Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => The O' Club => Topic started by: SMIDSY on July 09, 2005, 01:49:13 AM
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ok, here are the rules:
1. your choices must be commanders whose career started after the year 1600AD
2. limit your choices to ground and naval commanders
3. explain the reason behind your choice
4. if you disagree with a choice, feel free to say so
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Patton
Prima Donnas always make excellent commanders, albeit loose cannons.
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Is that for there entire carrer or can it be for campaigns or just specific battles?
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I'd hafta say Stonewall Jackson during the valley campaign or early Napolean. Washington was rather good himself, new his limitations and didn't let him self get crushed early.
Think I'll go with Jackson though, he did brilliant things with his troops and rarely made a mistake. Cold Harbor was a let down, but he was sick as hell so I'll give him that one.
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Nelson
Tactician, Leader of men, Visionary, Hero.
Gatso
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I would say either Napoleon or Georgi Zhukov.
Ravs
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for land i like Nakita Kruschev for his stubbord defence of stalingrad against impossible odds
for sea there is no question: Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson!
(http://nolantravels2.home.att.net/3engpic22.jpg)
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Oliver Cromwell/Horatio Nelson
Ill also throw in Keith Park as a wildcard (yes i know, not ground or navy) ;)
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King Leonaides of Sparta and Hannibal Barca
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Originally posted by storch
You have violated rule #1. rot in hell you bastige!
ok, here are the rules:
1. your choices must be commanders whose career started after the year 1600AD
;)
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Originally posted by SMIDSY
for land i like Nakita Kruschev for his stubbord defence of stalingrad against impossible odds
Was not NK a commisar? He was not the military commander of the Stalingrad area who was Vasily Chuikov (62nd Army).
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oh yah. i havent been getting much sleep lately. im gonna change it anyway to Field marshal Erwin Rommel. i suppose NK was a random combination of thoughts on my part: military career+short+shoe incident=holy crap this guy is friggin awsome!
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Off the top of my head
Patton.- Even the Germans considered him to be the best of the allied commanders.
R.E Lee. - Faught successfully often with enferiour equipment and at a numerical disadvantage.
Crazy Horse- True leader and an astounding man
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I vote for Whels; with Brooke as a close second.
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oh man! i cant believe i forgot about CH. completely fearless in the face of the enemy. Red Cloud was a good'n too.
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Furballz sucks...
greatest...
Alexander the Great of Macedon, never lost a battle...
and yes I know of your dumb 1600 A.D. rule
in that case try the Desert Rat, Rommel, a leader who actually lead in combat and not a the rear...
Patton as well was pretty good...
but none made others scared as did Napoleon...
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Bull Simons
# Distinguished Service Cross
# Silver Star
# Legion of Merit, 4th Oak Leaf Cluster
# Bronze Star
# Meritorious Service Medal
# Air Medal
# Army Commendation
# Purple Heart
# American Defense Service Medal w/bronze service star
# American Campaign Medal (Japan)
# Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal
# WWII Victory Medal
# American Occupation Medal
# National Defense Medal w/Oak Leave Cluster
# Armed Forces Expeditionary medal (2d Award) (Korea)
# Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal (Laos)
# Viet Nam Service Medal
# Armed Forces Reserve Medal w/10 years service
# Armed Reserve Components Achievement Medal
# Vietnam Campaign Medal w/3 bronze service stars
# CIB, 2d award
# Master Parachute Badge
# Philippine Republic Presidential Unit Citation
# Philippine Liberation Ribbon
# Philippine Independence Ribbon
# Vietnam Campaign Ribbon
# Meritorious Unit Commendation
Assignments
# 42 44 98th Field Artillery Bn
# 44 46 6th Ranger Bn (98th became the 6th Ranger Bn)
# 46 51 Out of service
# 51 54 Amphibious and Jungle Training Camp,Ranger Training Camp, FT Benning, GA
# 54 57 US Army Assistance Advisory Group, Ankara, Turkey
# 58 59 77th SFG(A)
# 59 61 7th SFG(A) (Operation Hotfoot and White Star Mobile Training Team)
# 62 63 JFK Center for Special Warfare Center
# 63 65 8th SFG(A)
# 65 66 SOG, MACV, Republic of Viet Nam
# 66 68 XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg
# 1969 Corps, Camp Red Cloud, Korea
# 1970 Overall Ground Force Commander, Joint Contingency Task Force, Operation Ivory Coast
# 1970 - 1971 XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg
# Total Time in Service: 32 years
# Total Active Service: 24 years
# Total Foreign Service: 8 years (Turkey, USARPAC,USARCARIB, RVN, Korea)
Plus..he had the guts and will to go back for those left behind when our government wouldn`t.
Plus... he played an intricate part in training and operations for the L`il, big eared fellow from Texas to get our people out of Iran when, once again, our government wouldn`t.
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Ripsnort
oh! u mean in the real world ?
I notice Napolean and a few other losers were picked, Why?
Losers are not great leaders, its just that simple. Winners ARE.
Nakita Kruschev ? any idiot can send men and women to slaughter on a wholesale level, it wasnt the Russian army that defeated the Germans, it was the russian winter and army with about 60% of it due to the winter.
"Too much social engineering in the world has many blinded by stupidity." Brady Y , SpecOp Warfare Center Coronado,Ca, RIP "Ivan 6"3/24/05
Eisenhower
Patton
George Washington
US Grant
And my all time Favorite, Rudy from 'Survivor'
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I'd have followed Jimmy Doolittle anywhere.
Besides having graduate degrees in Aeronautical Engineering, he was personally bold and brave (air racing career, the Doolittle Raid). He also changed the tactics of the 8th AF fighter command that freed them to pursue and destroy the Luftwaffe.
Hard to argue against Stonewall Jackson, Napoleon, Rommel and Geo Washington though. Just thought Doolittle deserved mention.
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My loyalty remains within Family Blood.
Bavarian General Wrede
Karl Philipp Freiherr von Wrede
(http://www.avalanchepress.com/images/wrede.jpg)
My Blood Line. (http://www.avalanchepress.com/Bavaria1809.php)
Hanau (http://miniatures.de/html/int/1813-schlacht-von-hanau.html)
Napoleon's First Defeat on French Soil. (http://web2.airmail.net/napoleon/La_Rothiere_battle.htm)
Wrede's Since 1202. (http://wredeberlin.de/)
Yes Napoleon was a looser...Let others eat Crow.
Frederick Wrede, Jr.
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Originally posted by AmRaaM
Ripsnort
oh! u mean in the real world ?
I notice Napolean and a few other losers were picked, Why?
Losers are not great leaders, its just that simple. Winners ARE.
Too much social engineering in the world has many blinded by stupidity.
Eisenhower
Patton
George Washington
US Grant
And my all time Favorite, Rudy from 'Survivor'
Napoleon a looser? such a looser his methods and tactics were copied untill and including the American Civil war?
In the end Napoleoon lost but I wouldnt call him a looser.
He was in fact a great military commander.
Now Washington on the other hand was a great leader. but hardly what anyone in their right mind could call a Great military commander.
]By Conrast British General William Howe was easily the more capable of the two.
He was at best adequit. He won some. he lost some. and he retreated some.
In fact some of his subordinates were probably more capable from purely a military standpoint.
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Originally posted by SMIDSY
oh man! i cant believe i forgot about CH. completely fearless in the face of the enemy. Red Cloud was a good'n too.
LOL might as well mention Cheif Joseph also.
While caught up with at the end. His accomplishments against vastly superiour forces was nothing short of astounding
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I'm going to add my $.02 for Napoleon as well for the early era.
Latter era
Billy Mitchell saw the beginnings of airpower for what it was.
Curtis Lemay for realizing results dictate tactics, not the other way around.
GW Patton AND Rommel as both saw the proper implememtation of armored warfare.
Dwight E, not because he was a brilliant tactician or even strategist but because he was the right man for the job and blended the forces so well to include the manipulating and interferring politicos as well.
I also agree with "Bull" Simmons. Just found out about him at Ft. Bragg. Very interesting and dynamic individual.
Gotta nominate Schwartzkopf as well for the way he was able to work with such disparate forces in such a smooth way. Short campaign I know but hell of a task none the less.
There are many others but these are a smattering of some of the very best IMO.
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Nathan Bedford Forrest
His Battle of Brice's Cross Roads has been called the "perfect" battle, and his campaigns were studied closely, before World War II, by the German field marshal, Erwin Rommel.
One of the military geniuses of American history,
On the Red Men
Geronimo gave em fits also.
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Brigadier General Dr. Franz Bake.
Never lost a battle.
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Napoleon
Patton
Rommel
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Hap Arnold
Billy Mitchell
Jimmy Doolittle
Curtiss E. Lemay
Carl Spaatz
Ira C. Eaker
Douglas MacArthur
and Chesty Puller.
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I have doubts wheter to put G. K. Zhukhov (Red Army) and G. S. Grant (Union Army) in the top 5, 10. These commanders had nothing special except overwhelm the enemy with HUGE ###s. Imo Grant and Zhukhov don't care how many soldiers die in the battlefiled; their concern is to reload their armies with more manpower and weapons;)
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Ender Wiggen
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General Burnside of the union
he had a nice hairdo
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Originally posted by Jackal1
Bull Simons
snip
Plus... he played an intricate part in training and operations for the L`il, big eared fellow from Texas to get our people out of Iran when, once again, our government wouldn`t.
If anyone here hasn't read the book Ken Follet wrote about that, they've missed out bigtime.
On Wings of Eagles (http://search.barnesandnoble.com/booksearch/isbnInquiry.asp?isbn=0451163532&itm=8)
culero
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it is a common misconseption to say that Zhukov just hurled men into battle. he was in fact a brilliant commander.
PS
BURNSIDE!?!?! he was probably one of the worst generals ever to see a war. he was hesitant and indecisive and wasted the lives of many a fine soldier at Fredricksburg and Antietam.
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Originally posted by SMIDSY
it is a common misconseption to say that Zhukov just hurled men into battle. he was in fact a brilliant commander.
PS
BURNSIDE!?!?! he was probably one of the worst generals ever to see a war. he was hesitant and indecisive and wasted the lives of many a fine soldier at Fredricksburg and Antietam.
huh...
you suddenly jumped from Zhukhov to Grant:D (but i understand)
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Originally posted by 1K3
I have doubts wheter to put G. K. Zhukhov (Red Army) and G. S. Grant (Union Army) in the top 5, 10. These commanders had nothing special except overwhelm the enemy with HUGE ###s. Imo Grant and Zhukhov don't care how many soldiers die in the battlefiled; their concern is to reload their armies with more manpower and weapons;)
Yep, Grants claim to fame was that he was the first Union Commander in the East who would take it to the enemy and use his superior numbers like a meat grinder, that and he didn't make mistakes. Otherwise, mediocre. For instance, see the wilderness campaign.
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Originally posted by DREDIOCK
R.E Lee. - Faught successfully often with enferiour equipment and at a numerical disadvantage.
Lee at times was briliant, other times not. To his advantage, he had excellent commanders under him. Jackson for his lightning offense and "mystification" and Longstreet one of the best defensive tacticians of the war.
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Originally posted by SMIDSY
for sea there is no question: Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson!
Crossed a T...woopeee, and died doing it.
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Originally posted by Rafe35
Hap Arnold
Billy Mitchell
Jimmy Doolittle
Curtiss E. Lemay
Carl Spaatz
Ira C. Eaker
Douglas MacArthur
and Chesty Puller.
Huh?
Uh..OK I get it.
"Merika HELL YEAH!"
...right?
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Who was the Japanese Admiral who wooped hell out of the Russians back before WW2? Might've been before WW1...anyway, he did number on em.
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Originally posted by Maverick
Gotta nominate Schwartzkopf as well for the way he was able to work with such disparate forces in such a smooth way. Short campaign I know but hell of a task none the less.
Have to overrule on Schwartzie, his battle plan for Gulf 1 was over ruled by Chaney, Powell and Boyd. He took credit, but from what I've been reading his "big idea" was a straight up the middle push that would've cost alot of men there lives.
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Orde Wingate ( think thats how you spell it )
(http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/orde_w1.jpg)
David Sterling ( SAS )
(http://www.sasrogues.co.uk/Origins/WWII/DavidSterling.jpg)
Breaking the rules for a moment and including Air
Arthur Harris
(http://www.geschichtsthemen.de/wk2_bilder/bombing/arthur_harris.jpg)
Hugh Dowding
(http://www.cronologia.it/storia/biografie/dowding.jpg)
That'll do for now.
Though I'd add
Gavin
Rommel
Manstein
Monty
WW2 is my bag.
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Originally posted by Lizard3
Lee at times was briliant, other times not. To his advantage, he had excellent commanders under him. Jackson for his lightning offense and "mystification" and Longstreet one of the best defensive tacticians of the war.
True. but the key to any great commander is not only his abilities but those of his subordinate commanders
And the proper placement and application of said commanders talents.
In WWII for example Monty would have in all likelyhood done poorly in operation Cobra He simply wasnt audacous enough.
whereas Patton probably wouldnt have done so well running along the coast.
It can be asked if teh subordinate commanders make the general great, or the other way around.
I think they make each other.
But the ultimate decisions, responcability and recognition usually falls on the general in overall command.
You mention both Jackson and Longstreet. Both IMO could be mentioned in the same breath of Lee, Patton, Monty, Napoleon.
Both were outstanding generals.
But would they have been so successful had a lesser commander been in command and not used them where and how they would do best?
On another note
There was nothing particularly brilliant about Grant. His main asset is he was willing to fight a war of attrition.
Sherman was probably the more capable or at least the more imaginative of the two and his willingness to not be tied to his lines of supply was pretty remarkable for the time
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Erwin Rommel is one of the best leaders because he was good at deception. He turned a battle in North Africa by making The "dummy" brigade, basicly it was a bunch of wooden tanks mounted on Kubelwagon chasis. He made a british spy open his mouth in horror when he saw tank after tank rolling around the block, actuly only 20 tanks did this but it gave the illusion tha 500 tanks were circling the city. Hitler didnt get assasinated so the &^$&^@$(donkey) killed evry good General he had. Hitler, what an IDIOT!
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Erwin Rommel makes the likes of Patton look like a boy scout.
Alexander and Hannibal being the greatest of all.
...-Gixer
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Schwarzkopf by any measurement.
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Hmm, lots of good ones mentioned.
I nominate Nathan B Forrest
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Has Oliver Cromwell been mentioned?
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GENGHIS KHAN
(http://www.lastsquare.com/MiniCatalog/Largefigs/P90-905.jpg)
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George Armstrong Custer.
Only later in his career did his head get over inflated.
The famous Pickett's charge was actually infamous for being such a failure. But people don't know that it wasn't a failure because of a bad plan.
Part of the plan was for Jebb Stuart to take his cavalry and hit the rear of the line on cemetary hill. This was to happen just as Pickett's men were about half way up. It would have decimated the union forces.
But Stuart never got there. Stuart was met by Custer (who wasn't under orders to do so) in the field behind the Union lines.
CUSTER SPANKED STUART LIKE A RED HEADED STEP CHILD. And because of this single act, the union went on to win the war.
Btw, MacArthur was one of the worst commanders ever. Anyone who posts his name again will be banned from the list.
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Originally posted by DREDIOCK
True. but the key to any great commander is not only his abilities but those of his subordinate commanders
And the proper placement and application of said commanders talents.
It can be asked if teh subordinate commanders make the general great, or the other way around.
I think they make each other.
But the ultimate decisions, responcability and recognition usually falls on the general in overall command.
You mention both Jackson and Longstreet. Both IMO could be mentioned in the same breath of Lee, Patton, Monty, Napoleon.
Both were outstanding generals.
But would they have been so successful had a lesser commander been in command and not used them where and how they would do best?
I would agree with your statements. On the other hand, when Jackson was on his own is when he did his best. Absolute audacious tactician and motivator of men. Even when under Lee, he seemed to be the spark that ignited the older man. Most of Lee's brilliant successes were in large part due to Jackson. At Chancellorsville, there were witnesses attesting to Jackson goading Lee into letting him loose to make the big loop around the left. Lee sitting on a crate, Jackson drawing in the dirt while pointing this way and that.
Furthermore, I've thought about this alot and have come to the conlusion that had Jackson not been mortally wounded at Chacellorsville and been present at Gettysburg, the US of A would be a very different country, a good bit smaller perhaps. The crucial point IMHO at Gettysburg was the first day. Had Jackson been in command on the left instead of Ewell he would've taken that hill (on the left) and the whole union line would've been untenable, hence the Union wouldn't have had the high ground, been forced to attack and lost. The door to Washington being open, I think Lee would've taken it.
Ewell's ***** footing around cost the rebs the first day and set the ground for the second and third. Cost Lee the battle and any chance at ending the war favorably.
Thats not to say that thats what I would've liked to see happen, just my take on it all.
Yeah, my votes for Ol' Stonewall for his valley campaign magic.
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Originally posted by Lizard3
Think I'll go with Jackson though, he did brilliant things with his troops and rarely made a mistake. Cold Harbor was a let down, but he was sick as hell so I'll give him that one.
Cold Harbor? That was in the spring of 1864, a year after Jackson was dead. Cold Harbor was a resounding Confederate victory (against Grant).
Perhaps you were thinking of his failures during the Seven Days battles in 1862?
Jackson was brilliant, but suffered lapses in judgement from time to time.
If we look at the American Civil War (the War Between The States for you purists), there are many who displayed brilliance. Some examples:
Grant
Lee
Forrest
Buford (utterly unsung, but clearly the best cavalry tactician in the Union Army) and many others.
Longstreet is a bit over-rated. Many agree with his suggested relocation of the ANV at Gettysburg. However, I don't think the outcome would have been much different. Lee was forced to concentrate his army. A concentrated army cannot forage enough to supply the needs of the troops and/or the horses. Time was not on Lee's side. All Meade had to do was invest Lee's position (where ever it was) and Lee would eventually be forced to attack or retreat (I wrote my Masters thesis on this topic some time ago :D).
There are too many great generals to pick a single one. It is a useless exercise for military historians, much less for this environment. ;)
My regards,
Widewing
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Originally posted by lasersailor184
George Armstrong Custer.
Only later in his career did his head get over inflated.
The famous Pickett's charge was actually infamous for being such a failure. But people don't know that it wasn't a failure because of a bad plan.
Part of the plan was for Jebb Stuart to take his cavalry and hit the rear of the line on cemetary hill. This was to happen just as Pickett's men were about half way up. It would have decimated the union forces.
But Stuart never got there. Stuart was met by Custer (who wasn't under orders to do so) in the field behind the Union lines.
CUSTER SPANKED STUART LIKE A RED HEADED STEP CHILD. And because of this single act, the union went on to win the war.
Btw, MacArthur was one of the worst commanders ever. Anyone who posts his name again will be banned from the list.
From all I've read, Custer was a useless Fop during and after the Civil War. Never heard of him spankin anyone. Do you remember where you read this?
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Shaka, increased his lands by 4000x and the people under his power by 1000x.
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i will challenge the person who said that schwartskopf was the greatest commander. he beat a second-rate conscript army that was poorly equipped and had even worse leadership.
PS
ALL COMMANDERS LISTED MUST HAVE BEGUN THIER CAREER AFTER THE YEAR 1600 AD because after that point, info on battles became more reliable.
also, alexander and hanibal were not particularly great, they just used inovative tactics against second rate militaries.
EDIT: Lizard, stop double, triple and sextuple posting.
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Huh? This is not debatable? Well, I never.
Unless your a "MP", I don't think you retain control after you post a subject. All my posts have been on topic and non-repetitive.
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BTW, with under 1500 posts in over 5 years I don't fit the mold of post-potato/ripsnot, its just that you hit upon a subject of which I've done a bit of self study and have an opinion. Not to say I'm a self appointed expert, far from it. I would like to learn a thing or two more, hence the debate aspect. If I am at fault in any way, it would've been with the Nelson crack as that was a rather obvious hook looking for a fish, but, there again, I was looking to learn a thing or two about Nelson as I am sad to admit I have scant knowledge...Gimme a break here.
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I think I'll break rule #1 as well. I'll go with Germanicus Caesar (You can read about him in Tacitus... "Annals", if I recall correctly). Remarkable fellow.
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Originally posted by Lizard3
From all I've read, Custer was a useless Fop during and after the Civil War. Never heard of him spankin anyone. Do you remember where you read this?
I thought it was Buford's tired and beat up troops who held Stuart at bay. Never heard anything about Custer there.
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BTW, you guys who disparage those who win with numbers, such as Grant.....
He won with numbers where no other Union general had been able to. He understood that his road to victory lay with the destruction of Lee's army, not with flanking moves to reach Richmond. He did as the situation called for. Perhaps not a "great" strategist or tactician, but certainly one who understood his army and his enemy.
That said, Lee with Longstreet and Jackson in command made for a fearsome force. If Jackson had lived.....who knows?
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On land:
Giap
Defeated Japanese, French and American armies.
On the seas:
Nimitz
Kicked butt in the Pacific.
In the air:
Horner
Helped turn the fourth largest army in the world into the second largest army in Iraq.
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Originally posted by SMIDSY
also, alexander and hanibal were not particularly great, they just used inovative tactics against second rate militaries.
Which were those "second rate" militaries?
As for the greatest military commander after 1600 AD, my pick is Frederick the Great.
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Originally posted by Lizard3
Furthermore, I've thought about this alot and have come to the conlusion that had Jackson not been mortally wounded at Chacellorsville and been present at Gettysburg, the US of A would be a very different country, a good bit smaller perhaps. The crucial point IMHO at Gettysburg was the first day. Had Jackson been in command on the left instead of Ewell he would've taken that hill (on the left) and the whole union line would've been untenable, hence the Union wouldn't have had the high ground, been forced to attack and lost. The door to Washington being open, I think Lee would've taken it.
Ewell's ***** footing around cost the rebs the first day and set the ground for the second and third. Cost Lee the battle and any chance at ending the war favorably.
Thats not to say that thats what I would've liked to see happen, just my take on it all.
Yeah, my votes for Ol' Stonewall for his valley campaign magic.
I would tend to agree with you here. Or even in failing to make the move on the first day, had he been on the right flank. either little Round top might have been taken through his sheer force of presence. or he might have even made the move to take Big round top which has an even more commanding view of the area.
Upon visiting the site on my honeymoon (what better place to start a marriage then on a battleground) I noticed Big round top. Had they been able to get some artillary up there in any kind of numbers they would have been able too have had free range on just about anyplace on the battlefeild. firing on little round top would have been like shooting ducks in a barrel.
Also Big round top even if left untaken could have been used to mask a movement around the Union left and come up the TaneyTown road and flanked Birneys division who's rear was undefended.
With an assault from both the front and rear on little round top even with the forces and commanders that were there with Hoods Division and elements of McLaws and using the artillary Longstreet already had in place as supressing fire. They would have been able to roll up the left flank on Birneys Division and third Corps as a whole. Giving them the commanding position on the whole battlefeild
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Originally posted by Gixer
Erwin Rommel makes the likes of Patton look like a boy scout.
...-Gixer
Care to back up that claim with actual data?
Both were outstanding commanders.
Though largely Rommel went against unseasoned troops with enferiour weapons and outdated tactics and poor leaders whos mindset was still set in the first world war.
Once met with more modern thinking and able generals he had problems.
Patton with the exeption of the Casabalnca landings went largely against seasoned troops using modern weapons & Tactics with good leaders.
Sorry but the facts just dont back up that claim
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Originally posted by lasersailor184
George Armstrong Custer.
CUSTER SPANKED STUART LIKE A RED HEADED STEP CHILD. And because of this single act, the union went on to win the war.
LOL I wouldnt go that far. It was a fairly bloody affair for both sides and while Custer did distinguish himself there he hardly did it all by himself.
Yes he prevented Stewart from doing what he wanted and in that sence he was successful. But in the battle between the two
Both sides eventually retired and the contest ended in a draw.
During the battle Custers Brigade lost 257 men More by far then any other cavalry brigade during the battle
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Originally posted by SMIDSY
also, alexander and hanibal were not particularly great, they just used inovative tactics against second rate militaries.
Didnt realise the Roman Army was considered a "second rate Military."
At Cannea Hannable was outnumbered nearly 2-1 by and equally equiped and trained Roman force
Hannial and the Battle of Cannea is still studied to this day
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call me a hopeless romantic but I consider Queen Elizabeth I and Joan of Arc the greatest.
Maybe not the most successfull but heck, look at what they did considering the times they lived in.
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Originally posted by lasersailor184
Btw, MacArthur was one of the worst commanders ever. Anyone who posts his name again will be banned from the list.
Why is he the worst commander ever?
Thought MARSHALL was the worst one....
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DELETED
4- Members should post in a way that is respectful of other users and HTC. Flaming or abusing users is not tolerated.
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Originally posted by gatso
DELETED
4- Members should post in a way that is respectful of other users and HTC. Flaming or abusing users is not tolerated.
See post 5 of page 2.....Above^
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Originally posted by DREDIOCK
I would tend to agree with you here. Or even in failing to make the move on the first day, had he been on the right flank. either little Round top might have been taken through his sheer force of presence. or he might have even made the move to take Big round top which has an even more commanding view of the area.
Upon visiting the site on my honeymoon (what better place to start a marriage then on a battleground) I noticed Big round top. Had they been able to get some artillary up there in any kind of numbers they would have been able too have had free range on just about anyplace on the battlefeild. firing on little round top would have been like shooting ducks in a barrel.
Also Big round top even if left untaken could have been used to mask a movement around the Union left and come up the TaneyTown road and flanked Birneys division who's rear was undefended.
With an assault from both the front and rear on little round top even with the forces and commanders that were there with Hoods Division and elements of McLaws and using the artillary Longstreet already had in place as supressing fire. They would have been able to roll up the left flank on Birneys Division and third Corps as a whole. Giving them the commanding position on the whole battlefeild
Have you read Newts fiction books on the subject? Really entertaining. He works on the premise that Longstreet kicked Lee hard in the balls and made him see the folly of a head on and convinced him to pull out during the night and slip down twrd Washington, getting set up on the good ground the Union commander had been eyeballing earlier in the week. For fiction, it reads well.
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Originally posted by Rafe35
Why is he the worst commander ever?
Thought MARSHALL was the worst one....
The thousands of US soldiers slaughtered at the beginning of the Korean war can be attributed solely to McArthur --they were ill-prepared to fight, and WORSE prepared for the horrible winter that ensued.
MY vote for best (well, at least he should be top 5) is Chesty Puller---greatest marine there ever was--he parked his command tent at the front lines, scaring the watermelon out of visiting officers...his men would follow him anywhere---we might have lost at Gaudalcanal but for Chesty and his men (Seems like I heard Robert Duvall's character in Apocalypse Now was modeled after Chesty--I could be wrong)
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(http://www.bibl.u-szeged.hu/bibl/mil/ww2/who/pics/rommel.jpg)
Hands Down.
Karaya
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LOL I wouldnt go that far. It was a fairly bloody affair for both sides and while Custer did distinguish himself there he hardly did it all by himself.
Through out the course of wars, you can pick out the singular point where the tide of the war was changed. If that singular act didn't happen, the war would have been completely different.
Now, I'm not talking about the first day of Cavalry fighting at Gettysburgh, I'm talking about the very last day. Had Jebb Stuart made it through and hit the Union lines, the confederacy would have WON. And since this was the turning point of the war, if they won Gettysburgh, they would have won the rest. Hence, Custer saved the union.
(I can actually point out the singular act that saved the Revolutionary War too).
Custer gets overlooked a lot because his ego got way too big when he was fighting the Indians.
It's like that saying: Build a thousand bridges and no one will ever remember your name. But if you ever suck...
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Originally posted by DREDIOCK
Care to back up that claim with actual data?
Both were outstanding commanders.
Though largely Rommel went against unseasoned troops with enferiour weapons and outdated tactics and poor leaders whos mindset was still set in the first world war.
Once met with more modern thinking and able generals he had problems.
Patton with the exeption of the Casabalnca landings went largely against seasoned troops using modern weapons & Tactics with good leaders.
Sorry but the facts just dont back up that claim
Any book written on North African Campaign will REFUTE you DRED. To ignore the FACTS is the funniest thing.
Most people do NOT realize how close the Allies were kicked off of Africa AFTER Operation Torch began. The US and British did NOT put much stock into armor prior to WWII. They stuck with the "anti-infantry guns" on them instead of the 75mm. The only "effective tank" the Allies had in Africa was the Matilda, and even that is a stretch. At the onset of the War the French had some of the best tanks of the "Allies". They chose to break them up to Infantry Divisions, had they consolodated them France would have held out longer than it did.
Patton had the luxury of Quantity. The Eighth Army (mainly Aussie and NZ) kicked Rommel off of Africa, NOT Patton, nor the US. Rommel is in a class all by himself. He ate what his troops ate and fed the "Allied POW's" what his troops ate. Rommel had the respect of his men and the respect of his enemies on the battlefields on which he fought.
It's like Rommel said after Hitler appointed him Field Marshal: "I would rather he had given me one more division."
Karaya
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Originally posted by DREDIOCK
Care to back up that claim with actual data?
Both were outstanding commanders.
Though largely Rommel went against unseasoned troops with enferiour weapons and outdated tactics and poor leaders whos mindset was still set in the first world war.
Once met with more modern thinking and able generals he had problems.
Patton with the exeption of the Casabalnca landings went largely against seasoned troops using modern weapons & Tactics with good leaders.
Sorry but the facts just dont back up that claim
Err how was Rommel's campaign a battle against unseasoned troops with enferior weaposn and outdated tactics? Unless your thinking of his attacks against American Troops which he favoured against the British or ANZACS. North Africa was a long hard campaign on both sides long before the US even entered the war. And Rommel was a genius.
As for Patton nothing more then a pistol head primadona a name that comes up by Americans partly because he had a good movie. What genius did Patton show where he didn't gain victory through numbers,air superiority and atrition?
As for the "Care to back up that claim with actual data?" I don't need to there are plenty of books on history of commanders if you'd care to read them other then the pro US ones.
...-Gixer
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Originally posted by bj229r
The thousands of US soldiers slaughtered at the beginning of the Korean war can be attributed solely to McArthur --they were ill-prepared to fight, and WORSE prepared for the horrible winter that ensued.
MY vote for best (well, at least he should be top 5) is Chesty Puller---greatest marine there ever was--he parked his command tent at the front lines, scaring the watermelon out of visiting officers...his men would follow him anywhere---we might have lost at Gaudalcanal but for Chesty and his men (Seems like I heard Robert Duvall's character in Apocalypse Now was modeled after Chesty--I could be wrong)
Well......
You seem have the point there about General MacArthur and also Chesty too.
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Originally posted by DREDIOCK
Didnt realise the Roman Army was considered a "second rate Military."
at the time, yes! the roman army, while being well equipped, was poorly led. it was like the americans whooping the iraqi army: on paper the iraqi army had the advantage, but they had incompitent leadership. any commander who allows his army to be surrounded by a force with inferior numbers is a fool.
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Originally posted by Gixer
Err how was Rommel's campaign a battle against unseasoned troops with enferior weaposn and outdated tactics? Unless your thinking of his attacks against American Troops which he favoured against the British or ANZACS. North Africa was a long hard campaign on both sides long before the US even entered the war. And Rommel was a genius.
As for Patton nothing more then a pistol head primadona a name that comes up by Americans partly because he had a good movie. What genius did Patton show where he didn't gain victory through numbers,air superiority and atrition?
As for the "Care to back up that claim with actual data?" I don't need to there are plenty of books on history of commanders if you'd care to read them other then the pro US ones.
...-Gixer
France. where he first made a name for himself.
but then again Germany also had that air superiority you mentioned also as he did in north africa for a time.
in NA he did well untill he was met with Able leadership (monty) who then proceeded to push his arse across Africa.
Patton. North africa and Sicily. In Sicily he was up against the Herman Georing Div. Arguably one of the best the germans had. and in spit of the bulk of support going to Monty still managed to reach and take Palermo (rathr then fight a battle of attrition) then move along the coast and take Massina
While the allies at the time had air superiority in both north africa and sicily Patton received little of it untill the breakout in normandy and then half the time Allied bombers had to abandon their targets because
Pattons forces had already reached and captured them
Patton didnt fight battles of attrition. If you look at his numbers he tended to loose less men while killing or capturing more germans then his allied counterparts. Battles of attrition tend to be very costly for both sides.
Im not going ot say Rommel wasnt a genius or a great commander. Indeed he was. But to put him so far ahead of Patton is beyond absurd.
none less then Rundstedt claimed Patton and Mongomery were the two "best" the allies had.
I thinik I'll trust his opinion over yours as he was only slightly more qualified to make that kind of judgment
LMAO I've read plenty of books about the commanders on all sides.
Its obvious you have only read the books on the commander you decided to like
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Authur Currie
He invented the Blitzkrieg, which has evolved into the modern tactics that are still used to today (Desert Storm).
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Patton had the luxury of Quantity. The Eighth Army (mainly Aussie and NZ) kicked Rommel off of Africa, NOT Patton, nor the US.
The 8th was not mainly Aussie and New Zealanders.
The casualty figures for North Africa:
British 68,553
Dominion, Colonies and Allies 56,274 (allies are the various "Free" forces, not the US)
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you cant calculate an army's manpower by the casualty report. perhaps the dominion troops were better at keeping their heads down.:p
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Originally posted by SLO
Furballz sucks...
in that case try the Desert Rat, Rommel, a leader who actually lead in combat and not a the rear...
Desert Fox(obvious reasons), or Silver Fox(due to grey hair), not desert rat.
The Desert Rats were the men of the British Eighth Army.
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Originally posted by Masherbrum
Any book written on North African Campaign will REFUTE you DRED. To ignore the FACTS is the funniest thing.
Most people do NOT realize how close the Allies were kicked off of Africa AFTER Operation Torch began. The US and British did NOT put much stock into armor prior to WWII. They stuck with the "anti-infantry guns" on them instead of the 75mm. The only "effective tank" the Allies had in Africa was the Matilda, and even that is a stretch. At the onset of the War the French had some of the best tanks of the "Allies". They chose to break them up to Infantry Divisions, had they consolodated them France would have held out longer than it did.
Patton had the luxury of Quantity. The Eighth Army (mainly Aussie and NZ) kicked Rommel off of Africa, NOT Patton, nor the US. Rommel is in a class all by himself. He ate what his troops ate and fed the "Allied POW's" what his troops ate. Rommel had the respect of his men and the respect of his enemies on the battlefields on which he fought.
It's like Rommel said after Hitler appointed him Field Marshal: "I would rather he had given me one more division."
Karaya
Actually they dont refute me at all. Nor am I refuting your statements. the Allies the americans in particular did indeed have problems in north africa. The tendancy to leaving the high ground to the germans and taking up defencive positions in front of rivers instead of behind them,and ignoring the benefits of air and ground reconnacence along with poor traffic management, poor road maintanence all the result of poor leadership and a lack of cohesion in the command system (noted by Marshal in communications with Eisenhower)deteriorating weather. combined with good coordination by the germans in the use of infantry, tanks,artillary and divebombers.
Patton In part because of uncertainties about the situation in spain
For a good deal of the northafrican campaign was stuck in Casablanca.
And wasnt even involved in situations like Kassarine.
It wasnt untill March 43 that he took over II Corps
but once he did get back into the fighting he did well and dd so successfully.
While the american and British armies as a whole didnt put alot of stock in the Tank. Patton did.
He did warn them about the insufficiancies and correctly so of the tank they did use.
I never said Patton Kicked Rommel off north africa.
And yes the brits had the larger hand in doing the job.(largely due to political reasons) but did so with the assistance of the US
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Originally posted by Nashwan
The 8th was not mainly Aussie and New Zealanders.
The casualty figures for North Africa:
British 68,553
Dominion, Colonies and Allies 56,274 (allies are the various "Free" forces, not the US)
WTG Statsman. Glad you googled that one! Thanks. :aok
Karaya
PS - the Aussies and NZ's made the other soldiers in the Eighth Army fight harder, for they would not give ground easily.
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Dred,
I have have read "Patton: A Genius for War" - Carlo D' Este. Patton, again, was a good commander. But read "An Army at Dawn" - Rick Atkinson. You'll realize an unbiased fact of how fragile the north African campaign was for the Allies.
Karaya
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Not to hijack the thread, but I saw "Gettysburg" on TV this weekend and have a question. The show made it appear that Chamberlain (sp?) and the 20th Maine's actions the second day saved the Union position, thereby the battle and possibly the war. Is this true? Also I read that Chamberlain received the South's surrender and ordered his men to come to attention for the Southern troops.
63tb
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Originally posted by 63tb
Not to hijack the thread, but I saw "Gettysburg" on TV this weekend and have a question. The show made it appear that Chamberlain (sp?) and the 20th Maine's actions the second day saved the Union position, thereby the battle and possibly the war. Is this true? Also I read that Chamberlain received the South's surrender and ordered his men to come to attention for the Southern troops.
63tb
He ordered his men to a Bayonet Charge that saved Little Round Top and drastically reduced Oate's Confederate Force.
Karaya
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5- Flamebaiting, trolling, or posting to incite or annoy is not allowed.
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4- Members should post in a way that is respectful of other users and HTC. Flaming or abusing users is not tolerated.
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In what way? Can you refute it? Or can you only make snide comments? By our own admission, we do not even control the road to the Baghdad airport, for example.
Can you think of a more effective way to conduct the campaign from the Iraqi side?
Our military is crippled, in case you haven't noticed. All this talk of campaigns against Syria and Iran is a joke now. And the recent insults from North Korea show we don't seem to be much of a threat to them. Iran and Iraq have signed an agreement where the Iranian military will be training Iraqi troops. Seems like a slap in the face to me.
But that is OT for this thread.
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Give me the name of this commander and I will shut up. Otherwise, I stand by my assessment.
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4- Members should post in a way that is respectful of other users and HTC. Flaming or abusing users is not tolerated.
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You cant compare guerilla combat to open battle in the field. Any knuckle head can strap a bomb to himself and kill a few highly trained soldiers.
COwardly acts like that say " I know Im inferior, but I feel better doing something..even if its under-handed..than nothing at all."
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Theater Commander:
General W. T. Sherman - War is Hell
Tactical Commander:
Gen. O.P. Smith - The battles of the Chosin Res.
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All the top 10 operational level comanders of the last century are Germans.
Nelson is the greatest naval commander of all time easy.
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All arguable.. and in my mind all just standouts in their roles.
Power Strategist: Mahan
Military Planner: Marshall, Napoleon, Yammamoto
Air, Theory: Mitchell
Armor, Operations: Guderian
Armor, Tactics: Rommel
Operational Commander, Air: LeMay, Galland
Operational Commander, Ground: MacArthur, Mannheim, Zhukov
Operational Commander, Sea: Nimitz, Nelson, Doenitz
Combined Forces, theatre logistics: Eisenhower
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Originally posted by Bluedog
Desert Fox(obvious reasons), or Silver Fox(due to grey hair), not desert rat.
The Desert Rats were the men of the British Eighth Army.
True...
consider me corrected...
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I forgot one--again, this man was a Colonel, like Chesty Puller---only in charge of...battallions? But David Hackworth was the best field commander we had in Vietnam--shame he earned the wrath of the establishment-- most decorated soldier we ever had--quit the army in disgust, lived in Austrailia for many years---he took THE worst fighting group in theater and turned it into the best in country in a space of 6 months--pretty good for work with a bunch of draftees
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Originally posted by Masherbrum
Dred,
I have have read "Patton: A Genius for War" - Carlo D' Este. Patton, again, was a good commander. But read "An Army at Dawn" - Rick Atkinson. You'll realize an unbiased fact of how fragile the north African campaign was for the Allies.
Karaya
Im not nor have I been disputing the situation in NA.
It was very fragile indeed
But it was also that way in part because of poor leadership and a lack of cohesion in the command structure as well as inexperianced and ill diciplined troops among othe things. Vrs a well led,experianced and diciplined German force.
havent Read "An Army at Dawn" yet though and will indeed check it out
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Heres another name I dont think has been added to the list yet.
Andrew Jackson.
Guy was nuts LOL
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Anyone mention Winfield Scott, yet?
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We just buried a vet recently. A Marine who served under Puller. He hated him.
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Im gonna go out and say GW Bush, or maybe Osama Bin Laden, Osama, even though I hate the guy I gotta give it up to him, he knows what he's doing... Also how about Hitler, again I don't agree with him and think he's a POS but he did get the job done very well
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Best carrier admiral would be Mitscher. More level headed than Halsey and much more adept in the use of airpower at sea than Spruance. Much of the success that followed the Fast Carrier Task Force (later TF 58) through the central Pacific is due to his abilities as a carrier commander.
(http://www.bibl.u-szeged.hu/bibl/mil/ww2/who/pics/mitscher.jpg)
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Originally posted by BlkKnit
I thought it was Buford's tired and beat up troops who held Stuart at bay. Never heard anything about Custer there.
Buford's Brigade held Heth's division until Reynolds brought up the lead units of 1st Corps. From that point on the battle quickly became a general engagement. Buford's Brigade assumed flank coverage when relieved. They did not participate in the cavalry fight at Hanover. Custer's Michigan Brigade was deeply involved in repulsing Stuart at Hanover, but it was General Gregg, not Custer who directed the Union cavalry action.
However, one person here has greatly over-stated the threat Stuart presented. Confederate cavalry had little chance to change the outcome of the Gettysburg fight. Their primary mission was to disrupt the Union rear in the event Lee's assault on the center succeeded in crushing the Union center on Cemetery Ridge. Lee's assault never had a chance as an entire Union division was in reserve behind the ridge and strong elements of 3 Corps within double-time distance of the center of the Confederate attack goal.
Gettysburg was a nightmare for the Confederates, beginning with Stuart wandering around the countryside and Heth's stupid insistance at trying to drive Buford's brigade from the ridges northwest of Gettysburg. From that moment on, Lee was always one step behind good fortune and once fully engaged, either had to utterly defeat a small portion of the Union army or be forced to slug it out against the whole of it. Either way, his adventure into Pennsylvania was doubtless a high risk endeavor. If Meade and his army made no major blunders, Lee would eventually have to retire to Virginia. Meade made no such blunders. Even Sickle's folly of advancing his Corps on day two had the unexpected effect of sucking up Longstreet's combat power like a sponge; meaning that the full weight of his Corps would be expended before he was in a position to capture the high ground on the Union left. This allowed enough time for the Union 5th Corps to come up and hold the flank.
My regards,
Widewing
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Originally posted by Masherbrum
He ordered his men to a Bayonet Charge that saved Little Round Top and drastically reduced Oate's Confederate Force.
Karaya
Much has been made of the 20th Maine's defense of the left flank on Little Round Top. It was a magnificent fight and Chamberlain conducted his defense better than most regimental commanders could have. In light of his limited experience in command, that makes it all the more impressive (not bad for a college professor).
Within the context of the overall tactical situation at that time, Little Round Top wasn't the strategic fight many have alluded to.
Even if Law's Brigade had pushed the Federals off of the hill, it is extremely doubtful that they could have held it long enough to exploit the position. Indeed, the bulk of the Union 5th Corps was only minutes away, advancing to occupy the two hills. Right behind it was the entire 6th Corps.
As it was, Hood's division (of which Law's brigade was a part, and to which Oates Alabama regiment belonged) was utterly exhausted from the long forced march (and counter-march prior to the attack), from the lack of water and had its manpower nearly halved from severe fighting. They were at the end of their rope.
The nearest artillery batteries Alexander (Longstreet's artillery commander) had were in the Peach Orchard, more than a mile away (My great-great grandfather commanded one of those batteries, the Bedford Light Artillery). This meant limbering the guns, dragging them over difficult ground to the base of Little Round Top (Big Round Top was too heavily forested to be of use for artillery shooting north or east) where they would have to be unlimbered and manhandled to the summit. This would take as much as two hours, probably more. By then, the 5,000 Federals of the 5th Corps not yet engaged would have swarmed over the hills and displaced the worn-out and battered Confederates. Another 9,500 Federals were right behind these. Meade had already issued orders to retake the hills should the Union defenders be forced off.
My regards,
Widewing
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Admiral Yi Sun Shin (1545 ~ 1598), of the Chosun Dynasty, of the Korean peninsula.
If there ever was a "perfect general" in the history of the world, it's him. Too bad he isn't as famous as some of the other great military commanders of history, East and West alike. By all rights, he should be.
"It is always difficult for Englishmen to admit that Nelson ever had an equal in his profession, but if any man is entitled to be so regarded, it should be this great naval commander of Asiatic race who never knew defeat and died in the presence of the enemy; of whose movements a track-chart might be compiled from the wrecks of hundreds of Japanese ships lying with their valiant crews at the bottom of the sea, off the coasts of the Korean peninsula
...and it seems, in truth, no exaggeration to assert that from first to last he never made a mistake, for his work was so complete under each variety of circumstances as to defy criticism...
His whole career might be summarized by saying that, although he had no lessons from past history to serve as a guide, he waged war on the sea as it should be waged if it is to produce definite results, and ended by making the supreme sacrifice of a defender of his country."
G. A. Ballard, "The Influence of the Sea on The Political History of Japan""
[/b]
"You may compare me to Lord Nelson, but do not compare me with Admiral Yi Sun-Shin. He is too remarkable for anyone."
Admiral Heihachiro Togo, after defeating the Russian Navy, 1905[/b][/i]"
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A brief history of Admiral Yi Sun Shin, and the 7-Year War between Chosun and Japan, for those who do not know who he is.
Though the article's understanding of the internal politic and economics of the Chosun Dynasty is quite superficial, the accounts of the war, and the story of Admiral Yi is well told and worthwhile. The 7-Year War between Chosun and Japan, was the largest, and bloodiest war of the Korean peninsula before the Korean War of 1950.
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Fifteenth century Choson's prejudice against foreign trade and commerce contributed to financial problems and the suspension of trade relations with Japan. Oda Nobunaga emerges as the strongest of Japan's daimyo, intent upon unifying the Japanese under a single ruler.
During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as the Europeans hotly pursued trade and colonialism in India, Indonesia, and Southeast Asia, the Korean kingdom of Choson lived in relative isolation, deeply embroiled in factionalism and power politics. While Choson's neighbors sought new ways to deal with the changing nature of foreign relations in the Far East, the Yi dynasty faced disastrous economic problems at home. Political factions fought to displace or eliminate their perceived enemies and, in the process, virtually neglected the country's economic health and the people's welfare.
The rising affluence of Choson's yangban landlords in the countryside compounded the country's existing economic problems as land tenure, tax laws and the military all declined in a state of confusion. Choson royalty, addicted to lives of luxury and pleasure-seeking, contributed a great deal to the massive squandering of Choson's financial resources. Not even the royal court was immune from the capacity to drain the nation's treasury. With each new king on the throne came new appointees to an expanding Merit Subjects roster, and with each new appointee came the obligatory awards and land grants needed to support them.
The Yi government's attempts to reform Choson's economy, driven largely by an intense desire to increase revenue, led to a further increase in the already steep financial burden borne by the populace. The bureaucrats in Seoul apparently never anticipated the dramatic impact of the almost punitive level of land taxes, tribute taxes and other special levies they imposed on the country. Faced with the sudden rise in taxes, many peasants simply gave up trying to meet the demand for ever more government revenue. In frustration, or because of economic necessity, thousands of peasants unable to make a living simply abandoned their farms and property. The inevitable result was a dramatic reduction in the nation's tax base and the government had few practical alternatives to make up the loss.
In the realm of foreign relations, the early Yi dynasty maintained a vassal relationship with Ming China, but behaved as an equal partner in its relations with other nations in the region. The Confucian-oriented government in Seoul, which disapproved of private trade, conducted its foreign relations almost exclusively under the guise of tribute and gifts. Their deeply-entrenched Confucian prejudice against commerce and finance contributed much to Choson's economic trouble during this period, since it effectively inhibited the growth of foreign trade and prevented the government from deriving any significant income from a potentially rich resource. The Yi government carefully maintained this fiction of "tribute" and the "exchange of gifts" throughout most of the fifteenth century.
Despite the government's strict adherence to Confucian philosophy, numerous secret business deals and private agreements existed just beneath the surface that supported a growing volume of covert commercial trade. Japanese vessels sailed into the treaty ports of Pusanp'o(modern Tongnae), Naeip'o (modern Ungch'on) and Yomp'o (modern Ulsan), and carried away large cargos of foodstuffs and dry goods to enrich the daimyo and merchants of western Japan. By 1510, the volume of goods moving through this "underground" market between grew to such an extent that King Chungjong's ministers felt it necessary to impose tight restrictions to stop it. Japanese traders reacted almost immediately to the government's crackdown on trade by staging violent protests in the treaty ports. Many of these demonstrations actually developed into armed uprisings against local Choson garrison commanders and it took the use of military force to suppress them. Choson responded to furor raised by the Japanese over the trade restrictions by closing its trade ports altogether and suspending trade with Japan.
The head of the So clan on Tsushima Island, who had become quite dependent on Choson imports, voiced his indignance over this action. After numerous entreaties to the Choson government, Tsushima and Choson reached a new trade agreement two years later, in 1512. King Chungjong permitted the resumption of trade under strictly limited terms, permitting only twenty-five ships per year to visit Choson. Nevertheless, one treaty port and two of the permanent Japanese trade missions remained closed. With the lone exception of vessels sent by the Shogun, King Chungjong made no allowances for ships sailing on special missions. Even under the trade restrictions imposed by Choson however, Japan maintained fairly widespread commercial relations in the Far East.
The So clan daimyo dealt directly with Seoul in part because the Ashikaga Shogunate had been in decline for years. The authority of Japan's central government had virtually disappeared early in the fifteenth century and the former stability and power of the shogunate gradually dissipated to the point where, by mid-century, it had lost all authority and control over the provinces. Neither the shogun nor the emperor had the power to restrict, let alone control, the growth of Japan's feudal houses.
Toyotomi Hideyoshi continues the unification process in Japan, taking the role of Regent following the death of Oda Nobunaga. After establishing his own supremacy over Nobunaga's remaining daimyo, Hideyoshi opened contacts with Seoul in preparation for his planned invasion of the peninsula.
The conqueror of Japan did not simply rest on his laurels. Instead, he fell prey to the Alexandrian desire for more worlds to conquer, and in East Asia at the time that meant China. As early as the spring of 1586, years before he completed the subjugation of all his enemies in Japan, Hideyoshi's fertile imagination led him to lay down plans for a great Oriental Empire ruled by a Japanese sovereign. In expressing his dream to the Jesuit Vice-Provincial Gaspar Coelho, he stated that his sole ambition was to leave behind a great name. His plan was simple and direct. He resolved to cross the sea at the head of a large expeditionary force and form an alliance with Choson's King Sonjo. Japan would then march northward up the Korean peninsula with Choson troops in the vanguard and conquer the Chinese Ming Empire "as easily as a man rolls up a mat."
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(continued)
The frequent diplomatic missions between Japan and Choson during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were terminated after a particularly vicious pirate attack on the Cholla coast in 1555. The activities of Japanese pirates remained virtually uncontrolled, but the situation gave Hideyoshi a convenient pretext for an attitude of injured dignity. With a firm grip on Japan, Hideyoshi undertook an exercise in international diplomacy in 1587. Using the offices of the So clan of Tsushima, the only daimyo then having formal relations with the Yi court in Seoul, Hideyoshi sent a short note to King Sonjo with a request that the reciprocal exchange of diplomatic envoys be resumed. King Sonjo was reluctant to restart this expensive custom, a matter which had never been approved by the Ming court in Beijing. Hideyoshi sent another mission to Choson the following year to reiterate his demand and not to return until they had the king's agreement. Choson held the Japanese at arm's length for nearly two years while court officials discussed and argued Hideyoshi's proposal. In their closest approach to an actual decision, they replied to Hideyoshi that they would consider his request if he eliminated the problem of pirate raids on the peninsula.
When Choson finally sent its mission to Kyoto, Hideyoshi's vanity had been so ruffled by the lengthy delays in dealing with Seoul, he kept the Choson envoys waiting for over a year. After treating the envoys unceremoniously, he sent them home along with two Japanese envoys carrying a letter to King Sonjo that went far beyond a mere request to reopen formal relations between the two countries. The envoys were instructed to make it public that the Chinese had refused to receive a Japanese embassy (at best an excuse) and that if Choson gave Hideyoshi free passage through the peninsula to invade China and remained neutral they would be unmolested. Japan's future friendship with Choson depended on the answer. The two Japanese envoys underscored the seriousness of Hideyoshi's proposal with a surreptitious warning, telling the Choson officials who received them that a refusal to cooperate might invite a Japanese invasion. King Sonjo flatly rejected the idea, noting that Choson had been friendly with China for centuries and pointing out the hopeless project was like a bee stinging a tortoise.
In 1590, still unable to reach a definite conclusion on Hideyoshi's proposal, King Sonjo sent a large diplomatic mission to Kyoto to discover whether or not the Japanese could actually carry out their threat of invasion. The senior member of the Kyoto delegation, a member of the court's So-in (Western) faction, had as his deputy a member of the court's Tong-in (Eastern) faction. To Sonjo's dismay, the mission returned with typically conflicting points of view. While the chief of the embassy presented an alarming report indicating the extent of Japanese military preparations already underway, his deputy stressed the lack of any evidence whatsoever to support Japanese preparations for an attack on Choson. As too often happened, the truth of the matter disappeared in the shuffle as faction members at court closed ranks behind their man to support his judgment, right or wrong.
Although Choson was militarily weak at this point, it was not as unprepared to defend itself as one might suspect. In response to the resumption of sporadic pirate attacks against Choson during the mid-sixteenth century, the Yi government entrusted the country's defense to its Border Defense Command. Jointly staffed with civil and military officials, this government agency eventually evolved into a kind of executive council that completely reorganized the Choson army. The Border Defense Command reorganized artillery, bowmen and spearmen into specialty units. It also pressed private slaves, once exempt from conscription, into service. In the year 1420, there were about 200,000 government slaves. By 1484 the number had risen to 350,000, and in later years their numbers, as well as the slave population owned by private individuals increased markedly. Desperate for both funds and manpower, the Sonju government pressed many slaves into military service, a move that brought with it an automatic upgrade in status. Frequently, the government had no other option but to free large numbers of slaves for no other reason than it could no longer afford to feed and house them. Korea's new military structure soon became permanent and saw no significant changes for nearly three hundred years.
Choson's yangban, accustomed as they were to peacetime conditions, could not be easily moved by national issues. Once the matter of Japanese military readiness became seriously enmeshed in factional conflict, a concerted national effort became impossible. As a result, the Choson military took only half-hearted defensive measures. Instead of accelerating troop training, Choson's top generals merely ordered an inventory of all weapons. Armed with few guns of any sort, when warned of Japan‘―s big advantage in cannons and muskets, one commander said dismissively, ‘°They can‘―t hit their targets every time they shoot, can they?‘± Had it not been for the efforts of Chief Minister Yu Songnyong, a member of the Namin (Southerner) faction, Choson would likely have made no defensive preparations at all. Unwilling to let Choson's defense die in the hands of competing factions, Minister Yu insisted after considerable debate that a report be immediately sent to the Ming court in Beijing. By this time the Chinese had already learned of Hideyoshi's intentions through similar reports from its envoys from the Ryukyu Islands. As a result of Yu Songnyong's prodding, a number of cities began repairing and reinforcing their defensive walls. Facing Japan across the Tsushima Straits, a dozen or so towns in Kyongsang Province built new defensive walls. From early in the fifteenth century, as a direct result of pirate raids and the military reorganization of King Sejo, towns in Kyongsang Province took on the appearance of virtually armed camps. By 1591, all the principal towns in Korea and most of its inland towns had defensive walls.
Choson knew the military uses of gunpowder and had a few firearms, but it lacked the manufacturing technology to produce its own muskets. With no available source to supply these weapons, virtually all Choson's troops carried swords, spears, bows and arrows. Choson also faced a a major problem gathering a defensive army, since most peasants bought an exemption from military service by paying the exemption tax. What soldiers there were had little real military training and spent most of their time employed in public works projects such as building defensive walls. Although a few active military units guarded the northern border region and repelled Japanese pirates, Choson had no full-scale field army. Given the condition of the government and the economy at the time, training and mobilizing such a force would have taken years. Nevertheless, under the guidance of the military district headquarters at Andong, located in the northern interior near the headwaters of the Naktong River, military officers in each town drilled the local peasants in tactics and the use of weapons twice a year. Choson's "citizen soldiers" were no match for any invading army.
The Imjin War
In May 1592, Hideyoshi's army invaded Choson. With overwhelming force, the army occupied Seoul within three weeks and took P'yong'yang soon after. The legendary exploits of Admiral Yi Sun-sin killed any hope that Japan would ever succeed in invading China or hold on to its position in Choson.
Born in Seoul on April 28, 1545, Yi Sun-sin thoroughly absorbed the tactics and theories of the Seven Military Classics and passed his military examination in 1576. He not only studied the ancient military and literary classics, but actually understood how to apply their principles to contemporary warfare. This gifted naval architect with an unusual talent for mechanical inventiveness became a true soldier-scholar and a great military leader. His broad grasp of the strategic situation facing Choson from Japan and his remarkable, proven skills as a naval tactician rightfully place Admiral Yi Sun-sin among the world's great military commanders, heroic men like England's Admiral Horatio Nelson, and America's generals Robert E. Lee, George S. Patton, and Douglas A. MacArthur.
Typical fighting ships in sixteenth century Choson and Japan were little different than their merchant ship counterparts. Fighting ships generally had more oars for greater speed and a better hull design for added maneuverability. Japanese fighting ships still used the boarding tactics employed in the Battle of Lepanto. The captains's main goal was to get close enough to the enemy ship to use grappling hooks and pull his ship close aboard so his soldiers could then engage in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. When that wasn't possible, archers and men armed with matchlock rifles targeted the crew of the enemy ship and frequently fired flaming arrows to set the enemy ship ablaze. Even the arquebus, a predecessor to the musket used by the Japanese, required the ships to get close enough for the guns to be effective. Well aware of his navy's current limitations, potential threats, and the need to improve and strengthen Choson's naval forces, Admiral Yi Sun-sin began work in 1588 to develop an entirely new ship design.
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While diplomatic wrangling continued between Seoul and Kyoto, Admiral Yi was busy creating a genuinely secret weapon, the kobukson, or "turtle ship" (Figure 1). Although Yi Sun-sin is commonly given credit for inventing the "turtle ship," the term kobukson was actually used in historic documents as early as 1414, when King T'aejong first inspected this new warship design. The aggressive use of the kobukson in Koryo's 1419 raid against pirates on Tsushima Island certainly indicates it was originally designed as an attack ship.
Beginning with a hull design adapted for high speed and maneuverability, Admiral Yi's highly-modified kobukson was essentially a flat-bottomed, oar-powered galley 100 feet in length with a 25 foot beam and two large masts rigged with large rectangular sails. Admiral Yi did not have to defend the open seas of the Tsushima Strait, but faced the constant battlefield constraint of inadequate maneuvering room in the narrow channels and shallow waters among the 400 small islands and uninhabited islets of the Hallyo Waterway. This small inland sea stretches 172 km from Hansan Island in the east, including Ch'ungmu, Samch'onp'o and Namhae Island, Odong Island, to the seaport of Yosu in the west.
Japanese superiority in both soldiers and firearms made engaging Japanese ships at close quarters a very dangerous tactic. Admiral Yi could not afford to be boarded, so he designed an arched "roof," believed to have been made of iron plate, that covered ship's entire topside structure to ward off enemy arrows and cannon shells. The top of this roof was studded with sharp upright spikes to deter potential boarders. The Yi court had discussed the idea of building ironclad ships as early as 1413, but the world's first ironclad warship was not actually built until Yi Sun-sin took command of the Choson navy.
Choson had already manufactured some very powerful cannons designed to protect fortresses and they soon figured out how to put them on ships. Yi Sun-sin increased the firepower of his kobukson by mounting thirteen small cannon atop the rowing deck along both flanks of the ship that fired through portholes to allow the vessel to deliver a broadside attack from either side at will. The Choson Navy had four types of cannons; ch'on (heaven), chi (earth), hyon (black) and hwang (yellow). The heavy 660 pound ch'on cannon, with a 5.5 inch bore, could hurl a cannonball only a few hundred yards. Smaller and shorter in range than contemporary English cannons, Admiral Yi's guns certainly proved adequate to counter the threat posed by the smaller cannons aboard Japanese ships.
A large dragon head sat above the reinforced ram in the ship's bow and a wood-fired smoke generator was used to spew sulfur smoke through the dragon's grinning mouth. When put to use with the ship underway, the smoke screen enshrouded the entire ship and no doubt intimidated superstitious enemy sailors. The addition of new advanced cannons, archery ports ahead, astern and abeam, iron spikes on the roof, and the smoke generator in the bow made the kobukson a true offensive weapon.
The primary strength of Choson's professional military resided in its naval forces garrisoned along the southern coast, the direct result of Japanese pirate activity in Korea during the fourteenth century. In 1591, faced with an imposing threat from Japan and with Choson's very existence at stake, Chief Minister Yu Songnyong persuaded the royal court to appoint Admiral Yi Sun-sin to the post of Naval Commander of the Left (western) Cholla Province Naval Station headquartered at the southeastern port city of Yosu. There, in early 1592, Admiral Yi energetically set about training crews for his new warships.
With Choson enmeshed in factional squabbling, Hideyoshi readied his forces to move into Choson. From his headquarters in Hizen, Hideyoshi mobilized seven fully-equipped divisions, nearly 150,000 men and gathered a fleet of some 700 ships, transport vessels, naval ships and small craft to move his army across the Tsushima Strait. Many of the approximately 9,000 seamen who manned the Hideyoshi's fleet were reportedly former pirates. From their advanced staging area on Tsushima Island, an expeditionary force of three divisions (51,000 men) sailed for the south Choson coast near the end of May 1592 (Figure 2): 11,000 men under General Kuroda Nagamasa, 18,000 men under the leadership of General Konishi Yukinaga, a Christian born of a merchant family from Sakai, and 22,000 men commanded by General Kato Kiyomasa, a Buddhist "mustang" officer who rose from the ranks with Hideyoshi.
Pusan garrison troops under the command of Chong Pal manned beachhead defensive positions around Pusan To the north, a few miles inland at the small town of Tongnae, town magistrate Song Sang-hyon commanded a small civil defense force. General Konishi reached the port of Pusan a full five days ahead of generals Kato and Kuroda.The Japanese surprised and quickly overwhelmed the badly outnumbered defenders in both Pusan and Tongnae. Despite bravely defending the beachhead areas to the death, Choson's garrison troops proved no match for Japanese soldiers armed with short-range brass cannon and matchlock muskets. Moreover, they faced an army with extensive combat experience, men already bloodied from the many campaigns of Japan's Warring States period.
General Konishi had already established a beachhead in Choson by the time Kato and Kuroda's two remaining divisions reached Pusan (Figure 3). The combined Japanese army was too large to advance along a single route, particularly since the troops would have to live off the land. The Japanese left Pusan in three separate columns, opening a three-pronged northward assault toward the capital in Seoul. By messenger and beacon fires, reports of the invasion quickly reached the Yi court in Seoul along with reports of the many towns captured by the Japanese. Stunned by the news, King Sonjo's government panicked. The Border Defense Command quickly issued orders to call up the scattered remnants of the Choson army.
The government placed its hopes on the talents of General Sin Ip, a tough military fighter who had won earlier fame in successful campaigns against the Jurchen in the northern provinces. General Sin received orders to take all the men he could muster and contain the Japanese in the Naktong River basin by blocking the three mountain passes leading out of Kyongsang Province. Sin mustered a few thousand untrained men armed only with spears, bows and arrows. The leadership of this ragged group was even worse than the condition of the troops. Well before his small force reached the first of the mountain passes, General Sin received disturbing, detailed reports describing the Japanese army's battle prowess. Instead of taking the high ground, where tens of men could defend against thousands, the doughty general decided to wait for the advancing Japanese behind a strong defensive position established on an open plain near the city of Ch'ungju, where he felt his men would fight better than in the mountains.
General Kuroda's division swept westward through the Sobaek Range over the Ch'up'ungyong Pass and proceeded north through the western provinces toward Seoul. General Konishi's division moved virtually unopposed up the center of Kyongsang Province. Meanwhile, General Kato's division, the third prong of the Japanese assault, drove north from Pusan toward Kyongju, turned northwestward, then linked up with Konishi in the valley near Ch'ungju. After crossing the undefended Oryong Pass, Konishi's soldiers moved into the lower Han River valley, where the Japanese met their first strong resistance from General Sin Ip's rag-tag army. In the bitter and bloody fight that ensued, Japanese troops overran the Ch'ungju defenders and killed General Sin. The two Japanese divisions continued their march toward Seoul along two different routes. The main objective of the assault on Korea was plunder. The Japanese deployed six special units with orders to steal books, maps, paintings, craftsmen (especially potters) and their handicrafts, people to be enslaved, precious metals, national treasures, and domestic animals. Meeting little resistance, the Japanese ravaged the civilian population. Entire villages were swept up in the raids. Japanese merchants sold some to Portuguese merchants anchored offshore and took the rest to Japan.
If the summer of 1592 exposed fatal weaknesses in the Choson army with brutal thoroughness, it also highlighted the Choson navy's reputation. Admiral Yi Sun-sin proudly launched his kobukson in May 1592, just days before General Konishi's troops landed at Pusan. The admiral selected eight of his most courageous naval officers to act as commandants at various ports. He also called up four government officials from their posts as magistrates of local cities and put them in the forefront of his battle formations as commanders of the Left Wing, Front Forward, Central Forward, and Right Forward commands. Within days of the outbreak of the Imjin War, Admiral Yi Sun-sin sailed into the Hallyo Waterway in search of Japanese shipping intent on engaging and destroying it whenever and wherever it might appear.
The war was less than ten days old when the Choson Navy had its first major engagement against the Japanese. Sailing from the southwest early one morning, Admiral Yi sighted the supply and troop ships that landed two Japanese divisions near Pusan less than two weeks earlier lying at anchor near Okp'o, off Koje Island. Borrowing a maxim from Sun Tzu's Art of War - "If the soldiers are committed to fight to the death they will live, whereas if they seek to stay alive they will die." - Admiral Yi gathered his captains and repeatedly had them pledge their willingness to fight.
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Driven by a strong steady wind, Admiral Yi's ship led his ships downwind into the anchorage, firing cannon and arrows from both sides. Skillful maneuvering prevented the Japanese from boarding any of the attacking ships, which soon set a number of Japanese ships ablaze with flaming arrows. In the confusion that followed, Japanese sailors began cutting their anchor lines in a desperate attempt to flee. Few were lucky enough to escape destruction. In its first engagement the Choson Navy sank twenty-six Japanese vessels without a single loss. The only casualty was a sharpshooter who received a slight arm wound. It was the first naval combat action for many of the men in Admiral Yi's command, including many of the local magistrates recruited for military duty.
Sailing eastward from Okp'o under a steady wind, Admiral Yi ran across and attacked a smaller Japanese patrol squadron later that same afternoon. After annihilating the Japanese to the last ship before dark, he continued eastward for the rest of the night. The following morning, Admiral Yi's ships reached the main shipping lanes between Pusan and Tsushima Island, where he spotted a massive Japanese fleet sailing north. Undeterred by the odds, Admiral Yi plowed into the Japanese like a sledge-hammer. During the day-long battle, the Japanese fought with determined courage, but to no avail. By sundown, the entire Japanese fleet was either captured, ablaze, or on the bottom of the sea.
After a week of nearly constant action at sea, Admiral Yi wanted to attack Japanese ships at Pusan Harbor. After considering his situation however, with provisions low and his men exhausted and wounded, he wisely decided to avoid overextending his fleet deep into enemy territory and exposing himself to being cut off. With complete dominance of the seas along Choson's south coast and with no fear of a rival, Admiral Yi moved his fleet unobserved further west to the islands off the southern coast.
The relentless Japanese advance toward Seoul caused turmoil among the local population already gripped by confusion, fear and panic. Thoroughly alarmed and near panic themselves, King Sonjo and his court decided to flee north from Seoul to Kaesong. The government made no attempt to defend Seoul, but Sonjo ordered his two sons into the northern provinces of Hamgyong and Kangwon to raise fresh troops for the army. Neither of Sonjo's sons found anyone who would respond to their pleas to help defend the country against the Japanese. In the end, the Japanese captured both Choson princes.
King Sonjo made hasty preparations to abandon the city to the advancing Japanese. He gathered his family and with his retinue of high court officers fled through the west gate of the city along the "Beijing Road." When word of the impending royal evacuation reached the streets of the capital, citizens blocked their exit, hurling insults and stones at them. After fleeing the city to the north, the band of less than courageous aristocrats arrived in Kaesong only to be met again by local citizens armed with anger and masonry. Seven days later, the royal retreat finally crossed the Taedong River and halted in P'yong'yang (Figure 3).
Infuriated by the government's incompetence and irresponsibility, the people of Seoul erupted in a furious rage. They placed the full blame for Choson's wretched state of affairs squarely on the backs of government officials, men who had failed to concern themselves with the welfare of the people and had permitted the farming villages to fall to ruin. Mobs of people swept through the city looting and burning government storehouses. The city's slave population attacked and burned the offices of the Ministry of Punishments and the hated Ministry of Justice. In their fury, mobs of angry citizens destroyed large numbers of census registers and the archives which held the slave-deeds. The destruction of the census registers and numerous other documents that recorded the status of Choson citizens by the Japanese freed many slaves from their bondage.
Less than three weeks after departing Tsushima Island, Konishi Yukinaga's division triumphantly marched through the South Gate into the city of Seoul. By late spring, all three of Hideyoshi's vanguard divisions occupied the Choson capital. Hideyoshi landed the remainder of his army on the nearly defenseless southern coast to occupy Kyongsang Province. There the Japanese quickly began to organize feudal land holdings similar to those in Japan for distribution to victorious commanders.
After leaving a garrison force to maintain order in the city of Seoul, the three vanguard divisions marched north. Konishi and Kato proceeded northwest toward P'yong'yang, where they would halt and await resupply by the Taedong River. In their drive toward the ancient "western capital" of Koguryo, the Japanese encountered a determined defense force at the Imjin River. Choson defenders put up a fierce battle for three full days before the Japanese finally overran their positions. During the brief respite, King Sonjo and his entourage again took flight to the north, this time to the border city of Uiju on the Yalu River. General Kuroda turned his troops westward toward the Yellow Sea. General Kato marched eastward to subjugate the northern provinces of Hamgyong and P'yong'an, eventually crossing the Tumen River into Manchuria. General Konishi's division assaulted and captured P'yong'yang. With no hope of repelling the Japanese alone, the royal court in hiding at Uiju dispatched envoys to Beijing with an urgent plea for help from Ming China.
In the south, Admiral Yi Sun-sin's second major campaign against the Japanese began off Sach'on, where about four hundred Japanese soldiers were building fortifications to protect twelve pavilion vessels anchored near the wharf below (Figure 2). The Japanese held the high ground, safe among the cliffs facing the bay above Sach'on, well beyond the reach of arrows. Since the ebbing tide made it impossible for Admiral Yi's kobukson to get within shooting range of Japanese ships, he employed a classic maneuver frequently cited in Sun Tzu's Art of War. Breaking his formations and giving every impression of a disorderly retreat, the well-disciplined Choson navy drew the Japanese into open water. Suddenly, Admiral Yi turned on his enemy and, as if riding a charging war chariot, drove right through their midst, firing cannon and flaming arrows into the Japanese ships. The ensuing battle turned into a complete rout as the Japanese broke and ran into the surrounding hills. Admiral Yi wisely spared a few Japanese ships to give the defeated soldiers a way to escape and to prevent them from terrorizing the local population.
Hideyoshi had the temperament of a land warrior and tended to think of his fleet as little more than transportation for the army. As a result, the Japanese "navy" embarked on the Choson invasion ill-armed and ill-trained for fighting at sea. Yi Sun-sin took full advantage of the mismatch. In several sea battles near Tangp'o and Tanghangp'o during June and July, he cleared the seas of poorly led Japanese ships using line-ahead tactics with rams and flaming arrows. In one battle, Yi Sun-sin caught a convoy with twenty-five escort ships bound for P'yong'yang in open water and sent it to the bottom. Flushed with success, Yi Sun-sin's fleet lingered in the area the peninsula expecting further action.
A few days later, off Tanghangp'o, Admiral Yi once again sought the advantage of fighting in open water. He broke off his attack in a feigned retreat so the Japanese would not abandon their ships and escape to land. The results were the same as at Sach'on. The Japanese set off in pursuit of the admiral's ships, which then counterattacked from both flanks and destroyed all but one of the Japanese ships. As planned, the next morning one of Admiral Yi's captains caught the lone escaping Japanese ship in open water and sank it.
Whether Hideyoshi knew of Admiral Yi Sun-sin's stunning naval successes or not, he committed a fatal blunder by holding to his original plan for reinforcing his land army in northern Choson through the western passage. The Japanese advance to P'yong'yang had been so rapid that reserves meant to link up with them had to be embarked aboard ships by the end of June. In early July, hundreds of Japanese transport ships escorted by the majority of Hideyoshi's remaining fighting ships, set sail along the western passage toward the islands off Choson's southern coast and sailed directly into a trap. Anticipating the Japanese would sail a course to sight Choson's southern islands, Admiral Yi Sun-sin stationed his ships near Hansan Island and lay in wait for any Japanese shipping that happened by.
Anchored near the mouth of the Hansan Strait, a 400 yard-wide channel strewn with submerged rocks and shoals, Admiral Yi's ships were sitting in a position from which they could quickly sail in either direction. At dawn on the morning of July 9, 1592, lookouts sighted a Japanese fleet on the far eastern horizon. Fearing his large kobukson would be unable to maneuver effectively inside the strait, he decided to lure the Japanese into open water south of Hansan Island, where he could take the Japanese in a single strike.
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The Battle at Hansan Island began when Admiral Yi moved five or six kobukson in a tentative attack against the approaching Japanese. When he was sure he had been sighted, he turned his ships and feigned a retreat under oars. The Japanese admiral, intent on capturing a fleeing enemy, gave immediate chase under full sail. Admiral Yi carefully drew the faster Japanese fighting ships further into open water, outrunning the slower transports. At the critical moment, and with his own ships still under oars, Admiral Yi suddenly turned about. In a spectacular demonstration of precisely-timed maneuvering, he fell hard against the lead Japanese ships, ramming them as they tried to turn away from the approaching attack. One by one, the lead Japanese ships crumbled against the reinforced bows of the kobukson and near continuous cannon fire. Those lucky enough to escape the initial disaster were driven back into the approaching main body of the convoy, which also turned away in panic to escape.
During the running fight, Admiral Yi's fleet sunk or set fire to some seventy Japanese fighting ships. When a large reinforcing convoy was spotted sailing into the onrushing melee, Japanese admirals made a valiant attempt to halt the retreat with the new arrivals. The two large bodies of ships closed on each other quickly, which added to the building confusion. Nearly fifty more Japanese ships were lost to ramming, cannon fire or flaming arrows. Faced with an apparently unconquerable enemy, for the first and only time while engaged with a foreign enemy, Japanese commanders lost courage, panicked and broke in all directions looking for a way out. The retreat quickly degenerated into a rout, with a mixture of transports, escorts and fighting ships sinking and burning together. The panic was so thorough that the majority of those who managed to escape made for the coast rather than suffer the fates of their comrades. Many ships were driven aground and wrecked with a great loss of life.
The Battle at Hansan Island not only annihilated the Japanese fleet, it destroyed the vital materiel needed by generals Konishi and Kato in the north. Admiral Yi Sun-sin's systematic application of the principles of Sun Tzu and other Chinese military classics in his four sweeping naval campaigns of 1592, culminated in a single battle which cut off the sea lanes around the southwestern tip of Choson and abruptly ended all prospects of a future Japanese invasion of China.
The Home Front
While Admiral Yi Sun-sin continued to hamper Hideyoshi's ability to launch fresh attacks in Choson, the people of Choson, faced with a direct threat to their personal wealth and security, formed guerilla bands to fight, not to preserve the government, but to preserve their own way of life.
Admiral Yi sailed for Pusan in late August 1592, intent on destroying every last remaining Japanese ship, most of which were concentrating in the area of Pusan Bay (Figure 1). After three successive defeats, the Japanese had learned the best way to protect their ships was to anchor them close ashore beneath fortified hills for protection where they could take advantage of their superiority in shore guns and use their troops armed with matchlock rifles. Admiral Yi's fleet of only 166 ships charged into the Pusan anchorage on September 1 to attack some 470 enemy ships defended by thousands of Japanese on the nearby hills. The Japanese unleashed a nearly continuous barrage of arrows, rifle and cannon fire, yet despite the hail of falling projectiles, Admiral Yi pressed the attack.
The Battle of Pusan Harbor was an assault deep into enemy territory and is eloquent testimony to the bravery and courage of Choson's fighting sailors. Pusan Bay echoed with gunfire from the day-long battle as the Choson fleet repeatedly rowed their ships deep into Pusan Harbor, attacking the Japanese under a barrage of enemy fire and successfully sinking or destroying 133 Japanese ships, many caught at anchor. Admiral Yi Sun-sin understood that if he totally destroyed the Japanese fleet, it would "block the retreating route of the Japanese pouring down from the north, [and] the enemy thus trapped would probably become guerrillas in all provinces. . . ." Admiral Yi also understood his own navy's capabilities and limitations. Once he reached the point of diminishing returns, he called off the attack. The gallant admiral withdrew from Pusan Bay as night fell without having lost a single ship, unwilling to risk anymore lives or ships needlessly.
Admiral Yi Sun-sin stands, without exaggeration, as the single greatest hero in Korean history. Compared with other famous naval battles in history, Admiral Yi's exploits and his navy's victories stand in a class with the Spanish defeat of the Turks off the Cyprus coast in the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, and the English defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588. Each of these great naval engagements resulted in a significant turning point in naval warfare. The Battle of Lepanto marked the end of the era dominated by massive oar-powered war galleys and the defeat of the Spanish Armada marked the beginning of a new era dominated by the use of the heavily-armed, sail-powered man-of-war.
In 1571, Don Juan de Austria, the half-brother of Spain's Philip II, commanded the massive fleet of the Holy League against the fleet of the Ottoman Turks in the Gulf of Lepanto (Gulf of Corinth). The Battle of Lepanto was the last major naval battle fought by opposing fleets of rowing war galleys utilizing boarding tactics against each other. The Japanese relied on boarding tactics as their primary attack method in naval battles during the Imjin War, but Admiral Yi consistently denied them the opportunity to use them.
When King Henry VIII ordered new cannon installed on his warships in 1512, the result was the powerful English man-of-war. Powered by large sails and armed with heavy cannon mounted low on the cargo deck that fired through gun ports in the hull, the man-of-war stood in sharp contrast to the lightly armed Spanish galleys which still relied on boarding tactics as their principal fighting technique. The removal of the ornate elevated decks fore and aft made these ships lighter, less bulky and much easier to maneuver, a critical quality if a captain was going to avoid close quarter combat with an opponent. The development of England's man-of-war makes one appreciate Admiral Yi's development of the kobukson and its ultimate impact on Choson's history.
In the late 16th century, Spain's King Phillip II sent his "Invincible Armada" of 125 ships into the English Channel to ferry the Duke of Parma's army from the Spanish Netherlands across the channel and land them in England. There they would march on London, capture Queen Elizabeth I, and proceed to conquer the entire country. When the heavy Spanish galleys under the command of the Duke of Medina Sedonia arrived off the southwest coast of England in mid-July 1588, an English fleet led by Lord Howard and the privateer Francis Drake sailed into the channel to attack.
The more maneuverable English ships avoided close-in fighting, but harassed the Spanish galleys as they sailed up the English Channel to Calias. Between July 31 and August 8, individual English ships inflicted considerable damage by continually sailing around the heavier Spanish galleys using "hit and run" tactics. The Spanish, who began the fight in their traditional frontal line formation, reacted to the unorthodox English tactics by breaking their formation to fight individually, thus forfeiting their greatest strength. The resulting chaos caused by separate fights between individual ships turned the battle in England's favor.
In danger of a total defeat, the Duke of Medina Sedonia made a fateful decision to forego the invasion and return to Spain via the North of Scotland and Ireland. The English fleet pursued the Spanish into the North Sea for three days, breaking off and returning to England only after they ran out of ammunition. The few Spanish ships that managed to survive the violent storms off Scotland and Ireland limped back to Spain totally defeated and demoralized. The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 was an English victory only in the sense that its new warships held their own against the might of the Spanish Navy. It was certainly not a victory of English naval tactics, since they had no coordinated battlefield strategy. The free-for-all battle involving one-on-one engagements showed they had no idea how to apply their cannons effectively, but it also marked the beginning of a new era in naval warfare that used sailing men-of-war armed with heavy cannon.
England was lucky in 1588. Because early cannon were inaccurate, the British didn't understand that the best way to maximize the man-of-war's firepower was to sail in line-ahead column formation, to turn broad-side to their target and unleash all their cannons at once. Admiral Yi Sun-sin understood this principle because he read Sun Tzu. Furthermore, Admiral Yi did not rely on luck to win a fight. Just four years after the defeat of the Spanish Armada, Admiral Yi, who had never heard of Spain or England, consistently applied the right technology and used the right strategy to defeat the Japanese in 1592. Like the English, Admiral Yi had superiority over his enemies with fast, maneuverable warships. Both England and Choson adopted new sea-fighting techniques to thwart an enemy whose strengths lay in its soldiers and boarding tactics. The Defeat of the Spanish Armada ended in a draw. Admiral Yi Sun-sin however, was decisive in his victories and won every battle in 1592 against a far larger number of enemy ships without losing a single warship of his own! Neither Sir John Hawkins nor Sir Francis Drake could make that claim in 1588.
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Hideyoshi's armies entrenched well north of Seoul could be supplied only by sea. General Kuroda Nagamasa, holding the region west of P'yong'yang, depended completely on Japanese shipping for resupply, shipping that had to sail northward through waters under the full command of Admiral Yi Sun-sin. The Choson navy's spectacular summer offensive erased all hope of resupply or reinforcement and left the Japanese army to itself and its own resources for survival. Admiral Yi's achievements not only imperiled Japanese supply routes and hampered Hideyoshi's ability to launch fresh attacks in Choson, it had the lasting benefit of keeping the grain-rich Cholla Province out of Japanese hands. Stung more than once by this crafty naval officer, after three months of fighting the Japanese learned to avoid Admiral Yi on the open sea. They changed tactics and began making night raids and avoiding areas patrolled by the Choson Navy.
Japan soon faced a new set of challenges from the Choson people, who responded in a very interesting way to the presence of Japanese troops on their native soil. Despite the calamitous threat posed by the invasion, the common people's deep disaffection with their own government led many to actually refuse to support the government in defense of the country. Once the threat to their own estates and land holdings became a reality however, when the Japanese presence actually threatened their personal wealth and security, a boiling rage among the people swept the peninsula. People suddenly found the inspiration to fight, not to preserve the government, but to preserve their own way of life. The same population that earlier reacted so indifferently to government efforts to muster fresh troops to defend their country, suddenly took up arms in defense of their own homes.
In district after district, peasant farmers and slaves coalesced around a single leader, generally a member of the rural aristocracy, to form small fighting units. Literally hundreds of guerilla bands, including bands of Buddhist monks, large and small alike, sprang to life amidst the Japanese. As these guerilla bands gained strength, they expanded their area of operations. Using hit and run tactics, guerrilla fighters often dealt severe and stinging blows to Japanese military operations.
Once the Choson populace began to fight the Japanese, a number of heroic battles took place that earned a number of people a lasting place in Korean history Cho Hon led a guerilla force that rose from Okch'on in Ch'ungch'ong Province and routed the Japanese from Ch'ongju. Cho died in a later assault on Kumsan. Kwak Chae-u assembled a guerilla force in Uiryong in Kyongsang Province and, in battles along the Naktong River, drove the Japanese out of the Uiryong-Ch'anggyong area. Kim Ch'on-il led a guerilla force that repeatedly harassed the Japanese in the area around Suwon.
Ming China finally responded to King Sonjo's plea for help in July 1592, by sending a woefully inadequate 5,000 man division into Choson. After crossing the Yalu River near Uiju, the token force bravely marched southeastward toward P'yong'yang. General Konishi led his forces in a single night battle that swiftly decimated the entire Chinese division. Basking in his victory over the Chinese, Konishi eagerly anticipated the arrival of reinforcements sailing up the Taedong River so he could begin the actual invasion of China. He was not strong enough to move north without them. When he finally learned of the crushing defeat of Japanese shipping at sea and that reinforcements would never come, he realized there would be no invasion of China. He sat as far north as the Japanese would ever get. The Japanese army was spread across north-central Choson at the time and held a strong enough position they could wait for further orders. As they waited through the autumn of 1592 with no word from Japan, supplies ran low and their position became more precarious. Worse, the Chinese were concentrating a strong, well-equipped army north of the Yalu River.
In January 1593, General Li Ju-sung led fifty-thousand battle-hardened Chinese troops, fresh from subduing a Mongol rebellion in Manchuria, across the frozen Yalu River in the dead of winter. This Chinese army, unlike its ill-fated predecessors, marched directly to P'yong'yang and successfully drove General Konishi out of the city. General Konishi withdrew his battle-worn troops south to Seoul, pursued all the way by General Li. Choson's citizen guerrillas constantly harassed the starving Japanese soldiers, who were taxed nearly to the limit of their endurance. The fighting withdrawal halted at Pyokchegwan, just north of Seoul. Though Chinese and Japanese troops fought pitched battles outside the city walls, no large-scale attacks occurred on Seoul itself. Within the city however, Japanese troops killed many people and burned much of the capital, including the Kyongbok Palace, the Ch'angdok Palace, and numerous other structures that dated from the beginning of the Yi dynasty.
Japanese and Chinese troops fought to a standstill in a fierce battle at Pyokchegwan. Local guerilla forces under Kwon Yul, anticipating a joint attack on Seoul in concert with General Li Ju-sung's army, took up positions at Tohyang-san, the mountain redoubt south of Seoul on the north bank of the Han River near Haengju. The Chinese never arrived. General Li Ju-sung had pulled his army back to P'yong'yang for a rest, leaving the guerrillas isolated. Nevertheless, Kwon Yul's small force successfully held their ground in the bloody fighting that raged around Haengju. The Japanese repeatedly sent out large-scale assaults against Tohyang-san, but failed to dislodge Kwon's guerrillas. When the defenders ran out of arrows, women in the fortress helped gather stones that were thrown against the Japanese troops. Admiral Yi Pin resupplied the Tohyang-san fortress during the fighting by sailing up the Han River in time to deliver more arrows. Kwon Yul's guerilla force successfully held their ground in a campaign that is remembered as one of Korea's three great triumphs against the Japanese during the war.
The Japanese position gradually went from bad to worse. With no hope of resupply by sea, pinned down in Seoul by continuously mounting pressure from the Chinese army and local guerrillas, with food supplies cut off and his forces now reduced by nearly one third from desertion, disease and death, Konishi was compelled to sue for peace. General Li Ju-sung offered General Konishi a chance to negotiate an end to the hostilities. When negotiations got underway in the spring of 1593, China and Choson agreed to cease hostilities if the Japanese would withdraw from Choson altogether. General Konishi had no option but to accept the terms, but he would have a hard time convincing Hideyoshi he had no other choice.
Unbroken in spirit, but physically weakened by hunger to the point they were no longer an effective fighting force, the Japanese army departed Seoul in late May 1593, one year from the date of their invasion at Pusan. As the remnants of Konishi's division moved out of Seoul, Chinese troops marched southward from P'yong'yang in a screening formation to cover the Japanese and ensure their departure. The Chinese intended to prevent them from regrouping and again attacking to the north. Choson guerrillas joined in the pursuit by continually harassing and attacking Japanese soldiers throughout their arduous retreat to the port of Pusan and the southeastern coast of Kyongsang Province. Following the recapture of Seoul, the Chinese commander Li Ju-sung observed that,
"...the country all about was lying fallow, and a great famine stared the Koreans in the face....the dead bodies of its victims lay all along the road."
This should have been the end of the war, and General Li Ju-sung apparently believed it was over, for he marched his army northward, leaving Choson to take care of matters itself, even though the Japanese had yet to sail for home. Before the Japanese began loading aboard ships, orders arrived from Hideyoshi commanding the Japanese army to seize positions on a number of capes or promontories along Choson's south coast that were easily defended on the land side and to build entrenched camps. General Konishi strongly objected to such a plan, which was neither conducting a proper war nor completely withdrawing from Choson. Such sound advice nearly cost Konishi his head, but under specific orders to do so, the Japanese placed a number of strong rearguard detachments at selected points along the south coast to cover their evacuation. The bulk of Hideyoshi's war-weary troops finally sailed for Japan.
Once peace negotiations between China and Japan finally got underway, for some unknown reason Chinese negotiators gave Ming Emperor Shen Tsung the mistaken impression that he was about to deal with a minor state that had been subdued by war. Furthermore, they conveyed the idea that the Japanese regent, Hideyoshi, was prepared to become his vassal. Under such conditions, the Chinese sought to resolve the issue in their favor by including Japan in their tributary system of foreign relations. They would establish Hideyoshi as king of Japan and grant him the privilege of formal tribute trade relations with the Ming dynasty.
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In Japan, Hideyoshi's negotiators apparently led him to believe that China was suing for peace and ready to accept him as their emperor. Thus, Hideyoshi issued the demands of a victor; first, a daughter of the Ming emperor must be sent to become the wife of the Japanese emperor; second, the southern provinces of Choson must be ceded to Japan; third, normal trade relations between China and Japan must be restored; and fourth, a Choson prince and several high-ranking Yi government officials must be sent to Japan as hostages. Bargaining from such fundamentally different perspectives, there was no prospect whatsoever for these talks to succeed.
Hideyoshi needed time to rebuild his fleet and raise a fresh army before the almost certain protests over the presence of Japanese garrisons along Choson's south coast developed into military action to force them out. A past master of the art of plausible delay, Hideyoshi kept Chinese envoys waiting for months on various pretexts then sent them home with an entirely new set of demands he knew would never be accepted. For nearly three years, both sides engaged in long and drawn out negotiations. Envoys came and went, with constant protests from one side and constant evasions and excuses from the other. The needless misunderstandings between China and Japan proved irreconcilable.
While the diplomats delayed, Hideyoshi's shipwrights were building a new fleet as quickly as they could hammer the planks together. A new army was being trained and equipped. Large stores of food were being quietly cached in Japanese garrison camps along the south Choson coast. All the while, Choson's former great fleet sat rotting at anchor, with a few ships being used in the coastal trade. Admiral Yi Sun-sin lived the quiet, dull life of isolated retirement. In the summer of 1596, preparations were well underway to mount a second invasion of Choson. Hideyoshi appointed General Konishi Yukinaga commanding officer of his new fleet and quietly slipped a force of 100,000 men into the Choson garrison positions. Realizing that Ming China was adamantly refusing to entertain his demands, let alone submit to them, Hideyoshi suddenly exploded in a carefully affected attitude of rage at the latest Chinese emissaries. Claiming that China was trying to force Japan into submission, he stated in his reply that he intended to punish Choson for impeding good relations between his own country and China (a claim totally without foundation) and broke off all talks with the Chinese.
Song of the Great Peace
Toyotomi Hideyoshi launched a second major invasion of Choson in 1596, but faced greater opposition from both Choson and Chinese forces. Unable to expand beyond Kyongsang Province, the Japanese finally withdrew in the winter of 1598. The final disastrous defeat of the Japanese fleet by Admiral Yi in the Battle of Chinhae Bay ended fleet actions by the Japanese for the next 300 years.
The pounding suffered by the Japanese navy at the hands of the Choson navy remained an acute embarrassment to Hideyoshi. When Japanese troops left Choson, they did so quite willingly, in large part because so long as Admiral Yi Sun-sin lived, and so long as his ships controlled the seas, Japan had no hope of reinforcing the peninsula. Nearly 180,000 Japanese had already died at his hands and the Japanese greatly feared him. The Japanese confidently believed that removing Admiral Yi Sun-sin would leave the Tsushima Strait virtually undefended. Well-aware of the festering political jealousies that permeated Seoul, the Japanese devised a plan they hoped would take the Choson admiral out of action permanently.
In late 1596, a spy arrived at the Yi court in Seoul with a tempting piece of totally false, yet totally believable intelligence. He carefully planted the story that a Japanese invasion fleet would be sailing past a coastal point on a certain day. The still frightened and suspicious Yi government took the bait and immediately ordered Yi Sun-sin to sea to intercept the invaders. Yi Sun-sin had an ego as big as his fleet however, and correctly interpreted the situation as nothing more than a great deception. He refused to sail.
Admiral Yi Sun-sin, the naval hero whose genius ensured Choson's survival during the Japanese invasion, received his appointment from a member of the Namin (Southern) faction and subsequently earned the support of the Tong-in (Eastern) faction as well. Despite the war, factional feuds raged unabated in the Yi court with the So-in (Western) faction holding the dominant position. The bickering between the Tong-in and the So-in factions led to the kind of ironic result that epitomized the senseless nature of factionalism and the Choson court's totally unrealistic attitude toward the Imjin War. Yet another telling example of this attitude is the manner in which King Sonjo issued awards. Eighty-six members of the retinue that followed Sonjo in his earlier retreat to the city of Uiju received status awards granted to merit subjects. Only eighteen men received such awards for meritorious service for combat against the Japanese.
In the aftermath of the accusations and innuendos that flew about the Yi court, King Sonjo ordered Yi Sun-sin's arrest. The court relieved him of his command, reduced him in rank to a simple soldier, and jailed him in early 1597. The victorious So-in (Western) faction replaced Yi Sun-sin with its own favorite son, Won Kyun, commander of one of the Cholla district naval stations. The So-in won a hollow political victory. Admiral Won Kyun proved to be an utterly incompetent naval commander with little taste for battle, which he carefully avoided whenever he could.
Hideyoshi made two fatal mistakes in planning his second invasion of the Korean Peninsula. First, he assummed that with Yi Sun-sin out of the picture, even if he should encounter trouble at sea, which he evidently did, he had no reason to fear major interference with his invasion. Second, and more devastating, he completely underestimated the probable opposition on land. He totally misinterpreted the fact that Japan's rapid advanced up the peninsula in 1592 was due more to China's slow response than Choson's weak military defense. He confidently expected an easy occupation, secure from any interference by sea.
The Chinese realized that in the first war they had moved too slow in sending troops to assist Choson and left too soon, allowing the Japanese to retain a foothold in the south. Suspicious of Hideyoshi's intentions throughout the years of deadlocked diplomatic wrangling, the Chinese poured troops into Choson, helping to defend virtually every city, town, mountain pass, and river ford in depth.
Japan's second expeditionary force of about 140,000 men safely arrived along the southern coast of Choson and landed unopposed on the south coast of Kyongsang Province in early 1596. Once they established a foothold however, the Japanese found Choson both equipped and ready to deal with an invasion. Even China responded quickly to the renewed threat, sending an additional contingent of 40,000 troops under the command of General Yang Hao directly into Kyongsang Province. The Japanese faced strong, stubborn opposition and could not break out of the southern provinces. Outnumbered at every step of their painfully slow advance, it took the Japanese six months of constant fighting to advance no father than a point which they had reached in only two weeks during the first invasion in 1592.
The Japanese land army achieved little more than local success in its engagements and remained confined largely to Kyongsang Province. By late 1596, the Japanese dug in and established defensive positions from which they launched numerous short-range attacks that kept the more numerous Chinese and Choson forces off balance. To avoid any chance that the leadership in Kyoto would doubt the fighting prowess of the Japanese commanders in Choson, the officers sent barrels filled with the pickled ears of nearly 38,000 of their victims to the capital as proof. The grisly remains were later given a proper burial a long way from home at Kyoto in the Mimizuka, or "Mound of Ears."
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The situation at sea was very different. With Yi Sun-sin out of the picture, the Japanese navy operated with unaccustomed aggressiveness. Events quickly overtook the freshly appointed Admiral Won Kyun that again threatened the survival of the Yi dynasty. When news of the approaching invasion fleet reached Choson, Admiral Won received orders to attack. His lack of leadership had reduced the Choson fleet to such a low level state of readiness that it was hardly an effective fighting force. Nevertheless, Admiral Won was obliged to obey. When he finally crossed paths with General Konishi's fleet, purely by chance as it turned out, his inept maneuvering nearly resulted in the elimination of the entire Choson fleet. Admiral Won's captains deserted him at the first contact with the Japanese and the Choson fleet scattered. Admiral Won saved his own skin by fleeing the battle. Konishi completely turned the tables and destroyed nearly all the ships in Admiral Won's weak command, the first great naval victory against a foreign enemy in Japanese history. When word of the disaster reached the Yi court, it was only the influence of the powerful So-in (Western) faction that prevented his execution.
King Sonjo had no alternative. Having already treated a national hero with insulting ingratitude, he hastily pardoned Yi Sun-sin and reinstated him as Admiral of the Navy and Commander of the Fleet. Yi Sun-sin, always ready to act in the service of his country, accepted his new command; the twelve surviving ships from Admiral Won Kyun's disgraceful action against the Japanese. It is unclear whether these were all the ships that Won Kyun left him, whether the government feared he might stage the world's first naval coup d'ιtat if he had more, or whether all he needed was twelve ships. Despite its small size, Admiral Yi's ships wasted little time in aggressively harassing the Japanese to great effect.
General Konishi, unaware of the change of command in the Choson navy, dispatched a squadron of ships to the west from Pusan to assist the garrisons in that area. As Admiral Yi Sun-sin sailed into the area frequented by Japanese shipping along the southern coast, Konishi's squadron sailed headlong into his approaching ships near Hansan Island, the site of his earlier decisive victory over the Japanese. The results were the same as they had always been. The entire Japanese squadron suffered a complete and disastrous defeat. Although it was only the loss of a small squadron and Konishi's fleet remained intact, news of the naval action sent shivers through the Japanese army command. Their past experience with Admiral Yi Sun-sin made them suddenly very cautious about taking any further risks.
The Japanese held their positions through the winter of 1596, constantly harassed and threatened from the land side, but free from assault by sea. Although Admiral Yi had destroyed one naval squadron, he was too weak in numbers to take on the main Japanese fleet. His reputation still haunted Konishi and his menacing presence on the Japanese western flank kept the Japanese general perpetually apprehensive. Matters remained indecisive well into the summer of 1597, yet Hideyoshi refused to admit he had been beaten. The mounting strain took a terrible toll on troop morale as the Japanese tried to maintain a position from which they had nothing to gain.
During the winter of 1597, a large Japanese fleet sailed from the southern port of Oranp'o bound for the Yellow Sea. At the time, Admiral Yi's small twelve-ship squadron was stationed in the straits off South Cholla Province that lie between Jin Island and the Hwawon Peninsula, reinforced by a small squadron of Chinese ships under orders to follow his command. It is remarkable testimony to the great respect the Chinese held for the man, since on all other occasions of cooperation with Choson, the Chinese always insisted on taking supreme command. Lying in wait off Myongnyang, near the port of Mokp'o, secure in his knowledge of local high tides and torrential currents that roar through the narrow strait, Yi Sun-sin's twelve ships sat in ambush as the Japanese fleet carefully filed between Jin Island and the peninsula.
With his flagship anchored at the throat of the narrow channel, Admiral Yi held his position while his other ships sat at the ready to his rear. As the Japanese continued their advance, Admiral Yi's subordinate officers gave him up for dead and started rowing in retreat. At this critical juncture, Admiral Yi "whipped off the neck of a sailor rowing back and hung it up high on the ship's mast, then roared, "Attack!" With predictable effect, the decapitation galvanized the fighting spirit of his men and they charged into the Japanese ships. Through sheer fighting skill and the spirit of his men, Admiral Yi's twelve fighting ships sank thirty-one Japanese ships, killed their fleet commander and scattered the remaining ships into retreat. The "Miracle of Myongnyang" put the seas once again under Choson's control and sealed the fate of Japan's land army.
In early 1598, the Chinese engaged the Japanese in a massive battle near the city of Ulsan. Although the fierce engagement did not break the Japanese position, it starkly reinforced the fact that Hideyoshi's army could not break out of its defensive perimeter in Kyongsang Province. Driven back into a shrinking perimeter along the south, central and southeastern coastal regions, the Japanese army found itself hemmed in both by land and sea. Japan's position in Choson became so bad by autumn that the Japanese field commander was on the verge of asking to negotiate an armistice. The stalemate was broken with the sudden arrival of news from the Shogun. Hideyoshi had died suddenly on September 18, 1598 , and his successor had decided to abandon the campaign. The Japanese army in Choson quickly sued for peace and agreed to a complete withdrawal.
Orders for reembarkation were issued and in early winter the Japanese began the slow process of moving aboard ships for the journey home. Although neither Chinese nor Choson troops made any effort to grasp the opportunity at hand, the Japanese exercised extreme caution during their withdrawal, trying to prevent the sizeable forces nearby from taking tactical advantage of the movement. The withdrawal was successfully completed in due time, and the transport ships set sail for Japan, escorted by the main Japanese fleet under the command of General Konishi, the first to arrive in Choson some six years earlier and now the last to leave.
The Japanese still faced the challenge of recrossing the Tsushima Strait, a stretch of open water where the implacable warrior Yi Sun-sin still held command. Admiral Yi felt little sympathy for his landbound colleagues, who sat and watched the Japanese leave without striking a farewell blow. He was resolved that on his element at least, they should feel one. Having already been dealt with so unceremoniously by King Sonjo's court, Admiral Yi felt certain that jealous factions would again try to bring him down in disgrace after the war. Before that could happen however, he determined to win one last great victory against the Japanese.
Carefully watching for his chance, Admiral Yi Sun-sin hurriedly moved northeastward from Ch'ungmu just as the evacuation convoy was fully underway. On December 16, 1598, Admiral Yi led his fleet against some 400 Japanese ships in Chinhae Bay off Noryang Point. The small Choson squadron had no difficulty catching up with great lumbering fleet moving slowly toward the Tsushima Strait. Far outnumbered, Admiral Yi used his ships like sheep dogs to encircle the Japanese and herd their ships into a confused and helpless mass. General Konishi put up a gallant defense during the long and fiercely contested naval engagement that followed.
Near the height of the battle, under a sky covered by the smoke of burning ships, with arrows and rifle balls flying in all directions, a random bullet fatally wounded the fifty-four-year-old Yi Sun-sin as he proudly stood in the prow of his flagship. Lying mortally wounded on the deck of his ship, enjoying the satisfaction of seeing the last of the Japanese invaders leaving his homeland, Yi Sun-sin ordered his men to keep his death a secret until a decisive victory had been won. Both sides suffered heavy losses in the fighting that ultimately broke the Japanese convoy into a number of smaller groups. As the stragglers broke free of the fighting and made their way to safe ports, the last great naval battle of the Imjin War faded into history. Although Japan did not suffer the complete defeat handed the French and Spanish fleets at the Battle of Trafalgar, the outcome of the winter Battle of Chinhae Bay ended any fleet battle actions by the Japanese for the next 300 years.
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Few naval commanders ever more thoroughly justified Napoleon's words that, "war is an affair not of men, but of a man." The fact that Admiral Yi Sun-sin fought aboard a ship of his own design with such superior fighting qualities that nothing else afloat at the time could match it does not lessen the magnitude of his success. If the object of a war is to win, then the nation, or man, that attains that goal by the intelligent production of better weapons is fully entitled to the success achieved. Yi Sun-sin did more than just design a better ship. He never made mistakes. He went to war without the guidance of existing principles of naval strategy and literally improvised and acted on his own initiative as he went along. Not a single instance of any importance in his whole record of service was marred by faulty judgement.
Admiral Yi Sun-sin realized at the very outset of the Imjin War that he could not make the sea impassable to Japan by splitting his fleet and stationing squadrons along the southern Choson coast. He clearly understood that instead of picking the fruits of victory piecemeal, the best way to reach the fruit was to take a sharp axe and cut down the entire tree. In his first major campaign near Okp'o, he went directly after the troop and supply ships on which all else depended. Having destoyed them, the impact was felt throughout the Japanese command, right down to the soldier in the field.
The Imjin War cost the Japanese thousands of lives and an untold amount of their national treasure, all without any measurable material gain whatsoever. If Hideyoshi's two wanton and unprovoked invasions in 1592 and 1597 accomplished anything, they virtually devastated Choson and left a broken and desolate landscape. Nearly every one of Choson's eight provinces had been an arena for pillage and slaughter. While the Choson navy sank or destroyed by fire over three hundred Japanese ships in its first four naval campaigns, Admiral Yi's naval actions were the only true bright spot of the Imjin War.
In 1598, the poet Pak No-gye described the horror of the Japanese invasions in an epic entitled "Song of the Great Peace";
For 10,000 *li the waving battle-flags
darken the sky.
With a great roar the cries of the soldiers
seem to lift heaven and earth.
Higher than mountains, the bones
pile up in the fields.
Vast cities, great towns
become the burrows of wolves and foxes.
(* ' li ', is the traditional measurement of distance. 1 li is approximately 397m)
The Choson economy depended heavily on grain production and Japan's occupation of the southern rice-producing areas and the war demands they placed on the people created vast shortages of food and other supplies. The widespread foraging activities of Chinese and Japanese troops further aggravated an already serious grain shortage. As the grain shortages became more acute, famine and disease spread across Choson along with open banditry and peasant uprisings. The two attacks by Japan scarred the country for years afterward and left a legacy of undying hatred toward the Japanese, a bitter feeling handed down from one generation to the next. In the view of some historians, the country never really recovered.
One of the most important aspects of the Imjin War was that resistance against the Japanese emerged from among the people of Choson instead of being directed from the Choson government. For the first time in their long history, Choson's united guerilla resistance against an alien invader gave the Koreans a sense of nationalism and self determination.
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I have to complaints Kwaessa
1. Before 1600
2. Far too long. How about a resymθ and a couple of pics.
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1. He lived in the final days of the 16th century :D Died at 1598. Shouldn't that count as 'close enough'?
2. I tried to summarize the article, but I figured it was essential for other people to understand what the other side of the world was like. People lived here, and made wars here too, you know! :)
But yeah.. it's too long. The first half is all background info. If you don't wanna read all of it, just skip to the "The Imjin War", that's where the war breaks out. Sorry for the long long long long post.
3. A VASTLY summarized version of the whole tale would be the Wiki entry.
For the lazu guys :) here's the link;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yi_Sun_Shin
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Thats better :)
So the conclusion is that the Turtle ships are actually the reason for the whole Ninja Turtle thing in the 90's and Yi Sun-sin was infact the first Ninja Turtle?
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More like "My General PWNZ URZ!" :D
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Originally posted by lasersailor184
Btw, MacArthur was one of the worst commanders ever. Anyone who posts his name again will be banned from the list.
Ditto on Montgomery.
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Originally posted by Lizard3
Who was the Japanese Admiral who wooped hell out of the Russians back before WW2? Might've been before WW1...anyway, he did number on em.
Togo
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For the Rommel partisans, a question:
I recall that during the time Rommel ran rampant, looking like a tactical genius, he was actually being guided by specific intelligence that revealed the Brit's plans in detail. These plans had been provided as a courtesy to the US miltary attache in Africa, who kindly forwarded them by radio in a code the germans had broken (rather than by diplomatic pouch).
Once this leak was ID'd and plugged, Rommel suddenly didnt look so invincable -- at least as I recall the timing.
He was a clearly an excellent commander who both gave and received loyalty from his troops. His attacks into France benefitted from the French army's lethargy and tactical mistakes; he effectively spanked the inexperienced US army in N Africa; his defense of Normandy was hindered by material and higher command.
Does he really deserve the best of all time moniker?
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How about Gustavus Adolfus? This king of sweden revolutionized warfare with demonstrations of mobility and tactical innovations that made his swedes major players in the 30 Years' War. He shifted emphasis from careful defensive preparations to active defense by attack; he introduced mobile artillery; he used maneuver, misdirection, and deception better than any previous commander. He was idolized by both Clauswitz and Bonaparte.
Some say his death in combat (1632) profoundly changed european history by leaving germany's fractious hodgepodge of states destabilized, until they eventually became prussianized by Bismarck; had Gustavus lived, his militarily efforts might have unified germany without the prussian dominance and prevented.......world war????