Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => Aircraft and Vehicles => Topic started by: Squire on September 14, 2005, 06:08:11 PM
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Yes, I know its been debated already, but a Q. came up in another thread I would like answered, so my apologies, I dont want to hijack the other thread.
Guppy, Karnak, Kev (and who ever else wants in):
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/2taf150_112044.gif
What is the above doc refferring to if the XIV only ran on 100/130? and "never used +25lbs" as was stated?
Im confused since the 610 Sqn doc clearly states 21 lbs being used on 100/130 fuel, so if the XIV got 150 octane one would logically assume it wasnt to run at the same boost, yes?
Its also my understanding that Tempests, P-51s (USAAF and RAF), Spit IXs and Spit XIVs all received the stuff in the anti V-1 missions to begin with.
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150 octane fuel allowed the Spit XIV to be boosted to +21lbs boost from +18lbs boost on 100 octane. The Merlin 66 and Packard Merlin 266 were able to be boosted to +25lbs boost.
From what Kurfurst says it was not a problem with detonation in the Griffon engine, but rather the bearings were too likely to fail at +25lbs boost in the Griffon 65.
That is how I understand it. The only chart I have seen about a Spit XIV at +25lbs was a calculated chart, not actual flight test data.
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Ok, but if what your saying is accurate then this doc also needs explaining to me.
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no610orb.jpg
So, what fuel are they reffering to with 610 Sqn?
It indicates 130 octane fuel, with 21 lbs boost. Read the whole doc.
This doc here indicates trials on 25 lbs, and does not appear to me to be "guesswork"?
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit14speedns.jpg
...and further I have my own book (quoted in the other thread) that indicates its use. So far from the nay sayers I have not alot, Im not saying im absolutely sure but so far the preponderence of the evidence is with me. If you guys are saying it never used it I would like to see more than just opinion.
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Typing error.
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Ah ok, so it was 150 octane then for 21 lbs boost. Ok, well Im satisfied with that.
Nothing like a typo to get a guy confused.
I have also seen some references as "130 octane" which doesnt help in research either.
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Something else that I find curious is the total silence amongst the P-51 fans. Since the VIIIth AF Fighter Command did use the 150 fuel as well, I would have thought there would have been some posts on it. I have seen very little discussed on the subject however.
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Originally posted by Squire
Ah ok, so it was 150 octane then for 21 lbs boost. Ok, well Im satisfied with that.
Nothing like a typo to get a guy confused.
I have also seen some references as "130 octane" which doesnt help in research either.
The 130 might be used to differentiate between 100 fuel and 100/130 fuel.
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To help clear up a bit :
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/715_1126770880_avia152911.jpg)
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/715_1126770999_avia6-5817-griffon.jpg)
So the wanted to increase it to +25 later on, but appearantly did not succeed until the war`s end. See this trial done between March-July 1945, where limitations are still given as +21 :
"The relevant limatations at the time of the test were :-
Condition.................... ............. Boost lb/sq.in. R.P.M.
Maximum for climbing (normal rating) +9 2600
Maximum for combat (5 mins. limit *) +21 2750 "
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/la187.html
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An interesting reference to the Merlin 63 at +21 lbs, there were a number of Spitfire F.IXs (Merlin 63) still operating in 1944, although most were varients with the Merlin 66 and 70 series in various types.
Also the US built Packard V1650 (P-51).
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IIRC ~1000 F IXs, (61 or 63), 4000ish LF IX and 400 IX HF were built, so indeed the LF would be the most common variant, but I`d not underestimate the number of F IXs with Merlin 63. As for the Merlin 70 ones, I recall that there were only two squadrons with them (given the low numbers produced + reserves/replacements etc., and it had kindof a special task, like GM1ers in the LW) Unfortunately there`s very little info even RAF OOBs, even fewer that tell the exact type of aircraft.
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Yes, there was not a big need by 1943 for a high alt fighter in the RAF, so the high alt VII and the HF IX saw only limited use in comparison. Most being employed as "regular" fighters 44-45.
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Originally posted by Kurfrst
IIRC ~1000 F IXs, (61 or 63), 4000ish LF IX and 400 IX HF were built, so indeed the LF would be the most common variant, but I`d not underestimate the number of F IXs with Merlin 63. As for the Merlin 70 ones, I recall that there were only two squadrons with them (given the low numbers produced + reserves/replacements etc., and it had kindof a special task, like GM1ers in the LW) Unfortunately there`s very little info even RAF OOBs, even fewer that tell the exact type of aircraft.
Yeah, the original F IX (Mk V airframe with Merlin 61) was originally made as a response to the 190's. Didn't last long though, and as Kurfurst says the F IX with the Merlin 70 was never produced in significant numbers.
The fights had got lower and they started using the low alt Merlin 66.
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Here is a riddle.
The Merlin 61 model 1942 Spitfire IX could cruise at 43000 feet - battle formation. Over France BTW.
So what could an extended wing merlin 70 Spitfire touch a year or two later?
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If true, it must have awfully tiresome for the pilot at such altitude, at the edge of stall, without pressurized cabin... whats the data btw?
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43,800 ft is the highest reference I can find. The only thing up there would be Ju-86 recon birds.
Im sure the extended tips would give a bit more control over 30k than you would otherwise get. Damn high.
As for the Merlin 70, I dont think it gave much of an increase in absolute ceiling?, but rather its supercharger kicked in at a higher alt.
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Data is from Duncan Smith, who lead his squadron in formation at that altitude. I'll look it up just in case.
I think Quill mentions that as well.
Now if you adjust the Turbocharger for higher alt, have lower wingloading due to extended wings, and in the case of the Spit VII, - a Pressurised cockpit, how far do you get.
I have heard one claim of 49K, but I will have to get into the guy's logbooks to see it. Might happen one day though.;)
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The original document quoted DOES NOT "clearly state" that 130 octane is the fuel grade being used with +21lbs boost.
On 23.2.44 it mentions "service trials" with 130 Octane fuel. No boost level mentioned.
On 31.3.44 it mentions plug fouling as a result of the switch to 130 Octane fuel. No boost level mentioned.
THREE MONTHS LATER
On JULY 18th we see: "The modification of the aircraft to take 21 lbs boost continues." No mention of fuel type being used.
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Im not sure what your getting at. If its not 150 octane fuel then what is it?
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/merlin66_18_25b.jpg
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Even better
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no1_25lbs.jpg
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit14at21.jpg
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/125wing-replacement-aircraft.jpg
New type hood I assume means change to bubble type canopy.
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Originally posted by Squire
Ok, but if what your saying is accurate then this doc also needs explaining to me.
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no610orb.jpg
So, what fuel are they reffering to with 610 Sqn?
It indicates 130 octane fuel, with 21 lbs boost. Read the whole doc.
I was pointing out that the document does not state that 130 octane fuel was being used with 21 lbs boost. Also 130 octane is not a typo, they really mean 130 octane(a.k.a. 100/130, in US terminology).
1. It states that in Feb/March the Sqn switched fuel to 130 octane(no boost level mentioned), and that they had spark plug trouble as a consequence.
2. Then, 3 months later, they were modifying their aircraft for operation at 21 lbs boost, with no mention of the fuel grade then in use(presumably, 150 octane).
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It was a presumption based on faulty info I had from another source. My bad. In any case I beleive the question has been satisified, at least for me.
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This as of 16th March 1944,
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/130.jpg
Neil
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Hi Neil:
Thanks as ever for posting on this subject. I'm interested to see 60 O.T.U. on the list - it was the Operational Training Unit for Fighter-Bomber Mosquitos. I'm also intrigued to see the Merlin 21/23 as the test bed engine for the mossies - until now I've only ever seen the Merlin 25 in connection with 150 Octane.
For what it's worth, Lewis Brandon mentions in his wartime memoirs that when 157 Sqn. went over to chasing V-1s, the aircraft were modified by having their nose cones strengthened, stub exhausts fitted and the engines converted to use 150 Octane. He then says that with the exception of the exhausts, those modifications were retained when they went back to conventional night fighting. I believe they were using Mk.XIXs at the time - generally equipped with the M25 IIRC.
I'm on the road yet again, so I can't check in the book for the direct quote - will try to do so when I get back, though that could be weeks yet.
Cheers,
Scherf
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Thanks Scherf.
The information I have, is that as of July 1944, 96, 85 and 157 sqn were using 150 grade and increased boost, later 68 and 125 sqn Mosquito XXX's were modified and lastly the 1945 Edition of the Mossi FB VI Pilots notes clears +25lbs boost with 150 grade.
I look forward to hearing from you.
Neil.
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The surprising thing is that they are talking about doing so to Merlin 21/23 Mossie VIs. I'd have expected them to use the more powerful Merlin 25 Mossie VIs for the task.
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Thanks for that Neil - seems to confirm what Brandon says.
Was it just ADGB with 150 octane, or did some 2nd TAF squadrons have it as well? There were both nightfighter and fighter-bomber mossies on 2nd TAF, as you no doubt are aware.
Will get you the quote from Brandon when next I'm home - as I say though, that could be some weeks.
Cheers,
Scherf
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The information I have, is that as of July 1944, 96, 85 and 157 sqn were using 150 grade and increased boost, later 68 and 125 sqn Mosquito XXX's were modified and lastly the 1945 Edition of the Mossi FB VI Pilots notes clears +25lbs boost with 150 grade.
According to Dr Brett Stolle of the USAF Museum, only aircraft that consistanly ran 150 grade fuel were those involved in "Operation Diver" and in some cases "Operation Crossbow".
The British defence against the V-1 was codenamed Operation Diver.
When the attacks began in mid-June of 1944 there were fewer than 30 Tempests in 150 Wing to defend against them. Few other aircraft had the low-altitude performance to be effective. Initial attempts to intercept V-1s were often unsuccessful but interdiction techniques were rapidly developed. These included the hair-raising but effective method of using the airflow over an interceptor's wing to raise one wing of the Doodlebug, by sliding the interceptor's wingtip under the V-1's wing and bringing it to within six inches (15 cm) of the lower surface. Done properly, the airflow would tip the V-1's wing up, overriding the buzz bomb's gyros and sending it into an out of control dive. At least three V-1s were destroyed this way.
The Tempest wing was built up to over 100 aircraft by September; Griffon-engined Spitfire XIVs and Mustangs were polished and tuned to make them almost fast enough, and during the short summer nights the Tempests shared defensive duty with Mosquitoes. Specially modified P-47 Thunderbolts (P-47Ms) with half their fuel tanks, half their 0.5 in (12.7 mm) machine guns, all external fittings and all their armour plate removed were also pressed into service against the V-1 menace. There was no need for radar at night the V-1's engine could be seen from 16 km (10 miles) or more away.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-1_flying_bomb
Although trials were entered to try and get the fuel into general service, it simply caused too many problems. The allies had enormous industrial potential but even they could afford to replace the engines on the frequency general use would have required.
This is further evidenced by Neils document, at the top is specifies "German Bumble Bomber":
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit14at21.jpg
Hopefully I will have some T.O.'s to post from him soon.
Britain's 2 TAF consisted of four RAF Groups: No. 2 Group, No. 83 Group, No. 84 Group, and No. 85 Group. Of these four, only the first three were really available for the air-land battle in Normandy; 85 Group was under the temporary operational control of No. 11 Group, attached to an RAF home defense command.
http://www.usaaf.net/ww2/dday/ddpg4.htm
Operation Crossbow:
http://www.usaaf.net/ww2/preemptivedefense/pdpg4.htm
All the best,
Crumpp
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No V1's in Cornwall or in May 1944.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/Lizard.jpg
Date of conversion of 2nd TAF, 15 December 1944.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/date.jpg
Fuel now being introduced.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/knob.jpg
Delivery of Spitfire Mk XIV's modified for +21lbs boost.
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/125wing-replacement-aircraft.jpg
Please give Dr Brett Stolle of the USAF Museum my E-mail address and I will talk to him.
Neil
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Our only Icelandic fighter pilot was chasing divers in the late autumn 1944. He flew a P51C at the time.
He caught some, but needed a shallow dive to catch up with them.
He told me that already at the time, both Tempests and Spit XIV's were faster and able to catch the V-1's in a level run.
"Faster than my Mustang" he said.
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Mossi FB VI Pilots notes
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/FB+VI.jpg
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/FB+VI+a.jpg
Neil
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Specially modified P-47 Thunderbolts (P-47Ms) with half their fuel tanks, half their 0.5 in (12.7 mm) machine guns, all external fittings and all their armour plate removed were also pressed into service against the V-1 menace. There was no need for radar at night the V-1's engine could be seen from 16 km (10 miles) or more away.
The P-47M did not show up in the ETO til Jan 1945. The only user was the 56thFG which was a day-fighter unit of the 8thAF. The last V-1s were air launched against England from He111s on Jan 13 1945 the night before the 56th flew its 1st mission with the P-47M.
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"Something else that I find curious is the total silence amongst the P-51 fans. Since the VIIIth AF Fighter Command did use the 150 fuel as well, I would have thought there would have been some posts on it. I have seen very little discussed on the subject however."
As far as AH is concerned, we know we aren't going to get it anyway. The current P-51's fit in pretty well with most of the plane set so it isn't much of an issue.
J_A_B
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The RAF P51C's were from some reason not boosted up at the same time as the Spit XIV was along with the Tempest able (with extra boost?) to catch the V-1 in level flight.
BTW if I dig a little I can find an account of a Mossie catching those doodlebugs at night. Karnak? Interested???
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Crump I have made contact with Dr Brett Stolle of the USAF Museum.
Neil.
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"The Tempest wing was built up to over 100 aircraft by September"
I figured it was @100, but have not seen a quote for it. Thx.
As far as the issue of 150 octane goes, and has been pointed out, there was a difference between ADGB units (Fighter Command), and RAF 2nd TAF. Both commands used the stuff at different periods.
To say that the RAF only used it to chase V-1s in "Crossbow" is simply not correct, nor was it the sole purpose of its issue during the war.
"As far as AH is concerned, we know we aren't going to get it anyway"
Dont say we didnt ask though JAB ;)
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Angus, as of August 1944 there were 4 Mustang III sqns operating with 150 grade fuel and +25lbs boost and not just intercepting V1's, for example on the 14th of August 1944 306 sqn claimed 3 Bf 109's and 1 Fw 190.
Neil
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Crump I have made contact with Dr Brett Stolle of the USAF Museum.
OK!
Numerous RAF Mustang IIIs were diverted to the interception of V-1 "buzz-bombs". Some of them were "souped up" by using a special high-octane fuel and internal engine adjustments in order to increase the intake manifold pressure and made it possible to achieve a speed of 420 mph at 2000 feet. Since the typical V-1 flew at 370 mph, this made the "souped-up" Mustang very useful against these weapons.
http://home.att.net/~jbaugher1/p51_9.html
The 306th Squadron did have elements included in V1 operations. It does not mean that the 100/150 grade converted Mustangs were used on the escort missions. Look at the 56th FG and their P47Ms. Although they received the aircraft in Jan 44, no operational missions were flown with them until the final days of the war. They flew their P47Ds on operations until the problems with P47Ms and their fuel were worked out.
Breakdown of the 306th:
http://www.rafcommands.currantbun.com/Fighter/306F.html
It is a fact that 100/150 grade fuel quickly destroyed the valve seats in the V-1650 motors causing a loss of power.
This was corrected after the trials at Wright Patterson shortly before the war ended.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Angus
BTW if I dig a little I can find an account of a Mossie catching those doodlebugs at night. Karnak? Interested???
I'd like to hear it, yes thanks. I am currently fighting off the urge to start buying more Mossie books. I really should avoid that as it can be an expensive habit, but I really like the aircraft.
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Crump
I recieved a reply from Brent Stolle this afternoon.
Neil
I do not remember that inquiry about Operation Diver. If you are in contact with Crump ask him the date of my letter/email of reply. It will help me find out what sources I used. As I do not recall the inquiry it is likely the information credited to me was snipped by me from some other source/report. I handle thousands of inquiries yearly and this one does not appear to be in my saved file.
We do not maintain performance tables for the Republic P-47 in our museum collection. I suggest you contact the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum for this information, if available.
I look forward to your reply. Have a great day!
Brett Stolle
NMUSAF/MUA
Neil.
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from Roger Freemans' MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR MANUAL.
All 8th AF tactical aircraft operated on special high octane fuel rated on a perfomance number scale as 100/130. The use of an inferior anti-knock fuel in high performance engines would have resulted in overheating, detonation and pre-ignition, all causing engine damage. While 8th AF bombers were fuelled with 100/130 throughout hostilities, early in 1944, there was interest in the possible use of 100/150 fuel which would permit the use of highter war emergency power in fighters. In March, selected fighter squadrons tested this new grade, the results indicating that while the fuel permitted more power to be drawn from engines, it caused increased maintenance, primarily through persistent spark plug fouling. Despite reservations in some quarters, all 8th AF fighter groups went over to 100/150 fuel between July and late September 1944. Attempts to reduce plug fouling by decreasing valve setting and adjustment of carburettor enrichment valves did not appear to help matters. During the autumn there was an alarming increase in the number of P-51 take-off crashes due to engine failure, mostly attributed to the use of the 'Purple Passion' fuel.
Wright Field recommended the addition of ethylene dibromide fluid with 100/150 to prevent fouling problems and in December 1944 the 355th Group was given the task of testing this grade, known as 'Pep.' By mid-January the trial was satisfactorily completed by British agencies were not so enthusiastic, their tests indicated that the additive in the fuel caused engine damage. On 8 February 1945 technical Services reviewed the 355th Group experience, nothing that no chamber corrosion or valve distortion had been found and that no field maintenance on valves had been necessary. Further the use of 'Pep" had appreciably reduced engine maintenance time because plug fouling was practically eliminated. Other gains noticed were reduction to a minimum of abortive sorties due to engine roughness, increased range, and less brake wear as the P-51s were able to taxi at lower rpm. It was felt that any extra wear on the valves or other engine parts was due to the use of higher power and not the 'Pep' fuel. As a result, 'Pep" 100/150 was being supplied to all fighter groups by March.
Mustang performance tests with increased boost:
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/mustangtest.html
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British experience from September 1944 when using 150 grade and +25lbs boost.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/Summary.jpg
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/Summary+2.jpg
Neil.
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Well it would seem by that source that despite the problems with the engines the 8th AF Fighter Command P-51s used it widely for escort missions.
Im not advocating anything, just interesting history, thats all.
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(http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v424/timppa/mustang-level-150.jpg)
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As a result, 'Pep" 100/150 was being supplied to all fighter groups by March 1945.
That is the timeframe I have on 100/150 grade beginning to see general service. Not in the summer of 1944.
I do not remember that inquiry about Operation Diver. If you are in contact with Crump ask him the date of my letter/email of reply. It will help me find out what sources I used. As I do not recall the inquiry it is likely the information credited to me was snipped by me from some other source/report. I handle thousands of inquiries yearly and this one does not appear to be in my saved file.
I spoke with Dr Stolle as well on the phone and reminded him of the conversation. It was not an email but rather in person just before we went to lunch several years ago. He does not know me as Crumpp, BTW. I don't know what the P47 has to do with anything either.
Hey Timras! That is exactly where I am getting my information. If we look, "Pep" was approved by March 1945
Lets include the next paragraph from page 218:
As a result, Pep 100/150 was being supplied to all fighter groups by March. However, contrary to Technical Services findings, fighter groups reported that while sparking plug life was prolonged, valve adjustment had simultaneously become a problem, checks having to be made every third or fourth mission instead of the usual 50 hours. Opinions differed but the most likely reason was thought to be valve seat inserts burning out leading to diminishing valve clearance and loss of power. Enthusiasm for the new fuel waned quickly and in the same month some units requested a return to 100/130. As the old grade had been largely replaced by 100/150, supply was difficult. By April the position with Pep was so critical that a valve check was advised after every 25 hours of flight. In the middle of that month a message to Wright Field requested valve seat inserts on V-1650 engines be made of stelite or other suitable material with corrosion resistant properties. It was found that there was additive separation when fed to the engine, forming hydrobromic acid which attacked the valve seats. In May the British had made a decision to supply 100/150 containing less ethylene dibromide as additional spark plug maintenance was preferred to short engine life, a decision with which the 8th Air Force concurred.
I would say this a large gray area.
In summary the 8th USAAF appears to have used it for short periods of time but kept having technical difficulties.
They most certainly intended to change over completely.
First difficulty is the plugs fouling and lead deposits which they solved. The solution however turned out to be another problem.
Obviously, 100/130-grade fuel was used concurrently.
IIRC the original order dated July 44 directed that all stocks of 100/130-grade are to be used up before the conversion to 100/150 grade. The intention was to phase it out of the supply system.
When the units did use up there stocks and converted to 100/150 grade unforseen problems occurred a shortage of 100/130-grade occurred on the switchback.
Make sense?
All the best,
Crumpp
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Well, the article seems to indicate they used it and worked through the maintenance problems, but more references would be helpfull.
Also I will point out that combat fighters were not built to last, they were run hard in all air forces during the war, and that maintenance problems of all kinds were commonplace with many varients. Look at the Me 262s engines for instance.
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Also I will point out that combat fighters were not built to last
Your correct, they were not built to last. However with missions lasting 4-6 hours that means every week your checking motors. Fight hours add up quickly with the long duration flights.
For example.
If only a quarter need to be replaced a week that is still 100 percent replacement a month. This is in addition to normal wear and tear.
That is a large number of motors needed just to maintain the current force and does not include all the new production.
Add in the fact too that the fuel robbed the performance of the aircraft by lowering compression and it is no wonder "enthusiasm waned quickly".
We are not talking about a modification that gave the Mustangs better performance, you know?
If the allies had been desperate, like the Germans in their decision to field the Me262, it would make sense. However they were not, the war was clearly won by this point. Individually their aircraft were very competitive with the Luftwaffe's and they had overwhelming numerical superiority.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Again British experience with 150 grade. September 1944.
(http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/Summary.jpg)
(http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/Summary+2.jpg)
Neil
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Well, they sure seem to have tested it, - successfully ;)
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Add in the fact too that the fuel robbed the performance of the aircraft by lowering compression and it is no wonder "enthusiasm waned quickly".
Lowering compression? The CR for the Merlin stayed at 6:1 for what ever boost was used.
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Lowering compression? The CR for the Merlin stayed at 6:1 for what ever boost was used
That is what happens when the valve seats wear.
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/503_1127572479_iolimage3.jpg)
Those are trials. They are recommendations and the fuel was adopted by the 2nd TAF. Remember, the fuel was successful for short duration flights. High speed operation short duration flights were characteristic of Operation Diver.
Long range cruising profiles characteristics of missions over Europe on the fuel caused the problems. Lead fouling was the problem this fuel was causing, which also robs power, BTW. It shorts out the plugs. That's why they would lose the ability to use (+25) boost. Without all cylinders firing the motor could not achieve the pressure.
PEP was added to prevent the lead fouling. It caused even worse problems.
Look guys, I am not claiming that it was not used nor that the allies did not try to adopt it.
What I am saying is that it does not appear it was "the predominate" fuel for any large period of time due to the technical difficulties.
All the best,
Crumpp
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"We are not talking about a modification that gave the Mustangs better performance, you know?"
You have lost me there Crumpp, how do you figure they ran at a higher Hg but got no performance increase? Thats the whole point of using the fuel.
You know, I was thinking, there must be a gazillion Mustang experts on the BBSs, seems 50 percent of the players only research the P-51, you would think this Q. would have been settled by now re 8th AF FC use of the stuff a long time ago...
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Crump you claimed this,
According to Dr Brett Stolle of the USAF Museum, only aircraft that consistanly ran 150 grade fuel were those involved in "Operation Diver" and in some cases "Operation Crossbow".
This is demonstrably not the case.
Where did you get your information on valve seat wear from?
Can you prove that Mossi V1 missions were short?
Mitchell's, Boston's and Mosquitos were not short range aircraft.
Neil
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You know, I was thinking, there must be a gazillion Mustang experts on the BBSs, seems 50 percent of the players only research the P-51, you would think this Q. would have been settled by now re 8th AF FC use of the stuff a long time ago...
Problem is I don't think there is a clear answer among the Historians much less the amatuers.
The only units I have found that one can point a finger too and say beyond a shadow of a doubt the fuel was used consistantly, is the Operation Diver units. Those units belonged to the 2nd TAF.
You have lost me there Crumpp, how do you figure they ran at a higher Hg but got no performance increase? Thats the whole point of using the fuel.
First of all, this is not something "Crumpp" is coming up with. It is directly stated.
The fuel caused two problems both of which rob power from a motor:
1. Spark Plug fouling causes the plugs to short. This is why the motor backfires from intermittent ignition firing. If the motor is flown for longer than 15 minutes at cruise settings, the fouling can completely shut down a cylinder according to the RAF.
From Roger Freemans Mighty 8th War Manual:
Despite reservations in some quarters, all 8th AF fighter groups went over to 100/150 fuel between July and late September 1944. Attempts to reduce plug fouling by decreasing valve setting and adjustment of carburettor enrichment valves did not appear to help matters. During the autumn there was an alarming increase in the number of P-51 take-off crashes due to engine failure, mostly attributed to the use of the 'Purple Passion' fuel.
2. When PEP was added to prevent fouling, it attacked the valve seats causing a loss of compression.
From Roger Freemans Mighty 8th War Manual:
Opinions differed but the most likely reason was thought to be valve seat inserts burning out leading to diminishing valve clearance and loss of power. Enthusiasm for the new fuel waned quickly and in the same month some units requested a return to 100/130.
All the Best,
Crumpp
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Lot fuel to use on operation Crossbow
(http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/gip.jpg)
Neil
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According to Dr Brett Stolle of the USAF Museum, only aircraft that consistanly ran 150 grade fuel were those involved in "Operation Diver" and in some cases "Operation Crossbow".
Are you saying I am lying Neil?
We have seen that document before. I have a copy of it.
Supply is not the problem in this case, Neil. Technical difficulties are the cause.
All the best,
Crumpp
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The only units I have found that one can point a finger too and say beyond a shadow of a doubt the fuel was used consistantly, is the Operation Diver units. Those units belonged to the 2nd TAF.
What units were these?
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Crump there were technical difficulties, some aircraft types affected more than others.
We have a fist hand British report on short range and long range aircraft that states this,
(http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/Summary+3.jpg)
You have a second hand account as reported by R Freeman into american aircraft and apply it to British aircraft, why?
Mk XVI Spits did suffer, but as you know these aircraft had an American engine.
Neil.
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What units were these?
306 Squadron, Mustang
157 Squadrons Mosquito
For sure were in Operation Diver. RAF squadron histories are proving tough to track down. Every one that I have been able to track down has been in the 2nd TAF. Those units above participated in Diver.
Can you prove that Mossi V1 missions were short?
Certainly they were short range when compared to the daylight bombing escort missions.
That is the same document Neil, correct? It is the result of the trials not an order putting it into service with the 8th USAAF.
We know it was placed into service. You don't have to prove:
1. There was ample supply - Sure there was, supply was not the problem.
That is not the issue. The issue is how widespread was it's use.
2. It was ordered into service - We already know it was ordered into service.
What is in question is just how common and for how long?
The fuel robbed performance. Something no fighter pilot would accept gracefully.
You still have not answered my question about Dr Stolle. Are you saying that I am lying?
All the best,
Crumpp
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I asked him where your quote came from. He replied with this.
"I do not remember that inquiry about Operation Diver. If you are in contact with Crump ask him the date of my letter/email of reply. It will help me find out what sources I used. As I do not recall the inquiry it is likely the information credited to me was snipped by me from some other source/report. I handle thousands of inquiries yearly and this one does not appear to be in my saved file."
Not very convincing is it ?
"Certainly they were short range when compared to the daylight bombing escort missions."
Not proof but a statement of opinion.
Neil
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Originally posted by Crumpp
306 Squadron, Mustang
96 Squadron, Mosquito
85 Squadron, Mosquito
157 Squadrons Mosquito
306 Squadron, Mustang - a 2TAF unit - Mustang III
96 Squadron, Mosquito - an ADGB unit - Mk XIII
85 Squadron, Mosquito - a BC unit - Mk XIX
157 Squadrons, Mosquito - a BC unit - Mk XVII
So only one of the units you claimed as 2TAF was really a 2TAF unit.
The only units I have found that one can point a finger too and say beyond a shadow of a doubt the fuel was used consistantly, is the Operation Diver units. Those units belonged to the 2nd TAF.
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157 Squadrons, Mosquito - a BC unit - Mk XVII
157 Squadron is famous Milo for downing 20 V-1's in a week. Flying Mosquitos.
All the best,
Crumpp
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So only one of the units you claimed as 2TAF was really a 2TAF unit.
And then not for long 306 transfered to ADGB.
Neil
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Crump what was Operation Diver.
Neil
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Neil,
So he does not remember equals it did not happen?
And your using this to attack my crediability?
All the best,
Crumpp
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And your using this to attack my crediability
Using a seconhand account from a book and applying it to British aircraft despite this.
(http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/Summary+3.jpg)
Neil
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Originally posted by Crumpp
157 Squadron is famous Milo for downing 20 V-1's in a week. Flying Mosquitos.
All the best,
Crumpp
:rolleyes: You claimed this unit, as well as 85 and 96, were in 2cd Tactical Air Force when they were clearly NOT.
The only units I have found that one can point a finger too and say beyond a shadow of a doubt the fuel was used consistantly, is the Operation Diver units. Those units belonged to the 2nd TAF.
That they flew anti-Diver missions I am not questioning.
Nice edit job, without saying what was edited, after been shown your error.:eek:
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Neils says:
So only one of the units you claimed as 2TAF was really a 2TAF unit.
Come on Neil.
I saw your post before you edited it.
OK then I will answer it.
What was the Air Defense Great Britain doing?
By now Fighter Command had been renamed Air Defence of Great Britain (ADGB) and the three days grace enabled fighter aircraft, heavy and light antiaircraft guns, a balloon barrage, and radar stations to be redeployed to meet the robot bombs (by now officially code named "Divers").
The fighters comprised eleven squadrons (Spitfires, Typhoons and the new Tempests for interceptions during daylight, and Mosquitos for night)
http://www.nzfpm.co.nz/theatres/tow_tied.htm
All the best,
Crumpp
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The only units I have found that one can point a finger too and say beyond a shadow of a doubt the fuel was used consistantly, is the Operation Diver units. Those units belonged to the 2nd TAF
Wrong, Operation Diver= ADGB
Neil
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I'll repost this for you Milo. It has already been covered in this thread.
Numerous RAF Mustang IIIs were diverted to the interception of V-1 "buzz-bombs". Some of them were "souped up" by using a special high-octane fuel and internal engine adjustments in order to increase the intake manifold pressure and made it possible to achieve a speed of 420 mph at 2000 feet. Since the typical V-1 flew at 370 mph, this made the "souped-up" Mustang very useful against these weapons.
The 306th Squadron did have elements included in V1 operations. It does not mean that the 100/150 grade converted Mustangs were used on the escort missions.
http://home.att.net/~jbaugher1/p51_9.html
Breakdown of the 306th:
http://www.rafcommands.currantbun.com/Fighter/306F.html
All the best,
Crumpp
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Caught in a false statement Crumpp which you fail to acknowledge.
Since you have trouble understanding what you post, here it is again:
The only units I have found that one can point a finger too and say beyond a shadow of a doubt the fuel was used consistantly, is the Operation Diver units. Those units belonged to the 2nd TAF.[/u] [/COLOR]
As was pointed only the Polish Mustang unit was in the 2TAF.
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You forgot 418 Sqn. and 605 Sqn. at the very least, both ADGB.
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2nd TAF by Shores and Thomas
(http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/ARGB.jpg)
Neil
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And your using this to attack my crediability
I am not attacking your credibility at all Neil.
All I am saying is be careful.
How have you lost any credibility? You have uncovered a wealth of information on the extent that 100/150 grade was inplace. They were part of the 2nd TAF.
You have shown:
1. The fuel was there in the supply quantities needed.
2. They very much wanted to use it in general use.
As for the 306th Squadron then it is a non-issue. The Mustangs using 100/150grade fuel were part of Operation Diver and they did go out and hunt Luftwaffe fighters when they could.
Caught in a false statement Crumpp which you fail to acknowledge.
Maybe I just missed it Milo? What false statement is that?
ADGB was Fighter Command and borrowed units from the 2nd TAF.
It's a MACOM. It's like arguing that the 82nd Airborne Division is not in Forces Command.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Since you are blind and have a reading disability I can't help you. :( You even went back and edited your post that had 4 units being in the 2TAF. Stop playing dumb.
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Since you are blind and have a reading disability I can't help you.
What are you talking about?
All the best,
Crumpp
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Possibly your claim that 157 Sqn. was a 2nd TAF unit on anti-V1 ops.
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V1 units. 11 July 1944.
(http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/Untitled-Scanned-03a.jpg)
Mustang III sqns 129,306, 315 and 316.
Neil.
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Possibly your claim that 157 Sqn. was a 2nd TAF unit on anti-V1 ops.
Thanks Sherf!
I see the confusion. No attempt to "LIE" Milo. That was kind of a jerk thing to write. I was thinking 306th Squadron when I wrote that sentence.
Facts are the only aircraft that can be positively Identified as using 100/150 grade are those conducting V1 Defense.
Operationally it was the best solution for that mission. It gave wonderful performance when the motor was run at high manifold pressures and avoided the power destroying problems with cruise speed settings.
The V1 only had a range of 150 miles and flew around 400 mph. From Launch to impact was around 40 minutes at most.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Facts are the only aircraft that can be positively Identified as using 100/150 grade are those conducting V1 Defense.
No V1's in Cornwall or in May
1944.http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/Lizard.jpg
2nd TAF Clearance.
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/2taf150_112044.gif
Fuel now being introduced. 2nd TAF Spitfires.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/knob.jpg
2nd TAF Spit XIV's +21lbs boost.
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/125wing-replacement-aircraft.jpg
Storage and use April 1945.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/Supply.jpg
P51 marked 150 grade.
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/78thfg-p51-150grade.jpg
Relevant Engine limitations Spit XXI
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/la187.html
Mossi FB VI Pilots Notes.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/FB+VI+a.jpg
Mustang IV Pilots notes.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/Mustang+IV+pilots+notes..jpg
Neil.
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It seems that there were issues with the Spit XIVs having fouling problems too, but they still used +21 lbs boost on 150, so evidence of "issues" does not=no extra boost.
Secondly, the RAF Mustangs also ran on the stuff...so again, I have to say there is no reason that USAAF Mustangs could not? Fouling issues aside.
It seems there were technical issues with the 150 fuel in both the RAF and USAAF of various sorts, but they used it nonetheless, because of the performance boost it gave. It it gave no improvement they would have stuck with 100/130, and dropped 150 fuel entirely.
...As for a more complete answer on the Q, it has aroused my curiosity enough I would like more sources on the 8th AF FC use of it in WW2. The real Q. is how widespread was its use in the USAAF P-51s on escort duty, not did they ever use it for such a thing.
I used to think Egyptologists were a strange bunch, but they have nothing on us eh? hehe. :)
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Heheh, no, no less strange than us.
On that note, beg your pardon but, some of us don't care a hoot about P-51 escort sorties - far more interested in important stuff like Mosquitos and *their* use of 150 Octane.
Cheers,
Scherf
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Originally posted by Crumpp
I see the confusion. No attempt to "LIE" Milo. That was kind of a jerk thing to write. I was thinking 306th Squadron when I wrote that sentence.
:rolleyes: I am not Barbi who uses the 'liar' word continually.
I said you made a false statement. You did not even have the balls to say you changed your post listing those units you claimed were in the 2TAF. I would not have had to say anything if you could read and admit you made an error. Nice weasle job. :)
That is twice in this thread that you have accused people of calling you liar. Got a complex?
I hope you get a ghost writer for that book of yours.
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Nice weasle job.
You ever just think that maybe you posted before someone was finished?
I think that is probably what happened with Neil. Then he went back and changed it again.
Let's look at the documentation:
Where does it clear 100/150 for the units to use on these trial results?
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/Lizard.jpg
Where do you see the clearance to use 100/150 grade fuel on this document?
It simply states what the boost requirements will be the fuel is adopted. Notice the use of the future tense in the document not the present.
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/2taf150_112044.gif
A request to use the fuel from Jan 1945.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/knob.jpg
A document saying that the Spitfire Mk IVX can be delivered by March 21st 1945.
Not was delivered or is delivered. "Can be". All it proves is the intention to deliver the aircraft in March '44.
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/125wing-replacement-aircraft.jpg
We already know supply was not the problem:
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/Supply.jpg
Again, Nobody is claiming it did not see limited service nor that the allies did not have the intent to adopt the fuel.
What is a fact is the performance robbing technical difficulties they encountered.
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/78thfg-p51-150grade.jpg
We already know the fuel was used limited quantities. What does any of the following technical set ups for the aircraft have to do with the extent of 100/150-grade usage?
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/la187.html
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/FB+VI+a.jpg
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/Mustang+IV+pilots+notes..jpg
Neil is obviously putting some time in researching this. We are however talking about the RAF. They did not destroy their records to keep them from falling into enemy hands nor were they bombed to oblivion.
The records are intact. Hundreds of copies of the order to instate 100/150-grade fuel would have been made in order to send one to every unit. Where are they?
I mean seriously? Are we going to start putting the BMW801F (TH) in the FW190?
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/503_1127656963_bmw801th.jpg)
I mean this document shows the production breakdown by month, right?
All the best,
Crumpp
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Full service approval +25lbs for combat.
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/25lbs_approval.jpg.
Read this again.
This fuel is NOW being introduced for use in modified engines of Spitfire LF IX, XIV, XVI, and XIX of 83 and 84 groups.
(http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/knob.jpg)
Can be completed.
.http://www.askoxford.com/results/?view=dict&field-12668446=complete&branch=13842570&textsearchtype=exact&sortorder=score%2Cname (http://www.askoxford.com/results/?view=dict&field-12668446=complete&branch=13842570&textsearchtype=exact&sortorder=score%2Cname)
Completed as in finished. Doc date 16th March 45 completed by 21st March.
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/125wing-replacement-aircraft.jpg
102,000 tons of 150 grade approximately 4 weeks estimated consumption.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/Supply.jpg
The records are intact.
Really? I take it you have never visited the NA then?
Neil
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Yawwwnnnn.
So 150 oct was tested engines were corrected it was cleared distributed and saw quite some use.
I remember some wise guy stating that pouring high grade fuel into a tank was not so simple (that was from 87 to 100 which is rather easy) - anyway it seem's that using the 150 oct fuel was no big technical obstacle.
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Yawwwnnnn.
Indeed.
Neil.
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Wow!
I did miss that. So in Jan 1945, it is just being introduced to 2 Groups in the 2nd TAF?
Even though we have definative orders for use in March 1944?
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/25lbs_approval.jpg
It took them almost a year to do the changeover? That makes no sense at all.
Granted they are different variants but come on, if the fuel was standard why didn't they just come from the factory set up to use it?
I mean the Luftwaffe did not have to set up the BMW801 to use C3? Sure some timing and plug changes went with the different grades of C3 but nothing that would take 10 months to implement.
Well maybe our orders are not so definitive after all?
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/503_1127661534_25lbs_approval.jpg)
All the best,
Crumpp
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British history.
Originally 150 grade was to be used by A.E.A.F fighter aircraft that were to support Overlord. However this was cancelled some time in March 44 due to Spark plug problems.
However the V 1 appeard mid June 44 and those A.D.G.B sqns that were delegated the task of intercepting it were put on 150 grade.
Come 22nd September 150 grade use was suspended for these reasons.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/September+44.jpg
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/September+1.jpg
And the results of its use summarised here.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/Summary.jpg
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/Summary+2.jpg
Later in October 1944 it was decided to put the 2nd TAF on 150 grade, this starting 15-12-44.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/date.jpg
Indeed some aircraft did come from the factory ready to use 150 grade and +25lbs boost.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/MK+XVI.jpg
The fuel was not standard during 1944 and the extent of its RAF use unkown to me outside of 1944 A.D.G.B and 1945 2nd TAF.
Neil.
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Is there evidence that 150 grade was received by the 2ndTAF sqns that were proposed in November to run on higher boost?
And considering that there were spark plug problems not only in March 1944, but even in November 1944, ie. the documentations from that time issued to change the timing of ignition because of spark plug problems of the Merlin 266, which would effect every Mk XVI unit in the 2nd TAF. And if I recall you correctly, the 2nd TAF XVIs were soon banned from using anything higher than +18 lbs, ie. the 100 octane limit, in 1945.
The question of fuel supply is also there. Doing the modifictions alone means nothing, high boosts would be impossible without continous shipments of 150 grade fuel, which we all know was in limited supply, Britain being the only producer, and it`s avgas production was quite tiny compared to the US, but Britain also had to supply the entire 8th AAF fighter force with the high grade avgas.
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Originally posted by Neil Stirling1
2nd TAF Spit XIV's +21lbs boost.
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/125wing-replacement-aircraft.jpg
Hmm, interesting, but it doesn`t state they used the boost, just that they had the modifications to use the boost - IF the proper 150 grade fuel type was also delivered, at quite a late date.
Do you have evidence of shipments of 150 grade fuel to XIV units of the 2nd TAF?
Thinking of this how much planning and the actual case differs.
In September they though +25 lbs will be cleared for the XIV in 3 months.
3 months later, they still proposed just +21 boost, appearantly they were overly optimistic. They proposed fuel deliveries would start in December, but in fact they did not start until January 1945. And the first XIV aircraft were not modified for +21 boost (when R-R was supposed to work out problems to enable +25 lbs FOUR months ago...) until mid-March 1945. And the Mk21 test shows that the limitation was still +21 in SEPTEMBER 1945....
Whereas the MkXIVs pilot manual shows the following limiations :
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/715_1127681325_spit14_limits.jpg)
And strictly speaking, Crumpp is correct in that there`s no real evidence to the widespread operational use of 150 grade, unless you count those anti-diver squadrons that I can count on one hand, and which appearantly operated on the fuel for the months the V-1 raids lasted (3 months).
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"there`s no real evidence to the widespread operational use of 150 grade, unless you count those anti-diver squadrons that I can count on one hand, and which appearantly operated on the fuel for the months the V-1 raids lasted (3 months)."
Other than the fact there were no V-1s in May '44, or in Cornwall, as Neil will no doubt have to point out again.
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Neils list of docs above shows plans in November 44, and conversion by January 45 for 2nd TAF.
Also, other than pure speculation, I have seen nothing indicating a "shortage" of 150 fuel. If you have a source please post it.
At some point this is just becoming silly.
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It has been decided to change the grade of fuel consummed by the 2nd TAF from 100 octane/130 to 100 octane /150 from 15th December 1944.
(http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/date.jpg)
Why post the April 1946 edition of the Spitfire XIV pilots notes.
Neil.
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Ahemm.
Get some feet on the ground. The number of V-1's (which were fast down low indeed) caught and shot down by RAF fighters was something with 4 digits.
Maybe they got them without 150 grade anyway :D
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Oh so anti-diver squads being counted on one hand would then be responsible for for the destruction of hundreds of those in the air - each, right Scherf?
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Scherf was pointing out the same thing Angus. He was responding to the quote, and pointing out that there were no V-1 raids in May 44, yet units were converting to 150 octane in ADGB squadrons anyways.
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edit - Squire said it better.
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Does anyone realize that by the end of May 1944, there had been less that 70 Spitfire Mk XIV produced?
Total Delivered by end of month - Number delivered that month
1943 : 18 18
01-44 : 30 12
02-44 : 45 15
03-44 : 50 05
04-44 : 56 06
05-44 : 68 12
06-44 : 101 33
07-44 : 129 28
08-44 : 151 22
09-44 : 185 34
10-44 : 245 60
11-44 : 300 55
12-44 : 341 41
01-45 : 399 58
02-45 : 511 112
03-45 : 648 137
04-45 : 743 95
05-45 : 815 72
06-45 : 844 29
07-45 : 873 29
08-45 : 891 18
09-45 : 898 7
10-45 : 904 6
11-45 : 911 7
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I have seen nothing indicating a "shortage" of 150 fuel.
The shortage occurred in the 8th USAAF when the units went back to 100/130 grade and did not want to use 100/150 grade. It was a shortage of 100/130 grade as I understand it.
Scherf was pointing out the same thing Angus. He was responding to the quote, and pointing out that there were no V-1 raids in May 44, yet units were converting to 150 octane in ADGB squadrons anyways.
So what? Do you think when the first V1 crashed down on England it was the first the allies had heard of them?
We can rewrite history for Aces High. I could care less.
If you all are interested in having 100/150 Grade fuel performances from December 1944 on, I will back you.
In August 1943, a huge force of workers commenced construction of almost one hundred launching sites in northern France, and a provisional date of December 1943 was set for the opening of the "reprisal" campaign, with Hitler promising his troubled millions that the British could not continue to rain high explosive from the skies onto Germany's cities with impunity.
Unfortunately for Hitler the British had learned that "something" was afoot, and a devastating bombing attack launched in August 1943 against the experimental establishment at Peenemunde on the Baltic coast put back Hitler's plans several months.
http://www.nzfpm.co.nz/theatres/tow_tied.htm
I would say the allies were well aware of the threat and with good reason. The Diver and Crossbow missions had the highest priority of any allied air mission. It was a true no holds bar effort to stop the V1 attacks.
So yes, I very much see the allies pushing forward no matter what to get the extra performance 100/150 grade gave for Operation Diver/Crossbow.
For the general conflict in which they had overwhelming numerical superiority and technical parity, it does not make sense.
http://www.edenbridgetown.com/in_the_past/reference/v1.shtml
The last flying bomb was launched at London on March 29, 1945, only six weeks before Germany surrendered.
While the Germans maintained their launching rate of 100 a day the continuation of Vsite bombing was an essential part of the defence. Towards the end of June, over 40% of the Allied bomber effort from Britain was directed against Crossbow targets- despite objections from some Allied commanders who wanted more strategic air operations to be flown over Germany. Despite the bombing of the V-sites and supply centres, an average of almost 120 flying bombs a day were launched in the first week of July. After the first two weeks of bombing, some 1,769 people had been killed and in the Strand the Air Ministry itself was hit and 198 people killed. On July 1 a flying bomb crashed in Chelsea, killing 124; four days later the total death roll was 2,500. Reprisals against German towns and villages were considered but such reprisals were not likely to ease the situation. Moreover, Eisenhower was opposed to this kind of retaliation.
http://www.fiddlersgreen.net/aircraft/WWII/v1/v1_info/vi_info.htm
This was not some sideshow. It had priority over the Strategic Bombing Campaign.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Some goodies on the V-1 and V-2 threats.
Firstly as Crumpp pointed out the allies did indeed have some info on it as so many other things through ultra enigma and so on.
Information was misleading and confusing - it was for a while belived that the warhead was some whooping 14.000 lbs and cruising speeds were belived to be higher than the eventual outcome.
BTW had it not been for some successful bombing the Germans actually could have managed to make a missile good enough to bomb the USA!
Anyway, to catch some wind of actual history - some 35000 V-1's were built thereoff 9000 launched to England (1200 or so from He-111 over the north sea if my memory serves me), 4000 were shot down by flak or fighters, numerically more in the latter case.
The rest got bombed or overrun.
Many were launched in darkness and bad visibility - since visibility did not at all affect accuracy.
So, the V-2 - the mean and unstoppable one.
Some 1300 V-2's hit London, which gives a little insight into the "why" part of BC's merciless bombing of Germany in the closing months of the war. The only measure being to hit them before they flew - or buckle the Germans as soon as possible.
The Ugly total war folks.
Anyway, from the gathered data it is pretty obvious that the RAF was able to catch doodlebugs with relative ease be it on the ground or in the air. If there was just a handful of Mk XIV Spits, a few fast fighters squadrons, and scarce supply or clearance of high grade fuel, the performance of those "few" who were responsible for the shooting down is nothing less than outstanding :D
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Originally posted by Kurfrst
Do you have evidence of shipments of 150 grade fuel to XIV units of the 2nd TAF?
Hmm, interesting, but it doesn`t state they used the boost, ....
Do you have evidence of shipments of 150 grade fuel to XIV units of the 2nd TAF?The question of fuel supply is also there. Doing the modifictions alone means nothing, high boosts would be impossible without continous shipments of 150 grade fuel, which we all know was in limited supply, ....
Do you have any proof that C3 was delivered to the K-4s 4 Gruppen authorized to use 1.98? I see no proof from you that these units used 1.98.
Kurfy always demands proof but continually fails to produce proof when he is asked to. :eek:
A report (POWE 33/1363) of British 150, as well as 100 production, was posted on Butch's board. Why you totally ignore this Kurfy and continue your story of a 150 shortage is beyond belief. Oh, I forgot, you think the British were idiots to produce so much and not use it.
British avgas production from that doc:
Feb - 7,749,000 Impgal
Mar - 11,039,000
Apr - 1,533,000
May - 2,499,000
Jun - 7,605,000
Jul - 12,068,000
Aug - 9,761,500
Sep - 11,088,000
Oct - 9,950,500
Nov - 6,030,500
Dec - 10,318,000
Jan - 9,950,500
Feb - 10,430,000
Mar - 7,332,500
Lets use the Nov production. That is enough for 55,325 Spit VIX sorties or 1844 sorties/day or 369 sorties/day per each of the 5 Sqns Kurfy says were equiped with Spit XIVs.
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Reply 101 wohoo! :p
Thats it for me, this is all a retread of a retread re the RAF.
RAF use is well documented, as is the fuel availability,and originally this was a "what fuel did the XIV need for +21 lbs thread", which has been answered fully.
As for USAAF use, I would like to get samples of USAAF P-51 combat reports indicating the manifold inches used in WEP. Not just for the 8th, but the 9th and 15th AF as well. That will tell us what they were using better than anything.
Will have to dig around some.
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Yes Squire, Kurfy is like a skipping record. He keeps coming back recycling his old topics, ignoring all that he has been told before. :D
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RAF use is well documented, as is the fuel availability,and originally this was a "what fuel did the XIV need for +21 lbs thread", which has been answered fully.
I agree it saw much more widespread use in the RAF than the USAAF. It does not look like the RAF made the grievous mistake adopting "Pep" so they only had fouling/backfire issues at cruising speeds.
However it looks like the technical difficulties were not overcome for long duration missions until very late in the war if at all.
Looks to me like in spite of a desire to get the fuel into general service; it remained a special purpose item. Kind of reminds me of C3-Einspritzung.
Not surprising either given the difficulties associated with high-octane fuels. On a side note it is interesting that during the war, the allies did not have an explanation for the high aromatic content of the synthetic fuels. In Post war NACA studies, a high aromatic content solved many of the problems experienced by high-octane fuels.
Kurfurst, I do not follow you on the shortage issue. Looks to me, like supply was not the issue. Technical difficulties and the resulting maintenance logistics are more of an issue IMHO.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Neil Stirling1
It has been decided to change the grade of fuel consummed by the 2nd TAF from 100 octane/130 to 100 octane /150 from 15th December 1944.
[/B]
You mean it was planned, but my question was again that do you have evidence of shipments to the units themselves so that they
Sorry but fuel in STORAGE . wont fly aircraft in the field 15 000 tons, hmm, enough for less than a month of use for so many aircraft, considering the other documents you brought up showed 20 000 tons of 150 grade being the monthly requirement of the 8th AF alone, while those dozen or less RAF anti-diver squadrons consumed 12 000 alone in July. So hardly I can see being the stuff being in widespread service as you claim, some limited use by priviliged squadrons, yep.
Question is, how many of those 1000 + fighters of the 2nd TAF was actually running on high boost. It seems not many.
You were unable, or unwilling to show us any documentation of shipments to the UNITs themselves, nor any documentation on the number of squadrons that would run on such boost, why is that I ask.
Why post the April 1946 edition of the Spitfire XIV pilots notes.
Neil. [/B]
Quite a good question from you Neil, since I was going by YOUR logic. Not so long ago based on that a mid-42 109E manual lists the use of 1,4ata special WEP, you claimed it was not used before that at all. That was the logic you applied, now I apply the same, and I find you are appling the double standard, and despite the fact the even 1946 Spitfire XIV manual lists the boost as +18 lbs, no higher. By your logic it would mean there were no higher boost used before either.
In fact it would be very easy to post any manual for the XIV which would show +21 lbs being the limit - if there were any, that is.
So the question remains, how many of the 2nd TAFs squadrons were using high boost, from when in 1945. Thats the question you have to answer, Neil. I am asking that because originally you went the same way about the use of high boost in 1944 by the ADGB, ie. claiming it was in widespread use, and it was an exception to the rule for a squadron not to use it. But now we see it was technologically troublesome, which only enabled its use in response to serious threat by a handful of aircraft.
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Originally posted by Scherf
"there`s no real evidence to the widespread operational use of 150 grade, unless you count those anti-diver squadrons that I can count on one hand, and which appearantly operated on the fuel for the months the V-1 raids lasted (3 months)."
Other than the fact there were no V-1s in May '44, or in Cornwall, as Neil will no doubt have to point out again.
... other than the fact that there were no operational RAF unit running on 150 grade fuel on May 44 in Cornwall, other than 2 (two) RAF squadrons doing operation TRIALS.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/Lizard.jpg
"... at the commencement of these trials..."
Operational trial is quite different that operational use. I take it a poor attempt of joking to say the boost was in operational use, then post a document that says operational trials.
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Originally posted by Squire
Neils list of docs above shows plans in November 44, and conversion by January 45 for 2nd TAF.
Also, other than pure speculation, I have seen nothing indicating a "shortage" of 150 fuel. If you have a source please post it.
At some point this is just becoming silly.
I presume you missed one the documents Neil had posted :
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/September+44.jpg
Its dated mid-September 1944 and it says on 150 grade fuel shortage, see (iv) :
"The supply of 150 grade fuel is such that it can be only laid down on certain airfields".
I guess this pretty much means shortage, dont you think? The supply was enough for the 8th USAAF fighter command to use 20 000 tons of it (I recall some 30-35000 tons was the delivery, so they already used up 2/3s), and those selected anti-diver squadrons from the ADGB to run on it - that also costed 12 000 tons per month).
So where is the aduquate supply to support no less than 35 Squadrons of the 2nd TAF, plus Mosquitos etc.?
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Originally posted by Angus
Oh so anti-diver squads being counted on one hand would then be responsible for for the destruction of hundreds of those in the air - each, right Scherf?
Err, MkXIVs alone claimed 300+ V1s alone, and there were only 3 Squadrons of them operating on the task. Otoh, shooting down what is essentially a target drone isnt that difficult as long as you can catch up with it.
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Originally posted by milian
Does anyone realize that by the end of May 1944, there had been less that 70 Spitfire Mk XIV produced?
Total Delivered by end of month - Number delivered that month
1943 : 18 18
01-44 : 30 12
02-44 : 45 15
03-44 : 50 05
04-44 : 56 06
05-44 : 68 12
06-44 : 101 33
07-44 : 129 28
08-44 : 151 22
09-44 : 185 34
10-44 : 245 60
11-44 : 300 55
12-44 : 341 41
01-45 : 399 58
02-45 : 511 112
03-45 : 648 137
04-45 : 743 95
05-45 : 815 72
06-45 : 844 29
07-45 : 873 29
08-45 : 891 18
09-45 : 898 7
10-45 : 904 6
11-45 : 911 7
Interesting info, Milian. Can you give us the source of such excellent detailed information?
Prod was even slower than I excepted, I think Neil was giving some info on that and it was like 800 produced until the end of 1944, but I may mix him with Hop.
But, given this was a response to K-4 production until the end of December 1944 (856 in a few months from September), I can see why the numbers went up from the real number of 341. ,)
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Originally posted by Kurfrst
Operational trial is quite different that operational use. I take it a poor attempt of joking to say the boost was in operational use, then post a document that says operational trials.
That's right Kurfy. Your claim that K-4s were fully combat operational @ 1.98 with JG 11 even though it was just a trial. :eek: Love the double standard by you. :rofl
Its dated mid-September 1944 and it says on 150 grade fuel shortage, see (iv) :
"The supply of 150 grade fuel is such that it can be only laid down on certain airfields".
I guess this pretty much means shortage, dont you think? The supply was enough for the 8th USAAF fighter command to use 20 000 tons of it (I recall some 30-35000 tons was the delivery, so they already used up 2/3s), and those selected anti-diver squadrons from the ADGB to run on it - that also costed 12 000 tons per month).
As usual you have reading comprehension problems, for there was no shortage of 150 fuel.
Sep - 11,088,000Impgal - 316,800t 100/150 produced
There was almost 7 times the quantity available than the numbers you state. The document is referring to 150 fuel on the continent (Belgium and Holland).
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Funny that both Neil and Milo change the subject to 1,98ata and the 109 invariably, when the details of 150 grade usage by the 2nd TAF are inquired.
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Originally posted by Kurfrst
Funny that both Neil and Milo change the subject to 1,98ata and the 109 invariably, when the details of 150 grade usage by the 2nd TAF are inquired.
Not at all Kurfy, it is to illustrate the twisted double standard you have.
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Adam where did I mention this, in this thread.
Funny that both Neil and Milo change the subject to 1,98ata and the 109
Your not making things up are you?
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Originally posted by Neil Stirling1
Adam where did I mention this, in this thread.
Funny that both Neil and Milo change the subject to 1,98ata and the 109
Your not making things up are you?
Kurfy make things up? Never. :rofl
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Originally posted by Neil Stirling1
Adam where did I mention this, in this thread.
Funny that both Neil and Milo change the subject to 1,98ata and the 109
Your not making things up are you?
Certainly not making things up Neil, neither I did state that you brought up in THIS thread, which of course you didnt. You did however bring up 1,98 invariably in the past and inquired about C3 fuel supplies instead of answering the question over butch board in a thread regarding 150 grade usage all the sudden when doubts were cast over your version that it was some kind of standard fuel and boost. Ever since I collected the evidence and addressed it directly to you at butch board, but appearantly you lost interest for evidence of C3 supplies all the sudden as you did not show up... why?
Similiar was your reaction on another account when your original claim of 150 grade widespread use in 1944 was questioned (which you refined ever since appearantly, so perhaps those questions were not in vain), and opened a thread at butch saying that "recent events made you to ask how widely MW50 - Luftwaffe equivalent of 150 - was used..".
We dont have to go back that far in time however, this seems to be a pattern with you: crumpp brought up a valid point about spark plug problems with 150 grade fuel, and coincidentaly, Neil Stirling opened a thread about how bad MW50 was on spark plugs, claiming that spark plug life was only 5 hours (later corrected and self-corrected that in fact the source said 15-30), and implied it was never fixed. Hmm.
Is not there a pattern in your behaviour in a form of a kind of counter-attack aiming to prove things were, and must have been, worse on the other side, every time your conclusions are questioned and you run out of answers ?
Naturally, if you insist I can litter this thread with saved images of your past and recent responses like that, but I guess that wouldnt be much constructive, or much use, so I instead I ask simple question to which I - and most of us here, I think - would require honest answers :
1, Do you have documentation of the required 150 grade fuel supplies to IX/XIV/XIV units of the 2nd TAF ?
2, To what extent 150 grade and high boost was used in the 2nd TAF - documentation would be nice if any, but if not, your opinion/impressions are equally interesting. How many squadrons etc.
I guess your response will tell us wheter you are interested in an honest representation of history, or just pushing an agenda with evidence-filtering. Personally, I hope its the former case, for everyones enlightement for you have dug up quite a material of the subject, regardless of anything.
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Neil Stirling opened a thread about how bad MW50 was on spark plugs, claiming that spark plug life was only 5 hours (later corrected and self-corrected that in fact the source said 15-30), and implied it was never fixed. Hmm.
This is how Kurfy twists, manipulates and makes false statements.
Neil said in his opening post:
It is my understanding that the use of MW50 drastically reduced spark plug (5 hrs?) life. Was there a fix?
A clear lack of reading comprehension on Kurfy's part. He does not know the difference between a 'question' and a 'claim/implication'.
Is not there a pattern in your behaviour in a form of a kind of counter-attack aiming to prove things were, and must have been, worse on the other side, every time your conclusions are questioned and you run out of answers ?
Yes we see this far more often and continually by you Kurfy.
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Adam over the 4 or 5 years that I have known you, we have had several spirited debates indeed I have watched you engage in many spirited debates with others. Unfortunately when the evidence is against you, you resort to malicious behavior, for example innuendo and insults and this often leads to your banning.
This leads me to believe that the fact of winning is most important to you, rather than the fact itself. It is with the forgoing in mind I find myself no longer able to take you seriously and consequently I find it difficult to justify the time and effort in replying to you.
Neil.
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Don't let 'em grind you down Neil. I for one enjoy seeing the results of your research for it's own sake, especially as regards Mosquito operations - not stuff I see much of elsewhere.
As noted (I think - I've lost track ...), I don't give a hoot about P-51s, 109s or other such silly diversions.
:D
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Oh well, no answers from Neil Stirling then. Maybe it was naive to expect other - you always change subject when questions are asked.
I have to agree with Crumpp then, he made a perfectly logical statement when he said the documented perations were largely restricted to a few squadrons operating against V-1s in 1944. Not to say it wasnt used in the 2nd TAF, but evidence to the extent of this use is unknown so far, which was the question directed to you, and which you failed to answer and replied instead with accusations.
How ironic that you accuse me of making up things, Neil, after this last post of yours. As for winning being more important than the fact, hmm, I suggest you look up your co-authored website for examples of such. It had grown infamous for the sweated efforts in that. As for often leading to my banning, I am all ears of those 'many' cases.
Well I guess I did my part. You were given the opportunity to prove your point - you refused.
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1, Do you have documentation of the required 150 grade fuel supplies to IX/XIV/XIV units of the 2nd TAF ?
2, To what extent 150 grade and high boost was used in the 2nd TAF - documentation would be nice if any, but if not, your opinion/impressions are equally interesting. How many squadrons etc.
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Don't let 'em grind you down Neil. I for one enjoy seeing the results of your research for it's own sake, especially as regards Mosquito operations - not stuff I see much of elsewhere.
Thanks Scherf.
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;)
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Well no matter how it's twisted, - out of 35000 V-1's produced, less than 5000 made impact. (can go looking for a decent breakdown)
A rough guess of shot down V-1's by aircraft is some 3000.
So they DID get chased down. Perhaps on 87 octs?
And getting them was perhaps not so easy. Since there was no special visibility required for their navigation, launching in bad visibility was a perfect option. And normally their deck speed was quite high and sustained.
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Spit XIV figures are from Spitfire The History, scanned the serial numbers in, then OCR, then sorted in Excel a few months ago1. The dates are the dates delivered to the MU.
I had to laugh the first time I did it. The book states that "RB series all F XIV Merlin 65", and I accidently put the RM series in as M65 too, which only left 37 Griffon XIV produced by 1/1/45 . . . lol . . . it was 3 am . . . after getting some sleep I realized my mistake a few days later.
Anyone know what " 'Gem' mods " are?
only relevant things I find are the following:
RB161 hit by enemy AA 24-12-44
RB162 hit by AA during sweep i/sea pilot aban a/c but was k/d 22-5-44
RB169 hit by allied AA 23-12-44
RB175 hit by AA 28-5-44
RB176 . . . Nov,,endur trls and Griffon dev with ETP (7.9 and 19lbs eng boost with target of plus 25lb. Dev declared priority in Jan'45. Piston fail Feb. G65 replaced by G67 in June after 5 hrs fly.
RM619 s/dn nr Aachen pilot aban a/c POW 16-1-45
RM699 hit by AA a/c aban 18-12-44
RM743 air coll with V1 fly bomb cd 26-7-44
RM756 hit by enemy AA Ardennes 23-1-45
RM765 s/dn by Fw190 nr Munster pilot FTR 23-1-45
RM824 hit by AA 24-2-45
So it appears that the Spit XIV only saw action around May of 44 and Jan of 45, right before the invasion and during the Battle of the Bulge. Only 1 was shot down, by a Fw190. However by the same source it seems as though the Spit I and II were decimated by the Bf 109. But by the same token I would expect to see more Spit V s/dn by 190s but there are very few. I do see a number of Mk V with 'Basta' mods.
So unless I'm missing something, it seems the XIV saw very limited service and only in time of need. Perhaps someone that can decipher these abreviations better may provide a clearer picture. . . .
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ah, found the page with the abbreviation descriptions . . .
MV258 25-03-45 403 FTR ops
MV314 06-07-45 414 FTR ops
NH686 20-04-45 350 FTR ops
NH711 23-01-45 350 FTR ops
NH719 10-12-44 610 FTR ops
NH813 24-04-45 414 FTR ops
NH835 03-05-45 402 FTR ops
RB140 30-10-44 610 CE ops
RB141 03-05-44 322 FTR ops
RB150 30-08-44 610 FTR ops
RB154 25-12-44 610 eng fire
RB167 26-01-45 310 FTR ops
RB185 05-04-45 350 FTR ops
RB185 05-04-45 350 FTR ops
RB187 29-04-44 91 FTR patrol i/sea
RM618 24-04-44 350 FTR ops
RM619 16-01-45 350 s/dn nr Aachen pilot aban a/c POW
RM620 10-12-44 350 e/a CB
RM672 25-10-44 350 cancel AST 16-1-45 BAF 25-6-47 cd 5-8-53
RM673 25-12-44 350 FTR ops
RM677 14-02-45 610 FTR ops
RM690 24-12-44 350 hit by enemy AA a/c aban
RM731 18-01-45 610 FTR ops
RM736 18-12-45 610 FTR ops
RM739 26-02-45 350 CE ops
RM744 20-04-45 350 FTR ops
RM750 02-03-45 350 FTR ops
RM760 31-12-44 130 FTR ops
RM762 16-01-45 130 FTR ops
RM765 23-01-45 41 s/dn by Fw190 nr Munster pilot FTR
RM766 19-04-45 130 FTR ops
RM789 22-02-45 41 FTR ops
RM808 08-04-45 130 FTR ops
RM811 22-12-44 2 FTR ops
RM812 18-03-45 2 FTR ops
RM819 13-02-45 412 FTR ops
RM839 21-02-45 402 FTR ops
RM842 10-02-45 41 FTR ops
RM843 16-04-45 402 FTR ops
RM850 01-05-45 430 FTR ops
RM871 13-02-45 2 FTR ops
RM875 20-04-45 402 FTR ops
RM904 11-04-45 402 FTR ops
RM906 25-02-45 402 FTR ops
RN120 11-02-45 610 FTR ops
RN123 02-03-45 41 FTR ops
RN125 26-03-45 2 FTR ops
RN204 19-04-45 402 FTR ops
SM814 19-04-45 350 FTR ops
SM818 05-04-45 130 FTR ops
Squadron - losses
2 4
41 4
91 1
130 5
310 1
322 1
350 13
402 7
403 1
412 1
414 2
430 1
610 8
49
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by date:
RM618 24-04-44 350 FTR ops
RB187 29-04-44 91 FTR patrol i/sea
RB141 03-05-44 322 FTR ops
RB150 30-08-44 610 FTR ops
RM672 25-10-44 350 cancel AST 16-1-45 BAF 25-6-47 cd 5-8-53
RB140 30-10-44 610 CE ops
NH719 10-12-44 610 FTR ops
RM620 10-12-44 350 e/a CB
RM736 18-12-44 610 FTR ops
RM811 22-12-44 2 FTR ops
RM690 24-12-44 350 hit by enemy AA a/c aban
RB154 25-12-44 610 eng fire
RM673 25-12-44 350 FTR ops
RM760 31-12-44 130 FTR ops
RM619 16-01-45 350 s/dn nr Aachen pilot aban a/c POW
RM762 16-01-45 130 FTR ops
RM731 18-01-45 610 FTR ops
NH711 23-01-45 350 FTR ops
RM765 23-01-45 41 s/dn by Fw190 nr Munster pilot FTR
RB167 26-01-45 310 FTR ops
RM842 10-02-45 41 FTR ops
RN120 11-02-45 610 FTR ops
RM819 13-02-45 412 FTR ops
RM871 13-02-45 2 FTR ops
RM677 14-02-45 610 FTR ops
RM839 21-02-45 402 FTR ops
RM789 22-02-45 41 FTR ops
RM906 25-02-45 402 FTR ops
RM739 26-02-45 350 CE ops
RM750 02-03-45 350 FTR ops
RN123 02-03-45 41 FTR ops
RM812 18-03-45 2 FTR ops
MV258 25-03-45 403 FTR ops
RN125 26-03-45 2 FTR ops
RB185 05-04-45 350 FTR ops
RB185 05-04-45 350 FTR ops
SM818 05-04-45 130 FTR ops
RM808 08-04-45 130 FTR ops
RM904 11-04-45 402 FTR ops
RM843 16-04-45 402 FTR ops
RM766 19-04-45 130 FTR ops
RN204 19-04-45 402 FTR ops
SM814 19-04-45 350 FTR ops
NH686 20-04-45 350 FTR ops
RM744 20-04-45 350 FTR ops
RM875 20-04-45 402 FTR ops
NH813 24-04-45 414 FTR ops
RM850 01-05-45 430 FTR ops
NH835 03-05-45 402 FTR ops
MV314 06-07-45 414 FTR ops
it seems that other than the invasion, the Spit XIV didn't see any real action until the Battle of the Bulge. And then it seems that the Belgian Squadron 350, and 610 Squadron, along with 402 and 130, then 2 and 41 squadrons, were really the only ones to see any action.
Of course this list may be incomplete, but I think it gives a fair description of the record.
FTR ops - Failed to return, operations
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Very interesting findings, Milian! Excel can do wonders to a database, just recently I did a bit work on Mark V and MkIX operations in `42. Well, as much as the MkIX is celebrated being introduced in mid42, in reality it flew only a handful of sorties in that year, MkVs flying the vast majority and the combat effectiveness (kills/sortie, losses/sortie) of the two types don`t differ at all. Moreover, appearantly they couldn`t claim a single Bf 109 during the whole of 1942, it was a bit one sided. ;) The vast majority of engagements were with FW 190s however. I`d happily send over the XLS if you are interested!
Your findings regarding the MkXIV very much agree what I found. Production was terribly slow, the first Sqn to begin to equip with them in Jan 1944 did not complete the conversion until THREE months passed, and did not see action until May... appearantly their operational use was limited to a few sorties in May-June, then they went shooting target drones on high boost, reverting to normal boost in September and transferring to the continent, where appearantly they again saw little action until the Ardennes offensive, and some action on varying scale in 1945. Alltogether, not much - the vast majority of fighters were still MkIXs in 1945.
And then it seems that the Belgian Squadron 350, and 610 Squadron, along with 402 and 130, then 2 and 41 squadrons, were really the only ones to see any action.
Well, considering you have listed practically all RAF Sqns in WW2 that received MkXIVs... ;) Yep, a mere 6 Sqns, plus one recce unit with a mixed Allison Mustang/FRXIV combo.
I wonder if you have similiar info on MkIX production (ie. per month/delivered)? I suppose that would be equally interesting.
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Ehhhh, this one:
"Moreover, appearantly they couldn`t claim a single Bf 109 during the whole of 1942, it was a bit one sided. The vast majority of engagements were with FW 190s however. I`d happily send over the XLS if you are interested!"
I'll have a lookie into the bookies. I rather doubt that this stands.
Oddly enough, the last I read up were all 190's though.
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But by the same token I would expect to see more Spit V s/dn by 190s but there are very few.
There really were not many FW190's to down Spit's in 1942-43.
Luftflotte 2 was withdrawn for Barbarossa leaving only JG2 and JG26 in Luftflotte 3.
100% strength of an FW190 Jadgeschwader was 154 aircraft. At any given roughly 50% to 60% are servicable.
It is during this time that both JG26 and JG2 flew the FW190 almost exclusively.
Any numbers on RAF Fighter Commands and the AAF's strengths at this time to compare?
All the best,
Crumpp
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Just dipped into an autobiography of a Spit IX pilot flying in 1942.
Most of the combat accounts were with 190's. There were much less with 109's!
I only had to read for about a minute to find a claim on a 109 though. Well, for Kuffie's sake, wonder where the claim of no 109's being downed by the IX in 1942 comed. LW definitions from the time maybe, - took them a while to figure out which was which, - the nine or the five. Curious.....
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Originally posted by Kurfrst
Very interesting findings, Milian! Excel can do wonders to a database, just recently I did a bit work on Mark V and MkIX operations in `42. Well, as much as the MkIX is celebrated being introduced in mid42, in reality it flew only a handful of sorties in that year, MkVs flying the vast majority and the combat effectiveness (kills/sortie, losses/sortie) of the two types don`t differ at all. Moreover, appearantly they couldn`t claim a single Bf 109 during the whole of 1942, it was a bit one sided. ;) The vast majority of engagements were with FW 190s however. I`d happily send over the XLS if you are interested!
Your findings regarding the MkXIV very much agree what I found. Production was terribly slow, the first Sqn to begin to equip with them in Jan 1944 did not complete the conversion until THREE months passed, and did not see action until May... appearantly their operational use was limited to a few sorties in May-June, then they went shooting target drones on high boost, reverting to normal boost in September and transferring to the continent, where appearantly they again saw little action until the Ardennes offensive, and some action on varying scale in 1945. Alltogether, not much - the vast majority of fighters were still MkIXs in 1945.
And then it seems that the Belgian Squadron 350, and 610 Squadron, along with 402 and 130, then 2 and 41 squadrons, were really the only ones to see any action.
Well, considering you have listed practically all RAF Sqns in WW2 that received MkXIVs... ;) Yep, a mere 6 Sqns, plus one recce unit with a mixed Allison Mustang/FRXIV combo.
I wonder if you have similiar info on MkIX production (ie. per month/delivered)? I suppose that would be equally interesting.
Is there some sort of point you are trying to make? A handful of sorties. Define handful? In essense the Spit IX doesn't count until when in your mind?
As for the XIV. We're back to a handful of sorties before D-Day then chasing target drones. Kinda like 109s chasing target drones over Germany? Last I checked the V-1 threat was a fairly serious one and needed to be dealt with.
The logbook I have of a Spit pilot includes his time with both 41 and 91 squadrons from March of 43 until August of 44. During that time he had 185 Operational hours on Spit XIIs and 142 operational hours on Spit XIVs. His Spit XIV time was from March to August 44 with 91 Squadron. So he had a lot more hours on Ops in a shorter time while flying the XIV then he did in the XII and the XII was flying on constant Ops from the time he joined 41 until he joined 91 in February of 44.
Then the message was the saw little action once on the continent. Why is that? The LFIXs and XVIs were all flying ground attack? Why is that? Only 6 squadrons of XIVs. Of course there were Tiffies, Mustangs, Jugs, P38s, Tempests, Spit IX/XVIs too.
How many 109 squadrons on the western front opposing them ? Not those chasing 'target drones" over Germany. How many fighting the 2 TAF and 9th AF fighter bombers supporting the ground operations? Is it safe to say that the LW could only manage a handful of meaningful sorties?
Now I know I' ve been more tired and cranky lately, and I know the 109 won the war, but let's keep this in perspective just a bit ok?
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Tsk Tsk - Guppy, you know this was a futile attempt from penny pockets of aircraft running on 87 oct fuel when they had some, - not as if they had any range to cross the channel anyway :D
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The only Technical Order Wright Patterson has that deals with fuel is:
T.O. 02-1-38 Specified and Alternate Grade Fuel for Aircraft-Engine Combinations (2 Oct 1944, rev. 10 Feb 1945, rev. 20 May 1945)
All USAF fighter aircraft are listed with 130 grade fuel recommended, or alternate grade 91/96. No provision is listed for use of alternate 100/150 grade fuel.
It appears that 100/150 grades use was discussed by the 8th AF. Operational trials were conducted as well. However it does not appear to have entered general use.
I am checking on some other archives to confirm.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
The only Technical Order Wright Patterson has that deals with fuel is:
T.O. 02-1-38 Specified and Alternate Grade Fuel for Aircraft-Engine Combinations (2 Oct 1944, rev. 10 Feb 1945, rev. 20 May 1945)
Have you read this?
P-51 testing with 100/150 avgas (http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/mustangtest.html)
My regards,
Widewing
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Yes I have Widewing. The confusion in this issue has not been over operations at high speed. The fuel worked fine at high manifold pressures. Problems occur at cruising speeds.
Operational trials were conducted as well.
This is not correct. I should have written it entered operation for a few weeks but was withdrawn from general use.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Yes I have Widewing. The confusion in this issue has not been over operations at high speed. The fuel worked fine at high manifold pressures. Problems occur at cruising speeds.
All the best,
Crumpp
I haven't read thru this entire thread, but there appears to be some discussion as to the general use of 100/150 avgas in the ETO. I found this on the same website...
(http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/150-fuel-13-june44-b.jpg)
It appears that 100/150 was available to the 8th AF in June of '44.
My regards,
Widewing
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I haven't read thru this entire thread,
You need to need to read the whole thread Widewing. You are rehashing old issues.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Guppy35
Is there some sort of point you are trying to make? A handful of sorties. Define handful?
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800 sorties by MkIXs in the whole of 1942, to be exact, something like 10-20% of all Spitfire sorties. The LW fighters in France, despite fewer of them, flew that many alone on a single day at Dieppe, Fighter command was flying several thousends sorties a week during BoB, to put it into context.
In essense the Spit IX doesn't count until when in your mind?
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Well at the minimum it hardly made a difference until late 1943, when it finally appeared it numbers. It did not replace the Mk V until spring 1944 for sure. By then it had to face more modern enemy times.
Must have been tough fighting those 190As and 109F/Gs in 1941, 1942, 1943 in MkVs. Not really even playing ground.
Originally posted by Guppy35
As for the XIV. We're back to a handful of sorties before D-Day then chasing target drones. Kinda like 109s chasing target drones over Germany? Last I checked the V-1 threat was a fairly serious one and needed to be dealt with.
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Yep, the V-1 threat was quite serious, and it forced the RAF to deploy its mere 3 dozen modern Spits to fight them, which meant they had no impact on the air combat well until the automn/Winter of 1944. Even then, 60 planes didnt make a difference.
The logbook I have of a Spit pilot includes his time with both 41 and 91 squadrons from March of 43 until August of 44. During that time he had 185 Operational hours on Spit XIIs and 142 operational hours on Spit XIVs. His Spit XIV time was from March to August 44 with 91 Squadron. So he had a lot more hours on Ops in a shorter time while flying the XIV then he did in the XII and the XII was flying on constant Ops from the time he joined 41 until he joined 91 in February of 44.
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And ? You fail to see the forest from a tree. How many sorties MkXIVs had flew in total?
Then the message was the saw little action once on the continent. Why is that? The LFIXs and XVIs were all flying ground attack? Why is that? Only 6 squadrons of XIVs. Of course there were Tiffies, Mustangs, Jugs, P38s, Tempests, Spit IX/XVIs too.
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Point was the RAF was flying mostly with obsolate planes - the only modern ones comparable to enemy planes were the XIVs and Tempest - both very few in numbers.
How many 109 squadrons on the western front opposing them ? Not those chasing 'target drones" over Germany. How many fighting the 2 TAF and 9th AF fighter bombers supporting the ground operations? Is it safe to say that the LW could only manage a handful of meaningful sorties?
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Luftwaffe fighters flew well over 10 000 sorties on the Western front alone in December, if that answers your question. I dont think thats a handful only.
Now I know I' ve been more tired and cranky lately, and I know the 109 won the war, but let's keep this in perspective just a bit ok?
OK. The RAF was very slow introducing its advanced types in combat, and they constantly had to face the up-to-date oppistion in planes that were up-to-date 2 years before.
Hurricanes vs. 109E.
Spit Vs vs 109G and 190A
Spit IXs vs. late 109G, 109K and 190D
I see a pattern.
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Well, after going over everything I've seen here I have to say that I do not think the Spit XIV should be modeled at +21lbs boost and I do not think the Spit XVI should be modeled at +25lbs boost. The evidence of use is just not solid enough to make me think it was anything other than a minority until very late in the war. The same is true of the Bf109K-4 at 1.98ata.
The Spitfire F.Mk XIV and Spitfire LF.Mk XVIe should both be modeled at +18lbs boost to give those models the greatest usefulness in AH. The Bf109K-4 should use 1.8ata for the same reasons.
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Tsk Tskstksksss.
35000 doodlebugs made, 9000 made the run while the rest were largely destroyed by bombing or jabo attacks, some thousands were downed by fighters.
Seems that those few and obsolete RAF fighters had a field day then.
BTW, a lot of V-1's were launched over the North sea, at low alt (radar evasion), but most got shot down as well as quite many Heinkels were destroyed as well. Want stats?
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Kurfurst,
Hurricane Mk I vs Bf109E? Just ignore the 300 Spitfires, a full third of RAF Fighter Command in the BoB, why don't you. Oh, you did.
I know, let's ignore the fact that the Spitfire Mk V entered service nearly six months earlier than the Bf109F-2 and make the unsupported claim than the Spit V was only in service in time to face Bf109Gs and Fw190As, after all you read about soooooo many Spitfire Mk I and Spitfire Mk II fights against Bf109Fs.:rofl
And those pilots from the most active squadrons flying Spitfire Mk IXs in 1943, the reports of German pilots facing the notably improved Spitfire Mk IX? Let's ignore all that too as it is not really data that we like. It hurts our feelings.
You are right about the Spit XIV not being introduced very rapidly, almost like there wasn't a pressing need for it. You mention total sorties by the Germans without noting what types flew them or the nature of the sorties, then you pick at as specific an aircraft as you can in the RAF and represent it as the sum total of RAF efforts, glossing over or outright ignoring data that disagrees with your pet theories.
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Yes I have Widewing. The confusion in this issue has not been over operations at high speed. The fuel worked fine at high manifold pressures. Problems occur at cruising speeds.
This is not correct. I should have written it entered operation for a few weeks but was withdrawn from general use.
All the best,
Crumpp
And your evidence for this claim is what, Crumpp? There is none. You've been shown, repeatedly, that VIII Fighter Command was delivered 20,000 tons of 100/150 grade fuel in July of '44, was still receiving 20,000 tons per month in November, and yet another 18,000 tons in January of '45.
For some reason, you want to turn the fact that a new anti-plug fouling formulation ('Pep') was tested by the 355th FG in December of '44, into a claim that the standard formulation had been withdrawn from service at some prior date. Again, the evidence lends zero support to that contention.
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That's a lot of fuel for some penny packets of Spit IX's and XIV's.
Guess they were using it for cooking :D
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Originally posted by Angus
That's a lot of fuel for some penny packets of Spit IX's and XIV's.
Guess they were using it for cooking :D
Angus,
Actually, that 20,000 tons per month refers to deliveries to the USAAF's VIII Fighter Command, which Crumpp claims only used 100/150 grade for a short period in June of '44.
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Originally posted by Karnak
Kurfurst,
Hurricane Mk I vs Bf109E? Just ignore the 300 Spitfires, a full third of RAF Fighter Command in the BoB, why don't you. Oh, you did.
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What was the backbone of the RAF fighter command and which was to be most likely to be encountered by the 109E?
Answer the question.
Originally posted by Karnak
I know, let's ignore the fact that the Spitfire Mk V entered service nearly six months earlier than the Bf109F-2
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Really? Well that would mean the Spitfire V entered service in April 1940, given the first 109F was produced from July 1940, in action from early October 1940.
Of course, everyone except Karnak knows the Spit V first entered service march-april 1941... a full month after the Bf 109F-2 (february).
Take my advice... don`t open your mouth that big, people can see inside your head and realize it`s EMPTY. :D
and make the unsupported claim than the Spit V was only in service in time to face Bf109Gs and Fw190As, after all you read about soooooo many Spitfire Mk I and Spitfire Mk II fights against Bf109Fs.:rofl
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Nope, SpitVs also faced 109Fs, which washed the floor with them actually in 1941.
And those pilots from the most active squadrons flying Spitfire Mk IXs in 1943, the reports of German pilots facing the notably improved Spitfire Mk IX? Let's ignore all that too as it is not really data that we like. It hurts our feelings..
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Let`s ignore the fact there were only 10 SpitIX squadrons in mid 1943, most of them the old Merlin 61 engined anyway, the same number as in 1942... against 37 Spit V squadrons :
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/715_1126999612_raf-fc-1943jun.jpg)
A very much doubt a few dozen SpitIXs would really concern the Germans who had already 100% converted to the 109G ages ago by mid-1943. On the rare occasions they bumped into a SpitIX, they had to fight an equal opponent. Horrible, really.
You are right about the Spit XIV not being introduced very rapidly, almost like there wasn't a pressing need for it.[/B]
Yep. After all, the Americans did the fighting, not the Brits.
You mention total sorties by the Germans without noting what types flew them or the nature of the sorties,[/B]
Err, I think I said Luftwaffe daylight fighters on the West, Dec 1944.. now what types these could be... Bf 109G/K, FW190A/D maybe? :D
then you pick at as specific an aircraft as you can in the RAF and represent it as the sum total of RAF efforts, glossing over or outright ignoring data that disagrees with your pet theories. [/B]
Sorry I was unable to decrypt the meaning of that, maybe you should try pulling out your head out of your butt before attempting to communicate. Remember the light will hurt eyes intitially, and you will yell all over the place for a while.
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Originally posted by Angus
That's a lot of fuel for some penny packets of Spit IX's and XIV's.
Guess they were using it for cooking :D
How many IXs and XIVs were in the VIIIth USAAF Fighter Command?
My take is 0.
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The Hurricane Mk I obviously, but that does not warrant your complete dismissal of the Spitfire's presence in the battle, particularly given that the Spits were tasked, whenever possible, of tackling the 109s and the Hurris the bombers. You're phrasing and spin on it would have the Spitfires completely absent from the battle, which is hogwash.
Wotan gave a mid 1941 introduction for the Bf109F. I wonder why his date is so far off of yours as he is also a Luftwaffe fan.
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I didn`t say that, just that the RAF was always slow to convert to it`s most modern times, which regardless being as good as their Teutonic counterparts, and appearing in the same timescale, never spread around so quickly as on the other side.
Back on the BoB thingie, all those debates on SpitIvs109E performance are a bit silly considering the 109E usually met the Hurricane, which it totally outclassed.
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Kurfarce,
face it, no matter how much you argue.....Germany already lost the war.
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/209_1081438631_swoop.gif)
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Originally posted by Kurfrst
800 sorties by MkIXs in the whole of 1942, to be exact, something like 10-20% of all Spitfire sorties. The LW fighters in France, despite fewer of them, flew that many alone on a single day at Dieppe, Fighter command was flying several thousends sorties a week during BoB, to put it into context.
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Well at the minimum it hardly made a difference until late 1943, when it finally appeared it numbers. It did not replace the Mk V until spring 1944 for sure. By then it had to face more modern enemy times.
Must have been tough fighting those 190As and 109F/Gs in 1941, 1942, 1943 in MkVs. Not really even playing ground.
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Yep, the V-1 threat was quite serious, and it forced the RAF to deploy its mere 3 dozen modern Spits to fight them, which meant they had no impact on the air combat well until the automn/Winter of 1944. Even then, 60 planes didnt make a difference.
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And ? You fail to see the forest from a tree. How many sorties MkXIVs had flew in total?
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Point was the RAF was flying mostly with obsolate planes - the only modern ones comparable to enemy planes were the XIVs and Tempest - both very few in numbers.
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Luftwaffe fighters flew well over 10 000 sorties on the Western front alone in December, if that answers your question. I dont think thats a handful only.
OK. The RAF was very slow introducing its advanced types in combat, and they constantly had to face the up-to-date oppistion in planes that were up-to-date 2 years before.
Hurricanes vs. 109E.
Spit Vs vs 109G and 190A
Spit IXs vs. late 109G, 109K and 190D
I see a pattern. [/B]
When did we establish that the Spit LFIXe/XVIe was obsolete? Last I checked it was considered by many RAF pilots the best of the Spits for combat.
As for those 10000 sorties in December 44 being a handful. I guess that's a matter of persepctive as well.
A quick check through the books and it appears that the 8th Air Force alone flew almost 30,000 sorties that month. 9th Air Force flew close to 15000 sorties. 15th Air Force from the south was hitting targets on 21 different days in Germany and Austria with over 16000 sorties, and I haven't included Royal Air Force sorties at all in that count.
So just to defend against the American Air Forces attacking Germany, the average LW pilot was flying into a 6 vs 1 situation. Throw in the RAF sorties and you are probably talking about a 8-1 disadvantage at least. No wonder those Spit drivers weren't finding much action.
And how many of those 10K LW sorties were offensive sorties? How many were attacking those bombers that were hitting Germany from the south and the west almost daily?
So yeah I'd say that those 10K fighter sorties were a handful in comparison to what was being flown against them.
And I still don't see the point of all this? Jets were on the horizon for the future. Not much point in over producing prop planes when they were going to be obsolete to the jets. The end of the war was in sight and the supply of aircraft was exceeding demand as was the supply of pilots for the Allies. They had dominance in the air from pre-D-Day on. They must have been doing something right.
And the Spits were rarely fighting the 109Ks and 190D9s. And consider their numbers as well. Not staggering by any means, the D9 in particular. And they were dealing with far larger numbers of 51Ds, 47s etc in the airwar over Germany which they were losing badly.
The Spits were by that time flying ground attack for lack of any air combat to be found.
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Originally posted by Swoop
Kurfarce,
face it, no matter how much you argue.....Germany already lost the war.
Fabulus information, really. Thanks for stepping by. :rofl
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Originally posted by Guppy35
When did we establish that the Spit LFIXe/XVIe was obsolete? Last I checked it was considered by many RAF pilots the best of the Spits for combat.
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That may be their opinion, that it was the best balanced type, but last I checked it was a wee bit slow and lacking altitude performance of true 44/45 planes. The 109F, regardless of it`s qualities of nicely balanced flight characteristics, would be obsolate as well in an air combat that called for PERFORMANCE.
Let`s consider the fact the 109K cruised faster at altitude than the MkIX at all-out full power, quite telling of the performance gap.
Originally posted by Guppy35
So just to defend against the American Air Forces attacking Germany, the average LW pilot was flying into a 6 vs 1 situation. Throw in the RAF sorties and you are probably talking about a 8-1 disadvantage at least. No wonder those Spit drivers weren't finding much action.
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I`d really like to see some actual data for the 2nd TAF, instead of guessing. As for the USAAF, the vast numerical superioty is well known - oddly it`s usually denied by USAAF fans, who don`t like the main cause for success - ie 8 on 1 'dogfights' .
And how many of those 10K LW sorties were offensive sorties? How many were attacking those bombers that were hitting Germany from the south and the west almost daily?
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Why don`t you tell us?
So yeah I'd say that those 10K fighter sorties were a handful in comparison to what was being flown against them..
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True, but it was a whole different scale than the number of IX sorties in 1942, or XIV sorties in 1944, which we were talking about.
And I still don't see the point of all this? Jets were on the horizon for the future. Not much point in over producing prop planes when they were going to be obsolete to the jets. The end of the war was in sight and the supply of aircraft was exceeding demand as was the supply of pilots for the Allies. They had dominance in the air from pre-D-Day on. They must have been doing something right.
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Sure, the evergreen Allies won the war, so they did everything better arguement. Bit boring, really. Come up with something a wee bit more original.
And the Spits were rarely fighting the 109Ks and 190D9s. And consider their numbers as well. Not staggering by any means, the D9 in particular.[/B]
Last I checked, there were about 400 D9/K4 around in December 1944, and I am quite sure there were at least 600 by January. Just between you and me, that`s alone about as much IXs the whole 2nd TAF had, and about 10 times of the number of XIVs/Tempest.
The Spits were by that time flying ground attack for lack of any air combat to be found. [/B]
Another evergreen... claim, but no factuality. Guess what, Bf 109Ks flew a lot of ground attack sorties in April 1945. By your logic, the Allies were nowhere. Silly, isn`t it?
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Originally posted by Kurf�rst
I`d really like to see some actual data for the 2nd TAF, instead of guessing. As for the USAAF, the vast numerical superioty is well known - oddly it`s usually denied by USAAF fans, who don`t like the main cause for success - ie 8 on 1 'dogfights' .
It's denied because the ' 8 vs 1' dogfight was far from the norm. As you know, those vast numbers of USAAF fighters were spread over equally as vast areas. No doubt that the Allies greatly outnumbered the JG's in the last year of the war, but air battles between elements of similar size were far more common than you would like to admit. Almost invariably, the better-trained Allied pilots came out on top during those engagements.
The Luftwaffe, on the other hand, had no choice but attempt to concentrate its meager forces at certain points since it had long before ceded general air superiority to the Allies. The fact is that Luftwaffe Jagdflieger was very likely to meet enemy aircraft during each sortie, while USAAF fighter groups could go weeks without spotting a single airborne Luftwaffe prop fighter.
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So the point again is? The Spit IX wasn't flying lots of ops from England in 1942. Since they didn't really get into action until the latter part of 42, that makes sense. And since the main focus of the war at that point wasn't France, that makes some sense as well. Seems to me North Africa, Russia etc was where the bigger battles were taking place. RAF Ops were basically to fly across with Medium bombers with fighter escort and try and get the LW to come up.
The Spit XIV wasn't used in great numbers. Yep. This is true. Can't say that it's counter part, the 190D9 that didn't get into action until the Fall of 44 did a whole lot more
Your opinion again on the combat capability of the Spit LFIX. I'll take the word of the guys who flew it in combat over that of someone who wasn't there and who clearly has convinced himself that the Spitfire was a waste of time.
You mention 400-600 109K4s. I'd love to hear about who operated them, where and how often. I don't recall the bombers over Germany seeing that many fighters in the air. From the Fall of 44 the 8th was seeing LW fighters only in small numbers ,save a couple of days where the LW had apparently marshalled all the planes it could to try and make an impact. Even then it was only 150-200 aircraft estimated seen and you know how those Allied crews over estimated numbers.
I was thinking about it, and this is how the discussions go here every time.
Your typical Axis vs Allied argument
It occurred to me today after reading more of the threads in the aircraft and vehicles forum that the discussions are a lot like your typical sports fan.
Axis: My team had better players.
Allied: Thats your opinion, and my team won
Axis: We were kicking your butt all over the field in the first part of the game.
Allied: Thats true, but we had to play the entire game to determine the winner and in the end we won.
Axis: My team had much better equipment then yours!
Allied: That may be true to some extent too. But then again we didnt even want to play the game. You were planning for the game before we even knew we were going to play. We seemed to have caught up though and in the end we won.
Axis: But I have statistics to show you how much better my players were then yours. My best players scored a lot more goals then your best!
Allied: Yep. Youve got the guys with the best numbers. But then again your players had to play the entire game without a rest. I could rest the players on my team. And you know what? We won.
Axis: Thats because you had more players on your team!
Allied: Well, we didnt want to play the game to begin with, and we didnt make up the rules. So we used all the players we were allowed to. We cant help it you didnt have as many players.
Axis: If our coach had made better decisions, wed have won for sure!
Allied: Not my problem your coach was an idiot. Hindsight is always 20-20. We still won.
Axis: But we had the best players and equipment on the field at the end!
Allied: Probably true, but our players and equipment were pretty good too and we had the better team so we won.
Axis: Quit saying that! Just because you won doesnt mean we werent better!
Allied: Last I checked, all that mattered was who won.
Axis fan last seen running away screaming about statistics, what might have beens and coulda shoulda wouldas.
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Well, lets be clear on intro dates, by October 1944 the LW was made up of 190As and 109G-6s and 109G-14s. Thats it, for prop types.
Tempest, Spit XIV are already operating on the Continent in strength from September 1944, as are the Mustang IIIs. The remainder are Spit LF IXs and Typhoons.
From Oct-Dec 1944 the LW starts getting 190Ds and 109K/109G-10s. They gradually come into service, but never fully replace the 109G-14 or the 190A in the last 6 months of the war.
Just as the Tempest and Spit XIV never fully replace the Spit LF IX and Mustang III.
The established strength of an RAF Sqn was 20 a/c in 44-45, not 12. 12 was what they kept in the air, just as JGs did not sortie 100 percent of their strengths, nor did the USAAF (or anybody else). Pilot avialability and maintenance schedules made that impossible.
...Lastly, just to set the record straight on the Tempest and Spit XIV, their main reason for being deployed to Holland had nothing to do with 190s or 109s. They were deployed there as the # of Me262 fighter-bomber sorties increased (from KG51), and the allies needed their fastest fighters to counter that.
Read "Invasions Without Tears", about 126 Wing RCAF, they had no Temps or XIVs, and didnt need them, either:
http://www.valourandhorror.com/BOOKS/berger.php
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You know I still wonder why is it hard to meet with an avarage of 350 enemy fighter flying all over the front every day.
As for superior Allied pilots winning combats on equal numbers invariably, Japo gives the following figures for the Western Front, Decemer 1944 for LW daylight fighters :
Sorties flown : 11 053
Victories : 552
Losses : 527
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Originally posted by Guppy35
You mention 400-600 109K4s. I'd love to hear about who operated them, where and how often.
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I said K-4s and D-9s. There were 314 Bf 109K-4s listed with 1st line LW units on 31 Jan 1945.
Bf 109K was operated by the following units. Each Roman number designates a LW JagdGruppe, or Fighter Wing.
In comparision, there were only 1 MkXIV Fighter wing during the war in the RAF.
III. / JG 1
II. / JG 2
Stab / JG 3 "Udet"
I. / JG 3 "Udet"
II. / JG 3 "Udet"
III. / JG 3 "Udet"
I. / JG 4
III. / JG 4
IV. / JG 4
Stab / JG 6
II. / JG 11
III. / JG 26
I. / JG 27
II. / JG 27
III. / JG 27
Stab / JG 51
III. / JG 51
IV. / JG 51
Stab / JG 52
I. / JG 52
II. / JG 52
III. / JG 52
II. / JG 53
III. / JG 53
IV. / JG 53
Stab / JG 77
I. / JG 77
II. / JG 77
III. / JG 77
III. / EJG 1
II. / KG(J) 6
II. / KG(J) 27
II. / KG(J) 55
I. / NJG 11
Italian units
I. Gr. C.
II. Gr. C.
Hungarian units - based on the telling of Tobak Tibor, 101st veteran
101. Honi Vadszezred (101st Home Fighter Regiment)
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One thing I think we can agree on which I think has been often overlooked by "army" military historians ,is the fact that the air campaign in France and the Low Countries from June-September 1944, was a hard fought one amongst the "tactical air arms" of the LW and the RAF/USAAF. Authors seem to almost completely dismiss it, I dont know why.
They focus almost solely on the 8th AF efforts vs the LW, and just ignore everything else as "background". Its just as important of a campaign, if not more so, being that the armies decided the fate of the western front, and the air arms covering them were directly engaged in the struggle.
As for large air combats, there were many, read any good book on the campaign, this business of "Priller and his wingman strafe Juno-Sword beach and go home" < and thats it... is a myth started by Cornelius Ryans "The Longest Day", a rather average telling of the D-Day fighting...
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Just a glimpse of 2 TAF sorties based on a Canadian Tiffie Wing 143 Wing comprised of 438, 439 & 440 Squadrons.
First Operational Flight March 20, 1944, last Operational Flight May 5, 1945.
In a little over 13 months they flew 12, 926 operational sorties, so not quite 1000 a month.
2 TAF on D-Day was 80 Squadrons. Can't find a number for December 44 but it's no doubt similar if not more.
Do the math. Figure that 143 Wing was typical and it adds up to about 24000 sorties a month with all those squadrons.
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Have a look at Chris Shores' 3-Volume "2nd TAF". Covers the larger strategic situation, snapshots of tactical requirements, and a daily review of all 2nd TAF operations, night and day.
Has Orders of Battle at various points, airfield assignements, daily losses and claims. I don't believe there is a daily total of sorties flown.
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Originally posted by Kurf�rst
You know I still wonder why is it hard to meet with an avarage of 350 enemy fighter flying all over the front every day.
You can wonder all you like, but the fact is that by 1945, VIII Fighter Command saw absolutley zero aerial opposition on the vast majority of its missions.
BTW, 552 'Claims' Isegrim, not 'Victories'. If you want to measure air-to-air claims vs. losses, then your average USAAF fighter group had many times that kill:loss ratio.
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Considering most Typhoon sorties, ie. in Normandy barely lasted more than 15-30mins with just flying a few miles to the frontline and back, it`s not hard to add up many quick sorties this way.
Ie, how do you compare that to 5-6 hour escort sorties of the USAAF, or 1-2 hour interception sorties of the Reichsverteidigung? Apples and oranges.
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Originally posted by LRRP22
552 'Claims' Isegrim, not 'Victories'. If you want to measure air-to-air claims vs. losses, then your average USAAF fighter group had many times that kill:loss ratio.
JAPO uses the word 'Victories'.
And of course we all know how much reality was there behind USAAF figther claims. If half of those were true, the LW would cease to exist in 1943 already.
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I have Vol I and Vol II of "2nd TAF" by Chistopher Shores, im wating for Vol 3 to become available. Probably the best source on that air force, and very detailed.
As far as all this stuff about 8:1 and 10:1 and 20:1, its mostly mythology. Local air combats took place between small units usually. "On paper" OOBs does not indicate the ratio of friend to foe in most air combats in WW2.
Im going to paraphrase some from "2nd TAF" Vol II.:
"411 Sqn met 12 Bf 109s"
"403 Sqn encountered 40 Bf 109s"
"401 Sqn undertook a sweep, met 40 190s"
I wont bother going through the entire book, but rest assured there are many reports like that. Did it always happen that way? of course not. I am illustrating that BOTH sides fighter units would run across equal or larger enemy forces on many occasions, because that was just "the fortunes of war", the side to see the other 1st and attack, usually did better.
It made no difference to a Typhoon sqn that ran across 3 Staffels of 109s that "on paper" the allies outnumbered the Germans by X ammount, thats hardly going to help them in the next 10 minutes, is it?
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Originally posted by Kurf�rst
JAPO uses the word 'Victories'.
And of course we all know how much reality was there behind USAAF figther claims. If half of those were true, the LW would cease to exist in 1943 already.
My point exactly. Even the officially awarded victories were well above the actuall losses suffered by the opposition- and that applies to the Luftwaffe claims system as much as it does to that of the Allies. The myth that the Luftwaffe system was vastly more accurate than that of the Allies simply isn't born-out. Reading works such as Urbanke's 'Green Hearts' and Caldwell's JG26 works indicate that overclaiming by a factor of two to four was common amongst those units. And before you say that they were just claims, how do you explain the fact that the pilots from those various units, as well as the units themselves, are credited with virtually all those claims to this day? After all, Hartmann's 352 victories include claims that were made on the last day of the war, how could those have possibley been 'officially' confirmed? Didn't the Luftwaffe claims system's supposedly stringent process require months to 'officially' confirm a victory? Didn't it break down completley in the last months of the war?
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Originally posted by Kurfrst
Considering most Typhoon sorties, ie. in Normandy barely lasted more than 15-30mins with just flying a few miles to the frontline and back, it`s not hard to add up many quick sorties this way.
Ie, how do you compare that to 5-6 hour escort sorties of the USAAF, or 1-2 hour interception sorties of the Reichsverteidigung? Apples and oranges.
LOL planes in the air. Sorties lasting about an hour minimum for the Tiffies. The Operational hours and sorties flown were similar with the operational hours being a bit more.
Since you want to set ground rules for what a sortie is now, then how do you compare those short interception flights of the LW to the long range sorties of the USAAF from England?
Using your own argument against the Tiffie sorties counting and giving every LW fighter sortie a 2 hour limit and the USAAF sorties from England 6 (although we know the bomber sorties were longer and fighter sorties lasted longer too on occasion) Then it's 169080 operational sortie hours for just the 8th AF alone to 20000 operational hours for the LW fighters.
apples and oranges wouldn't you say? :)
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Originally posted by Kurfrst
Considering most Typhoon sorties, ie. in Normandy barely lasted more than 15-30mins with just flying a few miles to the frontline and back, it`s not hard to add up many quick sorties this way.
So now sorties only count if they last x amount of time, where x is defined as whatever number will deny the most RAF sorties while maximizing the allowed Luftwaffe sorties?
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Originally posted by Squire
I have Vol I and Vol II of "2nd TAF" by Chistopher Shores, im wating for Vol 3 to become available. Probably the best source on that air force, and very detailed.
As far as all this stuff about 8:1 and 10:1 and 20:1, its mostly mythology. Local air combats took place between small units usually. "On paper" OOBs does not indicate the ratio of friend to foe in most air combats in WW2.
Im going to paraphrase some from "2nd TAF" Vol II.:
"411 Sqn met 12 Bf 109s"
"403 Sqn encountered 40 Bf 109s"
"401 Sqn undertook a sweep, met 40 190s"
I wont bother going through the entire book, but rest assured there are many reports like that. Did it always happen that way? of course not. I am illustrating that BOTH sides fighter units would run across equal or larger enemy forces on many occasions, because that was just "the fortunes of war", the side to see the other 1st and attack, usually did better.
It made no difference to a Typhoon sqn that ran across 3 Staffels of 109s that "on paper" the allies outnumbered the Germans by X ammount, thats hardly going to help them in the next 10 minutes, is it?
And therin lies the danger of getting into the statistics and graphs game, yet it always ends up with "Show me the numbers!"
LOL gotta wonder why I keep responding in these threads :)
Guess I better give it a rest
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Originally posted by Karnak
Wotan gave a mid 1941 introduction for the Bf109F. I wonder why his date is so far off of yours as he is also a Luftwaffe fan.
"Deliveries of the BF 109 F-1 to the Lw began in autumn of 1940. The new version first saw action in October 1940 with Stab/JG 51, where Werner Mlders, as early as October 6th according to other sources, flew his first sortie in a Friedrich on October 25, 1940. From the beggining of November I./JG 51also received several BF 109 F-1 machines.
The first known loss of one of these aircrafts ocurred on November 11, 1940, when the Staffelkapitn of 1./JG 51, Oblt.GeorgClaus, failed to return following an engagement off the British coast. "
"Deliveries of the F-2, the first major production variant , began in January 1941."
Finally, the F-4 saw action in June, 1941 (maybe that was Wotan said...)
source: Messerschmitt BF 109F, G & K series- an illustrated study- Prien /Rodeike
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For some reason, you want to turn the fact that a new anti-plug fouling formulation ('Pep') was tested by the 355th FG in December of '44, into a claim that the standard formulation had been withdrawn from service at some prior date. Again, the evidence lends zero support to that contention.
If you read the rest of the thread you will see the technical difficulties of 100/150 grade use in the P51.
Well Wright Patterson has no record of it. The TO which specifies what fuel USAAF were authorized to use:
T.O. 02-1-38 Specified and Alternate Grade Fuel for Aircraft-Engine Combinations (2 Oct 1944, rev. 10 Feb 1945, rev. 20 May 1945)
All USAF fighter aircraft are listed with 130-grade fuel recommended, or alternate grade 91/96. No provision is listed for use of alternate 100/150 grade fuel.
General widespread use of any other fuel would be published in a T.O., Lrrp2.
Not a memo from supply.
The Military does not work that way. Logistics gets equipment, it does not tell you how to use or authorize it. MACOM's do that. In this case, HQ USAAF would have issued a T.O. with instructions to the aircrews on both the modifications and use of 100/150 grade.
The argument of "its a British fuel" holds no water. Why?
It's a USAAF fighter.
I am continuing to search various archives.
It's denied because the ' 8 vs 1' dogfight was far from the norm. As you know, those vast numbers of USAAF fighters were spread over equally as vast areas. No doubt that the Allies greatly outnumbered the JG's in the last year of the war, but air battles between elements of similar size were far more common than you would like to admit. Almost invariably, the better-trained Allied pilots came out on top during those engagements.
I should set you down with some of the Luftwaffe veterans. You can set them straight. According to them, the days of equal numbers in air battles ended in the beginning of 1944.
Surely you do not believe the allied fighters had to wander the skies of Europe searching for LW fighters in 1944?
I mean, those German fighters certainly would not be targeting the bombers or using airfields to operate?
Of course the allies did not have radar either to guide them.
All the best,
Crumpp
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"Deliveries of the F-2, the first major production variant , began in January 1941."
Same time as the Spit Vb.
Any of which can be found in any # of sources, this supposed to be controversial? How did we even get on this track?
...Crummp, if the USAAF 8th FC quit using 150 grade then there is going to be a book somewhere that states just that. Or a doc somewhere. We have sources indicating its use, so I have to say the onus is on you to show it was stopped, because so far you dont have anything except that there were increased maintenance problems, which is not the same thing, despite the reaching.
In regards to the Luftwaffe pilots, well, maybe you need to sit down with some RAF/RCAF ones, and they can tell you about how they always outnumbered the enemy, in every encounter.
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despite the reaching.
There is no reaching Squire and it's not Crumpp saying.
It's Freeman and the USAF saying it is unlikely.
So far none of the USAAF documentation shows it's use.
The USAF Museum says it use was unlikely as there are no T.O.'s published covering it.
All the best,
Crumpp
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It's very simple then, Crumpp- please explain where that 20,000 tons per month of 150 grade allocated to VIII Fighter Command was going? Please explain the repeated reference to its use by VIII FC fighter groups.
It was a British fuel, refined by the British and provided to the USAAF, in Britain, by the British. Wright Field tested the fuel and approved of its use. Period.
The mechanical problems from June to December of '44 were limited to plug fouling if certain cruise practices weren't observed. That's it. The 'Pep' formulation of 1945 cured the fouling problem but caused valve problems instead. The valve problems resulted in some unknown number fo groups requesting a return to 100/130 grade fuel during the last month of the war. It doesn't appear that that request was granted.
You can search archives all you want, Crumpp, but Neil Stirling has already done just that and produced the origianl source documentation that proves you wrong. Are we now going to get into another ridiculous argument over whether or not 'the Continent' means Great Britain as you attempt to ignore the source documentation? No amount of selective quoting and obvious misinterpretation is going to change that. Sorry, but I'm just not interested in more of your sophistry.
Originally posted by Crumpp
If you read the rest of the thread you will see the technical difficulties of 100/150 grade use in the P51.
Well Wright Patterson has no record of it. The TO which specifies what fuel USAAF were authorized to use:
General widespread use of any other fuel would be published in a T.O., Lrrp2.
Not a memo from supply.
The Military does not work that way. Logistics gets equipment, it does not tell you how to use or authorize it. MACOM's do that. In this case, HQ USAAF would have issued a T.O. with instructions to the aircrews on both the modifications and use of 100/150 grade.
The argument of "its a British fuel" holds no water. Why?
It's a USAAF fighter.
I am continuing to search various archives.
I should set you down with some of the Luftwaffe veterans. You can set them straight. According to them, the days of equal numbers in air battles ended in the beginning of 1944.
Surely you do not believe the allied fighters had to wander the skies of Europe searching for LW fighters in 1944?
I mean, those German fighters certainly would not be targeting the bombers or using airfields to operate?
Of course the allies did not have radar either to guide them.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Hehe:
"It's very simple then, Crumpp- please explain where that 20,000 tons per month of 150 grade allocated to VIII Fighter Command was going? Please explain the repeated reference to its use by VIII FC fighter groups."
I told ya it was used for cooking. Sauerkraut and sausage BTW :D
And for Kuffie, - I recommend you browse upward and read Guppy's inputs very carefully.
Then I'll tell you more of how to cook bratwurst with 150 oct fuel :D
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Originally posted by LRRP22
My point exactly. Even the officially awarded victories were well above the actuall losses suffered by the opposition- and that applies to the Luftwaffe claims system as much as it does to that of the Allies. The myth that the Luftwaffe system was vastly more accurate than that of the Allies simply isn't born-out. Reading works such as Urbanke's 'Green Hearts' and Caldwell's JG26 works indicate that overclaiming by a factor of two to four was common amongst those units. And before you say that they were just claims, how do you explain the fact that the pilots from those various units, as well as the units themselves, are credited with virtually all those claims to this day? After all, Hartmann's 352 victories include claims that were made on the last day of the war, how could those have possibley been 'officially' confirmed? Didn't the Luftwaffe claims system's supposedly stringent process require months to 'officially' confirm a victory? Didn't it break down completley in the last months of the war?
.
Always wondered about the LW superior way of confirming kills. After all, if all their claims were correct the BoB would have been over in less than 2 weeks.
Hopefully I can find the reference that says that after the introduction of the Mossie early on LW pilots were awarded 2 kills for shooting down 1 Mossie as they were that hard to catch.
Mossie might not have been a wonder weapon, but it sure impressed the hell outta Goering!!!
Jan 1943 - Herman Goering quote.
"In 1940 I could at least fly as far as Glasgow in most of my aircraft, but not now! It makes me furious when I see the Mosquito. I turn green and yellow with envy.
The British, who can afford aluminium better than we can, knock together a beautiful wooden aircraft that every piano factory over there is building, and they give it a speed which they have now increased yet again. What do you make of that?
There is nothing the British do not have. They have the geniuses and we have the nincompoops. After the war's over I'm going to buy a British radio set - then at least I'll own something that has always worked."
Another reference I am hoping to find again is a top LW ace refusing to fly the late model 109s because the built quality was crap.
One question - Why stop at the Mk XIV as the ultimate WW2 Spit, the F.21 entered service (91 sqn) in Jan 1945. Originally destined to built in the 1000's, production halted shortly after VE day after only 120 had been delivered. 455-460mph at 25,600ft.
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It doesn't appear that that request was granted.
The instructions to convert the Mustang to use 100/150-grade would be published in the form of a Technical Order and supplement the POH for the 8th USAAF.
Perhaps you can produce the USAAF T.O. for the P51D to use the fuel?
Wright Patterson cannot. I tend to believe them. After all their mission is:
The museum identifies, searches for, acquires, preserves, refurbishes, displays or stores, and manages items of historical or technological significance to the USAF.
They say it's use was most likely very rare in the 8th USAAF.
It makes sense given the performance robbing technical difficulties of 100/150 grade and the fact that there is very little performance differences between 72" and 67".
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
The instructions to convert the Mustang to use 100/150-grade would be published in the form of a Technical Order and supplement the POH for the 8th USAAF.
Perhaps you can produce the USAAF T.O. for the P51D to use the fuel?
Wright Patterson cannot. I tend to believe them. After all their mission is:
They say it's use was most likely very rare in the 8th USAAF.
It makes sense given the performance robbing technical difficulties of 100/150 grade and the fact that there is very little performance differences between 72" and 67".
All the best,
Crumpp
(http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/78thfg-p51-150grade.jpg)
Neil can correct me if I'm off, but I believe that the above photo was taken in April of 1945, the aircraft itself being delivered to the 78th FG in January. It is placarded for 100/150 avgas.. So were the P-47Ms.
Why would they specify 100/150 if it were not available?
My regards,
Widewing
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I'm no expert, and I tend to stay out of these back-and-forth arguments (dare I call them posts?) for the most part.
But I don't think that plane's being delivered. Not if it's already got a kill mark on it. EDIT: It's also already been given a name and has nose art on it. That means it's been in service at least long enough for the pilot to get a kill in it and customize the paint job.
EDIT2: Never mind, I mis-read your post.
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(http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/78thfg-p51-150grade.jpg)
oh jeebus, has everyone missed the "SPEC.PROJ.NO 92917-R" painted above the 100/150?
Just what was special project no 92917-R?
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Gring's quote was very good.
He also gave quite a comment when Mustangs were first spotted deep inside Germany. At first he did not belive that single engined fighters could venture that far, - when it was confirmed he said "Now we have lost" (the airwar)
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(http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/150+grade+production.jpg)
57,000 tons left 31st May 1945
28,000 tons left 7th September 1945.
About 312,000 tons of 150 grade consumed from early 1944 to the end of the European War I doubt that the RAF used all of it or even half of it.
Neil.
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Interesting couple of lines in a history of the 4th Fighter Group, flying Mustangs out of Debden England.
"June 15, 1944-After extensive tests, which began on February 10th, 1944, all 8th Fighter Command bases started getting 100/150 fuel"
I've seen this mentioned a couple of places. This was just prior to the Russian Shuttle runs.
I went hunting for images showing 8th or 8th AF Mustangs and the Data blocks under the cockpit like the one above.
Found this one of a 370th FG Mustang in March 45. 100/150 fuel Another with the R designation after Special Projects.
Found the same on some Iwo based Mustangs as well
Tech order 00-5-1 seems to be the TO to look for.
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/810_1127984459_p51150.jpg)
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AIR 29/822 No. 407 Aviation Fuel and Ammunition Park, Groombridge, 2nd T.A.F. 1943 Aug.-1946 May
AIR 29/822 No. 422 Aviation Fuel and Ammunition Park, Epping and Slindon Park, 2nd T.A.F. 1 944 Feb.-1945 Aug.
(http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/2nd+taf+150.jpg)
(http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/2nd+taf+150+b.jpg)
Neil
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"June 15, 1944-After extensive tests, which began on February 10th, 1944, all 8th Fighter Command bases started getting 100/150 fuel"
Please read the rest of the thread. We know the 8th AF attempted to bring the fuel into General service. Technical issues prevented it. Lets stop going over the same ground please.
Found this one of a 370th FG Mustang in March 45. 100/150 fuel Another with the R designation after Special Projects.
In fact the 78th has the exact same marking.
That would go along with what Wrigth Patterson is saying.
They say it's use was most likely very rare in the 8th USAAF.
Supply is not the issue, USE is the problem.
All the best,
Crumpp
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So it all makes sense?
RAF and USAAF stockpiled 150 oct fuel, but were not advanced enough to use it.
Guess my theory on using it for cooking holds then :D
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Originally posted by Squire
I have Vol I and Vol II of "2nd TAF" by Chistopher Shores, im wating for Vol 3 to become available. Probably the best source on that air force, and very detailed.
As far as all this stuff about 8:1 and 10:1 and 20:1, its mostly mythology. Local air combats took place between small units usually. "On paper" OOBs does not indicate the ratio of friend to foe in most air combats in WW2.
Im going to paraphrase some from "2nd TAF" Vol II.:
"411 Sqn met 12 Bf 109s"
"403 Sqn encountered 40 Bf 109s"
"401 Sqn undertook a sweep, met 40 190s"
I wont bother going through the entire book, but rest assured there are many reports like that. Did it always happen that way? of course not. I am illustrating that BOTH sides fighter units would run across equal or larger enemy forces on many occasions, because that was just "the fortunes of war", the side to see the other 1st and attack, usually did better.
It made no difference to a Typhoon sqn that ran across 3 Staffels of 109s that "on paper" the allies outnumbered the Germans by X ammount, thats hardly going to help them in the next 10 minutes, is it?
Squire, do you have the ISBNs for those volumes? Are they still in print?
Regards,
shubie
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They are newly-released, Vol. 3 still not out.
Amazon should have them. Vol. II is titled, IIRC, "2nd TAF Breakout to Bodenplatte".
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Originally posted by Angus
So it all makes sense?
RAF and USAAF stockpiled 150 oct fuel, but were not advanced enough to use it.
Guess my theory on using it for cooking holds then :D
312,000 tons consumed is a lot of cooking.
Can I have your eggs?
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Originally posted by milian
oh jeebus, has everyone missed the "SPEC.PROJ.NO 92917-R" painted above the 100/150?
Just what was special project no 92917-R? [/B]
The 'Special Projects' entry on the data block is nearly universal for P-51D's. I looked at hundreds of photos last night and on every P-51D were the data block was complete and unaltered, the 'Special Projects' entry is there. I suspect that it is a contract number.
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So, there's nothing special about a "special project"?
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Please read the rest of the thread. We know the 8th AF attempted to bring the fuel into General service. Technical issues prevented it. Lets stop going over the same ground please.
Crumpp,
We'll stop going over the same ground as soon as you stop making the same unsupported claims. 20,000 tons per month Crumpp- were did it go? Why are you ignoring all evidence other than your mis-interpretation and retrograde extrapolation of Freeman 'Mighty Eighth War Manual'? Since the 'Fuels' section of that work is the primary source for your claim that 150 grade wasn't widley intoduced into service until May of '45, why do you ignore the preceeding sentences that make clear that 100/150 grade had been in use for months by the time the 'Pep' formulation of 150 grade began operational testing in December of '44?
Why do we see repeated 8th AAF reference to the fuel and the related power settings in June, in July, in September, in November, in December, in March if they weren't using the fuel?
Why did the 8th AAF authorize the use of increased power settings on 100/150 grade for all three fighter types on 11 July 44 if the fuel had been tested and discarded during the Spring?
Why did CPT Leonard Carson of the 357th FG refer to the use of 72" Hg WEP on 25 July 44 over Paris if 150 grade had been discontinued?
Why was the 361st Fighter Group commenting on plug fouling related to the use of 100/150 grade in September of 44 if the Command was no longer using that fuel grade?
Why did the 78th Fighter Group immediately modify the engines of there brand new Mustangs to run at 72" Hg on 100/150 grade fuel upon receipt in December of '44?
Why do 78th FG pilots and ground crew refer to the use of 100/150 grade fuel post-December '44 if the fuel's use had been discontinued months before?
Why does now-MAJ Leonard Carson again refer to the use of 72" Hg during a 30 March 45 encounter with Me 262's?
Why does Freeman refer to the request of a couple of VIII FC groups to return to 100/130 grade fuel in March of '45 if the command was already using 100/130 grade? Why does Freeman state that the request was difficult to grant since the Command only had stocks of 100/150 grade on hand?
Merle Omstead, 357th FG Historian and wartime group Crew Chief, has repeatedly referred to the conversion to 100/150 grade in his works and the works of others. The first reference I've come across occurring in Roger Freeman's "Mustang at War" published in 1974. A contention that MSgt Olmstead has confirmed by personal correspondance.
In fact the 78th has the exact same marking.
That would go along with what Wrigth Patterson is saying.
The 370th FG was a 9th Air Force formation stationed on 'the Continent'. As you know, the 9th, on the Continent, never received 100/150 grade fuel. The 100/150 grade marking is no doubt related to the fact that the 370th was passed some former 8th AAF Mustangs when it converted from the P-38 in March of '45.
Wright Field successfully tested 100/150 grade in the Mustang during the March to May of '44 period. Have you run across that report in your exhaustive search?
P-51B-15-NA 43-24777
((Packard Merlin V-1650-7))
Performance Tests on P-38J, P-47D and P-51B Airplanes
Tested with 44-1 Fuel. (GRADE 100/150)
1. Flight tests were started on P-38J, P-47D, and P-51B airplanes at Wright Field on approximately 20 March 1944 in order to measure the performance and note any effect on flight characteristics when flown with 44-1 fuel. Tests on the P-51B have been completed but tests on the P-38J and P-47D have not been completed to date.
2. All tests were flown with the airplanes loaded to their maximum combat gross weight. The P-38J airplane tested was P-38J-15, AAF No. 43-28392, equipped with Allison V-1710-89 and 91 engines with Curtiss electric three blade propellers. Gross weight at take-off was 17,360 lbs. with the c.g. at 26.72%. The P-47D tested was AAF No. 42-26167 and was equipped with Pratt & Whitney R-2800-63 engine and an A-23 turbo regulator. Gross weight at take-off was 13,320 lbs. with the c.g. at 29.5%, gear up. The P-51B tested was the P-51B-15, AAF No. 43-24777 and was equipped with a Packard V-1650-7 engine with a 11 ft. 2 in., four blade constant speed propeller. Gross weight at take-off was approximately 9680 lbs. The weight included 265 gal. of fuel, full oil, and no ammunition (85 gal. in auxiliary tank instead of ballast for ammunition).
3. There was no noticeable change in handling characteristics of any of the airplanes tested when operating at the higher powers which were obtainable with the 44-1 fuel. Only a slight increase in vibration was noted at the higher powers. On one long range test made with the P-51B, there was no apparent trouble due to the 44-1 fuel.
4. All performance data obtained on the P-51B is included in the attached curves. It will be noted that all tests were run with the wing racks installed. Speeds would be approximately 12 mph faster with the wing racks removed as shown by the dash line curve on the Speed vs Altitude Curve. Approximately 16 MPH increases in speed below critical altitude and approximately 600 ft. per minute increase in rate of climb below critical altitude was obtained by using the 75” Hg. Manifold pressure allowed by 44-1 fuel. No tests were made on this airplane with standard fuel.
Supply is not the issue, USE is the problem.
[/B]
If VIII Fighter Command didn't use 20,000 tons per month, where did it go? Why did the Command continue to receive 18-20k tons per month if they weren't using it? Doesn't strike you as unimaginably stupid that VIII Fighter Command would continue to receive enogh 100/150 grade fuel to fuel 40+ squadrons month after month if the Command wasn't using that grade of fuel?
(http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v11/brentce/Nov44150grade_1doc.jpg)
BTW, that 78th Fighter Group Mustang photo is a scan from my collection, so please don't try and dispute the origin.
Brent Erickson
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Originally posted by Scherf
So, there's nothing special about a "special project"?
Apparently not, since it seems all P-51D's left the factory with that label on the data block stencil.
I have a shot of a 357th FG P-51D from September '44 that shows the 100/150 grade label on the data block but no 'Special Projects' label. That D model had received the group's customary RAF Dark Green repaint and when the data block was re-stencilled over the new paint, the 'Special Projects' label was not replaced. From what I can tell, it was standard practice to only include an abbreviated data block when a data block needed to be re-applied.
.
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Originally posted by Scherf
So, there's nothing special about a "special project"?
I think the "R" designation at the end is something seperate. Not sure exactly what it's for but it isn't on all the 51s with Special Projects # on it.
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One thing that seems to be overlooked with regards to both these photos is that both have obviously had the '3' in the '100/130 Grade' line of the data block changed to a '5' by hand. So the 'Special Projects' tag, with or without the 'R', was originally included in the data block with the '100/130 grade' line. It seems extremely unlikely that it had anything at all to do with the use of 150 grade fuel.
Originally posted by Guppy35
Interesting couple of lines in a history of the 4th Fighter Group, flying Mustangs out of Debden England.
"June 15, 1944-After extensive tests, which began on February 10th, 1944, all 8th Fighter Command bases started getting 100/150 fuel"
I've seen this mentioned a couple of places. This was just prior to the Russian Shuttle runs.
I went hunting for images showing 8th or 8th AF Mustangs and the Data blocks under the cockpit like the one above.
Found this one of a 370th FG Mustang in March 45. 100/150 fuel Another with the R designation after Special Projects.
Found the same on some Iwo based Mustangs as well
Tech order 00-5-1 seems to be the TO to look for.
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/810_1127984459_p51150.jpg)
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312,000 tons consumed is a lot of cooking.
Your showing production not consumption.
The 'Special Projects' entry on the data block is nearly universal for P-51D's.
That is good of you to guess, Lrrp2.
The instructions to convert the Mustang to use 100/150-grade would be published in the form of a Technical Order and supplement the POH for the 8th USAAF.
Perhaps you can produce the USAAF T.O. for the P51D to use the fuel?
Wright Patterson cannot. I tend to believe them.
If you notice the T.O. which does list the authorized fuel was REVISED during some significant time periods.
T.O. 02-1-38 Specified and Alternate Grade Fuel for Aircraft-Engine Combinations (2 Oct 1944, rev. 10 Feb 1945, rev. 20 May 1945)
Those dates fit for:
from Roger Freemans' MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR MANUAL.
On 8 February 1945 technical Services reviewed the 355th Group experience, nothing that no chamber corrosion or valve distortion had been found and that no field maintenance on valves had been necessary. Further the use of 'Pep" had appreciably reduced engine maintenance time because plug fouling was practically eliminated. Other gains noticed were reduction to a minimum of abortive sorties due to engine roughness, increased range, and less brake wear as the P-51s were able to taxi at lower rpm. It was felt that any extra wear on the valves or other engine parts was due to the use of higher power and not the 'Pep' fuel. As a result, 'Pep" 100/150 was being supplied to all fighter groups by March.
The units recieve "Pep" in March however, continuing on page 218:
However, contrary to Technical Services findings, fighter groups reported that while sparking plug life was prolonged, valve adjustment had simultaneously become a problem, checks having to be made every third or fourth mission instead of the usual 50 hours.
Opinions differed but the most likely reason was thought to be valve seat inserts burning out leading to diminishing valve clearance and loss of power.
Enthusiasm for the new fuel waned quickly and in the same month some units requested a return to 100/130. As the old grade had been largely replaced by 100/150, supply was difficult.
By April the position with Pep was so critical that a valve check was advised after every 25 hours of flight. In the middle of that month a message to Wright Field requested valve seat inserts on V-1650 engines be made of stelite or other suitable material with corrosion resistant properties. It was found that there was additive separation when fed to the engine, forming hydrobromic acid which attacked the valve seats.
Makes sense that the T.O. revisions are the adoption of 100/150 grade fuel after completion of the operational trials in Feb. 1945. Then in May 1945, the fuel was withdrawn from service.
If VIII Fighter Command didn't use 20,000 tons per month, where did it go?
Seems to be some confusion in this thread between the roles and differences between supply and operations.
This is just Logisitic doing their job, Lrrp2.
All this memo does is point out current production vs. projected requirements from late November 1944.
It is not an order to begin using the fuel.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Your showing production not consumption.
No, I'm not.
From Neil's post of 9:58 a.m. above:
Total aero fuel production. 663,348 tons, of which 55.7% was 150 grade. [That's 369,484 tons if you calculate, but the docco says 369,385.]
57,000 tons left 31st May 1945.
That's 312,000 tons consumed.
Give or take 484.836 tons, or thereabouts.
But it's still a lot of cooking.
Angus, you still ain't said whether I can have your eggs.
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"It seems extremely unlikely that it had anything at all to do with the use of 150 grade fuel."
Yes, but it comes in handy to hatch yet another theory.
The Truth, Is Out There...the mystery of the "R". Oh yes. Oh yes indeed.
:noid
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57,000 tons left 31st May 1945.
Where do you see that?
Neil says:
57,000 tons left 31st May 1945
28,000 tons left 7th September 1945.
Please post the documents this came from and show that it includes the strateagic reserves. The intention was to adopt 100/150 grade without a doubt. In looking toward that goal, some production would have gone toward those reserves.
Unless of course we want to pretend that only the Axis needed strateagic reserves and every drop of allied fuel produced went into an operational aircraft.
"It seems extremely unlikely that it had anything at all to do with the use of 150 grade fuel."
Really? Got something to prove that? I cannot find a single P51D not marked for 100/150 grade that does not have the "Special Project" marking.
It very nicely follows what the USAF historians say!
All the best,
Crumpp
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Crumpp,
It seems that you're having a really hard time understanding the difference between the 'Pep' formulation of 1945 and the original '1 Theory of Etheline Dibromide' used in VIII FC from June '44 to February '45, and by the RAF for the duration. It is not the testing and introduction of the 'Pep' formulation that is at issue here, it is the use of the standard formulation for the nine months prior to the introduction of the 'Pep' 1.5 Theory of Etheline Dibromide formula. You simply can't explain away the 20,000 tons of 150 grade supplied to VIII FC as 'production' and not 'consumption'. VIII Fighter COmmand didn't produce a single drop of 100/150 grade fuel, ever. They simply received and consumed it, period.
Your demand to see a T.O. from Wright Field is nothing more than another maneuver intended to ignore the obvious and allow you to further your pet theory. Mostly though, you just don't want to admit that you're wrong. Ever.
Also, please don't lecture me on the 'confusion' between Supply and Operations in the military- I spent ten years in the Infantry.
Originally posted by Crumpp
Your showing production not consumption.
That is good of you to guess, Lrrp2.
The instructions to convert the Mustang to use 100/150-grade would be published in the form of a Technical Order and supplement the POH for the 8th USAAF.
Perhaps you can produce the USAAF T.O. for the P51D to use the fuel?
Wright Patterson cannot. I tend to believe them.
If you notice the T.O. which does list the authorized fuel was REVISED during some significant time periods.
Those dates fit for:
from Roger Freemans' MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR MANUAL.
The units recieve "Pep" in March however, continuing on page 218:
Makes sense that the T.O. revisions are the adoption of 100/150 grade fuel after completion of the operational trials in Feb. 1945. Then in May 1945, the fuel was withdrawn from service.
Seems to be some confusion in this thread between the roles and differences between supply and operations.
This is just Logisitic doing their job, Lrrp2.
All this memo does is point out current production vs. projected requirements from late November 1944.
It is not an order to begin using the fuel.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Really? Got something to prove that? I cannot find a single P51D not marked for 100/150 grade that does not have the "Special Project" marking.
It very nicely follows what the USAF historians say!
All the best,
Crumpp [/B]
Do you have anything to prove that 'Special Project' had anything at all to do with the use of 150 grade? NO, you don't.
Considering that you've seen a grand total of 2 photos of P-51D's marked for 100/150 grade, both P-51D-20-NA's, I'd say your sample size is a bit on the slim side.
Now, please to explain the presence of the same 'Special Project' marking on P-51D's marked for 100/130 grade? How about the fact that the two photos showing '100/150 grade' abviously had the '3' changed to a '5'?
Besides, the second photo is of a 370th FG kite that was assigned to the Ninth AAF on The Continent and wasn't using any formula of 100/150 grade no matter how it is marked.
.
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Apparently this has all been hashed over on the IL-2 boards as well, where even more docs were produced indicating USAAF usage.
Here is the link, for those interested:
http://forums.ubi.com/groupee/forums/a/tpc/f/63110913/m/9991053533/p/38
And the quoted NACA document, which apparently the "guy" at the USAF museum cant find (or anything else on the subject, apparently):
"It is understood that numerous changes were made in American aircraft at British bases utilizing this fuel so that, according to some reports, it caused no more mechanical troubles or servicing difficulties than did Grade 100/130."
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Originally posted by Squire
Apparently this has all been hashed over on the IL-2 boards as well, where even more docs were produced indicating USAAF usage.
Here is the link, for those interested:
http://forums.ubi.com/groupee/forums/a/tpc/f/63110913/m/9991053533/p/38
And the quoted NACA document, which apparently the "guy" at the USAF museum cant find (or anything else on the subject, apparently):
"It is understood that numerous changes were made in American aircraft at British bases utilizing this fuel so that, according to some reports, it caused no more mechanical troubles or servicing difficulties than did Grade 100/130."
A lot of the same guys playing through the debate too.
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Please post the documents this came from and show that it includes the strateagic reserves.
Perhaps you mean AIR 25/616.
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I have come across a few references to 8th Mustang pilots using 72 " WEP. This was possible with 100/150 fuel
The limit for 100/130 was 67" WEP.
Any explaination for this?
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Got some info regarding the Special Projects tag from a Mustang junkie. He's digging through his stuff for info on 100/150 Tech Orders. He's not sure if he has anything but says he has a fairly complete collection of Mustang tech orders.
"the Special Proj. Numbers were an identification of
contracts to which aircraft were assigned for
distribution to different Theatres of War. 92048R was
a block of aircraft for the ETO - the "R" stands for
Replacement, i.e. to fill gaps for aircraft lost in
accidents or combat. an "N" suffix depicted "New
Issue" aircraft - i.e. when an unit converted to
P-51's from a different type, or when an unit was
formed in the field and the initial equipent of
aircraft was sent.
These numbers were issued in ascending numerical order
for all types of aircraft - but contained within one
assigned particular project number (for example
92048R) were only P-51D's.
I fortunately have a lot of information regarding
Project Numbers for individual aircraft - some of
these Project numbers were augmented by Theatre
designations, especially in the CBI & PTO.
The Proj. Numbers do not have anything to do with the
type of fuel used, though."
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Well what other P51 Special Projects could have been going on?
Now, please to explain the presence of the same 'Special Project' marking on P-51D's marked for 100/130 grade?
Please post them! I have yet to come across any!
That is the proof of your claim all P51's were "Special Projects".
Any explaination for this?
Sure!
Without a doubt 100/150 grade was in operational trials with the 8th USAAF with some units until aircraft started dropping from the sky. When "Pep" was adopted, it most likely entered general service from Feb. 1945. When Wright Patterson could not find a suitable replacement for the valve seats nor could they correct the lead fouling issues it was withdrawn. Not surprising as these are common issues with high octane fuels. The NACA solved them post war by adding a much higher percentage of aromatics.
So yes, you will find P51's that used the fuel.
To claim it was:
used in VIII FC from June '44 to February '45, and by the RAF for the duration.
For a general service use is simply not factual.
In the RAF it was a special purpose fuel used in Operation Diver and later by a two Groups in the 2nd TAF.
The RAF missions fit the profile the fuel could be operated on, short duration high speed profiles.
That has been covered.
The 8th USAAF is covered above.
Also, please don't lecture me on the 'confusion' between Supply and Operations in the military- I spent ten years in the Infantry.
So, are you the burrito chef at Taco Bell, now?
How much time do you have at the traffic light on Victory?
All the best,
Crumpp
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Light a fire under his butt to get us some more info if he's a "Mustang nut."
I used to know a few back when I was with the Warbirds community (lots there), they all lived and breathed P-51 ETO history. I dont think I have many left I can contact.
Went down to the Boeing Museum of Flight once, and actually talked to a P-51 ETO ace, who was in town for a 31st FG get together. I dont recall his name now. Sure would come in handy to be able to talk to him again.
Actually, crew chief vets would be the ones to ask, they worked and serviced the a/c after all. Sadly im sure many are no longer with us.
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Crumpp, can we at least get the operation names correct.
Operation 'Crossbow' - The code name given to operations designed to counter the threat from German secret weapons, the V-1 and V-2. These included both offensive measures before and during the attacks as well as defensive measures once the attacks had begun.
No such opertion called Diver. http://www.rafweb.org/Ops_Europe.htm Diver was the code name given to the V-1.
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Well what other P51 Special Projects could have been going on?
Please post them! I have yet to come across any!
That is the proof of your claim all P51's were "Special Projects".
Sure!
Without a doubt 100/150 grade was in operational trials with the 8th USAAF with some units until aircraft started dropping from the sky. When "Pep" was adopted, it most likely entered general service from Feb. 1945. When Wright Patterson could not find a suitable replacement for the valve seats nor could they correct the lead fouling issues it was withdrawn. Not surprising as these are common issues with high octane fuels. The NACA solved them post war by adding a much higher percentage of aromatics.
So yes, you will find P51's that used the fuel.
To claim it was:
For a general service use is simply not factual.
In the RAF it was a special purpose fuel used in Operation Diver and later by a two Groups in the 2nd TAF.
The RAF missions fit the profile the fuel could be operated on, short duration high speed profiles.
That has been covered.
The 8th USAAF is covered above.
So, are you the burrito chef at Taco Bell, now?
How much time do you have at the traffic light on Victory?
All the best,
Crumpp
Well, since I was never permanent party at Benning- just OSUT and jump school, I didn't spend a lot of time on Victory Drive.
20,000 tons a month to VIII Fighter Command, Crumpp, 20,0000 tons. It's just not going to go away, no matter how much you spin and twist...
As for the "Special Projects" thing, it appears I was right, now doesn't it?
Let's summarize: We've got multiple original documents, as well as many squadron accounts showing widespread use of 100/150 grade vs. your tortured interpretations of selected quotes. I think I'll stick with the documents, if you don't mind.
.
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Originally posted by MiloMorai
No such opertion called Diver.
I think you may be wrong there.
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Originally posted by Scherf
I think you may be wrong there.
Operation 'Crossbow' - The code name given to operations designed to counter the threat from German secret weapons, the V-1 and V-2. These included both offensive measures before and during the attacks as well as defensive measures once the attacks had begun.
Diver operations and Operation Diver are not the same.
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As I understand it, Crossbow went against the launching sites with bombs, Diver went against the V-1s in the air.
Makes sense, as two separate organisations were used - 2nd TAF vs the sites and ADGB vs the missiles.
Noball sorties vs. anti-diver sorties, IIRC.
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Crumpp, can we at least get the operation names correct.
Operation Diver:
IV. Operation Diver. Covers the history of the operations to combat the flying bombs, lists of sites, site layouts and locations.
http://www.ukfortsclub.org.uk/aldis/69/69_3.html
The archives project is likely to run for 3 years and in the first year 5 reports have been completed which vary considerably in size (some run to several volumes of text, sources, and gazetteers). Subjects completed to date are anti-aircraft artillery 191446, bombing decoys of WWII, Operations Diver, Overlord, and Anti-invasion.
http://www.eng-h.gov.uk/ArchRev/rev95_6/c20thdef.htm
"Operation Crossbow" was the code name for a top-secret WWII mission to build and destroy a copy of a German V1 missile launch site. Working around the clock for 13 days in 1944, contractors built the full-sized facility on a remote part of the Eglin reservation. Today, portions of nine concrete and brick structures scattered over a 14-acre area are what remains of the complex. Several of the buildings remain virtually intact and show little damage from the many attempts over the years to destroy them. They offer mute testimony to one of WWII's great events.
http://www.eglin.af.mil/em/virtualtours/crossbow/
The Operations are commonly confused as ones cover was the other.
The V1 Operation Crossbow built and the United States produced is on display at Wright Patterson:
http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/air_power/ap15.htm
Squire says:
And the quoted NACA document, which apparently the "guy" at the USAF museum cant find (or anything else on the subject, apparently):
The NACA document from 1949 does not say what you are wishing it did say.
About 100/150 grade it says:
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/503_1128029883_00342.jpg)
The fuel caused serious problems which robbed power on long range escort missions.
It was used extensively in Operation Diver. It was prematurely adopted and found unsuitable for long range escort.
Operation Diver was a huge operation. I have posted the specifics earlier.
Your confusing the reports comments about 93/110 with 100/150 grade:
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/503_1128031628_0034.jpg)
In fact the report says that high aromatic content is useful for overcoming the problems found in high octane fuels. The fuel cannot contain any amines.
http://naca.larc.nasa.gov/reports/1949/naca-rm-9d13/index.cgi?page0002.gif
From an allied analysis of the composition of C3:
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/503_1120872887_alliedantiknockagents.jpg)
Which is probably why in that same report the allies are wonder why C3 contained a higher concetration of aromatics.
I tend to think the NACA report 9D13 would not exist if 100/150 grade was useable.
So some guy on the internet says the "Special Projects" Tag has nothing to do with fuel?
Again, I will go with what The USAF Museum says on the 100/150 grade fuel use by the 8th USAAF.
Let's summarize: We've got multiple original documents, as well as many squadron accounts showing widespread use of 100/150 grade vs. your tortured interpretations of selected quotes. I think I'll stick with the documents, if you don't mind.
Yes let's summerize!
None of your documents dealing with the USAAF are from the command. They are all from the Deputy Director of Supply.
The fuel is listed in a post war NACA report concerning the exact problems encountered by the USAAF and RAF under cruising conditions.
The USAAF says the aircraft did not use the fuel in T.O.:
T.O. 02-1-38 Specified and Alternate Grade Fuel for Aircraft-Engine Combinations (2 Oct 1944, rev. 10 Feb 1945, rev. 20 May 1945)
100/150 grade should be an alternate, right?
The August 1945 P51 POH does not list 100/150 grade use either. You would think if it was so successful it would have been adopted? Especially when you consider that a few weeks before, the invasion of Japan was under consideration.
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/503_1128033746_fueltype.jpg)
Well, since I was never permanent party at Benning
Neither was I. My first duty station was HAAF.
If you think your logistic documents are valid proof, remember being in the supply room and looking at all the crap that was never used!
All the best,
Crumpp
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Accurate records available here POWE33/1363
(http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/list.jpg)
Neil
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Neither was I. My first duty station was HAAF.
If you think your logistic documents are valid proof, remember being in the supply room and looking at all the crap that was never used!
All the best,
Crumpp [/B]
Crumpp,
There is simply no way that VIII FC was receiving 20,000 tons of 100/150 grade fuel per month just store it. No Way. 20,000 tons was more than enough for for every one of VIII FC's 45 squadrons.
100/150 grade was a British fuel, so it's not suprising that the majority of documentation describing its use and implementation resides in the UK and not Wright Pat. It was a grade of fuel refined and supplied by an ally, and used by only one command of one of the numbered Air Forces- evidence for its use is not going to be that widespread outside of that context. Neil Stirling has done a fabulous job of unearthing a large number of these documents. Those numerous documents coupled with the numerous references, including Freeman's, to its use in squadron service leaves no doubt that it was the exclusive fuel used by the command from the Summer of '44 'til at least Spring of '45.
Were you with 1st Batt at Hunter?
.
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Supply is not the question.
How many times does that have to be said??
That is just like claiming the large number of Me262 airframes from 1945 were flying.
100/150 grade was a British fuel, so it's not suprising that the majority of documentation describing its use and implementation resides in the UK and not Wright Pat.
True, but the P51 was a USAAF piece of equipment. When was the last time a foreign country wrote the instructions for US equipment?
They did not and never will.
I was in B co, 2nd Plt.
All the best,
Crumpp
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(http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/USAAF.jpg)
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So they borrowed 100/130 grade form the British in September of 1945. It's proof they were at least using it by then.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Supply is not the question.
How many times does that have to be said??
I guess as many times as it takes for you to realize that there is just no way that VIII Fighter Command was going to stock, every month, its entire monthly requirement for fuel in a fuel that it doesn't use! If they were not using 100/150 grade, then that means they were receiving a parallel supply of 20,000 tons of 100/130 grade at the same time- it simply defies comprehension!
I'll ask again- where did that 20,000 tons per month go? It had to go somewhere if it wasn't being consumed.
Let me ask you this, can you envision any scenario where a platoon of Bradley's would receive, month after month, a supply of MoGas large enough to supply every last drop of the platoon's monthly fuel usage, despite the fact that the platoon uses only Deisel fuel? That is what you're asking us to believe.
True, but the P51 was a USAAF piece of equipment. When was the last time a foreign country wrote the instructions for US equipment?
They did not and never will.
I was in B co, 2nd Plt.
All the best,
Crumpp
They didn't, Eighth Air Force did:
A US Air Corps. memorandum from the Chief, Petroleum Section to the Chief, Supply Divison, US Army dated 11 July, 1944, Subject: Grade 150 Aviation Fuel, stipulated the following:
The following limiting War Emergency Rating Manifold Pressures have been established by the Eighth Air Force for the different aircraft:
Aircraft Old W.E.R. New W.E.R.
P-38J 60" 66"
P-47D without water 52" 62"
P-47D with water 57" 67"
P-51B 67" 72"
It is thought that the above manifold pressures may even be increased to some extent using 150 Grade fuel, and roughly speaking the increase in speed of fighter aircraft at altitudes below 20,000 ft. is approximately 25 miles per hour. The increase in the rate of climb is approximately 800 ft. per minute. In addition, manifold pressures can be used at the higher ratings without danger of incipient detonation; this gives a greater factor of safety.
The RAF ran its Mustangs at 81" Hg WEP on 100/150 grade.
Sua Sponte.
.
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Story has it the Iwo Jima based Mustangs ran at 81" wep on 100/145 fuel
Gotta remember where I found that.
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A US Air Corps. memorandum from the Chief, Petroleum Section to the Chief, Supply Divison, US Army dated 11 July, 1944, Subject: Grade 150 Aviation Fuel, stipulated the following:
It is a memo from supply, bro. It's not orders from the command.
Did you ever go on any missions that you did not state your requirements to supply? Supply pushed those requirements up the chain if they could not fullfill them, right?
Did you always get what you asked for?
I'll ask again- where did that 20,000 tons per month go?
Your confusing requirements with use. Nothing on that memo says 20,000 tons per month is being used. It says it is required.
That document I posted earlier on the BMW801TH showed the required number of engines per month. Not the number produced. It is from a meeting with BMW and their subcontractors to determine how many engines they needed to produce to meet the requirements for operations and a reserve of engines.
However it could easily be misunderstood as production. It's an easy mistake to make especially if you take one document as the whole picture.
Several factors make me highly skeptical.
First is the USAF Museum. Those guys get paid to research the History for a living. They have much better access to documents, veterans, and aircraft. If they say it was unlikely that 100/150 grade saw widescale use, I believe them.
Second is the fuel technology of 1944-45. They simply did not have the knowledge to produce ultra-high octane fuels that could be run in the entire power band. The NACA conducted multiple investigations before they determined the right combination to make high octane fuels work without damaging engines over the entire power band after the war. 9D13 was conducted in 1949!
Third, the mission profile of the 8th AF does not fit the optimum operating specifications of 100/150 grade fuel as determined by the RAF.
Sua Sponte.
Hooah......
:p
What unit were you with?
All the best,
Crumpp
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(http://home.att.net/~islandphoto/Fuels.jpg)
I think this covers all arguments...
My regards,
Widewing
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That is exactly what I have been quoting Widewing.
All the best,
Crumpp
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The thing I wonder about is how that while Neil found all these beutiful docs about production and storage, how come he didn`t find or post any about consumption? Ie. the 1945 one with 2nd TAF, USAAF units.
How come that if his claims are true, there isn`t an awaful amount of papers regarding consumptions at all?
Possibly :
a, Such papers don`t exists
b, Neil had not found them
c, Neil found them but they contain something that`d like to filter, since then it`s so much easier to make vogue, optimistic guesses of all sort.
Given my experience with Neil, I`d go with c,. It is really hard to imagine consumption docs are no-where to be found when the production docs and and those recent snippets of the 2nd TAF are there. I guess it goes the same way as his previous claims about 150 grade use : "All of ADGB used it". Now it seems it was really half a dozen diver squads until the V-1 raids lasted.
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So I guess you are implying that the goods were produced, stockpiled and after a while used for cooking sausage?
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No, I suggested that 150 grade was appearantly more problematic and less widespread than the 'unversal' use that Neil suggests. It took time to try to solve problems, evidently the USAAF Merlins had problems that weren't sorted out until the end of the war, so I wonder how much use it saw, really. Of course some used it, but let us remember that Neil and others told the story as like from spring 1944 virtually every figther unit made used of the increased performance, but the more and more we see of the documentation the more this view becomes wishful thinking and more grey rather than black and white. It would be really nice to know the real extent of the use, but I fear there is no willingness on the behalf of Neil to show the real facts, rather than the all-positive, filtered ones.
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British history.
Originally 150 grade was to be used by A.E.A.F fighter aircraft that were to support Overlord. However this was cancelled some time in March 44 due to Spark plug problems.
However the V 1 appeard mid June 44 and those A.D.G.B sqns that were delegated the task of intercepting it were put on 150 grade.
Come 22nd September 150 grade use was suspended for these reasons.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirling...eptember+44.jpg
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirling...September+1.jpg
And the results of its use summarised here.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/Summary.jpg
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/Summary+2.jpg
Later in October 1944 it was decided to put the 2nd TAF on 150 grade, this starting 15-12-44.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/date.jpg
Indeed some aircraft did come from the factory ready to use 150 grade and +25lbs boost.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/MK+XVI.jpg
The fuel was not standard during 1944 and the extent of its RAF use unkown to me outside of 1944 A.D.G.B and 1945 2nd TAF.
Neil.
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Yeah we heard(read) this already.
Then tell us please the extent of use in 1945 2nd TAF.
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Originally posted by Kurfrst
The thing I wonder about is how that while Neil found all these beutiful docs about production and storage, how come he didn`t find or post any about consumption? Ie. the 1945 one with 2nd TAF, USAAF units.
How come that if his claims are true, there isn`t an awaful amount of papers regarding consumptions at all?
Possibly :
a, Such papers don`t exists
b, Neil had not found them
c, Neil found them but they contain something that`d like to filter, since then it`s so much easier to make vogue, optimistic guesses of all sort.
Given my experience with Neil, I`d go with c,. It is really hard to imagine consumption docs are no-where to be found when the production docs and and those recent snippets of the 2nd TAF are there. I guess it goes the same way as his previous claims about 150 grade use : "All of ADGB used it". Now it seems it was really half a dozen diver squads until the V-1 raids lasted.
LOLOLOLOLOLOL
Sounds just like someones pet theory on 1.98ata doesn't it.
You frickin HYPOCRITE.
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I find a pattern in that the matter of 1.98ata is always raised when unpleasent questions are directed about the extent of use of 150 grade fuel and high boost.
Why not just answer the question?
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Why don't you answer any -
People have shown (documented)-
Delivery 150 grade
Use 150 grade
You on the other hand -
Have failed to show 1 drop of C3 got to any of your K4 units.
That even 1 K4 was converted for 1.98ata.
Yet we are supposed to accept your theory as being true, and ours that 150 grade was used is not.
Even a good politician couldn't worm his way out of that BS.
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Originally posted by Kurfrst
unpleasent questions are directed about the extent of use of 150 grade fuel and high boost.
Such as: "Damn, why did they produce so damn much if they didn't use it?" "Where did they put it all?" and "Why didn't they have much left at the end of the war?"
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They didnt produce that much, Neil is manipulating by using British fuel production of 150 vs. 130 grade, but of course the British themselves got most the 130 grade from the US, so hardly they needed to produce it themselves.
Funny still, if it was that much used, why 2nd TAF logbooks are not mentioning the use of such boost... why the lack of evidence of use. It should be everywhere.
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You're saying they didn't produce as much as Neil claims?
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I am saying Neil is posting meaningless comparasions of Brtiish 150 and 130 grade production, as the vast majority of 130 grade fuel was imported into the UK from the USA.
After all, its pretty silly to believe that huge bombers would do with that 130grade produced in Britian, being 40%-50% of their fuel production, when the rest 50% wasn`t enough for much fighters which had 1/10th the fuel capacity.
Besides, the only 'evidence' he posted on 150 grade production are his own home-made tables.
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Originally posted by Kurfrst
No, I suggested that 150 grade was appearantly more problematic and less widespread than the 'unversal' use that Neil suggests. It took time to try to solve problems, evidently the USAAF Merlins had problems that weren't sorted out until the end of the war, so I wonder how much use it saw, really. Of course some used it, but let us remember that Neil and others told the story as like from spring 1944 virtually every figther unit made used of the increased performance, but the more and more we see of the documentation the more this view becomes wishful thinking and more grey rather than black and white. It would be really nice to know the real extent of the use, but I fear there is no willingness on the behalf of Neil to show the real facts, rather than the all-positive, filtered ones.
100/150 was used by all 8th AF fighter groups, and it was used up until VE day. After VE day, all units went back to 100/130 as there was sufficient volumes of that fuel to meet the reduced flying requirements. Some units requested stocks of 100/130 when engine maintenance was severely affected by the newly introduced "PEP" additive (March '45), but this did not occur until late March/early April and the lower octane rated fuel was not generally available to the 8th FC.
Looking at the 56th FG, I cannot find any references of valve seat damage to the R-2800 from the use of 100/150 with PEP. It may be that this engine was not as susceptible to this problem or that there was insufficient data from its limited use (over 3 months) and limited P-47M sorties. I do know that the R-2800 C-series was dyno tested at 80" MAP for 250 hours using 100/130 and suffered no mechanical failures. So, I'd be inclined to think that the P-47M would have benefited as much from rigging for over-boost as it would have from 100/150. It appears that the PEP additive was coming out of solution (separating) in the intake manifold of the Merlin. This is a problem similar to that experienced by the Allisons used in P-38Js in early 1944. A special fuel formulation was ordered by Doolittle specifically for P-38 units that solved this problem (which was further addressed by a design change to the manifolds). Solution breakdown did not occur in the R-2800 engine, which could run with good efficency and reliability on just about any fuel available.
By the way, usage can be clearly defined by month to month deliveries. When I get a delivery of home heating oil, I get a receipt that not only defines what was delivered, but what was replaced due to consumption.
So, any argument that there is no record of fuel consumption would be imbecilic, and to argue that there was no usage of massive stores of 100/150 stretches credibility to the breaking point. Indeed, Freeman states that 100/130 was not generally available to the 8th Fighter Command; "as the old grade had been largely replaced by 100/150, supply was difficult."
My regards,
Widewing
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55.7% is a comparison.
369,000-odd tons is a volume. Are you saying this volume was not produced?
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Am I right in the sence that the RAF was a bit earlier into introducing the highest rate fuel than the USAAF then?
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Posted without comment...
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/j.webb2/Main/Enlarge/crash/Street1.htm
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You are. No's 1 and 165 sqn converted theri Spitfire LF IX's to 100/150 grade fuel and +25 lbs boost during the first week of May, 1944.
Originally posted by Angus
Am I right in the sence that the RAF was a bit earlier into introducing the highest rate fuel than the USAAF then?
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Can we lay the 100/150 grade as 'Special Project' thing to rest now?
A photo from the Inglewood, CA factory:
(http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v11/brentce/InglewoodCropped.jpg)
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Looking at the 56th FG, I cannot find any references of valve seat damage to the R-2800 from the use of 100/150 with PEP. It may be that this engine was not as susceptible to this problem or that there was insufficient data from its limited use (over 3 months) and limited P-47M sorties.
Really?? I found these in about 4 minutes of googling.
The 56th was the only group to operate them.
While some were delivered in 1945 they had serious problems that did not get worked out until the wars end.
The performance of the YP-47M was excellent, with a top speed of 761 km/h (473 mi/h), and the variant was put into limited production. While it is commonly thought that the P-47M was a specific counter to the threat of German V-1 pulsejet missiles, project dates disprove this; work began on the YP-47M before the first V-1 attacks. 130 P-47Ms were built, with the first arriving in Europe in early 1945. However, the type suffered serious teething problems in the field due to the highly-tuned engine, and by the time the bugs were worked out, the war in Europe was over.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P-47_Thunderbolt
The production P-47M fighters did not reach operational status until after many of the V-1 launch sites were over-run by Allied ground forces. Deployed to 3 squadrons of the 56th Fighter Group, the new fighter likely did not chase very many flying bombs. Inasmuch as most aviation historians claim that the P-47M was designed specifically to intercept the V-1, it will come as a surprise to them to learn that the prototype existed more than a year before the first V-1 was launched at Britain. Moreover, the P-47D, deployed in large numbers, was certainly fast enough to overtake the V-1. It was only coincidence that the XP-47M and the R-2800 C series engines were available when the V-1's began falling on London.
The new M models also suffered a fair amount of teething troubles. The C series engines suffered from high altitude ignition leaks and burned pistons. The 56th kept many of their older D models until the new M had its bugs corrected.
http://www.cradleofaviation.org/history/aircraft/p-47/7.html
With the constant rush of wartime production, complete testing was sometimes not undertaken. What worked under hasty factory testing would not function under operational conditions. This, unfortunately, was true with the P-47M. M model pilots were horrified to find their engines stopping completely or cutting in and out once they reached cruising altitude. Missions were hastily aborted and maintenance men were puzzled. Other engine problems began to manifest themselves, including corrosion and low cylinder head temperatures which affected the correct operation of the engine. The problem soon grew to nightmare proportions when it became obvious that every P-47M operated by the 56th was stricken with the same problem.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3901/is_200410/ai_n9438499
The operational dates are conflicting. Most have Republic developing semi-reliable fixes in April 1945. Many sources say the type never saw combat while others claim it conducted unopposed armed recons the last two days of the war.
I think the He-162 would be just as appropriate for the game. In fact it would be much more appropriate as it actually fired shots in anger.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Many sources say the type never saw combat while others claim it conducted unopposed armed recons the last two days of the war.
I think the He-162 would be just as appropriate for the game. In fact it would be much more appropriate as it actually fired shots in anger.
All the best,
Crumpp [/B]
Crumpp,
"Beware the Thunderbolt" is a day-by-day history of the 56th Fighter Groups combat operations. It shows unequivically that the P-47M saw much combat beginning in January of '45. There were continual problems with engine reliability, but the M's were never grounded for more than a few days at a time. The cause of the problems was finally determined to be improper weather proofing during shipment to the U.K.
BTW, most of my 3 yrs active duty time was with Patrol 2-2, Co. E (Long Range Surveillance) 109th MI at Lewis- hence the LRRP22 handle!
.
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We arent talking about the P-47M.
Or the use of C3 in the 109K.
And its not relevent, either.
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P-47Ms piloted by Ball, Lear and Gould shot down 2 Ar 234s on March 14 1945. Four Ar234s were lost in total that day (pilots > Johne, Baumler, Schulte, Hirschberger). Another P-47M, piloted by Faringer shot down a Me262 on April 5 1945. On April 10 1945, P-47Ms piloted by Sharbo and Wilkenson each claimed a Me262.
On April 13, 48 P-47Ms attacked Eggebeck airfield with great success.
You should find a better reference sources than wikipedia.
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Crump,
I've talked to a pilot who ditched his P-47M behind German lines after taking damage and then snuck through to the Allied side.
Don't try to insinuate that the P-47M didn't see combat. Don't start pulling Kurfurst's tactics where anything Allied needs confirmation in triplicate whereas anything German that is vaguely referenced is a shoe in for having seen heavy service.
In any case, the P-47M's service is documented well in above triplicate.
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We now return you to your regularly scheduled program:
"RAF 150 Octane"
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You should find a better reference sources than wikipedia.
Milo,
You should understand what you read before writing something stupid like Operation Diver did not exist or this.
My use of wikpedia was in response to Widewing saying he was unable to find reference to the R-2800C having difficulties.
Hence the first line of my post:
Really?? I found these in about 4 minutes of googling.
Just games people play when they do not like the facts.
Facts are everyone here is speculating about the 100/150 grade fuel use.
Even the USAF Museum cannot say for sure the extent. They feel it could not have been used extensively as no T.O.'s exist for it and none of the wartime or post war manuals allow it's use.
They do make more than one copy of a T.O. so it one was written clearing the use 100/150 grade fuel for general use in the 8th USAAF we should be able to find it rather easily.
Next we have the NACA reports. Obviously fuel technology had reached an stumbling point with high octane fuels that was not resolved until the post war years.
100/150 was used by all 8th AF fighter groups, and it was used up until VE day.
That is a nice opinion but in the end that is all.
Freemans book Widewing clearly says that ALL 8th AF tactical aircraft used 100/150 grade. Aircraft types are classified as either tactical or strateagic in the USAF. Fighters are tactical aircraft as they do not have the capabililty to strike outside the theater.
http://www.military.com/Resources/EQG/EQGmain?file=EG_Tactical&cat=a&lev=2
http://www.military.com/Resources/EQG/EQGmain?file=EG_Strategic&cat=a&lev=2
Seems rather odd that he would contradict himself in the same paragraph.
However there are plenty of unclear points in his narative.
For example refering to the highlighted sentence below. If they did return to 100/130 grade as the USAF believes and they had plenty of 100/150 grade fuel....
Why was supply difficult??
Enthusiasm for the new fuel waned quickly and in the same month some units requested a return to 100/130. As the old grade had been largely replaced by 100/150, supply was difficult.
On the other hand we have the supply of 100/150 grade.
We know the allies had it and we know they used it.
Operation Diver was a large operation. It had priority over the Campaign even.
While the Germans maintained their launching rate of 100 a day the continuation of Vsite bombing was an essential part of the defence. Towards the end of June, over 40% of the Allied bomber effort from Britain was directed against Crossbow targets- despite objections from some Allied commanders who wanted more strategic air operations to be flown over Germany. Despite the bombing of the V-sites and supply centres, an average of almost 120 flying bombs a day were launched in the first week of July. After the first two weeks of bombing, some 1,769 people had been killed and in the Strand the Air Ministry itself was hit and 198 people killed. On July 1 a flying bomb crashed in Chelsea, killing 124; four days later the total death roll was 2,500. Reprisals against German towns and villages were considered but such reprisals were not likely to ease the situation. Moreover, Eisenhower was opposed to this kind of retaliation.
The last flying bomb was launched at London on March 29, 1945, only six weeks before Germany surrendered.
http://www.fiddlersgreen.net/aircraft/WWII/v1/v1_info/vi_info.htm
http://www.edenbridgetown.com/in_the_past/reference/v1.shtml
As Neil says:
The fuel was not standard during 1944 and the extent of its RAF use unkown to me outside of 1944 A.D.G.B and 1945 2nd TAF.
All the best,
Crumpp
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I have a conspiracy theory.
In RL the allied didn't have much fuel, nor was it any good, nor was their engine technology good enough to benefit from it anyway.
The Axis had ample fuel of all grades desired, allthough synthetic it was perfect, and they mounted hoardes of aircraft and aero engines that could consume it all the way to VE day.
So, the conspiracy is about implying otherwise. And VE day????
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It is interesting to see how incompetent some Axis fans think the US and UK were. I'd guess they'd hold the USSR in even greater contempt, but that doesn't come up much so I'm not sure.
Obviously the only thing we could do, given the absolute crap engineers we had, is make tons and tons of crap and overwelm the masterful designs of the Germans with sheer numbers of aircraft that would be helpless without a five to one advantage in numbers.
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And put hundreds of thousands of tons of fuel in seeeeecret reserves.
:noid
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I have a conspiracy theory.
No conspiracy Theory Here, Angus. Just an ambigious part of WWII history.
So stop with the silly answers. I don't know if you are on AAW boards but I posted a rather long reply:
Interesting Kurfurst.
Do you have documentation showing these shortages or are you just making an assumption?
While stocks of 150 grade fuel did make up a smaller percentage of the Allied Aviation fuels it maybe a misleading conclusion to state there was a shortage.
Certainly in the very begining of it's introduction I would agree but by early 1945 it appears to me that the allies had plenty for the aircraft (fighters) that used it.
Below is a report from the 2nd TAF, RAF on 150 grade stocks.
Compare that with the number of flying hours flown by the USAAF single engine fighters, which IIRC had priority for 150 Octane fuel. The majority of allied aircraft did use 100/130 as their was little to gain when 150 was used in multiengine bombers and auxilery aircraft.
So while the allies did have larger stocks of 130 Octane it does not mean an "operational" shortage for the aircraft that could use it and gain benefit.
If the Mossie squadrons felt comfortable requesting to use it, it is not a great leap of logic to conclude that the single engine fighter units were not in a crunch. Especially when you consider the multi engine flying hours using 100/130.
Included is a USAAF document on fuel use for the entire USAAF during the war. The usefulness of this information is debateable. However it does show that 150 Grade fuel is not distinguished in anyway. The USAAF listed fuels by their lean octane rating of 100 octane. Additionally you can compare consumption for the entire USAAF with the stocks on hand in the RAF's 2nd TAF to get an idea of the scope.
I don't think there was an operational shortage of 150 Octane fuel. The allies had some major advantages in fuel production. Rich oil fields, production under no military pressure, plenty of production facilities, and open supply lines. Hardly the scenario for major shortages.
Can you produce some documentation showing this shortage?
All the best,
Crumpp
I have good reason to change my opinion on the use of 100/150 grade fuel including the USAF Museum opinion.
And some experienced gained researching.
It is interesting to see how incompetent some Axis fans think the US and UK were.
Where do you see me claiming that??
BTW, I don't know the circumstances of your anecdotal evidence on the P47M but I can say be careful.
Several of the veterans have related anecdotes only to later change the details. It was 60 years ago.
They are ordinary men who experienced exordinary circumstances and rose to the occasion.
And put hundreds of thousands of tons of fuel in seeeeecret reserves.
There were a surprisingly large number of fighters that did use it consistantly. It was in AFDU and the 2nd TAF in 1945.
All the best,
Crumpp
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I tell you what Crummp, how about this oft quoted USAF museum provides either a book or a doc.
Just one. Concerning 130 grade usage thats relevent to our debate. If its so cut and dry, and these guys are the super gurus of all USAF history, how hard can it be? Do they have any info, or not.
Quite frankly, I find it bemusing that I can find more docs (dozens so far), doing google and yahoo searches of flight sim BBSs than your great source of knowledege at the USAF museum who says "probably not" but has bupkiss past that, and not a single document supporting your position.
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Really?? I found these in about 4 minutes of googling.
The 56th was the only group to operate them.
While some were delivered in 1945 they had serious problems that did not get worked out until the wars end.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P-47_Thunderbolt
http://www.cradleofaviation.org/history/aircraft/p-47/7.html
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3901/is_200410/ai_n9438499
The operational dates are conflicting. Most have Republic developing semi-reliable fixes in April 1945. Many sources say the type never saw combat while others claim it conducted unopposed armed recons the last two days of the war.
I think the He-162 would be just as appropriate for the game. In fact it would be much more appropriate as it actually fired shots in anger.
All the best,
Crumpp
Sorry Bud, you are going to have to do better than quote my own work... Yeah, I wrote that P-47 piece for CAM, and it's also on my website.
Few people on earth are better versed on the P-47 than I am. I have spent hundreds of hours pouring through Republic documents over the years.
P-47Ms had issues with ignition systems breaking down at high altitude and engine/accessory corrosion due to improper preparation for shipment to Britain by the Army. Some engines suffered from burned piston crowns due to excessively lean mixtures in top-rear cylinders, the result of vacuum leaks and incorrect rigging of turbo controls. Modified baffles were employed to reduce cylinder head temps of top-rear cylinders as well. Similar problems were experienced with early P-47C models as well.
I have never seen any reports of 100/150 related engine failures in any P-47s.
P-47Ms of the 56th saw a significant amount of combat in the last three months of the war.
My regards,
Widewing
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I tell you what Crummp, how about this oft quoted USAF museum provides either a book or a doc.
I get a copy of the TO.
Again,
Not a single document has been produced that is a command to use the fuel or a technical order for the aircraft clearing it for general use.
In all these searches of the Internet, produce one, please.
Sorry Bud, you are going to have to do better than quote my own work... Yeah, I wrote that P-47 piece for CAM, and it's also on my website.
I thought it was a little leaning toward fandom.
Better give Micheal O'Leary a call to tell him he is wrong.
The P47M had no problems and flew all the time in combat!
Only 130 P-47Ms were produced and the 56th FG received virtually the entire production run but trouble soon followed. With the constant rush of wartime production, complete testing was sometimes not undertaken. What worked under hasty factory testing would not function under operational conditions. This, unfortunately, was true with the P-47M. M model pilots were horrified to find their engines stopping completely or cutting in and out once they reached cruising altitude. Missions were hastily aborted and maintenance men were puzzled. Other engine problems began to manifest themselves, including corrosion and low cylinder head temperatures which affected the correct operation of the engine. The problem soon grew to nightmare proportions when it became obvious that every P-47M operated by the 56th was stricken with the same problem.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3901/is_200410/ai_n9438499/pg_7
As the war in Europe fought to a close, the P-47M was finally operationally deployed during April 1945 and its high top speed meant that the Luftwaffe more advanced adversaries such as the Me 262 jet could, if conditions were right, be caught and destroyed. The rocket-powered Me 163 was an other matter and these aircraft, which were fortunately deployed in a limited number, were extremely difficult to destroy and could usually only be attacked after they had exhausted their fuel supply and were heading back to home field. For all its speed and power, the P-47M remained a "limited production" version.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3901/is_200410/ai_n9438499/pg_8
I always though the War ended in May 1945, not July.
Looks like Micheal might know a thing or two about the aircraft. His Pom-Poms are not as brightly colored, though.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/search?tb=art&qt=%22O%27Leary%2C+Michael%22&sn=0
All the best,
Crumpp
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Fuel shortage?
Check the National Archives.
POWE 33/596 deals with Blending existing SURPLUS stocks of 150 grade down to 100/130.
Exact title of document is
"Aviation spirit: blending surplus 100/150 Grade into 100/130 Grade"
Hardly supports any claim of 'scarcity', does it. - Over to you Kurfy.
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Better give Micheal O'Leary a call to tell him he is wrong.
I always though the War ended in May 1945, not July.
Looks like Micheal might know a thing or two about the aircraft. His Pom-Poms are not as brightly colored, though.
All the best,
Crumpp
All anyone has to do is examine the 56th's records to discover that the P-47M was flying combat sorties in February. No rocket science involved in that.
Total P-47M wartime losses:
44-21159 P-47M HV- Lightfoot Lt. Edwin B Crash-landed this, his first assigned P-47M on 21 Jan 45
44-21115 P-47M HV-Q Joy Boy Crashed 13 March 45 - mid-air collision. Details unknown
44-21159 P-47M HV-? Lost 13 March 45 Lt. Richard B Tuttle
44-21197 P-47M HV-I Crashed 3 Feb 1945
44-21125 P-47M LM-S Lost 11 March 45 - Lt. Frank Aheron lost
44-21222 P-47M UN-S Lt. Willard C Scherz KIFA 5 March 1945
44-21126 P-47M UN-S Lt. Samuel F Stebleton Lost 2 April 45 - Mid-air collision.
44-21134 P-47M UN-P Lt. William R Hoffman Lost in this a/c 13 April 45 - KIA - triple A.
44-21230 P-47M LM-A Lost 16 April 45 - Capt. Edward W Appel KIA.
44-21207 P-47M LM-M Maj. Felix D. Williamson Crashed Belgium 17 April 45
January 3, 1945: 56th FG accepts first P-47M.
Numbers of P-47Ms grow steadily, but allow for only limited sorties through February. Ignition breakdown first reported on Feb 3, 1945. Two aircraft return to Boxted. Another is lost in accident.
March 4, 1945: 56th FG puts up 16 P-47Ms with group. 6 abort with engine trouble. All P-47Ms with more than 50 hours on engine receive engine changes.
P-47Ms fly limited sorties alongside P-47Ds until entire group is outfitted with fully sorted P-47Ms. All P-47M aircraft declared "up" on 2 April, 1945.
My regards,
Widewing
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P-47Ms fly limited sorties alongside P-47Ds until entire group is outfitted with fully sorted P-47Ms. All P-47M aircraft declared "up" on 2 April, 1945.
That's exactly what Crumpp's quote says:
As the war in Europe fought to a close, the P-47M was finally operationally deployed during April 1945
That's a far cry from this exaggeration:
P-47Ms of the 56th saw a significant amount of combat in the last three months of the war.
Significant as defined by who? You? pfff...
The M was completely insignificant in Europe and as far as the 56th goes as well.
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Originally posted by Bruno
The M was completely insignificant in Europe and as far as the 56th goes as well.
But not quite as insignificant as you....
Widewing
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Isn't April 2 about the same time the K-4 is claimed to be operational @ 1.98. We can now say the the K-4 @ 1.98 was insignificant. :aok
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Originally posted by Widewing
But not quite as insignificant as you....
Widewing
Wow, clever...
However, its obvious to anyone who reads your nonsense posted on this forum or in general on your crappy website that you distort and exaggerate.
It maybe one thing to be insignificant, but it's a whole other thing to know it and pretend your not.
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Emmm, this:
"44-21159 P-47M HV- Lightfoot Lt. Edwin B Crash-landed this, his first assigned P-47M on 21 Jan 45
44-21115 P-47M HV-Q Joy Boy Crashed 13 March 45 - mid-air collision. Details unknown
44-21159 P-47M HV-? Lost 13 March 45 Lt. Richard B Tuttle
44-21197 P-47M HV-I Crashed 3 Feb 1945
44-21125 P-47M LM-S Lost 11 March 45 - Lt. Frank Aheron lost
44-21222 P-47M UN-S Lt. Willard C Scherz KIFA 5 March 1945
44-21126 P-47M UN-S Lt. Samuel F Stebleton Lost 2 April 45 - Mid-air collision.
44-21134 P-47M UN-P Lt. William R Hoffman Lost in this a/c 13 April 45 - KIA - triple A.
44-21230 P-47M LM-A Lost 16 April 45 - Capt. Edward W Appel KIA.
44-21207 P-47M LM-M Maj. Felix D. Williamson Crashed Belgium 17 April 45
January 3, 1945: 56th FG accepts first P-47M.
Numbers of P-47Ms grow steadily, but allow for only limited sorties through February. Ignition breakdown first reported on Feb 3, 1945. Two aircraft return to Boxted. Another is lost in accident.
March 4, 1945: 56th FG puts up 16 P-47Ms with group. 6 abort with engine trouble. All P-47Ms with more than 50 hours on engine receive engine changes. "
Now I don't think significant is the right word, but they definately were there and flying from January onwards.
So, - that has been cleared..
As for my conspiracy theory Crumpp, - it wasn't exactly aimed at you. I know you're data mining like many other of us ;)
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(http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/blend.jpg)
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No Problem Angus.
Wide wing,
44-21159 P-47M HV- Lightfoot Lt. Edwin B Crash-landed this, his first assigned P-47M on 21 Jan 45
44-21115 P-47M HV-Q Joy Boy Crashed 13 March 45 - mid-air collision. Details unknown
44-21159 P-47M HV-? Lost 13 March 45 Lt. Richard B Tuttle
44-21197 P-47M HV-I Crashed 3 Feb 1945
44-21125 P-47M LM-S Lost 11 March 45 - Lt. Frank Aheron lost
44-21222 P-47M UN-S Lt. Willard C Scherz KIFA 5 March 1945
44-21126 P-47M UN-S Lt. Samuel F Stebleton Lost 2 April 45 - Mid-air collision.
44-21134 P-47M UN-P Lt. William R Hoffman Lost in this a/c 13 April 45 - KIA - triple A.
44-21230 P-47M LM-A Lost 16 April 45 - Capt. Edward W Appel KIA.
44-21207 P-47M LM-M Maj. Felix D. Williamson Crashed Belgium 17 April 45
So on this whole list we have ONE confirmed combat lost AFTER April, 1944.
Looks to me like the rest crashed trying to get the P47M to work.
This can't be your "proof" the P47M was used extensively combat.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Bruno
Wow, clever...
However, its obvious to anyone who reads your nonsense posted on this forum or in general on your crappy website that you distort and exaggerate.
The internet is loaded with guys who attempt to assuage their meager self-esteem by belittling the efforts of others, while their contribution to the study of history is non-existent. All heat, no light...
So tell us Mr. loudmouth, what of your work has been published? What have you accomplished beyond occupying the void below the local bridge?
I'm not anyone special. I did earn a history degree (US Studies), but my work is as a Senior Project Engineer (mostly DOD weapons projects) and write as hobby. I have over 2,300 hours in Military aircraft (mostly recips) and have logged 332 traps aboard US Navy carriers.
Please, define for us your credentials. Let us determine if your opinions are based upon some experience, or just piss and wind.
Several years ago, a well known fighter pilot ventured into USENET and when asked, described his battle with a Bf-109 over Germany. He wrote of how his P-38J was able to turn inside the 109 and follow it up in a vertical climb.
Well, the Luftwobble intardnuts scrambled from their holes and accused him of being a liar, a fraud and stated that what he had just described was not possible.
What was even more amazing was that this pilot had been recognized with the DFC, several Air Medals and a host of other awards for his service. Meanwhile, a bunch of fat-boy, pasty-face wannabes crouching over their keyboards, take potshots at an honored combat vet. Captain Art Heiden simply stopped posting to the web and a lot of people would be denied his knowledge and memories. Few vets post to the web these days, primarily because of that sort of response.
Even fewer historians and writers post to the web for precisely the same reason. Why suffer the slings and arrows of hateful trolls who have no credentials beyond those self-appointed?
Now Bruno, ask me if I give a damn what you think or write here.
Widewing
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One should give a damn! Ze tards must not override everyzing with zeir propaganda.
On the serious flipside, I was lucky enough to spend some time with 2 WW2 aces, and blimey, I have posted many of their anecdotes only to be booed on by the crowd, - surprizingly both of them by the LW crowd!
One of them, - just look at my sig :D
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What was even more amazing was that this pilot had been recognized with the DFC, several Air Medals and a host of other awards for his service. Meanwhile, a bunch of fat-boy, pasty-face wannabes crouching over their keyboards, take potshots at an honored combat vet. Captain Art Heiden simply stopped posting to the web and a lot of people would be denied his knowledge and memories. Few vets post to the web these days, primarily because of that sort of response.
Sad
However it is not confined to the "Luftwobble tard network":huh
The problem Widewing, is all of your experience come from one side of coin.
All the best,
Crumpp
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ask me if I give a damn what you think or write here.
You cared enough to write 9 paragraphs...
I have no interest in your 'life' so you can save the biography for your 'publisher'. I am sure it will be a 'best seller'.
I am only replying to your exaggeration when using words like 'significant amount of combat'.
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Ahemm
"The problem Widewing, is all of your experience come from one side of coin."
Crumpp, - isn't that better than those one-sided coins that have no experience at all?
With experience, most people adapt some relation to it. Okay, But this I found uneccecary.
And for you Bruno, stop yer BS.
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Originally posted by Crumpp
This can't be your "proof" the P47M was used extensively combat.
All the best,
Crumpp
Proof that the LW was scarcer than teeth in a chickens mouth.
Since you are so high on Freeman, quoting him numerous times, read the Osprey book, chapter 7, on the 56th FG. First claim by a M was a 109 on Jan 14. A further 10 were claimed in the Magdeburg area. On March 14, 2 Ar234 were claimed by Ms. On March 27, 2 Me262s were claimed by Ms.
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That should settle it then ;)
I'd maybe still not call it common, - but it's certainly getting closer to significant.
Nice one Milo.
Sending you a P47 pic, - NOW.
What model, I don't know.
You're welcome to post it.
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No one said the P47M didn't see 'combat'. That's a proven fact. However, in the over all scheme of things, even that late in the war, to describe it as significant would be an exaggeration at best. Especially for someone who passes themselves off as a 'respected author, publisher and historian'.
And for you Bruno, stop yer BS.
First off, no.
Secondly, you need to go back and read the sequence of replies. Widemouth took his shots, I took mine...
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First claim by a M was a 109 on Jan 14. A further 10 were claimed in the Magdeburg area. On March 14, 2 Ar234 were claimed by Ms. On March 27, 2 Me262s were claimed by Ms.
Probably unlikely as the P47M could not fly away from it's field in Jan. 1945.
Most likely it is just simple confusion between the P47D, which the 56th did keep and fly in combat.
The problem Widewing, is all of your experience come from one side of coin.
That is such a bad sentence, lol. When all of your experience comes from one side of the coin it is not necessarily better than no experience at all.
People do not listen to those with no experience.
Someone with one-sided experience though is perceived as an expert in one area. They are in a position to do much more harm, as people will listen.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
No Problem Angus.
Wide wing,
44-21159 P-47M HV- Lightfoot Lt. Edwin B Crash-landed this, his first assigned P-47M on 21 Jan 45
44-21115 P-47M HV-Q Joy Boy Crashed 13 March 45 - mid-air collision. Details unknown
44-21159 P-47M HV-? Lost 13 March 45 Lt. Richard B Tuttle
44-21197 P-47M HV-I Crashed 3 Feb 1945
44-21125 P-47M LM-S Lost 11 March 45 - Lt. Frank Aheron lost
44-21222 P-47M UN-S Lt. Willard C Scherz KIFA 5 March 1945
44-21126 P-47M UN-S Lt. Samuel F Stebleton Lost 2 April 45 - Mid-air collision.
44-21134 P-47M UN-P Lt. William R Hoffman Lost in this a/c 13 April 45 - KIA - triple A.
44-21230 P-47M LM-A Lost 16 April 45 - Capt. Edward W Appel KIA.
44-21207 P-47M LM-M Maj. Felix D. Williamson Crashed Belgium 17 April 45
So on this whole list we have ONE confirmed combat lost AFTER April, 1944.
Looks to me like the rest crashed trying to get the P47M to work.
This can't be your "proof" the P47M was used extensively combat.
All the best,
Crumpp
Another interpretation is : the 47M was so superior it had only one combat loss.
And this interpretation is as pertinent and backed by facts as your.
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So now Freeman is liar when it suits you. :rolleyes:
They flew from their base at Boxted because they did not know of the troubles that were to come. The first known identification of a problem occured on Jan 21 when a Lt Lightfoot (61stFS) had an engine failure at 32,000ft and landed at Boxted. (44-21159 P-47M 61 HV- Lightfoot, Lt. Edwin B) The other Ms were inspected and found that there was cracks in the ignition high tension leads.
a/c and pilots for the claims.
44-21134 P-47M 63 UN-P Conger, Maj. Paul A Bernyce
44-21200 P-47M 62 LM-R Ball, Lt. Sandford N
44-21210 P-47M 62 LM-O Gould, Lt. Norman D
44-21112 P-47M 63 UN-Z Bostwick, Maj. George E Ugly Duckling
44-21137 P-47M 63 UN-E Crosthwaite, Lt. Edwin M
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Originally posted by Bruno
First off, no.
Secondly, you need to go back and read the sequence of replies. Widemouth took his shots, I took mine...
The difference is that your "shots" were personal slurs. But hey, I can play that game better than most, although I'd rather not waste energy on meretricious debates.
Still waiting to dazzled by those sterling credentials...
Widewing
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Originally posted by MiloMorai
Proof that the LW was scarcer than teeth in a chickens mouth.
Since you are so high on Freeman, quoting him numerous times, read the Osprey book, chapter 7, on the 56th FG. First claim by a M was a 109 on Jan 14. A further 10 were claimed in the Magdeburg area. On March 14, 2 Ar234 were claimed by Ms. On March 27, 2 Me262s were claimed by Ms.
Yes, and after April 2, the 56th went wild. On April 10, two Me 262s downed and 45 more Luftwaffe aircraft destroyed. On the 13th they claimed 95 aircraft destroyed near Kiel (on airfields... Few fighters were encountered in the air).
My regards,
Widewing
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So now Freeman is liar when it suits you.
Where do you see that??
My God, youre jumping off the deep end. If your going to put in your signature about reading my posts, please do that.
This is what, the third time in this thread you have jumped on your misconceptions of my post.
Widewing,
The facts are the P47M's problems were not solved until April, 1945.
Both Widewings and O'Leary's findings show this to be true.
How much combat it saw after that is debatable.
Just as I said:
The operational dates are conflicting. Most have Republic developing semi-reliable fixes in April 1945. Many sources say the type never saw combat while others claim it conducted unopposed armed recons the last two days of the war.
From my very first post written on the subject. I would have written that some claim the Type was in combat from the day it arrived in Europe and is responsible for single handily destroying the Luftwaffe if that was the case. Widewings site was included to show the range of claims.
What is everyone so afraid of that they do not even read my post?
If the P47M saw significant amounts of combat and you have the proof....
Why didn't you just say so and present it in your article?
This is the only reference to combat service for the P47M in the article I can find:
The new M models also suffered a fair amount of teething troubles. The C series engines suffered from high altitude ignition leaks and burned pistons. The 56th kept many of their older D models until the new M had its bugs corrected. Nonetheless, once sorted out, the P-47M was the fastest propeller driven fighter to see combat service in any Air Force in the ETO. Capable of speeds up to 475 mph, the M was a true "hotrod".
http://www.cradleofaviation.org/history/aircraft/p-47/7.html
That statement, BTW, is only true at certain altitudes. Most of the late war fighters were equal or faster to the P47M at lower altitudes.
The vaunted 350 hours endurance test is not all that remarkable either. It was good but is the only engine I know of even tested that long. Most tests simply concluded earlier with no damage at all. In many cases these engines were installed on aircraft and flown even more!
Not run on a bench until they were useless and tossed in the garbage.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Widewing
The difference is that your "shots" were personal slurs. But hey, I can play that game better than most, although I'd rather not waste energy on meretricious debates.
Still waiting to dazzled by those sterling credentials...
Widewing
Now you a liar, you replied with an ad hominem to my questioning of your use of the word significant. I said it was an exaggeration, and it was.
Here's your reply:
But not quite as insignificant as you....
Personal slurs? I said you exaggerate and your website is crappy.
Which are truths not slurs.
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Crumpp, you quote Freeman as the bible on 150 fuel but you don't believe that the 56th was flying Ms in Jan 45 and claiming victories. :eek: So Freeman tells the truth when it suits you but is a liar when it doesn't.
To quote Freeman, "In the early afternoon of April 13 48 P-47Ms set out from Boxted making landfall near hamburg 70 minutes later. Flying on to Denmark the group overflew Eggebeck airfield and found it lined with a/c - est 150+ of several types.'
They then proceded to wreck havok on those est 150+ a/c. This was the mission in which Hoffamn was killed when he jumped to low for his chute to open fully. FSs participating > 61st, 62cd, 63rd, ie. all of the 56th FG.
Your posts are still worth reading when one filters out the BS and misconceptions.
You still ignore the RAF site, which has more credibility than your links, that says Crossbow was both offensive and defensive.
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Originally posted by Bruno
Now you a liar, you replied with an ad hominem to my questioning of your use of the word significant. I said it was an exaggeration, and it was.
Personal slurs? I said you exaggerate and your website is crappy.
Which are truths not slurs.
Keep digging that hole Bruno...
Widewing
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Keep digging that hole Bruno...
Or what? You will lie some more? Exaggerate more?
From exaggeration, to lying, to idle threats...
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To quote Freeman, "In the early afternoon of April 13 48 P-47Ms set out from Boxted making landfall near hamburg 70 minutes later. Flying on to Denmark the group overflew Eggebeck airfield and found it lined with a/c - est 150+ of several types.'
Milo,
This looks like another case of you making a mountain out of a molehill.
Freeman is obviously correct if you look at the date it is well after the P47M was released for combat duties.
The April entry has never been indispute so I am at a loss as to why you felt this passage was even relative to the discussion.
This has never been an issue except in your mind.
However counting aircraft destroyed on the ground as proof of the P47M's combat prowness as a fighter is rather dubious.
The "Crossbow" issue you raised was that "Operation Diver" did not exist. It did and you were wrong.
Operation Crossbow was a highly classified program to build, launch, and operate an allied version of the V1 rocket.
Missions to photograph, attack, and perform BDA on the German V weapon program did fall under Crossbow. The deception that this was the main effort of Crossbow was allowed to stand.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Tell me Crumpp why this document is titled 'Cabinet "Crossbow" Meeting' and not 'Cabinet "Diver" Meeting'?
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/merlin66_18_25b.jpg
Only fighters used in anti-diver missions are mentioned, NO Bombers.
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That docco wouldn't have a page 2 for mossies would it Milo?
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Hi Guys
As a newbie to this forum I have been following the piece with interest, having been directed here from RAF Commands.
Whilst these comments are not about 130 Grade fuel they are about the operating conditions, and thus relevant to fuel usage.
Some comments have been made about the lack of operations of the Spitfire XIV in 2TAF service, and also stated the fact that 126 RCAF Wing did not operate them, when they did.
Can I therefore leave a "few" words in explanation:
Nobody seems to have thought of the terrible weather conditions or poor airfield conditions that 125 Wing, and indeed all the other 2TAF Wings, had to operate through. One of the worst winters in Western Europe for a good number of years.
Or, of course, the fact that these Wings were mobile and whilst a Squadron can fly anywhere it takes time for the ground echelons to be in place.
125 Wing ORB B82 Grave - when 125 Wing was a mixed Tempest V/Spitfire XIV Wing for a short while, before 80 and 274 joined 122 Wing.
2/10/44
Our memories of our last few days in Belgium are somewhat confused. Everything happened at once. We suffered unpleasant shelling, our Spitfires were exchanged with 126's Spitfires, our Squadrons were returned to A.D.G.B. and replaced by two Tempest Squadrons and two Spitfire XIV Squadrons and on top of it all we were ordered to GRAVE. Operations, meanwhile, continued. Indeed 441 Squadron, on patrol just a couple of hours before taking off for England, had the pleasure of damaging one of the Boche's new Me 262 Jet-propelled aircraft. "A" party travelled apprehensively but uneventfully up to the new strip and there sat down to await the arrival of the Squadrons and the "B" party - or the Hun. They were never sure who would come first. Meanwhile Dakota's did a Ferry Service between Deurne and Grave to remove the last of the bodies who were Blighty-bound.
"B" party at half strength struggled manfully to cope with a difficult situation. The Messing Staffs with fewer hands than ever turned out more meals for more people and satisfied everyone. Ground crews who had lived with Spits ever since the Wing was formed had to learn about Tempests the hard way - by experience. And by some odd coincidence during those two or three days we had more visiting aircraft to cope with than ever before. Dakota's, Tempests, Typhoons and Mustangs, all added to the motley array we already had. Eventually, however, everything was accomplished. We said farewell at DEURNE to 132, 602, 453 and 441. We reassembled at GRAVE with 80 and 274 Tempest V Squadrons and 130 and 402 Spitfire XIV Squadrons. By ten o'clock on the 2nd October the Wing was operational. Patrols were taken on and were uneventfully carried through. The only out-of-the-ordinary being the sighting occasionally of Me 262's.
4/10/44
Throughout the day Patrols were continued with the object of intercepting the Me 262's and nine of these were uneventful. On the first Patrol 402 Sqdn sighted 5 ME 109's flying NW from NIJMEGEN at 10.000 ft. A Section of the Spitfires dived to attack but the enemy aircraft evaded in cloud. At 09.30 hours 274 Sqdn saw one ME 262 at 22.000 ft. 6 miles East of Arnhem flying S.W. but they were unable to make contact. On their next Patrol, these Tempests were more successful; they were flying at 14.000 ft when the Leader sighted 5 ME 262's carrying Bombs at 16.000 ft flying westwards towards the bridge at Nijmegen. When our A/C turned to engage them, the e/a jettisoned their bombs in open country and made away eastwards.
One of the Jet Planes when fired on turned on its back and dived down at an angle of 60 degrees and may have crashed after this manoeuvre although no claim is made. It was appreciated when 80 Sqdn. who relieved 274 on Patrol reported on the success of this interception. 80 Sqdn saw a ME 262 at 16.30 hrs climbing from 20.000 ft just N.W. of Nijmegen and were unable to make contact but two of their pilots (F/Lt. Friend and F/O Garland) twenty minutes later fired at 3 ME 109's which they contacted 3 miles N.E. of Nijmegen. The e/a were flying in and out of cloud and no results of the engagement were seen. Another ME 262 was spotted at 17.30 hours over Nijmegen when 402 Sqdn were airborne. It was at 25.000 ft and the Spitfires found it impossible to close on it.
125 Wing ORB - Y.32 Ophoven
19/1/45
First its rain, then its snow and ice and now its a mixture, icy rain and sleet, driven along by a high powered wind. Conditions were impossible for flying. The duty squadron did cockpit readiness from first light, but when the weather became too bad the state was relaxed to 15 minutes, and the pilots were able to stay in the briefing room.
125 Wing ORB - B.78 Eindhoven
30/1/45
Again we have to report a blank day. We awoke to find the countryside blitzed by a blizzard now we know why these Dutch merchants who sell earcaps look so prosperous.
31/1/45
No operations, a violent thaw, roads rapidly becoming impassable and a frantic search for a new mess before the road dies on us altogether. Quite enough for one day!
This is both an official comment from the 125 Wing ORB (as shown above) and a personal comment from my father who was at 125 Wing HQ from April '44 to July '45 and had to live and work outside, in the main, in these conditions.
Dad was one of the:- "A" party travelled apprehensively but uneventfully up to the new strip and there sat down to await the arrival of the Squadrons and the "B" party - or the Hun."
Also, comment was made about 126 (RCAF) Wing not using XIV's - this is not true as 402 (Winnipeg Bear) Squadron transferred to 126 Wing (at B.88 Heesch) at the end of December 1944, just before the move of 125 Wing from B.64 Schaffen/Diest to Y.32 Ophoven.
125 Wing ORB - B.64 Schaffen/Diest
26/12/44
At the dinner in the Officers Mess on Christmas night it was officially revealed that we are losing 402 Squadron from the Wing..The Squadron moved over into the Wing in September, when with 130, they, as newcomers were able to sample the joys of Grave.
The "joys of Grave" being typical British understatement as the conditions for air and ground crews were terrible.
125 Wing ORB - B.82 Grave
12/10/44
Billets. The hunt for comfort goes on. Five N.C.Os have made a couple of cows move up and have occupied their stalls. Sixteen erks in one farm have got themselves set up in a comfortable hay loft, the only disadvantage being that they have to pass through Mabels room to get there. Mabel doesnt mind.
13/10/44
HAS 125 GOT B.O.? Whereas in the old days 125 always had gaggles of visitors, nowadays the front line airfield is left severely alone. Visitors who do arrive always leave precipitously pleading engagements at Rear or Main or Remote Control Centre. It must be our B.O. Bomb Orrors.
41, 350 (Belgian) and 610 (County of Chester) Squadrons had been held back in the UK because of the state of both the weather and the landing grounds.
Because of the appalling weather conditions, and the poor state of the landing grounds, it was not until 5 December that 41 Squadron joined 125 Wing at B.64 Schaffen/Diest. The pilots were briefed on a number of occasions on the unfavourable conditions at B.64, but the ground personnel of the Squadron finally left for B.64 on 19 November.
When the squadron 'Air echelon' at last moved on 4 December 1944, the pilots landed their precious Spitfire XIVEs at B.56 Evere, drove to B.64, where they scrupulously inspected the runway and stayed overnight. The following morning, they hitched a ride back to B.56 and flew their aircraft to B.64. They all landed uneventfully, but the strip at B.64 would remain a concern during their whole stay.
350 and 610 initially joined 127 (RCAF) Wing at B.56 Evere, in early December, before joining 125 Wing at Y.32 Ophoven just in time for Operation Bodenplatte.
125 Wing ORB - Y.32 Ophoven
31/12/44
Quite an exciting end to the old year and a much more exciting beginning to the new. Our aircraft from Diest (41 and 130 Sqdns) and from Brussels (610 and 350 Sqdns) arrived at our new base, having operated from our old fields, landed at Y.32 and then continued to work for the remainder of the day. We got no joy, and so far now news has been received of P/O Joseph of 130 Sqdn who failed to return from the last sortie flown by the Punjabs on the last day of the old year. Most of the chaps were tired out by the end of the day, but a few remained up to bid farewell to 1944. Fritz tried to dampen our spirits with a few bombs and a shoot-up, but at midnight we sang in 1945 with Auld Lang Syne. A few of the windows in our new billet failed to live long enough to let in the light of the new year.
1/1/45
New Years Day saw everyone up bright and early and 41 Squadron were away on an Armed Recce when the Hun turned up in some force and proceeded to strafe us and the American strip nearby. Considering everything, his shooting was poor. 350 Squadron came off worse having had seven aircraft u/s but not all badly damaged. 130 had one damaged. Two airmen were wounded and a petrol dump was set on fire. The Wing cannot claim any Huns destroyed over base, but the Americans got quite a few. Just after the strafe, 610 were able to report one FW 190 destroyed by F/Lt Gaze a good show. The Wing was able to continue work all day and 130, 610 and 41 were constantly in the air on Recces and Patrols, and some Met, Goods Truck and a Signal Box were shot up by 41 Sqdn. Altogether we flew 39 sorties on December 31st and 81 on January 1st.
cheers
Allan
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Hey Crumpp:
"However counting aircraft destroyed on the ground as proof of the P47M's combat prowness as a fighter is rather dubious."
Well, the point is that they were in combat, and did see some action yes?
There were Meteors in action as well, they just never found anyone to play with. Many a pilot finished his ToD in 1945 without ever seeing action, - typical for the state of the LW at the time.
I'd still not call it significant, but definately existent.
This is all rolling in the mud and the point of this thread is long lost.
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Originally posted by Bruno
Or what? You will lie some more? Exaggerate more?
From exaggeration, to lying, to idle threats...
:rofl :rofl :rofl
Wotan by any other name is still Wotan just the same.
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I beleive it was me who made the 126 Wing RCAF comment, it was only a generalisation, you are correct that RCAF 402 did operate the XIV for a time. I was pointing out that as the top scoring Wing in the RCAF, it used Spit IXs for the vast majority of its ops from D-Day to VE Day.
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Wotan = Odinn in old Norse/Icelandic
It is a frequent name.
If the Odinn in question has questionable mental health, some have the habit of nicknaming, using ur instead of inn.
ur means mad or insane.
Madness can mean Bedlam.
Of course this is all exaggerations and lies.
For a nickchangingshapeshifter"Bedlam" would be a good nick for the next time, yes?
BTW Wotan does fly AH or?
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Well, the point is that they were in combat, and did see some action yes?
Sure they saw some. About as much as the He-162 Salamander as I said in the begining.
To characterize the type has having "extensive" combat use is just plain wrong.
All the best,
Crumpp
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I bet they had very much more flight hours than the Salamander. And many times more would have been needed to even get into contact with an enemy aircraft....
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I bet they had very much more flight hours than the Salamander. And many times more would have been needed to even get into contact with an enemy aircraft....
Hey Angus,
I think you might be surprised!
All the best,
Crumpp
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The He 162 Salamander did not score a single air to air kill in WW2, despite seeing limited combat.
The Me 163 Komet scored 10, and was essentially a failure.
The Me 262 Schwalbe was far more prolific, and effective as a jet fighter than either of those two, both in terms of deployment and use, scoring more than 500 kills with its various Kommandos and JG/7 and KG/51.
As for the Meteor, no I wouldn't say extensive combat either.
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I thought the He162 got a Tempest.
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Credit was not allowed, it was given to a flak position.
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Originally posted by Squire
Credit was not allowed, it was given to a flak position.
Why was credit not allowed? Who really got the Tempest?
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The claim was put in, but credit was given to a flak unit. I imagine the LW intel officer had his reasons . I really dont have any info past that the He 162 put a claim in but that ultimate credit was not officially given by the LW.
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Two more to 300 replies wohoo!
Yes, my pleasures are simple. :p
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The He 162 Salamander did not score a single air to air kill in WW2, despite seeing limited combat.
You should check into that statement. It actually got a few. It's time in service and combat record is easily comparable to the P47M's.
http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=1153
I/JG 1 was declared combat-ready on 23 April, after it had already claimed one British fighter on 19 April. Feldwebel Günther Kirchner was credited with shooting down a fighter when the captured pilot admitted he'd been shot down by a jet. Unfortunately Kirchner himself was shot down shortly thereafter by another British fighter. At least two other claims were made by He 162 pilots before the end of the war, although only one Tempest V can be confirmed from British records since a number of British aircraft were lost to unknown causes at times and places that match these other claims. At least one and possibly three He 162s were lost to enemy action.
http://pilotfriend.com/century-of-flight/Aviation%20history/WW2/new%20aircraft3/Heinkel%20He%20162%20Salamander.htm
* The He-162 finally began to see combat in mid-April. On 19 April, the pilot of a British Royal Air Force (RAF) fighter who had been captured by the Germans informed his interrogators that he had been shot down by a jet fighter whose description was clearly that of a He-162. The Heinkel and its pilot were lost as well, shot down by an RAF Tempest fighter while returning to base.
On 20 April, a Luftwaffe pilot successfully ejected from a He-162, though the reason for the hasty exit from his aircraft was not recorded. One possibility is that he simply ran out of fuel. The He-162's half-hour endurance was simply not enough, and at least two of JG-1's pilots were killed making "dead-stick" landings after exhausting their fuel.
On 4 May, all of JG-1's surviving He-162s were formed into a special consolidated "Einsatzgruppen (Special Action Group)", but this action amounted to little more than "rearranging the deck chairs on the TITANIC". On 5 May, the Germans agreed to a cease-fire and the He-162s were all grounded.
From mid-April, I/JG-1 had scored a number of kills, but had also lost thirteen He-162s and ten pilots. Most of the losses were from flying accidents, due to problems such as engine flame-outs and occasional structural failures. The difficulties with the type seem to have been due to the fact that it was rushed into production, not that it was an inherently bad design. One experienced Luftwaffe pilot who flew it called it a "first-class combat aircraft".
http://www.vectorsite.net/avhe162.html
Both aircraft had been in the wings waiting to see service in Early 1945. Neither saw significant combat action and came into service in the last weeks of the war.
Of course neither saw "significant" action.
All the best,
Crumpp
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The claim was put in, but credit was given to a flak unit. I imagine the LW intel officer had his reasons . I really dont have any info past that the He 162 put a claim in but that ultimate credit was not officially given by the LW.
Squire,
No Luftwaffe claims are confirmed after November 1944. It is an impossibility for the flak unit to have been officially "awarded" credit.
It frequently took more than a year for confirmations to be awarded by Berlin, and it appears that no claim filed after November, 1944, was ever confirmed.
http://www.lesbutler.ip3.co.uk/jg26/claims.htm
All the best,
Crumpp
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fyi the He-162, the aircraft, was not designated as 'Salamander' that was the name of the project out which the 162 was developed.
The 162 did have several confirmed kills (I will look them up tomorrow) but its kill claims never exceeded own losses. As Crumpp's quote states most of those losses were due to mechanical failures or accidents etc...
It was even less significant then the P-47M...
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one other thing:
Einsatzbereitschaft im Bereich Luftflotte Reich (http://Einsatzbereitschaft im Bereich Luftflotte Reich)
(scroll to bottom)
original document here:
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/thumbs/334_1128484494_einsatzbereitschaft.jpg) (http://www.onpoi.net/ah/picpopup.php?ImgId=25427)
The translation of the chart is as follows:
Flgz = Aircraft
Besatzung = crew or pilots
Soll = number of aircraft (equipment) assigned
Ist = actual amount, usually this figure differs from the upper
eins = einsatzbereit = serviceable/ working. Can either be given in actual number or percentage.
Stab./JG 1 - was assigned to have 16, but had 0 on hand none serviceable (Keine Meldung)
I./JG 1 - was assigned to have 52, had 16 on hand and only 10 serviceable
III./JG 1 - was assigned to have 52 but have 0 on hand and none serviceable
This was as of Stand: 11.4.45
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"No Luftwaffe claims are confirmed after November 1944"
Hmm, well, thats an interesting bit of info. Im not exactly sure where that leaves the LW then, I mean if a pilot claimed a kill, your saying there was no official examination by the Gruppe intel people? at all? How would they formulate any intel as to kills and losses?
In regards to what I have on the He 162, I will post what I have later, and you guys can decide what it means (or doesnt), im off to the show...I hear "Lord of War" is good, always liked Cage.
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The following comes form the old LEMB forum (I am just posting the relevant information that is sourced. Most of the following comes from various posters on LEMB)
All 162 claims are unconfirmed of course.
However, there are several:
An article by Jean-Claude Mermet that appeared in Arojournal No 11 (Feb 2000) goes into some detail on He-162 claims:
The first He-162 victory is claimed by Oberst Ihlefeld of Stab./JG 1. No details are listed.
April 19: Feldwebel Gnther Kirschner (type unknown to me)
According to the Germans Kirschner was shot down and killed by Thunderbolts. However, according to Mermet it was mostly likely RAF pilot P/O Walkington of 222 Squadron flying a Tempest who shot down Kirschner. There is no supporting losses by the allies to support a shoot down claim by Kirschner.
May 2: Uffz. Rechberger claims a P-47
No information.
However, a Uffz. Rechenbach reportedly shot down a Mosquito on 25 or 26 April. This claim is supported by 2 witnesses. Schmitt (accounted for in his log book) and Oblt. Eric Demuth. But there is no supporting loss on the allied side.
May 4: Lt. Rudolf Schmitt claims a Typhoon
A single Typhoon of 183 squadron and a Tempest of 486 Squadron were lost attacking ground targets. Both have been claim at some point as Schmitt's victim. According to Mermet Schmitt's claim is 'without foundation'.
From He-162 action in 'Janes, Battles With The Luftwaffe'
"I was commander of II./JG11 during the fierce battles and consequent heavy losses in the Reich Defense, April-December 1943, when I shot down 12 Viermots. I was pulled out by Goring and given the task of setting up the new department 'General Recruiting Luftwaffe' in the Reich Air Ministry. At the same time I was appointed in agreement with Reich Youth Leader(A Axmann) honorary Reich Inspector of Hitler Youth Airmen. So I was saddled with the running of two departments at the same time. The Hitler Youth Airmen had 250,000 members who received pre-military training in Hitler Youth camps, followed by flight instruction(in a selective process for suitability) by the NSFK(the party flying corps, Generaloberst Keller) in their gliding camps. About march 1944 I was ordered to report to Goring on the Obersalzberg, together with Prof W. Messerschmitt, in order to express my opinion on the Volksjager(peoples fighter) project and the possibilities of using selected Hitler Youth pilots. About June 1944 there was a meeting at the Reich Air Ministry under the chairmanship of Keller with Milch, Sauer, Knemeyer, myself and others to discuss the Volksjager project. Here things began to take shape with a reference to a development by Heinkel. It so transpired that, when I was once again with Goring at Karinhall to make my report, the idea of a Jagdgeschwader 'Hitler Youth' with the name 'Oesau was to be realised. It was also decided that this Geschwader was to be equipped with Volksjager(which were still in the development stage). In September 1944 I took part in the so called Volksjager conference at Rastenburg. Galland and Messerschmitt were in favour of giving priority to the Me 262. But Sauer, Galland having meanwhile fallen out of favour with Goring, succeed with his idea of mass production of the Volksjager. In the middle of December 1944 I was ordered to Vienna to attend the first display of the He 162, which ended tragically. Back in Berlin a few days later I had a serious clash with Generaloberst Keller about the possible use of the He 162 for "my Hitler Youth airmen". He did not share my doubts about the Volksjager and advised for its mass production at another meeting with Goring a few days later, in the presence of Gollob. I did not suspect at the time how heavily I would be involved with the He 162 later.
In January 1945 I was Ordered to Rechlin in order to fly and test the He 162. I was given initial instructions on it by Bar(Obstlt Heinz Bar),with whom I had been in Tunisia. After the first circuit it had become obvious to me that, unless decisive changes were made to the machine, this aircraft would be out of the question for Hitler youths coming straight from gliders without intermediate training on other and proven fighters. I informed Goring about my impressions in a priority report! I also informed Keller who meanwhile had flown the He 162. At the beginning of March I was ordered to Goslar to form a yet unnamed fighter Geschwader where I, under Gollob, first assembled ground personnel made up of various fighter Geschwaders to a 'new mob'
In the middle of March the first 32 He 162s arrived, from Travemunde, I believe and we began immediately with the training of the pilots(not Hitler Youth) who had meanwhile arrived from various fighter training schools. It turned out that the conversion training brought no problems, only the lack of fuel causes us difficulties! Enemy formations daily passed overhead without us being able, nor permitted to interfere. On 15 April 1945 I was able to take off for a sortie with the first section, but as we had been sent to the wrong place by fighter control, we failed to make contact with the enemy. We did not operate again until the 21st of the month because of bad weather, when I was able to score the first Abschuss, a P-47, with the He 162. On landing the weak undercarriage collapsed under me and I ended up on my belly. On 22 April Lt Bartz also shot down a P-47 and that was the end of this nameless Geschwader which was to have been named 'Hitler Youth'. As the Americans were meanwhile getting uncomfortably close to the Harz, the remaining He 162s were flown from Goslar to Travemunde and the entire Geschwader was sent to the Harz for ground fighting as infantry. I received orders, again from Loerzer, to take over the Bucker project at Friedersdorf, where I, together with Hptm. Purps, on 1 may 1945 did a night sortie against the approaching tank units of the Red Army between Kustin and Landsberg, but without success as the defensive fire of the Russians was so heavy that, riddled with hits from infantry arms, we had to give up further attempts. I spent the remaining days with Loerzer in the personnel department of the Reich Air Ministry"
Oberst Adolf Dickfield, 132 kill claims. However, quite a number of Dickfield's claims can not be confirmed. For example, he claim 12 bombers while flying with JG 11, only 2 can be confirmed.
EDIT:
The old post was carried over to the new LEMB and can be found here:
He 162 in action. (http://www.luftwaffe-experten.org/forums/index.php?showtopic=552)
Another post with an interesting pic...
Erich Demuth of I./JG1 (http://www.luftwaffe-experten.org/forums/index.php?showtopic=559)
It shows the rudder of Oblt. Eric Demuth's 162 indicating 16 kills. It's highly doubtful he had 16 kills in a 162 and mostly likely this is his own personal kill claim total on all types he flew.
Also, in regards to the 163's combat service see:
163 in combat (http://www.xs4all.nl/~robdebie/me163/units.htm)
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Ahh, my book "German Jet Aces of WW2" says "JG/1s sole jet claim".
So again, the devil is in the very narrow wording.
It says "Lt. Schmitt of 1 Staffel made JG/1s sole jet claim, a low flying RAF Typhoon. It was not allowed, credited instead to a nearby flak unit", and its says it happened on May 1, 1945, flying a He 162.
So I guess it was unnofficially unconfirmed? I wont spend too much time on that, I really dont think it matters. Anyways, thats what it says. Would you argue with a bunch of liquored up 13 year old flak gunners sporting lugers? I wouldnt. :)
In the appendix it gives the breakdown of "jet units and approximate kills":
Me262s:
Epro 262: 12
KG/51: 8+
III Erganzungsjagdgeschwader 2: 40
Kommando Nowotny: 22
JG/7: 500
Kommando Welter (10/NGJ II): 48
JV 44: 55+
KJ 54: 50
Others:
Kommando Bonow (Ar234): 0
JG/400 (Me163): 10
JG/1 (He 162): 0
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May 2: Uffz. Rechberger claims a P-47
I wonder if it was a P 47M?
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Bruno
one other thing:
Einsatzbereitschaft im Bereich Luftflotte Reich (http://Einsatzbereitschaft im Bereich Luftflotte Reich)
(scroll to bottom)
original document here:
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/thumbs/334_1128484494_einsatzbereitschaft.jpg) (http://www.onpoi.net/ah/picpopup.php?ImgId=25427)
Nice stuff Bruno! Where did you find it, I am looking for stuff exactly like that!
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Originally posted by Crumpp
I wonder if it was a P 47M?
All the best,
Crumpp
Nope, as the 56th flew its last mission on April 21 with A formation going to Salzburg in support of bombers and B formation going to Munich on a free-lance. Cloud cover had the B-24s recalled and the formation did a free-lance sweep. The only a/c seen were Allied.
Missions on the 17, 18, 20 were equally barron, no LW a/c to be found.:eek:
Must have been no fuel for the LW to fly.
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They were busy emptying their lighters into a bin :D
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Nice stuff Bruno! Where did you find it, I am looking for stuff exactly like that!
It was posted on another forum in a thread about JG400 and the Ho-229.
I will see if I can find it. However, if you follow the link to Mike Holm's site that is the complete document.
EDIT:
I just realized the link I posted is busted, here it is corrected:
Einsatzbereitschaft im Bereich Luftflotte Reich (http://www.ww2.dk/articles/elflr1.html)