Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => The O' Club => Topic started by: Nilsen on March 30, 2004, 05:55:24 AM
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I see here in the paper today that the russians have just finished a new nuke missile that renderes the US missile defence shield completly useless.
ill see if i can find an english source to.
Apparently its a hypersonic missile that can maneuver between space and the atmosphere. The russians sais its ready for mass production and that its not very expencive to build. It was made to counter the expencive "sheild" and experts in the west sais that it will indeed make the shield useless when the new missile becomes operational.
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Originally posted by Nilsen10
I see here in the paper today that the russians have just finished a new nuke missile that renderes the US missile defence shield completly useless.
ill see if i can find an english source to.
Apparently its a hypersonic missile that can maneuver between space and the atmosphere. The russians sais its ready for mass production and that its not very expencive to build. It was made to counter the expencive "sheild" and experts in the west sais that it will indeed make the shield useless when the new missile becomes operational.
Uhhh . . . the "shield" is already useless. Remember the tests when they couldnt hit the incoming missle unless it had a homing beacon on it?
It is just a mishmash of patriot missle type elements that were hastily deployed. Frankly I havent heard much about it since 9-11
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Originally posted by Nilsen10
It was made to counter the expencive "sheild" and experts in the west sais that it will indeed make the shield useless when the new missile becomes operational.
While Putin said the development of such new weapons wasn't aimed against the United States, most observers viewed the move as Moscow's retaliation to the U.S. missile defense plans.
After years of vociferous protests, Russia reacted calmly when Washington withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 in order to develop of a nationwide missile shield. But U.S.-Russian relations have soured again lately, and Moscow has complained about Washington's plans to build new low-yield nuclear weapons.
..and the beat goes on...
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True GS but read this:
http://pub.tv2.no/nettavisen/verden/article207556.ece
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Meanwhile Ukraine can't find its *** from a hole in the ground...
Ukraine officials: Hundreds of Soviet-era antimissiles missing
KIEV, Ukraine (AP) — Several hundred decommissioned Soviet-built surface-to-air missiles are unaccounted for in Ukraine's military arsenal, the defense minister told a newspaper.
Defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk, in an interview published in the newspaper Den, appeared to suggest the missiles may have been dismantled without proper accounting, rather than stolen or sold.
"We are looking for several hundred missiles," Marchuk was quoted as saying in Thursday's edition. "They have already been decommissioned, but we cannot find them".
Marchuk didn't specify the types of missile. Defense Ministry spokesman Kostyantyn Khivrenko told The Associated Press that he was referring to S-75 air defense missiles — also known in the West by the code-name SA-2.
Marchuk said the Defense Ministry hadn't observed the accounting requirements established by law until last summer, an apparent jab at his predecessors.
Hundreds of such missiles from Soviet arsenals in Warsaw Pact member countries had been brought to Ukraine for dismantling but were lost due to "accounting problems," Khivrenko said.
He said the absence of records documenting what happened to the missiles was "strange," and added that an investigation was under way.
The missiles entered service with the Soviet air defense troops in 1957. Able to shoot down targets at altitudes up to 12 1/2 miles, they have been sold to a large number of nations around the world.
It was the same type of missile that brought down a U.S. U-2 spy plane over the Ural Mountains in 1960. Its pilot, Francis Gary Powers, bailed out safely, but was captured, convicted as a spy, and held for almost two years until being traded for a KGB agent.
The S-75s played a prominent role in the Vietnam war, Mideast conflicts, and, most recently, were used in wars in Yugoslavia and Iraq.
Marchuk blamed his predecessors for not observing proper accounting standards while dealing with the missiles and other weapons.
"They say they were destroyed. OK, destroyed," Marchuk said. "Every such missile has gold, silver, platinum metals. Where are the results of their destruction?"
Marchuk said that when he became minister, "no one knew what the armed forces had," and after nine months in the job he still doesn't have precise information.
He said that inventories of military equipment had revealed a gaping hole equivalent to some $189 billion. In comparison, Ukraine's entire budget last year was less than $10 billion.
Ukraine inherited a vast arsenal with the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, including dozens of intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and a wide array of other weapons. It shipped all its nuclear weapons to Russia in the early 1990s.
Marchuk's statement drew renewed attention to numerous reports of military equipment leaking out of Ukraine amid the post-Soviet turmoil.
In 2002, the United States claimed Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma had sanctioned the sale of a sophisticated military radar to Iraq. The allegation, which Kuchma denies, badly strained relations between Washington and Kiev.
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Yup Rip....it was no order whatsoever when the Soviet empire colapsed. However that is not news.
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I would think that to assess whether or not an anti-missile system is effective you would have to know something about it's capabilities, right? And who would know this?
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Everyone except the most ignorant knows that the missile defence is pure fantasy. Surely it will be possible to intercept one missile, but in a full strike we are talking about hundreds of MIRV warheads.
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Nah Iron....its useless :D
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Originally posted by mora
Everyone except the most ignorant knows that the missile defence is pure fantasy.
I can understand how some with little advanced technology and/or no military capability might want to believe that.
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Measure and countermeasure leads to measure and countermeasure.
Remember, they started out with sticks and rocks.
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Originally posted by AKIron
I can understand how some with little advanced technology and/or no military capability might want to believe that.
What is that supposed to mean?
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Originally posted by mora
What is that supposed to mean?
It means how would you know what the US has up it's sleeve?
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Originally posted by Toad
Measure and countermeasure leads to measure and countermeasure.
Remember, they started out with sticks and rocks.
Very true, but Russia no longer has a spy network capable of learning what must be countered. An anti-missile system won't likely be revealed until it is needed.
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lol Iron.. you do know that Finland uses the F18 dont you? :lol
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Originally posted by Nilsen10
lol Iron.. you do know that Finland uses the F18 dont you? :lol
I wasn't aware that the F-18 had any anti-icbm capability. Do you think that the US sells any of it's most advanced or secret weaponry? The F-117 is over 20 years old, got any of those?
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LOL!
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lol, was refering to your comment:
"I can understand how some with little advanced technology and/or no military capability might want to believe that."
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Originally posted by AKIron
It means how would you know what the US has up it's sleeve?
Hmm. It's common knowledge that your attempts to build a working ABM system were a total failure since 60s. Last tests showed that not much have changed.
Even if you'll succeed - the total planned number of deployed missiles is too small to protect you from an attack from China now or India in a matter of years.
More to say, this new Russian hypersonic-maneuverable warhead makes intercept impossible on current stage of technological development.
The funniest thing that his new missile was researched on American money, granted in early-90s. I have heard this scientific and experimental studies of hypersonic air-space maneuverable warhead was payed by US, and the only thing they recieved in return was the conclusion that this thing is possible and we can make it.
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If you guys think that the US doesn't spend a great deal of money and effort on completely secret military research then you really are clueless. If you think these efforts don't yield successful results then you are only fooling yourself. If it makes you feel better to believe Boroda knows all the answers then who am I to try to stop you?
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Nobody doubts that the US is spending billions on top-secret and advanced military stuff.
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Originally posted by Ripsnort
Meanwhile Ukraine can't find its *** from a hole in the ground...
Ukraine officials: Hundreds of Soviet-era antimissiles missing
Marchuk didn't specify the types of missile. Defense Ministry spokesman Kostyantyn Khivrenko told The Associated Press that he was referring to S-75 air defense missiles — also known in the West by the code-name SA-2.
S-75 "Dvina" was the first Soviet non-stationery SAM. It was obsolet 20 years ago. Calling this huge liquid-fueled radio-command homing winged monster an "antimissile" is funny.
I think I can reveal the great Ukrainian military secret: all this SAMs were stolen, scrapped and sold as recycled aluminium.
Russia now developes a target drone for SAM tests based on S-75 missile. They were produced in huge quantities, to have a stock big enough to withstand a full-scale war with NATO. S-75 is an interesting design, simple as a 5-kopeyka coin, but too old now. I doubt there are any of them still in service in ex-USSR.
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Originally posted by AKIron
If you guys think that the US doesn't spend a great deal of money and effort on completely secret military research then you really are clueless. If you think these efforts don't yield successful results then you are only fooling yourself. If it makes you feel better to believe Boroda knows all the answers then who am I to try to stop you?
I never pretend to "know all the answers", I only can't find any reasonable explaination for the American "national missile defence". If you want to make it effective - why don't order it from the people who know how to do it? And now it only looks like an attempt to feed your military-industrial complex.
Can you give me links to any reports of successfull ABM tests in last five years?
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Originally posted by Boroda
I never pretend to "know all the answers", I only can't find any reasonable explaination for the American "national missile defence". If you want to make it effective - why don't order it from the people who know how to do it? And now it only looks like an attempt to feed your military-industrial complex.
Can you give me links to any reports of successfull ABM tests in last five years?
Goes back to the old measure/counter measure thing Toad mentioned Boroda. Why would the US spend a great deal of effort developing a system and then reveal it's characteristics so that a counter measure might be developed?
Obviously, with secret things the public will never know what capabilites exist or don't exist.
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was my understanding that the missle defense was targeted at rougue states that have "limited ICBM capability", single or small numbers of missles not a massive strike like the FUSSR could mount. North Korea was mentioned as the focus with its offloading of missle technology to muslim states also mentioned as a serious concern. The FUSSR (F for Former) was not described as a concern.
I support the effort to develope a limited ICBM defense.
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With alot of things i would agree with you on that one Iron, but not in this case.
A missile shield is a deterrent, and those dont work unless the "enemy" is aware of them.
an SSBN is completly useless unless the enemy knows you have them and they work.
A functional defence against ICBM's would work in the same way so keeping a functional shield secret makes little sence. .
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Originally posted by AKIron
Goes back to the old measure/counter measure thing Toad mentioned Boroda. Why would the US spend a great deal of effort developing a system and then reveal it's characteristics so that a counter measure might be developed?
Obviously, with secret things the public will never know what capabilites exist or don't exist.
The declared goal of the NMD is to prevent a nuclear missile strike from "rogue countries". This means that they must know the capabilities of missile defence, so they'll not pe provoked to try penetrating it. With 110 deployed AMBs the only thing they will need is to deliver 55+1 warhead to be 100% sure they'll get what they want.
Another thought: 1972 AMB treaty limited ABM capabilities mostly to make both sides understand that they can't hide behind a "missile shield" and MAD was inevitable. Anyone believing that he can wage a "limited nuclear war" is extremely dangerous.
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What Yaeger said seem the more rational explanation.
The rest is an Area 51 guess.
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Originally posted by Boroda
The declared goal of the NMD is to prevent a nuclear missile strike from "rogue countries". This means that they must know the capabilities of missile defence, so they'll not pe provoked to try penetrating it. With 110 deployed AMBs the only thing they will need is to deliver 55+1 warhead to be 100% sure they'll get what they want.
Another thought: 1972 AMB treaty limited ABM capabilities mostly to make both sides understand that they can't hide behind a "missile shield" and MAD was inevitable. Anyone believing that he can wage a "limited nuclear war" is extremely dangerous.
Boroda, how many MIRV tha SS-20 had on board?
(Was the SS-20 the dangerous ICBM that was "traded" in exchange of the minutemans?).
Just checked a site for the MIRVs.
Amaizing is the MX (Lgm118A Peacekeeper).
Up to 10 x 300 KT MIRVs :eek:
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10 Naso
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Originally posted by Naso
Boroda, how many MIRV tha SS-20 had on board?
(Was the SS-20 the dangerous ICBM that was "traded" in exchange of the minutemans?).
Just checked a site for the MIRVs.
Amaizing is the MX (Lgm118A Peacekeeper).
Up to 10 x 300 KT MIRVs :eek:
SS-20 was traded for Pershing-2s in late-80s, it was a middle-range missile.
"Dangerous" ICBM with 12 MIRVs was SS-18 "Satan". At least half of it's payload was fake targets and ECM jammers.
I don't know exactly, but after American withdrawal from 1972 treaty many officials here insisted on withdrawing from the treaty prohibiting MIRVs. I don't know if they did.
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Originally posted by Naso
What Yaeger said seem the more rational explanation.
The rest is an Area 51 guess.
Dunno about the black helos but I'm just about certain there are secret research and development areas.
BTW, an ABM system's effectiveness isn't necessarily dependent upon a potential enemy's awareness. It can also be effective by doing it's job and eliminating all missiles. I prefer the latter.
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Originally posted by Boroda
Hmm. It's common knowledge that your attempts to build a working ABM system were a total failure since 60s. Last tests showed that not much have changed.
Hmmmmmmm third time I must correct you on this. A very efficient system was operational in the mid-1970's, and was cancelled only due to political and economic forces.
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Originally posted by Nilsen10
A missile shield is a deterrent, and those dont work unless the "enemy" is aware of them.
A missile shield is not a deterrent.
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Originally posted by FUNKED1
Hmmmmmmm third time I must correct you on this. A very efficient system was operational in the mid-1970's, and was cancelled only due to political and economic forces.
Mike, I enjoyed your links about Nike-Zeus and other experimental missiles, but I don't remember anything about operational (deployed) system that was supposed to cover North Dakota in 70s. AFAIK the whole 1972 treaty was suggested by Americans because they were afraid that Soviet first-generation ABM system could really protect us from massive launch. I also want to know more about that "political and economical forces".
Thank you for reminding me ;) I mentioned your information in a recent ABM discussion, but it seems to me you didn't notice that.
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I dont think our broken Patriot mish mash is to deter Russia or China but more so to deter these fledgling archaic misslle programs that in include IRAN, DPRK, Osama Etc...
Patriot is a good system against aircraft so much so that they were used against slow moving missles such as scuds.. with limited success...
But Patriot is outmatched by hyper velocity weapons... we have newer laser systems to take those out.. (THEL)
Still I wouldn't be surprised if the Russians get smart and steal stealth or develope it themselves, and start building their warheads around such technology.. Yeah well know a warhead is comming but do we have the technology to track such devices let alone lock them and destroy them with Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL)... or another weapon..
Big problem with hypervelocity is tracking it.. IMO that is the problem.. Hitting a target going that fast is not...
Old news..
DoctorYo
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Yes it is Hortlund
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The shield was never ment to work. It was just a money sink for our tax dollars. It was going to be voted down ,untill 9/11 ,and then bush snuck it through congress.
Its free money for the millitary industrial complex that ike warned us about.
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Originally posted by AKIron
BTW, an ABM system's effectiveness isn't necessarily dependent upon a potential enemy's awareness. It can also be effective by doing it's job and eliminating all missiles. I prefer the latter.
Aircraft defence works with non-disposable returnable resources (aircrafts and crews), so ambushes to eliminate enemy ACs are as effective as point-defense. ABM simply has to be point defence and letting enemy know that we are capable of shieling it's initial strike and retaliating is vital for the decision of attack.
Sorry, explaining logical constructions in English isn't my best ability :)
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Originally posted by Nilsen10
Yes it is Hortlund
You seem unable to understand the most basic concepts of modern wafare. Further discussion on the topic is useless since it would be like talking to Boroda about Katyn.
A missile shield that is designed to shoot down incoming missiles is a defensive measure. It will work the same way whether the enemy knows of its existance or not. Frankly it will probably work better if the enemy is NOT aware of its existance.
This is something you are confusing with the MAD-doctrin that prevailed in the 70s and 80s.
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Originally posted by Boroda
Aircraft defence works with non-disposable returnable resources (aircrafts and crews), so ambushes to eliminate enemy ACs are as effective as point-defense. ABM simply has to be point defence and letting enemy know that we are capable of shieling it's initial strike and retaliating is vital for the decision of attack.
Sorry, explaining logical constructions in English isn't my best ability :)
When you want to discourage your enemy from producing overwhelming numbers of ICBMs you persuade him that you won't develop an ABM shield and that there is no need for further escalation. When that enemy no longer exists you put up an ABM shield and let no one know of it's capabilities.
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Originally posted by Hortlund
You seem unable to understand the most basic concepts of modern wafare. Further discussion on the topic is useless since it would be like talking to Boroda about Katyn.
A missile shield that is designed to shoot down incoming missiles is a defensive measure. It will work the same way whether the enemy knows of its existance or not. Frankly it will probably work better if the enemy is NOT aware of its existance.
This is something you are confusing with the MAD-doctrin that prevailed in the 70s and 80s.
Funny logic.. by funny I mean ... flawed.
If you knew that every punch you threw at me would be blocked.. you would logically not throw any. Hence knowledge of the shield was as useful or more useful than the shield itself. Simple really. At least it's simple south of the Arctic Circle.
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Originally posted by Hortlund
You seem unable to understand the most basic concepts of modern wafare. Further discussion on the topic is useless since it would be like talking to Boroda about Katyn.
A missile shield that is designed to shoot down incoming missiles is a defensive measure. It will work the same way whether the enemy knows of its existance or not. Frankly it will probably work better if the enemy is NOT aware of its existance.
This is something you are confusing with the MAD-doctrin that prevailed in the 70s and 80s.
This is a kind of logics that will make a looney somewhere across the ocean start a full-scale nuclear war.
Developing a missile shield that your enemy is unaware of can have the only possible purpose: to stike first without being afraid of retalliation. A gangster buys a bullet-proof waist, that, as he believes, will protect him. Didn't you ever think why bullet-proof waist ownership is prohibited in many countries?
As for talking about Katyn' - it's useless to talk about it with you, not me.
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You are either confused or you know very little about this stuff Hortlund. I suspect it is a mix of both. :rolleyes:
Somehow i feel i need to explain it so even you can understand.
It is a deterrent because:
1) It makes your potential enemy aware that if he should fire a ballistic missile against you it will not reach its intended target and you will be able to retaliate.
2) The shield would make your enemy manufacture alot of fairly costly missiles to make sure that enough missiles gets through to get the job done. That in itself should make the enemy think twice before investing.
It is a reason for the shield to be a hot topic when it comes to nuklear arms reductions, and the reason is that...
...it is in fact a deterrent
was it simple enough for you Hort?
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I think Hortlund is just doing an "expuriment"
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Yeager is right the shield is for a rouge nation launching a couple of ICBMs
Yes they have had Succesfull tests and and more than a few failures
The ABL (airborn laser) is a great system being tested but it is for "THEATER DEFFENSE" not national IE keeping ground forces from being hit with short/medium range chemical weapons and tactical nukes.
The missle shield is NOT a patriot system it is a highly integrated network of ground air and sea launched weapons systems guided by many ground and airborn radar tracking systems.
Uhhh . . . the "shield" is already useless. Remember the tests when they couldnt hit the incoming missle unless it had a homing beacon on it?
It is just a mishmash of patriot missle type elements that were hastily deployed. Frankly I havent heard much about it since 9-11
sorry strk this just screams HATE bush ignorance.
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Originally posted by midnight Target
Funny logic.. by funny I mean ... flawed.
You are funny...by funny I mean... [fill in blank]
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A rouge nation wouldnt launch an icbm. Why would they when they can stick one in a cargo container and blow it up when it gets under the golden gate bridge, or enters new york harbor. And they would have to worry about us fireing icbms at them unless we could find proof.
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Originally posted by Nilsen10
blah blah
Originally posted by Hortlund
You seem unable to understand the most basic concepts of modern wafare. Further discussion on the topic is useless since it would be like talking to Boroda about Katyn.
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Originally posted by Frogm4n
A rouge nation wouldnt launch an icbm. Why would they when they can stick one in a cargo container and blow it up when it gets under the golden gate bridge, or enters new york harbor. And they would have to worry about us fireing icbms at them unless we could find proof.
Umm....North Korea would rather use a missle to hit the golden gate bridge. Seems kinda single minded there. KInda like this:
Sept 10th 2001
"i dont think any terrorist would hijack 4 airplanes at once and crash them into the WTC pentagon and whithouse."
Not saying you ever said that but that's the attitude i'm getting from you. Just cause its never happend doesnt mean we shouldnt prepare for it.
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With that reply I guess you have accepted that you lost this discussion Hortlund.
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Originally posted by Gunslinger
Umm....North Korea would rather use a missle to hit the golden gate bridge.
IMHO North Korea would rather use a nuke in a battlefield or against South Korean targets or US military bases.
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Originally posted by Boroda
IMHO North Korea would rather use a nuke in a battlefield or against South Korean targets or US military bases.
agreed but a country with missles isnt going to use a cargo ship
EDIT
We are also talking about long range missles too wich would probaly not be used on south korea. They have short range weapons for that
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Originally posted by Gunslinger
agreed but a country with missles isnt going to use a cargo ship
EDIT
We are also talking about long range missles too wich would probaly not be used on south korea. They have short range weapons for that
Why use a missile that would envoke retaliation when you can smuggle in an unmarked nuke.
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I would say that your suggestion Frogm4n is the most likley...or a malfunction/accidental launch. Against the latter a working shield would be great.
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Originally posted by Frogm4n
Why use a missile that would envoke retaliation when you can smuggle in an unmarked nuke.
Actually no nuke is really "unmarked" radioactive isotopes have certain characteristics from where they where mined and refined. Also on each US border their are new radiation detection equipment both static and mobile. I have pics showing two helicopters on either side of the NJ tunpike with long white antenna's underneath they where flying on a HIGH alert day I later asked a state trooper about them and he comfirmed it. I've seen other things as well and watched on the discovery channel how the "scan" incommiing cargo ships. I'm not saying its impossible just that they ARE activly searching for this type of attack. Also regarding the ABM anyone of ya here latley they have perfected the laser fo the airborn antimissle laser? I just saw a show about that on the wings channel.
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Originally posted by Boroda
Mike, I enjoyed your links about Nike-Zeus and other experimental missiles, but I don't remember anything about operational (deployed) system that was supposed to cover North Dakota in 70s. AFAIK the whole 1972 treaty was suggested by Americans because they were afraid that Soviet first-generation ABM system could really protect us from massive launch. I also want to know more about that "political and economical forces".
Thank you for reminding me ;) I mentioned your information in a recent ABM discussion, but it seems to me you didn't notice that.
Here you go: http://www.redstone.army.mil/history/vigilant/intro.html
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Originally posted by Frogm4n
And they would have to worry about us fireing icbms at them unless we could find proof.
Since when Bush needs a proof to justify a war? :D
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I did peer review for the Chair of the APS Study Fred Lamb on NMD. Its a 400 page 2 Vol read - but it can answer your questions on NMD and its feasability - or lack there of.
http://www.aps.org/public_affairs/popa/reports/nmd03.cfm
Best,
Wolf
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Originally posted by Hortlund
A missile shield is not a deterrent.
But a panty shield is:aok
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Originally posted by Nilsen10
With that reply I guess you have accepted that you lost this discussion Hortlund.
Keep repeating that to yourself and you might start believing it sooner or later...who knows (or cares)
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:rolleyes:
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Yes...when expressing yourself through the written language is too hard, one can always resort to drawing pictures...
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Hortlund
Why do you insist on undermining your own credibility with these posts?
Is it somekind of fetish?
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Heh...this is rich...mr terrorist-supporter thinks Im undermining my credibility.
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and you just did it again !!
Not gonna bother with that last one cause its not worthy of a reply.
You have disputed a fact and lost. Nobody here agrees with you on the the missile shield issue and you are now insulting your own inteligence by resorting to insults.
This gets you nowhere really fast :D
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Originally posted by Nilsen10
Not gonna bother with that last one cause its not worthy of a reply.
And this post of yours would be what exactly? If its not a reply I mean?
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I was refering to the terrorist-supporter comment that has nothing to do with anything we discuss on this thread but that should have been obvious to everyone.... Is seems tho that you need some special attention.
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Bottom line: you'll never know the anti-missile defense capability of the US until you fire a missile at us. Of course when you do, you won't have long to ponder that newly gained knowledge.
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Jeez Hortlund... The only thing your last three posts need is a good "nanner nanner" and they would have been complete.
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hehe MT, i was thinking something like that to but i didnt want him to pop his top. He is a lawyer so he may have sued me :D
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Originally posted by AKIron
Bottom line: you'll never know the anti-missile defense capability of the US until you fire a missile at us. Of course when you do, you won't have long to ponder that newly gained knowledge.
its a multi billion dollar boon doggle that is creating another arms-race.
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Originally posted by Frogm4n
its a multi billion dollar boon doggle that is creating another arms-race.
I'm glad you have so much faith in the benevolence of mankind. Misplaced I'm afraid but I think you'll eventually see that, unfortunately.
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Originally posted by AKIron
Bottom line: you'll never know the anti-missile defense capability of the US until you fire a missile at us. Of course when you do, you won't have long to ponder that newly gained knowledge.
I love this "conclusion" :) I hope no country will try to reveal this highly classified information. Please notice that it includes: "If you'll fire missiles at us you can suddenly learn that we have spent billions of dollars on useless toys that never were supposed to leave the silos". I hope noone will try to reveal this highly classified information.
"Ó íŕń ĺńňü ŇŔĘČĹ ďđčáîđű! Íî ěű âŕě î íčő íĺ đŕńńęŕćĺě!" :D
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Originally posted by Nilsen10
I see here in the paper today that the russians have just finished a new nuke missile that renderes the US missile defence shield completly useless.
ill see if i can find an english source to.
Apparently its a hypersonic missile that can maneuver between space and the atmosphere. The russians sais its ready for mass production and that its not very expencive to build. It was made to counter the expencive "sheild" and experts in the west sais that it will indeed make the shield useless when the new missile becomes operational.
YES! Propaganda straight out of the 80's!
Ve haf a missial systam that rendars yor missial shield inoperabal. Surrendur now and ve wont haf to use it.
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Originally posted by Saurdaukar
YES! Propaganda straight out of the 80's!
Ve haf a missial systam that rendars yor missial shield inoperabal. Surrendur now and ve wont haf to use it.
Well, in the 80s US didn't have any missile shield, and USSR had it's own system according to 1972 treaty - that possibly only made Moscow with it's 10 million population a not-so-good target for a nuclear attack.
With MAD doctrine in action noone had to surrender.
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Are you sure its propaganda Saurdaukar?
this was a serious question so please try to give a serious answer :)
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Originally posted by Nilsen10
this was a serious question so please try to give a serious answer :)
Man are you barking up the wrong tree. ;)
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Originally posted by Frogm4n
its a multi billion dollar boon doggle that is creating another arms-race.
how do arms race? are feet involved?
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Originally posted by Boroda
I love this "conclusion" :) I hope no country will try to reveal this highly classified information. Please notice that it includes: "If you'll fire missiles at us you can suddenly learn that we have spent billions of dollars on useless toys that never were supposed to leave the silos". I hope noone will try to reveal this highly classified information.
"Ó íŕń ĺńňü ŇŔĘČĹ ďđčáîđű! Íî ěű âŕě î íčő íĺ đŕńńęŕćĺě!" :D
News for ya Boroda, the defensive part is for us. Whether it works or not won't matter much to the ones that fire on us. Well, that may not be completely true, if our defense doesn't work they may be vaporized with a smile on their face.
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Originally posted by AKIron
News for ya Boroda, the defensive part is for us. Whether it works or not won't matter much to the ones that fire on us. Well, that may not be completely true, if our defense doesn't work they may be vaporized with a smile on their face.
Sure. The only thing that stopped you from nuking USSR was not our missile shield over Moscow, but the fact that you'll not survive longer then two hours after first massive launch.
Fear of retaliation, MAD, whatever you call it is the only protection from nuclear attack.
Anyone who believes in his "protection" from nuclear missile attack is dangerous, because he will start what he believes to be "limited nuclear war" sooner or later. Considering nuclear weapons as military but not only political factor is insane.
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Jeez, Wolf!
If you did the peer review, how about you give us the short answer without making us read 400 pages?
;)
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Originally posted by GScholz
Tactical nuclear weapons would be used in a large scale war, however taking that step (and it would almost certainly be the losing party of a conventional war) dramatically increase the risk of a fully committed nuclear war ... which is insane. However it may also lead to a cessation of hostilities as each party are not willing to commit to MAD.
Exactly. But it applies to countries with limited nuclear potential, like India or Pakistan.
OTOH - even Hitler didn't dare to use chemical or biological weapons when it was obvious that he is doomed. Maybe he thought his separate peace talks with Americans could be successfull?... He had an enormous stock of chemical weapons, most of them were "buried" in Baltic sea after the Victory.
Originally posted by GScholz
Any large scale war between nuclear powers that threaten the political and territorial existence of one or both nations WILL end with a nuclear exchange. A tactical exchange that ends the war, or a massive exchange that ends both nations and possibly the world.
Russian military doctrine of the last decade is based on a pre-emptive full-scale nuclear strike. We don't have armed forces that can withstand a big conventional war with NATO, that is still our biggest enemy. So, we declare that any attempt of an agression will be anwered with a full-scale nuclear release.
If you think I am happy about it - you are wrong :(
Another thought: if Americans will persuade everybody that they have a working ABM system - the strike will be redirected to their European allies... :( I don't mean a Russian strike, if NATO will be involved into a conflict with any country that posesses nuclear weapons - you are hostages again.
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this war business sounds awful...we better not
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If you want the answer to the BOOST PHASE BMD question - it is as follows....
Boost-phase intercept systems for defending the United States against ballistic missile attack are being actively considered as a major part of a national missile defense strategy. Spending
on such systems by the U.S. Department of Defense is growing, and there is a prospect of much larger expenditures in the future. Boost-phase intercept weapons would seek to disable attacking missiles during the first few minutes of flight, while the missiles’ boosters are still burning and before they have released nuclear, chemical, or biological munitions.
The technical aspects and feasibility of such weapons are the subject of this report. In spite of the growing interest in boost-phase intercept systems and the increasing resourcesbeing committed to developing them, little quantitative information about their technical
feasibility, required performance, and potential advantages and disadvantages is available to the public. Consequently, the American Physical Society (APS) convened a study group
of physicists and engineers, including individuals with expertise in sensors, missiles, rocket interceptors, guidance and control, high-powered lasers, and missile-defense-related systems,
to assess the technical feasibility of boost-phase intercept systems. The Study Group has based its assessments solely on information found in the open literature about ballistic missiles and missile defense. We have supplemented this information
by our expertise in science and engineering and have confined the assessments reported here to those that can be made with confidence by applying the fundamental principles of rocket propulsion, signal detection and processing, guidance and control, and laser beam propagation. In many instances, as documented throughout this report, we have performed our own analyses to address important issues and to assure ourselves of the validity of our conclusions.
Our main conclusions are the following:
1. Boost-phase defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) hinges on the burn time of the attacking missile and the speed of the defending interceptor rocket. Defense of the entire United States against liquid-propellant ICBMs, such as
those deployed early by the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (China), launched from countries such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and Iran, may be technically feasible using terrestrial (land-, sea-, or air-
based) interceptors. However, the interceptor rockets would have to be substantially faster (and therefore necessarily larger) than those usually proposed in order to reach the ICBMs in time from international waters or neighboring countries willing to host
the interceptors. The system would also require the capability to cope with at least the simplest of countermeasures.
2. Boost-phase defense of the entire United States against solid-propellant ICBMs, which have shorter burn times than liquid-propellant ICBMs, is unlikely to be practical when all factors are considered, no matter where or how interceptors are based.
Even with optimistic assumptions, a terrestrial-based system would require very large interceptors with extremely high speeds and accelerations to defeat a solid-propellant ICBM launched from even a small country such as North Korea. Even such high-
performance interceptors could not defend against solid propellant ICBMs launched from Iran, because they could not be based close enough to disable the missiles before they deployed their munitions.
3. If interceptor rockets were based in space, their coverage would not be constrained by geography, but they would confront the same time constraints and engagement uncertainties as terrestrial-based interceptors. Consequently, their kill vehicles (the final homing stage of the interceptors) would have to be similar in size to those of terrestrial-based interceptors. With the technology we judge could become available within the next 15 years, defending against a single ICBM would require a thousand
or more interceptors for a system having the lowest possible mass and providing realistic decision time. Deploying such a system would require at least a five- to tenfold increase over current U.S. space-launch rates.
4. The Airborne Laser now under development could have some capability against liquid- propellant missiles, but it would be ineffective against solid-propellant ICBMs, which are more heat-resistant.
5. The existing U.S. Navy Aegis system, using an interceptor rocket similar to the Standard Missile 2, should be capable of defending against short- or medium-range missiles launched from ships, barges, or other platforms o U.S. coasts. However,
interceptor rockets would have to be positioned within a few tens of kilometers of the launch location of the attacking missile.
6. A key problem inherent in boost-phase defense is munitions shortfall: although a successful intercept would prevent munitions from reaching their target, it could cause live nuclear, chemical, or biological munitions to fall on populated areas short of the target, in the United States or other countries. Timing intercepts accurately enough to avoid this problem would be dicult.
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Boost-phase missile defense systems would disable attacking missiles while their rocket motors are burning by hitting them with an interceptor rocket or a laser beam. For ICBMs, this phase of flight typically lasts 3 or 4 minutes. Boost-phase defense has been proposed as a way to avoid the problems faced by midcourse defense systems, which are intended to disable the attacking missile’s warheads after they have been deployed. The midcourse approach is complicated by the need to counter multiple warheads, submunitions (“bomblets”), lightweight decoys, and other countermeasures. The Study Group was asked to evaluate boost-phase intercept systems that would defend
the United States using land-, sea-, air-, or space-based interceptor rockets or an airborne laser now being developed. Space-based laser systems were not included because
the technology needed for such systems would not be ready within the 10- to 15-year period considered. The Study did not consider the feasibility of the communications, command, control, and battle management that would be required. Nor did it consider policy issues, such as the arms control, strategic stability, or foreign policy implications of testing or deploying a boost-phase defense.
Developing and deploying a reliable boost-phase missile defense would be a major undertaking likely to require a decade or more to complete. We therefore considered missiles that might be developed or acquired by North Korea and Iran during the next 10 to 15 years. These countries were the focus of the Study because the U.S. government has expressed concern specifically about them. According to U.S. intelligence estimates, neither of
them currently has a credible ICBM capability but they are projected to develop or acquire ICBMs within the next 10 to 15 years. The Study Group also considered defense against
ICBMs launched from Iraq. With the changed political situation arising from the events of the Spring of 2003, an ICBM threat from Iraq appears unlikely for the foreseeable future.
We have nevertheless retained the analysis of the Iraq threat in the body of our report, to illustrate the requirements for defending against ICBMs from a country that is intermediate
in size between North Korea and Iran. We began by identifying boost-phase intercept systems that could work in principle and
then determined the system performance that would be required to defend the entire United States, the contiguous 48 states, or only the largest U.S. cities. The attacking missiles were assumed to be similar to the first ICBMs developed 30 to 40 years ago by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Both liquid- and solid-propellant missiles were considered, because either type could be developed or acquired within 10 to 15 years.
Key Issues
Hitting the Missile. An important question in boost-phase defense is whether the kill vehicle carried by the interceptor could actually hit a long-range missile, given the inherently unpredictable acceleration that is normal for an ICBM in powered flight and the possibility of programmed trajectory-shaping or evasive maneuvers. Assuming interceptors can reach the missile during its boost phase, we find no fundamental obstacle to homing on the missile accurately enough to hit it. To do so, however, the kill vehicle would have to be very agile and would need to carry enough fuel to continue adjusting to the missile’s acceleration
until the moment of impact. We determined that kill vehicles capable of meeting these requirements would be substantially heavier than those that some have suggested for boostphase
intercept. Our analysis of this agility requirement and its implications for the weight of the interceptor are key new aspects of this study. Time. Time is short for boost-phase defense because ICBMs burn out quickly: in roughly 3 minutes for solid-propellant missiles and 4 minutes for liquid-propellant missiles.
But the time actually available is substantially shorter than the duration of the burn. Even systems with state-of-the-art tracking sensors would require 45 to 65 seconds or longer to
detect the launch of a potentially threatening rocket and determine its direction of flight well enough to fire an interceptor (that is, obtain a firing solution).
Additional time must also be allowed for the decision to fire. We have analyzed the decision times that would be provided by various boost-phase defenses. “Decision time” as used here also includes any additional time required for communication between system elements, estimating the performance characteristics of the attacking missile and its trajectory, resolving uncertainties in the performance of the defense system, and other operational factors.To be successful, the intercept would have to occur before the missile gives its munitions the velocity needed to reach the United States. This velocity could be attained as early as
40 seconds before the missile would normally burn out.
Due to the potentially similar flight profiles of ICBMs and space launchers, in many cases the defense system would not be able to distinguish a peaceful space launch from an
ICBM attack. In these cases, the defense would have to shoot at every rocket, unless it had been established as nonthreatening before it was launched.
Extending the time for intercept beyond the boost phase into the ascent phase (defined here as the period after the missile’s final stage has burned out or its thrust has been terminated but before it has deployed all its munitions and decoys) would not increase the available time significantly. The reason is that once the missile’s thrust has been terminated, it could deploy its munitions and any decoys or countermeasures quickly, possibly in less than a second. With so little time available, interceptors would need to reach high speeds very quickly. Taken together, the short time available for intercept and the size of the kill vehicle needed to hit an unpredictably accelerating ICBM would require large interceptors. In some cases, they would have to be larger and faster than the ICBMs themselves and would have to
accelerate four times more quickly. Such interceptors have never been built and would push the state of the art. Range. The useful range of interceptor rockets is restricted by practical limits on rocket speeds and by the short time available for intercepting the attacking missile. The range of he Airborne Laser is also limited, both by constraints on its power and by the distance ts beam can propagate through the atmosphere and remain focused. Consequently, boostphase defense would be possible using interceptor rockets only if they could be positioned close enough to the required intercept locations, generally within 400 to 1000 kilometers. Defense would be possible using the Airborne Laser only if it could be stationed within 300 to 600 kilometers of the intercept points. The required intercept locations are typically
hundreds of kilometers downrange from the missile launch site, which would further restrict nterceptor basing options.
In general, boost-phase defense using terrestrial (land-, sea-, or air-based) rocket interceptors or the Airborne Laser requires that the missile’s flight path during its boost phase be accessible from international waters or from neighboring countries willing to host U.S. interceptors. The feasibility of boost-phase defense therefore depends not only on the performance of the attacking missile and the speed of the interceptor, but also on the size
of the country that launches the missile, the direction of the missile’s flight, and the local physical and political geography.
Shortfall.
If a missile were hit during its boost phase by an interceptor, it wouldprobably lose thrust quickly, but the missile (perhaps in fragments) and its munitions would not fall straight down. Instead they would continue on ballistic trajectories, falling to Earth short of their target but possibly on populated areas. Thus, unless the missile’s munitions were disabled by the collision—which cannot be assumed because they are loosely coupled to
the missile and hardened to withstand re-entry at hypersonic speeds—a successful intercept could cause live munitions to fall on populated areas. These areas would not be in the
attacking country but might well be in countries friendly to the United States or in the United States itself.
This problem is inherent in boost-phase intercept. Our analysis indicates that it would be extremely dicult to time intercepts to avoid causing live munitions or debris to hit populated areas. This problem would be eliminated if the interceptor could reliably destroy the missile’s munitions, but doing so would be much more dicult than simply disabling the missile’s booster rocket.
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Space-Based Interceptor Requirements.
Boost-phase interceptors fired from orbiting
satellites could in principle defend the United States against ICBMs launched from anywhere on Earth. While their coverage would not be constrained by geography, spacebased interceptors would have the same time constraints and engagement uncertainties as terrestrial-based interceptors. As a result, their kill vehicles would have to be at least as massive as the kill vehicles of terrestrial-based interceptors. Because a satellite orbiting at ow altitude spends so little time over a single spot on Earth, many interceptor-carrying satellites would be needed to defend against even a single missile. The precise number of
satellites and the total mass that would have to be placed into orbit would depend on the type of ICBM as well as the speeds, accelerations, and masses of the interceptors and their
kill vehicles, which would in turn depend on the technology available. Based on the technology that could, in our judgment, be developed within the next 10 to 15 years, we find that a thousand or more interceptors would be needed for a system having the lowest possible mass and providing a realistic decision time. Even so, the total mass that would have to be orbited would require at least a five- to tenfold increase over current U.S. space-launch rates, making such a system impractical
The Airborne Laser’s Performance.
A laser weapon now in development has also
been proposed for boost-phase defense. The Airborne Laser is being developed to disable short- or medium-range ballistic missiles by illuminating them with a powerful laser beam from distances of several hundred kilometers, heating them suciently to cause the structure of the missiles to fail. In principle, this weapon could also disable long-range missiles during their boost phase. Because the laser beam could reach an ICBM within a fraction of a second, its speed is not an issue. However, the range of the Airborne Laser is limited by the distance its beam can propagate through the atmosphere and remain focused. Assuming that it works as planned, its useful range would be about 600 kilometers against a typical liquid-propellant ICBM. This range would be sucient to defend the United States against such ICBMs launched from North Korea but insucient to defend against such missiles launched from Iran, unless the laser could be stationed over the Caspian Sea or Turkmenistan. Because solid-propellant ICBMs are more heat-resistant, the Airborne
Laser’s ground range against them would be only about 300 kilometers, too short to defend against solid-propellant ICBMs from either Iran or North Korea.
Countermeasures.
While boost-phase intercept would not be susceptible to some of the countermeasures to midcourse intercept that have been proposed, there is no reason to think it would not face any countermeasures. E ective countermeasures to boost-phase
intercept by interceptor rockets could include launching several ICBMs at nearly the same time or deploying rocket-propelled decoys and jammers. Furthermore, ICBMs could be programmed to fly evasive maneuvers that might overwhelm the agility and guidance and control capabilities of the interceptor or exhaust its propellant. Shortening the boost phase would also be an e ective countermeasure: it would be practically impossible for any interceptor rocket to reach an ICBM with a boost phase of 2 minutes or less, even if it were launched from a very small country. Countermeasures against the Airborne Laser could
include applying ablative coatings or rotating the ICBM to reduce the amount of heat the missile absorbs, launching multiple missiles to overwhelm the Airborne Laser’s capabilities, or attacking the aircraft carrying the laser.
Defending the United States
We considered the e ectiveness of boost-phase intercept for defending the United States against ICBMs from the two specific countries of concern, North Korea and Iran. The results summarized here for these countries are based on a series of optimistic assumptions. In particular, we have made optimistic assumptions about the missile detection and tracking
capabilities available to the defense. Also, we have not fully taken into account the many uncertainties likely to be present in any real engagement, such as uncertainties about the performance of the attacking missile and its trajectory, ignorance of the missile’s target, and the unpredictable natural variations in any missile’s flight. Nor have we accounted for possible operational delays in processing and transmitting information. All of these factors would make boost-phase intercept more dicult.
We found that terrestrial-based interceptors that burn out in 40 to 50 seconds and reach speeds of at least 6.5 to 10 km/s would generally be required to defend against ICBMs launched from North Korea or Iran. As noted above, such interceptors would have to be substantially larger and capable of higher performance than any that have yet been built or deployed. In a few situations, a 5-km/s interceptor would work against slow-burning liquid-propellant ICBMs. The time available would be significantly greater for very slowly burning liquid-propellant ICBMs having burn times of 5 minutes or longer, but a defense
that would work only against missiles as slow as the slowest-burning missiles ever built would risk being ine ective. North Korea. Defense of all 50 states against typical liquid-propellant ICBMs launched from North Korea would require interceptors with speeds of 6.5 km/s (almost as fast as ICBMs) based in Russia or the Sea of Japan and fired within about 40 seconds of obtaining
a firing solution. The intercept locations for most ICBM trajectories from North Korea would be over China, hundreds of kilometers inside its border. Such interceptors would have ranges as long as ICBMs. Consequently, firing them toward China to intercept a
North Korean missile could be mistaken for an attack on China, Russia, or other countries.
The Airborne Laser might provide an alternative defense against liquid-propellant ICBMs. To defend against typical solid-propellant ICBMs and provide more than a few seconds of decision time would require interceptors that could reach speeds of about 10 km/s, 50 percent faster than a typical ICBM, in one-quarter of the time it would take an ICBM to reach its maximum speed. The interceptors would have to be based in Russia or the Sea of Japan and fired within 30 to 40 seconds after a firing solution was obtained. Such interceptors could be mistaken for o ensive weapons. Iran. To defend the entire United States against liquid-propellant ICBMs launched
from Iran using interceptors based in conventional locations would require basing 10-km/s interceptors in the Persian Gulf, and even this deployment would provide only about 15 seconds
of decision time. More decision time would be possible only if interceptors could be based in unconventional locations, such as Turkmenistan or the land-locked Caspian Sea. A system with 6.5-km/s interceptors based in either of these locations could provide a decision time of about 30 seconds.
Defense of the entire United States against solid-propellant ICBMs launched from Iran appears impractical; even a system with 10-km/s interceptors based both in the Caspian
Sea and in Turkmenistan or Afghanistan would provide less than 10 seconds of decision time, which is unlikely to be adequate for an operational system.
Defending Only a Portion of the United States.
We also considered the feasibility of defending only the contiguous 48 states or only the largest U.S. cities against ICBMs
launched from North Korea or Iran. In most cases, this would be no easier than defending all 50 states. If, however, a boost-phase defense were not solely responsible for intercepting
all missiles from these countries, the required system performance would be less demanding. Interceptors could hit liquid- or solid-propellant missiles launched from these countries
toward some U.S. targets. Such a system could provide a partial defense; for instance, for one U.S. coast but not the other. Coupled with an e ective midcourse system, a partially
e ective boost-phase defense could improve protection of some targets by hitting missiles before they deploy decoys that could overwhelm the midcourse layer. This possibility, however, depends on the midcourse system’s being able to handle the unpredictable debris generated by a boost-phase intercept while engaging the warheads, which most likely would
survive the intercept. Such a capability would be dicult to achieve.
Defending Against Short- or Medium-Range Missiles Launched from O shore.
Missiles that could be used for a sea-based attack probably are already available to nations of
concern to the United States. The Aegis radar system is adequate for tracking such missiles provided it is within a few tens of kilometers of the missile launch location, and a missile similar to the Navy’s Standard Missile 2 is adequate for such an engagement withoutsignificant modification.
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NOW FOR THE FINDINGS.....
The Study Group analyzed boost-phase defense against liquid-propellant ICBMs, which the United States may face initially, and against solid-propellant ICBMs, which the nation
may face later. The basic parameters of systems that could counter these threats in a variety of geographical situations were identified. In the course of analyzing these systems,
the Study Group identified many significant limitations to boost-phase intercept, especially when confronting solid-propellant ICBMs. However, it made no judgment as to whether any or all of these limitations would rule out deployment of such systems on operational, political, or economic grounds. The analysis in the main body of this report supports the following findings. A number (or letter) in parentheses indicates the relevant chapter (or appendix), section, or subsection of the supporting material.
1. Intercepting missiles during their boost phase presents major challenges not faced
by midcourse-intercept systems.
• Midcourse systems have 20 to 25 minutes to observe and intercept threatening
warheads (A.2); boost-phase intercept systems could have 4 minutes or less to
detect, track, and intercept potentially threatening missiles (4.4, 5.4–5.6, 10.4, 15).
• In midcourse flight, the trajectory of a warhead is ballistic and highly predictable
(B); in powered flight, the trajectory of a missile is inherently unpredictable. This
unpredictability results from uncertainty about the intended target, the e ects of the
missile’s maneuvers to manage its energy, shape its trajectory, or evade intercept,
and its unpredictable thrust variations (4, 12.4, 15.2).
2. The e ective ranges of boost-phase hit-to-kill interceptors, whether land-, sea-, air-, or space-based, are limited by the short duration of ICBM boost phases and practical limits on interceptor fly-out velocities. The range of the Airborne Laser is limited
primarily by the distance its beam can propagate through the atmosphere while remaining focused, and to a lesser extent on its power. These limitations have the following consequences:
• In a hit-to-kill boost-phase defense, the time remaining after an interceptor is fired is so short—less than 170 seconds for a liquid-propellant threat missile and less than 120 seconds for a solid-propellant threat missile—that the defense could fire only once, either a single interceptor or a salvo of interceptors fired virtually simultaneously. There would be no opportunity to recover from a misfire or failure of an
intercept attempt (5.4–5.6).
• Boost-phase defense with interceptor rockets would be possible only if the rockets could be positioned close to the intended intercept point. The intercept point is
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xxxiv Findings typically 400 to 500 kilometers from the missile launch point. The interceptors typically must travel at least 500 kilometers from the interceptor base to reach the intercept point (5.4–5.6).
• Terrestrial-based boost-phase defense—both by interceptors and airborne lasers— also depends on the size of the country that launches the missile, the direction of the missile’s flight, and access to areas adjacent to that country, determined by local
physical and political geography (5).
• Boost-phase defense using terrestrial-based interceptors could not defend the United
States against accidental or unauthorized launches of ICBMs from the interiors of
large countries such as Russia or China (5).
3. The large and unpredictable variations of ICBM boost-phase trajectories and the short time available for engaging them drive the requirements for any boost-phase kinetic kill interceptor.
Factors contributing to uncertainties in the intercept point include:
• Random and systematic errors in the defense detection and tracking system’s measurement
of position and velocity and estimate of acceleration of the attacking
missile (10.1.4, 12.3.1).
• Lack of knowledge of the missile’s target (15.2).
• Normal or induced thrust-time variations of the threat booster (15.2).
• Intentional trajectory shaping, including lofting or depressing the trajectory and
maneuvering to manage energy (15.2).
• Intentional evasive maneuvers, such as dog-legs or other maneuvers (12.4).
• Lack of knowledge of the potential type or characteristics of the threat (3.3).
• Uncertainties in the method and times at which the missiles’ warheads or submunitions
would be deployed (15.2, A.2.2).
These uncertainties reduce the time available for the engagement and require kill-vehicle maneuver velocity and acceleration substantially greater than is generally recognized. These e ects are discussed in Chapters 5 and 12.
4. The only way a boost-phase defense can assure that lethal warheads will not strike a defended area is to disable the attacking missile before the earliest time it can
achieve the velocity needed to carry its munitions to that area, because the defense does not know the particular target. This time is uncertain because the missile may fly various trajectories and execute a variety of maneuvers to manage its energy or
evade the defense (4.1, 5.1.3, 5.2.1, A.2).
5. A robust boost-phase defense against ICBMs would require modern space-basedsensors to detect launches and provide initial tracking information needed to launch
interceptors. Even so, it would take at least 45 to 65 seconds to detect the launch of an ICBM and establish a track of its trajectory accurate enough to launch an inter-ceptor. Such sensors would also be needed to provide continually updated tracking information to the interceptors as they fly to the target. A system such as the high-altitude Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS-High) now under development
Findings xxxv could perform these functions if the boost-phase defense requirement is included in
its design (10.4).
• While radars with sucient sensitivity exist, geographic constraints and horizon limitations would require a modern space-based missile warning and tracking system, such as the planned SBIRS-High system, for the earliest detection and initial
tracking (10.4). The existing Defense Support Program (DSP) system could provide aunch detection and initial tracking, but it would take 30 seconds longer to obtain a firing solution than a system such as SBIRS-High (10.4). Consequently DSP would be useful only against slow missiles, and only if the fastest interceptors were used (5.9.2).
• Additional time margin would be required to allow for the decision to fire and any other intentional or system delays. We use the term “decision time” to encompass any time required beyond the zero decision time case (5.1.3).
6. While boost-phase defense against slow-burning liquid-propellant ICBMs not em-ploying countermeasures appears technically feasible for some geographic scenarios,
the much shorter burn times typical of solid-propellant ICBMs using even 40-year-old technology call into question the fundamental feasibility of any boost-phase inter-
cept of such threats at useful ranges—no matter where or how the interceptors are based—even with the most optimistic assumptions about detection and track times
(5.3, 6.11, 8.6).
• While liquid-propellant ICBMs typically have powered flight times of 4 minutes or more, solid-propellant missiles typically have three boost stages that burn a total
of 3 minutes or less (3.4). This di erence is crucial.
• No matter where or how they are based, interceptors would typically have to travel
500 kilometers or more, requiring prohibitively high flyout velocities (in excess of orbital velocity) and very high accelerations to reach solid-propellant missiles before they have achieved the velocity required to deliver their payloads to the United States (5.3–5.6).
• By comparison, against liquid-propellant ICBMs, small two-stage terrestrial-based interceptors having modest burnout velocities of only about 5 km/s, such as the largest-sized interceptor that could meet the constraints of the Aegis cruiser vertical
launchers or deployment by bombers, could marginally engage threats at about 500 kilometers (5.3). Interceptors having velocities similar to those of ICBMs would provide greater decision time and range for this case but still could not engage
solid-propellant ICBMs.
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7. According to U.S. intelligence estimates, North Korea and Iran could develop or acquire solid-propellant ICBMs within the next 10 to 15 years (3.3). Boost-phase defenses not able to defend against solid-propellant ICBMs risk being obsolete when
deployed.
8. The time constraints imposed on any boost-phase defense system by the short du- ration of ICBM boost phases would pose significant real-time decision issues.
• In most situations, interceptors would have to be fired within a few seconds after confirmation of the launch of a large rocket to intercept it in time to defend the
xxxvi Findings United States (5.3). The decision to fire interceptors would have to be almost automatic (5.3–5.6).
• Because of the potentially similar flight profiles of ICBMs and space launchers, in many cases the defense system would have diculty distinguishing a space launch from an ICBM attack. In these cases, the defense would have to shoot at every
rocket, unless it had been identified as non-threatening before it was launched (10.4).
9. Despite the variations and uncertainties inherent in the boost-phase trajectories of ICBMs, our analysis indicates that a kill vehicle incorporating current sensor and
guidance technology could home on ICBMs in powered flight with a precision com-patible with direct hit-to-kill requirements, assuming the kill vehicle’s booster could place it on a trajectory that would take it within homing range of the ICBM. The
kill vehicle would also have to meet certain critical performance requirements. Critical kill-vehicle performance requirements include:
• Capacity to shift from guiding on the rocket’s exhaust plume to guiding on the rocket body. The Study Group believes this requirement in particular requires
more investigation (10.4).
• Ability to acquire and track the rocket body within the plume at ranges of at least 200 kilometers and with sucient precision, using sensors on board the kill vehicle
(12.3).
• Sucient kill-vehicle acceleration (7–8 g initially and 15 g in the end game), velocity for maneuvering (2 km/s for terrestrial-based and 2.5 km/s for space-based kill vehicles), and guidance system response (0.1 second or less) (12.5).
These requirements would result in kill vehicles with masses substantially greater than is generally appreciated. In our judgment, kill vehicles using technology that would
be available in the next few years would have masses on the order of 90 kilograms to 140 kilograms: 90 kilograms for the total divert velocities of 2 km/s that would be required for most ground- and air-based interceptors and roughly 140 kilograms for 2.5-
km/s divert velocities that would be appropriate for space-based interceptors and the fastest ground-based interceptors (14.4).
10. Although a successful intercept would prevent munitions from reaching their target, live nuclear, chemical, or biological munitions could fall on populated areas short of the target, in the United States or other countries. This problem of shortfall is
inherent in boost-phase missile defense.
• Warheads and submunitions are loosely coupled to the final stage of the ICBM and cannot be assumed to be destroyed by an intercept that destroys or disables the ICBM booster, as borne out by numerous destruct events during flight tests (13.1).
• After an intercept, the munitions and debris will continue on a ballistic trajectory,
albeit one that is shorter than intended by the attacker (5.8).
• The warheads or munitions and debris of an intercepted missile will not fall on the country that launched it (5.8).
• Preventing warheads or submunitions and debris of intercepted missiles from hitting the territory of U.S. friends and allies would sometimes require the defense to intercept
missiles within a time window as small as 5 to 10 seconds, greatly complicating
the already daunting intercept management problem (5.8.1).
• Given the unpredictable variations in trajectories and thrust that characterize ICBMs in powered flight, it is not clear that the intercept can be timed to occur
within the narrow window required (5.8.2). The problem of controlling shortfall could be avoided if the boost-phase defense system could destroy the missile’s warheads or submunitions during boost, rather than simply disabling the booster. This is a much more dicult task, and it has not been established
that it can be accomplished (13).
11. Airborne interceptors o er some unique advantages for boost-phase defense, but they also have significant limitations in defending against ICBMs. They could be de-
ployed more quickly than land- or sea-based interceptors in response to new threats, but several backup aircraft equipped with interceptors, as well as refueling aircraft and defensive air cover, would be required for every airborne-interceptor aircraft on
station (16.5.3).
• An interceptor of any given size has a slightly greater range if launched from a highaltitude platform, because it uses less energy to overcome gravity and aerodynamic drag as it flies out toward its target. However, the constraints on the size and weight of missiles that an aircraft can carry limit the flyout velocity of high-acceleration airborne interceptors to about 5 km/s (16.5.3).
• Because of their limited flyout velocity, airborne interceptors could engage ICBMs only in situations comparable to the situations in which a 5 km/s surface-based interceptor could engage them. Consequently, using airborne interceptors to defend the United States against long-burning liquid-propellant ICBMs would be possible only if the required intercept locations are within about 500 kilometers of the nterceptor-carrying aircraft (5.3.2, 5.5.1).
Concluding remarks
In assessing the feasibility of boost-phase missile defense using hit-to-kill interceptors or the ABL, we attempted to make optimistic assumptions to bound the performance of such
systems. In some cases we made assumptions that appear technically possible but may not be realistic on other grounds. An important example is the assumption in some of our analyses that interceptors could be fired as soon as a target track has been constructed, without allowing additional time for decision or assessment. In other cases we simply examined the performance that would be required to make the system workable, without
making any judgment about whether such components could realistically be deployed. An example of this kind is our consideration of an interceptor having a flyout velocity 40 percent
higher than an ICBM’s velocity. We emphasize that the choices made in this study were used to obtain upper bounds on performance; their use does not imply that the Study Group endorses these choices as realistic in all cases. Given the results that follow from our assumptions, we conclude that while the boost phase technologies we studied are potentially capable of defending the United States against iquid-propellant ICBMs at certain ranges of interest, at least in the absence of countermeasures, when all factors are considered none of the boost-phase defense concepts studied would be viable for the foreseeable future to defend the nation against even first-generation solid-propellant ICBMs (5, 6.11, 8.6).
FOR THE FULL REPORT GOTO
http://www.aps.org/public_affairs/popa/reports/nmd03.cfm
Boost Phase Defense Timeline - PROBLEMS with it.
http://www.aps.org/media/pressreleases/nmdfig2-2.pdf
Potential Impact Sites
http://www.aps.org/media/pressreleases/nmdfig5-3.pdf
Interceptor Basing areas:
http://www.aps.org/media/pressreleases/nmdfig5-10.pdf
Hypothetical Interceptor Models - LOOK AT IT
http://www.aps.org/media/pressreleases/nmdfig16-9.pdf
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I think they had the right answer 25 years ago. ;)
(http://www.inettek.com/stuff/missile.bmp)
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Boost-phase intercept system!?
Is it a science fiction or what?... :rolleyes: I never thought anyone could spend money on researching such things.
Are they serious about deploying boost-phase intercept missiles in the Caspian sea? Who will let them do it?
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Originally posted by Boroda
Well, in the 80s US didn't have any missile shield, and USSR had it's own system according to 1972 treaty - that possibly only made Moscow with it's 10 million population a not-so-good target for a nuclear attack.
With MAD doctrine in action noone had to surrender.
Boroda, first you state "Dangerous" ICBM with 12 MIRVs was SS-18 "Satan". At least half of it's payload was fake targets and ECM jammers" about 3 pages back. Now you state the US had no missile shield in the 80, why would you waste lifting power to send fake warheads and ECM jammers if we had no CM's to warrent the expense????
One other question Did the USSR not keep secret the MANY failures of the Soviet space program so the missile failures would not reveal the country’s limitations????
Perhaps we are releasing failures to allow you and others not to worry about our SDI program, no that can't be it as then you would never be developing a counter to our program and it would be such a waste, being as it won't work and all.
Sheese guys if the US SDI was such a joke and had no hope of working WHY would they be building a counter?
The proof that it will work (when completed,.. remember aviation had a LOT of crashes in its early days) is the energy being used to defeat it.
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"Boost-phase intercept system!?
Is it a science fiction or what?... I never thought anyone could spend money on researching such things.
Are they serious about deploying boost-phase intercept missiles in the Caspian sea? Who will let them do it?"
Look at these figures before you make a stupid comment.
FOR THE FULL REPORT GOTO
http://www.aps.org/public_affairs/popa/reports/nmdfull-report.pdf
http://www.aps.org/public_affairs/p...ports/nmd03.cfm
Boost Phase Defense Timeline - PROBLEMS with it.
http://www.aps.org/media/pressreleases/nmdfig2-2.pdf
Potential Impact Sites
http://www.aps.org/media/pressreleases/nmdfig5-3.pdf
Interceptor Basing areas:
http://www.aps.org/media/pressreleases/nmdfig5-10.pdf
Hypothetical Interceptor Models - LOOK AT IT - ESP considering the largest inteceptor is more the double the mass of the LGM-30 or SS-18 just to achieve intercept.
http://www.aps.org/media/pressreleases/nmdfig16-9.pdf
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LOL Iron :D
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In any case it is always easier to develop or modify a weapon to defeat a defence system, and a lot cheaper. This ABM shield of yours will be expensive, inflexible, easily circumvented and ultimately useless. It will be your Maginot line.
Yes, and if you read the concluding remarks, it says PRECISELY that.
"In assessing the feasibility of boost-phase missile defense using hit-to-kill interceptors or the ABL, we attempted to make optimistic assumptions to bound the performance of such
systems. In some cases we made assumptions that appear technically possible but may not be realistic on other grounds. An important example is the assumption in some of our analyses that interceptors could be fired as soon as a target track has been constructed, without allowing additional time for decision or assessment. In other cases we simply examined the performance that would be required to make the system workable, ."without making any judgment about whether such components could realistically be deployed. An example of this kind is our consideration of an interceptor having a flyout velocity 40 percent
higher than an ICBM’s velocity. We emphasize that the choices made in this study were used to obtain upper bounds on performance; their use does not imply that the Study Group endorses these choices as realistic in all cases. Given the results that follow from our assumptions, we conclude that while the boost phase technologies we studied are potentially capable of defending the United States against iquid-propellant ICBMs at certain ranges of interest, at least in the absence of countermeasures, when all factors are considered none of the boost-phase defense concepts studied would be viable for the foreseeable future to defend the nation against even first-generation solid-propellant ICBMs
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AkIrons example was right on the mark. How many times you've actually finished Missile Command as the winner?
The game only ends when all the cities are destroyed by the overwhelming attack.
It's quite funny to see all the ranting about the technical superiority weeks after Apaches role had to be changed because their high-tech was useless against guerilla tactics and $50 rpgs.
Sure, you beat Iraqi army in the direct conflict.
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Did you win?
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Did anyone win?
I predicted all this before the war even escalated. Most of you laughed.. Supposedly there were WMD's 100% sure in Iraq. Just as sure as the people would welcome the troops and throw sweets and flowers at your face. Just as sure as the conflict would quickly and cleanly be won with smart bombs.. And sure enough, the phrase 'make no mistake' that was repeated all the time in the media now has a totally new meaning.
The joy of the people was apparent in the news footage from the naded vehicle and the charred bodies. The care the natives took in nursing the bodies was heart warmingly generous. Don't you agree?
Too much hollywood.
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A swing and a miss by Siaf_csf.
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Originally posted by Siaf__csf
AkIrons example was right on the mark. How many times you've actually finished Missile Command as the winner?
Of course if the real deal ever happens we only hafta stop one "wave". I'm not suggesting there will be any winners, We'll most likely all lose in a nuclear war.
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Originally posted by Boroda
Well, in the 80s US didn't have any missile shield, and USSR had it's own system according to 1972 treaty - that possibly only made Moscow with it's 10 million population a not-so-good target for a nuclear attack.
With MAD doctrine in action noone had to surrender.
Wonder if it worked as well as the air defenses? They seemed
to have a bit of trouble stopping the West German Cessna 172
"stealth bomber" from landing in Red Square.
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We'll most likely all lose in a nuclear war. [/B]
Very true I hope all sides never forget that to.
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If the US launched all their nukes against russia we would all die...even if the russians didn't shoot back. Same goes for the oposite of course so we are ****ed anyway.
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Originally posted by AKIron
Very true, but Russia no longer has a spy network capable of learning what must be countered. An anti-missile system won't likely be revealed until it is needed.
LOL who told you that russian spy network is uncapable ... lol
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Originally posted by Nilsen10
If the US launched all their nukes against russia we would all die...even if the russians didn't shoot back. Same goes for the oposite of course so we are ****ed anyway.
Most nukes are free fall bombs for B-52's, so it's very unlikely that the whole arsenal would be used at once, and why would they if no one is shooting back. I doubt that no more than 10% of the whole arsenal of both coutries would be used in any case. Anyway those alone would make the lives of the survivors very miserable.
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Originally posted by maslo
LOL who told you that russian spy network is uncapable ... lol
Boroda did when he said their new weapon has rendered our shield useless. Of course I realize that Boroda probably doesn't have a clue regarding his nation's secrets. Russia no doubt has a spy network but I'm confident it isn't half as effective as when at the height of the USSR.
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Originally posted by Scootter
Boroda, first you state "Dangerous" ICBM with 12 MIRVs was SS-18 "Satan". At least half of it's payload was fake targets and ECM jammers" about 3 pages back. Now you state the US had no missile shield in the 80, why would you waste lifting power to send fake warheads and ECM jammers if we had no CM's to warrent the expense????
You know, god helps those who help themselves. Just listen to what AKIron says: someone over the ocean could follow his strange logics and keep ABM systems classified. And now - our missile systems developed in 70s and still on combat duty until maybe 2020 are already prepared for your countermeasures.
Originally posted by Scootter
One other question Did the USSR not keep secret the MANY failures of the Soviet space program so the missile failures would not reveal the country’s limitations????
Hm. The only secret I know was a Lunar program, but - you could find information about N-1 launcher.
Originally posted by Scootter
Perhaps we are releasing failures to allow you and others not to worry about our SDI program, no that can't be it as then you would never be developing a counter to our program and it would be such a waste, being as it won't work and all.
Sheese guys if the US SDI was such a joke and had no hope of working WHY would they be building a counter?
Trying to keep up with the US SDI programm in the 80s was one of the "straws" that have broken the spine of the USSR. We tried to keep up with your R&D, while you just declared that you develop it but never tried :)
Originally posted by Scootter
The proof that it will work (when completed,.. remember aviation had a LOT of crashes in its early days) is the energy being used to defeat it.
I only can say I hope we'll never know if it works or not.
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Originally posted by Rino
Wonder if it worked as well as the air defenses? They seemed
to have a bit of trouble stopping the West German Cessna 172
"stealth bomber" from landing in Red Square.
Rust was tracked from the very moment when he crossed the border. He flew from Finland, BTW. If it was not in 1986 but 15 years earlier - he must have been shot down immediately or forced to land. Remember, Gorby was trying to sell the country to the West?
The whole affair looks like a provocation that have let Gorby get rid of the old defence minister Sokolov and PVO (aircraft defence) commander Koldunov. Koldunov was a best Yak ace, IIRC 45 victories, not counting two American P-38s he shot down when they vulched his airfield near Nish in Yugoslavia, Nov. 7th, 1944. He died a few months after Rust's landing on Red Square :(
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Originally posted by AKIron
Boroda did when he said their new weapon has rendered our shield useless. Of course I realize that Boroda probably doesn't have a clue regarding his nation's secrets. Russia no doubt has a spy network but I'm confident it isn't half as effective as when at the height of the USSR.
The opinion that I repeated here is based on the current state of affairs in rocket technology. I mean that sci-fi like "boost-stage intercept" was not thought of. The idea of a hypersonic-maneuverable warhead that can hit the atmosphere and jump back into space makes intercept on entrance impossible. Usual ICBM trajectory gives you a relatively narrow dispersion ellipse, while this new warhead can "trigger" your ABM launch and easily move out of it's range to hit a remote target. More to say - it can perform evasive maneuvers on entrance at hypersonic speed with significant accelerations. At least it's what you can understand from vague materials given to the press so far.
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Borda
MARV's have been around for quite sometime - but like the MIRV before it - was thought to be highly destabilizing and hence was never put into service.
Now as START II was ratified all land based missiles both US and FSU are to be de-mirved. This because Land Based missiles are inherantly more accurate. SLBM's however retain their MIRV'ing since they are not as accurate - however a CEP of 300 meters for an SLBM is hardly less accurate IMO. Its just not meant for hardened targets such as digging out bunkers, silo's, etc. Land based ICBM's have that responsability.
If you guys want a good read - try the publication from April 2000 by the Union of Concerned Scientists - "Countermeasures" Here's the link. Its an excellent read for anyone who wants a severe background check into missile defense problems and countermeasures without the political bull**** from both U.S. and Russia.
Fact that the FSU had an ABM system is incidential to its value because they were nuclear tip'd interceptors. They could intercept 1 RV - but the moment that goes off - you blind yr radar and hence, yrself against any future RV's that are imbound.
http://www.ucsusa.org/publications/report.cfm?publicationID=132
Wolf
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Thread HiJack, on a somewhat related note
("Excuse me while I whip this out...")
I also heard several years ago that the Chinese have a method of detecting stealth aircraft, by reading television and radio transmission signals as the aircraft passes through its airspace. As the signal is interrupted, they can determine the speed and size of the aircraft.
Please, don't ask where I read this from, although I believe it was Reuters, sometime in the early 90's, after Desert Shield.
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Boroda give it up!
Our collective noodle is way bigger than your collective noodle.
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should be possible in theory and in a controlled enviroment but not in real life.
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Originally posted by Red Tail 444
Thread HiJack, on a somewhat related note
("Excuse me while I whip this out...")
I also heard several years ago that the Chinese have a method of detecting stealth aircraft, by reading television and radio transmission signals as the aircraft passes through its airspace. As the signal is interrupted, they can determine the speed and size of the aircraft.
Please, don't ask where I read this from, although I believe it was Reuters, sometime in the early 90's, after Desert Shield.
One problem with that, lotta Chinese don't have television.
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Originally posted by midnight Target
Boroda give it up!
Our collective noodle is way bigger than your collective noodle.
Best contribute to the discussion so far. :)