easily access it and point out my mistake......
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj94/mccrabb2.html
Crumpp
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Guppy35,
The 8th AF lost over 1000 heavy bombers to enemy fighters in jan-may period 1944, over half of them in April and May. These are heavy losses despite loss rate per sortie was tolerable and decreased (in May) due to increased number of bombers and better escort fighters. Note also that USBBS and BBSU seems to count loss rate per sortie differently beacause they claim 3,5% for April. Note also that kill claims as well as losses are absolute numbers so absolute comparison is fully valid.
Crumpp,
Well, it all depends on definition of the air superiority, there was no such thing in that period if we use USAF definition.
gripen
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"No doubt the Luftwaffe could have won the BoB"
Oh here we go again, get your pom poms on everybody!
Could have, would have, if they only...
Crecy, Waterloo, Gettysburg, The Marne, Midway, El Alemain, Kursk...
Proving what exactly?
You LW cheerleaders spend all your time trying to get over the fact they were unable to defeat the RAF in 1940.
Listen, I hate to break this to you, but battles have a chance of a winner and a loser, so please stop acting like you are discovering something new here.
Its also interesting to note that despite a 2 1/2 year bombing campaign by the Allies, the LW was still able to field fighters, even though the Germans produced less a/c, and trained fewer pilots. Why would the RAF be unable to hold out in a continued air campaign? Even Japan still possessed fighters for home defence in 1945. If your all so big on history, maybe heed some of its lessons.
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True Squire.
You know, what puzzles me is why the British started so late to bomb large urban areas, while they had that done to themselves as early as 1940. Given the poor accuracy in the beginning of their bombing campaign, it would have been so much easier. And the Eye for an Eye motto as well, - with London burning so ferociously, that once the fire brigades pumped the Thames down to mud!
Instead they attempted accurate bombing on strategic/industrial targets.
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Originally posted by F4UDOA
Do you have a problem with a 1945 F4U-4C(4 M3 20MIL) or a 1944 F4U-1A(430MPH at 20K)?
(http://www.vought.com/heritage/photo/assets/images/db_images/db_0429_023.jpg)
I don't!!! Great Pic.
Gainsie
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Squire since you came late to the discussion and didn't read the thread I will fill you in.
Some folks are claiming that the RAF didn't have to put up much of a fight in the BoB. Basically there was NO way the LW could have won it. WE both know that's wrong. The LW in fact could have and almost did win the BoB. They changed their strategy though and lost the fight.
Secondly some folks claim that just because the LW could send up fighters that the Allies did not control the skies over Europe after Mar - Apr timeframe '44. Again absolutely wrong.
They could have won in '41 and there was NO WAY they could have stopped the Allied onslaught by '44. The tide had turned irrevocably against them.
Crumpp
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BoB was in '40 Crumpp.
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Some folks are claiming that the RAF didn't have to put up much of a fight in the BoB.
Crumpp, I hope you don't mean me. That's not what I'm saying at all.
If the didn't put up a fight they would be bombed into oblivion. If they sent all their aircraft up in big titanic battles their attrition would be too high.
What the RAF had to do was constantly battle large German formations with small ones of their own, whilst keeping their own losses to an acceptable level. They did so.
WE both know that's wrong. The LW in fact could have and almost did win the BoB. They changed their strategy though and lost the fight.
The Luftwaffe could have won the battle by shooting down more RAF fighters and losing fewer aircraft themselves. They didn't.
The whole crux of my argument is it doesn't matter what strategy theLuftwaffe tried, they simply weren't shooting down enough RAF aircraft. By September, when they were trying yet another strategy, the RAF had been building up it's strength for months, and it was simply too late for the Luftwaffe to win. They were now the smaller force (in fighters at least)
The whole thing is simply another what if question. What if the Luftwaffe had 1,000 Me262s in 1942? Fact is, they couldn't. what if the Luftwaffe had continued attacking RAF airfields? By the begining of September the Luftwaffe had less fighter pilots that the RAF, less fighters, was replacing both the fighters and pilots at a slower rate, and the pilots were having to fly long missions every day.
To beat the RAF the Luftwaffe would have had to sustain the same pressure they applied in late August throughout September. I've never seen any objective analysis of the Luftwaffe that says they were remotely capable of that.
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That's funny, cause the analysis was just posted a few days ago FROM the LW point of view. It certainly did say they could sustain it without difficulty.
Crumpp
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Crumpp,
I have said right from my first comment that allies were winning air war in spring 1944. The analogy between BoB and spring 1944 is clear; it takes really lot of effort and time to bring an air force down. The allies (specially USAF) had resources and winning strategy to beat LW. Still as statistics show, it was not an instant victory and also losses were high during process.
The case of the BoB, things are quite bit different. The LW did not have resources and strategy has been under discussion some 60 years now. Anyway, we know the outcome and everything else is pure speculation.
gripen
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YES!!
The Spit iX IS OVERMODELED IN ACES HIGH.
Atta's dead, stop hijacking the friggin post...:mad:
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Originally posted by Red Tail 444
YES!!
The Spit iX IS OVERMODELED IN ACES HIGH.
Atta's dead, stop hijacking the friggin post...:mad:
The Spit IX isn't modeled in Aces High. Something called a Spit IX is, but we haven't quite figured out what :)
Still looking for a clipped wing Spitfire LFIXe for Aces High
Dan/Slack
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Originally posted by Guppy35
The Spit IX isn't modeled in Aces High. Something called a Spit IX is, but we haven't quite figured out what :)
Dan/Slack
hehe...punt...
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We have a MK IX HF, late 1942, AH Field mod :D
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Storch...hows it going bud? haha :D
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Gripen,
The LW did have the resources in 1940 and they used a winning strategy. They changed it to a losing one. Check out that link.
The Allies had to build up the resources and up until Doolittle changed the mission statement of the Allied fighters had a losing strategy. Once the resources were in place and the strategy was changed the LW's downfall was fairly rapid. Within a few months.
Crumpp
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Crumpp,
I quess you will continue forever. I believe you mean "The Battle of Britain - A German Perspective" by E. Lund. Basicly it tells about same story as other sources but some statements there are quite odd like:
"The German concentration on Fighter Command airfields was, as the Luftwaffe had hoped, forcing the RAF fighters into combat. The resultant war of attrition was one that Fighter Command could not hope to win. The higher concentration of fighters in the German raids reduced the edge that Fighter Command had previously enjoyed: the Germans could afford to trade Me109s, one for one, with Spitfires and Hurricanes!"
Based on sources I tend to rate reliable 1:1 exchange rate in fighters favored RAF due to it had more resources (it has been questioned, but so far nobody has come up with reliable data on supposed LW reserves, RAF situation is well known) and in that case the LW lost a plane and a pilot while the RAF lost a plane and around half pilot. The writer constantly argues that attrition was more problem to RAF than for LW, why? Actually the writer tells that (about RAF):
"By using replacement aircraft (from repairs and storage) Fighter Command managed, until 1 September, to keep frontline strength at about the same levels as were available at the end of July."
And following about LW:
"Production of the Me109 (190 per month) was about one-half the British production rate for the Spitfire and Hurricane. Reserves were sufficient to keep most fighter units at 80 percent strength and bombers at 86 percent."
Basicly the writer does exactly same thing as you with your air superiority statements; statements contradict each other. In addition the writer also states that: "In fact, the Me109 and its pilots had proven superior in most one-on-one air combats with the British fighters." which is a quite questionable claim if compared with test data and statistics.
Overall the title says it all.
Regarding the change on fighter strategy, please check again USAAF statistical digest. There is not too many enemy fighters claimed in ground by USAAF fighters before April 1944 (assuming that Doolittle's strategy means also attacks against air bases).
gripen
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Gripen,
The higher concentration of fighters in the German raids reduced the edge that Fighter Command had previously enjoyed: the Germans could afford to trade Me109s, one for one, with Spitfires and Hurricanes!"
Don't know how else to interpret this for you. It's pretty cut and dry. The LW could afford the lose ratio as long as they kept to the "Airfeld" strategy.
"Production of the Me109 (190 per month) was about one-half the British production rate for the Spitfire and Hurricane. Reserves were sufficient to keep most fighter units at 80 percent strength and bombers at 86 percent."
You've conviently taken this out of context and changed the authors meaning. What this statement says in fact is that the LW was not straining it's production capacity to keep it's units at full strength. Yes, ask any Military Intelligence Anaylsist, 80 percent is considered a combat effective unit.
Regarding the change on fighter strategy, please check again USAAF statistical digest. There is not too many enemy fighters claimed in ground by USAAF fighters before April 1944 (assuming that Doolittle's strategy means also attacks against air bases).
The LW "Airfield" strategy and Doolittles change to the USAAF strategy are the same. The fighters were freed to go and destroy the Enemy WHEREVER they were found. They were not tied to visual distance escort of bombers nor did they have any restrictions on them once contact was made. Their orders were the same....DESTROY THE ENEMY. Chase him down and kill him. Leave him no safe haven.
In the case of the LW, Goering took a successful strategy and began to unravel it by placing restrictions on the fighters (visual range escort) AND he completely changed the targets. Both gave the RAF a "safe haven". Fly beyond visual range of the bombers and the 109's would disengage. Then you could reattack or land safely at your field....refit and do it again.
Before Doolittle came along the LW fighters had their own "safe havens". The Allies had an altitude restriction and couldn't chase below it. So LW fighters could dive for the deck and live to fight again. The Allied fighters were tied to close escort of the bombers leaving the airspace around them free for LW fighters to use unmolested. The LW could take off, form up, and attack at their leisure. Doolittle did the exact opposite of Goering. He denied the LW safe haven.
Once that safe haven was removed and the full wieght of a numerically/tactically superior enemy could be brought to bear, it did not take long to push either Air Force to the brink of destruction. In '44 the LW went over the edge and ceased to exist as an effective fighting force. In '41 the RAF was pushed right to that edge.
Crumpp
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tsk tsk,,,Crumpp and Gripen, you must stop meeting like this. Your wifes may get suspicious;)
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Crumpp,
The quotes basicly show that in the end of "2nd Phase" the RAF could keep first line strenght up to about same as in the beginning of the BoB (by using reserves) while the LW had fallen to 80% of what it should be (using unknown reserves). Question is about first line strenght but in long run production capacity is also an important factor. Basicly author proves that the RAF could maintain it's capability better than LW (during that critical period) and actually contradicts his own earlier statements. And very same thing is going on with your spring 44 statements; you started with one week in February and now we are going in April; basicly the thing what I stated in first place couple hunred messages ago.
gripen
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Here is something to add.
Did you know that the LW night bombed London in January 1944 with sometimes as many as 500 planes, and many times.
This was later named "The Baby Blitz"
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Your drawing the wrong conclusions about plane production just like the allies did in the begining of their Daylight campaign. The fact is the LW was producing more than enough planes to replace it losses and could keep that pace up. Just like they could in '44.
Planes only matter in so far as there are pilots to man them. Producing more planes than pilots to fly them is a waste of resources. Producing enough to maintain your losses AND provide for new/replacement pilots is the goal. Now the LW did not set a production goal thru wonderful resource managment. The RLM's policy of not entering a wartime footing was sufficient at this point to do what they needed.
The RAF couldn't replace it's pilots fast enough to keep up with their losses. They were losing not only pilots but experience as a fighting force. The LW was increasing the experience edge it already had over the RAF with every RAF pilot killed. As this gap increased the rate of loss for the RAF would also increase in proportion. The LW had a much larger pool of experienced pilots to draw upon.
This is what caused the collapse of the LW in '44. The LW had plenty of planes and bodies to throw in them. It just didn't have many guys with the knowledge to take their high performance fighter to the edge of the envelope and survive. Doolitte had increased the chances the "old hats" would get killed by taking away all their safe havens. When they began to die off it rapidly became a paper tiger and a hollow force.
This is all cover in the "Luftwaffe point of view" link for the the BoB.
Crumpp
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Yes they did have a "Baby Blitz",
Did you know that just Three months later they were totally incapable of putting a few bombs on their own coastline??
Seems a fairly rapid demise to me....
Crumpp
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Correction,
In three months they lost Air superiority and in 5 months the LW was completely incapable of an effective defense of it's own territory.
Crumpp
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Crumpp,
Well, seems that you don't fully understand this issue. According to E. Lund in the most critical part of the BoB (2nd phase, see pages 19-22):
- the LW lost roughly twice more fighter pilots than the RAF + other planes + crew due to fighting area.
"the Germans could afford to trade Me109s, one for one, with Spitfires and Hurricanes!" (I have no idea if this is actual rate).
- England out produced Germany in factor of two in the production of fighters (real number is more than twice).
"Production of the Me109 (190 per month) was about one-half the British production rate for the Spitfire and Hurricane."
- the RAF could maintain it's frontline strenght and still have some reserves left for several weeks of fighting at this rate.
"By using replacement aircraft (from repairs and storage) Fighter Command managed, until 1 September, to keep frontline strength at about the same levels as were available at the end of July."
"But, those reserves had dwindled from 518 Spitfires and Hurricanes (in maintenance and storage) on 6 July, to only 292 by 7 September."
- the LW could not maintain it's strenght ie was running out of reserves.
"Reserves were sufficient to keep most fighter units at 80 percent strength and bombers at 86 percent."
Basicly the LW had no resources to win BoB despite what ever strategy they used as Nashwan allready noted (or where are those reserves?). Nothing indicates that the he quality of the pilots in the RAF did reduce much, actually during September they generally reached better than 1:1 ratio (mostly much better).
The main difference if compared to spring 1944 is that the allies had resources then. Still the LW fought hard, an often refered claim is that the LW lost about 1000 fighter pilots KIA/MIA between January and May 1944 in the defence of the Reich. Suprisingly this about same number as heavy bomber losses to enemy fighters at same period. And as noted earlier, there appear to be no big changes in the activity of the LW until autumn.
gripen
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I thought you might have got booted for those comments, just checking... :D
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Gripen,
Since you insist on pedaling half truths. Lets examine some key paragraphs keeping them in context.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ww2/batlbrit.pdf
You say the RAF could have sustained it's losses and the LW could not have kept up the pressure.
Lets examine the Order of Battle:
"On 1 August RAF Fighter Command
strength stood at 570 Hurricanes and
Spitfires (two- thirds of these were
Hurricanes), and of the total only 367 were
operational. Thus, excluding the less
capable types, Blenheims, Defiants,
Gladiators, and so forth, the German
Me109s outnumbered the British forces by
almost two to one (367 versus 702). British
defenses also included some 1,200 heavy
and 650 light antiaircraft pieces. And,
although the Germans considered these
insufficient for the defensive task, antiaircraft
fire would account for about 12 percent of the
German losses in the coming battles."
This is the Strength of RAF FIGHTER COMMAND. The entire RAF fighter force. Including the areas the LW could not overfly to the North/West of England.
"GERMAN AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY
10 AUGUST 1940
The total force available on 10 August
was 3,196 aircraft, with 2,485 operational.
Luftflotte 5:
138 He111 and Ju88 (123 operational)
37 Me110 (34)
Luftflotten 2 and 3:
406 Ju87 (316)
282 Me110 (227)
813 Me109 (702)"
This is the LW forces involved in the BoB. Now there are 2 other Luftflottes the LW is not using. They are holding down the frontiers of the Riech which is not at war any place else except England in August '40. Check out the appendix in Lund's article under Order of Battle.
Now lets look at losses, ability to replace Aircraft, and pilots.
"Between 8 August and 6
September, 657 fighters had been lost. By
using replacement aircraft (from repairs and
storage) Fighter Command managed, until 1
September, to keep frontline strength at
about the same levels as were available at
the end of July. But, those reserves had
dwindled from 518 Spitfires and Hurricanes
(in maintenance and storage) on 6 July, to
only 292 by 7 September."
The RAF's Entire fighter force reserves are down to 292 planes. Pretty low. Now lets look at the RAF's ability to replace those reserves and keep it's frontline strength up.
"British production figures were no
more encouraging. In the last week of
August, for example, only 91 Spitfire and
Hurricanes were produced while losses
reached 137 destroyed and 11 seriously
damaged. With losses at these rates,
Fighter Command estimated that reserves
would be exhausted in three weeks followed
by steady depletion of the frontline
squadrons. This, of course, would be
accelerated if the Luftwaffe could
successfully knock out critical production
facilities."
So by the end of September '40 IF the LW kept it's current strategy the RAF would be running on empty with nothing to replace it's losses OF JUST PLANES.
Let's look at the RAF's ability to replace it's pilots.
"The critical problem faced
by Fighter Command was the loss of
trained fighter pilots. In phase one of the
campaign (8 to 18 August), the RAF lost
154 pilots (killed, seriously wounded or
missing). Only 63 new fighter pilots were
available from the training schools for the
same period. During phase two, 24 August
to 1 September, the figures were even
worse as losses reached 231 pilots, or
about 20 percent of the total combat
strength of the command! Combat strength
in the month of August decreased by
almost one-third, from 1,434 to 1,023. The
squadron average fell from 26 to 16
operational pilots. Naturally, combat
experience was similarly reduced.
In July and August, roughly onefourth
of the squadron leaders and one-third of
the flight leaders had been killed or removed
from flying due to injuries. Experienced pilots
numbered no more than 500—less than onehalf
of Fighter Command's strength—with the
remainder often having less than 20 hours
flying time on fighters. Daily sortie rates were
high and it was not uncommon for pilots to fly
three and four sorties a day. Stress was also
high. "One squadron, No. 85, based at
Croydon, had fourteen of its eighteen pilots
shot down in two weeks, two of them
twice."105"
So the RAF was losing pilots it could not replace AND just as importantly was losing it's experienced pilots who could fight.
So were does this all leave the RAF on 7 September '40?
"On the ground the persistence of the
German attacks was beginning to take effect.
The RAF was faced with the real possibility of
withdrawing 11 Group to bases north of
London. "Air superiority over Kent and
Essex, at least for a week or two, was in the
Luftwaffe's grasp; the aim of Adlerangrif was
near to being realized."106"
Now lets look at the LW's Three Luftflottes that were facing down the RAF:
First we will look at the LW's ability to replace it's lost Aircraft.
"Material losses were also high; in the
two week period beginning 24 August some
545 aircraft of all types were lost—200 more
than British losses for the same period. By 7
September, Luftflotten 2 and 3 fielded 623
operational Me 109s. This was a reduction of
about one-eighth the available strength at the
beginning of phase one."
They have lost ONE EIGHTH their original Strength of ME 109's...They went from 702 (just 109's) to 623.
Now lets look at the RLM's ability to produce 109's.
"Production of the Me109 (190 per
month) was about one-half the British
production rate for the Spitfire and Hurricane.
Reserves were sufficient to keep most fighter
units at 80 percent strength and bombers at 86
percent. While losses of the bombers and
Me110s should be considered high, this too
was changing. "As the inexperience of the
R.A.F. squadrons increased, so also would
the success of the German bombers and twinengined
fighters, whose crews were, thus far at
least, more easily replaced with experienced
personnel."107 Therefore, the Luftwaffe ended
Phase two with a capability to field 623
operational Me109s against a force of only 350
RAF fighters."
So the LW was able to replace it planes and keep it's units at a combat effective level.
Now lets look at the LW's ability to replace it's pilot losses.
"The Luftwaffe, too, was experiencing
difficulties at this point in the campaign. Crew
fatigue was evident because the Luftwaffe did
not establish a system of pilot rotation as had
the RAF. Because of the requirement for
extensive escort duties most fighter pilots flew
two sorties a day for weeks at a time. Aircrew
losses were high, reaching five losses for each
British loss. This problem became so serious
Goering ordered that only one officer be allowed
to fly per aircraft, severely reducing the
experience level “airborne” within the bomber
forces. Only 97 percent of the pilot
requirement could be met for the serviceable
Me109s."
So the LW was down 3 percent of its 109 pilots and 1/8th of it's planes. Again their are two other Luftflottes the LW has not drawn any replacements from. The RAF's average fighter squadron has been reduced by 38 percent. Seems the facts show the LW was winning AND could sustain the losses. Sure the bombers were getting a nose bleed but there were 2 other Luftflottes to throw in the fray AND the RAF was fatally hemorrhaging the all important fighter pilot.
The single engine dayfighters were doing just fine in the LW. Even at the 1:2 ratio. which would have begun to dramatically increase just as the USAAF ratio increased in '44 against the average inexperienced LW pilot, the LW could sustain it's losses. Not an easy victory but a victory nonetheless.
But we all know the LW high command changed strategy and lost the fight. Thank god.
To say the LW had no chance of winning the BoB is pure fantasy. It was in fact a hard won victory for the RAF. One that they almost didn't come out on top of...
Crumpp
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Crumpp,
Well, I quess you will soon earn so called "Barbi Award" :)
We are talking about situation in the end of the 2nd phase (beginning of september). England produced around 13 new fighter planes/day and there were still 292 planes in reserve. So with the loss rate of 2nd phase there were reserves and new production for at least for a month (to keep front line in same strenght). Please show where the LW reserves were? E. Lund is very clear, LW could maintain just 80% strenght in this very same moment; the one eight reduction tells us that the LW was allready out of reserves in the July.
Funny thing is that E. Lund claims that combat experience of the RAF reduced, in fact it actually increased all the time, absolutely and relatively to LW; again according to him self because he claims that 1:1 plane loss rate which means 2:1 pilot loss rate which favors RAF. And as you just quoted there were still plenty of pilots in reserve (front line strenght was much less than reserves). And as noted above, the RAF pilots did well in September despite what ever losses. About LW it should be noted that Lund actually says that they did not have pilots even for that 80% strenght; Lund says "Only 97 percent of the pilot
requirement could be met for the serviceable
Me109s."
Nashwan all ready quoted LW strenght above. Tell me where the LW reserves where?
gripen
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That ratio you are claiming is wrong and an attempt at revisionist history. The ratio of fighter to fighter losses according to Lund is as follows:
For Phase I of the BoB
"The fighter ratio was
actually 1:2 (46 Me109s to 98 Spitfire and
Hurricane) and even lower still if the loss of 35
Me110s is added!"
Allow me to explain this data. For every ONE Me-109 Shot down the RAF lost 2 Hurricanes or Spitfires. Hardly a losing ratio especially when the Jagdwaffe outnumbered the RAF almost 2 to 1 inlcuding the RAF's fighter reserve.
For Phase II of the BoB
"Therefore, the Luftwaffe ended
Phase two with a capability to field 623
operational Me109s against a force of only 350
RAF fighters."
Now I'm not sure if the author means 350 TOTAL RAF fighters or 350 frontline. Let's not split hairs and go with the best case for the RAF. So with their "Reserves" the RAF at best equals the LW in single engine fighter strength. However with a loss ratio of 2 RAF fighters for each LW fighter it is not going to take long for the LW to destroy Fighter Command.
To claim that experience was on the rise in the RAF, well frankly, is a stupid statement. For a few individuals who survived sure. But for the force as a whole, no way. If YOUR claims held any truth then the LW in Feb '44 would have been the most experienced force in the world. IF your claim holds true then why don't Armies just train a few people really really well and throw them in with hundreds of inexperienced ones with no training. The majority can just learn by osmosis.
Now this is just Luftflotte 2, LF 3, and LF 5. The LW still has in existence LF 1 and LF4 as well as quite a few "unaccounted for Jagdgeshwaders". Their is almost NO data out there on the LW forces that were not directly involved in the BoB. However it is unreasonable to believe they did not exist or that they were quickly formed in just a few months. So by examining the Orders of Battle form both before and immediately after the BoB we can see some of these unaccounted for Units show up. They were there and available. The LW just didn't need them so they never became a factor.
All LW Fighter Wings:
http://www.feldgrau.com/jagdg.html
Granted a few where not in existence in Aug '40. the Majority however where around.
And Luftflotte 1 and Luftflotte 4:
http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/2072/LW_OBs.html
Without a doubt, using the reasonable man standard, one can conclude that the LW had other forces to draw upon, they just were not a factor in the BoB.
No lets look at Lund's conclusions about the BoB:
"In the final analysis, perhaps the Germans
could have won. Perhaps, if they had
aggressively pursued either campaign
strategy they could have won, but that will
always remain conjecture."
Gosh that is exactly what I have been saying.
And in regards to "Big Week" and the rapid demise of the LW....
Here is an exerpt from an interview with Don Caldwell by Thrustmaster for their website:
http://us.thrustmaster.com/news/read.php3?newsid=217&skin=Hotas
" · When Galland was given command of JG 26 during the Battle of Britain, he quickly transformed the unit from an average performer to one that the Luftwaffe itself rated as superior — objective proof that Galland was as good a leader as he always claimed to be.
· JG 26 (and its partner JG 2) then maintained its ascendancy over the RAF for two full years, from mid-1941 to mid-1943. Two hundred Luftwaffe fighters were able to ‘hold the line” over the English Channel while the rest of the Luftwaffe moved East for the invasion of the USSR. RAF Fighter Command losses exceeded Jagdwaffe (Luftwaffe fighter arm) losses by a factor of about 4 to 1. The reason this was such a surprise to me is that the RAF over claimed by about this same factor, 4 to 1, and maintained then and now that the results of their Non-Stop Offensive were a draw.
· The Luftwaffe’s loss of control of the air over Germany and the western occupied zone was sudden and irrevocable, and can be dated precisely to one month, February 1944, and even to a single week, “Big Week”, which had been dismissed by revisionist historians as only an Allied propaganda victory.
· Although their commanders knew that the war was lost, JG 26 fought constantly over the Invasion Front and on the retreat through Germany up until the cease-fire on 4 May 1945 ended the fighting on Montgomery’s front. The Jagdwaffe was so badly outnumbered that its efforts were barely noticed by the Allies, but the German pilots continued to fight and die on every day that the weather permitted them to take off."
Crumpp
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" · JG 26 (and its partner JG 2) then maintained its ascendancy over the RAF for two full years, from mid-1941 to mid-1943. Two hundred Luftwaffe fighters were able to ‘hold the line” over the English Channel"
Is that why RAF units saw no LW a/c on some Ramrods, Rhubabs,...., or if they did, the LW did not come near the RAF a/c since the LW was so outnumbered, interesting.:eek:
The RAF in BoB did not stay back because its sections or squadrons were out numbered.
............................. ..............
Big Week operations
SUNDAY, 20 FEBRUARY 1944
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):
Mission 226: The Eighth Air Force begins "Big Week," attacks on German aircraft plants and airfields. For the first time, over 1,000 bombers are dispatched; 21 bombers and 4 fighters are lost hitting 3 areas in Germany, i.e.:
1. 417 B-17s are dispatched to Leipzig/Mockau Airfield, and aviation industry targets at Heiterblick and Abnaundorf; 239 hit the primary targets, 37 hit Bernburg, 44 hit Oschersleben and 20 hit other targets of opportunity; they claim 14-5-6 Luftwaffe aircraft; 7 B-17s are lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 161 damaged; casualties are 7 KIA, 17 WIA and 72 MIA.
2. 314 B-17s are dispatched to the Tutow Airfield; 105 hit the primary and immediate area, 76 hit Rostock and 115 hit other targets of opportunity; they claim 15-15-10 Luftwaffe aircraft; 6 B-17s are lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 37 damaged; casualties are 3 KIA and 60 MIA.
3. 272 B-24s are dispatched to aviation industry targets at Brunswick, Wilhelmtor and Neupetritor; 76 hit the primary, 87 hit Gotha, 13 hit Oschersleben, 58 hit Helmstedt and 10 hit other targets of opportunity; they claim 36-13-13 Luftwaffe aircraft; 8 B-24s are lost, 3 damaged beyond repair and 37 damaged; casualties are 10 KIA, 10 WIA and 77 MIA.
Missions 1 and 3 above are escorted by 94 P-38s, 668 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s and 73 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s; they claim 61-7-37 Luftwaffe aircraft; 1 P-38, 2 P-47s and 1 P-51 is lost, 2 P-47s are damaged beyond repair and 4 aircraft are damaged; casualties are 4 MIA. Mission 227: 4 of 5 B-17s drop 200 bundles of leaflets on Tours, Nantes, Brest and Lorient, France at 2123-2200 hours without loss.
MONDAY, 21 FEBRUARY 1944
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):
Mission 228: "Big Week" continues with 3 areas in Germany targetted with the loss of 16 bombers and 5 fighters:
1. 336 B-17s are dispatched to the Gutersioh, Lippstadt and Werl Airfields; because of thick overcast, 285 hit Achmer, Hopsten, Rheine, Diepholz, Quakenbruck and Bramsche Airfields and the marshalling yards at Coevorden and Lingen; they claim 12-5-8 Luftwaffe aircraft; 8 B-17s are lost, 3 damaged beyond repair and 63 damaged; casualties are 4 KIA, 13 WIA and 75 MIA.
2. 281 B-17s are dispatched to Diepholz Airfield and Brunswick; 175 hit the primaries and 88 hit Alhorn and Verden Airfields and Hannover; they claim 2-5-2 Luftwaffe aircraft; 5 B-17s are lost, 3 damaged beyond repair and 36 damaged; casualties are 20 KIA, 4 WIA and 57 MIA.
3. 244 B-24s are dispatched to Achmer and Handorf Airfields; 11 hit Achmer Airfield and 203 hit Diepholz, Verden and Hesepe Airfields and Lingen; they claim 5-6-4 Luftwaffe aircraft; 3 B-24s are lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 6 damaged; casualties are 3 WIA and 31 MIA.
Escort for Mission 228 is provided by 69 P-38s, 542 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s and 68 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s; the P-38s claim 0-1-0 Luftwaffe aircraft, 1 P-38 is damaged beyond repair; the P-47s claim 19-3-14 Luftwaffe aircraft, 2 P-47s are lost, 2 are damaged beyond repair, 3 are damaged and 2 pilots are MIA; the P-51s claim 14-1-4 Luftwaffe aircraft, 3 P-51s are lost and the pilots are MIA.
Mission 229: 5 of 5 B-17s drop 250 bundles of leaflets on Rouen, Caen, Paris and Amiens, France at 2215-2327 hours without loss.
TUESDAY, 22 FEBRUARY 1944
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):
HQ VIII Bomber Command is redesignated as HQ, Eighth Air Force. Mission 230: "Big Week" continues with 799 aircraft dispatched against German aviation and Luftwaffe airfields; 41 bombers and 11 fighters are lost.
1. 289 B-17s are dispatched against aviation industry targets at Aschersleben (34 bomb), Bernburg (47 bomb) and Halberstadt (18 bomb) in conjunction with a Fifteenth Air Force raid on Regensburg, Germany; 32 hit Bunde, 19 hit Wernegerode, 15 hit Magdeburg, 9 hit Marburg and 7 hit other targets of opportunity; they claim 32-18-17 Luftwaffe aircraft; 38 B-17s are lost, 4 damaged beyond repair and 141 damaged; casualties are 35 KIA, 30 WIA and 367 MIA.
2. 333 B-17s are dispatched to Schweinfurt but severe weather prevents aircraft from forming properly and they are forced to abandon the mission prior to crossing the enemy coast; 2 B-17s are damaged.
3. 177 B-24s are dispatched but they are recalled when 100 miles (160 km) inland; since they were over Germany, they sought targets of opportunity but strong winds drove the bombers over The Netherlands and their bombs hit Enschede, Arnhem, Nijmegen and Deventer; they claim 2-0-0 Luftwaffe aircraft; 3 B-24s are lost and 3 damaged; casualties are 30 MIA.
These missions are escorted by 67 P-38s, 535 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s, and 57 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s; the P-38s claim 1-0-0 Luftwaffe aircraft, 1 P-38 is damaged beyond repair and 6 are damaged; the P-47s claim 39-6-15 Luftwaffe aircraft, 8 P-47s are lost and 12 damaged, 8 pilots are MIA; the P-51s claim 19-1-10 Luftwaffe aircraft, 3 P-51s are lost and 3 damaged, 3 pilot are MIA.
THURSDAY, 24 FEBRUARY 1944
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):
Missions 237, 238 and 239 are flown today against targets in France; 7 B-17s are lost. Heavy clouds cause over half the bombers dispatched to return without bombing.
Mission 237: 49 of 81 B-24s hit the Ecalles sur Buchy V-weapon sites; 1 B-24 is damaged.
Escort is provided by 61 P-47s.
Mission 238: 258 B-17s are dispatched against V-weapon sites in the Pas de Calais; 109 hit the primary target, 10 hit a road junction E of Yerville, 7 hit a rail siding SW of Abbeville and 6 hit targets of opportunity; 7 B-17s are lost and 75 damaged; casualties are 5 WIA and 63 MIA.
Escort is provided by 81 P-38s, 94 P-47s and 22 P-51s; 1 P-38 is damaged beyond repair; the P-51s claim 1-0-0 Luftwaffe aircraft on the ground.
Mission 239: 5 of 5 B-17s drop 250 bundles of leaflets on Amiens, Rennes, Paris, Rouen and Le Mans, France at 2023-2055 hours without loss.
FRIDAY, 25 FEBRUARY 1944
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):
Mission 235: In the final "Big Week" mission, 4 targets in Germany are hit; 31 bombers and 3 fighters are lost.
1. 268 B-17s are dispatched to aviation industry targets at Augsburg and the industrial area at Stuttgart; 196 hit Augsburg and targets of opportunity and 50 hit Stuttgart; they claim 8-4-4 Luftwaffe aircraft; 13 B-17s are lost and 172 damaged; casualties are 12 WIA and 130 MIA.
2. 267 of 290 B-17s hit aviation industry targets at Regensburg and targets of opportunity; they claim 13-1-7 Luftwaffe aircraft; 12 B-17s are lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 82 damaged; casualties are 4 KIA, 12 WIA and 110 MIA.
3. 172 of 196 B-24s hit aviation industry targets at Furth and targets of opportunity; they claim 2-2-2 Luftwaffe aircraft; 6 B-24s are lost, 2 damaged beyond repair and 44 damaged; casualties are 2 WIA and 61 MIA.
Escort is provided by 73 P-38s, 687 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s and 139 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s; the P-38s claim 1-2-0 Luftwaffe aircraft, 1 P-38 is damaged beyond repair; the P-47s claim 13-2-10 Luftwaffe aircraft, 1 P-47 is lost and 6 damaged, 1 pilot is MIA; the P-51s claim 12-0-3 Luftwaffe aircraft, 2 P-51s are lost and 1 damaged beyond repair, 2 pilots are MIA.
All know how exagerated were the claims of the 8th AF bomber gunners.
http://hometown.aol.com/jlowry3402/feb44.html
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Crumpp,
Please count the planes of the RAF here (http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/calendar.html). It gives you daily numbers for hole lenght of the BoB. Basicly E. Lund uses numbers which happen to support his agenda and therefore his statements tend to contradict each other as pointed out several times above by me and Nashwan and others. And as you admit above, even you don't know what he means so please don't try to say that you explain the data.
The case is very simply; even during the 2nd phase the LW did not shoot down enough RAF planes down to bring RAF down (the reserves and production were enough). The Fighter command refused to fight with all available power and the LW was forced to change strategy. And as even E. lund shows, the LW was running out of pilots and planes. All this is discused above thoroughly.
As Nashwan wrote:
"Phase 2 ended on the 7th Sept. By his own admission, the RAF still had 292 Spits and Hurris in storage at this point.
Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 7th September 1940
Spitfire - 223
Hurricane - 398
Total = 621 (and this doesn't include the reserves)"
Based on results during September it's clear that relative combat experience of the RAF if compared to LW increased.
gripen
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That site corresponds to Lund's numbers almost exactly. It does include the reserves. Remember Dowding threw the RAF reserves into the battle. From July on the RAF reserves were being used to keep up the frontline strength. That is the point. The RAF Reserves were within weeks of being gone...This is the RAF's OWN assesment.
The RAF on their own site list's the claims made each day. Look at those numbers. The actual numbers of "destroyed" planes includes ALL LW planes, both fighters and bombers and is roughly half of the number of planes claimed. The claims include "damaged" LW planes. Many which flew back were repaired and reentered the fight. When you cross reference the actual casualties like Lund has done you see the results. Lund does not quote LW claims. He quotes RAF/LW planes destroyed by examining each AF's own loss records.
Same thing Don Caldwell does in his assesment of "Big Week". This was it doesn't matter that each force "overclaimed".
Crumpp
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That site corresponds to Lund's numbers almost exactly. It does include the reserves.
It doesn't include the reserves.
"On 1st September there were 701 operational aircraft and on 6th September the figure was 738, with 256 in stores ready for immediate despatch"
Overy, the battle
6th September
Operational squadrons
Spitfire 19
Hurricane 32
Established strength
Spitfires 304
Hurricanes 512
Actual strength
Spitfires 304
Hurricanes 512
Serviceable reserve
Spitfires 41
Hurricanes 183
The Battle of Britain, Richard Townshend Bickers
Now, let's look at what figures the RAF site gives.
Serviceable aircraft, Spits and Hurris,
24th August 646
30th August 644
5th september 636
If these numbers include the reserves, then the RAF was not even losing strength from the reserves.
Those figures for the RAf site are serviceable aircraft with the squadrons, not including the reserves. To suggest otherwise is not only wrong, it implies the RAf was winning by a bigger amount than anybody has claimed.
Remember Dowding threw the RAF reserves into the battle.
Park, commanding 11 group, not Dowding. And by his reserves he means committed all the squadrons in 11 group, not aircraft from storage depots. There is a huge difference betweem tactical reserves and reserves held in storage.
The RAF on their own site list's the claims made each day. Look at those numbers. The actual numbers of "destroyed" planes includes ALL LW planes, both fighters and bombers and is roughly half of the number of planes claimed. The claims include "damaged" LW planes. Many which flew back were repaired and reentered the fight. When you cross reference the actual casualties like Lund has done you see the results. Lund does not quote LW claims. He quotes RAF/LW planes destroyed by examining each AF's own loss records.
Lund does, in places, quote LW claims. He says the RAF lost 68 aircraft in one day, about twice the highest figure for any real day. He also seems to be ignoring RAF actual strength and basing it more on LW intelligence assesments. Certainly his figure of 350 operational Hurris and Spits is closer to the Luftwaffe's assesment of 300 than the RAF's actual 800 or so (600 - 650 is a serviceable figure, not operational).
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Crumpp,
Dowding never "threw" reserves to combat, the squadrons got replacements when needed. As noted above there were over 50 RAF squadrons in combat, 12 planes each (possibly more). That is about 600 and the combat strenght stayed around 600 through whole critical period. Shortly, nothing indicates that RAF was running out planes nor that there were no reserves left. Maybe I should cut and paste answers from above, all this is allready discussed.
But where are the LW reserves? So far you have not brought in any data on LW reserves despite requested (actually noone have), basicly you should prove it or shut up. According to Lund the LW could keep just 80% strenght and they have pilots for 97% of them (as noted several times). Again it should be also noted that Lund claims 1:1 ratio for 2nd phase and even his numbers show that the RAF had more pilots and twice production of fighters. In addition the RAF repair units did good work and around 35% of the replacement aircraft were repaired (according to Wood & Dempster).
gripen
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I keep wondering why no one has brought up the possible impact on "Ultra' during the B of B. I know it's open for debate but certainly that gave the British an advantage.
And Crumpp, I'm with ya on the 1944 Allies having Air superiority and I'm with gripen on the B of B. It got close for a bit, but I don't believe the LW was ever going to be in a position to win it.
Fighters lacked the range, and the bombers, designed for ground support just weren't enough to carry out a strategic campaign.
I got to be good friends with one of those 20 hour Spit pilots who joined 266 Squadron in August 1940. While they were busy trying to stay alive, he doesn't ever recall a time where they had a doubt they weren't going to win(for lack of a better word) the battle.
I think it's the danger in getting too caught up in statistics. They don't tell the whole story and can be manipulated enough to try and prove a point.
Eisenhower in a jeep on the beach in Normandy telling his kid he's got air supremacy, carries a lot more weight with me then a stat that says so many LW planes were able to fly. Ike knew how the war was going and had a feel for the situation.
The B of B pilot was there and able to get a feel for how his commanders were reacting, how his fellow pilots were reacting and a sense of the time he was flying in.
Coulda, shoulda, woulda's are exactly that regardless of the numbers.
Dan/Slack
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It's been proven? Did you not read it? Do you need me to spell it out AGAIN. YOU are the one who seems to think that "reserves" being used in a battle is not a big deal. There is a reason why ALL militaries keep them. When things get desperate you use your reserves.
Your oblivious to your own data. EVEN THE RAF SAYS SEPTEMBER OF '40 WAS DEPERATE AND THEY WERE WITHIN WEEKS OF LOSING. So why would you come around 60 years later and tell them they were not?
Do you not see the numbers given by the RAF? Yes the Luftwaffe was at 80 percent without using reserves. The RAF was at 50 percent unit strength until the reserves were thrown in? Just how hard is that to understand? The RAF had NO more to give. IF the LW didn't use any other pilots and lost another 20 percent...The LW would be at 60 percent and the RAF at 50 percent. Same loss ratio continues and the LW is at 40 percent and the RAF is at 0. End of story. This is using YOUR screwed up simplistic reasoning.
Quoting your site for 07 Sept. '40:
"During engagements with the enemy, our fighters destroyed 74 enemy aircraft (plus 34 probable and 33 Damaged). Our casualties amounted to 27 aircraft of which 14 pilots killed or missing."
74 bombers, fighters, paper airplanes?? AGAIN THESE ARE THE RAF's "claims" and have no validity until compared with the LW actual losses. Otherwise your doing the same thing the LW did...your down to the last spitfire real quick.
If the RAF maintained the ratio they claimed the BoB would have been over in a matter of weeks.
As for the LW reserves, that has been proven. You need to examine the data.
Crumpp
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Guppy 35,
Yeah, one of the main problems of the LW during BoB was that it was a tactical air force trying to do work of a strategic air force. This is a principal difference if compared to spring 1944 and even then the LW was still mostly an tactical air force.
Crumpp,
It's well documented that Dowding thought that the loss rate during the end of august was untolerable. From hindsight we know that the RAF could sustain that kind of losses longer than LW simply because they had more resources.
So where are the LW reserves?
gripen
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Come on,
No historian that examines the loss records and not the claim records is screaming the LW didn't have the strength to win in 'Sept '40. At least None that i have been able to find. Every account I have of the BoB backs up the fact that things were desperate. Hard fighting on the part of the RAF and mistakes on the LW's part won the battle.
To quote sources that do not use the Actual loss data for each Air Force is to just further muddle the picture and only supports a revisionist argument.
The reserves were there. In the form of Luftflotte 1 and 4 and the other unaccounted for JG's.
Gripen, you are attempting to place goals and restrictions on the event that did not exist. The LW stated goal of Air Supremacy over South Eastern England is not the same as wiping out the RAF. That could only be accomplished once an invasion took place. The LW knew this and total destruction of the RAF was not one of their goals in the BoB. This is clearly stated in Lund's site.
Crumpp
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Let me give you my view on this.
I belive the LW could have "won" the BoB. However that would have required better decisions on their side along with worse decisions on the RAF side.
Lw would have needed to give the Fighters a better chance as a harassing force, and maintaining full strength on the airfield offensive. RAF would have to have made the mistake of meeting them steadily from the foremost airfields.
The RAF could also have won more decisively. They made mistakes regarding formations, they were keeping too big units too near the front and so on.
Anyway, my view is that the RAF won by some margin. LW could have "won", but not quickly enough for Germany to mount a successful invasion. RAF could also have drawn back inland to relative safety for the German fighters.
The Brits were already on the go for a total war with a much more realistic production plans, both for planes and pilots. Only a year or so from the BoB their force had become stronger than the LW.
So what is there to argue about?
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Crumpp,
Well, so far you have stated many kind of things about historians above and mostly questionable statements like above. Terraine quotes a German historian K. Klee who states that the alteration of strategy (in the end of 2nd phase) "was absolutely correct in the given situation, frustrated the efforts of the Luftwaffe to force a decision. Fighter Command had certainly suffered heavy losses, but it had not been put out of action."
Note that you have quoted E. Lund, who appear to use what ever data (like kill claims) to supports his agenda despite evident contradictory statements. I have not refered kill claims except by USAAF and in that case only as a indicator of the LW actitivity. Or do you mean that RAF statements on their own strenght are some how biased?
Regarding the LW reserves; I'm still waiting and I quess others too. Actually the planes in the service of the other luftflottes are not reserves but please give the numbers at least on them (if there was such).
I'm not attempting to place anykind of goals or what ever. It's actually your jobb to prove that the LW could won BoB.
gripen
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I totally agree with you Angus. Good assessment.
To say the LW had no chance to win is stupidity and totally invalidates the Courage and Sacrifice of the RAF pilots.
Surely Gripen, it is not you contention that Luftflotte 1 and Luftflotte 4 did not exist. As to them being reserves, The LW wasn't organized like the RAF but I am sure if those planes were needed they would have been thrown into the fray. The LW did this on many many occasion throught the Second World War.
Here is the Average amount of A/C in a Luftflotte, Gripen.
"The organisation of the Luftwaffe was very different from the Royal Air Force. Whereas the latter had branches based on function, such as Fighter Command, the German Air Force was arranged into air fleets, or Luftflotten, which were self-contained units complete with all fighter, bomber and other elements. The average strength of a Luftflotte was 1,000 aircraft."
That leave the LW with about a 2000 planes that are not engaged in England.
Even the Imperial War Museaum says the LW almost won in September.
http://www.iwm.org.uk/online/battle%20of%20britain/overview.htm
"The crucial period of the battle was between 24 August and 15 September. Fighter Command came closest to losing when its vital sector airfields around London were attacked. The decisive turning point came on 7 September when the Luftwaffe switched its attention to the capital. This tactical blunder allowed Fighter Command to recover its strength rapidly to inflict, on 15 September, losses significant enough to show the Germans the battle could not be won."
So lets stop presenting a warped view Gripen and accept the fact the RAF pulled off a great victory from an enemy with the capability to beat them.
Crumpp
[
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"The Battle of Britain raged over the skies of southern England throughout that late summer of 1940 - the Luftwaffe lost a total of 1,733 aircraft from July to October, the RAF 915. Had he but known it, Göering was only 24 hours from victory at one point according to British Flight Command. All our reserves were spent and our pilots were exhausted. Incredibly, Göering decided that the Luftwaffe were taking too much of a punishment from the British fighters and he ordered his planes to switch their attention away from the British airfields and towards the British cities. Whilst this was bad news for the civilian populations of the industrial cities, this gave the R.A.F. and the aviation industry a reprieve and a crucial breather to re-arm and re-stock. It also meant that a German invasion of Britain had to be postponed and that Germany was soon to turn its attention eastwards - a decision which was arguably to cost them the war."
http://www.retrosellers.com/features61.htm
Another site...Keep wishing Gripen
Crumpp
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Even your own post shows your wrong crump.
Only churhill and those that accept his melodramatic slant could accept that on sept 7th the RAF was at the crux of defeat but by Sept 15th the LW had to accept that they could not win the battle.
The RAF was not close to desperate. Your own numbers show it. Your just babbling 400 posts later.
The RAF probably was happy that the LW had switched to civi targets. But to switch from defeated to undefeateble in 7 days based on that change of tactics is silly.
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Who is churhill? :rofl
Guess the RAF and the British Imperial War Museum have it wrong and you got it all right Pongo!
You know, It's better to keep your mouth shut and be thought a fool than than to open it and prove it.
Speaking of idiots, is that you picture under your name or some other.......
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
You know, It's better to keep your mouth shut and be thought a fool than than to open it and prove it.
Then why are you still yapping dirt eater?:)
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Did anybody hear anything? :rofl
Crumpp
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This thread should be renamed the "BOB THREAD"!!
Anyway, as much as this has been an argument over numbers and the meaning of numbers, we have to keep in mind the conclusion of what happened in the BoB.
A better view than just numbers may be to put yourselves in the position of the LW & RAF commanders, and also to look at some historical facts. I'll try to make this as short as possible. (hard!)
HERE BEGINS THE ESSAY
The LW tried a campaign which aimed at getting the RAF into the fight and crushing them by force. They had met the RAF in France and done well. They knew that the RAF force in the UK wasn't THAT big. So did the British, - Dowding gave his statement to Churchill about the situation and just so managed to keep what he considered to be a minimal force.
The campaign was rather logical, starting with radar stations, then airfields, then after the RAF would submit, the aim was to paralize shipping and navy ops. (Well, ok, the first phase was basically anti-shipping strikes)
However, after weeks and weeks of fighting, and claims of more than 1xRAF value of British fighters shot down, the RAF seemed to be as strong as ever, and kept shooting down an increasing number of LW planes. Bombing London did also not seem to break the morale (like Warsaw, Rotterdam and such) of the people, but the LW losses just raised streaching that "far" inland.
The RAF with half the force of the LW, less experienced pilots, and a combat doctrine that was somewhat lagging behind (i.e. Vic's vs finger four's), however had some advantages.
Most importantly, the defence system was set up nicely, in a way which was more advanced than the German way (the Germans were actually quite as well advanced in radar techniques). Secondly, the British fighters were of the best quality the Germans had yet met. There was no more an absolute superiority in speed, and the LW could also not benefit from chaos and confusion of an advancing frontline. This was a rather static duel, and now the weapons were equal.
So, The might of the LW was not enough. That was a shock to the Germans, - however the might of the LW was also a shock to the British. The RAF was on its last legs when the battle was directed towards London, what the RAF did not know was that the LW was very weary as well. After bombing London heavily, the city population was actually on the verge of revolt, - the very much hoped for consequence of sustained bombing by the LW.
However, they did not know that. The RAF could defend London better than themselves (!) From the LW pont of view, all effort was in vain. The British just seemed to learn fast, grow fast, and as a concequence improve their kill rate. A month after the "Adlertag", the last "50" Spits scored better than ever, leaving LW high command in deep thought about how much there was left. They knew their reserves, but failed completely at guessing at the RAF status.
The RAF won the day. The first time that the excellent and mighty LW met a proper and properly controlled air force at only half their size, they had to back off. They got close to succeeding, but they didn't know how close, nor how to follow it up.
The British had a different look upon it. The suffered severe casualties, their capital burned, the RAF almost gave up, they came close to rebellion. But the score against the LW kept going up. Eventually, the LW concluded that the RAF, or the British for that sake, could not be defeated in a blitz, just kept at bay. They turned to another business. That gave the BOB a definate British victory. And the German assumptions also became their own undoings.
Here endeth the essay
;)
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Who is churhill? :rofl
Guess the RAF and the British Imperial War Museum have it wrong and you got it all right Pongo!
You know, It's better to keep your mouth shut and be thought a fool than than to open it and prove it.
Speaking of idiots, is that you picture under your name or some other.......
Crumpp
Every other battle in ww2 was a ballance of logisics and tactics and technology and signal intelligance and fighting spirit..But not the Battle of Britian..no it was special. Because Crump knows that the warrior spirit of the LW failed! The Totem of the RAF was more powerful then the Totem of the LW I guess.
The whole concept that the Battle of Britain was won on Monday but Hitter and the Nasities just had to bomb London so they lost the battle by the following Sunday is just so preposterous.
Wars of attrition between great powers do not hang on the fine a thread Im affraid. It fills some inner nead of yours to think they do.. But if will could have won WW2 it would not have ended the way it did.
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That is some mighty fine babble you got there Pongo. Pretty new to thinking huh?
Tell me, Are you as dumb as you want to be? :aok
Great essay Angus.
Crumpp
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Crumpp,
Well, I'm still waiting numbers on the LW reserves. So far nothing relevant. Is there a remote possibility that the reserves actually did not exists? This is actually what E. Lund says; the LW could not keep the strenght of units and had not enough pilots even for that amount of planes.
gripen
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Originally posted by Crumpp
That is some mighty fine babble you got there Pongo. Pretty new to thinking huh?
Tell me, Are you as dumb as you want to be? :aok
Great essay Angus.
Crumpp
OK ill play crumb
boy you sure are stupid
you sure are one pathetic clown
you musta fell on your head a few too many times
how was that...
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Again I will post it for you,
The LW had other forces to draw upon. Around 2000 planes in the form of two complete Air Fleets. I wonder if they would have withdrawn units from LF 2 and LF3 and replaced them with units of LF1 and LF4 if needed? NAW, they would have just let the ONLY military action going on at the time just collapse while those other 2 complete Air Fleets hung out and did nothing.
You don't seem to understand the difference between the RAF and the LW. They explain the differences in organization on both the RAF's site AND the Imperial War Museum.
That's a FACT Gripen. You can't change it. To play ostrich to the truth and say "Well they didn't label them reserves" is asinine.
Another thing, Gripen just because you say a thing doesn't make it true. You seem to just throw up data with no attempt to actually look at it. Your betting that most people will not check it out and actually put some though into it
Here is an example of your untruths..
Well, I'm still waiting numbers on the LW reserves. So far nothing relevant. Is there a remote possibility that the reserves actually did not exists? This is actually what E. Lund says; the LW could not keep the strenght of units and had not enough pilots even for that amount of planes.
OK here is Lunds conclusions:
"In the final analysis, perhaps the Germans
could have won. Perhaps, if they had
aggressively pursued either campaign
strategy they could have won, but that will
always remain conjecture."
What is that he is saying...THE LW had the capability to win but pursed the wrong strategy! Hey, That's what I've been saying! Now are you going to post another LIE?
I have also posted Imperial War Museum and the RAF's assessment of the situation in September '40 yet you continue to take a contradictory view to even theirs AND claim a fallacy based on numbers that do not support your conclusions.
And along comes Milo-moron and Pongo, What can I say except your gonna need some grazing land for the flock......
BAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA!! BAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA!!
It's as simple as that.
Crumpp
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Crumpp,
Well, you announced that "As for the LW reserves, that has been proven." Please, show me these reserves, should be easy if the issue is proven. So far you have told just that two Luftflottes were not there. According to your logic the LW had around 2000 aircraft some where but did not use them in BoB. Utterly nonsense.
gripen
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It is good you produce lots of manure dirt crawler for it will help to fertilize the crops. To bad I don't have a large enough storage area for the amounts you produce.:rofl :)
As for your Big Week crapola,:D:D:D:D. Yup nothing but the usual 8th AF outrageous claims,.:)
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Milo-Moran,
You lost that one about 20 post's back. Don't even try and regain your self-respect in this thread. Just slink to your dark, dank corner and hang out with the other Fungi.
Crumpp :p
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Utter nonsense?? How do you explain the existence of Luftflotte 1 and Luftflotte 4 both before and after the BoB? Guess they just made them up, disbanded them, and then reformed them again.
:rolleyes:
Oh I forgot the borders of Reich just extended from Southern France to Norway. There was no need to station other Forces to rest, refit, train, and hold down the frontiers on the other 75 percent of the Reichs borders.
:eek:
Come on, Gripen. Even with your Pom-Pom wielding cheering section of idiots, I actually credited you with some sense at the beginning of this discussion. Your consistent inability to reason points to my error.
Crumpp
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What ever you say dirt eater.
BTW, you have the 'moron' attached to the wrong name.:rofl :aok
keep shovelling the manure.:)
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No I bashed Pongo in an earlier post....
:rofl :rofl :rofl :rofl :rofl :rofl
Crumpp
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Crumpp,
I have not denied the existence of those Luftflottes. The question is about supposed Bf 109 reserves which you announced to be proven. Please, prove your words. Why according to Lund the LW had just 80% strenght on fighter units if the reserves existed?
gripen
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No Gripen,
The 80 to 86 percent was without drawing upon any other resources outside the normal supply channels of Luftflotte 2, 3, and 5. This includes not increasing the RLM's set production rate. Germany was still having its worker's work peacetime hours at the factory.
Crumpp
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Crumpp,
A source please and I'm still waiting for numbers on reserves. What's the problem? If reserves are proven, then just post the data and source.
I wonder where those two luftflottes with 2000 planes disapeared in couple hours? Must be the fastest destruction rate of the LW so far.
gripen
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I have posted the link AND a quote from it. Look back up the FIRST time you mentioned the Reserves.
Crumpp
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Crumpp,
80% is for fighters, 86% for bombers and we are talking about Bf 109 (fighter). So nothing new.
Where are the reserves? Can you give us a answer, please.
gripen
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No 80-86 percent is the range the LW was able to keep it's fighter units up. Did you use hooked on phonics? You seem to have trouble reading and comprehending.
Ok, Gripen want a cracker. I've shown were the LW had plenty of planes to draw upon if needed. End of Story. It's a fact so just face it. Your conclusion that the LW had no chance of winning the BoB is complete and utter fiction. Revisionist History and nothing more.
Crumpp
-
Crumpp,
We have been talking about fighter situation in the end of the 2nd phase and Lund states:
"Reserves were sufficient to keep most fighter units at 80 percent strength and bombers at 86 percent."
So far you have proven nothing. Please show us the LW reserves or shut up.
I can only conclude that you are not able to prove your words.
gripen
-
That is a direct quote from Lund. Maybe you would prefer the term "replacements" or perhaps we will call them "other planes not used yet". Maybe he could have used the term "New planes no one has flown yet". How about "planes just unwrapped, new still in box, you may use to shoot down the RAF".
I see this whole concept of the Anybody but the RAF having the intelligence, capability, or resources to replace their losses in battle is beyond you. WWII sure lasted a long time. Bet those Germans that crossed the Polish Frontier in Sept '39 were pretty darn tired by the end of it.
Crumpp
:rofl :rofl :rofl :rofl :rofl
-
Yeah, but what about the Spit IX?
-
The Spit IX is undermodelled :D
-
gripen, did you know that the USAAF's 15thAF was the reserve for the USAAF's 8thAF.:eek:
For that is what the dirt eater is saying with regard to the LW. ie Luft X was the reserve for Luft Y (sub in a number for X and Y)
-
Thead losing heat ... slowing down. Boilers need stoking. Not my job, man. So why post? Every lil post helps the post-count.
Grrrr! Spitfires!
Grrrr! 109s!
Grrrr! Luftwaffe!
Grrrr! RAF ... and her lil allies too!
Your side sucked!
No yours did!
No yours did!
You're delusional!
You're a revisionist!
I read a book!
I read a better book!
I've read every book!
My comprehension's better than yours!
In a pig's eye!
Leave your mother out of it!
You're now resorting to personal attacks!
Grrrr! Spitfires!
-
Wouldn't want to let those Arlo "grrrr Spitfires" go by untouched :)
Dan/Slack
SPITFIRE BABY!!!!
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/ah_169_1075921188.jpg)
-
I can tell by the pictures that the war suffered terribly from biased mismodeling.
-
mmm Spitfire!!
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/ah_71_1071342328.jpg)
-
Absolutely. Gotta love that Spit :)
Dan/Slack
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/ah_169_1076269859.jpg)
-
Crumpp,
I wonder where is the problem. Even your own source (Lund) admits that the LW had no reserves to keep strenght and also admits that the RAF still had reserves and could keep strenght in the end of the 2nd phase. All this has been pointed out several times in last couple hundred messages and so far you have not bring in any data on supposed LW reserves despite you claimed those proven.
Anyway, that other luftflottes theory was quite hilarious.
gripen
-
The spit IX is way overmodelled and the allied A/C are all favored By HiTech himself so they are all overmodelled.
Yep, the jig is up. Storch had exposed AH for what it really is. And HT almost got away with it. Damn you Storch and your little JG 3 too!!!
-
If the LW was hurting so bad as you seems to think? then why does Lund conclude that they could have won the BoB Crumpp
-
Because he too is merely another discredited luftwhiner.
-
:rofl :rofl :rofl :rofl :rofl :rofl
Good One Seeker!
Crumpp
-
Crumpp,
As pointed several times; Lund uses (possibly purposedly) wrong numbers on the fighter command strenght to support his theories. Nashwan has pointed out this to you several times.
In additon Lund uses sometimes kill claims as Nashwan pointed out and according to you (6.2.04) :
"To quote sources that do not use the Actual loss data for each Air Force is to just further muddle the picture and only supports a revisionist argument."
Well, that's funny and just look above to check who talked about revisionist history. Generally you appear to have quite short memory.
gripen
-
No that has not been pointed out. A bunch of junk that doesn't correspond to the RAF or the Imperial War Museum stuff was posted. Both of those sources correspond with Lund's numbers.
Crumpp
-
Crumpp,
Interesting , there is no numbers in the IWM site and RAF (http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/calendar.html) numbers are same as Nashwan used. Your other link was somekind of retro stuff store. Hm... sounds desperate. What next?
gripen
-
One silly question, - there are way too many links already. Yes, I am a lazy SoB.....
The LW had groups in Denmark and Norway at the time of the BoB. They tried an attack on the "flank", on the NE of England, presumably putting their money on that the British had no reserves left. The British however did (!)= and drove the LW back with some losses. It was not tried again.
So, did those units merge with those operating from France,or stay where they were?
BTW,if you're looking for numbers and such, I have an interesting game,- BOB strategy game from Talonsoft. Seems to have all numbers listed, and although not so playable, the outcomes in it are quite realistic. As LW, I won, as RAF,I also won :D In both cases, I sucked all reserves to the front while my computer opponent did not!
-
Thread ... slowing .... down. People ... not ... posting ... not ... arguing .... to ... the ... death ... anymore. Must .... post ... something. Keep .... thread ... alive ....
Luftwaffe sucked.
:D
-
Originally posted by Arlo
Thread ... slowing .... down. People ... not ... posting ... not ... arguing .... to ... the ... death ... anymore. Must .... post ... something. Keep .... thread ... alive ....
Luftwaffe sucked.
:D
SPITFIRE!!!!!! :)
Dan/Slack
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/ah_169_1075921424.jpg)
-
Originally posted by Crumpp
Your conclusion that the LW had no chance of winning the BoB is complete and utter fiction. Revisionist History and nothing more.
Crumpp
They lost any chance they had at winning the battle when Hitler ordered the bombing of London. Gave the Brits a much needed respite for their fighters.
The LW might have been good pilots with good tactical sense but their strategic thinking was down in the toilet. Heck, the strategic thinking for the entire German high command was in the crapper. They might have been able to win a lot of battles but with short sighted strategic thinking, no way in hell they could have won the war. So I guess the Allies' victory could be attributed not only to the bellybutton kicking we gave them but also to incompetent German high command strategic planning.
Ack-Ack
-
If the Nazis had been smart, they wouldn't have started WW2 in the first place.
-
Originally posted by -MZ-
If the Nazis had been smart, they wouldn't have started WW2 in the first place.
Careful MZ,
"Poland had WMD and was an imminent threat" comment can't be far behind :)
Dan/Slack ->running for the hills, arms flailing
-
It's a site that sells WWII memorabilia, Gripen....
You need to post some crediable sources that draw the same conclusions you do. Not data YOU or some knucklehead on the BB manipulate to present YOUR view.
Post a museum, University, Air Power Doctrine Study, Air Force, or Published Historian that draws the same conclusion as you. Quote their conclusion and leave a link.
These are the sources I've used and quoted their conclusions along with the links.
Crumpp
-
Crumpp: No good keeping that ranting on forever. The thread is so long, the links are so many, yet I fail to see (oh, silly me :) ) more than a bit of an opinion between you and Gripen.
I do see another difference, though, you are straightout rude and Gripen is not. A second point for your "dinner" is, that I have seen Gripen provide some outstanding data on these threads throughout the AH BB for a long while, mostly technical stuff. From your side I do not know yet.
So what is the thread-hijacking debate about? Could the LW possibly/easily/not have won the BoB. That's really all there is, and no dignity in your dim-witted vocabulary being mucked over those who do not completely agree with you. So please try to define your argument into a THESIS and stuff it into a sentence or two and keep with it, otherwise shut up, or....prepare for a very creative vocabulary of other readers of this thread, such as "Crumpp: you XXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXX"!
-
Angus,
Want to know what it's about then read it, til then.....How about a nice cup Of Shut the F--k Up.
I didn't Hijack the thread, it was dead on the spit topic long ago. Face it, Nobody gives a crap that the spit is overmodeled. It's one of the most popular planes in the game. That question was answered about 5 replys into this thread. It is overmodeled, however, it's not even a real spit. It's a hybrid AH version. Do you know AH2 in the works? Did not HTC say they were concentrating on that and not on AH?
With that said. Gripen, Nashwan posted the link but it's obvious he did not examine the numbers because the CONCLUSION the RAF comes too about the battle is COMPLETELY different from the one you and him are trying to push. The BoB was a hard fought campaign that the LW could have won Air superiority over Southern England. Changing to a bad strategy and a really determined defense prevented them from being successful. You want to say that they had no chance at all. That is just not true.
Crumpp
-
Originally posted by Crumpp
(snip)
Face it, Nobody gives a crap that the spit is overmodeled. It's one of the most popular planes in the game. That question was answered about 5 replys into this thread. It is overmodeled, however, it's not even a real spit. It's a hybrid AH version. Do you know AH2 in the works? Did not HTC say they were concentrating on that and not on AH?
(snip).
Crumpp
No, no, no you misunderstand - it's undermodeled in every area except endurance and possibly overmodeled in gross weight.
Just trying to do my bit Arlo.
palef
-
Right on, Palef.
And Goering wore lady's underthings.
-
Crumpp,
The facts are clear; the LW was running out of resources faster rate than RAF in the 2nd phase. The Fighter command could keep front line strenght quite constant through out 2nd phase while the strenght of the LW decreased. Actually your source admits this despite uses wrong strenght data on the Fighter command. From the RAF (http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/calendar.html) site I can easily see that the Fighter command had around 600 fighters or more ready all the time during critical period. And even your own source admits that the RAF had still reserves left and the LW could keep just 80% in the fighter units and they had pilots for just 97% of them. Shortly, even continuation of the 2nd phase would not have changed outcome of the BoB because the RAF had more resources.
Generally Dowding and Park avoided big air battles because they wanted to save resources and this was the reason why the LW was forced to change strategy; only way the LW could get the Fighter command up and fight was to bomb London.
So far you have posted nothing relevant which supports your claims on the supposed LW reserves. But you have posted many unsupported claims and actually invalidated your own sources with your own statements.
gripen
-
Yeah, but he's consistant:D
-
Again you have thrown up YOUR opinion unsupported by any facts. Just Quote some crediable sources and post the links.
Crumpp
-
Here Gripen,
Just like this. As Agent Friday used to say, "Just the facts".
Even the Imperial War Museaum says the LW almost won in September.
http://www.iwm.org.uk/online/battle...in/overview.htm
"The crucial period of the battle was between 24 August and 15 September. Fighter Command came closest to losing when its vital sector airfields around London were attacked. The decisive turning point came on 7 September when the Luftwaffe switched its attention to the capital. This tactical blunder allowed Fighter Command to recover its strength rapidly to inflict, on 15 September, losses significant enough to show the Germans the battle could not be won."
Notice the wording: "Came closest to losing..."
No lets look at Lund's conclusions about the BoB found on page 26 of the his document and pg 31 under adobe thumbnails:
"In the final analysis, perhaps the Germans
could have won. Perhaps, if they had
aggressively pursued either campaign
strategy they could have won, but that will
always remain conjecture."
Gosh that is exactly what I have been saying.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ww2/batlbrit.pdf
A site that deals in WWII artifacts:
"The Battle of Britain raged over the skies of southern England throughout that late summer of 1940 - the Luftwaffe lost a total of 1,733 aircraft from July to October, the RAF 915. Had he but known it, Göering was only 24 hours from victory at one point according to British Flight Command. All our reserves were spent and our pilots were exhausted. Incredibly, Göering decided that the Luftwaffe were taking too much of a punishment from the British fighters and he ordered his planes to switch their attention away from the British airfields and towards the British cities. Whilst this was bad news for the civilian populations of the industrial cities, this gave the R.A.F. and the aviation industry a reprieve and a crucial breather to re-arm and re-stock. It also meant that a German invasion of Britain had to be postponed and that Germany was soon to turn its attention eastwards - a decision which was arguably to cost them the war."
http://www.retrosellers.com/features61.htm
Notice it says "All our reserves were spent"
And Finally the Royal Air Force:
"Heavy fighter losses in France saw Dowding warn the War Cabinet of the dire consequences should the present wastage rates continue, and a letter dated 16 May 1940 is one of the great documents of history. After covering the evacuation from Dunkirk, he had just enough aircraft to fight the Luftwaffe in the one place they could be effectively used - within the comprehensive air defence system he had built in the UK. Even so, he admitted that the situation was "critical in the extreme" and while it is true that the immortal "Few" - his 'chicks' as Churchill christened them - won the Battle using the organisation he had created, the Luftwaffe lost it through bad leadership, faulty tactics and mistaken target selection."
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/commanders.html
Well that is straight from the horses mouth. Let see your sources without YOUR opinion placed on them. Just quote them without making an argument.
No amount of "data manipulation" to advance YOUR own view will change the facts of history.
End of Story
Crumpp
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Crumpp: you are far better at supplying links than making anything logical out of them
Maybe it would be suitable to define a LW victory. I define a LW victory with RAF buckling and being unable to intercept bombers, - that would have had to happen no less than mid-september.
RAF has a different view, they seem to estimate that disbanding squadrons and possibly evacuating some airfields due to LW's strength would equal defeat.
Fighter commands inner resources were practically depleated, and as you have pointed out, LW did have gruppen that did not participate in the battle. However, the Brits had 13th group almost sitting by idly. That, dear fellow, was quite a force. More accurately: 13th group 14 SQUADRONS before Adlertag, and I am not counting those who were moved northwards after the battle begun.
Looking better into this all, I am actually shifting to the opinion that the LW could not have won :D
-
Crumpp,
You can check RAF strenght from linked sited as noted several times.
IWM: Basicly this all is allready known, during the 2nd phase amount of reserves decreased but the RAF still had reserves for weeks at same rate. There is nothing which supports your arguments on LW strenght and reserves.
Lund: As noted several times, his conclusions are based on false numbers on the RAF strenght (possibly on purpose).
Retrosellers: This is actually a shopping site with no value as a source. Desperate attempt IMHO.
RAF site: Just check numbers on daily reports during 2nd phase from the very same site; the Fighter command could keep strenght through 2nd phase. And note that also LW lost large amount of planes during BoF.
Overall nothing new. Please show us numbers on the LW reserves.
gripen
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Angus I define victory as the LW being able to meet it's stated Goal in the BoB.
1. Air Superiority over Southern England to facilitate and invasion.
2. Complete and total destruction of the RAF was recognized as an impossibility by the LW in it's initial assessment of the RAF. This would have to wait until after German forces landed on the island.
Again Gripen you've given a buch of opinion and innuendo but no hard facts. Simply quote were ANY historian, Museum or Air Force doctrine agrees with your assesment that the LW had NO CHANCE of meeting it's above stated goal.
Crumpp
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IWM: Basicly this all is allready known, during the 2nd phase amount of reserves decreased but the RAF still had reserves for weeks at same rate. There is nothing which supports your arguments on LW strenght and reserves.
Yeah they had 3 weeks...Whew!! Your absolutely right 3 weeks worth is Loooooooooooonnnnnnnnnnnnng time.
Lund: As noted several times, his conclusions are based on false numbers on the RAF strenght (possibly on purpose).
Your and Nashwad's opinion. Please post a link that says Lund has bad numbers.
Retrosellers: This is actually a shopping site with no value as a source. Desperate attempt IMHO.
More valuable opinion than yours, at least they have an economic expertise in the subject.
RAF site: Just check numbers on daily reports during 2nd phase from the very same site; the Fighter command could keep strenght through 2nd phase. And note that also LW lost large amount of planes during BoF.
Ummmm YEAH! Good point, guess I could also post the LW claims. According to them the RAF was down to 300 planes in a week.....
Overall nothing new. Please show us numbers on the LW reserves.
Already done that, Gripen. Over 2000 planes in Luftflotte 1 and 4. Wonder were they got all those planes for Barbarossa? Must have had those pilot instructors and factory workers burning the midnight oil.....
Please just quote a site and post a link that draws your conclusion about the BoB from anywhere.
Crumpp
-
The Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain
13 Aug 40
Aircraft
Unit Airbase Type Strength Svcble
Luftflotte 2
I. Fliegerkorps
Stab/KG 1 Amiens-Glisy He 111H 4 4
I/KG 1 Montdidier 27 23
II/KG 1 Amiens-Glisy 31 29
III/KG 1 Rosières-en-Santerre 32 15
Stab/KG 76 Cormeilles-en-Vexin Do 17Z 5 5
I/KG 76 Beauvais-Tille 29 29
II/KG 76 Creil Ju 88A 36 28
III/KG 76 Cormeilles-en-Vexin Do 17Z 32 19
Lehrstaffel 11 7
Stab, I, III/KG 77 Laon Ju 88A 68 *
II/KG 77 Asch-Nord 38 *
II. Fliegerkorps
Stab, II/KG 2 St. Lèger Do 17Z 42 35
I/KG 2 Epinoy 43 27
III/KG 2 Cambrai-Sd 34 32
Stab, I/KG 3 Le Culot 43 31
II/KG 3 Antwerpen-Deurne 35 32
III/KG 3 St. Trond 30 25
I, II, III/KG 53 Lille-Nord He 111H 94 67
II/StG 1 Pas-de-Calais Ju 87B 38 30
IV (St.)/LG 1 Tramecourt 36 28
ErprGr 210 Calais-Marck Bf 109E-4B 10 9
Bf 110C-6 5 4
Bf 110D-0 21 17
9. Fliegerdivision
Stab/KG 4 Soesterburg He 111P 6 5
I/KG 4 He 111H 30 12
II/KG 4 Eindhoven He 111P 31 25
III/KG 4 Amsterdam-Schipol Ju 88A 35 23
Stab/KG 40 Brest-Guipavas 1 1
I/KG 40 Fw 200C 9 3
KGr 100 Vannes He 111H-1/3 41 19
KGr 126 Marx? He 111H 34 8
Jafü 2
Stab/JG 3 Wierre au Bois Bf 109E 3 3
I/JG 3 Grandvilliers 33 32
II/JG 3 Samer 29 22
III/JG 3 Desvres, Le Touquet 29 29
Stab, I/JG 26 Audembert 42 38
II/JG 26 Marquise-Ost 39 35
III/JG 26 Caffiers 40 38
Stab/JG 51 Wissant 4 4
I/JG 51 Pihen bei Calais 32 32
II/JG 51 Marquise-West 33 33
III/JG 51 St. Omer-Clairmarais 32 30
Stab, I/JG 52 Coquelles 42 34
II/JG 52 Peuplingues 39 32
III/JG 52 Zerbst 31 11
Stab, I/JG 54 Campagne-les-Guines 38 26
II/JG 54 Hermelingen 36 32
III/JG 54 Guines-en-Calais 42 40
Stab/ZG 26 Lille Bf 110C 3 3
I/ZG 26 Yvrench, St. Omer 39 33
II/ZG 26 Crècy, St. Omer 37 32
III/ZG 26 Barly, Arques 35 24
Nachtjagd-Division
Stab/NJG 1 Dusseldorf, Deelen Bf 110B? 3 3
I/NJG 1 Bönninghardt 4 3
Bf 110C 30 19
II/NJG 1 Dusseldorf Ju 88C-2 11 4
Do 17Z-10 7 6
Do 17Z-7 3 3
III/NJG 1 Köln-Ostheim Bf 110C 13 4
Bf 109D 3 1
Bf 109E 17 16
Luftflotte 3
VIII. Fliegerkorps
Stab, III/StG 1 Angers Ju 87B 41 28
Do 17M 2 1
I/StG 1 Ju 87R 39 27
Stab, I/StG 2 St. Malo Ju 87B 39 32
Do 17M 5 4
II/StG 2 Lannion Ju 87R 37 31
Ju 87B 2 2
I, II, III/StG 77 Caen 115 98
Do 17M 4 1
II (Sch.)/LG 2 Böblingen Bf 109E 39 31
V (Z.)/LG 1 Caen Bf 110C 32 21
Bf 110D 11 8
V. Fliegerkorps
Stab/KG 51 Paris-Orly Ju 88A 1 1
I/KG 51 Melun-Villaroche 30 21
II, III/KG 51 Etampes-Mondèsir 66 49
Stab, I/KG 54 Evreux 35 29
II/KG 54 St. André 31 23
Stab, III/KG 55 Villacoublay He 111P 42 34
I/KG 55 Dreux He 111H 21 18
He 111P 18 17
II/KG 55 Chartres He 111P 38 28
IV. Fliegerkorps
Stab/LG 1 Orlèans-Bricy Ju 88A 2 1
I (K.) , II (K.)/LG 1 67 47
He 111H 2 1
III (K.)/LG 1 Chateaudun Ju 88A 34 23
Stab, I/KG 27 Tours He 111P 20 13
He 111H 18 10
II/KG 27 Dinard-Bourges He 111P 26 18
He 111H 8 3
III/KG 27 Rennes He 111P 30 22
He 111D 1 1
KGr 806 Nantes, Caen-Carpiquet Ju 88A 33 22
Stab/StG 3 Bretigny Do 17M 1 0
Do 17Z 4 3
He 111H 2 1
Jafü 3
Stab, I, II/JG 2 Beaumont-le-Roger Bf 109E 73 63
III/JG 2 Le Havre 32 28
Stab/JG 27 Cherbourg-West 5 4
I/JG 27 Plumett 37 32
II/JG 27 Crèpon 40 32
III/JG 27 Arcques 39 32
Stab/JG 53 Cherbourg 6 6
I/JG 53 Rennes, Guernsey 39 37
II/JG 53 Dinan, Guernsey 38 34
III/JG 53 Brest, Sempy 38 35
Stab/ZG 2 Toussus-le-Noble Bf 110C 4 3
I/ZG 2 Caen-Carpiquet 41 35
II/ZG 2 Guyancourt 18 14
Bf 110D 23 20
Luftflotte 5
X Fliegerkorps
Stab/KG 26 Stavanger He 111P 6 6
I, III/KG 26 He 111H 56 55
Stab, I, III/KG 30 Aalborg Ju 88A 76 62
I/ZG 76 Stavanger-Forus Bf 110C 34 32
Stab/JG 77 ? Bf 109E 4 4
I/JG 77 ? 38 37
II/JG 77 Stavanger, Trondheim 43 38
KüFlGr 506 ? He 115B 8 7
He 115C 18 14
Seefliegerverbände
1./KüFlGr 106 Norderney He 115C 12 12
2./KüFlGr 106 Rantum Do 18 10 6
1., 2./KüFlGr 406 Stavanger 17 15
3./KüFlGr 406 Hörnum 10 10
KüFlGr 606 Brest Do 17Z 33 32
2./KüFlGr 906 Hörnum Do 18 9 8
TransOzeanSt. Brest Do 26 2 1
* KG 77 is converting to the Ju 88A
Strength Summary
Number Type Strength Svcble
42 1/3 Kampfgruppen 1482 1008
9 Stukagruppen 365 286
1 Schlachtgruppe 39 31
26 Jagdgruppen 976 853
9 Zerstrergruppen 244 189
3 Nachtjagdgruppen 91 59
14 Seefliegerstaffeln 240 125
-
The Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain
7 Sept 1940
Courtesy of Johann Palsson
Aircraft
Unit Airbase Type Strength Svcble
Luftflotte 2
Long-Range Bombers
Stab/KG 1 Rosières-en-Santerre He 111 7 5
I/KG 1 Montdidier, Clairmont 36 22
II/KG 1 Montdidier, Nijmegen 36 23
III/KG 1 Rosières-en-Santerre Ju 88A 9 -
Stab/KG 2 St. Lèger Do 17Z 6 6
I/KG 2 Cambrai 19 12
II/KG 2 St. Lèger 31 20
III/KG 2 Cambrai-Süd 30 20
Stab/KG 3 Le Culot 6 5
I/KG 3 29 25
II/KG 3 Antwerp, Deurne 27 23
III/KG 3 St. Trond 28 19
Stab/KG 4 Soesterburg He 111 5 5
I/KG 4 37 16
II/KG 4 Eindhoven 37 30
III/KG 4 Amsterdam-Schipol Ju 88A 30 14
Stab/KG 26 Gilze-Rijen He 111 6 3
I/KG 26 Meirbeke, Courtrai 25 7
II/KG 26 Gilze-Rijen 26 7
Stab/KG 30 Brussels Ju 88A 1 1
I/KG 30 10 1
II/KG 30 Gilze-Rijen 30 24
Stab/KG 40 Bordeaux 2 1
Stab/KG 53 Lille-Nord He 111 5 3
I/KG 53 23 19
II/KG 53 29 7
III/KG 53 19 4
Stab/KG 76 Cormeilles-en-Vexin Do 17Z 6 3
I/KG 76 Beauvais-Tille 26 19
II/KG 76 Creil Ju 88A 27 21
III/KG 76 Cormeilles-en-Vexin Do 17Z 24 17
Stab/KG 77 Laon Ju 88A 1 1
I/KG 77 36 31
II/KG 77 Asch-Nord 32 25
III/KG 77 Laon 30 19
KGr 126 ? He 111 33 26
Dive-Bombers and Ground-Attack Aircraft
Stab/StG 1 St. Pol Ju 87, Do 17 7 5
II/StG 1 Pas-de-Calais Ju 87 43 29
Stab/StG 2 Tramecourt Ju 87, Do 17 11 9
II/StG 2 St. Omer/St. Trond Ju 87 27 22
IV (St.)/LG 1 Tramecourt 42 28
II (Sch.)/LG 2 St. Omer Bf 109E 33 27
Single-Engined Fighters
Stab/JG 1 Pas-de-Calais Bf 109E 4 3
Stab/JG 3 Pas-de-Calais 3 3
I/JG 3 23 14
II/JG 3 24 14
III/JG 3 25 23
Stab/JG 26 Pas-de-Calais 4 3
I/JG 26 27 20
II/JG 26 Northen France 32 28
III/JG 26 29 26
Stab/JG 27 Etaples 5 4
I/JG 27 33 27
II/JG 27 Montreuil 37 33
III/JG 27 Sempy 31 27
Stab/JG 51 St. Omer 5 4
I/JG 51 St. Omer, St. Inglevert 36 33
II/JG 51 22 13
III/JG 51 Pas-de-Calais 44 31
Stab/JG 52 Laon/Couvorn 2 1
I/JG 52 21 17
II/JG 52 Pas-de-Calais 28 23
III/JG 52 31 16
Stab/JG 53 Northen France 2 2
II/JG 53 Wissant 33 24
III/JG 53 Northen France 30 22
Stab/JG 54 South Holland 4 2
I/JG 54 28 23
II/JG 54 35 27
III/JG 54 29 23
I/JG 77 Northen France 42 40
Twin-Engined Fighters (Night-Fighters Excluded)
Stab/ZG 2 Toussous-le-Noble Bf 110 1 -
I/ZG 2 Amiens, Caen 20 10
II/ZG 2 Guyancourt/Caudran 28 10
Stab/ZG 26 ? 3 3
I/ZG 26 Abbeville, St. Omer 33 14
II/ZG 26 Crècy 25 17
III/ZG 26 Barly, Arques 25 17
V (Z.)/LG 1 Ligescourt, Alencon 23 19
ErprGr 210 Denain Bf 109E/Bf 110C/D 26 17
Long-Range Reconnaissance Aircraft
1(F)/22 Lille Do 17, Bf 110 13 9
1(F)/122 Holland Ju 88A 5 3
2(F)/122 Brussels/Melsbrock Ju 88A, He 111 10 9
3(F)/122 Eindhoven 11 11
4(F)/122 Brussels 13 9
Bf 110
5(F)/122 haute-Fontaine Ju 88A, He 111 3 3
Coastal Aircraft
1./KüFlGr 106 Brittany He 115 10 4
2./KüFlGr 106 Do 18 9 6
3./KüFlGr 106 Borkum He 115 9 6
Luftflotte 3
Long-Range Bombers
Stab/LG 1 Orlèans-Bricy Ju 88A 3 3
I/LG 1 27 13
II/LG 1 31 19
III/LG 1 Chateaudun 30 19
Stab/KG 27 Tours He 111 7 4
I/KG 27 35 13
II/KG 27 Dinard-Bourges 32 15
III/KG 27 Rennes 20 13
I/KG 40 Bordaux Fw 200 7 4
Stab/KG 51 Paris-Orly Ju 88A 1 -
I/KG 51 Melun-Villaroche 33 13
II/KG 51 Paris-Orly 34 17
III/KG 51 Etampes-Mondèsir 34 27
Stab/KG 54 Evreux 1 -
I/KG 54 30 18
II/KG 54 St. André 26 14
Stab/KG 55 Villacoublay He 111 6 6
I/KG 55 Dreux 27 20
II/KG 55 Chartres 30 22
III/KG 55 Villacoublay 25 20
KGr 100 Vannes He 111H 28 7
KGr 606 Brest, Cherbourg Do 17 33 29
KGr 806 Nantes, Caen-Carpiquet Ju 88A 27 18
Dive-Bombers
Stab/StG 3 Brittany Ju 87, Do 17 7 6
I/StG 3 Ju 87 37 34
Single-Engined Fighters
I/JG 53 Brittany Bf 109E 34 27
*Stab/JG 2 Beaumont-le-Roger 3 2
*I/JG 2 29 24
*II/JG 2 22 18
*III/JG 2 Le Havre 30 19
Twin-Engined Fighters (Night-Fighters Excluded)
Stab/ZG 76 ? Bf 110 2 2
II/ZG 76 Le Mans, Abbeville 27 12
III/ZG 76 Laval 19 8
Long-Range Reconnaissance Aircraft
7(F)/LG 2 ? Bf 110 14 9
4(F)/14 Normandy Bf 110, Do 17 12 9
3(F)/31 St. Brieuc 9 5
3(F)/121 North-West France Ju 88A, He 111 10 6
4(F)/121 Normandy Ju 88A, Do 17 13 5
1(F)/122 near Paris 10 7
2(F)/123 near Paris 10 8
3(F)/123 Buc 12 9
Luftflotte 5
Single-Engined Fighters
II/JG 77 South Norway Bf 109E 44 35
Long-Range Reconnaissance Aircraft
2(F)/22 Stavanger Do 17 9 5
3(F)/22 Stavanger 9 5
1(F)/120 Stavanger He 111, Ju 88A 13 2
1(F)/121 Stavanger, Aalborg Do 17 7 2
Coastal Aircraft
1/KüFlGr 506 Stavanger He 115 8 6
2/KüFlGr 506 Throndheim, Tromso 8 5
3/KüFlGr 506 Lista 8 6
* JG 2 Interchangeable between Luftflotten 2 and 3
Strength Summary
Number Type Strength Svcble
43 Kampfgruppen 1291 798
4 Stukagruppen 174 133
2 Schlachtgruppe 59 44
27 Jagdgruppen 831 658
8 Zerstörergruppen 206 112
18 Fernaufklärungsstaffeln 191 123
6 Seefliegerstaffeln 52 33
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Crumpp,
The LW gave up BoB (ie realized that they have lost the battle) just about a week after the end of the 2nd phase, September 15th.
Regarding Lund's numbers. About strenght of the LW and Fighter Command in September 7th (end of the 2nd phase) Lund says (page 20):
"Therefore, the Luftwaffe ended Phase two with a capability to field 623 operational Me109s against a force of only 350 RAF fighters."
The RAF (http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/september7.html) site:
"Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 7th September 1940
* Blenheim - 44
* Spitfire - 223
* Hurricane - 398
* Defiant - 20
* Gladiator - 9
* Total - 694"
About the losses on August 18th Lund says(page 18):
"The highest total losses of the battle occurred on the 18th; 68 British and 69 German."
The Fighter command losses from the RAF (http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/august18.html) (18th August):
"Own: 22 aircraft with 12 pilots safe."
These are not mine or Nashwan's words but direct quotes from Lund (http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ww2/batlbrit.pdf) and RAF (http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/calendar.html) BoB calendar.
In the case of the Fighter command strenght in the end of the 2nd phase Lund's number is 56% of the real strenght (350 vs 621). In the case of the losses in August 18th Lund claims 300% higher number than real losses (68 vs 22). BTW all this has been pointed out several times but you appear to be not able to remember these.
The LW lost around 1200 planes in the BoF and the RAF lost around 1000 in the BoF (depending on source).
Please give us numbers on supposed Bf 109 reserves.
gripen
-
13 Aug 40
Strength Summary
Number Type Strength Svcble
42 1/3 Kampfgruppen 1482 1008
9 Stukagruppen 365 286
1 Schlachtgruppe 39 31
26 Jagdgruppen 976 853
9 Zerstrergruppen 244 189
3 Nachtjagdgruppen 91 59
14 Seefliegerstaffeln 240 125
7 Sept 1940
Strength Summary
Number Type Strength Svcble
43 Kampfgruppen 1291 798
4 Stukagruppen 174 133
2 Schlachtgruppe 59 44
27 Jagdgruppen 831 658
8 Zerstörergruppen 206 112
18 Fernaufklärungsstaffeln 191 123
6 Seefliegerstaffeln 52 33
Looks like the LW had a hard time keeping its Gruppen up to strength by drawing from its reserves.:rolleyes:
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Excellent data MiloMorai :)
Anyway Crumpp:
"Angus I define victory as the LW being able to meet it's stated Goal in the BoB.
1. Air Superiority over Southern England to facilitate and invasion."
I presume that would mean to be able to suppress the RN enough well enough to launch a rather vulnerable invation fleet across the channel. Well, under much more favourable circumstances, the LW could not stop RN destroyers from docking at Dunkirk! So, this would have to mean a very complete victory.
Allright, given that definition, the LW was far from it at eagle's day, and even further a month later. BTW, RAF Bomber command, came away from the BoB with very little losses. RAF coastal command suffered some, but not so much. Those are included in most reports of RAF losses during the battle.
Both of those commands would definately have veen a vital factor in intercepting a possible seaborne invasion, while Fighter command was responsible for tackling with enemy aircraft.
So, Victory was never so close for the LW. Both sides seem to have mis-estimated each other and themselves. In todays environment and all access to the historical procedure we can look at and analyze this somewhat better than the people looking into those same things years ago.
What I can see is that the only way the LW could have won would have been by obtaining data from the future :D
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Fine!
Again Just find me ONE site that makes those claims. I will take ANY site.
All you have to do is just quote their conclusions word for word an post a link.
You can't do it can you?
Again Gripen,
You need to be careful in quoting exact numbers. Ask Don Caldwell. In comparing Allied and LW records the numbers never lined up. Sometime drastically. It wasn't some conspiracy though at the heart of it. Most of the time it was simple explaintions. Take Schweinfurt for example. Depending on the time of day the RLM reported almost 2/3rd's of its single engine day fighters out of action. A great victory for the Allies. That is until the next day's status and less than 10 percent were down. The status included all fighter down for whatever maintenance. They may have needed a patch or an oil change but were listed as unservicable in the status report. By the next morning the crew chiefs got them back up.
With that in mind what time of day and when is Lunds status? It may have been correct but for a short period of time or the RAF status may be correct but for just short period of time. Instead of a snapshot of one day the whole time period of phase I and II should be examined.
Again please just post the conclusions about the time period we are talking about...
Coastal Command.....in 1940??!!?? Now there is a threat to your fleet!!:rofl
Crumpp
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Crumpp,
The links to the RAF (http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/calendar.html) site are direct links to mentioned dates, anyone (even you) can check the numbers and compare them to Lund's. From the RAF site anyone can check that the Fighter command could keep around 600 fighters ready to fight throughout 2nd phase.
Terraine ("Righ of the Line", 1985) quotes a LW general Werner Kreipe (Chief of the OKL):
"Though the air battles over England were perhaps triump of skill and bravery so far as the German air crews were concerned, from strategic point of view it was a failure and contributed to our ultimate defeat. The decision to fight it marks a turning point in the history of the Second World War. The German Air Force was bled almost to death, and suffered losses which could never again be made good troughout the curse of the war."
gripen
-
"The German Air Force was bled almost to death, and suffered losses which could never again be made good troughout the curse of the war."
Perhaps in trained pilots and for the ENTIRE battle. We are talking about Phase II, remember.
Many would disagree with that statement. Germany continued with its peacetime pilot training program well into late '42 early '43. Numerically the Luftwaffe was actually stronger in December '44 than it was September '39. The LW won Air Superiority over Russia for the first year and was able to grab local superiority over a battlefield until the last months of the war. It held the allies in the west off for another four years! I would hardly say it's back was broken in the BoB.
As for the RAF site numbers. In addition to the status pitfalls mentioned earlier you must keep in mind that is the numbers for the entire fighter strength of the RAF. How many of those fighters are in the combat box and how many are holding the line in Northwestern England? Since Lund only uses the LW strength of those fighters in the combat box it is only accurate to use the same standards for the RAF.
Again please post something that comes quotes your conclusions that it was unwinnable from the begining for the LW and provide a link. I will take any site.
Crumpp
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Crumpp: I mainly used the RAF site, the rest I have in books.
In case you missed it, here is the RAF site:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/bobhome.html
BTW, Did you know that the last month of daylight raids was november, and by then the LW was getting spanked badly, losing close to 4 vs 1!!!
I'll dig up some sources and give you quotes and if you like ISBN numbers.
My great uncle was in Britain, learning how to fly while the BoB was at its height. He was stationed in Wales, then Scotland, and was in no way pushed unprepared into battle! His first encounter with the enemy was in September 1941!!!!
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Crumpp,
Kreipe actually admits that even the decision to fight BoB was a mistake. The situation did not change much between September 7th and 15th. And statistics are clear in the September 7th: The RAF could keep the strenght and had plenty of planes and pilots (even Lund admits this) while the LW could not keep strenght and did not have pilots even for all serviceable planes.
Lund does not specify combat box or what ever, same time he mentions fighter production so he certainly means all Fighter command. Shortly, Lund writes fiction just like you in the case of the Luftflotte 1 and 4.
Me and others have pointed out that the RAF had better situation than the LW in the September 7th. This is backed up with RAF numbers and supported also by Lund.
So far you have not bring in any numbers on the supposed LW reserves nor any relevant numbers which prove that the LW was winning in the end of the 2nd phase (Lund's numbers are false as pointed out several times).
gripen
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Originally posted by Crumpp
The LW won Air Superiority over Russia for the first year and was able to grab local superiority over a battlefield until the last months of the war. It held the allies in the west off for another four years! I would hardly say it's back was broken in the BoB.
Does this statement mean you have changed your mind about your claim the western Allies having air superiority over the LW in early '44?.
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Ummmm MATH Milo-Moron!
44-40 = 4
So No I haven't changed the fact the Allies gained Air Superiority in March '44. You still lost that one.
Crumpp
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Although some of the Fighter Command claims of the time (I.e. numbers of German aircraft shot down etc.) have since been provd to be greatly exagerated on some days, it nevertheless does give a unique insight into the RAF's perspective of the Battle of Britain.
Yeah thanks for the link!
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/bobhome.html
Kind of blows your argument out of the water, Gripen. We can see that both sides grossly overclaimed which puts the LW which had an intitial 2 to 1 advantage still firmly on top.
Again Please just post a LINK and QUOTE to any site which clearly concludes that the LW had no chance whatsoever of achieving it's stated goals in 1940. Face it the LW could have done it but they blew it when they changed tactics.
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Ummmm MATH Milo-Moron!
44-40 = 4
So No I haven't changed the fact the Allies gained Air Superiority in March '44. You still lost that one.
Crumpp
And Americans can't see why there are not liked by the rest of the world. Here is a prime example of why, shown by a member of your armed forces.:rolleyes:
LOL, dirt eater better brush up on your math skills.
Sept 40 + 4 = Sept 44 :)
Sept 40 was when the LW went on the defensive in the 'west'.:eek:
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Crumpp,
I wonder why you are continously requesting something which no one else has talked about? I wrote some couple hundred messages ago (1.2.04):
"Otherwise so far I have not seen any statistics which supports the argument that the LW was actually winning BoB."
After that there has been a lot of discussion but so far noone has bring in any relevant statistics to support opposite argument. Known statistics are clear: In the end of the 2nd phase the RAF could keep the strenght and still had reserves left while the LW could not keep the strenght had no reserves.
gripen
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Ummm because I don't need to waste a bunch of time with posting the statistics. The Imperial War Museaum, the RAF, and a Historian have already done that and ALL came to the same conclusion.
You are the one who has to "examine" the data, post some B_S explaination for it and try and convince others to see your point of view. Your "conclusion" has no basis in fact and is completely contrary to the sources you post.
Crumpp
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Crumpp,
Well, so far you have not bring any relevant data despite you claimed for example that the LW reserves are proven. IMW link contained no anykind of relevant numbers and your statements on Luftflotte 1 and 4 are plain fiction.
Numbers on RAF site are clear, they could keep the strenght in the end of the 2nd phase and their numbers on their own force prove that Lund does fictious statements. The statistics on LW side are also clear, they had nearly all their Bf 109 in the BoB and they could not keep the strenght in the end of the 2nd phase.
The only thing what we know for sure is that RAF won. If you wan't to prove that the LW had some chance to win, then you should bring in relevant data to support your arguments and that data is numbers not quotes. Shortly, in data we trust.
gripen
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The whole site is relevant AND simply supports the conclusions the RAF, IWM, and a noted historian come too about the battle. My facts / figures are posted on each of the sites and the author makes the argument.:aok
You on the otherhand have to MAKE your argument because in reality it's a fiction YOU are pedaling.:eek:
Crumpp
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I don't get you Crumpp.
Who is pedalling?
The LW reserves seem to be a bit flaky, while the RAF strength numbers show that their airstrength was not even declining through the battle. If indeed the LW had a good reserve team, then the RAF had also their 12 squadrons of 13th group to play with if they liked.
Easy to say today, for at the time from both points of view it must have looked scary.
From the RAF side being under relentless pressure for so long without seeing any significant dent in the enemy's effort, and from the LW side doing all their best, still to meet the strongest enemy effort when there should have been no enemy!
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You want me to repost what the RAF concluded?? Or can U remember it?
Crumpp
-
Crumpp,
Data please. Like this:
Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 7th September 1940
* Blenheim - 44
* Spitfire - 223
* Hurricane - 398
* Defiant - 20
* Gladiator - 9
* Total - 694
Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 15th September 1940
* Blenheim - 47
* Spitfire - 192
* Hurricane - 389
* Defiant - 24
* Gladiator - 8
* Total - 660
Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 30th September 1940
* Blenheim - 45
* Spitfire - 218
* Hurricane - 403
* Defiant - 13
* Gladiator - 8
* Total - 687
gripen
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I credited you with more sense than this.
What good is data without a conclusion? Have you taken debate in school yet? :rolleyes:
Why bother to post more data. This thread has a wealth of data posted by both sides. To show one side is completely useless and to draw no conclusions from it is a waste of time. Pure philibuster tactics.
Just go to any site and post their conclusion or comments about Phase II of the battle that support your increasingly desperate view.
I will concede your point IF you can find a site that draws the same conclusions you do! How simple is that? Post it and you have won the argument? Otherwise you've slipped into a moronic babble about plane numbers which are neither new nor enlightening. In fact your getting those numbers from the one of the sites I quote their conclusion!
Do not digress into irrelevancies. All you have to do is POST:
ONE SITE THAT agrees with you that the LW couldn't have won if they continued to use Phase II tactics!
Do that AND:
You can shout "Hercules!! Hercules!!" and go home triumphant!
Crumpp
:aok
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Crumpp,
The question has been if there is statistics which supports the argument that the LW was actually winning BoB? If the relevant data exists then everyone can draw his/her own conclusion. All relevant data seen so far actually indicates that the LW was losing even in the 2nd phase despite what ever a historian or a web site concludes.
Basicly, if you want to prove that such data exists then please post it. So far you have stated just that you "don't need to waste a bunch of time with posting the statistics" because you have found a historian and web sites which support you. If you had stated this couple hunred messages ago, it would have saved really a bunch of time; it actually means that you don't want to discuss about this.
gripen
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Good GOD!!:mad:
You want Stats, Just reference ANY of the sites you or I are posting from. We are using the same ones for numbers, Moron.
I quoted the Imperial War Museum, The RAF, And a noted Historian CONCLUSIONS about phase II of the BoB!!
You have yet to produce ANY site which supports your conclusions. Do it. Simple as that.
Fact's are, you cannot. Facts are, your argument is not supported by history. Everytime I have asked you to that simple thing you have sidestepped it.
Here Gripen,
Just like this. As Agent Friday used to say, "Just the facts".
Even the Imperial War Museaum says the LW almost won in September.
http://www.iwm.org.uk/online/battle...in/overview.htm
"The crucial period of the battle was between 24 August and 15 September. Fighter Command came closest to losing when its vital sector airfields around London were attacked. The decisive turning point came on 7 September when the Luftwaffe switched its attention to the capital. This tactical blunder allowed Fighter Command to recover its strength rapidly to inflict, on 15 September, losses significant enough to show the Germans the battle could not be won."
Notice the wording: "Came closest to losing..."
No lets look at Lund's conclusions about the BoB found on page 26 of the his document and pg 31 under adobe thumbnails:
"In the final analysis, perhaps the Germans
could have won. Perhaps, if they had
aggressively pursued either campaign
strategy they could have won, but that will
always remain conjecture."
Gosh that is exactly what I have been saying.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ww2/batlbrit.pdf
A site that deals in WWII artifacts:
"The Battle of Britain raged over the skies of southern England throughout that late summer of 1940 - the Luftwaffe lost a total of 1,733 aircraft from July to October, the RAF 915. Had he but known it, Göering was only 24 hours from victory at one point according to British Flight Command. All our reserves were spent and our pilots were exhausted. Incredibly, Göering decided that the Luftwaffe were taking too much of a punishment from the British fighters and he ordered his planes to switch their attention away from the British airfields and towards the British cities. Whilst this was bad news for the civilian populations of the industrial cities, this gave the R.A.F. and the aviation industry a reprieve and a crucial breather to re-arm and re-stock. It also meant that a German invasion of Britain had to be postponed and that Germany was soon to turn its attention eastwards - a decision which was arguably to cost them the war."
http://www.retrosellers.com/features61.htm
Notice it says "All our reserves were spent"
And Finally the Royal Air Force:
"Heavy fighter losses in France saw Dowding warn the War Cabinet of the dire consequences should the present wastage rates continue, and a letter dated 16 May 1940 is one of the great documents of history. After covering the evacuation from Dunkirk, he had just enough aircraft to fight the Luftwaffe in the one place they could be effectively used - within the comprehensive air defence system he had built in the UK. Even so, he admitted that the situation was "critical in the extreme" and while it is true that the immortal "Few" - his 'chicks' as Churchill christened them - won the Battle using the organisation he had created, the Luftwaffe lost it through bad leadership, faulty tactics and mistaken target selection."
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/commanders.html
Well that is straight from the horses mouth. Let see your sources without YOUR opinion placed on them. Just quote them without making an argument.
No amount of "data manipulation" to advance YOUR own view will change the facts of history.
End of Story
Crumpp
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Crumpp,
You should post relevant statistical data like numbers on the LW reserves. It has been pointed out several times that Lund's numbers are false. Retrosellers and the page you linked on the RAF site contains no any kind of relevant statistical data for analysis, just anecdotal comments.
The question is if there is relevat statistics which supports the argument that the LW was actually winning BoB. So far you have posted none. The facts needed are statistical data, not conclusions.
My argument is well supported in history: The RAF won BoB. All other is pure speculation as this whole discussion.
gripen
-
Under the extremely critical situation, the RAF did not disband a squadron, they did not abandon a fighter station, their force actually grew, and they did not utilize the 12 squadrons kept under the command of 13th group.
The IInd phase switch by the LW gave the RAF some breathing space, however they could have moved several squadrons a bit further inland had they chosen to. It ALMOST came to that, that would have been what Dowding called a defeat. But it did not.
The British won a very decisive victory, and the LW was never again in any form to challenge them in daylight over Britain.
Crumpp, you are ranking yourself together with Barbi this time.
-
Basicly the problem in this thread is that Crumpp can't see the diffrence between the fact and a speculation.
gripen
-
So lets write the RAF, IWM and conventional History and PROCLAIM.....
WITHOUT a Shred of evidence to back his rewriting History..
Gripen has showed us the light!!
:rofl :rofl :rofl :rofl :rofl :rofl :rofl :rofl
Just post a ONE SINGLE SITE THAT SAYS THE SAME THING YOU DO GRIPEN!
Don't try and warp the argument for those too lazy to read the thread. Nobody is claiming the RAF didn't win the BoB or even remotely saying the LW could have destroyed the RAF.
I want to see were the RAF wasn't losing and in a critical point at the end of Phase II? Even the RAF say it was!!
Crumpp
-
Do you think that the IWM will not agree to the fact that the RAF won the Battle of Britain?
-
Crumpp,
As far as I know all sources admit that the RAF won. I'm not going to play with speculations like you. I have been looking and asking for facts (statistical data) last couple hunred messages (since 1.2.04). So far you have provided bunch of speculations, questionable data from Lund and large amount of total nonsense (like LW had 2000 planes somewhere and so on).
So far we know that (sources above) :
"Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 7th September 1940
* Spitfire - 223
* Hurricane - 398
These numbers do not contain reserves (something around 250) nor planes under mainteance/repair in the squadrons (number unknown). Producution was around 400/month.
Luftwaffe 7.9.40 (strenght/serviceable):
* Bf 109 - 864/678
Reserves unknown. These numbers contain also fighters in Norway (44/35). Production around 200/month.
gripen
-
get back in line and beg for aid. :aok
-
Do you think I'm arguing the LW WON the BoB?
If so then you truly are beyond moronic. Have the nurse check your thorazine drip......
Here let me once more quote both the IWM and RAF's FINAL CONCLUSIONS about the BoB. Yes folks these quotes are AFTER they have examined all the data. Since your getting your plane numbers from the same site......
And Yes GRIPEN those numbers for the RAF INCLUDE RESERVES! Read the darn site and quit manipulating data!
POST ANY SITE THAT REACHES YOUR CONCLUSION ABOUT PHASE II OF THE BoB!!
Here Gripen,
Just like this. As Agent Friday used to say, "Just the facts".
Even the Imperial War Museaum says the LW almost won in September.
http://www.iwm.org.uk/online/battle...in/overview.htm
"The crucial period of the battle was between 24 August and 15 September. Fighter Command came closest to losing when its vital sector airfields around London were attacked. The decisive turning point came on 7 September when the Luftwaffe switched its attention to the capital. This tactical blunder allowed Fighter Command to recover its strength rapidly to inflict, on 15 September, losses significant enough to show the Germans the battle could not be won."
Notice the wording: "Came closest to losing..."
No lets look at Lund's conclusions about the BoB found on page 26 of the his document and pg 31 under adobe thumbnails:
"In the final analysis, perhaps the Germans
could have won. Perhaps, if they had
aggressively pursued either campaign
strategy they could have won, but that will
always remain conjecture."
Gosh that is exactly what I have been saying.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ww2/batlbrit.pdf
A site that deals in WWII artifacts:
"The Battle of Britain raged over the skies of southern England throughout that late summer of 1940 - the Luftwaffe lost a total of 1,733 aircraft from July to October, the RAF 915. Had he but known it, Göering was only 24 hours from victory at one point according to British Flight Command. All our reserves were spent and our pilots were exhausted. Incredibly, Göering decided that the Luftwaffe were taking too much of a punishment from the British fighters and he ordered his planes to switch their attention away from the British airfields and towards the British cities. Whilst this was bad news for the civilian populations of the industrial cities, this gave the R.A.F. and the aviation industry a reprieve and a crucial breather to re-arm and re-stock. It also meant that a German invasion of Britain had to be postponed and that Germany was soon to turn its attention eastwards - a decision which was arguably to cost them the war."
http://www.retrosellers.com/features61.htm
Notice it says "All our reserves were spent"
And Finally the Royal Air Force:
"Heavy fighter losses in France saw Dowding warn the War Cabinet of the dire consequences should the present wastage rates continue, and a letter dated 16 May 1940 is one of the great documents of history. After covering the evacuation from Dunkirk, he had just enough aircraft to fight the Luftwaffe in the one place they could be effectively used - within the comprehensive air defence system he had built in the UK. Even so, he admitted that the situation was "critical in the extreme" and while it is true that the immortal "Few" - his 'chicks' as Churchill christened them - won the Battle using the organisation he had created, the Luftwaffe lost it through bad leadership, faulty tactics and mistaken target selection."
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/commanders.html
Well that is straight from the horses mouth. Let see your sources without YOUR opinion placed on them. Just quote them without making an argument.
No amount of "data manipulation" to advance YOUR own view will change the facts of history.
End of Story
Crumpp
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Crumpp,
Again, the question is if there is relevant statistical evidence which supports the argument that the LW was actually winning BoB. So far you have provided absolutely none, all your sources are just speculations not facts. Only certain fact is that the RAF actually won BoB, rest is just speculations and playing with "what if" card. I'm not going to play that game with you.
The IWM site does not contain any relevant statistical data, it just agrees that the fighter command suffered losses in the 2nd phase (no one has denied this).
Lund's speculations are based on false numbers as pointed out several times (with statistics from RAF site).
Rettrosellers is a shopping site and again their speculations are easy to prove false with statistics from the RAF site (there were reserves left).
The page you refer from the RAF site does not contain any relevant statistical data, it just states what is all ready known that the situation was critical and rest is speculation.
Please post facts not speculations. As noted above you appear to be unable to see difference between facts and speculations.
Please show where I have manipulated data?
gripen
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Originally posted by Crumpp
And Finally the Royal Air Force:
"Heavy fighter losses in France saw Dowding warn the War Cabinet of the dire consequences should the present wastage rates continue, and a letter dated 16 May 1940 is one of the great documents of history. After covering the evacuation from Dunkirk, he had just enough aircraft to fight the Luftwaffe in the one place they could be effectively used - within the comprehensive air defence system he had built in the UK. Even so, he admitted that the situation was "critical in the extreme" and while it is true that the immortal "Few" - his 'chicks' as Churchill christened them - won the Battle using the organisation he had created, the Luftwaffe lost it through bad leadership, faulty tactics and mistaken target selection."
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/commanders.html
Well that is straight from the horses mouth. Let see your sources without YOUR opinion placed on them. Just quote them without making an argument.
No amount of "data manipulation" to advance YOUR own view will change the facts of history.
End of Story
Crumpp
Going to take issue with the Dowding quote Crumpp. Thats referencing Dowding not wanting to send more fighter squadrons to France etc. He didn't see any point in wasting more fighter aircraft in what he saw was a losing battle in France. That's why no Spits were ever sent and not a great many Hurricanes either.
That comment was not made in reference to the Battle of Britain itself. They had time between Dunkirk and the start of the German attacks to regroup.
Dan/Slack
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Funny thing in these Crumpp's sources is that they tend to contradict each other. As for example Lund states (page 19):
"reserves had dwindled from 518 Spitfires and Hurricanes (in maintenance and storage) on 6 July, to only 292 by 7 September."
And as Crumpp self proudly quoted Rettrosellers:
"Notice it says "All our reserves were spent"
So which one is "Just the fact" Agent Friday?
And Crumpp's statement that numbers in RAF site includes reserves is simply laughable as Nashwan noted:
"It doesn't include the reserves.
"On 1st September there were 701 operational aircraft and on 6th September the figure was 738, with 256 in stores ready for immediate despatch"
Overy, the battle
6th September
Operational squadrons
Spitfire 19
Hurricane 32
Established strength
Spitfires 304
Hurricanes 512
Actual strength
Spitfires 304
Hurricanes 512
Serviceable reserve
Spitfires 41
Hurricanes 183
The Battle of Britain, Richard Townshend Bickers
Now, let's look at what figures the RAF site gives.
Serviceable aircraft, Spits and Hurris,
24th August 646
30th August 644
5th september 636
If these numbers include the reserves, then the RAF was not even losing strength from the reserves.
Those figures for the RAf site are serviceable aircraft with the squadrons, not including the reserves. To suggest otherwise is not only wrong, it implies the RAf was winning by a bigger amount than anybody has claimed."
gripen
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The first sentence of the quote refers to his decision not to throw the full weight of Fighter Command into the Battle of France.
Even so, he admitted that the situation was "critical in the extreme" and while it is true that the immortal "Few" - his 'chicks' as Churchill christened them - won the Battle using the organization he had created, the Luftwaffe lost it through bad leadership, faulty tactics and mistaken target selection.
Refers to the BoB. "The few" were not in France. Notice it doesn't say "lost it because they had no chance"
Further down the page IF you read it we find:
He abused the powers he was given to appropriate large estates and other trappings of status and wealth, neglecting his military duties in the process, and effectively leaving the new Luftwaffe leaderless at the crucial time. Indeed, it may be said that his major instance of direct control over the conduct of the battle, the switching of targets from airfields to cities, was the decision that cost the Luftwaffe the Battle, if not, ultimately, the war.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/commanders.html
What does the RAF say cost the LW the battle?? Where does it say the RAF wasn't at a critical point and about to lose? Where does it say that they had plenty of planes?
Your saying now Gripen that the RAF wasn't even taking significant losses?
:rofl :rofl :rofl
That is a new spin on History!!
Christ son Even the RAF says it was desperate and the change in tactics from Phase II saved them. End of Story
Now for the last time just provide a link to ANY site that takes your view of the battle. The RAF, where you are getting all your plane numbers, surely doesn't!!
Crumpp
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Crumpp,
I have stated right from the beginning that both sides suffered heavy losses (1.2.04):
"Otherwise so far I have not seen any statistics which supports the argument that the LW was actually winning BoB. Both sides suffered heavy losses and it appears that the RAF was more worried about their losses than LW; Dowding wanted to save fighters for possible invasion."
So let's see statistics from the site you pointed as a source:
http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/2072/LW_OBs.html
First Luftwaffe strenght and serviceable planes in the end of the 2nd phase, note that now I have included also ErprGr 210 which used also Bf 110 (night fighter unit which I did not count for 864/678). So actual total might be smaller because I don't know how many Bf 110s they had.
7 Sept 1940 JGs (unit, base(s), plane(s), strenght/serviceable, notes)
Stab/JG 1, Pas-de-Calais, Bf 109E, 4/3
Stab/JG 3, Pas-de-Calais, Bf 109E, 3/3
I/JG 3, Pas-de-Calais, Bf 109E, 23/14
II/JG 3, Pas-de-Calais, Bf 109E, 24/14
III/JG 3, Pas-de-Calais, Bf 109E, 25/23
Stab/JG 26, Pas-de-Calais, Bf 109E, 4/3
I/JG 26, Pas-de-Calais, Bf 109E, 27/20
II/JG 26, Northen France, Bf 109E, 32/28
III/JG 26, Northen France, Bf 109E, 29/26
Stab/JG 27, Etaples, Bf 109E, 5/4
I/JG 27, Etaples, Bf 109E, 33/27
II/JG 27, Montreuil, Bf 109E, 37/33
III/JG 27, Sempy, Bf 109E, 31/27
Stab/JG 51, St. Omer, Bf 109E, 5/4
I/JG 51, St. Omer, St. Inglevert, Bf 109E, 36/33
II/JG 51, St. Omer, St. Inglevert, Bf 109E, 22/13
III/JG 51, Pas-de-Calais, Bf 109E, 44/31
Stab/JG 52, Laon/Couvorn, Bf 109E, 2/1
I/JG 52,Laon/Couvorn, Bf 109E, 21/17
II/JG 52, Pas-de-Calais, Bf 109E, 28/23
III/JG 52, Pas-de-Calais, Bf 109E, 31/16
Stab/JG 53, Northen France, Bf 109E, 2/2
II/JG 53, Wissant, Bf 109E, 33/24
III/JG 53, Northen France, Bf 109E, 30/22
Stab/JG 54, South Holland, Bf 109E, 4/2
I/JG 54,South Holland, Bf 109E, 28/23
II/JG 54, South Holland, Bf 109E, 35/27
III/JG 54, South Holland, Bf 109E, 29/23
I/JG 77, Northen France, Bf 109E, 42/40
I/JG 53, Brittany, Bf 109E, 34/27
*Stab/JG 2, Beaumont-le-Roger, Bf 109E, 3/2
*I/JG 2,Beaumont-le-Roger, Bf 109E, 29/24
*II/JG 2, Beaumont-le-Roger, Bf 109E, 22/18
*III/JG 2, Le Havre, Bf 109E, 30/19
total 787/616
Other units:
II/JG 77, South Norway, Bf 109E, 44/35 (Norway)
ErprGr 210, Denain, Bf 109E/Bf 110C/D, 26/17 (Night fighters, also Bf 110 counted)
II (Sch.)/LG 2 St. Omer, Bf 109E, 33/27, (Fighter bombers)
total 103/79
All 890/695
The LW fighter units had 616 Bf 109s serviceable in the end of the 2nd phase and 79 in other units/places. As for comparison here is listings for 13.8.1940 from same site.
13 Aug 40 JGs (unit, base(s), plane(s), strenght/serviceable, notes)
Stab/JG 3, Wierre au Bois, Bf 109E, 3/3
I/JG 3, Grandvilliers, Bf 109E, 33/32
II/JG 3, Samer, Bf 109E, 29/22
III/JG 3, Desvres, Le Touquet, Bf 109E, 29/29
Stab, I/JG 26, Audembert, Bf 109E, 42/38
II/JG 26, Marquise-Ost, Bf 109E, 39/35
III/JG 26, Caffiers, Bf 109E, 40/38
Stab/JG 51, Wissant, Bf 109E, 4/4
I/JG 51, Pihen bei Calais, Bf 109E, 32/32
II/JG 51, Marquise-West, Bf 109E, 33/33
III/JG 51, St. Omer-Clairmarais, Bf 109E, 32/30
Stab, I/JG 52, Coquelles, Bf 109E, 42/34
II/JG 52, Peuplingues, Bf 109E, 39/32
III/JG 52, Zerbst, Bf 109E, 31/11
Stab, I/JG 54, Campagne-les-Guines, Bf 109E, 38/26
II/JG 54, Hermelingen, Bf 109E, 36/32
III/JG 54, Guines-en-Calais, Bf 109E, 42/40
II (Sch.)/LG 2, Böblingen, Bf 109E, 39/31
tab, I, II/JG 2, Beaumont-le-Roger, Bf 109E, 73/63
III/JG 2, Le Havre, Bf 109E, 32/28
Stab/JG 27, Cherbourg-West, Bf 109E, 5/4
I/JG 27, Plumett, Bf 109E, 37/32
II/JG 27, Crèpon, Bf 109E, 40/32
III/JG 27, Arcques, Bf 109E, 39/32
Stab/JG 53, Cherbourg, Bf 109E, 6/6
I/JG 53, Rennes, Guernsey, Bf 109E, 39/37
II/JG 53, Dinan, Guernsey, Bf 109E, 38/34
III/JG 53, Brest, Sempy, Bf 109E, 38/35
total 930/805
Other units (JG 77 unclear)
Stab/JG 77, ?, Bf 109E, 4/4 (unknown base)
I/JG 77, ?, Bf 109E, 38/37 (unknown base)
II/JG 77, Stavanger, Trondheim, Bf 109E 43/38 (Norway)
ErprGr 210, Calais-Marck, Bf 109E-4B, 10/9 (night fighters)
III/NJG 1, Köln-Ostheim, Bf 109D, 3/1 (night fighters)
III/NJG 1, Köln-Ostheim, Bf 109E, 17/16 (Night fighters)
Total 115/105
All 1045/910
Number of serviceable planes in JGs dropped from 805 to 616 between 13th August and 7th September ie 23,5% which tells that the drop was much more than Lund's claim (even more if unclear JG 77 parts are counted). Number of all serviceable Bf 109 dropped from 910 to 695 (23,5%).
Comparable numbers in same dates for Fighter command are:
August 13th from http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/august13.html
"Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 13 August 1940
* Blenheim - 71
* Spitfire - 226
* Hurricane - 353
* Defiant - 26
* Gladiator - 2
* Total - 678"
September 7th from http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/september7.html
"Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 7th September 1940
* Blenheim - 44
* Spitfire - 223
* Hurricane - 398
* Defiant - 20
* Gladiator - 9
* Total - 694"
So the RAF had 579 serviceable Hurricanes and Spitfires in August 13th and 621 in the September 7th. As pointed out several times, these numbers do not contain reserves (around 250 in 7.9.1940) nor planes under mainteance/repair in the squadrons or RAF repair organisation.
What we see here are facts not speculations (or the sources you have pointed out are false). In the end of the 2nd phase the RAF could keep the strenght and had reserves while the LW could not keep strenght and apparently had no reserves. If you want to argue that these numbers are manipulated then please prove it.
gripen
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The Goebbels Reenactors Club made up Gripen and Naswhan failed to show any proof for their claim for the LW not having reserves left during BoB during the last 200 posts. I have seen no sign of listing the OKL`s reserves by them, just the endless mantra and revisionism.
Applying their logic to the 2nd TAF`s Typhoon sqaudrons - which were down to 10% strenght in the end of 1944 - "proves" the RAF was completely out of fighter reserves by that time.
Nothing more needs to be said.
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Originally posted by VO101_Isegrim
The Goebbels Reenactors Club made up Gripen and Naswhan failed to show any proof for their claim for the LW not having reserves left during BoB during the last 200 posts. I have seen no sign of listing the OKL`s reserves by them, just the endless mantra and revisionism.
Applying their logic to the 2nd TAF`s Typhoon sqaudrons - which were down to 10% strenght in the end of 1944 - "proves" the RAF was completely out of fighter reserves by that time.
Nothing more needs to be said.
Gee Barbi, if the RAF was out of reserves then how were the a/c that were destroyed in Bodenplatte replaced so quickly - within-in days? :eek: :eek: :eek:
It is hard to show there was LW reserves when there was none.:rofl Now where did you say there were LW reserves? The LW could not even keep the original strength of the units involved from the start of BoB.
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Originally posted by MiloMorai
Gee Barbi, if the RAF was out of reserves then how were the a/c that were destroyed in Bodenplatte replaced so quickly - within-in days? :eek: :eek: :eek:
Mindless Moron, the RAF replaced the Typhoons that were destroyed in Bodenplatte? "Within days"? Where, when? Source, proof, anything? You never have those. NEVER.
Let`s test their logic.
The RAF`s 2nd TAF Typhoon squadrons were all down to 1-4 planes by December 1944 from the Established strenght of 20.
Applying the logic presented as "proof" by Nashwan, Gripen, and Mindless Moron, the RAF did not have reserves by December 1944. If the RAF would have reserves, the units strenght would not be allowed to fall that low, they say.
Naswhan, Gripen and Mindless Moron all agree that the RAF had no fighter reserves by December 1944.
It is hard to show there was LW reserves when there was none.
You only have to prove that now. You can parrot it very well, like a machine.
List the decline of OKL reserves. You can`t do that somehow. Which makes your posts no more than a mad mantra of wishful thinking.
BTW it`s a greatly entertaining to see Gripen`s strereotypical "All I say is Gold, all you say is false, all my stats are gold, all your numbers are false, all you say is unsupported, all I say has the Pope`s backing" way of argumentation.
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Barbi, how do you prove something that is not?:eek: This past week you spent in the mental asylum did nothing for your logic.:rolleyes:
You claim the LW had reserves in 1940 during BoB, so lets see you proof.:) The numbers, places, units,..... are?
Again your inability to read. :rolleyes: How do you see the word Typhoon in the word a/c?
I don't know why you continue to show the world that you are an idiot.
from The Hawker Typhoon & Tempest Francis Mason pg101
"No 440 Sqd suffered worst at Eindhoven. Eight(8) a/c were moving onto the runway to TO when Me109s and long-nosed Fw190s opened their attack. Two Typhoons were desrtoeyed immediately and two badly damaged. One pilot PO ET Flanagan was seriously wounded and many pilots and ground crew reeived minor injuries. The Sqd dispersal was struck by a 1100lb bomb but it only destroyed the orderly room. In the afternoon WgCmd Grant, whose own Typhoon had been damaged and was written off, decided that the 440 Sqd would be non-operational until replacement a/c were delivered. The Squadron was declared operational once more on Jan 4, 1945."
So both 440 and 338 Sqds had each 8 a/c preparing to TO. 440 Sqd lost 8 destroyed and 4 damaged. 438 Sqd lost 5 destroyed and 2 damaged. Now where is that 10% Barbi claims?:D
pg 103 "Within 6 days every Typhoon and Tempest that had been written off had been replaced from stocks."
So much for your bs Barbi, for that is in a "few days".:rofl :rofl :aok
Now were there any shortages of other a/c such as the Spitfire, Mustang, P-47,....... you would like to claim?
..............
Barbi, what does the state of RAF a/c reserves in late 44, early 45 have to do with BoB?:eek: Typical Barbi ploy to deflect the discussion.:(
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Oh, yeahhh baby, errrr.BARBI!!!!!!
Now we are maybe gonna have some fun!
I raise the common Barbi insult from "Mindless moron" to "you bed-wetting type". How's that for starters.
Anyway, Gripen has fed us with all the numbers we need in the BoB-debate. There was something about Jg77 though:
"Number of serviceable planes in JGs dropped from 805 to 616 between 13th August and 7th September ie 23,5% which tells that the drop was much more than Lund's claim (even more if unclear JG 77 parts are counted). "
Just dug up that the Germans did transfer a unit from home defence and re-assign to/as Jg 77. 1 Gruppe (1 sqn) perhaps.
source: Christopher Shores.
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Single engine fighters
Date: 29.06.40
Aircraft Pilots
Unit Type Est. On Str. Serv. Est. Pres. Ready Ltd. Duty
I./LG2 Bf 109E 39 38 21 39 33 30 0
Stab/JG1 Bf 109E 4 4 3 4 5 3 0
I./JG1 Bf 109E 39 28 26 39 51 32 0
Stab/JG2 Bf 109E 4 3 3 4 3 3 0
I./JG2 Bf 109E 39 33 26 39 39 35 0
II./JG2 Bf 109E 39 36 27 39 32 24 0
III./JG2 Bf 109E 39 36 14 39 34 22 0
IV./JG2 Bf 109E/Bf 109D 39 10/20 10/10 39 33 24 0
Stab/JG3 Bf 109E 4 3 3 4 3 3 0
I./JG3 Bf 109E 39 33 28 39 45 31 0
II./JG3 Bf 109E 39 40 31 39 34 32 0
III./JG3 Bf 109E 39 36 35 39 32 32 0
I./JG20 Bf 109E 39 37 25 39 41 32 0
I./JG21 Bf 109E 39 47 38 39 57 48 0
Stab/JG26 Bf 109E 4 2 0 4 2 2 0
I./JG26 Bf 109E 39 29 22 39 37 22 0
II./JG26 Bf 109E 39 35 16 39 30 23 0
III./JG26 Bf 109E 39 32 25 39 34 30 0
Stab/JG27 Bf 109E 4 3 3 4 3 3 0
I./JG27 Bf 109E 39 28 26 39 51 32 0
II./JG27 Bf 109E 39 35 25 39 37 30 0
Stab/JG51 Bf 109E 4 4 3 4 3 2 0
I./JG51 Bf 109E 39 48 25 39 34 24 0
II./JG51 Bf 109E 39 36 27 39 43 38 0
Stab/JG52 Bf 109E 4 3 3 4 1 1 0
I./JG52 Bf 109E 39 38 31 39 39 33 0
II./JG52 Bf 109E 39 39 26 39 32 32 0
III./JG52 Bf 109E 39 36 29 39 32 31 0
Stab/JG53 Bf 109E 4 5 4 4 4 4 0
I./JG53 Bf 109E 39 43 41 39 37 33 0
II./JG53 Bf 109E 39 39 38 39 35 35 0
III./JG53 Bf 109E 39 40 40 39 37 32 0
Stab/JG54 Bf 109E 4 4 3 4 3 3 0
I./JG54 Bf 109E 39 35 23 39 39 22 0
I./JG76 Bf 109E 39 39 35 39 34 27 0
Stab/JG77 Bf 109E 4 4 2 4 3 3 0
I./JG77 Bf 109E 39 40 35 39 39 32 0
II./JG77 Bf 109E 39 43 36 39 36 31 0
II./Tr.Gr.186 Bf 109E 39 42 38 39 39 30 0
TOTAL - 1171 1107 856 1171 1126 906 0
Single engine fighters
Date: 28.09.40
Aircraft Pilots
Unit Type Est. On Str. Serv. Est. Pres. Ready Ltd. Duty
I./JG2 Bf 109E 39 36 29 39 39 33 -
Stab/JG2 Bf 109E 4 4 3 4 4 2 -
II./JG2 Bf 109E 39 32 22 39 36 26 -
III./JG2 Bf 109E 39 25 11 39 41 18 -
Stab/JG3 Bf 109E 4 3 3 4 2 2 -
I./JG3 Bf 109E 39 37 30 39 24 18 -
II./JG3 Bf 109E 39 31 20 39 24 24 -
III./JG3 Bf 109E 39 26 18 39 29 23 -
Stab/JG26 Bf 109E 4 4 2 4 3 1 -
I./JG26 Bf 109E 39 32 27 39 30 24 -
II./JG26 Bf 109E 39 34 26 39 31 20 -
III./JG26 Bf 109E 39 31 26 39 24 20 -
Stab/JG27 Bf 109E 4 3 3 4 3 3 -
I./JG27 Bf 109E 39 30 26 39 36 19 -
II./JG27 Bf 109E 39 30 25 39 31 20 -
III./JG27 Bf 109E 39 32 24 39 32 22 -
Stab/JG51 Bf 109E 4 4 4 4 2 2 -
I./JG51 Bf 109E 39 37 26 39 30 18 -
II./JG51 Bf 109E 39 35 28 39 34 25 -
III./JG51 Bf 109E 39 36 30 39 26 18 -
Stab/JG52 Bf 109E 4 2 2 4 1 1 -
I./JG52 Bf 109E 39 28 21 39 24 17 -
II./JG52 Bf 109E 39 25 24 39 29 17 -
III./JG52 Bf 109E 39 28 28 39 38 38 -
Stab/JG53 Bf 109E 4 3 3 4 4 3 -
I./JG53 Bf 109E 39 31 29 39 34 21 -
II./JG53 Bf 109E 39 28 18 39 24 19 -
III./JG53 Bf 109E 39 31 22 39 36 23 -
Stab/JG54 Bf 109E 4 3 3 4 3 3 -
I./JG54 Bf 109E 39 24 15 39 32 23 -
II./JG54 Bf 109E 39 43 29 39 38 20 -
III./JG54 Bf 109E 39 35 28 39 33 28 -
Stab/JG77 Bf 109E 4 4 4 4 4 4 -
I./JG77 Bf 109E 39 31 30 39 25 22 -
II./JG77 Bf 109E 39 42 33 39 35 35 -
III./JG77 Bf 109E 39 26 17 39 38 34 -
Stab/JG1 Bf 109E 4 4 4 4 4 3 -
I./LG2 Bf 109E 39 27 19 39 34 25 -
TOTAL - 1132 920 712 1132 917 676 -
So in June 40 The LW had TOTAL - 1171 1107 856 1171 1126 906 0 but in Sept 40 with all their reserves:rolleyes: the LW could not even cover its losses during BoB - TOTAL - 1132 920 712 1132 917 676 -. In fact, German a/c production could not keep up with the losses.
http://www.ww2.dk/oob/statistics/gob.htm
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I would really like to see the figures for twin engined aircraft, - 110's and the bombers. I bet things look a lot worse there!
According to Gunther Rall, the LW lost about 25% of its force in the BoB.
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What is even more interesting is even by year end 1940 the LW had not made up for the losses during BoB.
Est. On Str. Serv. Est. Pres. Ready
TOTAL - 1162 829 586 1162 915 711
compared to Sept 1940
TOTAL - 1132 920 712 1132 917 676
The pilot situation had improved slightly.
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What? Gonna stop at 500?!
This thread can surely go another 500 easy.
German engineering was indeed all it was cracked up to be.
Spitfires kicked Messerschmitt butt.
(http://www.pcsystems.com/messerschmitt/kr20058.jpg)
(http://www.triumphspitfire.com/images/cars/borg.jpg)
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Even if the LW managed to 'win' the BoB, what does it get them? Temporary air superiority over southern England? They're still in no position to invade.
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What Barbi, no comment, yet, on the rapid re-supply of Typhoons and Tempests "in a few days" after Bodenplatte.