Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => Aircraft and Vehicles => Topic started by: simshell on June 14, 2005, 11:18:53 AM
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how accurate was the British bombing at night ?
and did it realy hurt germany in anyway?
and what was the method for finding and hitting the target?
this is something iv not heard much about
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In 1940 it was useless. Something like 50% of the bombs fell within 25 miles of the target. By 1945 it was pretty much as accurate as USAAF daylight bombing.
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Originally posted by Karnak
In 1940 it was useless. Something like 50% of the bombs fell within 25 miles of the target. By 1945 it was pretty much as accurate as USAAF daylight bombing.
And sometimes more accurate than USAAF bombing. It is hard to be accurate when the bombers drop on the lead bombers drop with formations over 1500' wide. Then there was the target being obscured from smoke and dust from previously dropped bombs.
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The introduction of H2S radar and the use of pathfinders helped a lot.
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From the United States Strategic Bombing Survey:
Under the conditions created in Germany by heavy flak, fighter opposition, bad weather, and effective smoke screening, it was necessary in a high percentage of the attacks to use instrument bombing, which proved to be far less accurate than visual bombing. As a result, tremendous tonnages had to be flown from England in order to hit vital parts of plants with a relatively small tonnage. Detailed plant records for three plants (Leuna, Ludwigshafen-Oppau, Zeitz) show that, of 30,000 tons of bombs dropped, only 3,781 tons hit within the plant fences. Different aiming techniques gave the following results:
Air Force and Technique Percentage of Hits Within the Plants
8th AF visual aiming 26.8
8th AF, part visual aiming and part instrument 12.4
8th AF, full instrument 5.4
RAF, night Pathfinder technique 15.8
Weighted average 12.6
That example illustrates the point quite nicely. On average, visual aiming by day was more accurate than instrument bombing.
However, because of weather conditions and smoke screens, the USAAF frequently had to bomb using instruments (I've seen figures that show more than half their attacks in the last year of the war were made on instruments, not visual aiming)
So, the USAAF frequently ended up using similar techniques to the RAF, but the RAF, which had pioneered the techniques, and put a lot of effort into training for them, were more accurate bombing with radar and nav aids than the USAAF.
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They had planes go in before the bombers and drop flares over the target to help them find it, didn't they?
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I think that was how they did it, before radar was widely used.
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Originally posted by nirvana
They had planes go in before the bombers and drop flares over the target to help them find it, didn't they?
A little different. The flares are colored and a pathfinder Mossie would go in and mark the target with a flare. If the Mossie missed he would go in and mark it again with a different color, then let the Lancs know which to target. So the Lancs were targeting the flare, not using it to illuminate the target.
That was one method. Another was to use the H2S ground mapping radar on later Lancs and Halifaxes to determine where the target was.
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What are you talking about, effective? They levelled cities! Forget whether they hit "factory X" for a second and think about the 100,000's of lives that were lost from incendiary bombs, the fact that some German cities were litterally obliterated completely.
It sure as HELL did damage. Forget hitting a single factory, but ALL bombing took its toll. Don't forget that.
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how accurate was the British bombing at night ?
Well, they normally managed to hit Germany, but some of the bombs still fell on neibouring countries like the Netherlands.
Bozon
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Yeah, the RAF officials came up with nice 'statistics' after the war to prove how much more accurate the Bomber Command was than the USAAF during the daylight.
Statistics lie 90% hit the target area... the only problem that they defined the target area with a circle of 8 miles(!!!!). :D
But one just wonder, if they had so brilliant bombing technique, why is it that even in 1945 they did nothing else than area bombing and piling up hills from the bodies dead civillians?
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Originally posted by Kurfürst
Yeah, the RAF officials came up with nice 'statistics' after the war to prove how much more accurate the Bomber Command was than the USAAF during the daylight.
Statistics lie 90% hit the target area... the only problem that they defined the target area with a circle of 8 miles(!!!!). :D
But one just wonder, if they had so brilliant bombing technique, why is it that even in 1945 they did nothing else than area bombing and piling up hills from the bodies dead civillians?
You mean apart from the Dams; sub pens and and the Tirpitz?
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2 dams, a couple of damaged subpens and an enemy battleship sunk does not seem to me a good payoff for over ten thousend bombers lost with 55 000 crew onboard, an effort that amounted 40% of the British war spendings according to AJP Taylor.
Hmm, Tirpitz...Flown by the best RAF bomber pilots, perfectly clear weather, no enemy fighters etc...
.. and out of the 60+ large bombs dropped, I think 1 or two hit a stationary, 250 m long, 36 meter wide target.
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You mean apart from the Dams; sub pens and and the Tirpitz?
Most of that wasn't night bombing nor was it standard level bombing. It's a stupid comparison.
Yeah, the RAF officials came up with nice 'statistics' after the war to prove how much more accurate the Bomber Command was than the USAAF during the daylight.
Statistics lie 90% hit the target area... the only problem that they defined the target area with a circle of 8 miles(!!!!).
But one just wonder, if they had so brilliant bombing technique, why is it that even in 1945 they did nothing else than area bombing and piling up hills from the bodies dead civillians?
Kurfürst is correct,
Its not that hard to fire bomb apartment blocks 'accurately'...
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Originally posted by Kurfürst
But one just wonder, if they had so brilliant bombing technique, why is it that even in 1945 they did nothing else than area bombing and piling up hills from the bodies dead civillians?
I don't believe you have the nerve!!!!!
Germany -
1) Indiscrimate bombing of London, Coventry etc
2) V1, V2 Were only to kill civilians.
3) Rounded up MILLIONS of innocent civilians and killed them.
He who live in glasshouse, shouldn't throw stones.
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Two wrongs just doesn`t make one good.
BTW... V-1 and V-2`s designation stands for 'Weapon of Retribution'. Retribution for what, hmm?
And I also think you need a lot more reading on London and Conventry.
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Kurfurst,
Yes, they did miss absolutely horribly in the early war, and yes they did (wrongly we know now) target cities. That is all true. It is also true that the USAAF also targeted whole cities at times.
But it is also true that they targeted specific things like factories and rail yards at night with accuracy eqivilent to the USAAF daylight raids. I have seen some of the before and after photos of these targets. They are not citiy sized and they are moonscapes after the raid, not just a couple of bomb craters out of the hundreds dropped.
To push one and omit the other only illustrates your bias. Your claim that they could only hit cities is demostratably false, not that I expect you to believe anything other than what you wish to and what reinforces the version of history that you prefer.
I put it to you, if the British were so fond of manipulating statistics to make them sound better, why didn't they tidy up their own reports about their absolutely useless "accuracy" in the early war?
FWIW, I agree with you about the waste of resources that Bomber Command was, as it was operated.
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Originally posted by Wotan
Its not that hard to fire bomb apartment blocks 'accurately'...
Heh. As we proved to Japan, starting on March 9, 1945.
- oldman
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Originally posted by Oldman731
Heh. As we proved to Japan, starting on March 9, 1945.
- oldman
Funny how that concept of "total war" works isn't it.
Dan/CorkyJr
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Yeah, the RAF officials came up with nice 'statistics' after the war to prove how much more accurate the Bomber Command was than the USAAF during the daylight.
The statistics were from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey.
But one just wonder, if they had so brilliant bombing technique, why is it that even in 1945 they did nothing else than area bombing and piling up hills from the bodies dead civillians?
They didn't.
About a third of RAF tonnage in 1944 and 1945 went on German cities, with 2 thirds on other target types. (eg about 96,000 tons on oil targets)
Most of that wasn't night bombing nor was it standard level bombing. It's a stupid comparison
Okay, what about the USSBS figures. It's a comparison they chose, and it's from their summary.
Or look at the operations over France and the Netherlands, where the USAAF had a terrible record of inflicting "collateral damage", far worse than the RAF.
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Originally posted by Wotan
Most of that wasn't night bombing nor was it standard level bombing. It's a stupid comparison.
I'm not sure it is.
It's a statement of what bomber command was capable of; not what they actualy did.
What bomber command did was what ever they wanted to; when ever they wanted.
Flattening German cities is no measure of the achievable accuracy; because flattening German cities is exactly what Harris wanted to do. (ipso facto: target achieved).
And when Bomber command wanted to be more precise; well, then they were.
Let's be fair; I'm by no means claiming smart bomb precision; especialy in the early years; but nonetheless; Bomber command hit what they wanted; when they wanted; losses were immaterial to Harris as they were to Zukov (sp?); so long as the mission was achieved.
Almost a centuary later we can discuss strategic effectivness and moral comparisons; but they were not the issues of the day.
We Brits just wanted to kill Jerry in large numbers; and we did.
Makes you glad for the EU; no?
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I think its pretty much accepted that massive RAF raids agin German cities were in Harris's own words targetted at the German people......... he considered attacks against strategic targets a waste of time. His preferred targets were cities not factories.
The RAF never got the Sperry or Norden bomb sight it was considered top secret by the US until the war end.......
The RAF made major improvements in bombing accuracy during pre DDay bombing of strategic targets in France this was day light or dawn/dusk and much lower than the norm.
The RAF bombed Germany (Rhine/Rhur) from 16K (lancasters) and 14K (halifaxes) during night time raids. On one occasion my father (in a Halifax)was forced below 11K by lead and slowed to some silly speed (which I cant remember) dropping bombs from 10k with wheels down to concentrate the pattern.
Only few lead navigation air craft were fitted with sophisticated air to ground radar for the purposes of bomb aiming....in the main it was about navigation to target zone.
The US dropped from 20K or above.
When looking at RAF and RCAF bomber command losses you have to factor in survival chances in 40 to 43 agin survival chances 43 to 45.
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Originally posted by Tilt
The RAF never got the Sperry or Norden bomb sight it was considered top secret by the US until the war end.......
How ironic... a german-american working in the Norden factory already sent the plans home before the war even started...
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Originally posted by Kurfürst
How ironic... a german-american working in the Norden factory already sent the plans home before the war even started...
nothing new there then!
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However, afaik the RAF developed it`s own gyro gunsight in 1943, similiar to the German Lofte or the American Norden.
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Originally posted by Guppy35
Funny how that concept of "total war" works isn't it.
Dan/CorkyJr
I just have to wonder how bad the Axis was to let the totally
skilless, clueless American horde beat them? I mean, gee whiz,
you know the Americans never did ANYTHING to win the war. It's
a darn good thing the rest of the allies were there to save our
bacon.
Just ask anyone on the eastern side of the atlantic, it's a
complete mystery.
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Originally posted by Rino
I just have to wonder how bad the Axis was to let the totally
skilless, clueless American horde beat them? I mean, gee whiz,
you know the Americans never did ANYTHING to win the war. It's
a darn good thing the rest of the allies were there to save our
bacon.
Just ask anyone on the eastern side of the atlantic, it's a
complete mystery.
What!?!
This is, erm, out of left field. Could you clarify what you are talking about/objecting too please.
Thanks.
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Originally posted by Seeker
I'm not sure it is.
It's a statement of what bomber command was capable of; not what they actually did.
What bomber command did was what ever they wanted to; when ever they wanted.
Flattening German cities is no measure of the achievable accuracy; because flattening German cities is exactly what Harris wanted to do. (ipso facto: target achieved).
And when Bomber command wanted to be more precise; well, then they were.
Let's be fair; I'm by no means claiming smart bomb precision; especialy in the early years; but nonetheless; Bomber command hit what they wanted; when they wanted; losses were immaterial to Harris as they were to Zukov (sp?); so long as the mission was achieved.
Almost a centuary later we can discuss strategic effectivness and moral comparisons; but they were not the issues of the day.
We Brits just wanted to kill Jerry in large numbers; and we did.
Makes you glad for the EU; no?
Well I am glad at least one Brit on this forums agrees. For the record the allies didn't even charge the Nazi's with war crimes related to the bombing of cities and civilians. However, moral relativism aside it's still a huge black mark of the western allies.
My point to you was that the three examples you gave aren't covered under the topic heading.
But since you brought them up, what do your three examples show?
Let's take them one by one:
the Dams:
The objective was to destroy the dams and knock out the electricity generated to the Ruhr industries...
What it accomplished was it killed a bunch of civilians. Ruhr industry was hardly effected.
Not only that but the loss of pilots and crews were hardly worth killing those civilians.
sub pens:
What sub pens were closed by the RAF?
Answer is none. In fact some were still in operation in France at the time of surrender.
Tirpitz:
You really think that was a 'success'? Look at all the resources that the RAF had tied up going after a single ship that was for the most part contained and posed little threat at that stage of the war.
The facts are the Bomber Command was more effective in fire bombing apartment blocks then anything else they 'accomplished'.
They didn't hit whatever they want and that which they did hit took considerable effort.
The goal of Harris was to win the war by killing as many people as possible so that the Germans give up. It didn't and it never could have happened.
I think its pretty much accepted that massive RAF raids agin German cities were in Harris's own words targetted at the German people......... he considered attacks against strategic targets a waste of time. His preferred targets were cities not factories.
Tilt is correct. When Harris was told to move resources over to help hit the transportation hubs just prior to D-day he through a fit and thought that he was wasting his effort. He felt if he was allowed to continue fire bombing German civilians he could win the war.
He learned his trade during the inter-war years when the Brits used gas bombs dropped from RAF bombers on Muslims villages to keep them in line.
His goal was to kill err... 'de-house' civilians.
I just have to wonder how bad the Axis was to let the totally
skilless, clueless American horde beat them?
This thread has nothing to do with Americans. Its entitled:
British Night bombing
Americans didn't win WW2 all by themselves regardless of what you may have seen in the movies or on the history channel.
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gas bombs on muslims ? not heard that one before
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Originally posted by Karnak
What!?!
This is, erm, out of left field. Could you clarify what you are talking about/objecting too please.
Thanks.
It's just a average whine because everyone is not spending every waking minute telling the Americans how wonderful they are and how we all owe them...well just about everything.
America entered and fought WW2 for it's own interests and to further those interests, as did every other combatant in just about every other war.
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That's the claim that gas bombs were used by the RAF in Iraq and Afghanistan. Not true, of course, but it's done the propoganda rounds in the run up to the recent invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.
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Originally posted by Nashwan
That's the claim that gas bombs were used by the RAF in Iraq and Afghanistan. Not true, of course, but it's done the propoganda rounds in the run up to the recent invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.
They were not used..........but the RAF was under no stricture of moral code vis a vis whether they should be or not.......(Harris is again on record as is Churchhill in this respect).......neither was the RAF concerned as to whether the victims were Muslims or not. They were Kurdish insurgents that needed quelling.
It was quite simply cheaper to bomb and shoot them from aeroplanes than use troops on the ground
There is no moral high ground to be sought in war .........there never is IMO.
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We Brits just wanted to kill Jerry in large numbers; and we did.
What the RAF were trying to do was destroy German cities. That's different from killing people, just as destroying a factory is different from killing it's workers.
Bomber Commands policy of area raids was developed from German attacks on Britiain in 1940 and 1941. In particular it was found that the damage done in German area attacks caused far more lost production than German raids on factories.
Here's a letter passed on from Herschel Johnson to the US secretary of state in early 1941, describing the effect of German raids on British towns, particulary Coventry:
At numerous industrial plants, in this part of England, where hundreds of workmen are employed, only a neglible percent of such workpeople is not in one way or another adversely affected in consequence of air raids. Loss of sleep is a factor even in cases where the workmen remain at home and do not repair to shelters.
But, generally speaking, a more potent factor is worry induced by the disintegration of family life. It requires little imagination to comprehend what must be the state of mind of a workman who begins his task in the morning knowing that his wife and children are standing at some windswept bus stop both hungry and cold, or what must be the state of mind of a workman who knows that his wife and family must remain in a house which has been rendered unfit for human habitation and which it is beyond his means to repair.
The bombing of working-class residential districts in this area has come to be accepted as an ingenious and effective move on the part of Germany. Moreover, such bombing has come to be viewed as even a greater menace than the damage actually done to industrial plant. What happened at Coventry well illustrates the devilish effectiveness of the bombing of districts inhabited by working-class people. It seems to be pretty well established that as many as 70,000 houses in the comparatively small city of Coventry were affected by bombing and that of these 30,000 were made unfit for human habitation, and 7,000 demolished entirely.
The big raid on Coventry took place during the night of November 14-15, 1940. Since that time some weeks have elapsed and great strides have been made in the direction of make-shift repairs to damaged working-class residences. But there is not a sizeable industrial enterprise in the whole of Coventry whose production is not still being adversely affected by raiding has wrought in the lives of Coventry working people. There hovers over that city an apprehensiveness which has lingered since the raid took place. This apprehensiveness is born of a realization that the Germans can at will again do to Coventry what they did to it
during that one horrible night in November.
Intricate, costly, and heavy machine tools can be extricated from the cellars of demolished manufacturing plants. Many of them can be repaired and installed in new plant. But the workers
who man these machines, so long as they live as they do today, can never attain the efficiency which, before the events in question took place, they maintained as a mere matter of course.
Note there is no mention of civilian casualties there. That's because the vast majority of raids produced relatively small civilian casualties.
Even the most devastating attack in Europe, the bombing of Hamburg, killed about 3% of the population, yet resulted in about 50% decline in production for months afterwards.
Britain was the recipient of both daylight precision attacks, and night time area raids, and found the latter much more damaging to production. It's based on that, and following the German example, that the RAF switched to area bombing themselves.
Well I am glad at least one Brit on this forums agrees. For the record the allies didn't even charge the Nazi's with war crimes related to the bombing of cities and civilians.
That's because it wasn't a crime. There was no international law or treaty prohibiting it. In fact, international law (the Hague Conventions of 1907) specifically allowed the bombardment by land and sea of defended cities, in the abscence of aircraft being mentioned, the same rules were applied to them.
There was a brief ban on bombardment from balloons, but that ws only designed to run for 5 years, and nobody agreed to extend that once the five years was up.
the Dams:
The objective was to destroy the dams and knock out the electricity generated to the Ruhr industries...
What it accomplished was it killed a bunch of civilians. Ruhr industry was hardly effected.
Not only that but the loss of pilots and crews were hardly worth killing those civilians.
Well, Speer diverted electric motors and specialist engineers from all over Germany to help restore the damage. In his own words, he wanted to restore armament production in the Ruhr to half it's normal after one week, and back to full production within 2 weeks. In all, not far off half of all armament production for the entire Ruhr area was lost for the month. (As just one example, steel production was down by about 400,000 tons because of the raid)
Plus 27,000 workers had to be used to clear up the mess, dredge some of the rivers that had been blocked to navigation, restore the pumping plants and electricity generators, etc. About half of these were taken directly from their work constructing defences on the Atlantic Wall, making for an easier time in 1944.
sub pens:
What sub pens were closed by the RAF?
Answer is none. In fact some were still in operation in France at the time of surrender.
Well, the RAF did of course destroy submarine pens, but not until later in the war, when the Tallboy became available. The simple truth is the pens were impervious to normal bombs.
It was the USAAF who expended most effort on the submarine pens, making them number one priority for much of 1942 and 1943, although I don't they succeeded in destroying any (the bombs simply wouldn't penetrate).
Tirpitz:
You really think that was a 'success'? Look at all the resources that the RAF had tied up going after a single ship that was for the most part contained and posed little threat at that stage of the war.
I believe the RAF lost 13 aircraft attacking the Tirpitz, which seems like a good return. They launched 3 raids in 1943, 3 more before the end of the war, iirc. In total less than 200 aircraft, and total losses amounted to 13 (again iirc)
And the Tirpitz was a threat to the Artic convoys, which tied up several British and US battleships and carriers.
His goal was to kill err... 'de-house' civilians.
No, his goal was to win the war.
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Bomber Harris when caught speeding by police in 1943 - Policeman "Sir, you might have killed someone!!" - Harris in reply "It's my job to kill people...."
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Gosh sounds bad for the Germans. I guess they shouldn't have started the freaking war eh?
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"The Nazis entered this war under the rather childish delusion that they were going to bomb everyone else, and nobody was going to bomb them. At Rotterdam, London, Warsaw, and half a hundred other places, they put their rather naive theory into operation. They sowed the wind, and now they are going to reap the whirlwind."
Arthur Harris
They were not used..........but the RAF was under no stricture of moral code vis a vis whether they should be or not.......(Harris is again on record as is Churchhill in this respect).......neither was the RAF concerned as to whether the victims were Muslims or not. They were Kurdish insurgents that needed quelling.
The claim that Churchill advocated "gassing" tribesmen needs to be seen in the context of the point he made:
"I do not understand this squeamishness about the use of gas. We have definitely adopted the position at the Peace Conference of arguing in favour of the retention of gas as a permanent method of warfare. It is sheer affectation to lacerate a man with the poisonous fragment of a bursting shell and to boggle at making his eyes water by means of lachrymatory gas. I am strongly in favour of using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes. The moral effect should be so good that the loss of life should be reduced to a minimum. It is not necessary to use only the most deadly gasses: gasses can be used which cause great inconvenience and would spread a lively terror and yet would leave no serious permanent effects on most of those affected."
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On the effectiveness of the Allied bombing of Germany, this is a quote from a presentation given by Professor Richard Overy, the historian:
"The effects of the bombing campaign went far beyond the mere physical destruction of factories and dwelling-houses, although these effects should not be underestimated in a complex and technically sophisticated industrial economy stretched taut by the demands of war. The bombing produced serious social dislocation and a high cost in terms of man-hours (or woman-hours in many cases). Evacuation, rehabilitation and welfare provision were carried out on the largest scale in an economy struggling with serious manpower losses and cuts in civilian production. Bombing also encouraged a strategic response from Hitler which placed a further strain on the war economy by diverting vast resources to projects of little advantage to the German war effort.
The net effect of the many ways in which bombing directly or indirectly impeded economic mobilisation cannot be calculated precisely. But in the absence of physical destruction and dislocation, without expensive programmes for secret weapons and underground production and without the diversion of four-fifths of the fighter force, one-third of all guns and one-fifth of all ammunition to the anti-bombing war the German armed forces could have been supplied with at least 50% more equipment in the last two years of war, perhaps much more. In an environment entirely free of bomb attack the German authorities and German industrial managers would have had the opportunity to exploit Germany’s resource-rich empire in Europe to the full. In 1942 the air force had begun to plan the production of 7000 aircraft a month, yet at the peak in 1944 a little over 3000 were produced, of which one-quarter were destroyed before even reaching the front-line.
Bombing took the strategic initiative away from German forces, and compelled Germany to divert an ever-increasing share of its manpower and resources away from production for the battlefield. As it was, German forces proved a formidable barrier to the end of the war. With more men, more heavily armed, an intact transport system and an uninterrupted flow of industrial resources Germany might well have kept the Allies at bay in 1945. Then the Allies would have faced the agonising decision about whether or not to drop atomic weapons on German cities rather than on Hiroshima and Nagasaki."
Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website (http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk) and discussion forum (http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/)
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A few comments on USAAF day-bombing v RAF night-bombing.
Targets: in the last year of the war, the RAF attacked area targets about two-thirds of the time, precision targets the other third. For the USAAF, the figures were the other way round. It is not generally known that although the initial RAF attack on Dresden did most of the damage, the USAAF follow-ups sent more bombers in total against that unfortunate city. A key difference between them was the Harris was honest about what he was doing, the USAAF never admitted it: they would say that they were bombing a specific target without mentioning that it was surrounded by housing. The German inhabitants often wouldn't have been able to tell the difference between a USAAF 'precision' raid and an RAF 'area' raid.
Technology: part of the reason for the USAAF's use of area attacks was that the weather frequently made visual attacks impossible. In the last 9 months of the war, no fewer than 70% of USAAF raids on Germany used radar bombing - which was no more accurate during the day than it was at night (which is to say, not very). The RAF used radar bombing when the weather was bad, but at other times they had, by the final stages of the war, developed a highly sophisticated system which involved Pathfinder crews locating and marking the target, and Master Bombers cruising overhead telling each incoming plane where to drop its bombs. When done well, this was phenomenally accurate and resulted in the obliteration of the target with few 'strays'.
Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website (http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk) and discussion forum (http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/)
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"The Nazis entered this war under the rather childish delusion that they were going to bomb everyone else, and nobody was going to bomb them. At Rotterdam, London, Warsaw, and half a hundred other places, they put their rather naive theory into operation. They sowed the wind, and now they are going to reap the whirlwind."
Arthur Harris
That would be all well and good but the Nazi strategy wasn't to bomb their way to victory. What was the plan anyway, to prove they could kill more by bomb then the Nazi's?
Rotterdam was bombed because it was a port bringing in supplies to feed Allied troops. The ports were the targets not civilians...
Warsaw was bombed because Polish military withdrew into the city. 'Flying artillery' was sent in not to target civilians but to demoralize those troops.
London? London was an escalation brought on by British retaliation of 'a few bombs gone astray'.
Harris not only went after civilians with a fervor but he went at them at the expense of his own aircraft and crews...
As an example:
Harris had claimed that he could "flatten" Berlin and cause the Germans to crumble under the weight of Bomber Command's assault. He didn't even come close. Bomber Command losses were high. In the nineteen raids on Berlin that comprised the "Battle of Berlin" BC lost 625 aircraft and over 3,000 aircrewmen killed or captured. The overall damage to Berlin, after nineteen heavy, concentrated raids, was relatively minor. Approximately 10,000 civilian deaths are attributed to those raids. The city's infra structure and arms production capabilities were not significantly degraded.
Martin Middlebrook "The Berlin Raids," chapter 12.
His theory of victory was flawed, even some Brits at the time thought so. Churchill was tried to distance himself from Harris after Dresden.
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/334_1118932217_memorandum.jpg)
Besides Harris was well versed on the use of bombs and bombers as terror weapons well before WW2:
WSWS : News & Analysis : Middle East : Iraq
How the British bombed Iraq in the 1920s
By Henry Michaels
1 April 2003
Use this version to print | Send this link by email | Email the author
The US and British governments, and most Western media pundits, have tried to explain the determined resistance of the Iraqi people to the US-led assault by referring to the first Bush administration’s 1991 betrayal of the Kurds in the north and Shiites in the south. Once Iraqis are confident that the Allies are serious about occupying the country, the argument goes, they will rise up and welcome them as liberators.
These assertions ignore the deeply-felt hostility to decades of colonial and semi-colonial rule by the Western powers, who long plundered Iraq’s oil reserves. During World War I, Mesopotamia was occupied by British forces, and it became a British mandated territory in 1920. In 1921, a kingdom was established under Faisal I, son of King Hussein of Hejaz and leader of the Arab Army in World War I. Britain withdrew from Iraq in 1932, but British and American oil companies retained their grip over the country.
One of the most bitter chapters in this history, one with direct parallels to the current military campaign, occurred during the 1920s. In many respects, the air war now being employed in Iraq is an offshoot of a military policy developed by Britain as it clung to its Iraqi colony 80 years ago.
Confronting a financial crisis after World War I, in mid-February 1920 Minister of War and Air Winston Churchill asked Chief of the Air Staff Hugh Trenchard to draw up a plan whereby Mesopotamia could be cheaply policed by aircraft armed with gas bombs, supported by as few as 4,000 British and 10,000 Indian troops.
Several months later, a widespread uprising broke out, which was only put down through months of heavy aerial bombardment, including the use of mustard gas. At the height of the suppression, both Churchill and Trenchard tried to put the most flattering light upon actions of the Royal Air Force.
British historian David Omissi, author of Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force 1919-1939, records: “During the first week of July there was fierce fighting around Samawa and Rumaitha on the Euphrates but, Churchill told the Cabinet on 7 July, ‘our attack was successful.... The enemy were bombed and machine-gunned with effect by aeroplanes which cooperated with the troops’.”
The order issued by one RAF wing commander, J.A. Chamier, specified: “The attack with bombs and machine guns must be relentless and unremitting and carried on continuously by day and night, on houses, inhabitants, crops and cattle.”
*Arthur “Bomber” Harris, a young RAF squadron commander, reported after a mission in 1924: “The Arab and Kurd now know what real bombing means, in casualties and damage: They know that within 45 minutes a full-sized village can be practically wiped out and a third of its inhabitants killed or injured.”
The RAF sent a report to the British Parliament outlining the steps that its pilots had taken to avoid civilian casualties. The air war was less brutal than other forms of military control, it stated, concluding that “the main purpose is to bring about submission with the minimum of destruction and loss of life.”
Knowing the truth, at least one military officer resigned. Air Commander Lionel Charlton sent a letter of protest and resigned in 1923 over what he considered the “policy of intimidation by bomb” after visiting a local hospital full of injured civilians.
The methods pioneered in Iraq were applied throughout the Middle East. Omissi writes: “The policing role of most political moment carried out by the Royal Air Force during the 1920s was to maintain the power of the Arab kingdoms in Transjordan and Iraq; but aeroplanes also helped to dominate other populations under British sway.
“Schemes of air control similar to that practiced in Mesopotamia were set up in the Palestine Mandate in 1922 and in the Aden Protectorate six years later. Bombers were active at various times against rioters in Egypt, tribesmen on the Frontier, pastoralists in the Southern Sudan and nomads in the Somali hinterland.”
* sound familiar?
EDIT:
ADDED IMAGE...
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Mr. Williams
There has been some rebuttal of Overy's conclusions. His a quote (I will dig up the source later today):
Richard Overy, in his book Why the Allies Won, makes the following statement about the effectiveness of British and American bombing of the Third Reich: "At the end of January 1945 Albert Speer and his ministerial colleagues met in Berlin to sum up what bombing had done to production schedules for 1944. They found that Germany had produced 35 percent fewer tanks than planned, 31 percent fewer aircraft and 42 percent fewer lorries as a result of bombing. The denial of these huge resources to German forces in 1944 fatally weakened their response to bombing and invasion and eased the path of Allied armies."
On the surface, Speer's analysis tells us that the Allied strategic bombing campaign had a decisive impact on the German war effort in 1944. Based on figures found in Paul Kennedy's "Rise and Fall of the Great Powers," the Germans produced in 1944: 17,800 tanks, 39,807 aircraft. So that, on the basis of Speer's statement, they aimed to produce 24,030 tanks and 52,147 aircraft. For comparison, Allied production of tanks and aircraft in 1944 resulted in 51,500 tanks (USSR: 29,000; UK: 5,000; USA: 17,500) and 163,079 aircraft (USSR: 40,300; UK 26,461; USA: 96,318). Therefore, even with the additional production that would have resulted from no bombing at all, the Allies still produce twice as many tanks and more than three times the number of aircraft as the Third Reich.
Such figures do not support Overy's conclusion that bombing Germany had "fatally weakened their response to bombing and invasion and eased the path of Allied armies." In terms of the kind of war of attrition fought in 1944 the additional German production would not have made a decisive difference. Allied production for 1944 is clearly overwhelming. Looking at the military situation on the ground in 1944 is even more telling of how the war is going.
Overy goes on to say: "The indirect effects were more important still, for the bombing offensive forced the German economy to switch very large resources away from equipment for the fighting fronts, using them instead to combat the bombing threat." At least, an ever-increasing number of Luftwaffe units were devoted to the air defense of the Reich as the war progressed. And, new aircraft production shifted towards fighters and away from bombers. The question remains as to whether this impact of the Allied bombing campaign was decisive to the outcome of the war or had just a marginal effect on it.
Furthermore, the converse of Overy's remark was also true. The production of bomber forces represented a significant resource expenditure for the US and especially Great Britain. Was this a worthwhile military expenditure? The results of the campaign are debatable. Certainly the German capitulation did not come about because of the Allied bombing campaign. That honor must go to the land campaigns fought by the allies. So, could the resources devoted to the bomber force been more effectively employed elsewhere?
Perhaps the greatest oversight in an analysis that focuses on the latter part of the war is that the crucial period to consider is from 1941 to 1943. It is in this period that German power is substantial and the possibility of a German military victory exists. How effective was the Allied bomber campaign during this period? According to a table found in the Penguin Atlas of World History, the Allies dropped about 10,000 tons on Germany in 1940, 30,000 tons in 1941, 40,000 tons in 1942 and 120,000 tons in 1943 while in 1944 they drop 650,000 tons and in 1945, about 500,000 tons are dropped in the first four months (at that rate, 1.5 million tons would be dropped over the course of 1945). Considering that Germany dropped about 37,000 tons on the UK in 1940, another 22,000 tons in 1941, with a few thousand tons every year thereafter with marginal results, there is little reason to believe that the scale of Allied bombing between 1940 and 1943 was substantial enough to alter the military balance in 1941 or 1942 either. Yet those are critical years to consider because that was when Soviet survival hung in the balance and British possessions in the Middle East were threatened by conquest.
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Interesting discussion gentlemen.
<>
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Thanks Wotan, for posting that very interesting, espichaly the part covering British use of Air power in the 20's, this was news to me, espichaly the use of gas on the population, I knew their was no love for British Colonalism but I now know why it was so heartfelt.
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It's worth pointing out that Wotan's bit about the bombing of Iraq in the 20s is from the World Socialist Website, as part of their opposition to the (then coming) invasion of Iraq in 2003.
In particular, no-one has ever been able to find any evidence of gas being used. The claims seem to have originated in an attempt to excuse Saddam's gassing of the Kurds, by claiming the British did it first.
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That would be all well and good but the Nazi strategy wasn't to bomb their way to victory.
It seems it was when neccessary, for example the Blitz. When faced with an enemy on the other side of the channel that they couldn't invade, they resorted to using the Luftwaffe in an all out attempt to bomb their way to victory. (see as evidence the 40,000 British civilians killed in 1940/41)
Indeed, they even went so far as to develop cruise and ballistic missiles in an attempt to bomb their way to vitory, when it became clear their air force couldn't.
What was the plan anyway, to prove they could kill more by bomb then the Nazi's?
No, the plan was to win the war.
Rotterdam was bombed because it was a port bringing in supplies to feed Allied troops. The ports were the targets not civilians..
And German cities were bombed because they were producing the supplies for the German armies. The cties were the targets, not the civilians.
Warsaw was bombed because Polish military withdrew into the city. 'Flying artillery' was sent in not to target civilians but to demoralize those troops.
When you look in to it, you'll find a lot of Luftwaffe bombing of towns and cities in Poland.
London? London was an escalation brought on by British retaliation of 'a few bombs gone astray'.
No, London was part of a gradual escalation as the Germans switched more bombers to night attacks because they didn't have enough escorts for daylight attacks.
London was also because Kesselring wanted to suck the RAF into a big air battle where he hoped for victory (and he'd been pushing Goering for it for weeks).
And London was because the Germans wanted to bomb their way to victory, because they couldn't stage a successfull invasion. As Jodl wrote before the BoB even began:
The Continuation of the War against England.
"If political means are without results, England's will to resist must be broken by force:
"a) by making war against the English mother country.
"b) by extending the war on the periphery.
"Regarding Point a) there are three possibilities:
"1) Siege....
"2) Terror attacks against English centers of population.
"3) Landing of troops...."
and
"Together with propaganda and temporary terror attacks-declared to be reprisal actions-this increasing weakening of English food supply will paralyze the will of her people to resist and finally break and thus force its government to capitulate
That was written in June 1940.
Otto Bechtle, in a lecture to the Luftwaffe General Staff in 1944, summed up the turn on London as "Economic warfare from the air was begun"
Harris not only went after civilians with a fervor but he went at them at the expense of his own aircraft and crews
Harris went after Germany with a fervour, with the aim of preventing the large scale slaughter of British troops that happened in WW1.
Bomber Command casualties were high, but it's worth pointing out they were lower tby orders of magnatiude than any of the major battles of WW1.
They were only a fraction of overall British casualties, as well.
More civilians in Britain died from German bombing than Bomber Command crewmen killed in battle. Bomber Command killed formed about 7% of total Commonwealth military killed.
And German civilians killed in bombing formed about 1% of all people killed in WW2, less than 10% of the number of Jews murdered, and less than the number of civilians killed in the siege of Leningrad.
Furthermore, the converse of Overy's remark was also true. The production of bomber forces represented a significant resource expenditure for the US and especially Great Britain. Was this a worthwhile military expenditure?
Considering the allies didn't lack for resources, but did lack ways to bring them to bear, then yes. More tank divisions don't help when you can't get supplies to the one's you've got, or when you can't effectively deploy the one's you've got against the enemy.
It makes sense when you overwhelming resources to open more fronts, and spread your enemy thinner, and that's precisely what the bombing campaign did.
And your remarks only consider the amount of allied resources vs the German production lost, without taking into account the amount of resources the Germans pitted against the bombing campaign (very large percentages of artillery output, almost their entire air force, most of their electronic industry, hundreds of thousands of men, etc)
Perhaps the greatest oversight in an analysis that focuses on the latter part of the war is that the crucial period to consider is from 1941 to 1943. It is in this period that German power is substantial and the possibility of a German military victory exists. How effective was the Allied bomber campaign during this period? According to a table found in the Penguin Atlas of World History, the Allies dropped about 10,000 tons on Germany in 1940, 30,000 tons in 1941, 40,000 tons in 1942 and 120,000 tons in 1943 while in 1944 they drop 650,000 tons and in 1945, about 500,000 tons are dropped in the first four months (at that rate, 1.5 million tons would be dropped over the course of 1945). Considering that Germany dropped about 37,000 tons on the UK in 1940, another 22,000 tons in 1941, with a few thousand tons every year thereafter with marginal results, there is little reason to believe that the scale of Allied bombing between 1940 and 1943 was substantial enough to alter the military balance in 1941 or 1942 either.
There's also little reason to believe the allied effort devoted to such small bomber forces would have made a difference to the military balance in 1941 or 1942 either.
There was no prospect of an invasion of Europe in 1941 or 42, even if there had been no bombing camapign, sufficient resouces were allocated for victory in NA, what exactly could be done different with resources devoted from the rather small bomber forces of the day?
Sending troops to Russia was out of the question (and the fact that it wasn't done is due to politics, not to a shortage of troops in 1941/42), there was no real prospect of the British losing Egypt (as Rommel proved when he got as far as El Alamein, he had gone beyond his supply chain).
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Originally posted by Nashwan
When faced with an enemy on the other side of the channel that they couldn't invade, they resorted to using the Luftwaffe in an all out attempt to bomb their way to victory.
Nashwan, that was a remarkably accurate, and amazingly self-restrained, post. I agree with all of your points.
- oldman
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Originally posted by Nashwan
It's worth pointing out that Wotan's bit about the bombing of Iraq in the 20s is from the World Socialist Website, as part of their opposition to the (then coming) invasion of Iraq in 2003.
In particular, no-one has ever been able to find any evidence of gas being used. The claims seem to have originated in an attempt to excuse Saddam's gassing of the Kurds, by claiming the British did it first.
Nashwan is correct in that there's no direct forensic evidence or a paper trail showing the Brits used gas in the '20s against Muslims. There are just claims and denials.
The article above lists a source for many of its quotes as:
British historian David Omissi, author of Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force 1919-1939
There you will find Harris' quote:
Arthur “Bomber” Harris, a young RAF squadron commander, reported after a mission in 1924: “The Arab and Kurd now know what real bombing means, in casualties and damage: They know that within 45 minutes a full-sized village can be practically wiped out and a third of its inhabitants killed or injured.”
This compliments well the quote that Nashwan posted:
"The Nazis entered this war under the rather childish delusion that they were going to bomb everyone else, and nobody was going to bomb them. At Rotterdam, London, Warsaw, and half a hundred other places, they put their rather naive theory into operation. They sowed the wind, and now they are going to reap the whirlwind."
Arthur Harris
British and French occupation of the Middle East following WW1 is one of the primary reasons for Muslim hatred of the West present day. The British made arrangements with Arabs in which the Arabs were lead to believe that if they entered the war on the side of the British and made attacks against the Turks they would get control over their own destiny.
That didn't happen and British and French used extreme measures to put down any discontent. To include the bombing of villages (whether not with gas is unimportant to my point that Harris learned his trade during his years 'de-housing' upstart Muslims).
It seems it was when neccessary, for example the Blitz. When faced with an enemy on the other side of the channel that they couldn't invade, they resorted to using the Luftwaffe in an all out attempt to bomb their way to victory. (see as evidence the 40,000 British civilians killed in 1940/41)
There was no real plan to invade Britain. It wasn't going happen it was a pressure tactic (threat of invasion) to bring the war to Britain to a negotiated end.
Sealowe was a fraud.
Indeed, they even went so far as to develop cruise and ballistic missiles in an attempt to bomb their way to vitory, when it became clear their air force couldn't.
Those were vengeance weapons, in retaliation for indiscriminate British bombing and ineffective at that.
And German cities were bombed because they were producing the supplies for the German armies. The cties were the targets, not the civilians.
Nonsense the civilians (laborers of the war machine) were the targets.
"the bombers... must in future be used to kill German civilians" - directive No.22 to BC
-War Cabinet policy paper, dated 3rd. November 1942
Churchill’s letter to Lord Beaverbrook, on 5th July 1940.
"Nothing else will get the Germans to their minds, and on their knees, than an absolutely devastating extermination campaign against their homeland with heavy bombers."
See: John Colville : Fringes of Power. Downing Street Diaries 1939-1955. London 1985, pg. 186.
No, London was part of a gradual escalation as the Germans switched more bombers to night attacks because they didn't have enough escorts for daylight attacks.
London was also because Kesselring wanted to suck the RAF into a big air battle where he hoped for victory (and he'd been pushing Goering for it for weeks).
And London was because the Germans wanted to bomb their way to victory, because they couldn't stage a successfull invasion. As Jodl wrote before the BoB even began:
Nonsense again the British made a strike on Germany and that lead to retaliation by the Nazis.
"We started to bomb targets on German soil before the Germans began bombing British soil. That is a historical fact."
-J. M. Spaight English expert of international law, Secretary of State, British Air Ministry, in 1944
Otto Bechtle, in a lecture to the Luftwaffe General Staff in 1944, summed up the turn on London as "Economic warfare from the air was begun"
Economic warfare was also conducted by sea, so what?
"Together with propaganda and temporary terror attacks-declared to be reprisal actions-this increasing weakening of English food supply will paralyze the will of her people to resist and finally break and thus force its government to capitulate
Reprisals for what? For what the British did...
Harris went after Germany with a fervour, with the aim of preventing the large scale slaughter of British troops that happened in WW1.
Bomber Command casualties were high, but it's worth pointing out they were lower tby orders of magnatiude than any of the major battles of WW1.
They were only a fraction of overall British casualties, as well.
More civilians in Britain died from German bombing than Bomber Command crewmen killed in battle. Bomber Command killed formed about 7% of total Commonwealth military killed.
With the amount of resources and efforts put into the de-housing strategy its reasonable to conclude that had those resources been put to better use it would have a had a meaningful impact on the out come of the war. Rather then the neglegible effect de-housing achieved.
And German civilians killed in bombing formed about 1% of all people killed in WW2, less than 10% of the number of Jews murdered, and less than the number of civilians killed in the siege of Leningrad.
What's that suppose to show? The Nazis were the bad guys, evil is no surprise from them. Bomber Command wasn't saving Jews or relieving the siege at Leningrad. It was fire bombing women and children. The fact that they only account for 1% (your numbers) of civilians killed only shows they weren't as good as it as the Nazis. Is that the point you are trying to make?
No matter how evil the nazis were there's no reason to belive they forced the Bomber Command into the straregy Harris had chosen.
Considering the allies didn't lack for resources, but did lack ways to bring them to bear, then yes. More tank divisions don't help when you can't get supplies to the one's you've got, or when you can't effectively deploy the one's you've got against the enemy.
It makes sense when you overwhelming resources to open more fronts, and spread your enemy thinner, and that's precisely what the bombing campaign did
The air war in the west tied up LW day fighters for the most a part. The Bombing campaign didn't open up more fronts. It sinply extended the LW.
The allies didn't necessarily need more tanks. The resources saved from the heavy bombers could have been employed anywhere, from fighters and fighter bombers to ships etc...
An exerted effort against German power plants would have been more effective at disrupting German war production then bombing civilians.
There's also little reason to believe the allied effort devoted to such small bomber forces would have made a difference to the military balance in 1941 or 1942 either.
The point isn't that a small bomber would have made a difference its that by time the bomber campaign began to reach its potential the war was all but over. The same can be said about lend lease to the Soviets. By the time the bulk of the aid arrived the Soviets had stemmed the tide and had the initiative.
There was no prospect of an invasion of Europe in 1941 or 42, even if there had been no bombing camapign, sufficient resouces were allocated for victory in NA, what exactly could be done different with resources devoted from the rather small bomber forces of the day?
The bombing campaign didn't pave the way for invasion through the targets it hit. It did so by crippling the LW. This could have been achieved by putting those resources into more fighters and fighter bombers.
The Germans were stripping away resources from the west and feeding them into the east. Coupled with the destruction of the LW this is what paved the way for the allies landing in France.
The deaths of civilians had little to do with it.
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wow im surprised by the amount and how informative these replys are
thank you:)
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Originally posted by Wotan
British and French occupation of the Middle East following WW1 is one of the primary reasons for Muslim hatred of the West present day. The British made arrangements with Arabs in which the Arabs were lead to believe that if they entered the war on the side of the British and made attacks against the Turks they would get control over their own destiny.
That didn't happen and British and French used extreme measures to put down any discontent. To include the bombing of villages (whether not with gas is unimportant to my point that Harris learned his trade during his years 'de-housing' upstart Muslims).
When I can't really say the French were "angels" I don't think and don't remember of my past lecture any act comparable to the british one from the French.
Albeit I can be completly wrong
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Nashwan is correct in that there's no direct forensic evidence or a paper trail showing the Brits used gas in the '20s against Muslims. There are just claims and denials.
In other words there's no evidence, just claims, largely since Gulf War I, and largely by campaigners against sanctions (and war) against Iraq.
British historian David Omissi, author of Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force 1919-1939
Nothing about gas from him, though, I don't think.
Again, the source for Wotan's piece is the World Socialist Website, as part of their campaign against the coming war in Iraq in 2003. Hardly an unbiased, or even credible, source on events in Iraq in the 1920s.
British and French occupation of the Middle East following WW1 is one of the primary reasons for Muslim hatred of the West present day.
And yet strangely it's not the British and French they mainly hate, it's the US.
Strange, that.
In fact, Britain and France both have long histories of very good relations with the Arab countries.
And British troops seem to be operating in Iraq now with much less hatred directed against them than the US troops.
(And I'm not blaming the US for the hatred the US receives, just pointing out Wotan's assertion is wrong)
he British made arrangements with Arabs in which the Arabs were lead to believe that if they entered the war on the side of the British and made attacks against the Turks they would get control over their own destiny.
That didn't happen and British and French used extreme measures to put down any discontent.
Only they did get control of their own destiny. Iraq, for instance, gained independence in 1930.
There was no real plan to invade Britain. It wasn't going happen it was a pressure tactic (threat of invasion) to bring the war to Britain to a negotiated end.
Sealowe was a fraud.
Hardly a fraud, more an impossible dream.
The Luftwaffe was ordered to "create the conditions" for an invasion, which they failed to do. If they had succeeded, then Jodl's idea of an invasion of a Britain that was already collapsing might have been possible.
But Sea Lion aside, the Luftwaffe bombed Britain to try to try to force us out of the war. That's no different to what the RAF did to Germany.
If the Germans weren't attempting to "Bomb their way to victory", what exactly were they doing? And why did it leave 40,000 civilians dead?
Those were vengeance weapons, in retaliation for indiscriminate British bombing and ineffective at that.
You mean the Germans weren't trying to bomb their way to victory with them? You mean the vast industrial resouces were devoted to them purely out of revenge, rather than as an attempt to gain some advantage?
Still, it's the same principle they applied to the untermensch, I suppose. Kill as many as possible, even if it costs us to do it.
That's the difference between the allies and Germany. The allies wanted to win the war, the Germans wanted to kill those they hated. Don't ascribe pathological Nazi motivations to Britain or the RAF, please, they were intent on winning, not destroying those they hated.
Nonsense the civilians (laborers of the war machine) were the targets.
Nonsense, the people of Rotterdam, Warsaw, London, Coventry, Leningrad, etc were the targets.
Nonsense again the British made a strike on Germany and that lead to retaliation by the Nazis.
No. Around the 3rd week of August the Germans began intensifying their night attacks against Britain, all (and their were quite a few) "accidental" attacks against London were part of this effort, as were the quite deliberate raids on provincal cities in Britain.
Civilian casualties from German bombign were 258 killed in July, 1075 in August.
To put that in context, by the end of 1940 Britain had killed somewhat less than 1,000 in Germany, in other words the German "retaliation" on London came after casualties much less than the British had already suffered (it seems odd to retaliate against an enemy you have already caused more suffering to)
Economic warfare was also conducted by sea, so what?
So that was the German plan, to bomb their way to victory.
Reprisals for what? For what the British did...
Um, Jodl is saying we'll bomb them and say it's reprisal. Not everything the senior Nazis said was true, you know...
Jodl was planning terror raids, and the justification for them, from very early on.
With the amount of resources and efforts put into the de-housing strategy its reasonable to conclude that had those resources been put to better use it would have a had a meaningful impact on the out come of the war. Rather then the neglegible effect de-housing achieved.
Couple of assumptions there, 1 that it was neglegible, the other that something else would have been better.
I'd just like to point out that every major air force in WW2 started off with attempts at precsion bombing, and switched over to area attacks on cities.
The Germans did it, the RAF did it, and despite their denials, the USAAF did it, both in Europe and Japan (and in Japan to an extent not seen before).
And the British only chose to do so after having first hand experience of being on the receiving end of both types of attack.
What are you qualifications to judge the effectiveness again?
What's that suppose to show?
It's supposed to show a sense of proportion. The bombing campaign was one of the minor killers of the war, certainly less damaging to the civilian population than fighting a war in heavily populated areas, certainly less damaging than assaulting cities with ground troops, certainly less damaging then allowing the Nazis free reign.
The Nazis were the bad guys, evil is no surprise from them. Bomber Command wasn't saving Jews or relieving the siege at Leningrad.
Wasn't it? Bomber Command was hitting the enemy, giving them less resources to murder Jews or lay siege to Leningrad.
It was fire bombing women and children.
It was firebombing cities.
To quote Denis Richards' biography of Charles Portal, head of the RAF:
"his objective was to demolish factories, communications, the homes of the workers, the apparatus and amenities of major urban life. It was not to massacre civilians, who, he hoped, would retreat from the urban areas to the countryside with consequent loss of production, or, if they remained, suffer loss of morale from hours spent in shelters and from the reduced amenities of life."
Britain evacuated many women and children from the cities, I think they had reason to believe the Germans would do the same (perhaps the German railways were too busy moving other groups of civilians around?)
The fact that they only account for 1% (your numbers) of civilians killed only shows they weren't as good as it as the Nazis
No, it shows it wasn't the aim.
I don't recall hearing of British Einsatzgruppen following the British army into Germany and liquidating civilians, German prisoners being sent to camps and murdered, or even bombing raids in areas already captured.
In other words, the British stopped killing Germans as soon as they had surrendered, whereas the Germans intensified their killing after surrender.
That's the difference, not in numbers killed, but in that the British attacked German cities, the Germans murdered people, soldiers and civilians alike, who had surrendered themselves into German care.
No matter how evil the nazis were there's no reason to belive they forced the Bomber Command into the straregy Harris had chosen.
Forced, no. Led the way, yes. Instructed in the most effective methods, yes.
The air war in the west tied up LW day fighters for the most a part. The Bombing campaign didn't open up more fronts. It sinply extended the LW.
Look at German bomber and close support aircraft production. Look at artillery production, where a large proportion went on anti aircraft guns to shoot down bombers.
The Germans increasingly reacted to the allies, and a side that spends it's time reacting is going to lose.
Instead of offensive support for the army, the Luftwaffe became a defensive force (that didn't succeed in defending either)
The allies didn't necessarily need more tanks. The resources saved from the heavy bombers could have been employed anywhere, from fighters and fighter bombers to ships etc...
They didn't need more fighters, or fighter bombers, either. They had all the ships they needed too.
What the western allies lacked is ways of bringing their strength againsg Germany. The bombing campaign gave them another front.
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An exerted effort against German power plants would have been more effective at disrupting German war production then bombing civilians.
Possibly. But then again ball bearings were going to win the war, and didn't, and so were a host of other things.
The electricity industry was rejected as a target based on intelligence assesments. They might have been wrong, but then again so are many judgements in wartime.
The point isn't that a small bomber would have made a difference its that by time the bomber campaign began to reach its potential the war was all but over.
Tell that to the millions who died.
And bear in mind that the bomber offensive, like everything else, took years of planning and production to get underway, and the forces the allies had in 1944 were the ones that had been planned and ordered in 1942 and earlier.
Ever seen all the "what if" threads? They're all "what if the Germans had done... instead". I glad it's not the other way around, and it's not because the allies covered the options. If D Day had been repulsed, the Germans strengthened on the eastern front, they would still have lost because of the collapse brought about by bombing.
The allies had an abundance of resources, they used them. I'm glad they used them to the full, rather than judged how much was required and tried using the bare minimum.
The same can be said about lend lease to the Soviets. By the time the bulk of the aid arrived the Soviets had stemmed the tide and had the initiative.
Which is exactly the point.
What do you suggest the allies do at the begining of 1942? They know they can build factories, make supplies, and send them, but they won't arrive for 2 years.
Do you not bother in the hope the war will be over by then? Or do you go ahead in case they will be needed? The Germans chose the 1st option early in the war in lots of areas, and lost. The allies, in every way, chose the second option, and won.
Apply that to the bomber campaign. Do you say in 1942 that by 1944 we'll be winning and won't need bombers, or do you go ahead and order the factories and aircraft and aircrew in case you do?
And when you've got them in 1944, do you say you won't use them, and waste their contribution, or do you use whatever you have to try to win the war?
The bombing campaign didn't pave the way for invasion through the targets it hit.
Transport plan. Oil plan. Less trucks, tanks, planes, supplies for the enemy.
The transport plan in particular was essential for the invasion.
This could have been achieved by putting those resources into more fighters and fighter bombers.
You can safely ignore fighter sweeps, and let your flak deal with them. It's the bombers that brought the fighters up to engage. You have to bomb things the enemy has to defend, otherwise they can choose to engage or not as suits them.
The Germans were stripping away resources from the west and feeding them into the east. Coupled with the destruction of the LW this is what paved the way for the allies landing in France.
And the bombing campaign.
And of course, the Germans spent 1944 transferring forces to the west, not away from it, in preperation for the invasion they knew was coming.
The deaths of civilians had little to do with it.
No, but the destruction of the cities did.
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Which is exactly the point.
What do you suggest the allies do at the begining of 1942? They know they can build factories, make supplies, and send them, but they won't arrive for 2 years.
Do you not bother in the hope the war will be over by then? Or do you go ahead in case they will be needed? The Germans chose the 1st option early in the war in lots of areas, and lost. The allies, in every way, chose the second option, and won.
Apply that to the bomber campaign. Do you say in 1942 that by 1944 we'll be winning and won't need bombers, or do you go ahead and order the factories and aircraft and aircrew in case you do?
And when you've got them in 1944, do you say you won't use them, and waste their contribution, or do you use whatever you have to try to win the war?
I would have put resources into a long range fighter-bomber and ran rampant across western Europe. The cost in dollars / pounds per 4 engine bomber plus the cost in crew and bombs etc... you could probrably get 3 or 4 fighters for that.
At the very least twin attack aircraft.
They would have been more accurate in pin point targets like rail bridges, electric gemerating stations, fuel depots etc...
Not only that they could fight the LW.
Fighter bomber and escorts woul dhave been much more efficient.
Transport plan. Oil plan. Less trucks, tanks, planes, supplies for the enemy.
The transport plan in particular was essential for the invasion.
Same as above...
You can safely ignore fighter sweeps, and let your flak deal with them. It's the bombers that brought the fighters up to engage. You have to bomb things the enemy has to defend, otherwise they can choose to engage or not as suits them.
Fighter bombers and escorts with number enough to over whelm the defenders would have been more efficient then the heavies.
And the bombing campaign.
And of course, the Germans spent 1944 transferring forces to the west, not away from it, in preperation for the invasion they knew was coming.
Nonsense, what untis that wer emoved west were moved there for refit. A good number of those on the western wal were Russians, Ukrainians, Poles etc...
The panzer forces stationed in the west were held back but weren't substantial.
No, but the destruction of the cities did.
No it didn't. Read the United States Strategic Bombing Survey.
As I posted above
Harris had claimed that he could "flatten" Berlin and cause the Germans to crumble under the weight of Bomber Command's assault. He didn't even come close. Bomber Command losses were high. In the nineteen raids on Berlin that comprised the "Battle of Berlin" BC lost 625 aircraft and over 3,000 aircrewmen killed or captured. The overall damage to Berlin, after nineteen heavy, concentrated raids, was relatively minor. Approximately 10,000 civilian deaths are attributed to those raids. The city's infra structure and arms production capabilities were not significantly degraded.
Martin Middlebrook "The Berlin Raids," chapter 12.
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"We started to bomb targets on German soil before the Germans began bombing British soil. That is a historical fact."
-J. M. Spaight English expert of international law, Secretary of State, British Air Ministry, in 1944
Spaight is wrong.
The RAF was forbidden from attacking Germany, and was restricted to attacking German warships at sea, at the start of the war.
They were not even allowed to bomb German warships in port or too close to the shore, for fear of causing civilian casualties.
That remained the case until late March 1940, when the Germans raided several military targets in Scotland, killing some civilians in the process.
Following that, the RAF were allowed to make a single raid on the German seaplane base on the island of Hornum.
That remained the situation until after the German bombing of Rotterdam, when the RAF were allowed to attack military targets in Germany.
The first RAF area raid was mid way through December 1940, on Mannheim, and was ordered as a response to Coventry.
"the bombers... must in future be used to kill German civilians" - directive No.22 to BC
-War Cabinet policy paper, dated 3rd. November 1942
I think that bit has been made up by someone.
It's actually a quote from John Keegan, not from an air ministry paper, and it's his opinion, not taken from official documents.
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In other words there's no evidence, just claims, largely since Gulf War I, and largely by campaigners against sanctions (and war) against Iraq.
There's claims that go back 80 years. They aren't new.
You may discount the article if you like as the rambling of Socialist Muslim Apologizers. However the relevant quotes are sourced.
Nothing about gas from him, though, I don't think.
Again, the source for Wotan's piece is the World Socialist Website, as part of their campaign against the coming war in Iraq in 2003. Hardly an unbiased, or even credible, source on events in Iraq in the 1920s.
There's a mention but nothing definitive. However, the relevant part is the Harris quote which shows how he revels in the role as civilian killer.
Arthur “Bomber” Harris, a young RAF squadron commander, reported after a mission in 1924: “The Arab and Kurd now know what real bombing means, in casualties and damage: They know that within 45 minutes a full-sized village can be practically wiped out and a third of its inhabitants killed or injured.”
And yet strangely it's not the British and French they mainly hate, it's the US.
Strange, that.
In fact, Britain and France both have long histories of very good relations with the Arab countries.
And British troops seem to be operating in Iraq now with much less hatred directed against them than the US troops.
(And I'm not blaming the US for the hatred the US receives, just pointing out Wotan's assertion is wrong)
Both Britain and France have seen a decline in their world power and in particularly their ability to project power since the war. The US has filled that roll. Add to that the US unwavering and at times irrational support for Israel and its no wonder the Muslim world hates the US. But they sure don't love you Brits.
You all started a war with Germany, went bankrupt, gave a way your empire and made 1/3 of the world British citizens. British imperialism doesn't have a good record. Every where you went you were hated and had to resort to force to maintain control. That includes your own island.
Only they did get control of their own destiny. Iraq, for instance, gained independence in 1930.
I made a long post covering the inter war period covering the situation in the middle east. I don't have time to dig it up. I am packing for 10 days in the Gulf fishing.
Through Lawrence King Faisal was told that if he supported the British and aided them in attacks against the Turks they would be given self rule. This included all the territory that is now the 'middle east'. Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, etc...
How the nation states sorted themselves out later on was in spite of British and French colonial control following WW1.
Hardly a fraud, more an impossible dream.
The Luftwaffe was ordered to "create the conditions" for an invasion, which they failed to do. If they had succeeded, then Jodl's idea of an invasion of a Britain that was already collapsing might have been possible.
But Sea Lion aside, the Luftwaffe bombed Britain to try to try to force us out of the war. That's no different to what the RAF did to Germany.
If the Germans weren't attempting to "Bomb their way to victory", what exactly were they doing? And why did it leave 40,000 civilians dead?
I am sure you have seen some of the Ultra reports and threat assessments that the British received through out BoB.
Hitler had sent numerous peace offers (whether they were genuine or not isn't question). All this is enough to piece together Hitler's intentions. He was incapable of invading Britain even if the LW had succeeded during BoB. The hope was that if the pressure was kept on Britain they would look to accept one of those offers.
Your government knew that.
You mean the Germans weren't trying to bomb their way to victory with them? You mean the vast industrial resouces were devoted to them purely out of revenge, rather than as an attempt to gain some advantage?
Their bombers were tasked as support elements for their ground forces. They didn't fire bomb Paris in hopes France would just give up. They bombed, they strafed but they weren't tasked with the specific order to kill civilians. No LW person was charged with any crime related to their bombing offensives.
Still, it's the same principle they applied to the untermensch, I suppose. Kill as many as possible, even if it costs us to do it.
That's the difference between the allies and Germany. The allies wanted to win the war, the Germans wanted to kill those they hated. Don't ascribe pathological Nazi motivations to Britain or the RAF, please, they were intent on winning, not destroying those they hated.
I am not you are. I say that the indiscriminate bombing of civilians is wrong and you say well blame the Nazis. They made us do it.
You make the comparisons don't get your panties bunched when asked about it.
You are playing the moral relativism card.
No. Around the 3rd week of August the Germans began intensifying their night attacks against Britain, all (and their were quite a few) "accidental" attacks against London were part of this effort, as were the quite deliberate raids on provincal cities in Britain.
Civilian casualties from German bombign were 258 killed in July, 1075 in August.
To put that in context, by the end of 1940 Britain had killed somewhat less than 1,000 in Germany, in other words the German "retaliation" on London came after casualties much less than the British had already suffered (it seems odd to retaliate against an enemy you have already caused more suffering to)
August? The British war plans always included the following:
Churchill’s letter to Lord Beaverbrook, on 5th July 1940.
"Nothing else will get the Germans to their minds, and on their knees, than an absolutely devastating extermination campaign against their homeland with heavy bombers."
See: John Colville : Fringes of Power. Downing Street Diaries 1939-1955. London 1985, pg. 186.
As evidenced by their actions against Muslims during the inter-war years.
"We started to bomb targets on German soil before the Germans began bombing British soil. That is a historical fact."
-J. M. Spaight English expert of international law, Secretary of State, British Air Ministry, in 1944
Believe you or Mr. Spaight?
The vengeance weapons were just that for vengeance against British Terrorfliegers. They hardly had any impact on the war. No one believes they were war winning technology.
Kill as many as possible, even if it costs us to do it.
Why not? That was Harris' plan all along. See you Brits have more in common with the Nazis with everyone of your posts.
Nonsense, the people of Rotterdam, Warsaw, London, Coventry, Leningrad, etc were the targets.
The targets at Rotterdam were the ports not civilians. I have target maps, orders OOB etc for the raid on Rotterdam.
Warsaw wasn't directed at civilians either. The raids were targeting military units the moved into the city.
London and Coventry were escalations in response to British attacks.
My Grandmother was 14 when Coventry was fire bombed. She lived there. Her sister is still alive and lives in Coventry today. I have 8mm (IIRC) on the Cathedral burning following the raid that was taken by her father. What happened at Coventry pales in comparison to Hamburg or any number of other German Cities.
Couple of assumptions there, 1 that it was neglegible, the other that something else would have been better.
I'd just like to point out that every major air force in WW2 started off with attempts at precsion bombing, and switched over to area attacks on cities.
The Germans did it, the RAF did it, and despite their denials, the USAAF did it, both in Europe and Japan (and in Japan to an extent not seen before).
And the British only chose to do so after having first hand experience of being on the receiving end of both types of attack.
What are you qualifications to judge the effectiveness again?
The British chose to do it from the beginning:
Churchill’s letter to Lord Beaverbrook, on 5th July 1940.
"Nothing else will get the Germans to their minds, and on their knees, than an absolutely devastating extermination campaign against their homeland with heavy bombers."
See: John Colville : Fringes of Power. Downing Street Diaries 1939-1955. London 1985, pg. 186.
It's supposed to show a sense of proportion. The bombing campaign was one of the minor killers of the war, certainly less damaging to the civilian population than fighting a war in heavily populated areas, certainly less damaging than assaulting cities with ground troops, certainly less damaging then allowing the Nazis free reign.
More moral relativism...
Keep telling yourself that...
Wasn't it? Bomber Command was hitting the enemy, giving them less resources to murder Jews or lay siege to Leningrad.
No BC was bombing and killing civilians.
It was firebombing cities.
The targets were the civilians:
"the bombers... must in future be used to kill German civilians" - directive No.22 to BC
-War Cabinet policy paper, dated 3rd. November 1942
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No, it shows it wasn't the aim.
I don't recall hearing of British Einsatzgruppen following the British army into Germany and liquidating civilians, German prisoners being sent to camps and murdered, or even bombing raids in areas already captured.
In other words, the British stopped killing Germans as soon as they had surrendered, whereas the Germans intensified their killing after surrender.
That's the difference, not in numbers killed, but in that the British attacked German cities, the Germans murdered people, soldiers and civilians alike, who had surrendered themselves into German care.
More moral relativism. The claim that the German's made me do it is no viable then the 'devil made me do it'.
Here you go comparing the deeds of BC with those of the Nazis. If you don't like that comparison then don't make it.
The Nazis were the bad guys, Harris did his best to make BC one. The specific acts of firebombing civilians is completely separate then the gas chambers, Einsatzgruppen etc...
Led the way, yes. Instructed in the most effective methods, yes.
At least you admit that much. BC led the way in fire bombing civilians.
Look at German bomber and close support aircraft production. Look at artillery production, where a large proportion went on anti aircraft guns to shoot down bombers.
The Germans increasingly reacted to the allies, and a side that spends it's time reacting is going to lose.
Instead of offensive support for the army, the Luftwaffe became a defensive force (that didn't succeed in defending either
The majority of which was directed at the USAAF.
The LW could have never produced enough to win the war. Even if they faced the Soviets alone.
What the western allies lacked is ways of bringing their strength againsg Germany. The bombing campaign gave them another front.
Fighter-bombers could have done a better job hitting the targets that mattered rather then just hitting civilians at night. Instead of a 1000 bomber night raid you could have 4000 fighter bombers.
When I can't really say the French were "angels" I don't think and don't remember of my past lecture any act comparable to the British one from the French.
Albeit I can be completly wrong
When the French took control of Syria after WW1 there was opposition which was put down by French troops. It certainly wasn't as extensive as the British action gas or no gas aside.
I got run. I am off to dinner then I drive down to the Florida Keys tonight to meet the boat tomorrow after noon. I wont be back for 10 days or so depending on the weather..
This thread is becoming one of those never ending circular arguments but if anything particularly insightfully gets posted I may try to reply when I get back.
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The targets were the civilians:
quote: "the bombers... must in future be used to kill German civilians" - directive No.22 to BC
-War Cabinet policy paper, dated 3rd. November 1942
Wotan, I pointed out last time that that wasn't a genuine quote from a government paper, yet you continue to use it. First time could be a mistake, second time and it looks deliberate.
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More moral relativism. The claim that the German's made me do it is no viable then the 'devil made me do it'.
That's hardly the point. I never claimed the "Germans made them do it". I pointed out that every major airforce eventually ended up using area bombing of cities, and the British did so after being on the recieving end of both types.
It must have seemed to them that area bombing was the better option, otherwise they wouldn't all have taken it.
Of course, what's the combined experience and judgement of the Luftwaffe, RAF and USAAF compared to Wotan's?
Here you go comparing the deeds of BC with those of the Nazis. If you don't like that comparison then don't make it.
The Nazis were the bad guys, Harris did his best to make BC one. The specific acts of firebombing civilians is completely separate then the gas chambers, Einsatzgruppen etc...
No, that's a comparison you made.
You claimed the aim was to kill Germans. Clearly the German's aim was to kill Jews, but they didn't do so with bombers, they used far more efficient ways instead. If the British aim had been to kill Germans, they would have done so as well.
At least you admit that much. BC led the way in fire bombing civilians.
Uh, no. I said the Luftwaffe led the way, as they did with the Blitz on London and other British cities.
My comment was quite clear in context:
No matter how evil the nazis were there's no reason to belive they forced the Bomber Command into the straregy Harris had chosen.
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Forced, no. Led the way, yes. Instructed in the most effective methods, yes.
Fighter-bombers could have done a better job hitting the targets that mattered rather then just hitting civilians at night. Instead of a 1000 bomber night raid you could have 4000 fighter bombers.
Fighter bombers didn't have the range to reach targets in Germany until after the invasion of France.
Both Britain and France have seen a decline in their world power and in particularly their ability to project power since the war. The US has filled that roll. Add to that the US unwavering and at times irrational support for Israel and its no wonder the Muslim world hates the US. But they sure don't love you Brits.
Wotan, I spent much of my childhood in the Middle East, and I don't recognise the hatred you seem to believe existed.
Indeed, the close ties Britain has with most ME governments, and the number of British workers in the ME, don't show the hatred you claim either.
I am sure you have seen some of the Ultra reports and threat assessments that the British received through out BoB.
Hitler had sent numerous peace offers (whether they were genuine or not isn't question). All this is enough to piece together Hitler's intentions. He was incapable of invading Britain even if the LW had succeeded during BoB. The hope was that if the pressure was kept on Britain they would look to accept one of those offers.
Your government knew that.
And how does this show that the Luftwaffe didn't try to bomb their way to victory?
Their bombers were tasked as support elements for their ground forces. They didn't fire bomb Paris in hopes France would just give up.
When they had an army winning on the ground.
When they ran into a situation where the army couldn't win, against Britain, they firebombed London in the hopes Britain would give up, and killed 40,000 people in the process.
They bombed, they strafed but they weren't tasked with the specific order to kill civilians.
Neither was the RAF. Please don't repeat your made up quote again, resorting to making up quotes shows you've lost the argument.
No LW person was charged with any crime related to their bombing offensives.
Alexander Lohr was tried and executed for his role in ordering the bombing of Belgrade, which had been declared an open city.
Can't think of any allied commanders tried for anything related to their bombing offensives, though.
I am not you are. I say that the indiscriminate bombing of civilians is wrong and you say well blame the Nazis. They made us do it.
Misrepresenting again? I'm saying the allies didn't target civilians, they targeted cities.
It's you who's seeking to ascribe Nazi like motives to the bombing campaign, claiming it was a campaign designed to kill German civilians to the detriment of the allied war effort.
Believe you or Mr. Spaight?
Or facts?
Having said which, Spaight does not even make the quote you ascribe to him (another false quote, something of a habit, it seems)
What Spaight actually wrote is:
"We began to bomb objectives on the German mainland before the Germans began to bomb objectives on the British mainland."
That's important, because the first casualties in Britain were from German bombing of the Orkney islands, which aren't of course part of the mainland.
What Spaight goes on to say is:
The first British raid on German territory was the attack on the seaplane base on the island of Sylt on the night of 18-19 March, 1940. The first German attack on British soil was carried out on the night of 16 March, 1940, when bombs were dropped on the Orkneys, causing civilian casualties. One of the first acts of the German offensive in the west was an attack on the town and harbour of Calais in the early morning of 10 May, causing numerous civilian casualties. This was followed by German attacks on aerodromes and communications in France on succeeding nights. The Royal Air Force began attacks on military lines of communication in western Germany on 11 May, 1940, and on the following nights and days.
You might successfully argue the technical accuracy of Spaight's claims, but the truth is the RAF were not allowed to bomb Germany until after Germany had begun bombing Western Europe.
In fact, the RAF lagged the Luftwaffe in attacks until 1942.
IT wasn't allowed to attack targets in Germany until after Germany attacked targets in Britain. It wasn't allowed to attack targets in mainland Germany until after the Germans had begun bombing Western European targets, it wasn't allowed to attack east of the Rhine until after Rotterdam, it wasn't allowed to attack area targets until after Coventry.
And it wasn't until 1942 or 1943 that the RAF inflicted as many casualties on the Germans as the Luftwaffe had on Britain in 1940/41.
The vengeance weapons were just that for vengeance against British Terrorfliegers. They hardly had any impact on the war. No one believes they were war winning technology.
So you are saying the whole programme was simply for hatred?
The targets at Rotterdam were the ports not civilians. I have target maps, orders OOB etc for the raid on Rotterdam.
actually the target at Rotterdam was support for German paras fighting in the city, so I don't exactly trust your claim.
But the Luftwaffe bombed cities for exactly the same reasons the RAF did, and it's only your prejudices that prevent you realising (or admitting) that.
Warsaw wasn't directed at civilians either. The raids were targeting military units the moved into the city.
Of course they were. Everything the Luftwaffe did was purely military support, like Coventry, London, Birmingham, Belfast, Liverpool, Bristol, etc.
London and Coventry were escalations in response to British attacks.
Excuse me?
By the end of 1940, less than 1,000 Germans had been killed by British bombing, over 20,000 Britons had been killed by German bombing. What exactly were they retaliating against?
My Grandmother was 14 when Coventry was fire bombed. She lived there. Her sister is still alive and lives in Coventry today. I have 8mm (IIRC) on the Cathedral burning following the raid that was taken by her father. What happened at Coventry pales in comparison to Hamburg or any number of other German Cities.
Coventry was pretty small (500+ dead), but there were only a few German cities that saw more casualties than London (offhand, Berlin, Hamburg are the only two I could name for certain)
29,888 civilians died in German attacks on London in WW2, over 60,000 in Britain as a whole.
The targets were the civilians:
quote: "the bombers... must in future be used to kill German civilians" - directive No.22 to BC
-War Cabinet policy paper, dated 3rd. November 1942
I'll repeat it a third time, as it didn't sink in before.
It's false, a lie, made up, bogus, rubbish, untrue. It's a misquote of an opinion piece by John Keegan, commenting on Air Ministry directive 22, which actually called for morale to be the target (incidentally, one of the key objectives outlined to the Luftwaffe in 1940/41 in their attacks on Britain)
You all started a war with Germany,
And there's me thinking the Germans invaded Poland to start the war. Your sympathies are quite clear, I think.
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An interesting debate, gentlemen.
Nashwan has a much stronger case here IMO.
Consider the context: Britain most decidedly did not want war. The guarantee to Poland was given in a despairing and futile effort to restrain Hitler's territorial ambitions, which had already resulted in the break-up and annexation of much of Czechoslovakia. Hitler called the bluff, and the guarantee had to be honoured, but the declaration of war was a cause for gloom and apprehension in Britain, where the memories of the horrendous casualties of WW1 were still fresh. Britain then refrained from attacking Germany for a long time, and even then basically only responded and reacted to German attacks.
All that Britain - and later the USA - wanted was to get the war over as quickly as possible, and to do that they used whatever forces they could apply, in what seemed to them to be the best way of achieving that aim. They had no interest in conquering other territories or subjugating other peoples. You may call this moral relativism if you like, but that doesn't invalidate the point - the Allied position was morally vastly superior to the Nazi one.
Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website (http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk) and discussion forum (http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/)
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[stamp] PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MINUTE
[stamp, pen] Serial No. D. 217/4
[Seal of Prime Minister]
10 Downing Street, Whitehall [gothic script]
GENERAL ISMAY FOR C.O.S. COMMITTEE [underlined]
1. I want you to think very seriously over this question of poison gas. I would not use it unless it could be shown either that (a) it was life or death for us, or (b) that it would shorten the war by a year.
2. It is absurd to consider morality on this topic when everybody used it in the last war without a word of complaint from the moralists or the Church. On the other hand, in the last war bombing of open cities was regarded as forbidden. Now everybody does it as a matter of course. It is simply a question of fashion changing as she does between long and short skirts for women.
3. I want a cold-blooded calculation made as to how it would pay us to use poison gas, by which I mean principally mustard. We will want to gain more ground in Normandy so as not to be cooped up in a small area. We could probably deliver 20 tons to their 1 and for the sake of the 1 they would bring their bomber aircraft into the area against our superiority, thus paying a heavy toll.
4. Why have the Germans not used it? Not certainly out of moral scruples or affection for us. They have not used it because it does not pay them. The greatest temptation ever offered to them was the beaches of Normandy. This they could have drenched with gas greatly to the hindrance of the troops. That they thought about it is certain and that they prepared against our use of gas is also certain. But they only reason they have not used it against us is that they fear the retaliation. What is to their detriment is to our advantage.
5. Although one sees how unpleasant it is to receive poison gas attacks, from which nearly everyone recovers, it is useless to protest that an equal amount of H. E. will not inflict greater casualties and sufferings on troops and civilians. One really must not be bound within silly conventions of the mind whether they be those that ruled in the last war or those in reverse which rule in this.
6. If the bombardment of London became a serious nuisance and great rockets with far-reaching and devastating effect fell on many centres of Government and labour, I should be prepared to do [underline] anything [stop underline] that would hit the enemy in a murderous place. I may certainly have to ask you to support me in using poison gas. We could drench the cities of the Ruhr and many other cities in Germany in such a way that most of the population would be requiring constant medical attention. We could stop all work at the flying bomb starting points. I do not see why we should have the disadvantages of being the gentleman while they have all the advantages of being the cad. There are times when this may be so but not now.
7. I quite agree that it may be several weeks or even months before I shall ask you to drench Germany with poison gas, and if we do it, let us do it one hundred per cent. In the meanwhile, I want the matter studied in cold blood by sensible people and not by that particular set of psalm-singing uniformed defeatists which one runs across now here now there. Pray address yourself to this. It is a big thing and can only be discarded for a big reason. I shall of course have to square Uncle Joe and the President; but you need not bring this into your calculations at the present time. Just try to find out what it is like on its merits.
[signed] Winston Churchill [initials]
6.7.44 [underlined]
Source: photographic copy of original 4 page memo, in Guenther W. Gellermann, "Der Krieg, der nicht stattfand", Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1986, pp. 249-251
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Hitler`s directive No 21 (instructions to the armed forces during operation barbarossa_
Führer Directive 21, on the role of the LW in the campaign :
'(B) Air Force:
It will be the task of the air force, so far as possible, to damage and destroy the effectiveness of the Russian air force, and to support the operations by the army at the points of main effort, that is to say in the sectors of the central army group and in the area where the southern army group will be making its main effort. The Russian railways will either be destroyed, or, in the case of more important objectives close to hand (i.e. railway bridges) will be captured by the bold use of parachute and air-borne troops. In order that maximum forces may be available for operations against the enemy air force and for direct support of the army, the munitions industry will not be attacked while the major operation is in progress. Only after the conclusion of the mobile operations will such attacks, and in particular attacks against the industrial area of the Urals, be considered.'
No sign of terror attacks against civillians being an adopted strategy, it seems, even against the 'Untermensch', as Nashwan calls the russians.
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Originally posted by Nashwan
The RAF was forbidden from attacking Germany, and was restricted to attacking German warships at sea, at the start of the war.They were not even allowed to bomb German warships in port or too close to the shore, for fear of causing civilian casualties.
[/B]
Don`t forget the part where the RAF is dropping flowers over Germany.
Of course it`s utter nonsense, on 6th September, just 3 days after Britain declared war on Germany, British bombers were sent to bomb Wilhelmshaven. They returned with a bloody nose though.
That remained the case until late March 1940, when the Germans raided several military targets in Scotland, killing some civilians in the process.
Following that, the RAF were allowed to make a single raid on the German seaplane base on the island of Hornum.
That remained the situation until after the German bombing of Rotterdam, when the RAF were allowed to attack military targets in Germany.
The first RAF area raid was mid way through December d 1940, on Mannheim, and was ordered as a response to Coventry.
[/B]
Keep telling yourself.
Worthy to note, in the original instruction on the war waged against England, Hitler specifically forbidden the attacks on London - this was not lifted until the RAF launched it`s first area bombing action in the summer of 1940 against Berlin.
"We started to bomb targets on German soil before the Germans began bombing British soil. That is a historical fact."
-J. M. Spaight English expert of international law, Secretary of State, British Air Ministry, in 1944
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"We started to bomb targets on German soil before the Germans began bombing British soil. That is a historical fact."
-J. M. Spaight English expert of international law, Secretary of State, British Air Ministry, in 1944
It could have harmed us morally only if it were equivalent to an admission that we were the first to bomb towns. It was nothing of the sort. The German airmen were the first to do that in the present war.
-J. M. Spaight English expert of international law, Secretary of State, British Air Ministry, in 1944
It was they [the Germans], not the British airmen, who created a precedent for 'war against the civilian population'.
-J. M. Spaight English expert of international law, Secretary of State, British Air Ministry, in 1944
Meanwhile, all the arts of German propaganda are employed to misrepresent what is really happening in the battles of the towns. The British raids are described as random attacks on the civilian population, as 'terror raids', as having no other object than the slaughter of women, children and other non-combatants.
-J. M. Spaight English expert of international law, Secretary of State, British Air Ministry, in 1944
As it was he [Hitler] chose to set a precedent for the bombing of centres of population in this war at its very outset and thereby prejudiced his position as
the advocate of the mutual abandonment by the belligerents of the practice of strategic bombing. In short, it was he who really began the battles of the towns. He is probably very sorry now that he ever did so.
-J. M. Spaight English expert of international law, Secretary of State, British Air Ministry, in 1944
Even if Warsaw is left out of account on the ground - vide German propaganda - that the city was invested and had refused to surrender, it is still undeniable that the Germans bombed undefended towns in Norway before we ever dropped a bomb in Germany.
'Kristiansund, an open and absolutely defenceless town where there have never been any military establishments whatever, was bombed for three days; only one house remained. . 15,000 inhabitants were left without shelter. In the same way Molde was bombed, and
Reknes, the great sanatorium for tuberculosis, was bombed and set on fire.' 'Where Elverum had been but a few hours before, only the church and the Red Cross hospital were left standing. . . . Hardly a house but had been razed to within four feet of the
ground.'
That the Germans, having so set the pace in Norway, should protest in the name of humanity when we, having caught them up, stiffened the going for them in the Ruhr, is an indication of the amazing obtuseness of the Teutonic mentality. Have they then forgotten what happened in April, 1940? Those raids in Norway could not be explained
away as reprisals. And why, given those raids, was it such a shock to the righteous Germans when we bombed the Ruhr? Why was it a 'Churchill crime'? Why should Essen or Duisburg or Dortmund be inviolate when Elverum and Kristiansund and Reknes were
not?
-J. M. Spaight English expert of international law, Secretary of State, British Air Ministry, in 1944
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Hoisted with his own petard.
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Hehe, this got me thinking, - oh, from Kurfurst:
"Don`t forget the part where the RAF is dropping flowers over Germany. "
They started with high amounts of toilet paper, - i.e. propoganda leaflets actually.
I think the Germans actually area bombed London systematically with great amounts of aircraft well before the English repeated that on German cities. German target accuracy through X-gerat and such gadgets was still much better, so it makes you wonder why they did it.
Well, burn their capital, and knock them millions of Londoners to insanity, - the country might revolt?
It actually was close to happening.
Would you like a quote of Hitler's comment on it?
It worked in other cases, - not to incite a revolt, but to subdue resistance.
The first terror bombings of WW2 was on Polish towns and then Cities which had practically no air defence. Warshaw? Does that ring a bell?
I am for that sake not surprized at all that late war the Brits bombed the core out of entire German cities. Payback in double. The only thing that actually baffles me is why they didn't start it earlier!
A city is easyer to find than a factory in the darkness, and the impact is quite some.
Well, of course, Nazi Germany had their Todt organization to compensate for the hampered and houseless civilians.....
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Originally posted by Schaden
It's just a average whine because everyone is not spending every waking minute telling the Americans how wonderful they are and how we all owe them...well just about everything.
America entered and fought WW2 for it's own interests and to further those interests, as did every other combatant in just about every other war.
Yeah Shaden, you sure have me pegged. It's not like the Brits
ever whine about the war. I guess getting your tails kicked for
2 years before the US entered the war makes you special.
The latest fad in Euroland is to minimize the contribution made
by the US not only before we entered the festivities, but after as
well.
Go ahead and quote the part where I denigrated the UK in my
first post. I'll be fascinated to see it.
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Rino i'm clueless to what you meant by your post and what made you post it.
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Originally posted by Rino
It's not like the Brits ever whine about the war. I guess getting your tails kicked for 2 years before the US entered the war makes you special.
The latest fad in Euroland is to minimize the contribution made
by the US not only before we entered the festivities, but after as
well.
Minimise the contribution? we merely try to make you understand that our country fought, just as hard as you did. We did not get our tails kicked for two years, we entered the war completely unprepared, outnumbered, outgunned and facing the strongest military in the world while you sat back and watched us struggle. True allies would have fought alongside us in that time, your ambassador to london even fled saying we were going to be invaded. Not only did we save ourselves but we started to go on the offensive, learning lessons that we passed on to our allies and contributed massively to ultimate victory.
Yes you gave us support through lend lease and we appreciate that... but its often made out that we cowered and prayed for help, which was by far from the case. The British alway have been, always will be good fighters no matter the odds.
so f-u.
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Dude i was trying the softly, softly approach.
You went in like a mushroom-cloud-layin' motherf...:D
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War is a terrible, terrible thing. Period!
Weather it US, Brit, Scott, Frenchman, German or any soldier or human to loose their life in such atrocities is heartbreaking.
(http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/TNSarchives/May04/salute.jpg)
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Ignore Rino gents. He is just an over-sensitive American who can't tolerate the idea that it was a joint effort and not a John Wayne movie.
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Time for a bit of perspective:
Thus, though the United States was at peace in the spring of 1940, the horror of war lay heavy on the world. And what military capabilities did the nation possess in this hour of crisis? The War Department might have called for combat-ready units in its training directive, but reality spoke otherwise. Just a few years earlier, the Army Chief of Staff announced that the U.S. Army ranked 17th in the world - right behind Rumania. Of nine Regular Army infantry divisions which existed on paper, only one was in any sense a complete unit. There was no full-time corps or army headquarters. The National Guard, with its eighteen infantry divisions, officially stood at "maintenance strength."
The situation was still grim in the spring of 1940, but it was improving. The outbreak of war in Europe allowed for modest increases in funding and manpower, enabling the Army to initiate some longoverdue modernization measures. For instance, the Regular Army adopted a new division organization, called the "triangular division," in the autumn of 1939. The triangular division was designed for mobility and maneuver, as opposed to the attrition warfare which dominated doctrine since 1918.
The Infantry Branch began to acquire machine-guns and mortars for its battalions and companies, revolutionizing infantry warfare and making the foot-soldier a combined arms force in his own right. The artillery adopted an experimental system of forward observers and fire direction centers that made American gunners the best in the world. Deliveries began on a new 105mm howitzer that the artillery branch asked for twenty years earlier. Armor did not yet have a branch, being divided between Infantry and Cavalry. Even so, for the first time, tank advocates such as Adna R. Chaffee were encouraged to explore the decisive potential of massed armor formations.
Although modernizing, the Army was still miniscule. Numbering 190,000 in mid- 1939, the Regular Army surpassed the 300,000 mark in 1940. The National Guard, however, was largely unaffected by either the expansion or modernization enjoyed by the Regulars.
These modest improvements to the Regular component allowed the Army to field division-size forces for maneuvers and testing for the first time in two decades. There was an acute need to test new doctrine and force structures, particularly as they applied to the transition from horse to motor transport. At Fort Benning, the War Department created the IV Corps, consisting of the 6th Cavalry Regiment and the newly triangularized 1st, 5th and 6th infantry Divisions. Commanded by Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, IV Corps conducted a variety of tactical exercises through the early spring of 1940.
In order to test IV Corps against a formation of comparable size, the War Department ordered Short to take his command to Louisiana for exercises against a provisional corps. The movement from Georgia to Louisiana was itself unprecedented, being the longest motor march ever undertaken by such a large U.S. Army unit. The IV Corps' 41,000 men moved 600 miles in six days, closing on Camp Beauregard for the first corps versus corps maneuvers in Army history. For the next four years, Central Louisiana would remain the Army's busiest maneuver grounds.
Now why did we have such a tiny unprepared army in 1939 and why didn't we send it over right away?
The Neutrality Acts were a series of acts created by the United States Congress that were geared toward keeping the United States out of another war. The acts passed between 1935 contained provisions limiting arms sales to nations that were not at war, gave the United States the power to keep citizens from traveling on belligerent ships or to belligerent nations, prohibited loans to belligerent nations and nations that were not repaying previous debts, and forbade American shipping to carry arms to belligerents. It was believed that if American ships were carrying weapons to a nation at war, they would be a logical target for an enemy nation and the U.S. could be drawn into another war. These acts released the United States from responsibility for actions that could provoke such a situation, and thus released the United States from the obligation of war in certain scenarios.
We didn't send troops because it was against the law. We had no treatys with you like you had with Poland.
The entire point of the Neutrality Acts was to keep the US OUT of another European war.
The four Neutrality Acts of the late 1930s represented an effort to keep the United States out of "foreign" wars, an effort resulting in part from widespread questioning of the reasons for and results of America's participation in World War I. These laws, unlike U.S. policy in 1916-1917, limited the exercise of neutral rights as a way of protecting that neutrality. A characteristic of the acts was that they made no distinction between aggressor and victim; both sides were simply characterized as "belligerents."
Note that FOUR Neutrality Acts passed.
Now as much as you get tired of hearing that "the US won the war" please understand that some of us, me for instance, get tired of hearing.
Why did you sit around and wait.
It's pretty obvious. One, by LAW our goverment was prohibited from helping at all. The Congress repeatedly passed Neutrality Acts for that exact reason.
Two, if there had been no Neutrality Acts, we had no mutual defense treaty with you folks AND we essentially had no military. We were behind Rumania.
When the war began, Germany had more than 4,000 combat aircraft. The British had about 2,000. The United States had only 800.
So now you know why we didn't come.
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Gentlemen please - let's not descend into a pointless nationalistic argument. The contributions of the USA, UK and USSR were all, in their different ways, essential to the defeat of Nazi Germany. Remove any one of the three from the equation and it is hard to see how victory would have been possible.
Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website (http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk) and discussion forum (http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/)
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Nice summary Tony :aok
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Originally posted by thrila
Dude i was trying the softly, softly approach.
You went in like a mushroom-cloud-layin' motherf...:D
did i make my point? :D
or do i need a few :mad: :mad: :mad: 's?
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You were superfly TNT, furby.
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Wotan, I pointed out last time that that wasn't a genuine quote from a government paper, yet you continue to use it. First time could be a mistake, second time and it looks deliberate.
Feb 14, '42 the 'Area Bombing' directive (Air Ministry Directive No. 22) was issued to Bomber Command saying:
It has been decided that the primary objective of your operations should be focused on the morale of the enemy civil population and in particular the industrial workers.
The directive was drafted by Air Marshal Bottomley and the minutes were kept by Chief of the Air Staff, Lord Portal.
I suppose it is clear that the Aiming Points are to be the built up areas and not the dockyards or aircraft factories.
In that Directive Bottomley also states:
You are accordingly authorized to employ your forces without restriction.
The quote I provided:
"the bombers... must in future be used to kill German civilians" - directive No.22 to BC
It maybe paraphrased but it's a valid one. It's not just Keegan's opinion either, that opinion is shared by British historian John Terraine:
Morale, in a bombing directive, means either the threat or the reality of blowing men, women and children to bits.
He goes on to state that the Air Ministry's estimates on the effects of area bombing on the German populace were:
a prescription for massacre, nothing more nor less.
Add to that the words of Mr. Churchill himself a few months after Directive No. 22:
Churchill’s letter to Lord Beaverbrook, on 5th July 1940.
"Nothing else will get the Germans to their minds, and on their knees, than an absolutely devastating extermination campaign against their homeland with heavy bombers."
See: John Colville : Fringes of Power. Downing Street Diaries 1939-1955. London 1985, pg. 186.
So yes my use of that quote was quite deliberate.
That's hardly the point. I never claimed the "Germans made them do it". I pointed out that every major airforce eventually ended up using area bombing of cities, and the British did so after being on the recieving end of both types.
It must have seemed to them that area bombing was the better option, otherwise they wouldn't all have taken it.
Of course, what's the combined experience and judgement of the Luftwaffe, RAF and USAAF compared to Wotan's?
You are in fact claiming the Nazi's made BC and Harris do it. All other nations in war inevitably hit targets in cities and / or embedded with in the civilian population. The only bomber force in WW2 that practically built their entire strategy on the indiscriminate bombing of civilians was BC whether it be to de-moralize, de-house' or to outright kill civilians.
It would be one thing if that strategy lived up its justification or even came close to what it was sold to do.
Did BC succeed in breaking German Morale?
Did it succeed in significantly disrupting the Nazi war machine?
Captain Carnahan of the U.S. Air Force Academy argues that:
the military advantage accruing from area-bombing proved to be either minimal or nonexistent... Civilian populations under bombardment on both sides in World War II commonly reacted with anger and resentment towards the enemy. Although the bombings terrorized people, these tactics had little ultimate effect on national war-making ability. Thus, beyond the question of its legitimacy, `terror bombing' has not proven its worth even to the attacker in terms of lost airmen and aircraft.
This conclusion can be quantified in the 10-volume report, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) released in 1947 and can be found on the web.
The British did their own survey British Bombing Survey Unit (BBSU). It was lead by Solly Zuckerman who in is biography stated that bombing had little effect on German morale. He goes far as to critisize BC for continuing on their de-housing strategy beyond what was necessary to overcome their operational limitations of inaccuracy in navigation and bombing.
Even Albert Speer who readily admits that the bombing campaign tied up resources and equipment states that area bombing:
spurred us to do our utmost. Neither did the bombings and the hardships that resulted from them weaken the morale of the populace. On the contrary, from my visits to armaments plants and my contacts with the man on the street, I carried away the impression of growing toughness. It may well be that the estimated loss of 9 percent of our production capacity was amply balanced by increased effort.
Speer wrote in Inside the Third Reich:
I had early recognized [that] the war could largely have been decided in 1943 if, instead of vast but pointless area bombing, the planes had concentrated on the centers of armaments production.
Even Harris in his autobiography states:
The idea that the main object of bombing German industrial cities was to break the enemy's morale proved to be wholly unsound; when we had destroyed almost all the larger industrial cities in Germany the civil population remained apathetic, while the Gestapo saw to it that they were docile, and, insofar as there was work left for them to do, industrious. But it seemed quite a natural opinion in 1941
How natural was that opinion early on?
In 1917 Churchill himself states:
It is improbable that any terrorization of the civil population which could be achieved by air attack would compel the Government of a great nation to surrender... In our own case, we have seen the combative spirit of the people roused, and not quelled, by the German air raids. Nothing that we have learned of the capacity of the German population to endure suffering justifies us in assuming that they could be cowed into submission by such methods, or indeed, that they would not be rendered more desperately resolved by them.
By '42 the British had experience with the effects of this type of bombing campaign (although limited in comparison) and knew that morale was not broken but emboldened.
The Nazi's didn't make Harris do it, it was ineffective, at least on some level the leadership in Britain knew that it had little hope of achieving its goals.
Do you not agree that the bombing campaign did not break the morale of the German people or produce a “speedy” victory?
Do you not agree that as new technology, and with the increased concentrations of bombers, and with the control of the air that came later in the war that BC was perfectly capable of re-evaluating and adjusting its strategy of area bombing cities? Why in 1945 did Harris continue the area bombing of cities with little relevance to the German war effort? Especially considering that BC could hit more precise targets with a more immediate impact on Germany’s capacity to wage war.
Harris pushed to stay the course even at the expense of his crews.
No, that's a comparison you made.
You claimed the aim was to kill Germans. Clearly the German's aim was to kill Jews, but they didn't do so with bombers, they used far more efficient ways instead. If the British aim had been to kill Germans, they would have done so as well.
You are making the comparisons not me.
I can judge individual acts by themselves. The context in which my judgments and points are presented in this thread aren't wrapped around what the Nazi's, or American's, or Soviet's, or Japanese did. Those are other topics for other threads.
You are making the moral comparisons. I state the deliberate strategy of targeting civilians by BC during WW2 was wrong. A valid rebuttal is not 'well the Nazi's killed Jews and others...'
You are making a case that BC and Britain had no other method, tactic or strategy available to them other then 'de-housing'.
There were British folks during the war who were appalled at the methods of BC. After Dresden even Churchill tried to get some space between him and Harris. In previous posts and threads of mine I quoted such folks. In this thread I posted Churchill's memorandum. If need be I can re-post them.
My point is that comparing immoral acts is in no way a useful tool in making your point.
Uh, no. I said the Luftwaffe led the way, as they did with the Blitz on London and other British cities.
On 24 Aug '40, German planes bombed central London due to a navigational error. This is for the most part is in agreement with a good portion of Historians. During the next 2 nights the Brits launched raids on Berlin.
From their everything escalated.
Fighter bombers didn't have the range to reach targets in Germany until after the invasion of France.
To prepare for invasion they didn't need to go Berlin or into Germany. They just needed to established control over western Europe. In fact leading up to and in support of D-day Bombers were pulled back from Germany to hit targets in the area I just described.
And how does this show that the Luftwaffe didn't try to bomb their way to victory?
I already told you. The LW wasn't tasked with 'victory'. Their roll was to force Britain into a deal. The Wehrmacht won its 'victories' on the ground with the LW supporting the ground forces. They didn't win it, nor was it their overall war objective to win the war by demoralizing, de-housing and / or killing civilians.
Hitler had no real plan to win a military victory over Britain by invasion and the best he could hope for was to destroy the RAF and get a deal.
From their I already answered your claim about the LW shift in strategy to hitting British cities.
continued in next post due to length restrictions:
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Alexander Lohr was tried and executed for his role in ordering the bombing of Belgrade, which had been declared an open city.
The IMT (International Military Tribunal) did not define the killing of civilians during aerial bombardment of population centers as a war-crime. The judgement of the IMT did not include the bombing of civilian targets, even though that would have been an 'easy' charge to lay against Goering as head of the Luftwaffe.
If we accept the judgement of the IMT, then neither the German bombing of Belgrade nor any other bombings of civilian targets by either side is to be considered a war crime. I have said so above.
Eric Mombeck in his Jagdwaffe series talks about the Luftwaffe's bombing of Belgrade.
By the end of the first day, the main targets in Belgrade had been destroyed. In his post-war memoirs, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill described the German raids as terror attacks and claimed a greatly inflated figure of 17.000 civilians had been killed by the Luftwaffe bombs, but when Generaloberst Alexander Lohr, the former commanding officer of Luftflotte IV, came before a Titoist court in 1946, the prosecution mentioned a figure of 1,500 Yugoslavs killed. It is believed, however, that the main targets in Belgrade were purely military and as the stukas carried out pinpoint attacks and the twin engined bombers carried a relatively insignificant load, it is certain that the figure of 1,500 was an exaggeration. However the Communist government wanted to conduct its own version of the Nuremberg trials and, consisted of atrocities, Alexander Lohr was hanged on the 26th February 1947
I don't necessarily agree with Mr. Mombeck that 1,500 civilian deaths is an exaggeration. I am more inclined to except Christopher Shores (Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete, 1940-41) estimates of 3,500-3,700 (certainly less then 4000).
I will note that Shores disagrees with Mombeck in that (quoting Shores):
Seven hundred and fourteen buildings were totally destroyed, 1888 heavily damaged and 6615 damaged to a less extent - 47% of the total building stock in the city. Only a small proportion of these were military targets of any sort. Some air raid shelters had also been hit, including one in the Church of Alexander Nevsky, where 70 people had died, and another where up to 200 were believed to have lost their lives.
However, Generaloberst Alexander Lohr wasn't charged by the IMT but by a 'Titoist' court. However, there certainly was a justification for those charges in that on 3 April Belgrade was declared an 'open city' even though there were military targets with in the city.
Maybe I should have been more specific in my statement:
No LW person was charged with any crime related to their bombing offensives.
So you are saying the whole programme was simply for hatred?
The v weapons were for hate, to kill and to respond to the area bombing of Germany.
They weren't effective nor did they have any potential to reverse the course of the war etc...
By the end of 1940, less than 1,000 Germans had been killed by British bombing, over 20,000 Britons had been killed by German bombing. What exactly were they retaliating against?
The British should have thought about that before they declared a war they weren't prepared to fight and bombing / targeting German civilians before they were prepared to defend their own.
What did you expect me to say?
And there's me thinking the Germans invaded Poland to start the war. Your sympathies are quite clear, I think.
Britain declared war on Germany, whether the reason was German aggression against Poland or not the British government bares the responsibility for their own actions. Much like America in Iraq '05.
If they weren't prepared to fight or if they weren't prepared to live up to the obligations they made to Poland then they should have moved in a different direction. Are you going to blame the decision of the British government to declare war on Germany? Were the Brits Nazi Puppets?
Britain may have had cause for war (after years of appeasement what did they expect of Hitler?) but Britain thought they could hide behind France.
I have no sympathy for Britain over the last century (even further back for that matter), that's for sure. A quick read of any my posts and you will see that.
Is that what you meant by 'sympathies'?
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Here is what British historian Martin Middlebrook says about Rotterdam:
The German Army units attacking Rotterdam were held back by strong Dutch resistance at a certain point in the city. The Germans issued an ultimatum: if the Dutch did not surrender, bombers would be called in to attack the Dutch positions. As the ultimatum ran out 100 Heinkel 111s took off en route for Rotterdam. During their flight the Dutch finally surrendered and a recall order was sent out to the bombers. Forty-three turned back but fifty seven had already dropped their bombs. Only 250-kilogram [550 pound] high explosive bombs were used and these were dropped accurately but they started fires with which the Dutch fire brigade were unable to cope. It was the resulting blaze which caused most of the damage and casualties. This was not a 'terror raid' but a tactical raid that went wrong. It must also be said, however, that the raid was in support of a completely unprovoked invasion of a country that had been neutral even during the First World War.
Martin Middlebrook, "The Nuremberg Raid," p. 3
Rotterdam was NOT an example of 'terror bombing' despite British propaganda. Adi Galland stated that the 'Luftwaffe's target was to bomb the defenders' and 'to clear a path for an assault crossing of the river'.
KG 54 were on route as negotiations for surrender were underway. Red flares were to be lit to call off the bombers if a deal was made. Kg 54 were to divert to secondary targets if this signal was observed. Obst Lackner's formation of 57 He111's failed to see the signal and and dropped their bombs on their assigned targets.
The resulting fires and destruction of buildings occurred by accident and was not the intended result. In fact Galland says that if the desired effect was to destroy the City, far more aircraft would have been sortied and incendiaries would have been loaded.
Its quite obvious that the intent was NOT to destroy the city or to target civilians.
Here are a selection of quotes describing the bombing raid found in Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries, Ballantine Books pp. 139-148:
At 16.00 hours on May 13th two civilians began waving great white flags at the southern end of the Willem bridge. As the firing ceased, they advanced hesitantly. One was the vicar of Noorder Eiland—the island in the Maas occupied by the Germans—the other a merchant. Von Choltitz bade them take themselves to the Dutch city commandant and emphasized that only by capitulating could Rotterdam be saved from devastation. In the evening the emissaries returned, trembling with fear. Their own countrymen had informed them that their closely populated island would be flattened by artillery that very night. If, Colonel Scharroo had said, the German commander had any proposals to make, he should send officers. He did not treat with civilians.
Destiny then took its course. Undoubtedly the Rotterdam garrison could effectively bar any further German advance to the north. From the strictly military point of view there was no reason why it should yield.
Understandably the German high command could equally press for a swift conclusion of the operation. It wanted Holland "cleaned up" as soon as possible in order to free forces for the main thrust through Belgium into northern France. Furthermore the 18th Army, as it attacked Holland on May 13th, feared that British landings were imminent. Thus at 18.45 General von Kuechler gave the order "to break the resistance at Rotterdam by every means".
The tank attack across the Willems bridge was fixed for 15.30 hours on May 14th, and would be preceded by artillery fire and a pinpoint bombing raid on a limited area at the northern end to paralyze the enemy's power of defense.
Meanwhile, the supreme command of the forces at Rotterdam had passed from Lieutenant-General Student to the general commanding XXXIX Panzer Corps, Rudolf Schmidt. The latter was instructed by the 18th Army commander, von Kuechler, "to use all means to prevent unnecessary bloodshed amongst the Dutch population" Accordingly, in the evening of May 13th, Schmidt drew up a new demand for Dutch capitulation, and had it translated. Unless resistance was terminated without delay, he wrote to the city commandant, he would have to use all means to break it.
"That," he added, "could result in the complete destruction of the city. I beg you, as a man with a sense of responsibility to take the necessary steps to prevent this."
At 13.50 the Dutch emissary duly crossed the bridge. He was Captain Bakker, the commandant's adjutant. On the Maas island he was met by Lieutenant-Colonel von Choltitz. A despatch-rider went off to the Corps HQ of Major-General Schmidt, just a few hundred yards to the south. Besides him, Lieutenant-General Student of the Air-Landing Corps and Lieutenant General Hubicki of 9th Panzer Division were also waiting there to hear the city commandant's answer to the urgent capitulation demand of the morning. Did the Dutch realise the seriousness of the situation?
Choltitz, waiting with Bakker on the. bridge for the few minutes till Corps was advised, seized the opportunity once
more to emphasize the deadly danger with which Rotterdam was threatened. But the Dutch officer looked about him
sceptically. There was not a shot to be heard. After days of fighting there seemed to be a cease-fire suddenly. As for the German tanks, allegedly all ready to swarm over the bridges into the centre of the city, there was not a sign of them. Perhaps they did not exist? Perhaps the Germans had hurled their imprecations "to save Rotterdam" just to hide their own weakness.
In dismay Choltitz, and soon afterwards the German generals , were forced to recognize the fact that the Dutch
commandant, Colonel Scharroo, saw no immediate necessity to surrender. He still held the major part of the city, with his forces outnumbering the invaders even south of the Maas, while the remnants of the German 22 (Airborne) Division still holding out under Graf Sponeck in the northern outskirts' with a few hundred men were no longer capable of launching any attack. Why then should he capitulate? In any case the Dutch supreme commander, General Winkelmann, had ordered him to answer the German demand evasively.
The previous evening a liaison officer of the Geschwader had flown to meet General Student in Rotterdam, and taken back with him exact details of the operation, above all a map on which the enemy resistance zones had been marked were indicated by a triangle at the northern end of the bridges. Only within this triangle was KG54 permitted drop its bombs.
Now, on his approach, Colonel Lackner in the leading aircraft had this map spread on his knees. Copies had been given to his Gruppen and squadron commanders. the attack was confined to a strictly military target. The powerful Dutch defense force to the north of the two bridges was to be immobilized by a short, sharp blow from the air, to enable the German troops to cross. Every bomber crew had further been instructed that on the north bank was also a small bridgehead of sixty Germans, whose lives must be safeguarded.
"Just before take-off," he reported, "we received information from operations headquarters on the telephone that General Student had radioed that the Dutch had been called upon to surrender Rotterdam. On our approach we were to watch out for red Very lights on the Maas island. Should they appear we had orders to attack not Rotterdam, but the alternative target of two English divisions at Antwerp."
The question was: would they recognize the lights amongst all the haze and dust raised by five days of fighting?
Meanwhile General Schmidt was writing out in his own hand, point by point, the conditions of surrender that an
out-matched opponent could honorably accept. He concluded with the words: "I am compelled to negotiate swiftly,
and must therefore insist that your decision is in my hands within three hours, namely at 18.00 hours. Rotterdam South, 4.5.1940, 14.55 hours, (Signed) Schmidt."
Captain Bakker took the letter from him and returned at once to the city. Von Choltitz escorted him to the Willems bridge, and he hastened over it. Now it was exactly 15.00 hours--the time originally appointed for the air raid. "The
tension was appalling," wrote Choltitz. "Would Rotterdam surrender in time?" At that moment there came from the south the sound of any aero-engines. The bombers were on their way! Soldiers on the island loaded the Very pistols.
"Those of us on the spot," continued Choltitz, "could only hope that the necessary orders had been given, that the communications had not broken down, and that the high command knew what was happening."
But now the high command had no more control over the course of events. For half an hour, since it eventually got Schmidt's signal, Luftflotte 2 had been doing its best to contact KG 54 on the radio and recall it. The command directly responsible for it the "Air Corps for Special Purposes"—had also put out urgent recall messages. As soon as its chief of staff, Colonel Bassenge, received the vital signal in Bremen, he dashed into the signals office in person and rushed out the agreed code-word for the alternative target.
Unfortunately only the Geschwader's own operations room was keyed to the same frequency as the aircraft in the air, and before the orders had been received and handed on much time was lost. At Munster Luftflotte 2's operations officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Rieckhoff, leapt into a Messerschmitt 109 and raced to Rotterdam. He hoped literally to divert the attack in person.
continued in next post due to length restrictions:
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Rieckhoff wouldn't make in time, no radio contact could be established with the He-111's of KG 54. The only chance to call off the raid was the red signal flares but:
"Though there were no clouds in the sky," he reported, "it was unusually misty. Visibility was so bad that I took my column down to 2,300 feet to be sure of hitting the required target and not Lieutenant Kerlin and his sixty men, or the bridges themselves."
At 15.05 he crossed the Maas and reached the city's edge. The altitude was ideal for medium flak, and it duly came up. With the target ahead, no evasive action was possible. All eyes were fastened on the course of the river. In the middle of Rotterdam the New Maas makes a loop to the north, and just west of its vertex are the twin bridges. Even in the prevailing mist and smoke their straight lines were still discernible, as were the outlines of the Maas island.
Yet despite their concentrated attention, neither pilots nor observers spotted any of the red light signals. All they saw were the little red balls of the Dutch flak which came dancing up in strings to meet them. Rotterdam's fate was just a few seconds away—seconds during which Choltitz's men on the island fired Very lights by the dozen.
It was too late...
The starboard column of KG 54 droned over the target and the 100- and 500-lb. bombs went whistling down. They struck precisely in the triangular zone, in the heart of the Old City. After that it was the turn of the port column, with Lieutenant-Colonel Höhne and the staff section at its head.
"Never again," he reported after the war, "did I fly an operation accompanied by such dramatic circumstances. Both my observer, prone in front of me manning the bomb sight, and the radio-operator seated behind knew the signal I would give in the event of the bombing being canceled at the last moment."
From the south-westerly direction of his approach the target was easy to recognize. On the inter-corn. the observer counted out his measurements. Höhne concentrated solely on the island, scanning it for the possible "barrage of red Very lights". But he, too, saw nothing. Finally his observer called out: "I must let go the bombs now or they'll fall away from the target."
Höhne gave the word, then immediately caught his breath. Faintly, and just for a second or two, he had glimpsed "not a barrage but just two paltry little Very lights ascending". Turning round, he shouted to the radio-operator the code-word to turn back.
For his own machine it was too late. The automatic release had already functioned, and the bombs went down. The same thing happened aboard the section's other two planes close behind. But for 1 Squadron the short space interval sufficed. Before the bombardiers could set their levers the radio-operators gave the stop signal. They hesitated, turned questioningly around, then gazed down again on the city.
So it was, that out of KG 54's hundred He 111s, only fifty-seven dropped their bomb-load over Rotterdam, the remaining 43 having been arrested from doing so at literally the last second. Subsequent inquiries elicited that, apart from Lieutenant-Colonel Höhne, not one man had spotted any of the Very lights that in fact had been sent up from the Maas island in an unbroken stream.
Altogether 158 500-lb. and 1,150 100-lb. bombs were dropped on the city—i.e., a total of ninety-seven tons. In accordance with the military nature of the mission, it was all high-explosive.
So its clear to anyone that the LW did not intend to 'area-bomb' Rotterdam in order to to 'de-moralize' the civilains (kill them) so that Holland would give up its defense efforts.
The target of KG 54 was the northern end of the bridges where the defenders were concentrated.
No incendiaries were dropped by the LW, they dropped standard HE bombs. More then 40% of the He-111's didn't even drop their ordnance.
The map below is from Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries p. 144.:
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/334_1119807351_rotterdam_raid.jpg)
This photograph is taken from Pictorial History of the Second World War, Wm. H. Wise & Co., New York: 1944, vol. I, p. 109. The large white area north of the Maas river, in the center of the photograph, shows the area which was destroyed in the bombing. There is also a port facility right across the bridge.
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/334_1119807319_rotterdam_14_may_1940.jpg)
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And Warshaw?
Shovelling 72 tonnes of incendiaries out of the loading doors of Ju52?s.
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Hitler's comment on the London Bombing, 14.september 1940.
"The preconditions for an invasion of Britain are yet not at hand. Nevertheless, the bombing of London would continue. If eight million civilians go crazy, that can lead to a catastrophy"
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It maybe paraphrased but it's a valid one.
It's invalid because the phrase you enclosed in question marks doesn't appear anywhere in the paper you atributted it to.
It's not just Keegan's opinion either, that opinion is shared by British historian John Terraine:
quote:Morale, in a bombing directive, means either the threat or the reality of blowing men, women and children to bits.
Actually what he goes on to say, in the very next sentence, is:
"It may be noted - and remembered - that in July 1940, with the Blitz still in the future, this programme did not appeal to the Air Staff."
As I said, British bombing methods followed on directly from German bombing methods. Where the Luftwaffe led, the RAF followed.
He goes on to state that the Air Ministry's estimates on the effects of area bombing on the German populace were:
quote:a prescription for massacre, nothing more nor less.
Again you are distorting quotes to suit your agenda. Terraine makes this comment in reference to the early war plan to build a 5,000 bomber force, and drop well over 1 million tons of bombs on Germany in 1943, with an estimated death toll of 900,000. (And if only they had, tens of millions of lives could have been saved).
So it's not the Air Ministry's estimates on the effect of area bombing on Germany, it's a comment on a proposal that was never implemented.
So yes my use of that quote was quite deliberate.
So you admit to making up quotes? How do you expect to have credibility when you admit to making up the quotes you claim to be taking from official documents?
You are in fact claiming the Nazi's made BC and Harris do it
Is that you paraphrasing again?
I've said no such thing.
I've said that Britain copied the methods and tactics used by the Luftwaffe. Obviously they had a choice in whether to do so. They could have continued the war denying themselves what they felt was an effective tactic the enemy had already used very widely.
All other nations in war inevitably hit targets in cities and / or embedded with in the civilian population. The only bomber force in WW2 that practically built their entire strategy on the indiscriminate bombing of civilians was BC whether it be to de-moralize, de-house' or to outright kill civilians.
Rubbish.
The first country to make morale a target was Germany, which referenced morale as a target in the BoB and Blitz, even if they did not do so earlier, in Poland, Norway, France, Belguim, Holland etc.
And of course to suggest the USAAF did not do is is, frankly, silly.
There is no difference between the methods and targets the Luftwaffe, RAF and USAAF all ended up attacking. (in that order, too)
All tagetted morale. All targetted enemy cities.
It would be one thing if that strategy lived up its justification or even came close to what it was sold to do.
Did BC succeed in breaking German Morale?
Did the Luftwaffe succeed in breaking British morale?
IT's worth noting that under air attack absenteeism in German factories soared, following Hamburg it ran at about 25% in major German cities, as the populace fled to the countryside (ie at any one time 25% of the workers weren't showing up for work)
Did it succeed in significantly disrupting the Nazi war machine?
Yes, most definately. See Overy for a good modern study of the effects.
This conclusion can be quantified in the 10-volume report, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) released in 1947 and can be found on the web.
Um, not really.
What the USSBS said:
"The city attacks of the RAF prior to the autumn of 1944, did not substantially affect the course of German war production."
"Commencing in the autumn of 1944, the tonnage dropped on city areas, plus spill-overs from attacks on transportation and other specific targets, mounted greatly. In the course of these raids, Germany's steel industry was knocked out, its electric power industry was substantially impaired and industry generally in the areas attacked was disorganized. There were so many forces making for the collapse of production during this period, however, that it is not possible separately to assess the effect of these later area raids on war production. There is no doubt, however, that they were significant."
And on the USAAF:
" Although the Eighth Air Force began operations August 17, 1942, with the bombing of marshalling yards at Rouen and Sotteville in northern France, no operations during 1942 or the first half of 1943 had significant effect. The force was small and its range limited. Much time in this period was devoted to training and testing the force under combat conditions.
In November and December of 1942, the U-boat attack on Allied merchant shipping was in its most successful phase and submarine bases and pens and later construction yards became the chief target and remained so until June 1943. These attacks accomplished little. The submarine pens were protected and bombs did not penetrate the 12-foot concrete roofs. The attack on the construction yards and slipways was not heavy enough to be more than troublesome. "
"When the Combined Bomber Offensive Plan was issued in June of 1943 to implement the Casablanca directive, submarines were dropped from first priority and the German aircraft industry was substituted. The German ball- bearing industry, the supplier of an important component, was selected as a complementary target."
"From examination of the records and personalities in the ball-bearing industry, the user industries and the testimony of war production officials, there is no evidence that the attacks on the ball-bearing industry had any measurable effect on essential war production."
"Nevertheless the attack on the aircraft plants, like the attack on the ball-bearing plants, showed that to knock out a single industry with the weapons available in 1943 and early 1944 was a formidable enterprise demanding continuous attacks to effect complete results. Recovery was improvised almost as quickly as the plants were knocked out. With the shift in priority for strategic attacks -- first to marshalling yards and bridges in France in preparation for invasion, immediately followed by the air campaign against oil -- the continued attacks on the aircraft industry were suspended."
The truth is the bombing offensive did not achieve much prior to 1944, it was too light.
Half the bombs dropped on Germany were dropped in the 5 years up to the end of September 1944, the other half in the 7 months afterwards.
Even Albert Speer who readily admits that the bombing campaign tied up resources and equipment states that area bombing:
quote:spurred us to do our utmost. Neither did the bombings and the hardships that resulted from them weaken the morale of the populace. On the contrary, from my visits to armaments plants and my contacts with the man on the street, I carried away the impression of growing toughness. It may well be that the estimated loss of 9 percent of our production capacity was amply balanced by increased effort.
Other quotes from Speer:
"The damage to the armaments industry was mostly caused by RAF night attacks"
He also said that RAF night attacks were more damaging because they were of longer duration, used heavier bombs, and displayed extraordinary accuracy.
Speer wrote in Inside the Third Reich:
quote:I had early recognized [that] the war could largely have been decided in 1943 if, instead of vast but pointless area bombing, the planes had concentrated on the centers of armaments production.
Speer's most famous quote from 1943 is:
"Three days
later I informed Hitler that armaments production was
collapsing and threw in the further warning that a series
of attacks of this sort, extended to six more major
cities, would bring Germany's armaments production
to a total halt."
"Fortunately for us, a series of
Hamburg-type raids was not repeated on such a scale
against other cities. Thus the enemy once again allowed
us to adjust ourselves to his strategy."
Pity the RAF didn't actually get their 5,000 bomber force in 1943, it might well have ended the war there and then.
Do you not agree that the bombing campaign did not break the morale of the German people or produce a “speedy” victory?
Nothing produced a "speedy" victory.
Bombing was one part of the strategy that produced a victory, which was by far the most important point.
Do you not agree that as new technology, and with the increased concentrations of bombers, and with the control of the air that came later in the war that BC was perfectly capable of re-evaluating and adjusting its strategy of area bombing cities?
Yes. That's also exactly what it did.
The idea that all BC did was area bomb German cities is wrong.
In 1942 and 1943, when area bombing was the only effective thing it could do, more than three quarters of BC's tonnage was dropped on German cities.
In 1944 it was just over a third, and the same for 1945. The rest was going on specific targets, like oil, transport, enemy troop concentrations etc.
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Why in 1945 did Harris continue the area bombing of cities with little relevance to the German war effort? Especially considering that BC could hit more precise targets with a more immediate impact on Germany’s capacity to wage war.
Why did Spaatz?
This was the USAAF's SOP, as updated in October 1944:
"No towns or cities in Germany will be attacked
as secondary or last resort targets, targets of
opportunity, or otherwise, unless such towns contain
or have immediately adjacent to them, one (1)
or more military objectives. Military objectives
include railway lines; junctions; marshalling yards;
railway or road bridges, or other communications
networks; any industrial plant; and such obvious
military objectives as oil storage tanks, military
camps and barracks, troop concentrations, motor
transport or AFV parks, ordnance or supply
depots, ammunition depots; airfields; etc."
"It has been determined that towns and cities
large enough to produce an identifiable return on
the H2X scope generally contain a large proportion
of the military objectives listed above. These centers,
therefore, may be attacked as secondary or
last resort targets through the overcast bombing technique"
In other words, if it's got a bridge, or a railway line, or a factory, the town is a valid target. If you can see it on radar, bomb it.
It's quoted in American Bombardment Policy Against Germany, by Richard G Davis, who sums up the policy:
"Almost every city or town in Germany with a population
exceeding 50,000, and a few below that
figure, met the foregoing criteria. This policy made
it open season for bombing Germany’s major cities
in any weather."
The USAAF was doing it's share of area bombing cities in Europe in 1944 and 1945, they just didn't like to admit it.
Harris pushed to stay the course even at the expense of his crews.
Harris pushed to end the war as quickly as possible.
He knew that would be hard on his crews, but he also knew that their losses were light in comparison to normal military losses.
You are making the comparisons not me.
I can judge individual acts by themselves. The context in which my judgments and points are presented in this thread aren't wrapped around what the Nazi's, or American's, or Soviet's, or Japanese did.
You have to keep it in context.
Area bombing Argentina over their invasion of the Falklands would not have been right. It would have been disproportionate.
Area bombing Germany was not disproportionate, in fact it was "small potatos" compared to the overall picture.
You are making the moral comparisons.
I'm not making moral comparisons. I see nothing immoral in attacking the enemy, providing the results of such attacks are not disproportionate to the harm the enemy is causing.
[quote I state the deliberate strategy of targeting civilians by BC during WW2 was wrong.[/quote]
I state there was no such policy, any more (or less) than Luftwaffe attacks on British morale (and food supplies) in 1940 were attacks on civilians, or any more (or less) than USAAF attacks on Japanese and German cities were attacks on civilians.
You are making a case that BC and Britain had no other method, tactic or strategy available to them other then 'de-housing'.
Am I? I don't think so.
I am making a case Britain had no more effective method. And to support that claim I pointed out the British followed the same progression the other major strategic forces did, from precision attacks to area bombing.
There must be some reason why the Luftwaffe, RAF and USAAF all ended up doing the same thing, area bombing (amongst others, of course)
There were British folks during the war who were appalled at the methods of BC. After Dresden even Churchill tried to get some space between him and Harris. In previous posts and threads of mine I quoted such folks. In this thread I posted Churchill's memorandum. If need be I can re-post them.
Be aware that Churchill's memorandum was withdrawn, and Churchill actually complains that Germany would be so damaged the allies wouldn't be able to seize anything worthwhile in reparations.
My point is that comparing immoral acts is in no way a useful tool in making your point.
I'm not comparing them. There is no comparison whatsoever between attacking your enemy and rounding up and murdering civilians who have already surrendered to you.
On 24 Aug '40, German planes bombed central London due to a navigational error. This is for the most part is in agreement with a good portion of Historians. During the next 2 nights the Brits launched raids on Berlin.
Not strictly true. On the 24th the Luftwaffe launched extensive bombing raids over Britain, some mistakenly hit London. On the 25th they did the same thing again, as the RAF was bombing select targets in Berlin.
But the entire "escalation" had been underway long before then. The Luftwaffe had killed over a thousand British civilians by the time they "accidentally" dropped their first bombs on London.
Whilst Hitler might have considered only London to be important, I don't think the British viewed those 1,000 dead as any less important because they weren't Londoners.
And the full scale attack on London was simply the German attempt to bomb their way to victory. Planned for weeks by the German staff, something Kesselring had been pinninghis hopes on.
To prepare for invasion they didn't need to go Berlin or into Germany. They just needed to established control over western Europe. In fact leading up to and in support of D-day Bombers were pulled back from Germany to hit targets in the area I just described.
So you would want to throw the entire bombing campaign out of the window?
Yes, the fighter bombers had sufficient range to contest air space over France, and destroy the Luftwaffe that way.
But the allies would be facing a Germany armed with far more tanks, far more artillery, far more fuel, far more soldiers.
Because the fighter bombers wouldn't be destroying German oil refineries, factories, cities, transport, and there wouldn't be a third of German artillery production going on AA weapons over Germany, with all the manpower associated with that.
The Wehrmacht won its 'victories' on the ground with the LW supporting the ground forces.
Right. So what happens against Britain? They couldn't use ground troops, because there was a bit of water in the way.
So they switched to bombing.
I already told you. The LW wasn't tasked with 'victory'. Their roll was to force Britain into a deal.
They were tasked with making sure Britain gave up the war against Germany. That's victory by anyone's definition (apart from yours, it seems).
Hitler had no real plan to win a military victory over Britain by invasion and the best he could hope for was to destroy the RAF and get a deal.
The best he could hope for was to destroy the RAF and bomb Britain into submission. That's what he set out to do.
From their I already answered your claim about the LW shift in strategy to hitting British cities.
Did you? Do you deny they did it, or do you claim they carried on the bombing for some obscure reason, rather than the obvious one fo trying to defeat Britain?
The IMT (International Military Tribunal) did not define the killing of civilians during aerial bombardment of population centers as a war-crime. The judgement of the IMT did not include the bombing of civilian targets, even though that would have been an 'easy' charge to lay against Goering as head of the Luftwaffe.
If we accept the judgement of the IMT, then neither the German bombing of Belgrade nor any other bombings of civilian targets by either side is to be considered a war crime. I have said so above.
Then we're in agreement. I've never claimed there was anything fundamentally different between the RAF, Luftwaffe and USAAF tactics and methods, although there was clearly a difference of scale.
Maybe I should have been more specific in my statement:
quote:No LW person was charged with any crime related to their bombing offensives.
Yes, you should have.
But the whole point is besides the point. I never made any claims that what the Luftwaffe did was a war crime (in regards to bombing, anyway).
The British should have thought about that before they declared a war they weren't prepared to fight and bombing / targeting German civilians before they were prepared to defend their own.
Well, Britain declared war on Germany after Germany invaded Poland, so I don't really think it was a war Britain wanted.
And Britain didn't target German civilians. I would argue at any point during the war, but if you believe that targetting a city is targetting civilians, then Britain did not do this either until after Germany had, repeatedly.
Again, by the end of 1940 less than 1,000 Germans had been killed by British bombing, 20,000 British had been killed by German bombing.
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Britain declared war on Germany, whether the reason was German aggression against Poland or not the British government bares the responsibility for their own actions.
Well, you're exact quote was :
"You all started a war with Germany".
It seems to me that they all (Germany) started a war with the allies. After all, Britian made a public guarantee to Poland, and backed it up in no uncertain terms to the Germans in private.
Perhaps it should rather be that Germany shouldn't have started a war they weren't ready for.
If they weren't prepared to fight or if they weren't prepared to live up to the obligations they made to Poland then they should have moved in a different direction.
Well, they clearly were prepared to fight, which is why Britain declared war, rather than backing down.
But going to the aid of someone under attack isn't agression, and I hope that if saw a weaker person under attack by a thug, I'd step in to help as well.
Are you going to blame the decision of the British government to declare war on Germany?
Sorry, you haven't finished that sentence. Am I going to blame the decision of the British government to declare war on Germany on what?
Blame Germany for it? Of course. Germany violated international law and treaty obligations to declare war on Poland, Britain had made it abundantly clear that if Germany did so (again) then Britain would go to war.
Britain may have had cause for war (after years of appeasement what did they expect of Hitler?
Rationality?
After all, millions of Germans voted for him. They must have thought he was rational, surely?
I have no sympathy for Britain over the last century (even further back for that matter), that's for sure.
That's obvious. Equally obvious is your sympathy for Nazi Germany.
Is that what you meant by 'sympathies'?
No, it's more where your sympathies do lie.
Rotterdam was NOT an example of 'terror bombing' despite British propaganda. Adi Galland stated that the 'Luftwaffe's target was to bomb the defenders' and 'to clear a path for an assault crossing of the river'.
Yes, that's what I said. (My "Nonsense" comment was merely in reply to yours) You claimed to have original source material that showed Rotterdam was bombed to restrict allied resupply efforts, though. Was that another "paraphrase"?
So its clear to anyone that the LW did not intend to 'area-bomb' Rotterdam in order to to 'de-moralize' the civilains (kill them) so that Holland would give up its defense efforts.
Never said they did (again, exluding my "nonsense" in reply to your "nonsense")
And Warshaw?
Shovelling 72 tonnes of incendiaries out of the loading doors of Ju52?s.
Exactly. What Wotan is trying to do is argue that every Luftwaffe bombing attack was purely aimed at military targets, until the RAF started bombing German civilians.
What he ignores is that the Luftwaffe bombed cities all over Europe, mostly as military targets, but not only. And they were careless of the civilian casualties they caused in the process.
The RAF didn't even do that until after the bombing of targets in Western Europe, when the RAF were allowed to attack strictly military targets in Germany.
The RAF didn't resort to attacking cities as such, rather than military targets that were sometimes in cities, until 17th December 1940, by which time the Luftwaffe had killed 20,000 British civilians in area attacks on British cities.
The timeline of bombing is:
1939 September - Germany bombs cities, towns, villages in Poland
1939 September - Britain bombs German warships at sea
1939 September - Germany bombs British ships at sea
!940 March - Germany bombs military targets in Scottish islands, killing a civilian
1940 March - Britain bombs a German seaplane base on an island in the North Sea
1940 April - Germany bombs many Norwegian towns and cities, killing hundreds
1940 May - Germany bombs military targets in France, Belguim and the Netherlands, including Paris
1940 May - Britain bombs miltary targets west of the Rhine
1940 May - Germany bombs Rotterdam, killing almost 1,000 people, and continues bombing attacks throughout western Europe
1940 May - Britain bombs military targets in the rest of Germany
1940 August - Germany launches extensive raids on Britain, killing over 1,000 civilians
1940 August - Germany drops first bombs on military targets in and around London
1940 August - Britain drops first bombs on military targets in Berlin
1940 September - Germany launches area bombing attacks on British cities
1940 October - By the 7th October, German bombing has killed 8,500 British civilians
1940 November - Germany intensifies area attacks on Britain
1940 December - Britain launches first area attack on Germany
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"He did it first!", said Tommy and pointed at Jerry the brownshirt. Then Tommy donned his own brown shirt. "I'll show him!".
Everyone is responsible for his own actions no matter if he flew for the LW, RAF or the USAAF.
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The LW demonstrated effective area bombing on the first day in Poland.
They effectively showed the world how to buckle a nation into submission with bombing.
The RAF kept to inaccurate strategical bombing in the beginning, but in Sept 1940 they were commanded to "dump" their cargo on almost anything if they could notfind the target.
(in those times, Göbbels garden was hit)
German losses are estimated somewhere between 300.000 and a million.
That is 5-20% of the dead in their KZ's by the way.
Oh, more from Speer, - after the Hamburg raid.
"Had the RAF repeated an attack of that scale some 2 times in a relatively short period, Germany would have had no option other than to resign"
We are blessed with information that those guys didn't have.
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"1940 August - Germany drops first bombs on military targets in and around London
1940 August - Britain drops first bombs on military targets in Berlin "
That`s so typical for Nashwan... little twist here, little twist there, and you`ve got the finest of Nashwan`s lies.
It`s a commonly accepted fact, even by at least 99.9% of British historians, that London was bombed accidently by a handful of Heinkels, who just got lost and jettisoned their load somewhere over the enemy territory. It`s throughly documented like the fact that not a single German bomb would fell on Britain if the latter would not declare war on Germany on the 3rd of September.
Of course, as per Nashwan, Britain declaring the war was actually Germany`s fault, and not the choice of HM`s Goverment.
Also I have seen Nashwan denying the accidental nature of that bombing, and getting into conspiracy theories... now he claims it was against military targets - another twist.
Also according to Nashwan - and only to him - the British started attacking military targets in Berlin. What 'miliatary targets' were these? Just list a few.
Total BS of course, it was on Churchill`s orders, and just like the circumstances of London bombed in August 1940, it`s throughly documented and accepted by British historians just the like.
Of course Nashwan doesn`t like the version. He doesn`t like how it happened.
He doesn`t like to take the responsibility for British acts of terror in ww2. He`d like to blame it all on the Germans, and accuse the Americans on doing similiar *****ty terror attacks like the Bomber Command. 'Come on Yank, lessen our guilt by sharing it'.
But why is it surprising from the same man who denies to existance of death camps? Or who repeatadly made up qoutes in this very thread from Speer and Spaight?
I never cease to be distgusted by the sheer amount of Nashwan`s hypocrat attitude and lies. If I`d be his fellow briton, I`d be ashamed to be British.
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It's invalid because the phrase you enclosed in question marks doesn't appear anywhere in the paper you atributted it to.
It's perfectly valid because it not only captures the tone and intent of BC's strategy, it is backed up by the fact that its what BC actually did...
"the bombers... must in future be used to kill German civilians" - directive No.22 to BC
-War Cabinet policy paper, dated 3rd. November 1942
Again you are distorting quotes to suit your agenda. Terraine makes this comment in reference to the early war plan to build a 5,000 bomber force, and drop well over 1 million tons of bombs on Germany in 1943, with an estimated death toll of 900,000. (And if only they had, tens of millions of lives could have been saved).
So it's not the Air Ministry's estimates on the effect of area bombing on Germany, it's a comment on a proposal that was never implemented.
Its not a distortion, it reflects the real policy and strategy implemented by BC and Harris. Britain could not have produced 5000 bombers but that didn't stop from trying to:
Churchill’s letter to Lord Beaverbrook, on 5th July 1940.
"Nothing else will get the Germans to their minds, and on their knees, than an absolutely devastating extermination campaign against their homeland with heavy bombers."
See: John Colville : Fringes of Power. Downing Street Diaries 1939-1955. London 1985, pg. 186.
So you admit to making up quotes? How do you expect to have credibility when you admit to making up the quotes you claim to be taking from official documents?
That quote didn't' originate with me and its 100% accurate in describing the policy and strategy of BC.
I've said no such thing.
I've said that Britain copied the methods and tactics used by the Luftwaffe. Obviously they had a choice in whether to do so. They could have continued the war denying themselves what they felt was an effective tactic the enemy had already used very widely.
Nonsense the British had practiced terror bombing during the inter-war years and Harris was a firm believer in BCs ability to terror bomb civilians into submission long before Germany dropped bombs in Britain.
All other nations in war inevitably hit targets in cities and / or embedded with in the civilian population. The only bomber force in WW2 that practically built their entire strategy on the indiscriminate bombing of civilians was BC whether it be to de-moralize, de-house' or to outright kill civilians.
That statement is 100% accurate as well. BC strategy was to kill civilians to disrupt war production and de-moralize the populace. It was a failure because not only did this strategy not achieve its goals it had no hope of doing so. All it did was increase the casualties among civilians.
Did the Luftwaffe succeed in breaking British morale?
IT's worth noting that under air attack absenteeism in German factories soared, following Hamburg it ran at about 25% in major German cities, as the populace fled to the countryside (ie at any one time 25% of the workers weren't showing up for work)
The LW wasn't built to break British morale nor was its overall war strategy built on such a premise.
Even if we believe your 25% absenteeism claim German war production increased until such a point that the situation on the ground led to a collapse inthe German economy. This collapse wasn't brought on directly by the bombing campaign but was due to the situation on the ground.
Yes, most definately. See Overy for a good modern study of the effects.
Overy's 'good modern study' is as flawed as any.
Richard Overy, in his book Why the Allies Won, makes the following statement about the effectiveness of British and American bombing of the Third Reich: "At the end of January 1945 Albert Speer and his ministerial colleagues met in Berlin to sum up what bombing had done to production schedules for 1944. They found that Germany had produced 35 percent fewer tanks than planned, 31 percent fewer aircraft and 42 percent fewer lorries as a result of bombing. The denial of these huge resources to German forces in 1944 fatally weakened their response to bombing and invasion and eased the path of Allied armies."
On the surface, Speer's analysis tells us that the Allied strategic bombing campaign had a decisive impact on the German war effort in 1944. Based on figures found in Paul Kennedy's "Rise and Fall of the Great Powers," the Germans produced in 1944: 17,800 tanks, 39,807 aircraft. So that, on the basis of Speer's statement, they aimed to produce 24,030 tanks and 52,147 aircraft. For comparison, Allied production of tanks and aircraft in 1944 resulted in 51,500 tanks (USSR: 29,000; UK: 5,000; USA: 17,500) and 163,079 aircraft (USSR: 40,300; UK 26,461; USA: 96,318). Therefore, even with the additional production that would have resulted from no bombing at all, the Allies still produce twice as many tanks and more than three times the number of aircraft as the Third Reich.
Such figures do not support Overy's conclusion that bombing Germany had "fatally weakened their response to bombing and invasion and eased the path of Allied armies." In terms of the kind of war of attrition fought in 1944 the additional German production would not have made a decisive difference. Allied production for 1944 is clearly overwhelming. Looking at the military situation on the ground in 1944 is even more telling of how the war is going.
Overy goes on to say: "The indirect effects were more important still, for the bombing offensive forced the German economy to switch very large resources away from equipment for the fighting fronts, using them instead to combat the bombing threat." At least, an ever-increasing number of Luftwaffe units were devoted to the air defense of the Reich as the war progressed. And, new aircraft production shifted towards fighters and away from bombers. The question remains as to whether this impact of the Allied bombing campaign was decisive to the outcome of the war or had just a marginal effect on it.
Furthermore, the converse of Overy's remark was also true. The production of bomber forces represented a significant resource expenditure for the US and especially Great Britain. Was this a worthwhile military expenditure? The results of the campaign are debatable. Certainly the German capitulation did not come about because of the Allied bombing campaign. That honor must go to the land campaigns fought by the allies. So, could the resources devoted to the bomber force been more effectively employed elsewhere?
Perhaps the greatest oversight in an analysis that focuses on the latter part of the war is that the crucial period to consider is from 1941 to 1943. It is in this period that German power is substantial and the possibility of a German military victory exists. How effective was the Allied bomber campaign during this period? According to a table found in the Penguin Atlas of World History, the Allies dropped about 10,000 tons on Germany in 1940, 30,000 tons in 1941, 40,000 tons in 1942 and 120,000 tons in 1943 while in 1944 they drop 650,000 tons and in 1945, about 500,000 tons are dropped in the first four months (at that rate, 1.5 million tons would be dropped over the course of 1945). Considering that Germany dropped about 37,000 tons on the UK in 1940, another 22,000 tons in 1941, with a few thousand tons every year thereafter with marginal results, there is little reason to believe that the scale of Allied bombing between 1940 and 1943 was substantial enough to alter the military balance in 1941 or 1942 either. Yet those are critical years to consider because that was when Soviet survival hung in the balance and British possessions in the Middle East were threatened by conquest.
There are many 'rebuttals' of the idea that the bombing campaign had 'fatally weakened their [Wehrmact] response to bombing and invasion and eased the path of Allied armies'.
The bombing campaing never achieved its what it was tasked with and it wasn't until late in the war that the bombers could even come close to its goals. However by that time the situation on the ground had all but decided the out come of the war despite of the efforts of BC and the bombing campaing in general.
The truth is the bombing offensive did not achieve much prior to 1944, it was too light.
Half the bombs dropped on Germany were dropped in the 5 years up to the end of September 1944, the other half in the 7 months afterwards.
Thats what I said not only in this reply but previously. The point at which the bombing campaign began appraoching its potential the situation on the ground had nearly collapsed the Germany economy despite the efforts of the bombers.
Other quotes from Speer:
"The damage to the armaments industry was mostly caused by RAF night attacks"
He also said that RAF night attacks were more damaging because they were of longer duration, used heavier bombs, and displayed extraordinary accuracy.
German production increased through '43 into '44.
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Three days
later I informed Hitler that armaments production was collapsing and threw in the further warning that a series
of attacks of this sort, extended to six more major cities, would bring Germany's armaments production
to a total halt.
"Fortunately for us, a series of
Hamburg-type raids was not repeated on such a scale against other cities. Thus the enemy once again allowed
us to adjust ourselves to his strategy."
Pity the RAF didn't actually get their 5,000 bomber force in 1943, it might well have ended the war there and then.
Martin Middlebrook in his The Battle of Hamburg doesn't seem to agree with Speer.
"Every one of the [targeted] districts was mainly residential. There were no sizeable industrial establishments anywhere in the area that it was hoped to bomb. No part of the attack was planned to fall south of the river [Elbe] where the U-boat yards and other major industries were located. It was pure Area Bombing.
Not much need for 'pin point accuracy' with the Hamburg raids.
More from Middlebrook:
Rothenburgsort [contained] the largest children's hospital in Hamburg. Billwarder Ausschlag was a densely crowded working-class area which could claim the distinction of having produced the lowest pro-Nazi vote [22.9 percent] in Hamburg in the 1933 elections... But the greatest weight of the attack [fell on the areas of Borgfelde and Hamm where] street after narrow street was comprised of six-storied buildings, each block usually housing eighteen families. There were many children...These areas were predominantly residential...densely populated with families of the middle and lower brackets of Hamburg society.
Middlebrook estimates that in total:
Approximately 45,000 people died. It is probable that 40,000 of those deaths occurred in the firestorm which took place during the second RAF raid. By contrast, less than one percent of the deaths were caused by the two American raids.
It might be assumed that the fatal casualties were divided as follows: women, 22,500; men, 17,100; and children, 5,400. A high proportion of the male dead would have been elderly men, above military age.
Speer might have admitted that the battle of Hamburg had immediate "catastrophic consequences" and had "put the fear of God in me."
However, he also says that it didn't take long before the city's war production "by the determined efforts of those directly concerned, first and foremost the factory workers themselves," had almost fully recovered.
What were the 'war industries' in Hamburg?
Middlebrook again:
Hamburg's most important war industries, particularly her U-boat yards, were not seriously damaged. The RAF bombing had never been directed on to the areas in which such industries were situated, and the Americans were hampered by smoke and had not the numbers of bombers available to achieve the complete destruction of such targets.
More Middlebrook:
If anything, the bombing was often counter-productive in terms of morale. The news of what had happened in Hamburg, taken back to their units by thousands of servicemen who were allowed special leave, certainly increased the will to fight on to the end by the German forces. In Hamburg itself, though its people may have been sick at heart at the destruction of homes and the loss of life, they pulled together as they had never done before.
John Kenneth Galbraith wrote that Hamburg raids:
destroyed restaurants, cabarets, specialty shops, department stores, banks and other civilian enterprises.
and:
the factories and shipyards away from the centre escaped. Before the holocaust these had been short of labor. Now waiters, bank clerks, shopkeepers and entertainers forcibly unemployed by the bombers flocked to the war plants to find work and also to get the ration cards the Nazis distributed to the workers there. The bombers had eased the labor shortage.
Nothing produced a "speedy" victory.
Bombing was one part of the strategy that produced a victory, which was by far the most important point.
The resources and efforts expended in the bombing campaign could have been better utilized and contributed far more to 'victory' then killing civilians.
Yes. That's also exactly what it did.
The idea that all BC did was area bomb German cities is wrong.
In 1942 and 1943, when area bombing was the only effective thing it could do, more than three quarters of BC's tonnage was dropped on German cities.
In 1944 it was just over a third, and the same for 1945. The rest was going on specific targets, like oil, transport, enemy troop concentrations etc.
Harris fought tooth and nail against anything that distracted from his strategy to destroy civilians.
BC may have hit other targets but their main goal and strategy was built around the area bombing of population centers through out the entire war.
As the war progressed the resources available to BC grew. Whether BC flew 1/3rd of their sorties against population centers is irrelevant given the scale of those attacks. 1/3rd may have been 'enough to do the job'. I can't imagine how many more sorties BC could have crowded in over Dresden.
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Originally posted by Kurfürst
It`s a commonly accepted fact, even by at least 99.9% of British historians, that London was bombed accidently by a handful of Heinkels, who just got lost and jettisoned their load somewhere over the enemy territory. It`s throughly documented like the fact that not a single German bomb would fell on Britain if the latter would not declare war on Germany on the 3rd of September.
Of course, as per Nashwan, Britain declaring the war was actually Germany`s fault, and not the choice of HM`s Goverment.
Hitler hoped for some time that the UK would give up the fight as he didn't really want war with the British, so he didn't immediately wage the kind of all-out war which would make an agreed settlement less likely.
However, once he realised that the UK was not going to give him the kind of settlement he wanted - i.e., to hold onto his Polish conquests and leave him master of France - the gloves soon came off, and military targets often had very little to do with it. Remember the Baedecker raids? The ones in 1942 in which the Luftwaffe launched bombing attacks on historic British cities of no military significance, just to try to terrorise and demoralise the population into surrender?
Kurfürst - Hitler and his minions started a war of aggression and conquest. He lied repeatedly about his aims, each success leading him to move up to the next target. The British - both the people and the government - were extremely reluctant to get involved and Chamberlain only gave the guarantee to Poland to make it absolutely clear to Hitler that no further aggression would be tolerated. Once the British government had given a public guarantee, they weren't going to back down. Hitler ignored that and took the consequences of his actions.
To give a domestic parallel with the British position: if my neighbour has his house broken into and is attacked by thugs, I hope I have the courage to go and help him. And if so, I certainly wouldn't hold anything back - I'd use whatever weapons I could lay hands on, and wouldn't stop using them until the thugs gave up or could no longer fight.
I recall seeing an interview with an elderly German lady who had survived the Allied bombing of her city. She didn't blame the Allies - she said something like this: in war, terrible things will inevitably happen. That's what war is like. The blame therefore lies with those who start the war - in this case, Hitler and the Nazis.
Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website (http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk) and discussion forum (http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/)
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It`s a commonly accepted fact, even by at least 99.9% of British historians, that London was bombed accidently by a handful of Heinkels, who just got lost and jettisoned their load somewhere over the enemy territory.
Where were the bombers actually going?
They were bombing targets on the outskirts of London, and the crews had orders that they could jettison over London because it was a big industrial target, and something of value might be hit.
It`s throughly documented like the fact that not a single German bomb would fell on Britain if the latter would not declare war on Germany on the 3rd of September.
No, just on our allies.
Britain could have stayed out of WW2 and let lots of other countries be invaded, and their populations exterminated. It chose not to, thankfully.
Of course, as per Nashwan, Britain declaring the war was actually Germany`s fault, and not the choice of HM`s Goverment.
And there's me thinking the treaty Britain had signed with Poland required us to go to war with Germany if they invaded Poland.
Also I have seen Nashwan denying the accidental nature of that bombing, and getting into conspiracy theories... now he claims it was against military targets - another twist.
I have no doubt the brief was to attack military targets around London, I suspect targets as close to the area prohibited by Hitler were being chosen deliberately.
Also according to Nashwan - and only to him - the British started attacking military targets in Berlin. What 'miliatary targets' were these? Just list a few.
The Siemens factory in Siemenstadt, the Klingenberg power station, the Henschel factory at Schoenefeld, the Bucker factory in Rangsdorf, Tempelhof airfield.
81 bombers dispatched, 29 bombed, 27 claimed to have reached Berlin but were unable to locate their targets, of these 21 brought their bombs home, 6 jettisoned into the sea on the return journey (RAF pilots were not allowed to jettison their bombs over Germany at this stage)
Total BS of course, it was on Churchill`s orders, and just like the circumstances of London bombed in August 1940, it`s throughly documented and accepted by British historians just the like.
Of course it is. But far too many assume that Churchill's orders were for an area bombing attack on Berlin, which they weren't. The RAF didn't carry out their first area bombing attack until 16/17th December, on Mannheim (codename Abigail Rachel)
Of course Nashwan doesn`t like the version. He doesn`t like how it happened.
No, I don't like people who make silly assumptions.
He doesn`t like to take the responsibility for British acts of terror in ww2.
What acts of terror? Strategic bombing? Certainly you can argue area bombing is "terror bombing". I just don't like the hypocracy of people who argue Luftwaffe area bombing was fine, USAAF area bombing was fine, RAF area bombing was "terror bombing".
I like to apply the same standards to everybody, based on their actions.
He`d like to blame it all on the Germans,
Blame what on the Germans, exactly? All area bombing? Don't be silly. I'm just holding the Germans to the same standards.
and accuse the Americans on doing similiar *****ty terror attacks like the Bomber Command. 'Come on Yank, lessen our guilt by sharing it'
Well, the Americans did carry out the same sort of attacks. Anyone who thinks they didn't has been taken in by Hollywood too much. (Memphis Belle and the second bombing run to avoid the school)
But why is it surprising from the same man who denies to existance of death camps?
Excuse me?
Or who repeatadly made up qoutes in this very thread from Speer and Spaight?
They're all genuine quotes. Check them if you like.
Unlike Wotan I was not "paraphrasing" (ie making them up)
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The RAF got their jettison order after the LW was already carpeting London, AFAIK, as I have mentioned. I have not seen any proof that it was otherwise. Note that the first Terror bombings of WW2 were not just Warshaw, but all over Poland.
The first nasty bit in size was probably the small and crowded town of Sulejow, totally undefended and bombed into rubble, with thousands (5000?) civilians dead.
Since the air defence was in shambles, there was also a lot of strafing. This was well known to the British, not only through Ultra, but also some little odds like this one, found on another forum (axishistory)
"The experience of the American Ambassador to Poland Biddle is interesting. He left Warsaw to try and reach Rumania and reported that his car was bombed 15 times and machine gunned 4 times forcing him to hide in ditches. He had tied a large stars and stripes to his cars roof but realised that it was attracting the attention of the German planes so took it off. On the 12 September he was in a village called Krzemieniec when the market place was bombed killing about 50 civillians.
On September 4 the British Embassey in Warsaw sent Captain Davies to Lithuania and from there back to Britain to give a first hand account of the bombing and strafing of Warsaw that he had witnessed from the roof of the British Embassy."
So, that's just the first cakebits from 1939. The bottom line was, that although Hitler had some hope to bring the British to peace, they had already seen through his pokerface. And it was to prove itself as correct many times again before the BoB.
I'll dig up the dates, - have them nearby.
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Why did Spaatz?
The difference was that the USAAF strategy wasn't to target civilians but industry. Even though the bombing campaign in general never lived up to what was expected in terms of destroying a nations war economy the clear intent of the targets are of a military nature.
It says nothing about fire bombing apartment blocks.
It's quoted in American Bombardment Policy Against Germany, by Richard G Davis, who sums up the policy:
"Almost every city or town in Germany with a population exceeding 50,000, and a few below that figure, met the foregoing criteria. This policy made it open season for bombing Germany’s major cities in any weather."
The USAAF was doing it's share of area bombing cities in Europe in 1944 and 1945, they just didn't like to admit it
Of course the US did not only in Germany but a better comparison to BC would be with 20th AF over Japan. But I wonder why the diversion into US actions? More moral relativism? They did it to so that makes it ok for us?
This thread is about British night bombing.
Harris pushed to end the war as quickly as possible.
He knew that would be hard on his crews, but he also knew that their losses were light in comparison to normal military losses.
Harris only saw 'enemies' and he never saw an enemy he didn't wish to firebomb.
Harris stuck to his strategy of targeting population centers despite all else. Not only did he put his crews at unnecessary risk he killed thousands of civilians needlessly (ie Dresden).
I'm not making moral comparisons. I see nothing immoral in attacking the enemy, providing the results of such attacks are not disproportionate to the harm the enemy is causing.
Sure you are.
They did it, he did it, she did it, the midget down the street did it so its ok for me...
Even in this thread you point the finger at the US.
I state there was no such policy, any more (or less) than Luftwaffe attacks on British morale (and food supplies) in 1940 were attacks on civilians, or any more (or less) than USAAF attacks on Japanese and German cities were attacks on civilians.
Yes we all see your denial. However, what BC did is documented not only on official paper but is documented by many Historians. The fact that you are in denial is evidence of nothing but your own ability to put your hand in the sand.
Am I? I don't think so.
I am making a case Britain had no more effective method. And to support that claim I pointed out the British followed the same progression the other major strategic forces did, from precision attacks to area bombing.
There must be some reason why the Luftwaffe, RAF and USAAF all ended up doing the same thing, area bombing (amongst others, of course)
Yes you are.
Here again you use the justification that they did it to so it must be ok. However the facts are only BC built their main strategy through out the war on the indiscriminate bombing of civilians.
Be aware that Churchill's memorandum was withdrawn, and Churchill actually complains that Germany would be so damaged the allies wouldn't be able to seize anything worthwhile in reparations.
I am aware. On 1 April Churchill resubmitted a more carefully worded memorandum:
…it seems to me that the moment has come when the question of the so-called "area bombing" of German cities should be reviewed from the point of view of our own interests. If we come into control of an entirely ruined land, there will be a great shortage of accommodations for ourselves and our allies: and we shall be unable to get housing materials out of Germany for our own needs because some temporary provision would have to be made for the German’s themselves. We must see to it that attacks do not do more harm to ourselves in the long run then they do to the enemy's war effort. Pray let me have your views.
The first memo may have undermined the British publics confidence in the 'righteousness' of the British war effort. British propaganda was as vital and as effective as any other. If a memo got out in which the PM implies that the bombing Germany cities was nothing more then terrorism not only will raise questions in Britain but would play right into the propaganda espoused by the Nazi.
I'm not comparing them. There is no comparison whatsoever between attacking your enemy and rounding up and murdering civilians who have already surrendered to you.
You are comparing them. You are the only one who brings up up other nations in this discussion about Britain and BC.
Even in this thread you did.
Quote where I said that:
There is no comparison whatsoever between attacking your enemy and rounding up and murdering civilians who have already surrendered to you.
You are a liar but that is typical of you where folks don't agree with you. Not only on this forum but others.
Not strictly true. On the 24th the Luftwaffe launched extensive bombing raids over Britain, some mistakenly hit London. On the 25th they did the same thing again, as the RAF was bombing select targets in Berlin.
But the entire "escalation" had been underway long before then. The Luftwaffe had killed over a thousand British civilians by the time they "accidentally" dropped their first bombs on London.
Whilst Hitler might have considered only London to be important, I don't think the British viewed those 1,000 dead as any less important because they weren't Londoners.
And the full scale attack on London was simply the German attempt to bomb their way to victory. Planned for weeks by the German staff, something Kesselring had been pinninghis hopes on.
On 24 Aug '40, German planes bombed central London due to a navigational error. This is for the most part is in agreement with a good portion of Historians. During the next 2 nights the Brits launched raids on Berlin.
From their everything escalated.
What I said is 100% accurate and is the prevailing view shared view by many. No amount of wiggling and word games will change that.
So you would want to throw the entire bombing campaign out of the window?
Yes, the fighter bombers had sufficient range to contest air space over France, and destroy the Luftwaffe that way.
But the allies would be facing a Germany armed with far more tanks, far more artillery, far more fuel, far more soldiers.
Because the fighter bombers wouldn't be destroying German oil refineries, factories, cities, transport, and there wouldn't be a third of German artillery production going on AA weapons over Germany, with all the manpower associated with that.
The bombing campaigns main contribution to the war effort was being an anvil to smash the LW fighter corp. However, I think this could have been achieved with the massive build up of fighters and fighter bombers.
I think the resources put into the 4 engine bombers and into the bombing campaign in general were a wasted effort.
Most of the 'extra' weapons the Germans would have produced would have been spent in the east. Those that weren't would have been ground to death in the west by Allied fighter bombers etc..
As an example the Soviets didn't develop a strategic bomber or strategy. Neither did the Germans. Both were successful by winning the war on the ground. Ultimately it was the western allies contribution on the ground that had the greater impact on the German collapse.
To land troops in western Europe a large force of fighter bombers and fighters could have paved the way for invasion.
Right. So what happens against Britain? They couldn't use ground troops, because there was a bit of water in the way.
So they switched to bombing.
As I explained above the British, along with the Americans could have opened up a front in the west with fighter bombers.
Battlefield interdiction and close air support were constant 'winning' strategies in all theaters.
They were tasked with making sure Britain gave up the war against Germany. That's victory by anyone's definition (apart from yours, it seems).
Coming to terms with an enemy doesn't necessarily mean 'giving up'. Whether or not Hitler could have been believed aside he made several offers to the British that were rejected.
Unless he could show them that the threat of invasion was real he would never have gotten a deal. He needed to destroy the RAF to help convince them.
The British knew that an invasion was improbable and put up a winning defense in the air.
The LW goal during BoB wasn't to bomb population centers until the British morale broke and they gave up. It was to destroy the RAF which would have made the threat of invasion more 'real'.
The best he could hope for was to destroy the RAF and bomb Britain into submission. That's what he set out to do.
That's what I saids all along? Are you playing games? You claimed that the LW was tasked with defeating (victory) Britain by bombing their cities.
Did you? Do you deny they did it, or do you claim they carried on the bombing for some obscure reason, rather than the obvious one fo trying to defeat Britain?
I said the shift of strategy (night bombing of British cities) was in retaliation for the British targeting of German cities.
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Hmmm, Wotan:
"I said the shift of strategy (night bombing of British cities) was in retaliation for the British targeting of German cities."
Disagree.
1. The LW was quicker to it.
2. The shift to night bombing came after very high losses in the day raids.
3. There were area bombings at day before night bombings.
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Then we're in agreement. I've never claimed there was anything fundamentally different between the RAF, Luftwaffe and USAAF tactics and methods, although there was clearly a difference of scale.
It had nothing to do with difference in scale or strategy. It simply wasn't 'illegal' according to the IMT and previous treatise.
Yes, you should have.
But the whole point is besides the point. I never made any claims that what the Luftwaffe did was a war crime (in regards to bombing, anyway).
I didn't expect some one to use an example of a "Titoist' court as evidence of something.
Who would?
Well, Britain declared war on Germany after Germany invaded Poland, so I don't really think it was a war Britain wanted.
And Britain didn't target German civilians. I would argue at any point during the war, but if you believe that targeting a city is targeting civilians, then Britain did not do this either until after Germany had, repeatedly.
Again, by the end of 1940 less than 1,000 Germans had been killed by British bombing, 20,000 British had been killed by German bombing.
Britain was in a position where it needed to stop Germany. Appeasement had failed. Along with the French they state openly that an attack on Poland would mean war. They expected (or maybe hoped) that this threat would force Hitler to think twice.
Hitler new that Britain and France weren't ready to fight a war over Poland (in terms of deployment, equipment, troops etc...).
Hitler made a deal with Stalin and attacked.
Britain declared war. Much like the guarrantees they made to Poland Britain wasn't ready to fight a war.
The expectation being that they could build up in France. Well it didn't work out that way.
Britain bares responsibility for its own actions in making guarrantees (who knows with out these guarrantess to Poland maybe the Poles would have excepted Hitler's deal on the 'Polish Corridor..?) and then for declaring war.
Britain and Frances began (started) a war they weren't prepared (at the time of declaration) to win.
As an opposite the US didn't enter WW2 until it had to. Stalin didn't enter war until he had to.
This has nothing to do with who is in the right or the wrong.
Well, you're exact quote was :
"You all started a war with Germany".
It seems to me that they all (Germany) started a war with the allies. After all, Britain made a public guarantee to Poland, and backed it up in no uncertain terms to the Germans in private.
Perhaps it should rather be that Germany shouldn't have started a war they weren't ready for
Germany had been preparing for war all along. They were prepared. They defeated Poland, Norway, France and you Brits in record time.
This action was forced by the French and British declarations. Had France and Britain actually prepared to fight rather they just resorting to rhetoric and 'unbacked up' threats of force Hitler may have been contained (even if in the short term).
Well, they clearly were prepared to fight, which is why Britain declared war, rather than backing down.
But going to the aid of someone under attack isn't aggression, and I hope that if saw a weaker person under attack by a thug, I'd step in to help as well.
Once they were beaten out of Europe their prestige and pride wouldn't allow a deal.
If Britain had been in France's situation and not protected by the channel they would have folded as easily.
Sorry, you haven't finished that sentence. Am I going to blame the decision of the British government to declare war on Germany on what?
Blame Germany for it? Of course. Germany violated international law and treaty obligations to declare war on Poland, Britain had made it abundantly clear that if Germany did so (again) then Britain would go to war.
Britain did little more then make idle threats. Had they been in a position to back up those threats or if they had not forced war at that time their response to German aggression would been more credible.
They gave a false sense of security to the Poles who then stood up to a bully expecting help. They were then beaten down and Britain ran back across the channel.
Rationality?
After all, millions of Germans voted for him. They must have thought he was rational, surely?
Whats more rational? To make idle threats? Or to strike first in response to perceived aggression (declaration of war)?
That's obvious. Equally obvious is your sympathy for Nazi Germany.
Quote my sympathy for the Nazi's?
Again you lie.
Yes, that's what I said. (My "Nonsense" comment was merely in reply to yours) You claimed to have original source material that showed Rotterdam was bombed to restrict allied resupply efforts, though. Was that another "paraphrase"?
No you said that the city was targeted to help support paratroopers:
Nonsense, the people of Rotterdam, Warsaw, London, Coventry, Leningrad, etc were the targets.
actually the target at Rotterdam was support for German paras fighting in the city, so I don't exactly trust your claim.
But the Luftwaffe bombed cities for exactly the same reasons the RAF did, and it's only your prejudices that prevent you realising (or admitting) that.
More lies from you.
You brought Rotterdam into this discussion as an example of the LW purposeful targeting of civilians. What I said was:
The targets at Rotterdam were the ports not civilians. I have target maps, orders OOB etc for the raid on Rotterdam.
At the north end of the Maas and in the center of the target (triangle area in the images I posted above) is a port with slips and docks and facilities. In the long series of quotations I posted you find this:
Understandably the German high command could equally press for a swift conclusion of the operation. It wanted Holland "cleaned up" as soon as possible in order to free forces for the main thrust through Belgium into northern France. Furthermore the 18th Army, as it attacked Holland on May 13th, feared that British landings were imminent. Thus at 18.45 General von Kuechler gave the order "to break the resistance at Rotterdam by every means".
There was a fear that the defenders would be re-supplied and re-enforced. Only 57 He-111s of KG 54 dropped standard HE bombs into this area.
Regardless, the targets weren't civilians and the raid was not in support of 'paratroopers'.
Never said they did (again, exluding my "nonsense" in reply to your "nonsense")
Yes you did:
Nonsense, the people of Rotterdam, Warsaw, London, Coventry, Leningrad, etc were the targets.
Why lie?
Exactly. What Wotan is trying to do is argue that every Luftwaffe bombing attack was purely aimed at military targets, until the RAF started bombing German civilians.
Why use Angus' fiction about Ju-52's shoveling out incendiaries over Warsaw?
Warsaw was a valid military target. The targets selected were not the civilians but the defenders and military that fell back into the city. Warsaw was invested and had refused to surrender.
That doesn't represent a fixed un-yielding strategy to de-house all of Poland's population centers in the same fashion as BC planned to do with Germany. The Nazi's didn't need the LW for that.
Here once again you bring in some other causation or at the very least some other excuse that does nothing to disprove my point or to prove your own.
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Originally posted by Wotan
If Britain had been in France's situation and not protected by the channel they would have folded as easily.
If it were up to Churchill I doubt this..... whether it would have been wise to do so is a matter of debate......... whether Halifax would have held sway is another..........
I think even without the channel Churchill would have fought until the end (no matter the cost) and even then he wanted to "return" wiuth a Commonwealth army.
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How come Guernica is forgotten amidst all this claiming and counter claiming?
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originally posted by Squire:[/i]
It wasnt a deal it was an ultimatum, and Hitler never thought the Poles would agree to it. Its hard to call it "deal making" when you tell the other guy "agree or we will send our panzer divisions over your border". Thats not serious diplomacy. Thats just a raw threat.
There were several offers not just one. Hitler offered to to extend League of Nations protection to the Danzig Corridor much like Danzig itself.
Danzig was a Free City under League of Nations protection and one of the many offers that Hitler made was an extension of this protection to the corridor.
It was rejected. France and Britain gave Poland the rather opened ended Agreement of Mutual Assistance Between the United Kingdom and Poland.-London (http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/bluebook/blbk19.htm)
ARTICLE 2.
(1) The provisions of Article I will also apply in the event of any action by a European Power which clearly threatened, directly or indirectly, the independence of one of the Contracting Parties, and was of such a nature that the Party in question considered it vital to resist it with its armed forces.
That European Power obviously only meant Germany given the fact no action was taken by the UK or France against the Soviets.
This amounted to a "blank cheque" for Poland. The terms were that if Poland considered that it needed to use its armed forces against another country to preserve its territorial integrity, then Britain would come to its aid.
Poland at this point had no interest in coming to terms with Hitler given the guarantees it had from Franc e and Britain.
Had Poland known that France and Britain really offered nothing more then rhetoric then who knows what would have happened.
Poland was emboldened by this guarantee. So much so that they had made preparations to send troops into Danzig should the the Danzig Senate vote for a unilateral declaration of reunion with the Reich.
In fact when Germany invaded Poland was preparing for precisely the above scenario. It had assembled a large force in the Polish Corridor, preparing to intervene in Danzig. When German forces attacked on 1 September, the Polish Danzig Intervention Force was trapped and annihilated, thereby contributing in a major way to Poland's rapid military defeat.
There's no doubt that Hitler manufactured the invasion of Poland but that doesn't change the fact that Britain is responsible for its declaration of war.
The final ultimatum Hitler issued to Poland was nothing more then a show and the invasion was already decided upon.
EDIT:
I guess he deleted his post
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If it were up to Churchill I doubt this..... whether it would have been wise to do so is a matter of debate......... whether Halifax would have held sway is another..........
I think even without the channel Churchill would have fought until the end (no matter the cost) and even then he wanted to "return" wiuth a Commonwealth army.
I agree...
Churchill would have never capitualted even if Britain were invaded.
How come Guernica is forgotten amidst all this claiming and counter claiming?
Its not forgotten, its just not part of the discusssion. Its also not the same as BC's strategy built on the indiscriminate bombing of civilians.
Guernica, much like those other cities Nashwan claimed:
Nonsense, the people of Rotterdam, Warsaw, London, Coventry, Leningrad, etc were the targets.
wasn't to kill civilains.
I will concede Leningrad and throw in Stalingrad and we may have something to discuss...
But this thread is so far off topic and almost impossible to follow that I won't contribute to topics that move the discussion even further away from the original post.
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Was rewording it slightly.
"Along with the French they state openly that an attack on Poland would mean war."
So Germany had a clear choice to make. Stay within its own borders or war.
"Britain bares responsibility for its own actions in making guarrantees (who knows with out these guarrantess to Poland maybe the Poles would have excepted Hitler's deal on the 'Polish Corridor..?) and then for declaring war."
It wasnt a deal it was an ultimatum, and Hitler never thought the Poles would agree to it. Its hard to call it "deal making" when you tell the other guy "agree or we will send our panzer divisions over your border". Thats not serious diplomacy. Thats just a raw threat.
Sort of like taking out a club, approaching an elderly lady in a dark alley, while you casually swing it around and say "can I borrow 20 dollars?". "I can, cool, thanks." "Gee officer, it wasnt robbery, I asked for a loan, and she obliged". I doubt it will prove a usefull defence in court.
"Germany had been preparing for war all along"
Your words. I agree however.
As for the bombing of civilians, its been debated ad nasuem on this BBS, I wont get into that again. Suffice to say, finding morality in total war (which is what WW2 was) is a difficult prospect.
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Originally posted by Wotan Its not forgotten, its just not part of the discusssion. Its also not the same as BC's strategy built on the indiscriminate bombing of civilians.
wasn't to kill civilains.
Sure, whatever you say Wotan. The Kondor Legion did not even hit the target, the stone bridge, that they claimed they were after.
Other Spanish cities experienced, what Guernica did, as well from the KL.
Yup, the LW was a bunch of angels, for sure.
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Btw...
I just finished "Overlord" and "Armageddon" by Max Hastings, both very interesting books. A good read for anybody thats into WW2 history. Not so much nationalism (anybodys), and more hard research than many.
He wrote one on Bomber Command as well, I will have to find it.
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here is a review of Death From On High
http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v01/v01p247_Lutton.html
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Losses in Guernica according to a few different sources:
1,654 killed and 889 wounded
Antony Beevor - "The Spanish Civil War", also Ian Westwell - "Condor Legion"
Approximately 2,000 killed
Roger James Bender - "Legion Condor"
The original figure of 1,600 dead proved to be greatly exaggerated; following the capture of the city official sources revealed a figure of just over 300 dead among the civilian population.
Karl Ries & Hans Ring - "The Legion Condor"
George Steer wrote a book called A Tree in Guernika which dealt with the subject.
The 1600 dead figure may have originated with him. He was a leftist political activist who during WW2 worked in British propaganda.
Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia and others were bombed by both the LC and the Italians but none were specifically targeted at the civilians.
Guernica was on an important road to Bilbao.
The targets were the Renteria Bridge over the river Oca and the railway station at the side of the town.
At 4 PM bombers (Do 17 and He 111 from VB/88 ) attacked the station from low altitude using 250 and 50 kg bombs.
At 4.25 the bridge was attacked by 3 Italian bombers (Savoia S.79 from 205a Squadriglia) from altitude of 3600 m with 36 /50 kg bombs.
Due to the inherent inaccuracies of 'bombing' added to the claims of strong winds most bombs fell on the town. This created a lot of smoke.
Between 5.15 and 5.45 several German bombers (Ju-52 from K/88 ) dropped their bombs "into the smoke" without aiming.
The returning pilots reported that finding the target was impossible but the commanders of K/88 sent the bombers from VB/88 out once again.
The bridge was the only one within miles along the river and it was the bottleneck in the path of retreat for the Republican forces in the area. It was a viable target.
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Copy that, thanks, I will order it with my next batch. Had to rebuild my Hondas engine so I have been poor lately :), but its payday Friday.
I have all but given up on "book stores" nothing but crap, I get almost everything now via mail order.
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"The bridge was the only one within miles along the river and it was the bottleneck in the path of retreat for the Republican forces in the area. It was a viable target."
Who saying it was not a viable target? Only problem, dispite your excuses, they could not hit the stone bridge with their 50kg bombs.
Sound like the problem the Brits had, and the Yanks, only the Brits were doing it at night, NOT in broad daylight.
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Sound like the problem the Brits had, and the Yanks, only the Brits were doing it at night, NOT in broad daylight.
This thread has nothing to do with the Yanks or the Germans.
This has nothing to do with unintended collateral civilian casualties that are the inevitable result of war and in particular of level bombing...
The main points Nashwan and I are discussing is the purposeful and deliberate strategy of targeting civilians by BC and Harris.
I don't know what your last post has to do with any of that. Since you concede that the LC and Italian targets in Guernica were militarily viable then why are you bringing that up?
BTW I can posts instances of USAAF and BC multiple attacks on fixed daylight targets and having missed to the same degree that LC and Italians did in Guernica.
If your point is to show how the German and Italian crews were inexperienced and less skilled I could careless. It has no bearing on the discussion at hand.
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Originally posted by Wotan
I agree...
Churchill would have never capitualted even if Britain were invaded.
Its not forgotten, its just not part of the discusssion. Its also not the same as BC's strategy built on the indiscriminate bombing of civilians.
Guernica, much like those other cities Nashwan claimed:
wasn't to kill civilains.
I will concede Leningrad and throw in Stalingrad and we may have something to discuss...
But this thread is so far off topic and almost impossible to follow that I won't contribute to topics that move the discussion even further away from the original post.
Originally posted by Wotan
But this thread is so far off topic and almost impossible to follow that I won't contribute to topics that move the discussion even further away from the original post.
I understand; but be fair.If BC command is discussed; then so will BC's moral foundation; and the moral foundation of the Douhet (SP?) also be discussed; along with the industrial powers application of it. To think otherwise is a bit naive.
I think this thread is evolving into a comparison of ruthlessness. In this; I have a subjective feeling that the German people were a bit ruthless than the British; but that the British leader was perhaps more ruthless than the German leader.
But the original question was:
“British Night bombing
how accurate was the British bombing at night ?
and did it realy hurt Germany in anyway?
and what was the method for finding and hitting the target?
this is something iv not heard much about”
And the answer is:
In the early days; not very accurate; as night bombing relied more on navigation than target acquisition. German navigational use of radar was as ahead of British radar as British fighter command was ahead of the LW with it's use of radar as a virtual battlefield.
Later; as radar and tactical technique improved; BC's bombing was at least as accurate as anyone else's, and; as the more famous Dam buster and Tirpitz raid showed; and in extreme cases could pinpoint the target to an astonishing degree.
It did have an enormous effect on Germany; but it's open to discussion wither the resources used in the bombing campaign could have been more effective spent else where.
Pretty much anything else in this thread is moral hindsight. (And I can say that 'cos we won).
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Originally posted by Wotan
This thread has nothing to do with the Yanks or the Germans.
This has nothing to do with unintended collateral civilian casualties that are the inevitable result of war and in particular of level bombing...
The main points Nashwan and I are discussing is the purposeful and deliberate strategy of targeting civilians by BC and Harris.
I don't know what your last post has to do with any of that. Since you concede that the LC and Italian targets in Guernica were militarily viable then why are you bringing that up?
BTW I can posts instances of USAAF and BC multiple attacks on fixed daylight targets and having missed to the same degree that LC and Italians did in Guernica.
If your point is to show how the German and Italian crews were inexperienced and less skilled I could careless. It has no bearing on the discussion at hand.
And how experienced were Brit crews?
The point being, since unable to see the target the LK and the Ities went on and bombed civilians using bombs that they knew full well would do no damage to a stone bridge.
In 1935, German General Erich Ludendorff published Die Totale Krieg (The Total War) in which he presented the view that in war, no one is innocent; everyone is a combatant and everyone a target, soldier and civilian alike. Italian General Giulio Douhet further suggested an enemy's morale could be crushed by air-delivered terror. Such theories intrigued Nazi Germany's new Fuhrer, but they needed testing. Spain seemed to be the perfect laboratory.
The Commander of the Condor Legion was Lt. Colonel Wolfram von Richthofen, cousin of Manfred von Richthofen, the infamous Red Baron of World War I. It was Von Richthofen who earmarked Guernica for bombardment, on behalf of Franco. At precisely 3:45 PM, Monday, April 26, 1937, the first German bomber took off. Three-quarters of an hour later, the first bomb fell on Guernica - a direct hit on the plaza at the center of town, a full quarter mile from the targeted bridge.
Nice statement, in 1935, by the German Ludendorff and you have a bleeding heart over Harris?
Though it can't really be proven, Guernica was Basque country and Franco's request would help with his Basque troubles.
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Originally posted by Squire
Btw...
I just finished "Overlord" and "Armageddon" by Max Hastings, both very interesting books. A good read for anybody thats into WW2 history. Not so much nationalism (anybodys), and more hard research than many.
He wrote one on Bomber Command as well, I will have to find it.
It's a very very good book. If limited to only one on RAF Bomber Command, the Hastings book on Bomber Command would be it.
I really liked Martin Middlebrook's book "The Nuremburg Raid" as well.
Dan/CorkyJr
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n 1935, German General Erich Ludendorff published Die Totale Krieg (The Total War) in which he presented the view that in war, no one is innocent; everyone is a combatant and everyone a target, soldier and civilian alike. Italian General Giulio Douhet further suggested an enemy's morale could be crushed by air-delivered terror. Such theories intrigued Nazi Germany's new Fuhrer, but they needed testing. Spain seemed to be the perfect laboratory.
The Commander of the Condor Legion was Lt. Colonel Wolfram von Richthofen, cousin of Manfred von Richthofen, the infamous Red Baron of World War I. It was Von Richthofen who earmarked Guernica for bombardment, on behalf of Franco. At precisely 3:45 PM, Monday, April 26, 1937, the first German bomber took off. Three-quarters of an hour later, the first bomb fell on Guernica - a direct hit on the plaza at the center of town, a full quarter mile from the targeted bridge.
First off you don't present any direct statement as you claim.
Second, do you even know who Ludendorff is?
Why don't you spell out his roll in planning the KL roll in Spain in 1935?
You are more the moron with every post...
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Originally posted by Wotan
First off you don't present any direct statement as you claim.
Second, do you even know who Ludendorff is?
Why don't you spell out his roll in planning the KL roll in Spain in 1935?
You are more the moron with every post...
:rolleyes: Oh an insult, just like your good bud does when he is presented with facts that does not suit his agenda.
Ludendorff, of WW1 fame, participated in both the Kapp Putsch (March, 1920) and the Munich Putsch (November, 1923). The following year he became one of the first Nazi Party members of the Reichstag (1924–28). :)
He railed at the new Republic and his new enemies, the Jews, Jesuits and Freemasons, whom he blamed for stabbing Germany in the back.
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Hey hey hey. (or hay ;)=)
Go back to the spanish war, you will find that the LW used heavy bombing power, unique in the world at the time, to brutally bomb supposedly important targets.
Go to WW2, that's what it's all about, and it is clear as the blue sky. Try to bomb your enemy into chaos, it may well work.
Evidence? Well, Poland for starters, also the France-Netherlands campaign.
I have taken the effort of looking into the "stairway" of "bombing each other" in the period from aug. 23 to sep 10th or so, 1940.
Some quick points are that the first London casualties occured on the 23rth of august by a mistake bombing. On aug 25th the British do a similar error and dump bombs on the center of Berlin. (leaflets included). No casualties. On the 28th the first 10 Germans die in a raid on Berlin (Navigation once again). OK, on the 30th the LW starts dumping incendiaries on London. (No navigation problems I suspect). Brits raid back (guess they passed each other) and hit nicely, such as the Siemens Works.
August civilian deads from air-raids are 1075 in the UK.
Yet not there....
to be continued................
:D
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Originally posted by Wotan
This thread has nothing to do with the Yanks or the Germans.
This has nothing to do with unintended collateral civilian casualties that are the inevitable result of war and in particular of level bombing...
The main points Nashwan and I are discussing is the purposeful and deliberate strategy of targeting civilians by BC and Harris.
Yes, they did that. So did the Luftwaffe. What do you suppose the Blitz was all about, or the Coventry raid, or the Baedecker raids I've already mentioned? And of course the development of the V-1 and V-2 which were so inaccurate that they could only ever have been area weapons.
As has been pointed out in this thread, by others as well as myself, WW2 was an all-out war. It was not a nice tidy war restricted to armies, navies and air forces - it was a battle to the death between cultures. That was decided by Hitler and his genocidal Nazi thugs who not only started the war, but did so with the aim of conquering and destroying other countries and oppressing - or worse - their peoples. To win that war the Allies had to use almost all of the means at their disposal.
Yes, with the benefit of hindsight you can suggest ways in which the Allies could have done things differently (I've done that myself, in some detail, in my novel 'The Foresight War'). But to try to suggest that Allied motivations and actions were morally equivalent to the Nazis' isn't even a bad joke, it demonstrates an appalling lack of moral awareness.
Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website (http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk) and discussion forum (http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/)
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Nice nice.
Ok, here comes a brief summary of how the Brits and Germans started bombing each other, or rather each other's cities:
(Some of this I have already listed)
1940
August 23: Germans mistakedly bomb London. 9 dead. Tension that night was very high, in the night the British set ablaze their "wall of fire" on the channel coast.
August 25: First bombs fall on Berlin when the RAF misses an armament factory in the northern part of the city. Propoganda leaflets were a part of the cargo. No casualties.
August 26: The LW has a really bad day over the channel with several formations (all but one?) forced back.
August 28: 10 Berliners killed in a RAF raid (6 in a single 100 lbs blast). The raid was not aimed at civilians.
August 30: Fierce fighting over southern England. The LW gets spanked in a raid of Biggin Hill. 900 LW aircraft participated that day. Some got to London and dropped incendiaries on the City. Enter the Blitz...
Brits strike military targets in Berlin again, and hit for instance the Siemens works.
Sept 2: Further night raids on London
Sept 4: Hitler declares that if the Brits increase their attacks on German Cities, he will raize theirs to the ground.
Sept 7: LW hits the London Docks with 300 bombers, escorts were 600. 337 tonnes were dropped, although the docks were the target, civilian deaths were 448. British now expect an invasion, - code word "Cromwell" was sent to military stations.
Sept 8: LW strikes railway lines and power stations in London, but suffer high casualties. Residental areas get hit. East enders amongst them. Eventually (but not on that day) it was close to a revolt.
Sept 9: Raeder speaks to Hitler. The outcome is that Hitler thinks it highly probable that a victory can be achieved even without invasion. Hitler orders London to be bombed. Göring takes his train to the command post at pas de Calais and takes over.
Sep 10: After the summary of LW's "quite indiscriminate" bombing of 2 previous nights, Bomber command aircraft are now instructed not to return home with their bombs if they failed to locate the targets they were detailed to attack. The bombs should be dropped anywhere. In the night Berlin was raided and Göbbels got a bomb into his garden.
Sept 12. Raids continue, LW hits London, Liverpool, Swansea and Bristol at night.
Sept 14 Hitler sais: "The preconditions for the invasion of Britain are yet not at hand. Nevertheless the Bombings would continue. If eight million people go crazy, that can lead to catastrophy"
Sep 15: BoB day.
Sep 16: RAF successfully strikes the docks at Bologne.
Sep 17: Hitler postpones the invasion of Britain until further notice.
Now, day and night, Britain was bombed untill the 4th of October. But the attrition was high for the LW, and on that day, Hitler ordered the daylight raids to end.
The night raids were of course heavier afterwards, and heavily hitting residence areas.
I have some more on this, like the RAF bombing campaign in the early stages. What boggles me is why they didn't just start firebombing several German cities right away. Instead, they kept clenching on the idea that the German industry could be destroyed with precision bombing at night.
The first really bloody bombing from the hands of the RAF on a German City for instance, is yet unknown to me. But in the autumn of 1940 it seems to have been minimal.
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But to try to suggest that Allied motivations and actions were morally equivalent to the Nazis' isn't even a bad joke, it demonstrates an appalling lack of moral awareness.
Tony,
I own some of your work and have a good deal of respect for it and yourself.
However, I would ask that you refrain from inserting words into my mouth that I did not say. I am not sure how much of this thread you have read but please point out to me where I attempted to suggest that BC's targeting of civilians is 'equivalent to the Nazis''.
Along with Nashwan you seem to be constructing some strawman fallacy rather then address my points as presented.
I have not made any moral comparisons at all. In fact I went as far to point out in a reply to Nashwan:
You are making the comparisons not me.
I can judge individual acts by themselves. The context in which my judgments and points are presented in this thread aren't wrapped around what the Nazi's, or American's, or Soviet's, or Japanese did. Those are other topics for other threads.
It's Nashwan and others who are using some moral relativism argument in defending the strategy of BC.
Nashwan denies that BC and Harris set upon a deliberate strategy based on the indiscriminate bombing of civilians.
quoting from Directive No, 22 again:
It has been decided that the primary objective of your operations should be focused on the morale of the enemy civil population and in particular the industrial workers.
I suppose it is clear that the Aiming Points are to be the built up areas and not the dockyards or aircraft factories.
You are accordingly authorized to employ your forces without restriction.
Nashwan would have you believe that the above doesn't really mean the civil population or the workers themselves but just 'the city where they live'.
On the one hand he argues that BC didn't target civilians and on the other he use the moral relativism argument of 'so what if they did' (reap the whirlwind and all that).
This discussion isn't a comparison of 'evils' nor is there any claim of moral equivalence by me between BC and the Nazi's.
To continue I think we first need to establish what it is we are discussing:
My points are clear but I will restate them:
The deliberate strategy of the indiscriminate bombing of civilians by BC and Harris was wrong.
It was wrong because it did not achieve what it was sold to do.
It was wrong because it was a waste of resources and lives of the crews.
It was wrong because of the civilian death toll.
These points are independent of anything the Nazi's did. If you want to discuss the evil Nazi's we can in another thread.
The points I raised aren't just hindsight as there was considerable debate and dissension at the time this type strategy was put into place.
Nashwan claims:
1. BC didn't target civilians.
Do you agree with that?
I think I have shown that BC did in fact target civilians.
2. BC selected the only viable strategy available to it?
Do you agree with that?
Nashwan presents his argument as if there were only 2 options available to the British. Area bombing or nothing.
I think this is nonsense.
Quoting from the review Milo posted of Max Hastings book BOMBER COMMAND: THE MYTHS AND REALITY OF THE STRATEGIC BOMBING OFFENSIVE 1939-45
*EDIT
This review comes from the website of the Institute for Historical Review an organization renown for its holocaust denial. I will leave the quote because it does show some valid (at least imho) alternatives to area bombing.[/i]
Hastings rejects that specious assertion and points out alternatives, a third choice being "to persist in the face of whatever difficulties, in attempting to hit precision targets" and a "fourth and more realistic alternative: faced by the fact that Britain's bombers were incapable of a precision campaign, there was no compulsion upon the Government to authorize the huge bomber programme that was now to be undertaken. Aircraft could have been transferred to the Battle of the Atlantic and the Middle and Far East where they were so urgently needed, and many British strategists would have wholeheartedly defended the decision to move them... There were alternatives to the area campaign, albeit at great cost to the amour propre of the RAF."
3. So what if there were civilian deaths, the Nazis started it (reap the whirlwind).
Do you agree with that?
Given my answer to the first two questions I think that it was well within BC's capability to limit the needless deaths of civilians especially later in the war.
All other diversions aside...
Regards,
Wotan
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Pfffttt!!!!
From Wotan:
"The deliberate strategy of the indiscriminate bombing of civilians by BC and Harris was wrong.
It was wrong because it did not achieve what it was sold to do.
It was wrong because it was a waste of resources and lives of the crews.
It was wrong because of the civilian death toll. "
Given the hindsight, you're right.
However, given the effectiveness of the work by the LW early in the war, given the grim and gritty losses of lives on all fronts, given the ineffectiveness so far of strategic bombings, and being confronted with the circumstances, I think it quite rational from the allied commanders point of view, that Germany would buckle from fierce air raids on their population.
Warshaw buckled. Rotterdam buckled. (well, they would have been overrun quickly anyway), Britain almost buckled. (London went close to a civilian uprise at one point)
So, before the allies went to this resort, the possibility had already been proved, - by the Germans.
There was more in the algorythm.
Through Ultra, the allies were quite aware of what Gerry was up to in many places, such as Poland. They still only knew a part of the wicked total. Still enough to infuriate the quietest of people.
At sea, the losses were high, on the eastern front, the blood was flowing at an incredible rate, and so on.
To cut it short, there was practically no mercy. They stopped at gas, - it was too wicked, and Gerry could have paid back, but to bomb them as they did before themselves, - well, yes.
As sad as it is.
And it was a close guess. Had the Hamburg raid been repeated like two times, - say once on Frankfurt, and once on Essen, and then Köln as a bonus (They all got bombed heavily anyway), in a close period of time, Germany might have resigned.
This was definately a thought, and occured on both sides. It didn't work, it was perhaps not that far off though.
So, in the heat of the moment, what would you have done?
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A few thoughts on the matters raised above.
I think it would do all sides well to admit that every air force that possessed an air arm capable, attempted "area bombing" of cities to bring about victory for their side.
The LW was the 1st to use it in a "large scale" campaign. September 1940-May 1941 (The Blitz, 150+ major raids against British cities), and even after Sealion was postponed, the night bombing continued, only petering off when Barbarossa was launched and the LW KGs were mainly transferred East.
The RAF (starting at the same time as the LW on a small scale and working up through 1942), and the USAAF was next. Bombing both Germany and Japan.
Italy and Japan did not possess a fleet of bombers to the task, so they didnt get the chance. It wasnt through any moral superiority.
The V-1s and V-2s were designed soley as area weapons, and by 1944 this was the only way the LW could hit back. So they did.
Say what you want about bombings in WW2, they did all share one thing. They had, in the end, strategic military objectives, to bring about the end to the war. Thats true for the LW, the RAF, and the USAAF.
As Tony Williams said, WW2 was total war, and all sides fought accordingly.
The only reason gas was not deployed was the fear of reprisals on either troops or populations. Considering the scale of the war its still somewhat surprising gas was not used.
Both sides developed atomic technology for the purpose of a weapon, and anybody that thinks it was "ok" for the USAAF to deliver atomic attacks to Japans cities to force them to surrender is certainly in total agreement with the "Bomber Harris" strategy.
The difference was Japan surrendered, thus sparing its population an invasion. Hitler refused, and even when Berlin was threatened with direct assault by the Soviet armies, and with no hope of winning the war, cared nothing for its people by preparing it as a fortress and forcing a seige.
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Originally posted by Wotan
3. So what if there were civilian deaths, the Nazis started it (reap the whirlwind).
Do you agree with that?
(looks around nervously)
...er...I think I do....
- oldman
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Originally posted by Wotan
Tony,
I own some of your work and have a good deal of respect for it and yourself.
However, I would ask that you refrain from inserting words into my mouth that I did not say. I am not sure how much of this thread you have read but please point out to me where I attempted to suggest that BC's targeting of civilians is 'equivalent to the Nazis''.
That comment was not specifically aimed at you and I apologise if it seemed that way. I was making a general response to some of the acknowledged anti-British and apparently Nazi-apologist comments elsewhere in this thread.
My points are clear but I will restate them:
The deliberate strategy of the indiscriminate bombing of civilians by BC and Harris was wrong.
It was wrong because it did not achieve what it was sold to do.
It was wrong because it was a waste of resources and lives of the crews.
It was wrong because of the civilian death toll.
I would say that BC went through three phases: first, they tried to hit specific targets and failed because their navigational equipment and training were inadequate to the task. So they switched to the only way they had of hitting a target, which was to target whole cities. Later in the war, they developed the capability to hit precision targets but by then Harris was locked into the area bombing philosophy.
You may argue that if BC couldn't hit specific targets they shouldn't have attacked at all, but this is where strategy rather than tactics comes into play. For four long years, the British had no means of attacking Germany, and specifically of supporting their initially hard-pressed Soviet ally, other than by bombing. It was a political necessity. Stalin was constantly pressuring Churchill to invade northern Europe and establish a second front (which would have been disastrous if tried before 1944) so the massive bombing campaign was the only available way of responding to his complaints and appeals, and reassure him that he wasn't being left to do all the fighting himself.
I agree with you that once BC had acquired the capability to hit precision targets at night (sometime in 1944, I believe) then they would have been better advised to focus on that, simply because it would have been more efficient. However, Harris was too inflexible (if you've read 'The Foresight War', you would know that Harris does not get command of BC...).
However, precision bombing, by day or night, depended on clear weather, and more often than not that was not available. That left BC - and the USAAF - with the choice between sitting on the ground doing nothing, or going in and bombing by radar, which was area bombing. In the last nine months of the war, the USAAF used radar bombing for no less than 70% of their raids, because the visibility was too poor for visual bombing. Presumably, conditions at night were no better.
With ferocious fighting going on in the Eastern and Western Fronts, was it acceptable for the Allies' only way of striking at Germany to sit on the ground for night after night doing nothing because the weather was cloudy? No, it wasn't. So they went in and bombed. You don't like it, I don't like it, but it was the necessity of the time.
Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website (http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk) and discussion forum (http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/)
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It's perfectly valid because it not only captures the tone and intent of BC's strategy, it is backed up by the fact that its what BC actually did...
So it's actually your interpretation of BC strategy, which you try to legitimise by putting quotes around it, and claiming it's from an Air Ministry directive?
Don't be silly, Wotan. The purpose of quotes is to show what a person actually said, not what you think they meant.
Its not a distortion, it reflects the real policy and strategy implemented by BC and Harris.
Of course it's a distortion. You claimed:
He goes on to state that the Air Ministry's estimates on the effects of area bombing on the German populace were:
quote:a prescription for massacre, nothing more nor less.
What you should have said was:
He goes on to state that the Air Ministry's estimates on the effects of the plan for 5,000 bombers in BC were:
quote:a prescription for massacre, nothing more nor less.
it reflects the real policy and strategy implemented by BC and Harris
No, it reflects a policy BC and Harris didn't implement, for 5 - 6,000 bombers, 1.25 million tons on Germany in 1943.
In fact, the RAF dropped half that on Germany in the entire war. (and they were overestimating the casualties as well)
That quote didn't' originate with me and its 100% accurate in describing the policy and strategy of BC.
So now you're saying you didn't make it up, someone else did?
In that case, a: you should have checked your sources better. I spotted it for a fake immediately becuase I've heard all the arguments before, and something that juicy would have come up before.
And b: you should have admitted the mistake, rather than try to defend it.
Nonsense the British had practiced terror bombing during the inter-war years
Guernica?
That statement is 100% accurate as well. BC strategy was to kill civilians to disrupt war production and de-moralize the populace.
Source please.
Bomber Command's policy was to bomb cities, destroy them, and damage German production. German civilians were not the target.
Perhaps you can find some sources that show BC targeting civilians? Rather than the sources that show them targeting housing etc? (and if you do, check them, they are almost certainly as false as your earlier quote, because no-one else has ever found them either)
Read again the Herschel Johnson letter earlier in this thread, and the view of how effective damage to housing was at reducing production. Nowhere does it say the dead civilians caused problems with production.
That's because there weren't enough dead civilians. The Luftwaffe killed about 0.8 people per ton of bombs dropped on Britain in 1940/41. The RAF did somewhat worse during the war, at about 0.5 people per ton.
That's not an efficient way to wage war, and I don't think anyone thought it was.
Even if we believe your 25% absenteeism claim German war production increased until such a point that the situation on the ground led to a collapse inthe German economy. This collapse wasn't brought on directly by the bombing campaign but was due to the situation on the ground.
No, it was also brought on by the bombing campaign. From the USSBS:
The German experience suggests that even a first class military power -- rugged and resilient as Germany was -- cannot live long under full-scale and free exploitation of air weapons over the heart of its territory. By the beginning of 1945, before the invasion of the homeland itself, Germany was reaching a state of helplessness. Her armament production was falling irretrievably, orderliness in effort was disappearing, and total disruption and disintegration were well along. Her armies were still in the field. But with the impending collapse of the supporting economy, the indications are convincing that they would have had to cease fighting -- any effective fighting -- within a few months. Germany was mortally wounded.
The bombing campaing never achieved its what it was tasked with and it wasn't until late in the war that the bombers could even come close to its goals.
That's true. The effectiveness of bombing was overestimated, or rather the difficulties of repairing bomb damage were overestimated.
It wasn't until 1944 the bombers had sufficient strength to begin to destroy Germany. But that's true of the western allied armies, too.
Thats what I said not only in this reply but previously. The point at which the bombing campaign began appraoching its potential the situation on the ground had nearly collapsed the Germany economy despite the efforts of the bombers.
Despite? That's just silly.
What's true is that victory in spring 1945 came from both the ground and the air. It's speculation that without the air forces the ground forces would still have achieved victory at the same time. (and there's little to support it)
German production increased through '43 into '44.
Germany only shifted to a total war economy in 1943. Production was bound to increase as they introduced extra shifts, imported slaves from all over Europe, etc.
But production in 1944 was way below target. It was way below what it should have been for Germany's size.
In 1944, Britain, with just over half Germany's population, produced a greater weight of aircraft, and more aero engines, than Germany.
Not much need for 'pin point accuracy' with the Hamburg raids.
No, there wasn't. It was area bombing, pure and simple, and it was also the most devastating bombing attack Germany suffered.
From Middlebrook, The Battle For Hamburg:
"However, for once, here is a clear-cut
Allied success. The raids on Hamburg in July and August 1943 were immediately recognized and have since been confirmed by historians as being an outstanding Allied victory in the bombing war."
Hamburg's most important war industries, particularly her U-boat yards, were not seriously damaged. The RAF bombing had never been directed on to the areas in which such industries were situated, and the Americans were hampered by smoke and had not the numbers of bombers available to achieve the complete destruction of such targets.
Middlebrooks says that atendance at Blohm und Voss shipyards (the main U boat manufacturer) was down heavily. Out of the ormal workforce of 9,400, 300 reported for work on the morning following the heaviest raid. By 1st August, 1,500 were back at work. By 1st September, more than a month after the raids, half were back at work, half still absent.
By 1st November, 3 months after the raids, 20% of the workforce was still not back at work.
Middlebrook also says that production of submarines was dow by 20 - 27 because of the raids, and that attendence in Hamburg's war related factories was down, on average, by 50% for 3 months after the raids.
The whole point of area bombing is that the damage it inflicts on the infrastructure of a city is worse than the damage inflicted on factories. Read the Herschel Johnson letter again.
Read that figure again. Hamburg, the largest armaments centre in Germany, lost 50% of production for 3 months after the raids. Not a particular factory, an entire city's factories.
John Kenneth Galbraith wrote that Hamburg raids:
John Kenneth Galbraith is a left wing economist. That's what he wrote some 40 or 50 years after the end of the war.
At the end of the war, he was a member of the USSBS, and that's not at all what they concluded. I quoted their conclusions above. That's what Galbraith signed his name to shortly after the war, I think that holds more weight than what he wrote in a book decades later.
Galbraith was also heavily against bombing Vietnam, even Kosovo. In fact he predicted that bombing Serbia would lead to a Serbian victory, and the destruction of Nato.
The resources and efforts expended in the bombing campaign could have been better utilized and contributed far more to 'victory' then killing civilians.
Of course they could. Killing civilians would have been hugely inefficient. That's why it was never the aim. That's why destruction of infrastructure was the aim, and that was very efficient.
That's why every air force with a strategic bomber fleet adopted it as a strategy.
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Harris fought tooth and nail against anything that distracted from his strategy to destroy civilians.
Harris fought anything that distracted his campaign to destroy German cities and industry.
He never fought solely for attacks on cities, indeed he was responsible for many attacks on specific industries in occupied Europe, which required accuracy to minimise civilian casualties in allied nations.
What Harris recognised is that carpet bombing districts did more damage than trying to hit an individual factory.
The difference was that the USAAF strategy wasn't to target civilians but industry.
No. The USAAF carried out the same sorts of attacks as the RAF. They were just less honest about it.
Apologies if I've already posted this, but from Richard G Davis, American Bombardment Policy Against Germany:
American bombardment policies:
"‘first destruction of the Luftwaffe,
its factories and planes; second essential German industries, and third, the cities themselves.’"General Anderson, Commander VIIIth BC, October 11th, 1943
"Anderson also introduced another change in
Eighth Air Force policy. It began to take effect at
the same time as the introduction of H2S - a large
increase in use of incendiary bombs. Anderson
had begun to encourage greater use of firebombs,
in July 1943. The September 27 Emden mission
was the first of the Eighth’s mission to load more
than 20% incendiaries, while the October 2 mission
against Emden was the Eighth’s first strike to
deliver more than 100 tons of fire bombs on a single
target. Henceforth, the Eighth would not only
conduct intentional area bombing, it would do so
using area bombing techniques."
"After the Second Battle of Schweinfurt bombing
policy changed. On the next mission, October 18,
the Eighth instructed its bombers to hit as their
primary ‘Duren, Center of City,’ and as their secondary
‘Any German city which may be bombed
using visual methods without disrupting fighter
support."
Further on:
"This memo had a chilling effect on reported area
bombing. Three-quarters of such raids reported
appeared in the Eighth’s records before this memo.
However, an analysis using the profile of known
command city raids; always over 100 aircraft,
almost always carrying over 20% incendiaries, and
bombing by radar over 80% of the time, and
applying it to all Eighth Air Force raids, surfaces
82 more ‘area like’ raids. Seventy, or 85%, of those
raids occurred after Anderson’s memo. In August
the Eighth’s area bombing of Germany dropped to
a mere 401 tons. For the first three weeks in
September American area bombing followed the
same pattern. But by the last week of September
the Germans achieved a stalemate on the Western
Front. The Eighth returned to area attacks with a
total of 4,700 tons on Frankfurt, Cologne,
Magdeburg, and Munster."
the clear intent of the targets are of a military nature.
It says nothing about fire bombing apartment blocks.
But that's what they did. Read it again. Over 20% incendiaries, dropped by radar on targets defined as "center of city". What else do you call it?
The USAAF was carrying out area bombing attacks in Europe from summer 1943 until close to the end of the war, just like the RAF.
Of course the US did not only in Germany but a better comparison to BC would be with 20th AF over Japan. But I wonder why the diversion into US actions? More moral relativism? They did it to so that makes it ok for us?
No, not moral relativism, just pointing out that all sides used similar tactics in their bombing campaigns.
It's you who's been claiming that the RAF were unique in their target choices, that they were the only air force to deliberately target civilians.
I'm just pointing out that's false.
They did it, he did it, she did it, the midget down the street did it so its ok for me...
Even in this thread you point the finger at the US.
Not at all. I'm not pointing the finger at anyone, I don't think there was anything wrong with the bombing campaign in WW2.
It's you who's pointing the finger, trying to claim there's something very wrong with the RAF's bombing campaign, something less wrong with the USAAF's, and the Luftwaffe's was mostly OK.
That's just ridiculous.
I state there was no such policy, any more (or less) than Luftwaffe attacks on British morale (and food supplies) in 1940 were attacks on civilians, or any more (or less) than USAAF attacks on Japanese and German cities were attacks on civilians.
Yes we all see your denial. However, what BC did is documented not only on official paper but is documented by many Historians. The fact that you are in denial is evidence of nothing but your own ability to put your hand in the sand.
I've never seen any reputable historians claiming the RAF was unique in it's aims or methods. A few revisionist historians, who's aim is to minimise Nazi atrocities, yes, but never legitimate ones.
I've never seen a legitimate historian claiming the Luftwaffe did not carry out area bombing over Britain in 1940.
I've never seen a modern legitimate historian who claimed the USAAF didn't carry out area bombing.
Here again you use the justification that they did it to so it must be ok. However the facts are only BC built their main strategy through out the war on the indiscriminate bombing of civilians.
No, the facts are that all air forces with a medium/heavy bomber fleet did it.
It's only by redifining Luftwaffe area attacks on Britain as attacks on military targets, and USAAF area attacks on Germany and Japan as attacks on military targets, can someone make that claim.
I have no problem with someone who says bombing enemy cities is wrong, because it kills civilians.
I think it's silly, because war kills people, and there's no way around that, but I don't have any problem with it as a philosophy.
What I do have a problem with is someone saying the RAF bombing civilians is wrong, and then either denying the Luftwaffe and USAAF bombed civiliains, or saying their bombing was justified.
That's just hipocricy.
The first memo may have undermined the British publics confidence in the 'righteousness' of the British war effort. British propaganda was as vital and as effective as any other.
Well, it was an internal government memo, and therefore not a matter for propaganda. If it had been leaked, the press wouldn't have been allowed to print it, and withdrawing it doesn't stop it being leaked anyway.
The simple truth is Churchill is known for his outrageous comments, which is why you can find so many of them, eg on the use of gas.
The memo was also only written at the end of March 1945, so the propoganda value is of little concern because of the imminent end of the war, anyway.
You are comparing them. You are the only one who brings up up other nations in this discussion about Britain and BC.
No, Wotan. It's you who keeps claiming the RAF was unique in it's methods, that neither the Luftwaffe or the USAAF bombed civilians deliberately.
Quote where I said that:
quote:There is no comparison whatsoever between attacking your enemy and rounding up and murdering civilians who have already surrendered to you.
You didn't. I didn't put it in quotes and attribute it to you.
What you said, and I responded to, was:
My point is that comparing immoral acts is in no way a useful tool in making your point.
-----------------------------------------------
I'm not comparing them. There is no comparison whatsoever between attacking your enemy and rounding up and murdering civilians who have already surrendered to you.
You are a liar but that is typical of you where folks don't agree with you. Not only on this forum but others.
Can you point out this lie, please?
On 24 Aug '40, German planes bombed central London due to a navigational error. This is for the most part is in agreement with a good portion of Historians. During the next 2 nights the Brits launched raids on Berlin.
From their everything escalated.
What I said is 100% accurate
No, it's not accurate because it assumes London is the only important part of Britain, that the 1,000+ dead elsewhere in Britain don't count.
The Luftwaffe was bombing Britiain quite heavily at night, killing civilians in large numbers. To focus only on London is silly.
and is the prevailing view shared view by many
It's Hollywood history. The good story, that doesn't let facts get in the way.
John Ray, The Night Blitz:
"There is a widely accepted, yet not entirely accurate, view that the attacks started and developed as a kind of retaliatory tennis match between Hitler and Churchill"
He goes on to point out that Kesselring wanted to attack London to draw what he thought was dwindling RAF strength into a final battle, Goering wanted to bomb London because he thought it would obviate need for an invasion, and that bomber losses were so high that a change in strategy was needed. He quotes Werner Junk, commander Luftflotte's IIIs fighters, that he had advocated an early switch to night attacks, which was eventually carried out because of bomber losses. (Luftflotte 3 lost it's fighters and switched to maily night attacks about 20th August, iirc)
Ray also quotes Otto Bechtle, operations officer KG2, to German air staff conference 1944, on switching attacks to London, and attacking by night:
"Incomparably greater success than hirtherto could be expected from this policy", adding that "economic war from the air could be embarked upon with full fury". Futhermore, he claimed, the morale of the civilian population could be "subjected at the same time to heavy strain".
-
Also from Ray, quoting the RAF official history: "the German belief that "the exertion of sufficient pressure on morale, together with sufficient measure of destruction, would demonstrate the futility of further resistance and bring offers of submission"
Ray quoting Jodl, from June:
"In conjunction with propoganda and terror raids from time to time - announced as reprisals - a cumulative destruction of Britain's food stocks will paralyse the will of the people to resist, and then break it altogether, forcing the capitulation of their government".
Ray, quoting Hitler: "if 8 million people go mad, it might very well turn into a catastrophe", adding, after that, he believed "even a small invasion might go a long way".
Richard Overy, the Battle:
"The raids on Berlin might have affected the timing of this descision, but even that is doubtfull. At most they allowed German leaders what Goebbels described as an "alibi": British airmen were presented in German propoganda as military terrorists, while German operations were presented as a legitimate attack on targets broadly defined as essential for war.
Such a distinction is still sometimes drawn sixty years later. It is an entirely false one. The two air forces operated under almost identical instructions to hit military and economic targets whenever conditions allowed. Neither air force was permitted to mount terror attacks for the sake of pure terror. The British War Cabinet issued a directive to Bomber Command early in June 1940 instructing bomber crews over Germany to attack only when a target was clearly identified, and to seek out an altenative target in case the first was obscured. If no contact was made with the target, aircraft were expected to bring their bombs back"
"The claim the attack on London was retaliation for starting an air war against civilians with the raid on Berlin on the night of 25/26th August is equally hollow. The Berlin raid was very small scale, and the amount of damage inflicted on the capital itself negligible."
"The raids on Berlin were in reality retaliation for the persistent bombing of British conurbations and the high level of British civilian casulaties that resulted. In July 258 civilians had been killed, in August 1,075: the figures included 136 children and 392 women. During the last half of August, as German bombers moved progressively further inland, bombs began to fall on the outskirts of London.
On the night of the 18/19 August bombs fell on Croydon, Wimbledon and the Maldens. On the night of 22/23 August the bombs fell on central London in attacks described by observers as "extensive" and for which no warning was given; on the night 24/25 August bombs fell on Slough, Richmond Park and Dulwich. On the night the RAF first raided Berlin, bombs fell on Banstead, Croydon, Lewisham, Uxbridge, Harrow and Hayes. On the night of the next raid on Berlin, on 28/29 August, German aircraft bombed the following London areas: Finchley, St Pancras, Wembley, Wood Green, Southgate, Crayford, Old Kent Road, Mill HIll, Ilford, Hendon, Chigwell. London was under red warning for seven hours and 5 minutes. The bombing of London began almost two weeks beofre Hitler's speech on 4th September, and well before the first raid on Berlin"
Most of the 'extra' weapons the Germans would have produced would have been spent in the east. Those that weren't would have been ground to death in the west by Allied fighter bombers etc..
Certainly I think the Germans would still have lost, at somewhat higher cost to the allies, and with the war ending somewhat later.
As an example the Soviets didn't develop a strategic bomber or strategy. Neither did the Germans. Both were successful by winning the war on the ground.
The point is the British and Americans could not fight a war on the ground against the Germans until 1944, they simply had no way of invading and sustaining the invasion earlier.
And even then the invasion was a gamble. If it had failed, the Germans would have been fre to fight the Russians alone for another year, and the war would have lasted at least another year.
The bomber campaign would have defeated Germany by the summer of 1945 anyway. With a successfull invasion, that wasn't necessary, but if the invasion had failed, it would have been (and it would have been too late to start in 1944 if the invasion had failed)
They were tasked with making sure Britain gave up the war against Germany. That's victory by anyone's definition (apart from yours, it seems).
--------------------------------------------------
Coming to terms with an enemy doesn't necessarily mean 'giving up'. Whether or not Hitler could have been believed aside he made several offers to the British that were rejected.
He didn't actually make any firm offers, he put out peace feelers. But are you seriously suggesting Hitler would have accepted peace on Britain's terms? Of course not, he wanted Britain to accept peace on his.
That's called victory, it's just not the same as total victory.
If you go to war, invade and occupy several countries, and get your enemy to agree terms and give up fighting, that's called victory.
Unless he could show them that the threat of invasion was real he would never have gotten a deal. He needed to destroy the RAF to help convince them.
Or bomb them in to submission, which is what he tried.
This is silly. What exactly are you suggesting the Luftwaffe was doing over Britain in 1940?
I say the Luftwaffe was trying to bomb Britain into submission. What do you say they were doing?
The LW goal during BoB wasn't to bomb population centers until the British morale broke and they gave up. It was to destroy the RAF which would have made the threat of invasion more 'real'.
That was certainly the goal at the start of the BoB. What would you say was the goal as the BoB turned into the Blitz?
That's what I saids all along? Are you playing games? You claimed that the LW was tasked with defeating (victory) Britain by bombing their cities.
Huh?
I'm saying that in summer 1940 Germany was faced with a country they couldn't invade, and used the Luftwaffe to try to bring about victory, by bombing Britain into submission.
They started by trying to beat the RAF, they ended by trying to bypass the RAF (by flying at night) and bombing British cities.
If you've got some other explanation of what the Blitz was, I'd really like to hear it.
I said the shift of strategy (night bombing of British cities) was in retaliation for the British targeting of German cities.
I said rubbish.
Let's get something clear.
The first country to start bombing in WW2 was Germany with attacks on Poland.
You claim these were all legitimate military targets.
The second round of bombing was Britain and Germany bombing each other's warships at sea, that's clearly a military target.
The third round was German bombing of military targets in Scotland, and Britain bombing a seaplane base on a north sea island. Again clearly military bombing.
The fourth round was German bombing in Norway. Spaight certainly says this was terror bombing, I presume you are claiming it was all military targets.
The fifth round was German attacks on French, Dutch and Belgian targets. This was probably military bombing.
The sixth was British bombing of military targets west of the Rhine. This was military bombing.
Seventh German bombing of Rotterdam, again military.
8th British bombing of military targets in Germany.
9th German bombing of military targets in Britain.
It remains that way until the Blitz.
The first British area attack on Germany, ie an attack on a city not on an industrial target within a city, was on 16/17 December 1940, the attack on Mannheim.
To believe the Blitz was retaliation for British bombing, you have to believe that Germany only attacked military targets in Britain prior to December 16/17 1940, and that the 20,000 dead civilians up to that point were all collateral damage.
You have to believe that hundreds of tons of bombs and incendiaries on the cnetre of Coventry were on purely military targets, that the nightly attacks on London, many aimed at the commercial centre of the city, were purely military targets.
And you have to believe that similar British raids after December 1941, aimed at the cetnre of German cities, were not military tartgets.
In short, you have to say when the Luftwaffe bombed a city it was a military target, when the RAF did exactly the same, it wasn't.
John Ray, commenting on German propoganda in late September 1940:
"In reality the RAF at this point was still attempting to strike at specific targets, for example oil depots, rather than follow the Luftwaffe's practice over London of unloading bombs randomly across a wide urban mass. The RAF's first "area" raid of the war, with the centre of the town as it's target, was not unleashed until 16 December 1940. Mannheim was then attacked after Coventry had been devestated a month earlier"
I didn't expect some one to use an example of a "Titoist' court as evidence of something.
Who would?
Not me. I was just correcting the wrong "fact" you introduced, even though it isn't germane to the topic.
I never claimed German bombing was illegal, so what was the point of claiming no Germans had been prosecuted for it?
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quote]If Britain had been in France's situation and not protected by the channel they would have folded as easily. [/quote]
If Britain had been in Fance's position Britain would be a continental land power with an entirely different history, ethnic makeup and military balance, so any speculation is silly.
Quote my sympathy for the Nazi's?
Again you lie.
I said you had sympathy for Nazi Germany, not Nazis.
You certainly seem prepared to give Germany the benefit of the doubt regards all their bombing being "legitimate", and just as certainly don't extend the same benefit of the doubt to Britain.
You extend that to saying Britain started the war, and yes, I think it's fair to say you are showing sympathy for Nazi Germany.
And that's not the same as saying sympathy for the Nazis, which would imply sympathy for their genocidal policies.
More lies from you.
You brought Rotterdam into this discussion as an example of the LW purposeful targeting of civilians.
No I didn't. Where exactly do I say Rotterdam was an example of targeting civilians (other than in the rhetorical "nonsense" bits)?
I brought Rotterdam in because it's the destruction the Luftwaffe wrought in Rotterdam that persuaded the British the Germans would have no qualms bombing cities as and when it suited them (because Rotterdam, even though it was a valid target, was also a city, and a lot of civilians died)
Regardless, the targets weren't civilians and the raid was not in support of 'paratroopers'.
It was. I believe elements of 7th Fallschirmjager were engaged, the bombing was in support of them. (although they might have been glider troops, rather than paratroops)
They had seized the northern end of a bridge in Rotterdam, they were cut off and would have soon needed to surrender, the bombing was directed close to their position.
Never said they did (again, exluding my "nonsense" in reply to your "nonsense")
Yes you did:
quote:Nonsense, the people of Rotterdam, Warsaw, London, Coventry, Leningrad, etc were the targets.
As I said, excluding the "nonsense" one.
My initial post was:
Rotterdam was bombed because it was a port bringing in supplies to feed Allied troops. The ports were the targets not civilians..
And German cities were bombed because they were producing the supplies for the German armies. The cties were the targets, not the civilians.
Note I was not claiming Rotterdam was bombed to kill the civilians. You said Rotterdam was bombed to destroy the port, I pointed out German cities were bombed to destroy the industries.
You responded with:
Nonsense the civilians (laborers of the war machine) were the targets.
I responded with:
Nonsense, the people of Rotterdam, Warsaw, London, Coventry, Leningrad, etc were the targets.
What I am trying to point ou is your double standard.
When the Luftwaffe bomb a city, it's to destroy the port (or whatever). When the RAF bomb a city, it's to kill the civilians.
I don't like double standards, which is why I emphasised yours.
I haven't seriously claimed Rotterdam was a deliberate attack on civilians.
Why lie?
I'm not, Wotan. I'm not the one who's making up quotes to suit himself.
Warsaw was a valid military target. T
Of course it was. Everything the Germans bombed was a valid military target. Everything the RAF bombed was designed purely to kill civilians.
You are approaching this with the preconceived idea that Bomber Command set out to kill civilians, and the Luftwaffe didn't.
That preconception is leading you to the conclusion that when the Luftwaffe bombed a city, they did so to destroy some physical thing in that city (docks etc), when the RAF bombed a city they did so to kill the inhabitants.
You haven't provided any evidence for that preconception, other than your made up quote.
That doesn't represent a fixed un-yielding strategy to de-house all of Poland's population centers in the same fashion as BC planned to do with Germany. The Nazi's didn't need the LW for that.
That's the point. The Germans developed the army as their primary force, the Luftwaffe to support it, and the navy hardly at all, because they were a continental land power.
When faced with a situation where the power of their army was no use (against Britain in 1940) they switched to a tactic of area bombing cities, in exactly the same way Britain later did. The reasons were just the same, for the Germans because they had a strong army but weak navy, and couldn't invade Britain, for the British because although they had a strong navy, they had a weak army, and couldn't invade Germany.
Here once again you bring in some other causation or at the very least some other excuse that does nothing to disprove my point or to prove your own.
What is your point exactly?
I'll state mine quite simply. All sides area bombed cities, starting with Germany, the Britain, then the US.
There is nothing particularly wrong with area bombing by the standards of the day.
Area bombing was a good strategy for the time, that's why everyone adopted it.
Now, your point?
There were several offers not just one. Hitler offered to to extend League of Nations protection to the Danzig Corridor much like Danzig itself.
You are surely not suggesting Hitler only wanted Danzig, are you?
Nashwan would have you believe that the above doesn't really mean the civil population or the workers themselves but just 'the city where they live'.
No, no, no.
I'm open to argument that BC targeted workers, that's ust a matter of interpretation. It's not the interpretation I put on it, but I can see why somebody would take that view.
What I object to is the claim that bomber command unloading hundreds of tons of bombs over a city is targeting civilians, the Luftwaffe or USAAF unloading hundreds of tons of bombs over a city is not.
-
I only have time for a quick reply but will try to get back later this evening. It maybe tomorrow before I can reply to all your points.
Anyway:
So it's actually your interpretation of BC strategy, which you try to legitimise by putting quotes around it, and claiming it's from an Air Ministry directive?
From Directive # 22:
It has been decided that the primary objective of your operations should be focused on the morale of the enemy civil population and in particular the industrial workers.
This doesn't mean buildings or the abstract 'city'. The targets are the civil population and in particular the industrial workers.
I suppose it is clear that the Aiming Points are to be the built up areas and not the dockyards or aircraft factories.
The built up areas are the targets why? Because that's where the people live and sleep.
Add that to Churchill's own words:
Churchill’s letter to Lord Beaverbrook, on 5th July 1940.
"Nothing else will get the Germans to their minds, and on their knees, than an absolutely devastating extermination campaign against their homeland with heavy bombers."
See: John Colville : Fringes of Power. Downing Street Diaries 1939-1955. London 1985, pg. 186.
And their intent is clear, to target civilians.
No, it was also brought on by the bombing campaign. From the USSBS:
Nonsense. Even the quote from the USSBS doesn't show that:
The German experience suggests that even a first class military power -- rugged and resilient as Germany was -- cannot live long under full-scale and free exploitation of air weapons over the heart of its territory. By the beginning of 1945, before the invasion of the homeland itself, Germany was reaching a state of helplessness. Her armament production was falling irretrievably, orderliness in effort was disappearing, and total disruption and disintegration were well along. Her armies were still in the field. But with the impending collapse of the supporting economy, the indications are convincing that they would have had to cease fighting -- any effective fighting -- within a few months. Germany was mortally wounded.
Germany's industrial centers weren't limited to the borders of Germany Proper. The overrunning of the eastern territories by the Soviets and the failure of the transportation system (mostly brought on roving fighters and fighter bombers) are what lead to collapse. By '45 even BC admits they were running out of targets.
By '45 the losses on the battlefield were far beyond replacement even if German industry were running at 100%.
Even the quote you posted doesn't refer specifically to 'bombers' but uses the general term 'full-scale and free exploitation of air weapons'.
From the USSBS:
The city attacks of the RAF prior to the autumn of 1944, did not substantially affect the course of German war production. German war production as a whole continued to increase. This in itself is not conclusive, but the Survey has made detailed analysis of the course of production and trade in 10 German cities that were attacked during this period and has made more general analyses in others. These show that while production received a moderate setback after a raid, it recovered substantially within a relatively few weeks. As a rule the industrial plants were located around the perimeter of German cities and characteristically these were relatively undamaged.
In the next paragraph:
Commencing in the autumn of 1944, the tonnage dropped on city areas, plus spill-overs from attacks on transportation and other specific targets, mounted greatly. In the course of these raids, Germany's steel industry was knocked out, its electric power industry was substantially impaired and industry generally in the areas attacked was disorganized. There were so many forces making for the collapse of production during this period, however, that it is not possible separately to assess the effect of these later area raids on war production. There is no doubt, however, that they were significant.
In late '44 and '45 the war was all but over. The German railway system had collapsed (or damn near collapsed). Added to the loss of raw materials such as ores, chemicals and oil due to the situation on the ground and the German economy broke down.
The report goes into the the attacks on the German transportation system (which wasn't the sole domain of BC or the bombers in general):
The attack on transportation was the decisive blow that completely disorganized the German economy. It reduced war production in all categories and made it difficult to move what was produced to the front. The attack also limited the tactical mobility of the German army.
Attack aircraft of all sorts contributed substantially to the collapse of German transportation.
The attack on German transportation was intimately woven with the development of ground operations. In support of the invasion a major assignment of the air forces had been the disruption of rail traffic between Germany and the French coast through bombing of marshalling yards in northern France. At the time of the invasion itself a systematic and large-scale attempt was made to interdict all traffic to the Normandy beachhead. These latter operations were notably successful; as the front moved to the German border the attack was extended to the railroads of the Reich proper. Heavy and medium bombers and fighters all participated.
It should be noted that Harris was against diverting BC resources to attack transportation leading up to invasion.
For those interested it what were are talking about here is a link:
THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY (http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm#c)
Summary Report
(European War)
September 30, 1945
What's true is that victory in spring 1945 came from both the ground and the air. It's speculation that without the air forces the ground forces would still have achieved victory at the same time. (and there's little to support it)
I never said anything about not having an 'air force'. What I said was that victory still would have came without BC targeting civilians.
I agree that 'air forces' can be decisive in battle. I pointed out that imho cas and interdiction are capable of 'war winning'. I don't believe and it has not been shown to me that 'strategic bombing' (absent nukes) could be a decisive factor in winning a war.
I gotta run but like I said I will try to get back later...
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Ok, get the short story:
1. First airforce to devastate whole towns and subdue nations with heavy bombings, - LW. Mission successful
2. London was bombed indiscriminately before Berlin, and as the ladder went higher, the LW tried bombing the British civilians into a surrender. So, Gerry is not a gentleman.
3. For years, the BC was both ineffectively trying to bomb strategic targets (well, sometimes they were lucky), and sometimes striking more populated areas. Gerry was itching a bit, but not so scratched.
4. One fine day, it was clear that BC was basically the only weapon to hurt Gerries homeland.
5. BC then moved on to tougher strategy, their ability to deliver their payload growing steadily. Gerry easily compensated for homeless or dead workers by applying millions of slaves.
6. All the time, the high command is aware of the growing wickedness of their enemy. (Ultra + Enigma). Bear in mind that more Polish people for instance are killed AFTER their country surrendered, than Germans in air raids. OOOps, I included the Jews. So, add some bombs.
6b. Like Tony said, Stalin wants some more support. Ok, bomb and bomb.
7. At one point, you have total war. Stopping only at WMD, which Gerry was as well as everybody else, trying to develop. And everybody could have delivered gas in some quantity.
8. No mercy for Gerry. Bomb the fatherland to pieces and get it over ASAP. This is a costly war. Gerry sucks!
9. Oooops. Gerry has rockets and cruise missiles. He is now bombing back. So, bomb the bugger more!
10 Gerry has been bombed and bombed, but still does not surrender. What a clot! Eventually, Gerry's capital gets shelled. One SS officer joked with this with Hitler. He said: It's getting so short between the Western and the Eastern front, that we can soon take the streetcar between them. Well, eventually it was over.
Since Gerry lost, at least we have the open sources to create a hindsight ;)
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"This is a costly war. Gerry sucks!"
You would not have made it as a speech writer for Churchill Angus, but maybe that would have been a catchy phrase for a war bond drive? :)
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I'd have to spend more than 5 secs to pick up a Churchill-quality line ;)
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A few additional comments:
First, it makes no difference in practical terms whether you say you're bombing a military target, but incidentally flatten thousands of nearby houses, or whether you say you're flattening a part of a city, and incidentally knock out a military target. The residents wouldn't be able to tell the difference and would get killed just the same either way.
Second, if a factory producing war goods is a legitimate target, then so are the workers in that factory as they are a part of the system producing the goods. De-housing, scaring them off or killing them is therefore a legitimate tactic in the kind of total warfare which constituted WW2.
Third, whether a particular action is regarded as legitimate or criminal depends on the context. Let me give you a simple analogy. A maniac walks into a public place, pulls out a gun and starts shooting. He hits and kills a man – an innocent passerby. A policeman sees what is happening, draws his gun and shoots the maniac dead. From a particular, very narrow, perspective, it is possible to argue that the actions of the maniac and the policeman were equivalent: they both deliberately shot and killed someone. However, when the actions are considered in context it is obvious that there is no moral equivalence at all. Put simply, the policeman’s action was morally justified, the maniac’s was not.
The same logic can be applied to the bombing by the Luftwaffe and RAF in WW2. From a particular, very narrow, perspective, it is possible to argue that the actions of the Luftwaffe and the RAF were equivalent. However, when the actions are seen in context, it is obvious that there was no moral equivalence at all. The Luftwaffe’s bombing was in furtherance of an aggressive war of conquest started by Hitler. After dismantling Czechoslovakia, he invaded Poland, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, the USSR and – oh yes – Yugoslavia, Greece and a few other places. The RAF’s bombing was in furtherance of a battle to stop Hitler’s aggression, to free the countries he had invaded and to end his evil regime. Put simply, the RAF’s action was morally justified, the Luftwaffe’s was not.
Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website (http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk) and discussion forum (http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/)
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I provided the most telling quotes from Middlebrook:
If anything, the bombing was often counter-productive in terms of morale. The news of what had happened in Hamburg, taken back to their units by thousands of servicemen who were allowed special leave, certainly increased the will to fight on to the end by the German forces. In Hamburg itself, though its people may have been sick at heart at the destruction of homes and the loss of life, they pulled together as they had never done before.
You go on to cite:
Middlebrooks says that atendance at Blohm und Voss shipyards (the main U boat manufacturer) was down heavily. Out of the ormal workforce of 9,400, 300 reported for work on the morning following the heaviest raid. By 1st August, 1,500 were back at work. By 1st September, more than a month after the raids, half were back at work, half still absent.
By 1st November, 3 months after the raids, 20% of the workforce was still not back at work.
Approximately 45,000 people died. It is probable that 40,000 of those deaths occurred in the firestorm which took place during the second RAF raid. By contrast, less than one percent of the deaths were caused by the two American raids.
40000 (+ 5000 others; Middlebrooks numbers) of the citizens of Hamburg were burnt to death. Don't you think this would have some effect on the labor force? Not to mention the injured.
So much for 'civilians weren't the target'...
No. The USAAF carried out the same sorts of attacks as the RAF. They were just less honest about it.
Did I say they didn't?
Here's what I said:
Of course the US did not only in Germany but a better comparison to BC would be with 20th AF over Japan. But I wonder why the diversion into US actions? More moral relativism? They did it to so that makes it ok for us?
This thread is about British night bombing.
My reply:
The difference [in reference to what you wrote] was that the USAAF strategy wasn't to target civilians but industry. Even though the bombing campaign in general never lived up to what was expected in terms of destroying a nations war economy the clear intent of the targets are of a military nature.
It says nothing about fire bombing apartment blocks.
should be read in context to what it is you cited as evidence:
You wrote:
No towns or cities in Germany will be attacked as secondary or last resort targets, targets of opportunity, or otherwise, unless such towns contain
or have immediately adjacent to them, one (1) or more military objectives. Military objectives include railway lines; junctions; marshalling yards; railway or road bridges, or other communications networks; any industrial plant; and such obvious military objectives as oil storage tanks, military camps and barracks, troop concentrations, motor transport or AFV parks, ordnance or supply depots, ammunition depots; airfields; etc."
"It has been determined that towns and cities large enough to produce an identifiable return on the H2X scope generally contain a large proportion of the military objectives listed above. These centers, therefore, may be attacked as secondary or last resort targets through the overcast bombing technique
What you typed doesn't establish that the US bombing strategy was built around bombing civilians. Even in the second paragraph where it says:
These centers, therefore, may be attacked as secondary or last resort targets through the overcast bombing technique
There is a qualifier before it:
It has been determined that towns and cities large enough to produce an identifiable return on the H2X scope generally contain a large proportion of the military objectives listed above.
What you wrote refers to 'military targets'.
It's you who's been claiming that the RAF were unique in their target choices, that they were the only air force to deliberately target civilians.
I'm just pointing out that's false.
What's false is you re-wording my points to suit your argument. What I specifically contend is:
All other nations in war inevitably hit targets in cities and / or embedded with in the civilian population. The only bomber force in WW2 that practically built their entire strategy on the indiscriminate bombing of civilians was BC whether it be to de-moralize, de-house' or to outright kill civilians.
I also said in another reply that:
This [thread] has nothing to do with unintended collateral civilian casualties that are the inevitable result of war and in particular of level bombing...
Not at all. I'm not pointing the finger at anyone, I don't think there was anything wrong with the bombing campaign in WW2.
It's you who's pointing the finger, trying to claim there's something very wrong with the RAF's bombing campaign, something less wrong with the USAAF's, and the Luftwaffe's was mostly OK.
That's just ridiculous.
It is you that keep bringing up other nations in this discussion about British night bombing.
It you that keeps saying 'they did it to...'
Quote where I said the USAAF was 'less wrong'.
Quote where I said the Luftwaffe was 'mostly OK'.
I haven't said either.
I have replied to the specific examples that you cite in this thread.
In reference to the LW you brought up cities like Rotterdam, Warsaw, Belgrade and now Guernica. You compared some of these raids to BC as an example that at least some of these raids were specifically targeted against civilians.
What I did was reply to your claims in order to show, that in reference to the specific cities you mentioned, the LW wasn't specifically targeting civilians in those examples.
I never said the LW didn't area bomb, they did. I never said the LW never targeted civilians. They did, so did the US.
It's only by redifining Luftwaffe area attacks on Britain as attacks on military targets, and USAAF area attacks on Germany and Japan as attacks on military targets, can someone make that claim.
I never said all LW raids on Britain were against military targets. What I said was the shift to area bombing by the LW was precipitated by the RAF night attacks on Berlin.
What I do have a problem with is someone saying the RAF bombing civilians is wrong, and then either denying the Luftwaffe and USAAF bombed civiliains, or saying their bombing was justified.
I haven't denied that the LW or the USAAF never bombed civilians nor have I justified' anything.
As I said above I replied to the examples you cite in this thread. What I have said is that the specific targeting of civilians by BC was wrong. I cited several reasons why. These reasons are independent of anything the US, DE, SU, JP etc... did during the war.
Can you point out this lie, please?
I already did:
There is no comparison whatsoever between attacking your enemy and rounding up and murdering civilians who have already surrendered to you.
No where did I say or imply that. As I pointed out to Tony (and confirmed by many of your wrong implications of my points through out) it would appear you are trying to build up some strawman fallacy.
Rather then stick to my specific points you seem to be attempting to re-define them so that instead of dealing with the specific issue of 'British night bombing' you create the illusion that I am defending or have sympathies with 'Nazi Germany'.
It's a tactic I have seen you use before.
I have to run and apologize that it is taking so long to finish my reply{ies} but I am just off vacation and have to catch up on some work. I will try to finish my replies tonight.
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Originally posted by Tony Williams
However, once he realised that the UK was not going to give him the kind of settlement he wanted - i.e., to hold onto his Polish conquests and leave him master of France - the gloves soon came off, and military targets often had very little to do with it.
[/B]
Tony, the gloves came off after Winston Churchill ordered the indiscriminate terror bombing of Berlin. Hitler explicitely prohibited the bombing of London before that - it`s a historical fact. The RAF was bombing major German cities before the Battle of France even ended.
British air attacks on major German cities, via Jane`s. Note the date of first attacks - the RAF was not hitting back, it started, and effectively the only long-term deployer of terror bombing tactics during WW2.
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/715_1120139074_rafbc1stbombings.jpg)
Remember the Baedecker raids? The ones in 1942 in which the Luftwaffe launched bombing attacks on historic British cities of no military significance, just to try to terrorise and demoralise the population into surrender?
Tony, as you probably know, the Baedecker raids which you desrcibed were in response to the RAF-BC`s raids on Rostock. Rostock was an old medieval city with no military importance, and was selected by the RAF as target because it had a great many of wooden housing from the old times which would burn easily. The city, with much of it`s cultural heritage was devasted by the Bomber commands firebombings.
The Baeder raids were an answer to that, just like the V1 and V2 were to the hundreds of thousends of innoncent dead the British were responsible for in Germany.
You came up with Coventry, but even British authors like Peter Hinchliff who wrote an excellent book on RAF night bomber and LW night fighter operations do not deny that in Coventry the aircraft industry was targeted, and was hit hard, not the civillian population.
I am sorry, but appearantly you took an easy position of blaming it all on the 'evil nazis who started all', and repeat the old wartime propaganda about LW bombings which are long dismissed even by British historians. I am curious, even in modern UK, why is it so hard for the population to face the countries historical past, that they waged 5 years of a terror campaign from the air killing and burning ca. 500 000 civilians?
It appears that modern Germany was capable of facing it`s old crimes, despite proportioanlly greater as the whole, why Britain could still not take a step ahead from an entrechned position of denial and relativization.
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Besides Tony, it`s a rather odd thing to argue about Britian was fighting for liberty and democracy and such values - it would be odd for a country which run the biggest colonial empire at that time, forcing hundreds of millions of indians, africans, boers etc. against their will, who had no right at all to influence their own nations political decision or were allowed to run a country of their own.
Basically, you are arguing a Slaver has moral superiority over a 'Thug' as you describe it, and thus all of it`s actions are justified.
By your logic, if India would choose to turn the UK into a nuclear wasteland, it would be justfied because the UK 'committed agression' in Iraq. Silly, isn`t it?
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Originally posted by Nashwan
Of course it was. Everything the Germans bombed was a valid military target. Everything the RAF bombed was designed purely to kill civilians.
You are approaching this with the preconceived idea that Bomber Command set out to kill civilians, and the Luftwaffe didn't.
That preconception is leading you to the conclusion that when the Luftwaffe bombed a city, they did so to destroy some physical thing in that city (docks etc), when the RAF bombed a city they did so to kill the inhabitants.
You haven't provided any evidence for that preconception, other than your made up quote.
[/B]
I don`t see preconception with Wotan. He did not say the LW only bombing miliary targets.
As for the RAF setting out with the task to kill civillians, why not ask the CinC of Bomber Command :
To qoute Arthur Harris, calculating that using mix of incendinaries and HE is more effective for mass murder :
"I do not agree with this policy. The moral effect of HE is vast. People can escape from fires, and the casualties on a solely fire raising raid would be as nothing. What we want to do in addition to the horrors of fire is to bring the masonry crashing down on top of the Boche, to kill Boche and to terrify Boche."
He does not need much of an interpretation, does he?
That's the point. The Germans developed the army as their primary force, the Luftwaffe to support it, and the navy hardly at all, because they were a continental land power.
When faced with a situation where the power of their army was no use (against Britain in 1940) they switched to a tactic of area bombing cities, in exactly the same way Britain later did. The reasons were just the same, for the Germans because they had a strong army but weak navy, and couldn't invade Britain, for the British because although they had a strong navy, they had a weak army, and couldn't invade Germany.
What is your point exactly?
I'll state mine quite simply. All sides area bombed cities, starting with Germany, the Britain, then the US.
But only Britian bombed cities in Europe through the whole war with the single goal of maximizing civillian casulties in cities.
Being less p.c., they went butchering civillians from the air, while others didn`t, though they did on a few occasion.
Area bombing was a good strategy for the time, that's why everyone adopted it.
You didn`t provide any evidence up to now that everyone would adopt area bombing at the time.
It`s just an attempt of moral relativization.
It`s how you usually deny to BC`s crimes.
First, you deny outright they would target cities. I read you say :
'They only bombed crossroads/RR stations. Unfurtunately, every German city had crossroads.'
When there are so many facts around that you can no longer deny what the BC did 60 years ago, you swicht to moral relativization and claim that 'everyone else was doing it'.
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Kuffy, you saw my my piece of how and when indiscriminate or civilian bombings started in WW2 (Poland) and how they started off properly between the LW and RAF.
Please ponder on that a bit :D
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It has been decided that the primary objective of your operations should be focused on the morale of the enemy civil population and in particular the industrial workers.
This doesn't mean buildings or the abstract 'city'. The targets are the civil population and in particular the industrial workers.
No, the target is their morale, just as it was for the Luftwaffe in 1940:
"economic war from the air could be embarked upon with full fury". Futhermore, he claimed, the morale of the civilian population could be "subjected at the same time to heavy strain"."
Otto Bechtle, operations officer KG2
"In conjunction with propoganda and terror raids from time to time - announced as reprisals - a cumulative destruction of Britain's food stocks will paralyse the will of the people to resist, and then break it altogether, forcing the capitulation of their government".
Jodl
"if 8 million people go mad, it might very well turn into a catastrophe", adding, after that, he believed "even a small invasion might go a long way".
Hitler
"The city is one single ruin... and so it must go on, until England is on her knees, begging for peace"
Goering
And read again the Herschel Johnson letter, which makes it clear that damage to the city, it's housing and infrastructure are what damaged morale, not a mention of civilian casualties.
From Lord Cherwell, Churchill's scientific adviser:
"Careful analysis of the effects of raids on Birmingham, Hull and elsewhere have shown that, on the average, I ton of bombs dropped on a built-up area demolishes 20-40 dwellings and turns 100-200 people out of house and home."
"Investigation seems to show that having one's house demolished is most damaging to morale. People seem to mind it more than having their friends or even relatives killed."
That's the thinking behind bomber command, when they speak of morale. Not to kill the civilians, but to destroy the city.
Look at those figures. 100-200 homeless from one ton of bombs, 0.5 killed per ton of bombs (or 0.8, if using the figures the Germans achieved over Britain)
It's quite clear, the British thought dehousing was most damaging to morale, and far, far more were dehoused than killed.
The built up areas are the targets why? Because that's where the people live and sleep.
The built up areas are not just residential, they are also commercial, and contain the densest infrastructure.
The German railway system had collapsed (or damn near collapsed).
Due to bombing.
Attack aircraft of all sorts contributed substantially to the collapse of German transportation.
Mainly bombers.
It should be noted that Harris was against diverting BC resources to attack transportation leading up to invasion.
It should be noted that Harris used his bombers to attack transport targets leading up to the invasion to the maximum extent, even if he had argued against it.
I pointed out that imho cas and interdiction are capable of 'war winning'.
Of course they are. The allies could have limited themselves to this, limited their attack on Germany. Why should they, though? Why, in a total war, limit yourself, especially when the enemy isn't?
40000 (+ 5000 others; Middlebrooks numbers) of the citizens of Hamburg were burnt to death. Don't you think this would have some effect on the labor force? Not to mention the injured.
So much for 'civilians weren't the target'...
No, I don't.
Hamburg had a population of about 1,500,000. 40,000 is less than 3%.
3% dead does not equate well with 50% absenteeism.
However, something over 50% of the population was made homeless, and that equates very well with the 50% absenteeism.
What you wrote refers to 'military targets'.
Military targets as in "any town of 50,000 people or more, or which contains a bridge, or a railway, or a factory, is a military target.
What the USAAF did was redifine cities as military targets, just as the RAF did.
I don't know of any town deliberately bombed by the RAF that would not fit that definition of a "military target".
Quote where I said the USAAF was 'less wrong'.
Quote where I said the Luftwaffe was 'mostly OK'.
I haven't said either.
You have said that the RAF was the only air force to target civilians.
As evidence, you have provided one made up quote that says that, several quotes that describe targetting morale and built up areas, and claimed the US didn't "firebomb apartment blocks".
Well, the USAAF did firebomb apartment blocks, the Luftwaffe did target morale and built up areas.
In reference to the LW you brought up cities like Rotterdam, Warsaw, Belgrade and now Guernica.
I brought up Guernica in your refernce to Iraq, Belgrade when you claimed no Germans were tried for bombing (wy, I don't know, as I never claimed they were), Rotterdam as the turning point that allowed Bomber Command to target military targets in Germany.
I have repeatedly brought up London and Coventry as examples of the Luftwaffe using area bombing.
You compared some of these raids to BC as an example that at least some of these raids were specifically targeted against civilians.
No, only Warsaw.
I never said the LW never targeted civilians. They did, so did the US.
Sorry, I thought you were saying the opposite when you said:
"The only bomber force in WW2 that practically built their entire strategy on the indiscriminate bombing of civilians was BC whether it be to de-moralize, de-house' or to outright kill civilians. "
"The difference was that the USAAF strategy wasn't to target civilians but industry."
" However the facts are only BC built their main strategy through out the war on the indiscriminate bombing of civilians."
If you are now saying what you mean is the RAF did a bit more killing of civilians than the USAAF or Luftwaffe, perhaps.
But I'd just like to point out that the Luftwaffe spent almost their entire war against Britain trying, as you define it, "to kill civilians".
They began in late summer 1940, and continued right to the end of the war, by air launching V-1s at British cities.
In light of you saying you don't think BC was the only one to target civilians, just devoted more of their effort to it, another of your comments:
At least you admit that much. BC led the way in fire bombing civilians.
No, the Luftwaffe led the way in firebombing civilians, in London, Coventry and other British cities in the summer and autumn of 1940, before the British began to respond in kind in December 1940.
As I said above I replied to the examples you cite in this thread. What I have said is that the specific targeting of civilians by BC was wrong. I cited several reasons why. These reasons are independent of anything the US, DE, SU, JP etc... did during the war.
OK, you believe all bombing was wrong. Why then do you seem to want to focus only on BC? If you have a complaint with bombing in general, why not air it, rather than focus on the actions of only one of the strategic bombing forces?
I never said all LW raids on Britain were against military targets. What I said was the shift to area bombing by the LW was precipitated by the RAF night attacks on Berlin.
Let's make this clear. You are saying the Luftwaffe shift to area attacks was promted by the RAF's attacks on military targets?
Because that's what the RAF, and the Luftwaffe, had been trying to do until the Luftwaffe switched to area bombing. They had been trying to attack single military targets. Frequently without success, of course, sometimes even bombing the wrong country. The Luftwaffe bombed Freiburg by mistake on 10th May, and used it as propoganda against the British throughout the war. They also bombed Ireland a few times. The RAF likewise bombed countries around Germany by mistake on occasion.
Prior to the first Luftwaffe area attacks on Britain, Britain and Germany had been bombing each other, and each other's allies, with small numbers of bombers trying to hit pinpoint targets (and usually failing).
It was the Luftwaffe who made the switch to area attacks, just as it was the Luftwaffe who made the switch to attacking targets on land, and the Luftwaffe who made the switch to attacking targets in cities that would inevitably result in an increase in collateral damage.
I already did:
quote: There is no comparison whatsoever between attacking your enemy and rounding up and murdering civilians who have already surrendered to you.
No where did I say or imply that.
Say or imply what? Why are the last two words in bold? What do you think I was saying?
To clarify what I meant: you posted:
My point is that comparing immoral acts is in no way a useful tool in making your point.
From this I thought you meant comparing Nazi atrocities (genocide etc) to BC, thereby "justifying" BC, was not usefull.
My reply was:
"There is no comparison whatsoever between attacking your enemy and rounding up and murdering civilians who have already surrendered to you."
In other words, I was denying I was using Nazi atrocities to "justify" BC.
How is this a "lie"?
Rather then stick to my specific points you seem to be attempting to re-define them so that instead of dealing with the specific issue of 'British night bombing' you create the illusion that I am defending or have sympathies with 'Nazi Germany'.
Why is British night bombing a "specific issue"? Why is it distinct from Luftwaffe and USAAF bombing?
Why do you want to focus only on what you seem to believe was wrongdoing by Britain, and ignore German and American activities in the same field?
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Originally posted by Kurfürst
I am sorry, but appearantly you took an easy position of blaming it all on the 'evil nazis who started all', and repeat the old wartime propaganda about LW bombings which are long dismissed even by British historians. I am curious, even in modern UK, why is it so hard for the population to face the countries historical past, that they waged 5 years of a terror campaign from the air killing and burning ca. 500 000 civilians?
It appears that modern Germany was capable of facing it`s old crimes, despite proportioanlly greater as the whole, why Britain could still not take a step ahead from an entrechned position of denial and relativization. [/B]
You have to be kidding. Even before the end of WW2, BC's policy of area bombing was being hotly debated in the UK, and the debate has continued ever since - it remains the most controversial aspect of Britain's conduct of WW2. There's no denial involved, no-one is trying to pretend that it didn't happen. The only argument has been over the extent to which it was justified. The popular opinion in the UK these days is probably mostly against, mainly because people retrospectively apply today's peacetime standards to the very different environment of WW2.
If you have read my previous posts, you will see that I personally believe that it was justified (as do many British historians who have studied the period), for several reasons. To repeat:
1. For political/strategic reasons, to support the USSR in the only way possible before a physical invasion of Germany.
2. For practical reasons, as not until late in the war was it possible to hit precise targets - and even then the weather did not usually permit precise bombing; it was area bombing or nothing.
3. For moral reasons: however much you may squirm about 'relativism', it is a simple fact that the war was started and waged by Hitler (including the bombing of civilian areas) for aggressive reasons of conquest, and that desperate measures were justified in stopping him. And if you don't believe the Nazis were evil, I suggest you account for the concentration camps and the systematic genocide of entire population groups for racist reasons.
Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website (http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk) and discussion forum (http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/)
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Tony, the gloves came off after Winston Churchill ordered the indiscriminate terror bombing of Berlin.
The first RAF area bombing raid was on 16/17 December 1940. The first area raid on Berlin wouldn't have been until 1941 at the earliest.
The Luftwaffe had switched to area attacks on British cities in late summer 1940, and had already killed 20,000 British civilians by the time of the first RAF area raid.
The RAF's first raid on Berlin was, like the Luftwaffe's raids on British targets at that time, directed against military targets, using small numbers of aircraft.
Hitler explicitely prohibited the bombing of London before that - it`s a historical fact.
Pity he didn't prohibit the bombing of other cities, which had resulted in thousands dead across Europe from 1st September, and had killed 1,000 civilians in Britian in August alone.
The RAF was bombing major German cities before the Battle of France even ended.
As Germany was bombing French, Dutch and Belgian targets from the first day of the Battle of France. As they had bombed Norwegian targets, and Polish targets before that.
Tony, as you probably know, the Baedecker raids which you desrcibed were in response to the RAF-BC`s raids on Rostock. Rostock was an old medieval city with no military importance,
Apart from 3 Heinkel factories, an aerodrome, a port, 2 railway stations, warehousing etc. (all damaged during the raid)
You came up with Coventry, but even British authors like Peter Hinchliff who wrote an excellent book on RAF night bomber and LW night fighter operations do not deny that in Coventry the aircraft industry was targeted, and was hit hard, not the civillian population.
Huh? The Luftwaffe bombed the centre of the city, they destroyed nearly 10% of the housing in the city, and damaged over 60%
The orders for Coventry noted resumption of manufacturing would be hindered by "wiping out the most densley populated workers settlements".
'They only bombed crossroads/RR stations. Unfurtunately, every German city had crossroads.'
No, I think that applies to the USAAF targeting, read the quotes I posted above.
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Absolutly fasinating read. You guys really know your stuff. Gend up like lecturer's almost. However, slightly off the original topic so I won't get into mossy, flares, path finders, dar, shortening the war, victory and so on.
Let me put it this way----->>
Plaintiff--------------------Wotan / Kurfurst
Defendant----------------Nashwan
Judg-----------------------Tony Williams
Juror-----------------------Me and other readers
Plaintiff's Brief:-
1) Bomber Command and especially Arthur "Bomber" Harris's mandate / intent was the whole sale slaughter of German citizens by means of "Terror" bombing. Indiscriminate bombing of residential areas irrespective of any tactical or stratigic effects.
2) LW aerial campain was targeted.
3) Developements of presice ground attack aircraft would have been a more viable means to cause tactical / strategic damage. Saving human / civillian deaths.
4) Britain declared war on Germany
5) Hitler didn't want a war with Britain
6) If Britain had capitulated to Hitlers "suggestion" everything would have been just Dandy.
Defendants Brief:-
1) Bomber Command and Arthur "Bomber" Harris did not set out to or have soul intent on targeting civillians.
2) There were tactical and strategic targetting.
3) De-housing was considered acceptable in that erra.
4) With the arms and technoligy of the erra little else was possible.
Judges summing up:-
The same logic can be applied to the bombing by the Luftwaffe and RAF in WW2. From a particular, very narrow, perspective, it is possible to argue that the actions of the Luftwaffe and the RAF were equivalent. However, when the actions are seen in context, it is obvious that there was no moral equivalence at all. The Luftwaffe’s bombing was in furtherance of an aggressive war of conquest started by Hitler. After dismantling Czechoslovakia, he invaded Poland, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, the USSR and – oh yes – Yugoslavia, Greece and a few other places. The RAF’s bombing was in furtherance of a battle to stop Hitler’s aggression, to free the countries he had invaded and to end his evil regime. Put simply, the RAF’s action was morally justified, the Luftwaffe’s was not.
MY VERDICT is----------- I the Juror find for the "DEFENDANT"
and here's why (irrespectively of me being from Coventry, before you spot that).
Turmoil in Germany leads to Hitlers power grab. Then the Germans vote him in again. Hitler has his own agenda to save face for the so called "sell out" / surrender of WW1. The rest of the world turns a blind eye with moderate utterensses of what he's (Hitlers) up to. Hitler gets the feel for this and instead of taking an "Inch" he takes a "Yard". Britain allies with Poland letting Hitler know exactly where he or Germany stands i.e "Enogh is enough"...... Kurfurt you really got to get to grips with this. It seems we ain't reading the same history books. Hitler after signing his pledges gambles that Britain ain't up for "it" (war with germany).
OK. I'll concede Hitler didn't want war with Britain. I am lead to believe he had some respect for "Blighty" and our empire as was. Kurfurt matey.. The dude (Hitler) fully tuck the P*ss breaking every arrgement (right or wrong) that Germany made after WW1. Then the guy's gamble didn't pay off as he thought. Hitlers world tour was canceled at Britain. Expansionism curtailed but by then Hitler was locked in. Britain in the red, white and blue shorts came out fighting. Round 1 to Germany. Britain retreats across the channel. Round 2 to Britain BoB and so on.
In the year 2045 we'll find out why Rudolph Hess really bailed out over Scotland for that little chat with the King. But if it's anything to do with Hitler calling the shots no wonder we didn't have a bar of it.
As for "Terror" bombing well yes and no. Yes it was done and by all sides and NO it was not the main agenda. I believe BC was more interested instrats than civilians. Then more interested in getting to the finish by any means possible. It was effective and more to the point, bloody well (take the word "bloody" as you will) deserved. I would hazard a guess the war would have lasted 2 or 3 more years without targeting civilians. By "Targeting" I really do mean killing them and de-housing them. Slowing down the Germans manufactoring capabilities. Causing ya grand pop the most inconvenience possible and or to include deep sorrow. "Mind games"
Germans / Hiltler started the thing. Don't mince words with the rest of the freakin world "Britain declared war on Germany". Germany was in direct revolt to and, if I can spell it right, the Versi treaty for years. Hitler gambled. Germans thought he was great so went in with him. Now all you here from Germans is "I didn't want the war. It was Hitler. We would have been shot". What a load of B*ll**s.
Now what has Germany got out of it today? Correct me if I'm wrong but Britain is still paying it's war debt. Germany got to start from afresh I must exclude the former "East Germany" . Britain is was nearly 15 years behind the rebuild time frame. Heres an example of what I mean. I'm 43 and in the street I live in a stick of bombs fell clean across it. Those houses were not rebuilt untill the mid / late 70's. Our city center is err awefull. A saying here in Cov is " the LW did a better job than the city planners". Man! my town centre was thrown together. It's concrete rubbish. I'm not bitter thats for the folk of that erra but I can't stand by ideal when I read "Britain declared war on Germany". I can't stand by when a guy says "Terror" bombing.
My thoughts plain and simple. Germany marches not once but twice to the sound of war drums. They asked for it. They got it. "reap the whirlwind".
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Originally posted by Nashwan
The first RAF area bombing raid was on 16/17 December 1940. The first area raid on Berlin wouldn't have been until 1941 at the earliest.
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No, the first RAF area bombing raid was on 25/26 August 1940 on Churchill`s orders, before Germany would start anything similiar over Britian, and in fact, the Luftwaffe was ordered not to target British civillian targets at all.
It was only after the RAF started indiscrimante area bombing of German cities that the LW responded with all it`s might and concentrated on British cities. Some say it was a deliberate policy from Chuchill, to give Fighter Command time to take a breath.
The Luftwaffe had switched to area attacks on British cities in late summer 1940, and had already killed 20,000 British civilians by the time of the first RAF area raid.
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The first RAF area raid was August 1940, and up to that time, there were only ca 1000 civillian casulties. You said the number before, now you changed your mind and multiplied it with 20.
The RAF's first raid on Berlin was, like the Luftwaffe's raids on British targets at that time, directed against military targets, using small numbers of aircraft.
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Military targets, huh? Name those allaged 'military targets' in Berlin, and the source for the claim as well.
Who wants to take a bet Nashwan will skip the subject?
Pity he didn't prohibit the bombing of other cities, which had resulted in thousands dead across Europe from 1st September, and had killed 1,000 civilians in Britian in August alone.
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Funny, last time you claimed 1000 civillians for July AND august, which is what the literature also say, you now say only in August..
Of course, during the 2 months of intense aerial warfare it`s not surprsing that missed bombs unitendedly killed a number of innocents as well, but then again, compare 1000 dead during 2 months of intense aerial operation during which LW bombers did thousends of sorties against British targets to the single unfurtunate 60-bomber raid on Rotterdam that, largely indirectly, killed 900.
Of course the RAF was busy bombing German targets from September 1939, and already caused thousends of casulties in German population ever since, but you don`t tell that part.
As Germany was bombing French, Dutch and Belgian targets from the first day of the Battle of France. As they had bombed Norwegian targets, and Polish targets before that.
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'Targets', that`s a very wide term.
Yes, the LW was boming French, Dutch and Belgian targets ie. tanks and infantry coloums, fortified positions etc.
Britain of course was bombing German 'targets' from September 1939 onwards, before even Waswhaw was bombed during it`s siege.
Appearantly, you think that if a Stukas bombed a french fortress in Western Europe, that`s justfied the RAF`s terror raids on Germany cities...
Apart from 3 Heinkel factories, an aerodrome, a port, 2 railway stations, warehousing etc. (all damaged during the raid)
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Provide sources please or we have to belive you are just making things up.
Regardless, unlike in LW raids where civillians were just collateral damage and the industries/military installation being the targets, the RAF targeted civillians only and the damage accidently done to industries/military installations were just collateral damage. Of course if you drop a lot of bombs, you might hit things you`d never want to. Harris himself was very upset when before DDay he had to divert his bombers from messacring civillians to stupid tasks like destroying the transportation system in france that paralyzed the Wehrmacht after DDay.
If I`d line up a hundred randomly picked civillians on the streetand shoot them all, it would not matter if one of them would be accidently a spy; I`d would not call that a counterspying operation, really. But that`s what you desribe.
Huh? The Luftwaffe bombed the centre of the city, they destroyed nearly 10% of the housing in the city, and damaged over 60%[/B]
No, the LW bombed 17 of the aircraft industry facilities found in the city, the rest was unintended collateral damage. And it was minimal compared to the forces used.Civillian casulties amounted only 568 killed in coventry, despite the fact that 533 tons of bombs were dropped.
Compare that to 900+ killed in Rotterdam in direct aerial support of the ground troops, performed by just 60 bombers.
The orders for Coventry noted resumption of manufacturing would be hindered by "wiping out the most densley populated workers settlements".[/B]
So that`s why the Germans bothered sending the elite Kgr 100 marker unit as a spearhead to mark the aircraft industry plants with using radar beam as guidance, ie. the most advanced bombing methods available to them. They ma
Quite irrelevant as it`s just a general note about the possible measures. Quote the whole thing, not just parts of it. "wiping out the most densley populated workers settlements" was of course one of them, obviously, but the LW declined it and the actual orders name 17 aircraft industry facilities as target, not civillians.
You can argue that fact, but it`s in the actual german orders for the operations : Zielunterlagen Conventry, reference BA-MA RL/II/863-867.
Ie. plants of the Standard Motory Company, Coventry Radiator, Press company, Alvis aero engine plant, Daimler plants etc.
It was the same conclusion arrived in the British war cabinet :
Beaverbrook, responsible for British a/c production, said on 15nov 1940 :
"The roots of the air forcr are planted in Conentry. If Coventry`s output is destroyed, the tree will languish."
See notes of the WC`s 289th session, PRO CAB 65/10, page 63.
And to qoute British historian Longmate from 'Air raid' :
"The Germans were really aiming at the factories", page 88
and page 182 :
"contrary to the tales of indiscriminate bombing soon being put about, the Germans were remarkably successful in hitting their intended targets and not a single famous name from the local Industry escaped."
Peter Hincliff etc. says the same. Basically no serious British historian argues anymore that it was a terror attack as you imply, the LW targeted and destroyed a good part of the British aero industry. They did not believe that in 1940, it was just the propaganda they fed to the public in 1940, the same as you do in 2005.
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No, the first RAF area bombing raid was on 25/26 August 1940 on Churchill`s orders, before Germany would start anything similiar over Britian, and in fact, the Luftwaffe was ordered not to target British civillian targets at all.
Source please.
"While all this was going on, however, a quite different type of operation, conforming to Portal's own convictions and drawing inspiration from the damaging German attack on Coventry on November 14/15, was being planned. Under the codename ABIGAIL, one of three designated industrial towns was to be attacked in strnegth, "without specific objective other than an industrial centre" The intention of the ABIGAIL raid was "to cause the maximum possible destruction in a selected German town", and was therefore a radical departure from the previous policy of bombing industrial objectives only."
The Right of the Line, John Terraine
"The attack on Mannheim on 16/17 December, however, marked a new departure. The aiming-point this time was the centre of the town, not any individual building or industrial feature. It was a reprisal raid, appreoved as such by the War Cabinet, in retaliation for the recent German attacks on Coventry, and other British towns."
"Mannheim was the first purely "urban area" attack, but it did not immediately inaugurate a systematic campaign of urban area bombing. Factories and other specific objectives, usually chosen because they were in industrial areas, continued to be the standard aiming-points until well into 1941. "
RAF Bomber Command in the Second World War, Denis Richards
"he two air forces operated under almost identical instructions to hit military and economic targets whenever conditions allowed. Neither air force was permitted to mount terror attacks for the sake of pure terror. The British War Cabinet issued a directive to Bomber Command early in June 1940 instructing bomber crews over Germany to attack only when a target was clearly identified, and to seek out an altenative target in case the first was obscured. If no contact was made with the target, aircraft were expected to bring their bombs back"
Richard Overy, The Battle (discussing the situation prior to the 7th September)
From a source Isegrim likes:
"The British government had been able to safeguard its secret from the day that the first area raid was launched
against Mannheim on December 16, 1940, right to the very end."
David Irving, Apocalypse Dresden (even Irving, the Nazi apologist, admits the RAF didn't carry out area ttacks until December 1940)
"The next night, 25/26 August, about 80 Wellingtons and Hampdens took off to attack precise objectives in Berlin"
RAF Bomber Command in the Second World War, Denis Richards
"In response, the War Cabinet sanctioned the first raid on Berlin. On the night of 25/26 August, the Hampdens of 49 and 50 squadrons left for a raid on Tempelhof airfield, whilst a force of Wellingtons tried to find the huge Siemens works nearby"
The Most Dangerous Enemy, Stephen Bungay
The first RAF area raid was August 1940,
No, see above.
and up to that time, there were only ca 1000 civillian casulties. You said the number before, now you changed your mind and multiplied it with 20.
No, there were about 20,000 by the time of the first RAF area raid, on the 16/17 December 1940.
Military targets, huh? Name those allaged 'military targets' in Berlin, and the source for the claim as well.
Tempelhof, Siemens, source above.
Who wants to take a bet Nashwan will skip the subject?
See above.
Funny, last time you claimed 1000 civillians for July AND august, which is what the literature also say, you now say only in August..
I don't think so, if I did I was in error.
Targets', that`s a very wide term.
Yes, the LW was boming French, Dutch and Belgian targets ie. tanks and infantry coloums, fortified positions etc.
And targets in cities.
See for example the bombing of Freiburg, when the Luftwaffe attacked that German city, killing 24 civilians (iirc), mistaking it for Dijon.
Britain of course was bombing German 'targets' from September 1939 onwards, before even Waswhaw was bombed during it`s siege.
No, only warships at sea.
Appearantly, you think that if a Stukas bombed a french fortress in Western Europe, that`s justfied the RAF`s terror raids on Germany cities..
No, I think if the Luftwaffe bombed a train station in Paris, an airfield in Dijon, a port in Calais, then that justified the RAF bombing a bridge in Aachen, a canal in Dortmund.
Because as we've seen, the RAF did not carry out area attacks until December 1940.
Provide sources please or we have to belive you are just making things up.
It's from the post raid assesments of the Rostock bombing.
But a simple google search will tell you about the Heinkel factories, in fact surely a Luftwaffe fan like yourself should know Heinkel had factories in Rostock?
Regardless, unlike in LW raids where civillians were just collateral damage and the industries/military installation being the targets,
Of course they were, Isegrim, the Luftwaffe didn't area bomb British cities in 1940/41, or if they did they id it for the "right" reasons.
No, the LW bombed 17 of the aircraft industry facilities found in the city, the rest was unintended collateral damage.
Of course it was.
And it was minimal compared to the forces used.
Not far off 1 person killed per ton of bombs dropped, about double the RAF's average for the war.
Civillian casulties amounted only 568 killed in coventry, despite the fact that 533 tons of bombs were dropped.
My mistake, more than 1 killed per ton dropped, better even than the Luftwaffe's average for 1940/41.
Compare that to 900+ killed in Rotterdam in direct aerial support of the ground troops, performed by just 60 bombers.
Daylight raids seem to be more effective in killing people, probably because a larger numbr are caught on the streets, away from shelters.
Certainly Rotterdam, with less than 100 tons of bombs dropped (iirc) daw an average of nearly 10 dead per ton, the Luftwaffe achieved about 0.8 in their attacks on Britain, the RAF about 0.5 per ton on Germany.
There are claims of 25,000 dead in German daylight raids on Stalingrad, as well, which support the theory (as does Guernica). So too does the USAAF raid on Tempelhof on 3rd Feb 1945, which reportedly killed 25,000. I don't know the tonnage, but typically for the USAAF it was just over 2 tons per bomber, 1,003 aircraft dispatched, assuming 2,500 tons, again 10 per ton.
The RAF rarely, if ever, got as high a ratio at night. Hamburg was hit by about 8,000 tons by the RAF, about 5 - 6 per ton (assuming all casualties were caused by the RAF). Dresden received almost 4,000 tons, about 6 - 7 per ton.
Did daylight bombing of cities cause proportionatly more casualties?
So that`s why the Germans bothered sending the elite Kgr 100 marker unit as a spearhead to mark the aircraft industry plants with using radar beam as guidance, ie. the most advanced bombing methods available to them.
They marked by dropping over 10,000 incendiaries in a pattern a few miles long across the city centre.
They also carried large numbers of parachute mines, which they released from medium altitude and allowed to float to earth, completely un-aimable, and not suited for attacking a precision target.
Quite irrelevant as it`s just a general note about the possible measures. Quote the whole thing, not just parts of it. "wiping out the most densley populated workers settlements" was of course one of them, obviously, but the LW declined it and the actual orders name 17 aircraft industry facilities as target, not civillians.
No, just like later RAF area attacks, the goal was to do the most possible damage to the city. Thus they targeted not just the factories, but the city centre, and the workers housing, because they knew it would cause more damage, and take longer to repair.
"The Germans were really aiming at the factories", page 88
and page 182 :
"contrary to the tales of indiscriminate bombing soon being put about, the Germans were remarkably successful in hitting their intended targets and not a single famous name from the local Industry escaped."
Of course they didn't. The Luftwaffe area bombed the city, not much did escape. Not the cathedral, not either of the cities hospitals, not the housing (over 70% damaged or destroyed)
Classic area bombing, and the demonstration that changed British bombing policy from precision attacks to area bombing.
Peter Hincliff etc. says the same. Basically no serious British historian argues anymore that it was a terror attack as you imply,
I don't, I say it was an area attack, just like the RAF's later on in the war.
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From Kurfie:
"
No, the first RAF area bombing raid was on 25/26 August 1940 on Churchill`s orders, before Germany would start anything similiar over Britian, and in fact, the Luftwaffe was ordered not to target British civillian targets at all.
It was only after the RAF started indiscrimante area bombing of German cities that the LW responded with all it`s might and concentrated on British cities. Some say it was a deliberate policy from Chuchill, to give Fighter Command time to take a breath. "
Source please?
I have not seen this anywhere.
Actually I always thought it was first the accidental bombings on London, then the purpose-bombing on Berlin, and then Göring went mad. I was quite surprized to find out it wasn't so, and the LW was already firebombing London before the Brits retalliated.
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As a matter of interest, in my alt. WW2 novel 'The Foresight War', in which both the British and the Germans receive advice from the future, the Brits start by trying very hard to avoid bombing cities. However, they come under such pressure from Luftwaffe attacks on ports and airfields that they deliberately launch a raid on German Government buildings in Berlin, in order to provoke a German response and deflect the attacks onto British cities.
Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website (http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk) and discussion forum (http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/)
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Did you read "Fatherland"?
I belive also that there is a movie based on the same idea as that book, - one of the stars is Natalie Portman
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Originally posted by Angus
Actually I always thought it was first the accidental bombings on London, then the purpose-bombing on Berlin, and then Göring went mad. I was quite surprized to find out it wasn't so, and the LW was already firebombing London before the Brits retalliated.
You are probably remembering the 1969 movie, "Battle of Britain."
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Saw that movie when I was 12, then never again.
But it turned out to be an understatement, however close to the truth, and easy to get mistaken on, unless you read the day-to-day accounts.
On the date Kurfurst quotes as a night area bombing, my source goes as bombs hit residental area, but no casualties, or something of that sort.
Anyway, Göring did go haywire and he did order the LW to raze London to the ground. Incendiaries were already falling on London before any measurable casualties occured in Berlin.
BTW, the first german city to have some noticable casualties was Freiburg in 1940. RAF at work said the German papers. Turned out to be a navigational error of the LW who were supposed to hit Strassburg.
Anyway, look at the day-to-day and see how it worked up.
Scroll up and have a look ;)