Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => Aircraft and Vehicles => Topic started by: leonid on August 22, 2004, 11:08:52 PM
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The following post was made in the Russian Military Forum by Christer Bergström, author of the definitive volumes of the "Black Cross-Red Star" series:
One of the most common misconceptions regarding the air war on teh Eastern Front is the notion of the Il-2 as always sustaining an almost unbearable loss rate.
I have made a brief summary and comparison of the Il-2 and the heavy bombers of U.S. 8th Air Force. The reason why I chose the latter is that it is widely acknowledged that these aircraft were fairly difficult to shoot down.
In the most difficult period, 22 June 1941 - 1 July 1942, the Il-2 loss rate was a terrible 7.7 % (one lost in every 13 sorties).
But after that, the Il-2’s loss rate declined.
The period 1 August 1942 - 1 June 1943 was the second worst for the Il-2, with an average loss rate of 3.85 % (one lost in every 26 sorties).
Interestingly, during the same period (1 August 1942 - 1 June 1943), the average loss rate for the U.S. 8th AF heavy bombers was higher - a staggering 5.1 % (one lost in every 19 sorties).
The loss rate in the Il-2 units dropped from then onward.
More interesting comparisons can be made with the heavy bombers of U.S. 8th AF:
Through 1944, a total of 4,100 Il-2s were lost in combat - compared with the 8,800 at hand on 1 January 1944, i.e. the yearly loss was 47 % of the number of aircraft available at the beginning of the year.
U.S. 8th AF: Through 1944, total of 3,497 heavy bombers were lost in combat - compared with the 1,686 heavy bombers at hand on 1 January 1944, i.e. the yearly loss was 207 % of the number of aircraft available at the beginning of the year.
If we compare the yearly loss for 1944 with the number of aircraft available at the end of the year, we get these relations:
Il-2: 40 % (10,200 available on 31 Dec 1944)
8th AF HBs: 94 % (3,706 available on 31 Dec 1944)
In 1945, the Soviet Air Force had an average loss rate of 0.6 %, while the 8th AF heavy bombers had an average loss rate of 1.15 %.
These relations are even more remarkable in view of the fact that the Soviet most of the time were faced with a stronger - or vastly stronger - German fighter opposition than the Western Allies were. The elite of the Luftwaffe always was concentrated against the Soviets, and the Allies were quite fortunate to be spared a confrontation with the best of the Luftwaffe.
All best,
Christer Bergström
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Interesting data and assessment.
-leonid
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Apples and Oranges. The USAF heavy bombers were not "hard" to shoot down, per se. They had to fly straight and level at high alts and at slow speeds and MOST of those losses came from teh flak, the horrible horrible flak.
On the other hand the IL2 was a close support plane, diving and attacking the Jabo way. Probably most losses were a combination of MG/cannon, whether in fighters or in trucks/static positions.
It *is* interesting to compare, but it doesn't really mean anything :P
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the German pilots called it the concrete plane because it could take so much damage and still fly. in the B17 you had so muchless armour the only thing that kept you from going down eaily was the size of the plane.
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I'm sure the IL-2 was devistatingly fantastic. But ... point of order here .... how is the opinion that the Luftwaffe's cream of the crop was specifically used on the Eastern front arrived at other than number of kills and the assumption that the Soviet airforce fielded nothing but equal or superior planes and pilots in comparison to their western allies?
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Originally posted by leonid
The following post was made in the Russian Military Forum by Christer Bergstr?author of the definitive volumes of the "Black Cross-Red Star" series:
These relations are even more remarkable in view of the fact that the Soviet most of the time were faced with a stronger - or vastly stronger - German fighter opposition than the Western Allies were. The elite of the Luftwaffe always was concentrated against the Soviets, and the Allies were quite fortunate to be spared a confrontation with the best of the Luftwaffe.
All best,
Christer Bergstr?
_____________________________
Interesting data and assessment.
-leonid
The soviet's faced stronger fighter opposition from the Luftwaffe then the western allies did? By spring 1943 when the USAAF was starting to launch B-17 raids against Germany itself there were around the same number of single engined day fighters deployed in Germany and France (facing the USAAF) as there were on the entire Russian Front. The balance of Luftwaffe fighter deployment continued to swing towards the Western front for the rest of the war.
And to say that the Luftwaffe pilot quality in the East was higher then in the West is laughable. While the Ostfront aces may have had higher scores, when transferred to the west they struggled almost without exception. When I/JG26 was transferred temporarily to the East in early '43 they had a field day, scoring 126 victories vs. 9 losses. Kurt Buhligen of JG2 commented that every pilot sent to him from the eastern front was lost in the West.
And almost without fail, the Luftwaffe deployed their newest equipment in the West. The first Fw190's were deployed with JG26 and JG2 in France in the fall of 1941 and it was nearly a year before FW190's were deployed in the east. Western units were also the first to recieve the Fw190D-9. And of course the Me163 and Me262 were brought into action against the western allies first.
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the 190 was effective in the winter when the Me109's could start because readiator fuild froze, while the Fw had no such thing because the engine was aircooled. Also not the mention the fact of the quality of soviet fight pilots compared to British.
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C. Bergstrom is correct. The rest of you are just regurgitating Myths.
Fighter Combat in the East and the West - A Comparison (http://www.bergstrombooks.elknet.pl/bc-rs/text.html)
Quotes from that artical.
"Jochen" Müncheberg, Galland's protegé in JG 26, arrived to JG 51 on the Eastern Front in August 1942. He was shot down twice in four weeks. Siegfried Schnell, who achieved 87 victories against the RAF and the USAAF, arrived to JG 54 on the Eastern Front in February 1944; two weeks later he was killed in combat with Soviet fighters. "Assi" Hahn was shot down by a Soviet La-5, and ended up in captivity three months after he arrived to the Eastern Front; he had previously scored 68 victories against the French Air Force and the RAF. Oberstleutnant Hannes Trautloft, "Assi" Hahn's Geschwaderkommodore on the Eastern Front, recorded this statement by "Assi" Hahn regarding the quality of the Soviet opposition three months after Hahn's arrival to the Eastern Front:
"Hahn told me that the air combats are not easier, but instead harder than what he previously had experienced. He, who is used to merciless air combats against a skillful enemy over the English Channel, told us that he had to mobilize all his skills to fight enemies who proved to be at least as killful as the Englishmen."
One famous Eastern Front expert who "changed fronts" is Günther Rall, who after 273 victories and over 700 combat missions (almost all on the Eastern Front) in the Spring of 1944 was shifted to JG 11 in the Home Defense. Indeed, Rall was shot down and wounded by Thunderbolts from U.S. 56 FG on May 12, 1944. But this was not until he had shot down two of the Thunderbolts himself - and in an air battle where 470 German fighters were pinned against fifteen hundred American planes, including 814 heavy bombers and 735 fighters. This was the ninth time Rall got shot down - eight of which had occurred on the Eastern Front. Asked about his opinion on the American and Soviet fighter pilots, Rall said: "The Americans weren't better than the Russians. The Russians were aggressive and tough opponents."
Ernst-Wilhelm Reinert had carried out around 500 combat sorties and achieved 103 victories on the Eastern Front in 1941-1942 when he was shifted to Tunisia. Between January 1943 and early May 1943, he was credited with fifty victories against the USAAF and the RAF - quite comparable to the success rate achieved by other top aces on the Eastern Front at that time, and also comparable to the rate of successes that he had achieved against inferior equipped Soviets. Heinz Bär arrived from the Eastern Front to North Africa in October 1942 and shot down twenty RAF and USAAF fighters in two months - about the same rate of successes that he had scored previously on the Eastern Front. Theodor Weissenberger arrived to the "Normandie Front" in June 1944, after almost three years of service on the Eastern Front; he claimed twenty-five US and British fighters in only twenty-six combat sorties in June and July 1944 - his previous twenty-two victories had been achieved on twenty-five combat sorties on the Eastern Front. And we all know how Hartmann dealt with the US Mustangs...
The LW in the east had much more time in the air and in combat sorties actually fighting VVS fighters. For the most part in the West the LW priority was the bombers and for the most were not tasked with destroying the USAAF fighter forces.
Th exception was in NA were LW fighters mostly went after allied fighters. A look at the kill claims in NA it would appear the LW wasn't to concerned with bombers in NA.
One German fighter ace and Knight's Cross holder (he expressed the wish of remaining anonymous) expressed the impression that the Soviet airmen were better than the Americans (this was regarding the US airmen in North Africa in 1942). This is supported by Alfred Grislawski, who - speaking of the last Soviet pilots that he met (in the spring of 1943) compared to the American pilots that he met later in 1943 and in 1944 - said: "It is hard to compare because the Americans always came in large numbers against few of us. But when it comes to the individual pilot, I regard the Russians as better than the Americans. This is only natural, because the Americans had this tour system. How much did they fly - thirty or forty combat missions? - and then they were called back home again. They never accumulated that much experience."
"The advantage of the Americans was that they always appeared in large numbers," is a common statement from former Luftwaffe aces.
It is a fact that the most experienced and most successful fighter aces on the Allied side in WW II were the Soviet top aces.* It is interesting to note that the P-39 Airacobra was rejected by both RAF and USAAF pilots. Soviet ace Aleksandr Pokryshkin nevertheless achieved the bulk of his 59 personal (plus several "shared") victories while piloting an Airacobra, which by all means was vastly inferior to the Bf 109 G and the Fw 190 A - and to the Spitfire IX, the Mustangs, and the Thunderbolts that the British and US fighter pilots manned.
In 1941, Soviet ace Boris Safonov achieved his first sixteen victories (plus six "shared" victories) while piloting an I-16 Ishak. Although the performance of the I-16 has been belittled in several Western accounts (comparing test flights made by a New Zealand test pilot in recent years indicated that the I-16 was slightly superior to the British Hurricane), it is clear that the I-16 was vastly inferior to the Bf 109s with which it was opposed. It is easy to imagine which successes Safonov would have been able to achieve, had he been equipped with a Spitfire, and had he operated within the frameworks of a radar-supported fighter control system like RAF Fighter Command in 1940.
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I agree Wotan.
What made the Western Front so "hard" for the LW was the fact they had no real strategic defense, doctrine, or effective bomber interceptors.
Simply put the LW was a tactical air force designed to grab and hold the Airspace over an Army and support that Army with "flying artillery".
Several things made the western front "hard".
1. The allied heavies put the Luftwaffe in a predicament. If you carry enough weapons and armour to destroy enough bombers to stop the raids you cannot fight off the escort fighter.
If you fly light enough to fight off the escort fighters then you cannot shoot down enough bombers to stop the raids.
2. The Luftwaffe high command recognized the Danger way too late to develop effective countermeasures. Therefore the Luftwaffe had to develop it's tactics under a numerically superior opponent. The Principals of War can be manipulated and used to overcome numerical superiority. Not having the numbers AND not having effective tactical answers spells doom.
3. Altitude - It's easy to underestimate the problems of high altitude combat or the importance of oxygen delivery systems to that combat. The Luftwaffe had the best O2 systems for much of the war. A lack of latex hampered further improvement.
4. Numbers - For some reason the Luftwaffe never fielded that large of force of single engine day fighters in the West until it was way too late. In May '44 the total number of FW-190 single engine fighters in the entire Luftwaffe was 265 Airplanes.
The majority of the Fighters Strength in the West was FW-190's.
The JG's with two or more Gruppen of FW-190's:
JG 1
JG 11
JG54 ( Two Gruppes in the East, One Gruppe in the West - all 190 )
JG2
JG26
With only one Gruppe 190's
JG300
JG3 (Sturm)
The Eastern Front was more "tailored" for the Luftwaffe. It was a tactical Air War for the most part. Exactly what the Luftwaffe was trained and designed to fight. Did not make it "easier" or less deadly.
Crumpp
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Link to original thread btw
http://www.network54.com/Forum/message?forumid=116312&messageid=1093125473
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Through 1944, a total of 4,100 Il-2s were lost in combat - compared with the 8,800 at hand on 1 January 1944, i.e. the yearly loss was 47 % of the number of aircraft available at the beginning of the year.
U.S. 8th AF: Through 1944, total of 3,497 heavy bombers were lost in combat - compared with the 1,686 heavy bombers at hand on 1 January 1944, i.e. the yearly loss was 207 % of the number of aircraft available at the beginning of the year.
I've seen statistics butchered before, but this takes the cake.
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Denes' post was interesting.
Here are the Il-2 loss statistics, as found in Hans Seidl's book on VVS aces:
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Year--Total Losses--Losses to enemy action--% of strength at hand
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1941--1,100--600--73.3
1942--2,600--1,800--34.2
1943--7,200--3,900--45.0
1944--8,900--4,100--46.6
1945--3,800--2,000--27.3
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Total: 23,600--12,400--70.3
from http://www.butler98.freeserve.co.uk/thtrlosses.htm
1. During the period in question, a constant 21-24% of the Luftwaffe's day fighters were based in the East - but only 12-14% of the Luftwaffe day fighter "losses" occurred in this theater.
2. During this period, a constant 75-78% of the day fighters were based in the West. The turnover was enormous: 14,720 aircraft were "lost", while operational strength averaged 1364.
3. During this period, 2294 day fighters were "lost" in the East; the ratio of western "losses" to eastern "losses" was thus 14,720/2294 = 6.4 to one.
4. During this period, a constant 43-46% of all of the Luftwaffe's operational aircraft were based in the East. It should be noted that these included entire categories (for example, battlefield recce, battle planes, dive bombers) that were used exclusively in the East, because they couldn't survive in the West..
5. During this period, a total of 8600 operational aircraft were "lost" in the East, while 27,060 were "lost" in the West; the ratio of western "losses" to eastern "losses" was thus 27,060/8600 = 3.41 to one.
(http://www.butler98.freeserve.co.uk/thtrloss.gif)
Ageed ra, someone has an agenda, comparing all Soviet Air Force to only the 8th AF heavy bomber losses.
"In 1945, the Soviet Air Force had an average loss rate of 0.6 %, while the 8th AF heavy bombers had an average loss rate of 1.15 %.
These relations are even more remarkable in view of the fact that the Soviet most of the time were faced with a stronger - or vastly stronger - German fighter opposition than the Western Allies were. The elite of the Luftwaffe always was concentrated against the Soviets, and the Allies were quite fortunate to be spared a confrontation with the best of the Luftwaffe."
USAAF stats can be found here, http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/afhra/wwwroot/aafsd/aafsd_index_table.html
Crumpp, you did not mention the JG300, 001, 002 units which mostly had 109s. http://www.ww2.dk/ A complete listing of LW units in the West for the time period (1944) would be useful.
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Crump; you make good points; but how different was the task the LW faced against the Allied heavies compared to the RAF's task in 1940?
Surely the same lessons apply for the Battle of the Riech as for the Battle of Britain?
They lost both.
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The LW lost 4 fighters on the western front for every 1 on the eastern front in 1944. What does that tell you?
The LW lost more fighters on the western front in 1940 than on the eastern front in 1944. What does that tell you.
Bergström quotes Rall. I never saw that quote before, however, several times Rall has quoted that life was more dangerous to the LW pilot on the western front, the factors being better pilots, better planes, and better tactics.
However, the toughness was more on the eastern front, shot down LW pilots were frequently executed, while if they got captured by the western allies, they would be handled well.
I actually asked Rall about this personally. He said something of this sort, but also that the russians learned their lessons and late in the war there was not much difference anymore, they had adapted to the same tactics as the others.
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Look closely at Milo's chart...
Late 43 the LW had 56.4% of its forces in the west and they suffered almost 75% casualties, versus 25% casualties in the east.
Early 44 they increased their presence to 78.4% of their force and lost an even higher precentage (76.9%), compared to a reduced loss rate in the east of 23.3%.
Jun-Oct 44 they spread themselves out more, only 53.5% was stationed in the west, their loss rate stayed near 75%, just as their loss rate in the east stayed at about a thrid of that.
+++++++++
This does not indicate anything about the individual skills of the VVS pilots versus their USAF/RAF counterparts. But it speaks volumes with regards to the overall effectiveness of the respective air forces.
Just as the Russian ground forces largely detroyed the German ground forces, the Western Airforces largely destroyed the Luftwaffe.
I see no point to the agendas by those who wish to claim otherwise.
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This is only natural, because the Americans had this tour system. How much did they fly - thirty or forty combat missions? - and then they were called back home again. They never accumulated that much experience."
Probably very true.
What the americans had going for them, both in ETO and PTO is tactics not individual skills. I am no expert, but from all the reading about WWII air combat I got the impression that the americans we the most flexible and innovative in their tactics - both wingman tactics, and general fighting tactics. When I read american aces stories, I actually get the impression of very dweebish flying. RAF aces tell of twisting and turning at treetops and much ACM. American aces tell about flying fast and diving into clouds out of trouble and banging a bandit in pairs.
just an impression.
Bozon
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Originally posted by ra
I've seen statistics butchered before, but this takes the cake.
I saw that too last night and declined to comment. The other stats seem interesting and applicable, e.g. loss rate per sortie, but the part Ra quoted is blunt lying with statistics. It looks like in means something to a casual reader, but in fact doesn't mean anything at all in relation to the claims being made.
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This does not indicate anything about the individual skills of the VVS pilots versus their USAF/RAF counterparts. But it speaks volumes with regards to the overall effectiveness of the respective air forces.
It would indicate that if you totally misunderstand the nature of the combat in the West and the LW's roll in it.
The VVS OTOH as Christer points out in that thread didn’t fly mass formations. They flew mostly tactical sorties spread out along the huge front. As such when they made contact with the LW they were at an altitude disadvantage and normally engaged by an equal or greater number of LW.
The Eastern experten had hundreds of hours of combat experience in that type of combat. This was the "furball" arena much like NA. See JG54 in Kurland.
In the west and over the skies of the Reich the situation was different. The LW was tasked with attacking the bombers and to avoid pitched combat with allied fighters.
Not only were they at a numerical disadvantage for the most part but the freedom of maneuver was restricted to the task at hand, shooting down the bombers.
There have been volumes written on the subject and we gamers aren’t going to come close to fully exploring the issue.
The point of Christer's post is lost of most in this thread. There are 2 myths you here a lot in the west about the Il2.
1. It was a flying tank.
2. The VVS sacrificed large numbers of IL2s to grind down the wehrmacht.
He doesn’t touch the 1st myth but it has been discussed on these forums before. I will add it was not a "flying tank".
Christer's point is that Il2’s were no more sacrificed then the USAAF / RAF bombers were sacrificed in the west.
Of course a LW fighter pilot was far more likely to be shot down in the west. But the 2 theaters are completely different and it’s clearly a case of apples and oranges.
Any comparison between the allied bombing campaign in the west and the LW in BoB is limited at best. These were completely different circumstances as well.
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IL-2 and IL-10 combat losses.
Years 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
Type of loss
Shot down by enemy a/c: 47 169 1090 882 369 2557
Shot down by enemy AAA: 101 203 1468 1859 1048 4679
Destroyed on the airfields: 13 14 40 34 8 109
Unknown cause: 372 1290 917 569 266 3414
Total: 533 1676 3515 3344 1691 10759
Sortie/Kill ratio in different periods of the war.
1st year (till july 42), 2nd year (till june 43), etc...
IL-2 13 26 85 90
Fighters 28 69 127 194
Bombers 14 48 125 133
Its yearly statistic. Sortie/Kill ratio wasnt so good in shorter periods - lets say Kursk battle - only 13 sorties/kill.
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Crump; you make good points; but how different was the task the LW faced against the Allied heavies compared to the RAF's task in 1940?
It was not that different. The Luftwaffe lost for the same reasons the Allies did not gain Air Superiority over Europe until Early 1944.
Any comparison between the allied bombing campaign in the west and the LW in BoB is limited at best. These were completely different circumstances as well.
I beg to differ in this one Wotan, bro.
The Luftwaffe lost the BoB because they took away the tactical initiative from their fighters. They restricted them to visual range escort and did away with the fighter sweeps in front of the bombers. The tactics of freeing up your fighters to seek and destroy the enemy air force was working in the beginning of the BoB. By attacking the airfields and other targets with large bomber formations that caused enough damage that the RAF had to respond, and freeing up the fighters to fight ot their strengths, the Luftwaffe was able to inflict casualties at a rate the RAF could not have sustained. When Goering made the fighters fly their escort missions within visual range of the bombers and no longer gave them the freedom of action they required, the writing was on the wall.
On top of this the Luftwaffe never employed a fighter during the battle with the range and performance to fly and fight in all the areas giving the RAF a safe haven.
Lastly the Luftwaffe violated the Principal of Mass. Rule in warfare is never attack unless you have a minimum of a 4 to 1 numerical advantage over the defender. Works for Airspace too. The Luftwaffe had a numerical advantage of almost 2 to 1. About half the forces they needed to win.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Daylight bombing campaign was inflicting little loss to the Luftwaffe and almost prohibitive casualties to the Allies until two things happened:
1. The allies got a fighter with both the range to escort the bombers AND the performance to take on Luftwaffe fighters once it arrived in the combat box.
2. Doolittle freed those fighters up to seek out and destroy the Luftwaffe wherever they could be found. Before Doolittle, allied fighter escorts had been tied to visual range escort AND could not go below 10,000 feet in pursuit of German fighters giving the Luftwaffe a safe haven.
3. The Allies built up an enormous numerical advantage over the Luftwaffe.
Crumpp
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I doubt it would come down to tactical reasons. Simple as that, defeating the fighter force of a highly industrialized country was not a possibility during WW2, at that technical level. The Allies committed VASTLY larger forces against Germany, and they didn`t succeed in the same task, the LW was up there until the last day causing heavy damage, and despite the huge losses suffered, their numbers just kept increasing. No, there was no way to achieve a goal like completely destroying an air force during WW2. Push it back, obtain air superiority or perhaps even air supremacy, yes. But nothing more.
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Originally posted by Crumpp
I beg to differ in this one Wotan, bro.
The Luftwaffe lost the BoB because they took away the tactical initiative from their fighters. They restricted them to visual range escort and did away with the fighter sweeps in front of the bombers. The tactics of freeing up your fighters to seek and destroy the enemy air force was working in the beginning of the BoB. By attacking the airfields and other targets with large bomber formations that caused enough damage that the RAF had to respond, and freeing up the fighters to fight ot their strengths, the Luftwaffe was able to inflict casualties at a rate the RAF could not have sustained. When Goering made the fighters fly their escort missions within visual range of the bombers and no longer gave them the freedom of action they required, the writing was on the wall.
On top of this the Luftwaffe never employed a fighter during the battle with the range and performance to fly and fight in all the areas giving the RAF a safe haven.
Lastly the Luftwaffe violated the Principal of Mass. Rule in warfare is never attack unless you have a minimum of a 4 to 1 numerical advantage over the defender. Works for Airspace too. The Luftwaffe had a numerical advantage of almost 2 to 1. About half the forces they needed to win.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Daylight bombing campaign was inflicting little loss to the Luftwaffe and almost prohibitive casualties to the Allies until two things happened:
1. The allies got a fighter with both the range to escort the bombers AND the performance to take on Luftwaffe fighters once it arrived in the combat box.
2. Doolittle freed those fighters up to seek out and destroy the Luftwaffe wherever they could be found. Before Doolittle, allied fighter escorts had been tied to visual range escort AND could not go below 10,000 feet in pursuit of German fighters giving the Luftwaffe a safe haven.
3. The Allies built up an enormous numerical advantage over the Luftwaffe.
Crumpp
umm Seeker said this
Surely the same lessons apply for the Battle of the Riech as for the Battle of Britain?
My reply was:
Any comparison between the allied bombing campaign in the west and the LW in BoB is limited at best. These were completely different circumstances as well.
Your reply didn't contradict what I said.
Once again:
These were completely different circumstances as well.
Your reply touched on some of the differences such as the almost endless supply of resources available to the allies. The allies had range and as such the battle area was much larger then just southern England etc... I can go into many others.
However, I have no interest in drifting further from the topic of this thread.
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The Allies committed VASTLY larger forces against Germany, and they didn`t succeed in the same task, the LW was up there until the last day causing heavy damage, and despite the huge losses suffered, their numbers just kept increasing.
The Germans kept pumping more and more resources into fighter production, but the number of fighters they could put into the air on any given day fell continuously during the last year of the war.
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Originally posted by VO101_Isegrim
I doubt it would come down to tactical reasons. Simple as that, defeating the fighter force of a highly industrialized country was not a possibility during WW2, at that technical level. The Allies committed VASTLY larger forces against Germany, and they didn`t succeed in the same task, the LW was up there until the last day causing heavy damage, and despite the huge losses suffered, their numbers just kept increasing. No, there was no way to achieve a goal like completely destroying an air force during WW2. Push it back, obtain air superiority or perhaps even air supremacy, yes. But nothing more.
Yeah, that's why Lancs were doing unescorted daylight missions in 1945.
Face it, by Feb. 1945 the Luftwaffe was done as an effective fighting force. They could harrass and inflict a few casualties here and there but their ability to actually inflict attrition level casualties was gone.
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Yeah, that's why Lancs were doing unescorted daylight missions in 1945.
Maybe do some research on that first. Lancs did the same over the Ardennes, w/o escort, until they bumped into German fighters - the results were ugly.
Face it, by Feb. 1945 the Luftwaffe was done as an effective fighting force. They could harrass and inflict a few casualties here and there but their ability to actually inflict attrition level casualties was gone.
Well, the USAAF`s statistics disprove this, as well the RAF loss statistics, as well as the LW`s own records . Myths like this can be repeated but can`t be proven. If the LW was not able to stop the Allied onlslaught, that had something to do with the vast numbers of the Allies employed by 1945, not the LW`s inability, which still shot down hundreds and flown thousends of sorties each month even in 1945. If you shoot down 100 out of 1000, that`s attrition. If you shoot down 200 out of 10 000, that`s nothing. Even if your results are twice as good as before.
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OK Barbi,
Post your loss data. I haven't got specific numbers, especially here at work. I'm sure you've got proof that the Germans were about to win the airwar when Germany surrendered.:rolleyes:
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Karnak, this is the most likely place he is getting his data from, http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/afhra/wwwroot/aafsd/aafsd_list_of_tables_aircraftequipment.html
There is another site, which I have lost which lists themissions from late 43 til wars end. Included is the losses as well as the claims(which I will not take seriously). Will try to find it.
Not the site but http://www.jcs-group.com/military/usaaf/hethel4.html
Wednesday, 14 February 1945
2 missions are flown.
Mission 830: 1,377 bombers and 962 fighters are dispatched to hit oil and rail targets in Germany; bombing of most targets is by H2X radar; they claim 11-0-3 Luftwaffe aircraft; 7 bombers and 7 fighters are lost:
1. 461 B-17s are dispatched to hit the marshalling yard at Dresden (311); targets of opportunity are Prague (62), Brux (25) and Pilsen (12) in Czechoslovakia and other (25); they claim 1-0-0 aircraft; 5 B-17s are lost, 3 damaged beyond repair and 54 damaged; 4 airmen are KIA, 15 WIA and 49 MIA. Escorting are 281 of 316 P-51s; 3 are lost (pilots MIA) and 1 damaged beyond repair.
2. 457 B-17s are sent to hit the marshalling yard at Chemnitz (294); targets of opportunity are Eger Airfield (38), Bamberg (33), Sonneberg (23), Tachau (24), Hof marshalling yard (12) and other (17); 1 B-17 is lost, 3 damaged beyond repair and 103 damaged; 2 airmen are KIA, 4 WIA and 14 MIA. The escort is 224 of 238 P-51s; 2 are lost (pilots MIA) and 1 damaged beyond repair.
3. 375 B-24s are sent to hit an oil refinery at Magdeburg but are unable to attack due to weather; 340 hit the secondary, the marshalling yard at Magdeburg; targets of opportunity are Emlicheim (1), Meppen (1), Bodenteich (1) and other (1); 1 B-24 is lost, 2 damaged beyond repair and 16 damaged; 9 airmen are MIA. 253 of 273 P-51s escort; they claim 10-0-3 aircraft; 2 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA).
4. 84 B-17s are sent to hit the Wesel road bridge (37); 35 hit the secondary, the Dulmen oil depot and 1 hits Ahaus, a target of opportunity; 15 B-17s are damaged. 26 of 30 P-51s escort the bombers.
5. 44 of 49 P-47s fly a sweep of the Magdeburg area without loss.
6. 24 P-51s escort photo reconnaissance aircraft over Germany.
7. 29 of 32 P-51s fly a scouting mission.
Mission 831: 10 B-24s drop leaflet in the Netherlands and Germany during the night.
NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of bombers attacking.
NOTE: Aircraft claimed: 'destroyed'-'probably destroyed'-'possibly destroyed'
Yes, for sure, the LW was swatting USAAF a/c out of the skies like flies.:rolleyes:
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Milo, http://paul.rutgers.edu/~mcgrew/wwii/usaf/html/
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Your reply touched on some of the differences such as the almost endless supply of resources available to the allies. The allies had range and as such the battle area was much larger then just southern England etc... I can go into many others.
Misunderstood you then Wotan!
Crumpp
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uhm the allied bombers had to fly miles over enemy territory. flying over many flak areas . Also i bet they flew over better radar controlled territory.
I bet the il's didn't had to withstand hordes off nme fighters . Wich been sent accuratly to their formations.
The ill did frontline attacks CAS and stuff.
The bombers did a whole other thing wich is a deep strike.
Apples and Oranges indeed
It also sound very unlogical why the LW wouldn't send in their elite to protect their own so beloved country :rolleyes:
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Appearantly, some posters fail to grab the difference between the historical fact that the LW`s strenght was not broken (which is what I say), and the hysterical crap that the LW won over the Allies (which is the usual reaction when someone points out that the German fighter force remained an active and strong adversary until the last days of war.)
Simple as that, mauling a fighter force of an industrialized nation was not possible under the WW2 technical level. They could produce, and train fighters faster than they could be destroyed.
Now, back to the original subject, I think one of the reasons for the rather low German/Soviet loss rate over the EF was the HUGE areas involved. Western Europe is relatively small area, fighter and AA cover was relatively dense. On the EF however, I guess literally dozens of missions were flown by both sides without ever encountering a single enemy flight. On the Soviet side, they encountered even less, as the Germans held only a relatively small number fighter on the EF, abot 1/4 of their total fleet, no more than a few hundred, for a multiple thousend km frontline`s needs.. Radar was at minimal use. Hence the loss rate was low (German loss rate was something like 0.5% !).
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Back on topic,
The only point Christer is making is the Il2 was not the flying coffin that some think it was.
I will quote the first line again:
One of the most common misconceptions regarding the air war on teh Eastern Front is the notion of the Il-2 as always sustaining an almost unbearable loss rate.
He may have taken some artistic license to demonstrate that (I don’t believe so) but that doesn't detract from the point.
Take it with a grain of salt...
KraziMorai portrays it completely out of context:
http://www.simhq.com/simhq3/sims/boards/bbs/ultimatebb.php?ubb=get_topic;f=98;t=012108
I am sure Christer is torn up due to your "lack of respect".
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Well I think this is turning into an argument of semantics. Certainly the Luftwaffe continued to fly right up until the end of the war. But if you look at USAAF bomber losses to fighters they drop off to a very low level after the Normandy campaign. After the mauling that the Luftwaffe took in Normandy an attempt was made to build up a reserve of fighter strength that could be used en masse to inflict heavy casualties on the allied airforces. After the losses of the summer though, average Luftwaffe pilot quality had sunk low enough that these maximum effort missions did little but offer the chance of a 5 kill mission to allied pilots. USAAF bomber losses to fighters never rose back to the levels suffered in spring and summer of '44.
So while the Luftwaffe never ceased to exist, they ceased to offer any dangerous (as in dangerous to the entire 8th AF etc.) opposition. Certainly the skies were still plenty dangerous for individual pilots with the Luftwaffe fighters continuing to score regularly right up until the end. And the German Flak was a constant threat right up to the end (that is vastly underplayed in AH).
Back to the original post of the Luftwaffe pitting the cream of their force against the Soviets and send the dregs against the US and British. I think we can all agree the evidence shows that to clearly be false.
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Thanks Sable. That's what I was trying to say. Yes, the Luftwaffe did fly to the end, but at greatly reduced capability. Heck, they were reduced to towing aircraft to the runway to conserve fuel in some cases.
There is a reason the Meteor Mk III's couldn't find anything to shoot down after they started using them in offensives sweeps over German held territory in March, 1945.
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Luftwaffe Fighter activity
Western Front, December 1944
11 053 sorties flown by LW fighters
552 victories vs. 527 losses
Eastern Front, January 1945
6816 sorties flown by LW fighters
395 victories vs. 140 losses
Eastern Front, February 1945
12 225 sorties flown by LW fighters
443 victories vs. 260 losses
*See Japo 109K, pg 90
German Tactical Air Sorties over the Ardennes Dec. 16 1944 - Jan. 1, 1944:
Dec 16. - 170
17 - 650*
18 - 849*
19 - 290
20 - 2
21 - 0
22 - 100
23 - 800
24 - 1,088
25 - 600
26 - 404
27 - 415
28 - 15
29 - 340
30 - 150
31 - 613
Jan 1. 1945 - 1,0357
Thats over 7,500 sorties alone for the time period.
*Doesn't include the additional 100 - 250 sorties flown during the nights of Dec. 17 - 18.
*See: Parker Danny S. To Win the Winter Sky. p.515
Luftwaffe Strenght in 1945
On 31 January 1945 the combat units of the Luftwaffe and their associated Erganzungs Einheiten, had the following strength in Bf109 types.
These are on hand totals, they include both 'frontline' and 'other' units.
Included are all aircraft operational and non-operational at the time. (combat/Erganzungs):
Bf109G1/5 (0/1)
Bf109G12 (0/5)
Bf109G6 (71/328)
Bf109G14 and G14U4 (431/190)
Bf109G10, G10/U4 and G14/AS (568/3)
Bf109K4 (314/0)
Bf109G10/R6 (51/0)
---------------------------
Total Bf 109 (1435/527)
Other Jagd types totaled (1058/359)
Schlacht types totaled (680/375)
Nachtschlacht types totaled (422/95)
Zerstorer types totaled (42/0)
Nachtjagd types totaled (1241, no breakdown between the two)
Kampf types totaled (543/158)
Nahaufklarer totaled (407/27)
Fernaufklarer totaled (195/81)
See types totaled (78/17)
Transport types totaled (496/9)
-------------------------------------------
Grand total (6597/1631)
From : RL2III/1158
If those Meteors couldn`t find any enemy to shoot down, they weren`t really looking for a fight. But after all, they weren`t looking for the opportunity in mid-44 either.
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Barbi,
No, they weren't deployed for action outside of the UK until March, 1945. The only air-to-air action was a Meteor Mk III squadron vs and Fw190 unit that got interupted by some Spitfires that saw the Meteors and assumed they were German. No kills on either side in that action.
You may prattle on all you like about how the Luftwaffe was just as strong and was everywhere ect, ect, but we both know that it was in a steep decline. Fuel shortages, pilot shortages, production problems and declining quality. It is remarkable that they were doing as well as they were, but it is a sham to make it out as though they were everywhere. Germany was falling apart in 1945 and the Luftwaffe was not immune from those effects.
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Well, I just posted some numbers on strenght and the number of sorties flown, never said it was everywhere, that it didn`t big huge problems, that pilot quality was the same - if that`s your read then it`s a reading comprehension problem on your part - but it was there, it was hardly kncoked out, destroyed completely etc. etc., and was still a force to be reckoned with. That was my point, and I underlined it quite well.
As for the Meteors, I have no idea why they were kept back. Guess they just weren`t seen to be fit for combat, having more than a few teething problems. Certainly, they would show nothing new to the Germans they didn`t know already about jets.
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The British were really antsy about deploying new tech over German territory. They made a lot of stupid decisions not to deploy new technology and lost many lives because of it in my opinion.
In the case of the Meteor, I'd say that the Mk I was not suitable for use against the Germans. The Mk III was, but it was later in the war.
As to the data you posted, it was late 1944 data. After the Germans lost the Battle of the Bulge and the Allied armies rapidly advanced things got really ugly. I'd say that the Germans held everything together really well, all things considered, until Feb. 1945. After that it is a pretty steep decline.
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The reason why life was more dangerous in the west front had to do with the bomber campaign. Flying into a bomber box was almost suicide with all the defensive fire you'd catch on the way in. Not only that, you'd have a large number of high-speed fighters close on your tail should you somehow survive the bomber "shower". So, basically a LW fighter pilot had to time it so that he could get past the wally fighter hordes, make one pass into, through, and out the bomber box while under heavy fire, then somehow shake the wally fighter hordes enough to fly home. Not much room for finesse to surviving that situation, just luck (or clouds), speed, and an unpunctured oil radiator.
But, nobody got the 'dregs' of the LW, it was rough all around for the allies. However, allied skill was basically balanced from west to east, meaning the VVS was no cakewalk for the LW - at least from 1943. The reason the LW got to operate more effectively in the East had to do with Red Army air doctrine, not general VVS pilot skill.
-leonid
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Woopsie, what a thread.
What got me thinking a bit was this:
"Any comparison between the allied bombing campaign in the west and the LW in BoB is limited at best. These were completely different circumstances as well."
True, but not to the point so many here have tried to show.
The BoB was quite special. LW with double to triple strength of the RAF trying to bomb them into submission and/or pave the way for an invasion at a very modest range. They failed.
The Allied bombing campaign is another issue. The range was quadruple as a typical, and until 43/44 mostly not escortable.
Anyway, to get a bit more true to the topic of this thread, as far as I know, the Il-2's were not being butchered so badly, especially considering what their job was.
Other russian planes got the hard end of the stick as well.
And for the bluffers, I have some fuel:
1. From Izzie: "I think one of the reasons for the rather low German/Soviet loss rate over the EF was the HUGE areas involved. Western Europe is relatively small area, fighter and AA cover was relatively dense. On the EF however, I guess literally dozens of missions were flown by both sides without ever encountering a single enemy flight."
You've got it mixed up I guess. LW pilots had lots of target opportunities on the eastern front. I am pretty sure Hartmann saw at least 300 enemy aircraft when he was there.
At the same time, many allied pilots flew as much as a whole tour of duty without seeing a bandit.
2. The LW got mauled into submission in 1944.
I will not go as far as Crumpp by naming it allied supremacy, but superiority will do just fine.
In 1944 on the Western front, the LW was still a problem, but they could not stop anything the allies wanted to harass in German airspace, even in daylight with allies crossing hundreds of miles of German airspace. This is something the Russians hardly tried, which just makes the LW loss difference more spectacular.
3. The LW mostly got mauled by the western Allies, all war through. Any summed up figures?
Anyway, I went through the LW loss records on microfilm at the IWM, and was baffled to find out that the LW losses in huge battles like Stalingrad were on pair or less than those in the Desert war at the same time! I was quite baffled, - had always thought that the eastern airwar was many times bigger in LW terms, but it turnes out not to be, -when it came to losses.
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The Luftwaffe on the Eve of Overlord, 31 May 44
Serviceable Aircraft Strengths
Single-engined fighters 1063
Twin-engined fighters 151
Night fighters 572
Fighter-bombers 278
Ground-attack aircraft 352
Night harassment aircraft 305
Twin-engined bombers 840
Four-engined bombers 97
Long-range reconaissance aircraft 153
Short-range and army cooperation aircraft 210
Coastal aircraft 123
Transport aircraft 719
Kampfgeschwader 200 (misc. aircraft 65
Total 4928
Luftwaffe Order of Battle, 10 January 1945
Serviceable Aircraft Strengths
Single-engined fighters 1462
Night fighters 808
Ground-attack aircraft 613
Night harassment aircraft 302
Multi-engined bombers 294
Anti-shipping aircraft 83
Long-range reconaissance aircraft 176
Short-range and army cooperation aircraft 293
Coastal aircraft 60
Transport aircraft 269
Misc. aircraft (KG 200) 206
Total 4566
Luftwaffe Order of Battle, 9 April 1945
Serviceable Aircraft Strengths
Single-engined fighters 1305
Night fighters 485
Ground-attack aircraft 712
Night harassment aircraft 215
Multi-engined bombers 37
Long-range reconaissance aircraft 143
Short-range and army cooperation aircraft 309
Coastal aircraft 45
Transport aircraft 10
Misc. aircraft (KG 200) 70
Total 3331
more detailed info for the above dates and where LW units were http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/2072/LW_OBs.html
example:
Luftflotte 1 (Northern Russia), 31 May 44
Unit Type Strength Svcble
Stab/JG 54 Fw 190A 4 4
I/JG 54 42 (44) 36
II/JG 54 54 (52) 50 (48)
II/NJG 100 Ju 88 29 21 (23)
14 (Eis.)/KG 55 He 111H 1 (11) 1 (8)
Stab/SG 3 1 1
I/SG 3 Ju 87D 27 (33) 24 (30)
II/SG 3 30 (36) 26 (32)
NSGr 1 Go 145 32 (35) 25 (28)
He 46
NSGr 3 Go 145 36 (40) 34 (38)
Ar 66
NSGr 11 He 50 22 19
Fokker C.V
NSGr 12 Ar 66 16 14
1. Osfliegerstaffel Go 145 9 8
Ar 66
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Ok, here's some statistics from a Rand report on aircraft vulnerability in WWII done for the armed forces. These will show broken down by month the # of heavy bomber sorties, # of heavy bombers lost, # lost to fighters, # damaged by fighters. I included the number damaged by fighters because there are some months where the number lost to fighters was unknown, so this helps display the trend. The numbers aren't exact as they are displayed in bar graph form.
Jan 1944 - 4500 sorties - 195 lost - 175 lost to ftrs - 195 dmgd by ftrs
Feb 1944 - 7500 sorties - 250 lost - 175 lost to ftrs - 225 dmgd by ftrs
Mar 1944 - 9000 sorties - 300 lost - 200 lost to ftrs - 225 dmgd by ftrs
Apr 1944 - 9500 sorties - 360 lost - 200 lost to ftrs - 300 dmgd by ftrs
May 1944 - 14,000 sorties - 310 lost - 125 lost to ftrs - 225 dmgd by ftrs
June 1944 - 23,000 sorties - 240 lost - 125 lost to ftrs - 50 dmgd by ftrs
July 1944 - 19,000 sorties - 250 lost - ?? lost to ftrs - 100 dmgd by fighters
Aug 1944 - 19,000 sorties - 240 lost - ?? lost to ftrs - 50 dmgd by ftrs
Sep 1944 - 15,000 sorties - 250 lost - ?? lost to ftrs - 30 dmgd by ftrs
Oct 1944 - 15,000 sorties - 130 lost - ?? lost to ftrs - 30 dmgd by ftrs
Nov 1944 - 15,000 sorties - 130 lost - ?? lost to ftrs - 30 dmgd by ftrs
Dec 1944 - 15,000 sorties - 100 lost - 35 lost to ftrs - 30 dmgd by ftrs
Jan 1945 - 14,500 sorties - 95 lost - 25 lost to ftrs - 25 dmgd by ftrs
Feb 1945 - 20,000 sorties - 100 lost - ?? lost to ftrs - 15 dmgd by ftrs
Mar 1945 - 28,000 sorties - 130 lost - 50 lost to ftrs - 50 dmgd by ftrs
We can see in the numbers here that the Luftwaffe's capability to oppose the allied daylight raids peaks in March and April of 1944 and then declines sharply and levels. Interestingly, this coincides with the arrival of P-51's and P-38's in greater numbers. In Feb the 8th AF had 13 FG's available - 2 P-51, 2 P-38, and 9 P-47. By May they had 15 FG's - 8 P-51, 3 P-38, and 4 P-47.
This total losses stay level through the Normandy and Market-Garden periods (June - Sept) but bombers damaged by fighters can be seen to fall markedly - unfortunately I don't have the data on bombers lost to fighters for most of this period. In October bomber losses drop dramatically and stay down for the rest of the war. Keep in mind that Luftwaffe fighter strength (in terms of numbers) actually increased between June of 44 and Jan of 45. The Luftwaffe also introduced a number of new and better aircraft in this period (Me163, Me262, 190D-9, 109G10 and K4).
Keep in mind that in the fall of '44 Galland wanted to inflict 400-500 bomber losses in a DAY with his 'grosse schlag' to try and pause the allied bomber raids and buy time to bring the Me-262 into greater use. The Luftwaffe pilots just didn't have the capability to do this vs. the growing strength of the Allies.
This is why I say that the Luftwaffe no longer posed a threat to the Allied air forces. The allied air commanders could do whatever they wanted, knowing that the Luftwaffe couldn't hurt them badly enough to stop them. But obviously on a personal level the Luftwaffe was still very dangerous - at least for 50-100 bomber crews every month.
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Milo,
Using Servicable Aircraft Strengths is not going to prove anything except what the USAAF concluded after WWII.
Heavy bombing produced little to no effect on complicated industrial output that is dispersed properly.
It could however effect simple industrial output like oil.
The Luftwaffe did not run out planes. It ran out of qualified men to fly them.
Good reads on the Subject:
http://www.schifferbooks.com/newschiffer/book_template.php?isbn=0887403484
Interestingly, this coincides with the arrival of P-51's and P-38's in greater numbers.
That is exactly right. When the USAAF started ranging ahead of the bomber Stream and bouncing the Luftwaffe as they climbed to hit the bombers, it was over.
Before the USAAF fighters were tied to visual range escort which meant the Luftwaffe could climb at leisure and attack when they were ready. Since the USAAF could not purse below 10,000 feet if a LW fighter got in trouble he could simply dive out and flew home.
Another thing Milo's statistics do not show. 98 Percent of the post-1943 Luftwaffe trained pilots died before the completion of their 6th mission. If they survived to their sixth, their chances of survival went up astronomically. The pre-1943 trained pilots took casualties, sure, but a surprising few fell compared to the multitude of "cannon fodder" post-43 trainees.
Crumpp
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Milo,
Using Servicable Aircraft Strengths is not going to prove anything except what the USAAF concluded after WWII.
Heavy bombing produced little to no effect on complicated industrial output that is dispersed properly.
It could however effect simple industrial output like oil.
The Luftwaffe did not run out planes. It ran out of qualified men to fly them.
Good reads on the Subject:
http://www.schifferbooks.com/newschiffer/book_template.php?isbn=0887403484
Interestingly, this coincides with the arrival of P-51's and P-38's in greater numbers.
That is exactly right. When the USAAF started ranging ahead of the bomber Stream and bouncing the Luftwaffe as they climbed to hit the bombers, it was over.
Before the USAAF fighters were tied to visual range escort which meant the Luftwaffe could climb at leisure and attack when they were ready. Since the USAAF could not purse below 10,000 feet if a LW fighter got in trouble he could simply dive out and flew home.
Another thing Milo's statistics do not show. 98 Percent of the post-1943 Luftwaffe trained pilots died before the completion of their 6th mission. If they survived to their sixth, their chances of survival went up astronomically. The pre-1943 trained pilots took casualties, sure, but a surprising few fell compared to the multitude of "cannon fodder" post-43 trainees.
Crumpp
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We can see in the numbers here that the Luftwaffe's capability to oppose the allied daylight raids peaks in March and April of 1944 and then declines sharply and levels. Interestingly, this coincides with the arrival of P-51's and P-38's in greater numbers.
It also coincides with a major daylight-bombing offensive that started in Jan. 44 with Berlin and culminated in Operation Argument "Big Week" in March.
Look at the number of Allied Sorties and how they rise thru March. After March the preparation of the Beachhead begins and targeting of supply lines, railheads etc..
Now look at the loss rate. The Luftwaffe became militarily ineffective. Individually they could and did score successes.
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Milo,
Using Servicable Aircraft Strengths is not going to prove anything except what the USAAF concluded after WWII.
Heavy bombing produced little to no effect on complicated industrial output that is dispersed properly.
It could however effect simple industrial output like oil.
The Luftwaffe did not run out planes. It ran out of qualified men to fly them.
Crumpp
Crumpp, I got your message with one post.;) You can delete the duplicate using the edit function.
What my post shows is that the LW was in a steady decline, dispite the increase in a/c production. Servicable means the a/c was flight/combat capable wether there was a pilot or not for it.
Thought the link would be of interest for you as it list Fw190 units. Here is another, 190 specific, http://fw190.hobbyvista.com/oob.htm
What heavy bombing did do was keep manpower away from production (re-building, repairing) and from combat, and deflecting production away from more important weapons of war (instead of producing 88 flak, they could have been building more 88 AT weapons).
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Originally posted by Crumpp
It also coincides with a major daylight-bombing offensive that started in Jan. 44 with Berlin and culminated in Operation Argument "Big Week" in March.
Crumpp
Naturally, it coincides, since the heavies had escorts. No more Black Thursday missions. No escorts, No berlin missions.
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Heavy bombing produced little to no effect on complicated industrial output that is dispersed properly.
German fighter production numbers increased primarily because fighter production was quite low prior to the 1000-bomber raids. Germany was fighting the allies with much fewer resources, and fighter production had been given a low priority. Dispersing the manufacturing led to greatly reduced efficiency and quality. After assembly, planes had to be thoroughly gone over by LW mechanics to bring them up to unit standards.
The Luftwaffe did not run out planes. It ran out of qualified men to fly them.
They were low on planes, fuel, and pilots. The bomber campaign had something to do with that. If there were surplus fighters at the end of the war it is probably because the factories continued to produce fighters for a few months after flight training had all but ceased. If pilots had been produced for those fighters, they would have been lost after 2 or 3 sorties, and the numbers of both planes and pilots would have stayed low. So these surplus fighters only existed because they never saw combat. But the LW was not able to defend Germany in the last year of the war.
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They were low on planes, fuel, and pilots.
They had more planes than pilots. They were catastrophically short of fuel as well due the fact POL is a very "bottlenecked" strategic industry and easy to target.
Dispersing the manufacturing led to greatly reduced efficiency and quality.
No it did not. In fact, Speer's same model is used today in many western nations for strategic industrial defense.
After assembly, planes had to be thoroughly gone over by LW mechanics to bring them up to unit standards.
Because key strategic industries used slave labor there was huge problem with sabotage. BMW, Mercedes, and most of the key war materials industry used concentration camp workers. BMW in Stuttgart received most of it's manual/assembly line workers from Dachau. The Bayer Company (Aspirin) was one of major contributors to Dr Mengele's "research".
The Allies conducted extensive After Action Reviews of the Air War in Europe. Those reviews became the foundation of today's strategic doctrine.
The biggest contribution the bombers made was in drawing the Luftwaffe into a war of attrition it could not afford, thereby destroying it.
Without total Air Supremacy and constant re-attack, industry suffers little.
The actual destruction of the German economy did not really occur until the last months of the war. Exception being the key POL industry. When the degradation of the German Aircraft production capability occurred in the last months of the war, Germany had no more pilots left anyway and a surplus of planes. By then the war was won anyway.
Some good reads on the Subject:
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0684839156/002-9877541-1789642?v=glance
The War Diaries
http://www.butler98.freeserve.co.uk/caldwell.htm
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0306806045/002-9877541-1789642?v=glance
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/1853673277/002-9877541-1789642?v=glance
Here is the USAAF review of the Strategic bombing campaign written in 1945.
Conclusion:
http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm#c
Entire Report:
http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm
This subject is still the topic of much heated debate in professional military circles. I highly doubt we sill solve it here.
Crumpp
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Detailed production data for this period, as for others, were taken by the Survey, and German air generals, production officials, and leading manufacturers, including Messerschmitt and Tank (of Focke-Wulf) were interrogated at length. Production was not knocked out for long. On the contrary, during the whole year of 1944 the German air force is reported to have accepted a total of 39,807 aircraft of all types -- compared with 8,295 in 1939, or 15,596 in 1942 before the plants suffered any attack. Although it is difficult to determine exact production for any single month, acceptances were higher in March, the month after the heaviest attack, than they were in January, the month before. They continued to rise.
Recovery was improvised almost as quickly as the plants were knocked out. With the shift in priority for strategic attacks -- first to marshalling yards and bridges in France in preparation for invasion, immediately followed by the air campaign against oil -- the continued attacks on the aircraft industry were suspended.
http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm#tgsp
The seeming paradox of the attack on the aircraft plants is that, although production recovered quickly, the German air force after the attacks was not again a serious threat to Allied air superiority. The attacks in the winter of 1944 were escorted by P-51's and P-47's and with the appearance of these planes in force a sharp change had been ordered in escort tactics. Previously the escort planes had to protect the bomber force as their primary responsibility. They were now instructed to invite opposition from German fighter forces and to engage them at every opportunity. As a result, German fighter losses mounted sharply. The claimed losses in January were 1,115 German fighters, in February 1,118 and in March 1,217. The losses in planes were accompanied by losses in experienced pilots and disorganization and loss of the combat strength of squadrons and groups. By the spring of 1944 opposition of the Luftwaffe had ceased to be effective.
German fighter production continued to increase during the summer of 1944, and acceptances reached a peak of 3,375 in September. Although it has studied the problem with considerable care, the Survey has no clear answer as to what happened to these planes; the differences of opinion between German air generals, it might be added, are at least as great as between those who have searched for the explanation. Certainly only a minority of the planes appeared in combat. Possibly the remainder were lost in transit from factory to combat bases, destroyed on the fields, or grounded because of a shortage of gasoline or pilots. Conceivably some are part of an inflation of German production figures. The answer is not clear.
http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm#tgsp
Crumpp
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Originally posted by bozon
Probably very true.
What the americans had going for them, both in ETO and PTO is tactics not individual skills. I am no expert, but from all the reading about WWII air combat I got the impression that the americans we the most flexible and innovative in their tactics - both wingman tactics, and general fighting tactics. When I read american aces stories, I actually get the impression of very dweebish flying. RAF aces tell of twisting and turning at treetops and much ACM. American aces tell about flying fast and diving into clouds out of trouble and banging a bandit in pairs.
just an impression.
Bozon
Don't forget that often technology dictates tactics. American planes were generally high wing loaded, faster, heavier fighters. Turnfighting would be suicidal, so you dont read about them turnfighting. The Brits have the spit .... need I say more?
It isnt dweebish to use what you have to its best advantage but avoid its weaknesses. And if you read about US engagements that extended in to multiple kills, the effects of lower energy do reflect more positioning and "turn" issues -- but still in essentially BnZ craft.
Incidentally, the appropriate effect of aircraft limitations might be worth considering next time one denigrates a 190D flier who zoom climbs and reverses back to you before you can get a clean snapshot (not meaning you, bozon, just a general comment).
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Originally posted by Crumpp
The biggest contribution the bombers made was in drawing the Luftwaffe into a war of attrition it could not afford, thereby destroying it.
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This subject is still the topic of much heated debate in professional military circles. I highly doubt we sill solve it here.
Crumpp
Strongly concur on both points.
Incidentally, Stalin was at first satisfied with the opening of the heavy daylight bomber offensive as a "third front" for this very reason -- it drew substantial LW resources away from the Eastern Front.
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From Crumpp:
"--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dispersing the manufacturing led to greatly reduced efficiency and quality.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No it did not. In fact, Speer's same model is used today in many western nations for strategic industrial defense. "
Well, it works, bombing the manufacture is out of the question if you disperse it. The Brits did it too!
However, it stops working so well when transport facilities get screwed up from bombing.
;)
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However, it stops working so well when transport facilities get screwed up from bombing.
Yep. It is much harder to choke a transportation system. Unless you have absolute Air Supremacy and enough planes to fly multiple sorties on reattack's, some stuff will still get through.
Crumpp
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The allies managed that pretty well in WW2.
After all, transport such as by rail is also very hard to defend.
Locomotive hunting, yeahhhhh.
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The allies managed that pretty well in WW2.
Railroads are vunerable. So is shipping.
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Angus
From Crumpp:
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Dispersing the manufacturing led to greatly reduced efficiency and quality.
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No it did not. In fact, Speer's same model is used today in many western nations for strategic industrial defense. "
Well, it works, bombing the manufacture is out of the question if you disperse it. The Brits did it too!
However, it stops working so well when transport facilities get screwed up from bombing.
;)
Dispersing the manufacturing didn't come at a price? That's the first I've heard of that. Maybe all industries should move their manufacturing into caves and forests.
I hope no one is using Speer's slave labor model.
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How is the Airbus made?
Although, not in order to counter bomb attacks, it still seems to be competitive to other airliners on the market.
Of course, dispersion as a countermeasure will come at a cost, it works brilliantly in a perfect world, but as it just isn't so, the costs are some.
BTW, the Brits "dispersion" was also due to subcontractors, etc.
Now, a dispersion of a final assembly line is rather bad.
The German dispersion was rather costly and seized up all sort of production once their transport system was hit. However, their manufacture output was still stunning in late WW2.
Of course, enslaving millions of people helped them out a bit.
:mad: SOB's
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Angus,
Yes, it was still running and absolute production is reported to have gone up through the summer of '44.
However, imagine how much it might have gone up if they hadn't had to disperse the production? A whole hack of a lot more I'd imagine.
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I completely agree Karnak. The attrition of a communications and transport system in shambles was quite severe.
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I completely agree Karnak. The attrition of a communications and transport system in shambles was quite severe.
Yeah it was definitely much tougher however neither communications nor transportation were totally knocked out until the final months of the war. When the Allies had total Air Supremacy.
Dispersing the manufacturing didn't come at a price? That's the first I've heard of that. Maybe all industries should move their manufacturing into caves and forests.
Yeah, Like the Computer Industry! Lot's of Dells in the forest...
I hope no one is using Speer's slave labor model.
Yeah me too. With the Exception of "Made in China". My life would be just too inconvenient without their stuff. :eek:
Crumpp