Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => Aircraft and Vehicles => Topic started by: 1K3 on October 14, 2005, 02:15:42 PM
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I saw Karnak posted that Spitfire Vbs only carrieed 120 rounds of cannon ammo BUT the new SCREENSHOT indicates the Spitfire Vb has 240 rounds of cannon ammo:huh
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Pyro hasn't had time to work on the model changes. The rounds carried are not part of what the artists do, so count those numbers as place holders.
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The B wing would only carry 60 rounds per gun for the cannons, ie. 120 rounds for two canons.
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The pilot, if he would choose to, could load a lot more 20mm ammo in the cargo compartment.
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One of my books indicates that certain Spitfire V squadrons were able to carry 480 rounds of 20mm by storing extra belts in the wings and employing trained squirrels to move the belts into position at the proper time. I feel that this should definately be simulated in the game.
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The Mk VIII carried 120 rds pro cannon.
Have to look into the older models, but anyway:
http://www.spitfireperformance.com
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Originally posted by TDeacon
One of my books indicates that certain Spitfire V squadrons were able to carry 480 rounds of 20mm by storing extra belts in the wings and employing trained squirrels to move the belts into position at the proper time. I feel that this should definately be simulated in the game.
LOL, yours was better
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Much better to implicate non-drag gondies supplying a cooling radiator and a 1000 rpg of ammo :D
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Originally posted by Kurfürst
The B wing would only carry 60 rounds per gun for the cannons, ie. 120 rounds for two canons.
Depends on the Hispano version in the b wing. Hispano Mk I was drum fed and had only 60 rounds. Hispano Mk II was belt fed and had 120 rounds. later Mk Vb Spits had Hispano Mk IIs I believe.
AH reports all cannon ammo on Spits in one total, so you need to divide the ammo count by two to get the per gun ammo. The current Mk V has 240 rounds, 120 per gun. The new one will have 120 rounds, 60 per gun. It will be a good 1941 Spitfire Mk V.
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Sorry if I've missed it Kar..
...where did anyone say we gonna have a true-blue '41 Spit?
Just curious. :confused:
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The visual model has the bumps on both sides of the (B)wing - indicating that it has drum fed cannon.
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Originally posted by Karnak
The current Mk V has 240 rounds, 120 per gun. The new one will have 120 rounds, 60 per gun. It will be a good 1941 Spitfire Mk V.
For reals?:D Now i get to see why RAF hurried the new Spit 9 in action with better Merlin egnine and belt-fed cannons because they're being massacred by FW-190s and 109Gs. In AH2, more peeps prefer the current spit 5 than spit 9 because its faster and quicker in all departments.
Just like new spit 5, 109F-4's Gondolas will be deleted (backed by popular demand)... right?
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I talked to Pyro on Thursday for about thirty minutes and one of the many things we talked about was the Spitfire Mk V changes. It will be a Merlin 45 at +12lbs boost with two Hispano Mk I cannons (60rpg) and four .303s Spitfire Mk Vb. I specifically confirmed that.
We also talked about some other things such as B-29s, flying boats, Mosquitos, Me410s and the Spitfire Mk VIII.
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Ahh.. cc, thx for the info.
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We also talked about some other things such as B-29s, flying boats, Mosquitos, Me410s and the Spitfire Mk VIII.
Feel free to elaborate.
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lol... better than baiting and hooking... hinting about the inside scoop! :)
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There is really nothing to elaborate on. HTC is very up front about their plans and what their customers can expect. No inside scoop.
In order of my list:
The B-29 is one of the aircraft the perk system was created for. The old website even said so. It will eventually be added, but there is no timeline scheduled for it.
Flying boats may be added at some point, but the H8K2 is iffy to say the least. The amount of 3D modeling required for it's cavernous and complex interior would make it very, very time consuming to make. Given how few were built on top of that and even though it would be a useful aircraft in the MA it probably won't be added.
The Mosquito's odd flight behavior is a known issue. Whenever they do get around to redoing the Mossie's 3D model they will probably add a B.Mk IV and maybe a perked B.Mk XVI. It is not planned at this time though, so just vague future stuff.
The Me410 is something that Pyro would like to do. It would have losts of fun options to play with and the cockpit would be unique. Hopefully we'll see it added someday.
Pyro would like to add the Spitfire LF.Mk VIII, all things being equal, but it really depends on how much time they have. Maybe we'll get it, maybe we won't. It still wasn't decided when we talked.
Nightfighters don't really have a place in the game right now and the night war, although very interesting historically, isn't really something that can be done in a sim. You don't have any of the technological cat and mouse as everybody knows all the tech. The P-61 and Mossie NF.30 would both get used during the day in AH and the P-61 is a very interesting fighter, but they aren't really a priority.
The A-26 is the fourth possible perk bomber. It's payload and performance are very, very good.
None of this stuff, other than the Spitfire Mk VIII, has any planned timeline to be added or not. Right now they are doing exactly what they have said they are doing. The programming effort is in ToD and they are trying to get the older planes updated. Mostly it was just shooting the breeze other than the Spitfire stuff which is currently relevant.
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man i wish they'll revisit the 190 lineup, do some important changes/add-ons to Antons
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Originally posted by 1K3
man i wish they'll revisit the 190 lineup, do some important changes/add-ons to Antons
Who knows. Pyro didn't give me a sneak peak at the roadmap. We just chatted about some stuff. Mostly WWII aviation enthusiest to WWII aviatian enthusiest as pertaining to AH in general. I didn't ask about Fw190s so they weren't discussed.
Certainly do not look at what I posted as some sort of "what is coming next" list. I know no more than what they have said on the website and in posts.
We know:
The Spitfire and Bf109 are being redone for the next version.
The B-17G is the next aircraft to be brought up to AH2 standards.
The programming effort is focused on ToD with AI and mission alpha testing being done.
They have posted that and it is all that I know as well.
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Did you talk about exactly WHAT was "off kilter" with the mossie, and what could be done to fix it? I.e. was it just the code computing how the lift works, and to fix it you'd just recode it? Or is it some characteristic of the plane/weight/lift/COG that was set wrong and could be fixed by weeding out all the variables?
That bug's been on the books for a LOOOOOooooooooong time.
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No, not what was specific, just that it had some wrong behavior that would be fixed when it was redone.
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ah, cc. Did you discuss the flame damper performance without flame dampers? Other moss-related issues?
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Krusty, a month from now: "Did you discuss how the world would end when purple aliens with trained squirrels and monkeysuits ran over Texas with a gigantic monster truck?"
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No. I mentioned the Mossie for a couple of reasons, the main one of which was as an example of my understanding of how inconsistant data can be. I have bought several Mossie books to try to get a read on it's performance and provide the needed data. It is a hard thing to find.
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Originally posted by OOZ662
Krusty, a month from now: "Did you discuss how the world would end when purple aliens with trained squirrels and monkeysuits ran over Texas with a gigantic monster truck?"
No you fool! Roscoroo has hte trained squirrels! The purple aliens will be by themselves! -- erm.. wait.. I've said too much!
[EXEUNT]
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How about 240 rounds per wing for 480 total?
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For what I've understood, the V never had such an option. Isn't it? :confused:
Pssst, Krusty: it's EXIT, not EXEUNT (this one is plural)... unless you meant the purple aliens!
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Spit VB never had more than 60rpg in its wings for the 20mm.
The Spit VB had Hispano Mk.IIs as well, not MK.Is.
The Spit VB wing remained unchanged in its service life, the blisters it had are evidence of the 20mm cannon mounting the drum. To have a VB with belt fed guns means altering the wing, they never did that.
The Spit VC with the Universal Wing, had belt fed Hispano Mk.IIs with 120 rpg in either 2, or 4 mounts.
The confusion goes like this: The Spitfire VC had the 120 rpg for its cannons, but most Spit VCs has the so called "B wing armament" of 2 x 20mm and 4 303s. That gets bastardized by folks into this: The later Spit VBs had 120 rpg". Close but not correct.
It also does not help historians that Spit VBs and VCs are externally, in many cases, almost impossible to differentiate. There have been many errouneously produced pics and docs because of this.
As for the Hispano Mk.I that never was used in the Spit V, that cannon was the original British design from the French plans, installed into the Spitfire IB. They were a failure due to design problems converting metric to imperial. The improved Hispano II served in all subsequent wartime Spits.
The Spit VC was the definitive Spit V model, it had a stronger fuselage, more ammo for its guns, a bomb rack and a 4 cannon option. It served in the ETO, MED, SW PACIFIC and CBI.
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So, in other words, what we have now is a Spit Vc with the B wing armament and we'll get a Spit Vb, isn't it?
EDIT: Problem. The Spit V we have now hasn't the stubs for the optional 2 more Hispanos, like it should if it has the Universal wing. So, what Spit V is the one we have? If it's a -b, and Squire is correct, it should already have 60 rounds per cannon, isn't it?
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Apparently....we are getting a "Spit VB". Yes. According to what folks are saying PYRO has said.
Why worry about the version we have now? its going to be changed probably within a month. Who cares.
2.05 will see AH with a Spit VB. I would concentrate on that.
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Lol, well, just for the sake of being picky! :p
Btw, it's 2.06.... :D
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Squire,
I'm pretty sure you're wrong about the Hispano Mk I. The change from the Hispano Mk I to the Hispano Mk II invovled removing some bits that allowed it to be manually recocked if it jammed and the switch to being belt fed. The jamming issue in the Mk Ib and Mk IIb was not due to the Hispano Mk I, but rather to the fact that they installed them on their side in an attempt to minimize the bulge on the wing. The Mk Vb simply had them installed rightside up which eliminated the frisction that was causing the jamming.
I am 90% sure that is right. I'll need to look it up to be sure though.
Certainly Beaufighters used Hispano Mk Is without jamming issues.
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Could very well be they got it to work on the Beaufighter ...but the 1st "British made" Hispano was the so called "Mk.I" and it was not a wide success do to problems of the french blueprints to british measurements, amongst other things. In any case the Hisp Mk.II soon followed...
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Hispanos were tested on some pair of Hurricanes in the BoB without troubles.
Some squadron of Spits had them as well but with some trouble. Based at Rochford I think.
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man i wish they'll revisit the 190 lineup, do some important changes/add-ons to Antons
Pyro has said for a couple of years now that he is going to redo the FW190's FM's.
From our conversations I gather it is going to be much harder to model the FW190 properly with the games code.
The Kommandgerät functions linking manifold pressure, prop pitch, and prop rpm will most likely never be modeled.
The fuel tankage also would require special coding as I understand it if the option of the Zusatzkraftstoffbehälter im rumpf was correctly modelled.
Our FW190A5 is way too light at the moment. AH data shows 3,893.18kg's. That is much lighter than an FW-190A3 with wing cannon as tested by the RAE!
Currently working on lining up all the aerodynamic data I have gathered. So far me and several others, using original documentation have narrowed the turn radius of the FW190A5 to roughly 15.8 degrees a second at 1Km altitude. This matches the VVS test data very well. In that report, the La 7 turned at 18 degrees a second under the same conditions. In otherwords, it would take an La7 roughly 116 turns to come full circle on an FW190. Now the best sustained rate of turn speeds are very different. However, as long as the FW190 flew his best numbers and used geometery he could "turn" fight an La7. The FW190 would have to use Yo-Yo's as the real FW190 pilots did to fly a longer path at a faster speed. The differences however are just not that dramatic.
Granted there are some holes in our data at the moment. The VVS test was done under "max continous power" which is 1.2ata @ 2300U/min for the FW-190A5 while our turn calculations are done at 1.42ata@2700U/min. Weight on the aircraft was 3995kg which is short of the full up wieght of 4088kgs most likely due to fuel consumption.
So it is too early to say just yet.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Uhmmm, - what if the Lala Pilot also decides to do yo-yo's?
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Originally posted by Angus
Hispanos were tested on some pair of Hurricanes in the BoB without troubles.
Some squadron of Spits had them as well but with some trouble. Based at Rochford I think.
I think I remeber reading somewhere that Douglas Bader's a/c had the cannons installed during BOB, but due to problems with them, they went back to the machine guns.
Maybe it was after BOB.......?
Maybe it wasn't Bader......?
Oh well, I do remember reading about some problem with cannon armed spitfires somewhere???
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AFAIK it wasn't Bader. He flew the Hurricane during the BoB.
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It definately wasn't Bader. He and Tuck almost got in a fist fight because Bader advocated sticking with the pure .303 armament and Tuck and Malan both backed the move to 20mm cannon when the three were asked their opinions. Bader felt the .303s had gotten them by so far and it wasn't a good idea to go mucking with what was working. Tuck felt that they'd have gotten a whole lot more of the hun if they'd had cannon.
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Not meaning to hijack the thread, but... what did Sailor think about it? I know he was used to say that it was better to send back home a german bomber full of woundeds and deads than to shoot it down, to break their nerve... so the .303 seemed perfect for that...
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Uhmmm, - what if the Lala Pilot also decides to do yo-yo's?
Ummm, he does yo-yo's too???
:huh
I would say the fight last's much longer than if the La 7 pilot decided to turn at his best sustainable numbers while the FW190 yo-yo'd.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Gianlupo,
He supported the cannons. Bader was the first to speak, then Malan and as Malan contradicted Bader, Bader got more and more irratated. Then Tuck said that Malan had said about all Tuck wanted and he'd only add that he was sure they'd have gotten a lot more of them if they'd had cannons and Bader lost his temper and Tuck reciprocated.
This forum is wierd. This thread went from a post about how much cannon ammo a Spitfire Mk Vb should have to the Fw190 and La-7 doing yo-yos with eachother.
I can't even claim to be innocent in the hijacking of it though.
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I can't even claim to be innocent in the hijacking of it though.
Not me, never I say!!
:furious
Sorry.....
:o
Uhmmm, - what if the Lala Pilot also decides to do yo-yo's?
What if a frog had wings? Would he still bump his behind on the ground?
What if frogs had pockets? Would they carry pistols and shoot snakes?
:confused:
All the best,
Crumpp
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Lol....:rofl
Anyway, - Bader was against the cannons, - he thought the job could easily be done with the reliable 303's if getting close enough.
Come to think of it,- the LW lost some 1200+ aircraft (destroyed) to the humble .303 in the BoB. Now while the setup would not perhaps have mattered too much in fighter-to-fighter engagements (mind you, some German fighter pilots considered their 20mm inadequate for dealing with the RAF guys), - imagine the RAF had really been mounting 20mm's with either 60 or 120 RPG's, already in 1940. My bet is they had killed bombers at a swatting rate! Not sent them home full of holes, - just returning dog tags.
Bader was always quite stubborn, - and in his decisions and such like, he got involved into some power struggling conflicts during and after the BoB. Such as Leigh-Mallory vs Dowding & Park for instance (Big wing theories) and as well, in a much less empasized way, - the gun debate.
He did not have things in his way about the cannons, and IMHO, both Tuck and Malan knew the business better. Now, Malan, was probably the toughest fighter and commander during the BoB and his position in the battle (front line) was vastly tougher than the one of Bader. Although he DID like to send the enemy home full of holes and corpses, he must have thought it looked even better with 20mm holes!
I have been comparing the load of .303's and .50's from WW2 recently and found myself stunned how vastly bigger and more powerful the 50 cal was.
And yet it is quite less a weapon than the 20mm! I have read some pilot accounts about disappointment with the .50 cal compared to the 20mm. So, that's something to consider!
BTW Karnak, do you have some stuff about Tuck????????
Recommendations????
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(mind you, some German fighter pilots considered their 20mm inadequate for dealing with the RAF guys),
imagine the RAF had really been mounting 20mm's with either 60 or 120 RPG's, already in 1940.
????
Did the RAF make their planes out of some special material or were the Luftwaffe just flying paper airplanes?
You have a source for the RAF being especially impervious to Minegeschoss?
You should read some vunerability reports. I think you would find them interesting.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Nonononono...it was not about the hitting effect. It was about reliablility and ROF. Remember the LW fighters were dealing with fighters ONLY, while the RAF had mostly bombers in their gunsight.
Anyway, the BoB always amazes me, - 1200 aircraft of the LW plonked in some odd 3-4 months with .303's!!
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Originally posted by Angus
Come to think of it,- the LW lost some 1200+ aircraft (destroyed) to the humble .303 in the BoB.
Not true..
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It was about reliablility and ROF.
You have any facts? Sounds like your claiming .303 was a wonderful air to air weapon?
Have you ever read any vunerability reports on WWII weapon effectiveness?
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/503_1128196369_109fvuln4.jpg)
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/503_1129032080_mgff20mmhe.jpg)
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/503_1129032250_mgff20mmhe2.jpg)
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/503_1129032294_mgff20mmhe3.jpg)
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Meyer
Not true..
So what is the 'real' number?
Kurfy's authoritarian source, 'Fighter', by Len Deighton, says 1404 LW a/c lost between July 10 and Sept 30. There was another ~400 written off.
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As with most things the truth lies between the two extremes.
As for the 20mm Hispano, it got a bad rep with the RAF in 1940 because of the Spitfire IB issues. Many pilots had a prejudice against cannon after that. It was eventually overcome, and they liked the Hispanos just fine after the Mk.V. save a very few pilots. Bader was just plain wrong about it.
The two LW fighters in the BOB, the 109 and 110, both relied on 7.92mm MGs as weapons, not just cannon. ALL the LW bombers...had 7.92mm MGs as defensive weapons. Remember that.
As for the 303s in the BoB, they were "adequate" but they had drawbacks, clearly, as the RAF recognised they did. The age of MG only armament was coming to an end when WW2 broke out. Whatever the # lost to RAF fighters, almost all were armed with 303s, save a single Sqn of Spit IBs.
They were not BBs, nor Pellets.
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As with most things the truth lies between the two extremes.
I would say the ".303 is great" lobby is a little short on facts to back it up. Otherwise all WWII fighters would have had rifle caliber MG's by the end of the war.
As for the BoB, things look pretty close to me. Not much different from the USAAF when tied to the bombers:
RAF - 1,547 aircraft
Luftwaffe - 1,887 aircraft
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Britain
I would say the 109 held it's own pretty good:
Spitfire vs. Bf 109 : 219 to 180 lost.
Hurricane vs. Bf 109 : 272 to 153 lost.
http://www.csd.uwo.ca/~pettypi/elevon/gustin_military/strength.html
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by MiloMorai
So what is the 'real' number?
Kurfy's authoritarian source, 'Fighter', by Len Deighton, says 1404 LW a/c lost between July 10 and Sept 30. There was another ~400 written off.
I don't think that all Lw aircraft losses in BoB were due to the .303 fire. That's all I'm saying....
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Originally posted by Meyer
I don't think that all Lw aircraft losses in BoB were due to the .303 fire. That's all I'm saying....
Well, there was the A/A fire, the balloons w/ hanging cables.....seems like I also remember reading about something they launched up with parachutes that floated down over the bases and snagged the airplanes - but then again it's late and I could be dreaming.....
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Originally posted by Meyer
I don't think that all Lw aircraft losses in BoB were due to the .303 fire. That's all I'm saying....
Yah, there was a few to AAA and balloons.
................
Crumpp, who is saying the ".303 are great"? They did a good job with the LW loooosing some 1800 a/c, most of which were due to Spits and Hurries.
Only after the bombers complained did the LW fighters get 'tied' to the bombers.
The 109s did pretty good? Not with 51.5% of the LW casualities being 109s and out numbering the Spits and Hurries of 11 Group by at least 2:1. (11 Group being the main combat area)
The LW could not even maintain the numbers of a/c it started the battle with while the RAF maintained the numbers they started with.
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Originally posted by MiloMorai
Yah, there was a few to AAA and balloons.
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Don't forget the non-combat related losses, I'm sure that all together makes more than "a few"
(Looking at the 109 numbers, seems like only less than a half were lost due to the .303 fire...)
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Karnak - Pyro would like to add the Spitfire LF.Mk VIII, all things being equal, but it really depends on how much time they have. Maybe we'll get it, maybe we won't. It still wasn't decided when we talked.
:( what did I tell you, as soon as it was decided a XVI at 25lbs boost was an MA nightmare, Mk VIII became obsolete.
"If we have time", yeah, yeah, heard it all before. Geez it has the same fuselage as the XIV, what extra time could it possibly take? Move the inboard .50cal options outboard of the 20mms and make them stubs.
Sounds like another "yeah we'd like to give you a decent Spit lineup, but" excuse.
Who knows another 3-4 years they might get around to it.
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The 109s did pretty good? Not with 51.5% of the LW casualities being 109s and out numbering the Spits and Hurries of 11 Group by at least 2:1. (11 Group being the main combat area)
You should probably check your numbers on that.
Luftwaffe - 1,089 fighters (includes Me 110's)
RAF - approx 700 fighters
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Britain
At the start of the war, Germany had 4,000 aircraft compared to Britain's front-line strength of 1,660. By the time of the fall of France, the Luftwaffe (the German air force) had 3,000 planes based in north-west Europe alone including 1,400 bombers, 300 dive bombers, 800 single engine fighter planes and 240 twin engine fighter bombers. At the start of the battle, the Luftwaffe had 2,500 planes that were serviceable and in any normal day, the Luftwaffe could put up over 1,600 planes. The RAF had 1,200 planes on the eve of the battle which included 800 Spitfires and Hurricanes - but only 660 of these were serviceable. The rate of British plane production was good - the only weakness of the RAF was the fact that they lacked sufficient trained and experienced pilots. Trained pilots had been killed in the war in France and they had not been replaced.
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/battleofbritain.htm
Your 2:1 is a gross exaggeration. Of course you are given to that when it comes to allied aircraft.
Perhaps you should study the Principles of War.
MASS
Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time
http://www.wpi.edu/Academics/Depts/MilSci/BTSI/prinwar.html
Something the RAF was easily able to do with Radar and they enjoyed a numerical parity of single engine fighters. History has shown that fighters are the single most important aircraft for winning air superiority.
800 single engine fighters vs 800 single engine fighters is numerically parity, Milo, not mass!!
For the attacker, mass must be available to do a reasonable amount of damage -- again, on a theater basis.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/warden/wrdchp04.htm
All the best,
Crumpp
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Maybe you should look at the area where most of the fighting took place over Crumpp. That is the 11 Group area. What were these RAF fighters of 11 Group fighting? Masses of LW bombers, 110s and 109s.
There was 24 squadrons assigned to 11 Group, so nominally 384 a/c (24x16).
Now go and check the number of fighters in the other 3 Groups of RAF FC.
So to use your link, the LW had 1600 a/c vs the 384 RAF fighters, or a 4:1 advantage. Or if you want to use the 660, then it is 2.4:1. Last time I checked 2.4 is greater than 2.
This site I will take over any Wikipedia site you put forward. http://www.geocities.com/Broadway/Alley/5443/bofb1.htm 'Pedias are not known for the accuracy.
Here is another site for you, http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/2072/LW_OBs.html
No Crumpp, just reality unlike Axis fanbois who make up excuses for the LW's dismail failure during BoB. They cry that the Americans had 2000 a/c (bombers and fighters) over Germany but love to forget that the Germans had bombers and fighters over southern England. Love that double standard.
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Angus,
Only his biography "Fly for your life", which I no longer have. I lent it to my mother to read and never saw it again. She said she liked it though.
Kev,
That wasn't his tone at all. He wanted to put it in, but it was the lowest priority of the Spits. He was hoping that it could be added in this release. We may yet get it. Hold on and keep hoping.
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So the LW lost 1200 + or even 1400+ to the .303!
Depends on which exact period is looked into.
And to clear it up exactly, Crumpp, - I do NOT consider the .303 to be a formidable air to air weapon, - if the RAF would have had the armament they were introducing only months later, the LW would either have suffered much more, or withdrawn from daylight ops before.
Now since Deighton's book was quoted, he mentions some factors about the 109E's cannons. Those are low muzzle velocity and little ammunition carried,- both very bad for a fighter pilot. To hit with the cannons a very steady target was needed.
But their firepower, - of course is very much better, and the muzzle velocity got improved.
If you look at the RAF later on, some pilots had a couple of their .303's (the outboard) removed to lighten the aircraft. They had no firepower compared to the Hispanos. I remember an incident though where a pilot was either out of 20mm ammo or had a jam, - he still peppered a Ju87 to death with his 2 remaining .303's!!
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Karnak, thanks for the reply... I didn't notice that you've already said in your post that Malan supported cannons, sorry... :p
I have a question about Leighton's book, but, looking at what started after my last one, maybe it's better if I take it for me.... :D
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No Crumpp, just reality unlike Axis fanbois who make up excuses for the LW's dismail failure during BoB. They cry that the Americans had 2000 a/c (bombers and fighters) over Germany but love to forget that the Germans had bombers and fighters over southern England. Love that double standard.
Everything I have posted has come from current facts with posted references.
Your claim of:
The 109s did pretty good? Not with 51.5% of the LW casualities being 109s and out numbering the Spits and Hurries of 11 Group by at least 2:1. (11 Group being the main combat area)
Is a clearly a gross exaggeration. You were not comparing total aircraft. You claimed that the 109 outnumbered the Spitfires and Hurricanes 2:1.
Your wrong. Don't go throwing up a strawman or change the subject.
In comparision of total aircraft, yes the Luftwaffe had more. They did not have the overwhelming mass required to win a war of attrition.
Luftwaffe:
At the start of the battle, the Luftwaffe had 2,500 planes that were serviceable and in any normal day, the Luftwaffe could put up over 1,600 planes.
The RAF:
The RAF had 1,200 planes on the eve of the battle which included 800 Spitfires and Hurricanes - but only 660 of these were serviceable.
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/battleofbritain.htm
At the height of the battle the Luftwaffe had 2:1 if we include all planes of all types and do not have a reserve.
The allies learned this lesson well from the German experience clearly demonstrating it in 1944.
Another phenomenon is important for the air commander to understand: Loss rates vary disproportionately with the ratio of forces involved. Two forces equal in numbers (and reasonably close in equipment and flying capability) will tend to have equal losses when they meet. Keeping the same equipment and personnel, as the force ratios go against one side, that side will have greater loss rates than the changed ratio would suggest. Conversely, for the side for which the force ratios become more favorable, loss rates will fall more than the ratios would indicate. The change in loss rates, either positive or negative, is not linear; it is exponential. Furthermore, no point of diminishing returns for the larger force seems to exist. That is, the larger the force gets, the fewer losses it suffers, and the greater losses it imposes on its opponent.79
On 11 January 1944, the American air force attacked a target deep in Germany with a force of 238 bombers and 49 escorting fighters. The Germans opposed it with 207 fighters. Losses were 34 bombers. Just over a month later, on 19 February, a force of 941 bombers escorted by 700 fighters met German opposition of about 250 fighters. In this encounter, the Americans lost just 21 bombers -- a lower absolute number and a lower percentage.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/warden/wrdchp04.htm
Angus, please read:
http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/WW2guneffect.htm
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Angus
So the LW lost 1200 + or even 1400+ to the .303!
That claim is very doubtful, given that the usually qouted LW losses contain the non-enemy losses to accidents, aging etc. as well. There's also the British AAA, which was quite numerous around airfileds and London and surely took some toll on the bombers. I have some data, for example 40% of the LW bomber losses usually qouted is more non-combat reasons. Taxying accidents, for example.
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Originally posted by Angus
So the LW lost 1200 + or even 1400+ to the .303!
Depends on which exact period is looked into.
oh well, if you look in the whole ww2 may be true :rolleyes:
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Keep on making excuses for the dismal failure of the LW during BoB Crumpp.
Here is another good link for you to look at, http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/units.html
Please look at the Group maps and tell me how many of those airfields could supply fighter a/c to the air battles over south-east England (11 Group area). The RAF FC did not commit all their fighters to the air battles over south-east England, at one time, while the LW sure put their 109s to full use.
It also has a listing of the LW units and maps of their airfields.
Please read more carefully, for I said 11 Group, not the whole of RAF FC.
On Aug 13, the LW had 24 Jagdgruppen with 891 109s in Luftflotte 2 and 3.
On Sept 7, the LW had 26 Jagdgruppen with 787 109s in Luftflotte 2 and 3.
That looks mighty close to at least 2:1 over 11 Group which had 24 squadrons with 384 fighters (includes 2 sqd of Blenheims). So a gross exageration, nope.
You also forget the battle (BoB) was between RAF fighters and LW bombers and fighters.
You should really find some better i-net references.
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*Never said the 303 was "great", 20mm cannon would be great. MGs were average.
*The RAF on September 15th 1940 sortied @300 fighters from 11 and 12 Groups. Constant ascertions that the LW fighters were outnumbered is baseless in fact. You guys always quote the entire RAF Fighter Force, including those based in Scotland and N. Ireland to make it look like the RAF went up daily with 600 fighters over London. Thats just patently false.
*The Hurricanes and Spits were targetting LW bombers (He-111, Do-17, Ju-88, Ju-87), and thet shot down more LW combat planes then they lost, despite being outnumbered much of the time.
*Nobody said the 109 couldnt hold its own. It was the best fighter in the BoB along with the Spitfire, and perhaps better. It had a fine record for what it was asked to do.
Finally I will say that the most important "matchup" in the BoB was this: He-111 vs Hurricane. The rest was a supporting sideshow. It was not a duel between a Spit I and a 109E in mid channel.
Regards.
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LOL Milo,
Good attempt to make the Luftwaffe's limited range seem like a disadvantage for the RAF!!
The RAF FC did not commit all their fighters to the air battles over south-east England, at one time, while the LW sure put their 109s to full use.
Haven't we hashed this out before? You do know that some were kept in the east and Germany?
The Germans threw everything had available. That does not mean aircraft being used to defend other frontiers.
Luftflotte 2, 3 and 5 are NOT the entire Luftwaffe.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/luftorg.html
http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/2072/Aug40.html#13Aug
Lets see who was stationed at Group 11:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/11group.html
It's kind of funny that the RAF does not claim the rest of the Groups sat out the battle. Why are you?? Guess it does not fit your agenda huh?
They clearly designate rest and refit areas:
Tern Hill was one of the 12 Group airfields used for resting units, and as a training airfield and maintneance depot. It was used as a relief landing ground and as a temporary base for night fighters operating against raids on Liverpool and cities in the north midlands.
The rest of Group 12 was participating in the BoB!
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/12group.html#leconfield
So wasn't Group 10 fighting the Luftwaffe:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/10group.html
Even Group 13 got in on the action!
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/13group.html
Facts are your claim of the 109's outnumbering the RAF fighters 2:1 is nothing more than a fabrication. You made a gross exaggeration based on the faulty assumption only Group 12 participated in the BoB.
You should really find some better i-net references.
Looks like the RAF numbers agree with the rest of the sources numbers. They should as I took some time to research multiple sights. I just found some that give more complete breakdown to disprove your gross exaggeration.
By the beginning of July 1940, the RAF had built up its strength to 640 fighters, but the Luftwaffe had 2600 bombers and fighters.
Just some slight statistical manipulation to make things look a little better. No harm no foul.
At the start of the battle, the Luftwaffe had 2,500 planes that were serviceable and in any normal day, the Luftwaffe could put up over 1,600 planes.
he RAF had 1,200 planes on the eve of the battle which included 800 Spitfires and Hurricanes - but only 660 of these were serviceable.
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/battleofbritain.htm
I think you should study up before making wild claims. The Luftwaffe had numerical superiority counting all planes of just a tad over 2:1. It did not have a 2:1 fighter advantage nor did it have anything remotely near the numerical advantage the allies in the skies of 1944.
There was a numerical parity in single engine fighter numbers between RAF and the Luftwaffe. The ratio is more like 1.25:1.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Constant ascertions that the LW fighters were outnumbered is baseless in fact.
Another gross exaggeration. Please point out where anywhere in this thread that claim is made??
The numbers of RAF single engine fighters quoted as participating come from the RAF.
The numbers of Luftwaffe serviceable single engine fighters come from the Luftwaffe.
No where in this thread does anybody claim the Luftwaffe was outnumbered.
The claim being disputed is :
Milo says:
The 109s did pretty good? Not with 51.5% of the LW casualities being 109s and out numbering the Spits and Hurries of 11 Group by at least 2:1. (11 Group being the main combat area)
Gross exaggeration that just did not happen. 11 Group was hardly the only RAF Group participating in the Battle as the RAF clearly states. 11th Group simply landed in the main combat area.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Short of draining the English Channel I don't believe there is ANY way of finding out the actually numbers of kills for both sides.
Both sides overclaimed victories to the point if German figures had been correct, in the first few weeks the RAF would have been down to a few dozen aircraft.
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The RAF underclaimed in the first month actually, then massively overclaimed for the rest of it. The Germans staggeringly overclaimed for the whole of it and their intelligence people believed the numbers being claimed, thus the assertions that the RAF was down to it'd last 60 Spitfires prior to the Sept. 15th, 1940 raids.
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Both sides overclaimed victories to the point if German figures had been correct, in the first few weeks the RAF would have been down to a few dozen aircraft.
Faulty intelligence and some good deception on the part of the RAF was a major contributor to defeating the Luftwaffe.
If both Fighter Command and the Luftwaffe's claims had been reality, both air forces would have been destroyed.
To prevent the "overclaiming" problems of the BoB, the RLM instituted more stringent confirmation standards.
It frequently took more than a year for confirmations to be awarded by Berlin, and it appears that no claim filed after November, 1944, was ever confirmed.
http://www.lesbutler.ip3.co.uk/jg26/claims.htm
I imagine the allies also took measures to avoid making the same mistake the Germans did.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Assuming Crumps Numbers of 18 and 15.8 Degrees per sec.
that is a gain of 2.2 degs per sec.
From a head to head merge to gain 180 degs would be 180 / 2.2 = 81 secs.
Fw time per circle = 360 / 18 = 20 secs.
So would only take aprox 4 circles not 177.
If fw was behind the LA would be apreox 8 circles.
HiTech
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Since you having problems Crumpp:
On Aug 13, the LW had 24 Jagdgruppen with 891 109s in Luftflotte 2 and 3.
On Sept 7, the LW had 26 Jagdgruppen with 787 109s in Luftflotte 2 and 3.
Luftflotte 2 and 3 area of operations was from France, Belgium and Holland. Is that in the east and Germany? If you really had checked, you would have seen I removed the numbers of 109s from Luftflotte 5 and that there was no 109s in Holland.
Good attempt to make the Luftwaffe's limited range seem like a disadvantage for the RAF!!
How did you arrive at such a conclusion?
It's kind of funny that the RAF does not claim the rest of the Groups sat out the battle. Why are you?? Guess it does not fit your agenda huh?
The RAF FC did not commit all their fighters to the air battles over south-east England, at one time, while the LW sure put their 109s to full use. Do you see anywhere in that statemant that I claimed that some of RAF FC sat out the battle? No just that RAF FC did not commit all their a/c.
What agenda are you yapping about?
The Germans threw everything had available.
Glad you agree that the LW used the 787 to 891 109s they had available in Luftflotte 2 and 3. I would call that full use.
When the LW came over on mass, 11 Group was the where the fighters came from to oppose them. Some units from 10 and 12 Groups helped when the 11 Group a/c had to return to base. 10 and 12 Groups were support Groups to take up the slack.
It is you Crumpp that has to should study up so you don't arrive at more of your erronious conclusions.
Nice to see you are using better reference sources, the ones I supplied.
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I have a superb article scrutinizing the BoB statistics to the spot.
Very accurate and with some reasonable breakdown.
I'll look it up after my evening milking and give you the stats, - it's from the aeroplane magazine summer 2000 (probably june or july).
They give the LW 1700 aircraft lost in the BoB period (some 3-4 months I think), there off 1200 air to air, while RAF losses do some 800+ (same arena).
Deighton must be read with some carefulness, some things he states are quite not right. HiTech pointed out something with turncircles, so this one to you HiTech: I can post a quote from Deighton's book about turn circles of the Hurricane Spit and 109, - you can safely see that his calculations are very wrong. If you want to see it, let me know, I can post it and mail the image included.
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Assuming Crumps Numbers of 18 and 15.8 Degrees per sec.
Oops! Did not convert to time. That is at 1.2ata @ 2300U/min power btw.
That is still close enough that a shallow yo-you will easily make up the difference as Oscar and the other FW190 pilots experienced during the war.
Your data is still wrong as well on the FW190 Hitech. You are modeling almost as much of a weight difference between the FW190A8 and the FW190A5 as the entire series gained form the FW-190A0 to FW190A9!
You want the loadout sheets and CG datum from Focke Wulf, Bremen?
I sent you the FW190A5 and FW190A8 information almost two years ago.
When the LW came over on mass, 11 Group was the where the fighters came from to oppose them. Some units from 10 and 12 Groups helped when the 11 Group a/c had to return to base. 10 and 12 Groups were support Groups to take up the slack.
Ummm,
Milo when the Luftwaffe came over in Mass....
The RAF responded in kind to defend. However they did not fall into the trap of defending everything.
You obviously know this as you state it above!
How did you arrive at such a conclusion?
By your attempt to say because the Luftwaffe was limited to Group 11's area, the rest of the RAF was too and could not participate in the BoB.
Here:
Please look at the Group maps and tell me how many of those airfields could supply fighter a/c to the air battles over south-east England (11 Group area).
The RAF clearly says all of them could and did respond to air battles over south-east England.
Nice to see you are using better reference sources, the ones I supplied.
Actually if you read and comprehend, your source did not break the numbers down into the types of aircraft.
Which fits your agenda.
Milo says:
Glad you agree that the LW used the 787 to 891 109s they had available in Luftflotte 2 and 3. I would call that full use.
Sure and according to the RAF, they responded with:
By the beginning of July 1940, the RAF had built up its strength to 640 fighters
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/background.html
Some of the reasons why the Germans lost the BoB:
1. Lack of Persistance and a clear strategy to win:
The Germans set out in the summer of 1940 to win air superiority over Britain. During the course of their two-month campaign, they continually changed their objectives, never identified a real center of gravity, and demonstrated a remarkable lack of patience and persistence. Of particular note was the short-lived thrust against Royal Air Force (RAF) bases. Starting in the second week of August, the Luftwaffe made RAF bases one of their primary objectives. Part of their effort was wasted, because it was directed against forward operating bases used only for quick refueling and rearming. These bases were relatively easy to repair. Another part of their base attack program, however, was directed against main bases, and it lasted until 6 September 1940.
The Germans launched coordinated attacks on British radar stations early in August and succeeded in destroying one. The British, however, sent false signals from the location of the destroyed radar station to make the Germans think their efforts had been for naught. The Germans responded precisely as the British hoped and dropped attacks on radars on express orders from Field Marshal Goering, the political and military chief of the Luftwaffe.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/warden/wrdchp03.htm
2. RADAR gave the RAF the ability to mass and the tactical advantage of manuvering forces so that they could defend where needed without the need to defend everything.
The second is to accept the fact that it is not possible to defend everywhere and everything: He who tries to defend all defends nothing. Penetrations are going to take place. When that fact is accepted, it becomes easier to do the concentrating which will permit significant victories with acceptable defender losses.
In the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe initially targeted fighter bases and aircraft production facilities. Since these bases and facilities were scattered over the southeast corner of Great Britain, the British had difficulty knowing exactly where a raid might be headed, when it was first detected on radar. The Germans were concentrating their offensive forces. The more they did so, the better their success. For a variety of reasons, the Germans in early Septemberswitched their efforts to London, removing doubt as to where raids were headed, and making the job of concentrating the defense that much easier. Also, the end of Luftwaffe attacks on British fighter bases made operations from the bases simpler.
3. Tied to the principle of mass is loss ratio. The Luftwaffe simply did not have enough of a numerical advantage. 2:1 is not enough given the force multiplier of Radar.
Loss rates vary disproportionately with the ratio of forces involved. Two forces equal in numbers (and reasonably close in equipment and flying capability) will tend to have equal losses when they meet.
The most important ratio being the aircraft designed to win the skies, fighters. The USAAF rediscovered this in late 1943. By mid 1944 they came back in force with fighters to spare.
In the end, the Luftwaffe High Command was Germany's biggest factor in defeat.
Nowhere have I seen a professional historian or military force conclude it was the Spitfire or Hurricane flying circles around the 109 that led to the Luftwaffe losing the battle. Only from game players in these kinds of forums do we see that kind of silly claim.
It's the same silly claim that is made about the P51!
From "Spitfire Special" by Ted Hooton:
Spitfire vs. Bf 109 : 219 to 180 lost.
Hurricane vs. Bf 109 : 272 to 153 lost.
Looks like the 109 gave as good as it got according to the facts. The 109 would have probably done much better as it had the advantage of point defense and altitude. Goering interfered by tying them to the bombers removing the 109 units freedom of manuver. Essentially a reversal of Doolittles Jan. 1944 order to the 8th USAAF FG's. The tactical initiative Doolittle gave the USAAF fighters, Goering took away from the Jagdwaffe.
All the best,
Crumpp
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As I stated before -
Until they drain the English Channel we will NEVER know the true figures.
Any claim of 'X' got so many 'Y' kills is pointless considering the hugely inflated claims from both sides during the BoB.
If the German claims had been correct the RAF would have been down to a dozen or aircraft after 2 weeks.
The RAF overclaimed as well, there's just no way of getting exact numbers.
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As I stated before -
Those numbers come from post-war actual loss analysis from each service, not fighter pilot claims made during the war.
It does not matter if the wreck is at the bottom of the channel, the moon, or another solar system.
Both the RAF and Luftwaffe recorded their own losses.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Milo when the Luftwaffe came over in Mass....
They were not going to Church.
The RAF clearly says all of them could and did respond to air battles over south-east England.
All of the RAF? Tell me how fighters from RAF Sumburgh or RAF Kirkwall or RAF Wick or RAF Dyce or RAF Grangemouth, to name a few, participated in the air battles over south-east England.
By your attempt to say because the Luftwaffe was limited to Group 11's area, the rest of the RAF was too and could not participate in the BoB.
That is were the major air battles took place. Trouble reading maps? The RAF FC was spread all over GB. That is why squadrons, mostly from 11 Group, the major combattant Group, were sent to these quiet bases out of the main battle area for R&R.
Actually if you read and comprehend, your source did not break the numbers down into the types of aircraft.
My source does. That is if you could read, comprehend and looked fully at the link to see what it says. See post of 10-19-2005 05:53 AM for http://www.geocities.com/Broadway/Alley/5443/bofb1.htm of which
http://www.geocities.com/Broadway/Alley/5443/fcob8.htm is part of and list the a/c types.
Nowhere have I seen a professional historian or military force conclude it was the Spitfire or Hurricane flying circles around the 109 that led to the Luftwaffe losing the battle.
Now that is quite the statement! Who here says that? I am not. You do have your troubles. Have you been taking lessons from another poster for arriving at melodramatic erronious conclusions. 'Gross exageration' is another from you.
From "Spitfire Special" by Ted Hooton:
Spitfire vs. Bf 109 : 219 to 180 lost.
Hurricane vs. Bf 109 : 272 to 153 lost.
You forgot to include the LW bombers that the Spit and Hurrie also had to fight. Just another attempt of stat manipulation.
No agenda on my part Crumpp, unlike you. I just understand the BoB better than you do.
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Crumpp: the more you peek into the BoB, - the more amazing it gets! Promise;)
Ok, my source, which is the best research and breakdown I have seen:
AEROPLANE, Souvenir issue No1
July 2000.
Article: "TOP GUNS" by John Alcorn
His numbers go: RAF Claims 2480, confirmed LW losses linked 1194, total BoB related LW losses 1609 (unknown, accidents and so on)
Period is the 1st of July to the 31st of October 1940. 4 months.
Still there are uncleared issues from the Quartermasters (LW)
So, with merely 1 partially operating cannon-armed Spitfire squadron, as well as 2 Hurricanes or so, it can be safely said that the RAF gunned down in mid-air some odd 1200 LW aircraft with their humble .303's in the BoB.
On we go, another one:
"Milo when the Luftwaffe came over in Mass....
The RAF responded in kind to defend. However they did not fall into the trap of defending everything."
I think you should study this better. Basically they did try to defend everything, - therefore their groups were so spread. That is also why they were intercepting raids over the North Sea in the BoB, - the LW thought they had all their strength in the south.
All the best lads....off to bed.
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The northern raids were a disaster.
One was intercepted by Spits from RAF Turnhouse (Edinburgh, my birthplace :) ) and absolutely gang plugged.
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This is one of your sources Milo??
http://www.geocities.com/Broadway/Alley/5443/index.html
Alex is a heck of guy. He say anything else you like to hear?
Well looks like Alex's number agree with everyone elses. 684 available fighters according to his site:
http://www.geocities.com/Broadway/Alley/5443/fcweek.htm
Unless of course your going to erroneously claim the listed reserves are not counted. If that is the case, then the RAF has more Defiant's in reserves than they have aircraft to fly!
Especially since the RAF says they had 660 fighters to meet the Luftwaffe!
Allow me to recap since it just has not sunk in with you:
Luftflotte 2, 3 and 5 are NOT the entire Luftwaffe.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/luftorg.html
http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanave...ug40.html#13Aug
Lets see who was stationed at Group 11:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/11group.html
It's kind of funny that the RAF does not claim the rest of the Groups sat out the battle. Why are you?? Guess it does not fit your agenda huh?
They clearly designate rest and refit areas:
Tern Hill was one of the 12 Group airfields used for resting units, and as a training airfield and maintneance depot. It was used as a relief landing ground and as a temporary base for night fighters operating against raids on Liverpool and cities in the north midlands.
The rest of Group 12 was participating in the BoB!
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/12group.html#leconfield
So wasn't Group 10 fighting the Luftwaffe:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/10group.html
Even Group 13 got in on the action!
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/13group.html
Facts are your claim of the 109's outnumbering the RAF fighters 2:1 is nothing more than a fabrication. You made a gross exaggeration based on the faulty assumption only Group 12 participated in the BoB.
Looks like the RAF numbers agree with the rest of the sources numbers. They should as I took some time to research multiple sights. I just found some that give more complete breakdown to disprove your gross exaggeration.
By the beginning of July 1940, the RAF had built up its strength to 640 fighters, but the Luftwaffe had 2600 bombers and fighters.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/background.html
Just some slight statistical manipulation to make things look a little better. No harm no foul.
At the start of the battle, the Luftwaffe had 2,500 planes that were serviceable and in any normal day, the Luftwaffe could put up over 1,600 planes.
he RAF had 1,200 planes on the eve of the battle which included 800 Spitfires and Hurricanes - but only 660 of these were serviceable.
http://www.historylearningsite.co.u...leofbritain.htm
I think you should study up before making wild claims. The Luftwaffe had numerical superiority counting all planes of just a tad over 2:1. It did not have a 2:1 fighter advantage nor did it have anything remotely near the numerical advantage the allies in the skies of 1944.
Glad you agree that the LW used the 787 to 891 109s they had available in Luftflotte 2 and 3. I would call that full use.
Actually I have claimed that number from the begining, Milo. You just don't read.
660 to 787-891......
There was a numerical parity in single engine fighter numbers between RAF and the Luftwaffe. The ratio is more like 1.25:1.
Crumpp: the more you peek into the BoB, - the more amazing it gets! Promise
Not really IMHO. Hardly any original research left on that subject, AFAIK. Many of the worlds major air forces have throughly covered it. It is referenced in many a doctrine on defense.
All the best,
Crumpp
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You do have your problems Crumpp.
This is one of your sources Milo??
You did not post it and is sure better than the generalized ones you posted.
Facts are your claim of the 109's outnumbering the RAF fighters 2:1 is nothing more than a fabrication. You made a gross exaggeration based on the faulty assumption only Group 12 participated in the BoB.
Especially since the RAF says they had 660 fighters to meet the Luftwaffe!
It's kind of funny that the RAF does not claim the rest of the Groups sat out the battle. Why are you?? Guess it does not fit your agenda huh?
The LW had ~800 fighters in Luftflotte 2 and 3. They were stationed directly across from the Kanal from the major Group that fought the LW. There was not 660 fighters stationed in southern England. I did not say the LW fighters had a 2:1 advantage overall, just in the south of England where 11 Group was outnumbered. Did I say all of RAF FC did not participate in BoB in some way or another? NO.
Now where did I say 12 Group was the only participate in BoB? 12 and 10 Groups were support Groups for 11 Group, the major Group participating in BoB.
Did all 660 take-off all at once?
It is not a gross exageration that 11 Group was outnumbered 2:1 especially when there was LW bombers that also had the attention of RAF fighters. When is did 11 Group become the whole of RAF FC?
Since you have your problems: Tell me how fighters from RAF Sumburgh or RAF Kirkwall or RAF Wick or RAF Dyce or RAF Grangemouth, to name a few, participated in the air battles over south-east England.
No agenda from me Crumpp, for the umpteenth time. Only one that is paranoid insecure would keep saying that.
Please learn to read more carefully in the future.
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The LW had ~800 fighters in Luftflotte 2 and 3. They were stationed directly across from the Kanal from the major Group that fought the LW. There was not 660 fighters stationed in southern England. I did not say the LW fighters had a 2:1 advantage overall, just in the south of England where 11 Group was outnumbered. Did I say all of RAF FC did not participate in BoB in some way or another? NO.
That is the problem, Milo!
According to the RAF and the sources you posted, the number of fighters the RAF used was around 660.
Even your friend, Alex agrees!
Group 11 according to the RAF was not the only Group used in the BoB. Even in attacks coming straight across the channel.
Makes perfect sense. They are fighting over home soil and could land at anytime.
England is just not a very big physically sized country. The distances are not nearly as great.
The 395 mile combat radius of the Spitfire was more than sufficient.
If you check your History, the RAF used Radar to ignore the fighter sweeps, BTW, further increasing the odds in their favour.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Ehm Crumpp:
"--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crumpp: the more you peek into the BoB, - the more amazing it gets! Promise
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not really IMHO. Hardly any original research left on that subject, AFAIK. Many of the worlds major air forces have throughly covered it. It is referenced in many a doctrine on defense."
Well, it seems that you still miss some points. The major points in comparing the BoB to the later airwar over Germany are not exactly the order of battle, "aircraft to aircraft". The very heavy weighting factors are the distances and time within radar covered enemy airspace and the enormous amount of flak mounted in the Reich.
As for defence of the UK, attackers could be expected anywhere (Bombers and 110's), - that's why FC had many a unit in odd places. But there was only one option for the 109, - the very south-east.
Anyway, I have some BoB statistics from Chris Shores to put into the pot ;)
On the 10th of August he lists 805 servicable 109's, the WHOLE of FC mounting 708-764 servicable aircraft in the same period on a daily basis.
11th group (South-east) mounts to his countings some 21 squadron, 10th (South-West i.e. Cornwall, S-Wales etc.) has 9, 12th (Midlands and N-Wales) has 15, 13th (Scotland) has 14.
It was the 11th that bore the brunt of the fight most of the time with some help from the 10th, and some for the 12th, - the 12th didn't really kick in properly untill the LW went inland. (oh, you know, all the big wing debates and so).
He lists 16 RAF squadrons with 6 or less victories, while the heavy shooters cross the 100 and the 16th from the top has 70. So you can really see that there were many indeed that saw little to none of the fight.
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Originally posted by Crumpp
That is the problem, Milo!
According to the RAF and the sources you posted, the number of fighters the RAF used was around 660.
Even your friend, Alex agrees!
Group 11 according to the RAF was not the only Group used in the BoB. Even in attacks coming straight across the channel.
Makes perfect sense. They are fighting over home soil and could land at anytime.
England is just not a very big physically sized country. The distances are not nearly as great.
The 395 mile combat radius of the Spitfire was more than sufficient.
If you check your History, the RAF used Radar to ignore the fighter sweeps, BTW, further increasing the odds in their favour.
As I said: Please learn to read more carefully in the future.
It says 660 available.
Who is Alex?
You still not have said how those squadrons from the north of 13 Group fought over southern England with 11 Group when 11 Group was in the air.
Did I say 11 Group was the only Group that participated in BoB. NO! 11 Group had the most combat time since it was in their area that most of the air battles took place.
395mi is the straight line range, not the combat radius. Another of your blunders.
Hard to ignore the LW fighters when the they were tied to the bombers further increasing the odds in the LW's favour especially when ~half of the British fighters would be after the bombers.
Just to further educate you, many times it was only 1 or 2 sections (3 to 6 a/c) that took off and engaged the LW with several Gruppen of fighters around.
Yes Angus, Crumpp does have his problems.
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Well, the BoB was amazing wasn't it.
BTW, years ago I had this strategy game, Battle of Britain from Talonsoft.
It was a tad crude and boring at times, but excessively detailed. I crushed the LW bigtime by transferring most squadrons from the North to the S-Midlands.
Then I swapped sides and tried the LW. I crushed the RAF too, by mixing up their defences with quick raids and then hitting them wit a big one.
LOL that was when I had more time than these days..
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Hi,
Milo, you realy think the LW always did send ALL their fighters out??
What you tell wasnt possible, the Radar, the short range of the 109E3/4 and the stupid german HQ never gave this theoretical advantage to the groups.
All over the war the german LW HQ missed to make real mass attacks, they did the same like the british HQ did with their tanks in the desert until Monty came. They splitted off a advanced force and couldnt win again a much more smal enemy.
The radar was another big advantage to bring as many of the few fighters in best attackingposition into combatarea as possible.
Another big problem was the not existing communication between the german bombers and fighters(unlike to the USAAF, where the bombers could call the fighters for help).
The short range of the 109´s made a splitting of the force particular necessary, one group escort the bombers to the max range of the fighters and another group bring them home. This made a 100% activity in combatarea almost impossible.
The british HQ very fast took notice of the max range of the 109´s. Many german pilots did complain that they only had 5-10 min in combatarea.
5-10min in combatarea(London) vs british fighters with plenty of fuel attacking from best postions(due to the radar).
If you count "time to fight in combat area", the brits for sure had the advantage!
Its realy a incredible failsure (arrogance by Mr.Goering?), that they dont gave the 109E´s a droptank before or while BoB.
This would have given much more battletime for the 109E´s.
All over i think you be right that the germans messed up their advantage, but not due to less good performing planes in general, but due to incompetence in the HQ(droptanks was easy to make and massattacks to one target, good inside the 109 range also was possible) .
Even the 110c could have been same successfull in 1940 like the P38J in 1943/44, but not as a close escort dog fighter.
Greetings, Knegel
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Not all true Knegel.
Your description applies to the latest phase of the BoB, - when the LW is attacking London in daylight and finally the controllers had enough time to vector some proper force (including 12th group) to altitude and into a good interception position.
But the first phases of the BoB were at the south coast, - first the convoys, then the radar sites then the airfields of FC. That left FC with very little time and as many have pointed out, - including those big wing theorists at the time, - the FC was responding to amazingly well supported raids with "penny pockets" of fighters. I can go and dig up some data on this but really, - sometimes a dozen or so of RAF fighters attacked a force with really heavy escorts, - many times their number. And there were long and hard dogfights about.
But once that the humble 50 miles or so from the coast to London had to be added, the LW was screwed. It gave RAF the time it needed to gather a bigger force - as said in the beginning.
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Who is Alex?
Your source!!
Geez Milo, you have been holding him over what the RAF information and you do not know who you are quoting do you??
The one you have been quoting in your theory......
http://www.geocities.com/Broadway/Alley/5443/index.html
It says 660 available.
Correct, it most certainly does say available.
obtainable or accessible and ready for use or service; "kept a fire extinguisher available"; "much information is available through computers"; "available in many colors"; "the list of available candidates is unusually long"
not busy; not otherwise committed; "he was not available for comment"; "he was available and willing to accompany her"
http://www.wordreference.com/definition/available
Present and ready for use; at hand; accessible: kept a fire extinguisher available at all times.
Capable of being gotten; obtainable: a bedspread available in three colors.
http://education.yahoo.com/reference/dictionary/entry/available
able to be obtained, used, or reached:
http://www.freesearch.co.uk/dictionary/available
So your claiming that the available 660 RAF fighters were infact unavailable, unobtainable, could not be used, or reached.......
Correct??
In spit of the RAF's information saying they were infact available!
All the best,
Crumpp
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Hey Crumpp, come on, - you are staring too close into the porridge, or rather your tug-of-war with Milo, to actually see what is about.
Look at this again. From Chris Shores.
"On the 10th of August he lists 805 servicable 109's, the WHOLE of FC mounting 708-764 servicable aircraft in the same period on a daily basis."
The whole of Fighter Command lists 764 at best at daily basis over the whole of the UK, - those include Defiants, Gladiators, and Blenheims.
A lower number than servicable 109's which would operate ONLY over the south east.
As I pointed out before, roughly 1/3rd of the RAF was absolutely out of range. Another 1/3rd or so could make it to the fight technically, - and in praxis once the LW turned to London.
So basically, the biggest piece of the BoB was fought between surprizingly little amounts of RAF fighters against quite big groups of LW bombers, escorted with up to many times their numbers of 109's and 110's. And the RAF had almost just .303's to plonk at them!
Told you that the BoB was something to have a look into! And if it wasn't in your opinion, you wouldn't be looking into this thread.
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"On the 10th of August he lists 805 servicable 109's, the WHOLE of FC mounting 708-764 servicable aircraft in the same period on a daily basis."
660-680 is the number of servicable Spitfires and Hurricanes available according to the RAF. Using your numbers for Luftwaffe fighters of 805, we see a ratio of 1:1.18 or 1:21.
Those Spitfires and Hurricanes were available for battle according to the RAF.
Hardly the gross exaggeration of 2:1 for RAF first line fighter to 109's.
You seem to want to claim that the Luftwaffe was flying in massive formations of 109's. It was not. The most common task early in the battle for the Luftwaffe 109's was "Frei Jagd" missions or fighter sweeps. The majority of the Luftwaffe fighters were engaged in this task.
These the RAF correctly ignored to target the bomber formations.
Unlike the Allied fighter sweeps of 1944, the Luftwaffe fighters did not have Radar Ground Control at this time. This meant the RAF could avoid them with radar ground control instructions
The Luftwaffe fighters on the other hand were not vectored to the combat area unless they got good navigational information from the unit in contact over the radio. Then they had to have the navigational skills to find the moving combat engagement.
So the operational details are not as simple as they are being made out. They certainly do not support the contention that the RAF was grossly outnumbered in single engine fighters. On some engagements sure, on many however they were even or had advantage due to the force multiplier of radar.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Oh, come on Crumpp, - you're still missing it.
"Those Spitfires and Hurricanes were available for battle according to the RAF.
Hardly the gross exaggeration of 2:1 for RAF first line fighter to 109's."
Yes they were available. Actually counted with Blenheims, Defiants and Gladiators they mount to some 700+ or so.
But they cover the whole of Britain while the 109's are just on the south east corner, that is in this case, the point. Only a part of the Hurris and Spits were indeed fighting many times their number. In the ring!
BTW, some raids had some 3 fighters for each bomber. Escort. The 109's were quite tied up with the bombers, although there was also the "freie jagd" which was quite more successful. The 109's, being that many were not all close and at the same alt, - but also stacked higher. I pretty much guess that Göring's subordinates, which included probably the most brilliant minds of WW2 air warfare, did their best to compensate for his spontanic, and at times, passionate, decisions.
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Actually counted with Blenheims, Defiants and Gladiators they mount to some 700+ or so.
No not really....
From Milo's Alex!
304 - Spitfires
384 - Hurricanes
= 688 total RAF first line fighters
http://www.geocities.com/Broadway/Alley/5443/fcweek.htm
The RAF had 1,200 planes on the eve of the battle which included 800 Spitfires and Hurricanes - but only 660 of these were serviceable. The rate of British plane production was good - the only weakness of the RAF was the fact that they lacked sufficient trained and experienced pilots.
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/battleofbritain.htm
These sites very much agree with the RAF's number:
By the beginning of July 1940, the RAF had built up its strength to 640 fighters,
The 109's were quite tied up with the bombers, although there was also the "freie jagd" which was quite more successful.
Fighter Sweeps are generally flown in support of a larger objective or mission. These sweeps would be timed or proceed a raid. These sweeps are performed outside of visual range of the main raid body. This caused Goering to change to a close visual escort that robbed the 109's of the initiative.
However lacking radar ground control meant the Stafflekaptain's were limited to visual range. So while they could engage on better terms if they encountered the enemy, it was more difficult to mass forces.
The RAF simply avoided the Fighter Sweeps through the use of radar ground control and attacked the main body of bombers.
The Luftwaffe Fighters had no control after take off and flew much of the battle under radio silence. Granted their radio discpline was considered poor.
Good book to learn about actual Luftwaffe tactics used in the BoB is:
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1853673277/tailslidesaircom/103-5865364-1525459
I can scan the page showing a typical operational day in the BoB and show you exactly the Luftwaffe's doctrine.
You will find that the assumption of large numerical superiority of the Luftwaffe fighters disappears and the ratios are similar.
BTW, some raids had some 3 fighters for each bomber.
That would be very surprising. Luftwaffe doctrine called for a 1:1 ratio of fighters to bombers between the close escort and the escort cover provided enough fighters were available.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Forget it Angus, it is wasted effort. He 'talks the talk' but does not have a clue.
Have to love those 'copy and paste' sites he uses as reference sources.
Crumpp can't get into his noggin that all those 600-700 Spits and Hurries that RAC FC had available were not all based in the south while Luftlotte 2 and 3 with their ~800 fighters were based only a few miles across the Kanal from south-east England.
He still is caught up in total numbers, which has nothing to do with 11 Group.
Still waiting for how those fighters from the north of 13 Group participated in the air battles in southern England.
He also forgets that the battle started with Free Hunts but after complaints by the bombers, after being mauled, the fighters were tied to the bombers.
Glad you know what a dictionary is Crumpp. Now go check on the word 'used' which is the word you said.
According to the RAF and the sources you posted, the number of fighters the RAF used was around 660.
I might have $1000 available in the bank on the first of the month, but that does not mean I used all that $1000.
BTW Crumpp, I don't know this Alex, so why do you keep saying what you do? Hit a nerve that I had better sources than your generalizing Wikipedia?
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Originally posted by Angus
Not all true Knegel.
Your description applies to the latest phase of the BoB, - when the LW is attacking London in daylight and finally the controllers had enough time to vector some proper force (including 12th group) to altitude and into a good interception position.
But the first phases of the BoB were at the south coast, - first the convoys, then the radar sites then the airfields of FC. That left FC with very little time and as many have pointed out, - including those big wing theorists at the time, - the FC was responding to amazingly well supported raids with "penny pockets" of fighters. I can go and dig up some data on this but really, - sometimes a dozen or so of RAF fighters attacked a force with really heavy escorts, - many times their number. And there were long and hard dogfights about.
But once that the humble 50 miles or so from the coast to London had to be added, the LW was screwed. It gave RAF the time it needed to gather a bigger force - as said in the beginning.
Hi,
yes, in the early phase the RAF got in trouble and the HQ was up to regroupe the fighters more backward, but then Mr.Goering decided to attack London.
But even in the early phase they never made real massattacks to one airbase. They always attacked different airbases and other groundtargets at same time, in this way the german forces got splitted up. Rommel would have attacked one base with all forces and then the next, same like the USAAF most made it over germany. This would have given the LW its advantage in numbers, but the LW HQ was used to the tactical airwar, not to strategical airwar, therfor they used the wrong tactics.
The Bf109E was even on the south side of England badly handycaped by the missing droptank, specialy while escortflights.
Climbing to 5-6000m and meeting the bombers already grapped much of the range. Therefor the bombers often had to fly a direct course to target.
And much more important, the Bf109´s often wasnt able to follow the british fighters to their bases, after they disengaged. This was the big advantage of the P51 in 1944, they could follow the 190´s, 109´s and 262´s.
That the performence of the 109(next to the range) dont was a problem the results in Africa show, where a droptank was available in the 109E4b and E7b, and even here, same like in russia, the german fighter bases always was very close to the frontline.
As far as i know the Radar was available from the beginning of BoB. They already could see the german bombers forming up, so they was able to let the fighters on the ground until they was needed. Without radar they would have needed a patroul system, this would have minimized the power, or they wouldnt have been able to intercept the bombers with a altitude advantage and for sure not before they reached the targets in the south.
The losses of the 109´s also was relative high, cause they fought over enemy area. If a Spit or Hurri got light damaged, they often could land, but how many light damaged or fuelless 109´s sunk in the channel?
Even in best circumstances the 109E had only 30min in combat area(britsh coast to London), while 'Freie Jagd' in more low level it particular maybe was a bit more, thats still not much, nevertheless in this system the 109E was successfull(same like the P51).
Imho, low range of the main german fighter, wrong tactic for the 110 from the beginning, tactical instead of strategical bomber tactics, the Radar and the agressivity of the british pilots caused the result of BoB.
Greetings, knegel
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Rather nice!
I'll add some numbers later.
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BTW Crumpp, I don't know this Alex, so why do you keep saying what you do? Hit a nerve that I had better sources than your generalizing Wikipedia?
Your "sources" agree with Wikpedia, The RAF, and The Learning Site. They all say the same thing Milo. The RAF had available and used 660-680 first line fighters.
I have quoted your site, Milo, because you seem to attach value to it. It says the same as all the others.
He still is caught up in total numbers, which has nothing to do with 11 Group.
You seem to be believe that only 11 Group fought the BoB. Not according to the RAF, Milo.
11 Group's area was the main combat zone but other Groups reinforced them according to the RAF.
But even in the early phase they never made real massattacks to one airbase. They always attacked different airbases and other groundtargets at same time, in this way the german forces got splitted up. Rommel would have attacked one base with all forces and then the next, same like the USAAF most made it over germany. This would have given the LW its advantage in numbers, but the LW HQ was used to the tactical airwar, not to strategical airwar, therfor they used the wrong tactics.
Exactly.
Radar ground control was a huge leap forward for air combat. It allowed the RAF to move their fighters through these scattered German formations and attack surgically.
He also forgets that the battle started with Free Hunts but after complaints by the bombers, after being mauled, the fighters were tied to the bombers.
Sure, later in the battle after the numbers were changing to the RAF favour.
And you see this as a good move for the Luftwaffe fighters?
All the best,
Crumpp
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You seem to be believe that only 11 Group fought the BoB. Not according to the RAF, Milo.
11 Group's area was the main combat zone but other Groups reinforced them according to the RAF.
I have already stated that 10 and 12 Groups provided some support for 11 Group. 11 Group was the major combattant force.
It is not my site but a site, with more detail, I provided a link to, so is better than the general sites you provided. Available and used are not the same. Still waiting for you to tell us how those fighters from 13 Group, especially those in the north of the Group area, participated in the air battles over southern England.
Sure, later in the battle after the numbers were changing to the RAF favour.
No Crumpp. This was before the battle was turning to the British favour.
You do have your problems Crumpp.
As to odds, on July 24. III./JG26, with 3 staffels, escorted 2 staffels of Do-17s over the Thames estuary. 54 Sqd was ordered to intercept. (3:1 fighter ratio) 610 was ordered to patrol Dover to intercept the returning LW a/c. 610 met JG52 (note, no Gruppen number given) which was coming to support the returning Germans. (up to12:1)
Aug 10, 610 again was sent against a larger german force > II./JG52. (3:1)
Aug 31, every available 109 was sent to the Pas de Calais. 1300 sorties were flown to protect 150 bombers.
Sept 1, Kesselring insists that formations be ~75% fighters.
OBW, the Germans had a Freya radar at Wissant, across from Dover. This was used on Aug 8 to direct LW a/c to convoy CW9.
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The Germans were actually, at the time of the BoB ahead of the British in Radar technology. However the Brits excelled in the applicaton. During the BoB the LW never got anywhere near the RAF in using radar in a clever manner.
Anyway:
"Radar ground control was a huge leap forward for air combat. It allowed the RAF to move their fighters through these scattered German formations and attack surgically."
The attacks were anything but surgical. However, they were no more chaotic. Surgical accuracy occured at times, when the LW started hitting London. Yet again, see how much the DISTANCE on cruise will do.
I just dived into "Full Circle" which is Johnny Johnsson's book of air combat. He really confirmes that the RAF was, in the beginning, attacking the LW in "penny packets". Sometimes the RAF was still on the climb and outnumbered by 109's.
When the LW losses however became uncomfortable, Göring listened to the bomber pilots, and tied up the escort as close.
That's not the whole story though, because tactics were changed again, and eventually the escort-bomber ratio was 3 to 1, - 3 wings of escort for one of bombers, escorts providing sweeps, high escort and level escort.
This is actually a much favourable setup than the USAAF had to face over Europe some years later! Even regarding fighter vs fighter numbers. And the LW had CANNONS at the time as well as the DISTANCE to cover was multiple.
Told you, the BoB gets more and more interesting the more you look into it.
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Oh, and Crumpp: look at this point from Milo:
"all those 600-700 Spits and Hurries that RAC FC had available were not all based in the south while Luftlotte 2 and 3 with their ~800 fighters were based only a few miles across the Kanal from south-east England."
Those include Blenheims, Defiants, and Gladiators, - so Milo's numbers are actually too high, unless it would be referring to the latest stages of the BoB. That's what I listed before in this thread, - go and browse, and see.
There are more statements there quite wrong, just won't pick at them now. The main issue weights more.
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As to odds, on July 24. III./JG26, with 3 staffels, escorted 2 staffels of Do-17s over the Thames estuary. 54 Sqd was ordered to intercept. (3:1 fighter ratio) 610 was ordered to patrol Dover to intercept the returning LW a/c.(up to12:1)
You can point to exceptions all day long. It is the number of "good" days and "bad" days that become critical in a war of attrition.
The total strength of III/JG26 was around 40 aircraft. This number is spread out amoung the close escort and the excort cover. No 65 squadron also participated in that action and the Ground controller timed their entry perfectly. Oblt. Werner Bartels was shot down by a No. 65 squadron spitfire. Claims and losses were even.
610 met JG52 (note, no Gruppen number given) which was coming to support the returning Germans.
Pure speculation on your part, but I see your a given to that. Try including all the units next time.
All the best,
Crumpp
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I just dived into "Full Circle" which is Johnny Johnsson's book of air combat. He really confirmes that the RAF was, in the beginning, attacking the LW in "penny packets". Sometimes the RAF was still on the climb and outnumbered by 109's.
Plenty of Luftwaffe pilots will confirm otherwise.
In fact II/JG26 turned back from Milo's example Mission because their GruppenKomanduer spotted "30 Spitfires" above him!!
:aok
All the best,
Crumpp
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"Plenty of Luftwaffe pilots will confirm otherwise."
Read and look into both sides then, as well as the data already presented.
;)
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Nice of you to do an edit job Crumpp. Even if was only one Gruppen of JG52, on which upon further searching was I. Gruppen of JG52, it was still 3:1.
I see you read real well. It was III./JG26, lead by Galland, not II./JG26. We all know how reliable pilot observations are. That is a new one with a RAF fighter squadron having 30 a/c, especially as there was only #65 and #54 in the area. Why did not those 30 a/c not attack? The RAF was not knowing for laying back.
There was 2 raids that morning, one at 8am and one at 11am. It is the later one I provided info on.
Deighton does mention #65, but they attacked the unescorted Dorniers because the 109s were returning as they were running low on fuel. Take your whining up with him.
Nice of you to ignore this: Sept 1, Kesselring insists that formations be ~75% fighters.
OBW, the Germans had a Freya radar at Wissant, across from Dover. This was used on Aug 8 to direct LW a/c to convoy CW9.
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Sept 1, Kesselring insists that formations be ~75% fighters.
Didn't your example occur in July? Do you think the reason Kesselring had to issue that order was because formations were going out with less than the 1:1 ratio Luftwaffe doctrine required?
Deighton does mention #65, but they attacked the unescorted Dorniers because the 109s were returning as they were running low on fuel.
I would say his information is not complete.
III/JG26 had around 25 fighters on strength. The Jagdgruppen usually ran at 50%-60% of authorized strength.
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/503_1129930876_jg26.jpg)
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/503_1129930914_jg26-2.jpg)
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/503_1129931194_jg26strength.jpg)
Looks to me like Luftflotte 2 had a couple of hundred fighters vs 11 Group couple of hundred fighters. The Luftwaffe hardly had a huge numerical superiority in the BoB for first line fighters.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Hey Crumpp!
Well, welcome to the group of the BoB addicted.
As I mentioned before, and promised,- if you look more into it, it gets more interesting.
Now, keep your head a tad above the frame of time you two are tugging each other about and see things a little wider. I'll do a 1, 2 and perhaps 3 :
1: No matter where the haggle goes, the LW mounted roughly the same number of servicable 109's as the total fighter force of the RAF.
2: After some changes and tactic tests, the LW went to really heavy escort. They mounted 3 fighters for each bomber, - some being tied close, some flying high, some flying escort.
3: As a comparison, the USSAF escorts in deep penetration daylight bombings of Germany mounted much less fighters pro bomber, while covering many times the distance.
Little fact points for the database:
a. Calais- London is only 100 miles
b. South coast--London is only half that far.
c. Dover-Calais is easily a gliding distance from som 15K or less.
d. RAF responce time from scramble to interception was often not enough to be at the required altitude. They attacked uphill.
e. Park considered 3 squadrons to be the absolute maximum to get synchronised as a fighting force for interception. (36 at best)
f. on several cases the RAF fighters did not get through to the bombers. This applies mostly to the first phases of the BoB.
g. FC's radar was actually blinded on big patches throughout quite a bit of the battle.
h. The setup of FC made it impossible to use 13th group at all, - it was too far from the theater of ops. Same applied to several squadrons of 12th and 10th group.
Good for now ;)
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No matter where the haggle goes, the LW mounted roughly the same number of servicable 109's as the total fighter force of the RAF.
Not true. The sides were roughly equal in numbers of fighters. That has been shown. The German numerical advantage was hardly a decisive one. Unlike the allies in 1944.
For gaining air superiority, fighters are the key. The German High Command never acknowledged this until it was too late.
Radar allowed the RAF to properly employ their forces:
The smaller defending air force can win if its aircraft are properly employed, and if they are concentrated in such a way as to outnumber the attacker in any given engagement. Concentrating to achieve numerical superiority is imperative, even if doing so leads to some attacks escaping without interception. Far more important and effective is imposing heavy losses in one battle or on one day, than getting a constant 1 or 2 percent a day.
They did not outnumber the Luftwaffe in every engagement but in enough. Many they just achieved numerical parity.
As a comparison, the USSAF escorts in deep penetration daylight bombings of Germany mounted much less fighters pro bomber, while covering many times the distance.
They mounted roughly the same ratios on average as the Luftwaffe especially in 1944.
In the 1944 raids, the USAAF was able to achieve vast numerical superiority in fighters. Growing from 3:1 to over 8:1 by early 1945.
Just over a month later, on 19 February, a force of 941 bombers escorted by 700 fighters met German opposition of about 250 fighters.
Which is typical for 1944. Only on a handfull of occasions was the Luftwaffe able to get more than a few hundred fighters in contact. They operated usually in Gruppe or less and attacked piecemeal as the individual units arrived at the bomber stream.
Park considered 3 squadrons to be the absolute maximum to get synchronised as a fighting force for interception. (36 at best)
No different from the Gruppe being the largest operational element, 39 planes at full strength but usually around 20-30. The difference is in the German system the Gruppe is already part of the structure.
Park simply formed ad hoc "Gruppes" out of 3 available squadrons.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Now I've lost you Crumpp:
"--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No matter where the haggle goes, the LW mounted roughly the same number of servicable 109's as the total fighter force of the RAF.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not true. The sides were roughly equal in numbers of fighters"
I have the numbers. Servicable 109's on the channel front roughly equal ALL RAF fighters in the WHOLE of the country. Clear as daylight.
I'll dump some more numbers in later....
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(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/503_1129996990_lwstr.jpg)
(http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/503_1129997023_lwstr2.jpg)
Yes Angus,
The numbers were almost even. The Luftwaffe did not have an overwhelming numerical superiority. While they had more planes, they also had more territory to secure.
That is one of factors that caused them to lose the battle. The consistently underestimated the size of the RAF.
The ratio is closer to 1:1.25 - 1.5 in the Luftwaffe's favour. A ratio the force multiplier of Radar easily countered.
Nothing on the scale the allies were able to field in 1944.
Luftflotte 2 was the major German battlefront mainly due to the 109's restricted range.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/luftflotteII.html
On the 16th of August 1940, Luftflotte 2 had 471 serviceable single engine fighters:
http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/2072/Aug40.html#13Aug
Especially when you consider the RAF's building program which had built the force up to 890+ Frontline fighters with a further 330 frontline fighters in reserve!
http://www.geocities.com/Broadway/Alley/5443/fcweek.htm
Now, not all of those fighters were in 11 Group. However due to the fact the RAF was fighting over it's own territory, other Groups did move into 11 Groups area to fight. That was FC job to co-ordinate!
The BoB was a microcosm of the Daylight Bombing campaign. Germany just did not have the numerical superiority needed. Nor did she posses a single engine fighter with the range to escort the bombers all the way to many targets or stay in the combat box long enough to fully protect the bombers.
Since this was all essentially new territory for Military strategist at the time some the mistakes made by the Luftwaffe are understandable. The allies learned them well. They placed priority on developing a fighter with the range to provide adequate escort. They then deployed them in overwhelming numbers.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Just a minute....
805 109's on the SE front vs. 620 Hurris and Spits which belong to all 10th to 13th group. A rough count of radius would leave one with 2 109's for each Hurri/Spit in the first phaseS of the Battle.
Anyway I'll type something from Johnny's book. It's a pretty good read actually.
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805 109's on the SE front vs. 620 Hurris and Spits
No Angus,
That is 805 109's total in the Luftwaffe. Only 470 were in Luftflotte 2 at it's height.
All the best,
Crumpp
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That is 805 109's total in the Luftwaffe. Only 470 were in Luftflotte 2 at it's height.
Crumpp, you are forgetting Luftflotte 3. Based mostly in Normandy, it had almost all the rest of the 109s in the Jagdwaffe. Only a tiny number of 109s were not deployed along the coast of France against Britain.
Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy, gives a Luftwaffe OOB for 13th August, Luftflotte 2 had 568 fighters, 130 heavy fighters, Luftflotte 3 had 303 fighters, 101 heavy fighters.
I believe the only front line 109s not committed to the battle at that stage were the 37 of II/JG77 in Norway.
And at it's height, I believe Luftflotte 2 had many more 109s, as the majority of Luftflotte 3s 109s were transferred to Luftflotte 2 during the battle.
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Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy, gives a Luftwaffe OOB for 13th August, Luftflotte 2 had 568 fighters, 130 heavy fighters, Luftflotte 3 had 303 fighters, 101 heavy fighters.
The distances that Luftflotte 3 had to cover made it useful for interdicting channel shipping. It could not reach far into England at all. It could however defend against RAF attacks into France should they occur.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/luftorg.html
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/luftflotteIII.html#cherbourg
What is being neglected here is the RAF replacement program. While the Luftwaffe was building up slowly, the RAF was expanding at a faster rate.
Especially when you consider the RAF's building program which had built the force up to 890+ Frontline fighters with a further 330 frontline fighters in reserve!
http://www.geocities.com/Broadway/Alley/5443/fcweek.htm
Radar ensured that the RAF were able to ignore what they wished and attack where they wanted with the forces they wanted.
I am not forgeting them, Nashwan. The discussion has centered around the main combat area and it was claimed that only Group 11 of the RAF fought.
I used the Luftwaffe OOB for 13 August to arrive at the numbers:
http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/2072/Aug40.html#13Aug
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
I am not forgeting them, Nashwan. The discussion has centered around the main combat area and it was claimed that only Group 11 of the RAF fought.
:rolleyes: In only your eyes Crumpp is it claimed that 11 Group was the only RAF Group that fought the LW.
Nashwan, Crumpp is having trouble with his reading comprehension. He has still not told us how the squadrons in the north of 13 Group participated in the air battles over southern England at the same time as the squadrons from that area were in combat.
He ignores that the fighters from Luftlotte 3 were tranferred to the Luftlotte 2 area.
On Aug 13, there was 544 109s in Luftlotte 2 and 347 109s in Luflotte 3. Three weeks later on Sept 7, when the air battles over southern England really heated up, there was 649 109s in Luftlotte 2 and 118 109s in Luflotte 3. In Aug, 61% of the 109s were in Luftlotte 2 area while in Sept 85% of the 109s were in the Luftflotte 2 area.
from http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/2072/Aug40.html#13Aug and for Sept 7
There was at least 250 Spits and Hurries (~17 squadrons) that were too far away to participate in the air battles over south-east England. That left just under 400 Spits and Hurries to combat the 650 109s PLUS the other LW a/c (110s, bombers) for interception over s-e England.
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In only your eyes Crumpp is it claimed that 11 Group was the only RAF Group that fought the LW.
First Milo, you tried to claim that the RAF fighters were outnumbered by Bf-109's 2:1.
Milo says:
The 109s did pretty good? Not with 51.5% of the LW casualities being 109s and out numbering the Spits and Hurries of 11 Group by at least 2:1. (11 Group being the main combat area)
When this was disproved you he changed the argument to only the 11 Group RAF fighters were outnumbered 2:1.
Milo says:
It is not a gross exageration that 11 Group was outnumbered 2:1 especially when there was LW bombers that also had the attention of RAF fighters.
Now suddenly I am the one claiming 11 Group fought alone...
Keep track of your own argument Milo.
Of course if you keep changing it, at some point you will appear correct, right?
Milo says:
There was at least 250 Spits and Hurries (~17 squadrons) that were too far away to participate in the air battles over south-east England. That left just under 400 Spits and Hurries to combat the 650 109s PLUS the other LW a/c (110s, bombers) for interception over s-e England.
Great speculation. Do you have documentation on the RAF numbers or are you just spouting your most hopeful?
Wait a minute; we are talking about single engine fighters.... You know the type designed and built for the express purpose of winning the skies.
Milo says:
The 109s did pretty good? Not with 51.5% of the LW casualities being 109s and out numbering the Spits and Hurries of 11 Group by at least 2:1. (11 Group being the main combat area)
Remember Milo??? Your gross exaggeration...
The one that started this whole argument.
Facts are you just don't want to count the numbers the RAF says and most historian's agree was available for the battle. Not counting the reserves.
According to your source, the RAF had 816 fighters available on 06 September 1940 with another 142 fighters in reserve!!
http://www.geocities.com/Broadway/Alley/5443/fcweek.htm
All the best,
Crumpp
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"Bader was just plain wrong about it."
I'm not so sure about that. It was easy to score hits with a battery of .303s and any damaged plane was in high risk of ditching to England or on the way home. Any damaged British plane could RTB or be salvaged where ever it ditched.
***
Even it the Germans had five times as many fighters that would mean only a temporary airsuperiority over the target area and the 109 did not have adequate amout of fuel to establish this on a large area.
I don't understand what you people are arguing anyway. Are you trying to convince us of a superiority of some a/c over another by trying to point out how much more there was the other type over the other?
I think it's kinda pointless, considering the strategic situation during BoB.
You should rather argue on strategy and tactics more than aircraft quality as far as BoB is concerned.
-C+
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OK, another angle here. I'll go into numbers that the LW actually mounted in raids rather than availability numbers.
From Martin Gilbert's WW2.
13th of August. LW attacks with 1.485 aircraft.
15th of August. 520 LW bombers and 1.270 fighters cross trhe channel to attack in the timezone from 11:30 and 18:30
30th. 800 LW aircraft attack the nine British operational centres in southern England. That night they start bombing London with incendiaries.
Sep 7. 300 LW with 600 escort attack the London Docks
Sep 8. RAF manages to intercept 400 raiders with 200 aircraft.
(wonder why that seems to be big news....)
Sep 14. Hitler emphazises the need to break the British with heavy bombings on London.
Sep 15. BoB day. The LW attacks the London area with 230 bombers and 700 fighters.
So, it seems to me that the LW was actually throwing more fighters into the air than they could have according to Crumpp. But he has a point on the replacement and manufacture.
If you go as far back as Dunkirk and the Channel fights, the FC was down to 504 servicable aircraft. (June 2nd) At the time they are still sending aircraft to the "slaughterhouse" in France. On June 6th they sent 144, many of which never returned.
Then you see the order of battle just 1-2 months later. Now there were quite some fightings in June over the channel, so there were definately losses on both sides. But the FC is still growing and growing.
Anyway, on we go. Look a little better into the fights over London. I do not have the exact figures for how many RAF fighters made an interception on the 15th of Sep, but they were definately almost all from 11th and 12th group. - some of the 10th might have made it, and none from the 13th.
If it had been the half of FC's strengths they still would have been outnumbered by the German fighters (110's included) by 2 to 1. But they may have had some better odds, - some of the 109's never made it to London due to fuel shortage.
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The distances that Luftflotte 3 had to cover made it useful for interdicting channel shipping. It could not reach far into England at all. It could however defend against RAF attacks into France should they occur.
The Luftflotte 3 fighter bases were 75 - 100 miles from the British coast, and many of the important targets were along the coast (Supermarine, the radar stations, ports, airfields etc)
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I think it's kinda pointless, considering the strategic situation during BoB.
Exactly. It's very silly to try and claim an individual aircraft performance conclusion from a strategic point of view.
So, it seems to me that the LW was actually throwing more fighters into the air than they could have according to Crumpp.
Those are not Crumpps numbers, Angus. They are the Luftwaffe's own status reports!
The Luftflotte 3 fighter bases were 75 - 100 miles from the British coast, and many of the important targets were along the coast (Supermarine, the radar stations, ports, airfields etc)
Check out the Emil's combat radius. Depending on the amount of time flown under combat power the range dramatically decreases. 125 miles is about the maximum to have 20 minutes useful time at combat power.
http://home.monet.no/~oddbass/me109main.html
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/7607/luft.html
So Luftflotte 3 was pretty much a minor player in the fight as reaching the coast of England was pretty much the useful limit.
The only way the Luftwaffe could have won the Battle of Britain was to have completely spent itself and kept a focused strategy on the airfields after knocking out the Home Chain Radars.
It would have been a Pyrrhic victory that would have left the Germans wide open to Stalin's Russia. Stalin definately had designs on pushing west as soon as his forces were ready. With the Luftwaffe destroyed the way would have been open.
Even then it would have been dicey. Strategist today IMHO would have waited, outproduced the RAF, built up and developed a viable invasion fleet with a Navy to cover it. You would need an 6:1 minimum and more comfortabley a 10:1 advantage in fighters with the range to cover all of England to make an invasion a success.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Ehhhm.
"Those are not Crumpps numbers, Angus. They are the Luftwaffe's own status reports!"
If the LW reports conflict actual documented events, I tend to belive the actual events, if you see what I mean. This is not the first time I run across numbers from the LW that don't quite hold water.
As for the status reports, they were read by the Brits as well, - welll at least shortly later. But that's antother story.
Anyway, about other items of the Luftflotte 3:
"The Luftflotte 3 fighter bases were 75 - 100 miles from the British coast, and many of the important targets were along the coast (Supermarine, the radar stations, ports, airfields etc)"
This is really a shorter distance than the bulk of 10th and 13th group, - in fact much closer than the closest of 13th group!
Well, off to bed. This thread makes a ton of fun, will post something tomorrow. All the best yer latenighters ;)
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If the LW reports conflict actual documented events, I tend to belive the actual events, if you see what I mean.
Tell me, how did the RAF get an accurate count in the air over London?
All the best,
Crumpp
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"Tell me, how did the RAF get an accurate count in the air over London?"
Definately post war figures of sorties.
Tell me how instead how would aircraft from Scotland and Wales join the fray :D
BTW, they intercepted with some 250 aircraft. (John Keegan's second World War), - 11th group and some of 12th group.
Oh and he too lists the LW with some 800 109's available to concentrate on FC's TOTAL force of roughly 600.
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Tell me how instead how would aircraft from Scotland and Wales join the fray
This is getting tiresome.
Do you see Scotland or Wales on these maps from the RAF?
Poised to defend against incursions from Norway. Those to the south are in easy reach of the fighting.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/13group.html
Same with 10 Group. Those stationed in the East are in easy reach of the fighting.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/10group.html
The distances are only a couple of hundred miles at the most. Remember the Spitfire Mk I had a 395 mile combat radius. It could easily land and refuel over it's home territory. Using ultra intercepts and EW the RAF had plenty of advanced warning.
http://www.england.travelmall.com/country_images/England.gif
Definately post war figures of sorties.
I would be interested in knowing how he got the sortie figures. That would be Historical first. Especially since they were destroyed or missing.
The data needed to answer the question are operational strength, losses, and sortie rates. (A sortie is one combat mission by one airplane.) Luftwaffe research has always been hampered by a lack of data.
http://jg26.vze.com/
More likely he found the plans and assumed that plans always go according to plan.
The Operational Strengths do exist for part of the BoB but not the sortie information AFAIK.
Perhaps the most significant development in prewar planning was the introduction of the War Potential programme in 1938 that sought to give Britain the capability to produce 2,000 aircraft a month by the end of 1941. As Sebastian Ritchie pointed out, this provided the basis for planning aircraft production in much greater depth and for developing a comprehensive state production organisation. [16] Although an output of 2,000 aircraft a month would not be achieved until the end of 1942, actual production soon exceeded planned targets (Table 1). By comparison, German aircraft production languished in the early part of the war. Thus, while Britain produced 4,283 Hurricanes and Spitfires in 1940 against a planned total of 3,602, Germany produced 1,870 Bf 109s against a planned total of 2,412. [17] Incredibly, Germany did not mobilize its aircraft industry at the outbreak of war and did not seek to expand the Luftwaffe's repair capability. In September 1940, when attrition was at its highest, Britain produced 467 Hurricanes and Spitfires while Germany only produced 218 Bf 109s. [18] The relative performance of the British and German aircraft industries was critical to both the size and sustainability of the front line.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_2
Luftwaffe Order of Battle--August 1940 [33]
Establishment Strength Serviceability
Single-engine fighters 1,011 934 805
Fighter Command Order of Battle--11 August 1940 [35]
Establishment Strength Serviceability
Hurricanes 723 721 656
Spitfires 366 374 334
Total 1,089 1,095 990
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_5
It is arguable that the Battle of Britain was lost long before the Second World War started. Luftwaffe doctrine, so successful in establishing a powerful synergy between air and land operations, was deeply flawed in its understanding of the fundamentals of airpower. The causes were various, but the result was inadequate provision for the industrial investment and resources necessary to sustain operations in the face of high wastage rates that war would bring. By contrast, the Royal Air Force (RAF) was well placed to defend Great Britain, notwithstanding its perceived doctrinal emphasis on strategic bombing. As Richard Overy recently pointed out, the contest the country faced after Dunkirk had been anticipated and prepared for in the 1930s. [1] The Air Ministry, planning the rapid expansion of the front line, had clearly understood the lessons of the First World War, in particular, the high cost--in human and materiel terms--of sustaining air operations. [2] By providing the proper economic and logistics basis for realizing these plans, the air staffs had also established the foundation for increasing Allied air superiority as the war progressed. This is not to say their prewar planning was without flaws. Indeed, at a tactical and operational level, the Luftwaffe enjoyed self-evident advantages. However, by getting the fundamentals right and being prepared to learn from painful early reverses, the Royal Air Force placed itself in a significantly stronger position than the Luftwaffe to fight the Battle of Britain.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443#continue
Such experiences were not unique to the Royal Air Force. Anecdotal evidence indicates the Luftwaffe suffered no less seriously from high operational attrition. Feldwebel Eric Bartel, who served as a Jagdgeschwader mechanic for much of the war, recalled that after just 17 days' action his staffel of 12 Bf 109Es from JG 77 had been reduced to just 5 or 6, including spares, mainly through mechanical failures and normal wear and tear, rather than enemy action. [23]
In quality and general professionalism, it would be hard to fault the Luftwaffe maintenance organisation. It was certainly a match for the Royal Air Force. However, it was not organised for an attritional war and had made little provision for timely repair and salvage. It is also arguable that it was less flexible and had far more difficulty responding to changing circumstances.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_3
Other sources give slightly different figures, but most agree that the Luftwaffe deployed an effective strength of slightly more than 900 Bf 109 fighters out of some 1,000 aircraft. This comprised the bulk of their single-seat fighter force. Approximately 150 aircraft remained in other theatres, including Germany, to defend against possible Bomber Command attacks. [34] By comparison, Fighter Command could field 52 squadrons of Hurricanes and Spitfires, nearly 1,100 aircraft (Table 3). Thus, in terms of single-seat fighters, the opposing air forces were fairly evenly matched, albeit Fighter Command was outnumbered more than 3:1 overall.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_3
Fighter Command clearly possessed an increasing advantage in single-seat fighters as the battle continued, notwithstanding higher aircraft and pilot attrition.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_3
The simple answer is that losses were never greater than production.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_4
The Battle of Britain was a contest that the Luftwaffe had neither prepared for nor envisaged. Created as a strategic instrument, the Luftwaffe had become a superb tactical weapon. However, the expectation of a short war meant there were neither the industrial resources nor the necessary logistics arrangements in place to sustain operations in the face of a determined enemy. These shortcomings were never properly addressed and, coupled with the huge resources available to the Allied air forces, would ultimately seal the Luftwaffe's fate.
Too much can perhaps be made of the Luftwaffe's doctrinal weakness and flawed decision making. It was the creation of a strategic air defence force, in the form of Fighter Command, with the necessary equipment, organisation, and resources- underpinned by a comprehensive and highly effective logistics system-that defeated the Luftwaffe. Fighter Command's victory was founded on the vision, determination, and hard work of the prewar planning staffs. As Dempster and Wood concluded in their authoritative study of the Battle of Britain, "The outcome was the combination of the preparation, good judgement, and error, made in the preceding seven years." [55]
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_4
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
This is getting tiresome.
Sure is getting tiresome with your know-it-all, always right atitude. That is why I basically quite posting.
Do you see Scotland or Wales on these maps from the RAF?
Poised to defend against incursions from Norway. Those to the south are in easy reach of the fighting.
Same with 10 Group. Those stationed in the East are in easy reach of the fighting.
Sure leave areas undefended. Then there is the problem of those squadrons arriving before the air battle had ended. Even those squadrons in 11 Group had troubles getting to altitude before the Germans arrived.
The distances are only a couple of hundred miles at the most. Remember the Spitfire Mk I had a 395 mile combat radius. It could easily land and refuel over it's home territory. Using ultra intercepts and EW the RAF had plenty of advanced warning.
Combat radius and range are not the same. What you give is the range, Crumpp. Combat radius is less than half of the range. Yup Ultra was so good, the Brits did not know they were winning BoB.
All the best,
Crumpp
Bletchley Park
The Government Code and Cipher School at Bletchley Park initially broke Enigma by hand. In August 1940, they started using their own Bombe, designed by Alan Turing and Gordon Welchman. It was also a rotary electro-mechanical device but it worked on an entireley different principle. All information, retrieved by cryptanalysis had the codename “Ultra” and played a very important and sometimes decisive role during the entire war, mainly in the Battle of the Atlantic. All Ultra information was used very careful, to avoid suspicion in German forces. Special liaison officers, trained to deal with this valuable but delicate knowledge, were placed in Headquarters and other strategic places. Moreover, Ultra was never used, unless it could be confirmed by a second source. This to avoid that the German Command came up with the idea that their communication might be broken.
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Hey Crumpp. Tired?
"
This is getting tiresome.
Do you see Scotland or Wales on these maps from the RAF?
Poised to defend against incursions from Norway. Those to the south are in easy reach of the fighting.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/13group.html
Same with 10 Group. Those stationed in the East are in easy reach of the fighting.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/10group.html
The distances are only a couple of hundred miles at the most. Remember the Spitfire Mk I had a 395 mile combat radius. It could easily land and refuel over it's home territory. Using ultra intercepts and EW the RAF had plenty of advanced warning"
Of course Scotland is on MY maps and I have many. Try google-earth for once also loads of fun.
13th group is therefore equally in the equation as the Luftflotte in Denmark and Norway.
Anyway, included in the RAF figures are squadrons in N-Ireland as well ;)
Now, luftflotte III (?) you said was totally out of the picture. Well, the area is only some 140 miles from London (Cherbourg) while Inverness is a whooping 445 miles away, Belfast 323 and so on. The range to Luftflotte III is the same as up to Newcastle or thereabouts - so that's still only 12th group. Even Manchester is further away and that's not yet Wales. Try Cardiff the closest part of S-Wales - it's still as far from London as Luftflotte III. Try Cornwall, say Exeter - same distance.
As for the combat radius you quote, that is the RANGE. Milo pointed that out. So divide range with 2.
Somewhat the same range as the one of the 109, - unless you take Izzy's word of a much higher figure.
So the point is, that a good proportion of the RAF first class fighters was, as you point out by "Poised to defend against incursions from Norway" and other odd sides. Meanwhile the LW has their whole fleet of 109's in short distance from London - the max being about 140 miles by Luftflotte III. If you rule out Luftflotte III you rule out all of 10th group and most of the 12th. And the LW could move nearer if they wanted.....
Got some order of battle number and other goodies cooking ;)
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I cant beleive you guys are still on about this.
We have all enough decent books to know what the respective ratios are. The LW was comprised of He-111, Do-17, and Ju-88 KGs, 110 and 109 JGs, a Jabo ZG and Stukagruppen. To suggest they didnt have a numerical advantage vs Fighter Command is just not correct.
That being said, if you are going to try and invade a country and gain air superiority, you do it with a force that is stronger than your opposition, not weaker. The LW needed what it had to throw at the British, who had the benefit of being the defender. The LW was the attacker, and the burden was on them to have some striking power. Which they certainly did.
The reason the BoB is an interesting campaign is because it was hard fought, and one of the purer air campaigns fought in WW2, with the Channel being the dividing line.
Also, it is true that no air force ever sorties its entire fleet at the enemy at once, this happens rarely, and as such, a defending force with a smaller # of fighters can last. That happened in BoB, Malta certainly, Guadalcanal 1942, and the 8th AF vs the LW. As long as one side can replace fighters and aircrew, it can hold out, as air combat is attritional in nature, at the end of the day you return to your safe bases to begin anew again.
Imho, the biggest drawback to the preparation for Sealion was the very tight schedule the LW faced, they were reorganising after France still in July 1940, and were not able to really start ops vs Britain proper untill August 1940, with "Adler Tag" being Aug 13th. Thats about 6 weeks max to do the job, before the weather changes in the Channel in October, and makes an invasion impracticle. They ran out of time more than anything, and were let down by Berlins bad handling of the strategy, who underestimated British a/c production, and the ability to replace pilots lost, it had little to do with wether a Spit was 10mph faster than a 109 at 12k.
As for the # of 109s available, I will give what I have, and leave it at that, do what you like with the info:
"Bf 109E Aces 1939-41" by John Weal
I will list the bases, and serviceable #s for each unit August 13th, 1940 "Eagle Day":
Luftlotte 2 109Es (JG3, JG26, JG51, JG52, JG54):
Stab JG3 Wierre-au-Bois 3
I/JG3 Grandvillers 32
II/JG3 Samer 22
III/JG3 Le Touquet 29
Stab JG26 Audembert 4
I/JG26 Audembert 34
II/JG26 Marquise 35
III/JG26 Caffiers (Gallands unit) 38
Stab JG51 Wissant (Molders) 4
I/JG 51 Calais 32
II/JG 51 Marquise 33
III/JG 51 St Omer 30
Stab JG52 Coquelles 1
I/JG52 Coquelles 33
II/JG52 Peuplingues 32
III/JG52 Zerbst 11
I/LG2 St Omer 30
Stab JG54 Campagnel-les-Guines 2
I/JG54 Guines 24
II/JG54 Hermelingen 32
III/JG54 Guines 40
Total serviceable fighters: 513 (590 total ac) placed opposite No.11 Group.
Luftlotte 3 109Es (JG2, JG27, JG53):
Stab JG2 Beaumont 3
I/JG2 Beaumont 32
II/JG2 Beaumont 28
III/JG2 Le Havre 28
Stab JG27 Cherbourg 4
I/JG27 Plumetot 32
II/JG27 Crepon 32
III/JG27 Arcques 32
Stab JG3 Cherbourg 6
I/JG3 Guernsey (A British Channel Island) 37
II/JG3Guernsey (A British Channel Island) 34
III/JG3 Brest 35
Total serviceable fighters: 334 (386 total ac) placed opposite No.10 Group.
*And there were the Bf 110s as well, which I dont have any exact info on*
All of the above groups took part in ops vs the RAF. They are not in Norway, nor are they in Germany.
Regards.
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Milo says:
Sure is getting tiresome with your know-it-all, always right atitude. That is why I basically quite posting.
You quit posting because your wrong. At least according to both the RAF and USAF.
All Ultra information was used very careful, to avoid suspicion in German forces.
Sure most intelligence agencies guard their source and take measures to ensure it does not become compromised. The actionable intelligence is not the same thing however. Fighter command was instructed to act without knowing why or where the information came from.
The British were very good at deception operations as well. These operations severely hampered the Luftwaffe and cost them heavily.
It is a very naive assumption to think the English just went "gosh that is nice to know but we cannot act on it because the Germans might think we know what we are not supposed to know."
Poised to defend against incursions from Norway.
Which the RAF had hours of warning before a raid and plenty of time to react.
There were no single engine fighter stationed in Norway which could even reach England for the Luftwaffe. Some 109's were stationed there, mostly from JG 77 but at it's height Luftflotte V had around 100 single engine fighters.
The Luftwaffe only tried the Norway approach a couple of times. It was too hard to co-ordinate fighter cover from France. Each time they tried it their losses of unescorted bombers were too high.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/luftflotteV.html
Angus says:
Well, the area is only some 140 miles from London (Cherbourg) while Inverness is a whooping 445 miles away, Belfast 323 and so on. The range to Luftflotte III is the same as up to Newcastle or thereabouts - so that's still only 12th group.
Exactly, those units stationed in Cherbourg could not reach London. 125-mile combat radius is less than 140 miles distance. Essentially Luftflotte III could reach the coast of England if they took off and directly flew to target.
So in Less than 2 hours the entire RAF could in theory be in the combat area. As England had a ring of radar stations they could tailor their response based on advanced warning..
That is with a 395 mile "combat radius". The normal flying radius of the Spitfire Mk I was 575 miles.
You should probably reread this:
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443#continue
It comes from:
http://www.aflma.hq.af.mil/lgj/Afjlhome.html
The primary mission of the Office of the Air Force Journal of Logistics is to publish the Air Force Journal of Logistics, the Air Force's only professional journal for logistics, engineering, and services.
I will list the bases, and serviceable #s for each unit August 13th, 1940 "Eagle Day":
Your numbers are the same ones that have been repeated ad nauseum in this thread. They are the same one used in the Air Force article as well and by Boyne.
I tend to believe a professional Military Logistical Journal's conclusion backed up by several noted Historians conclusions over the junk history posted on this BBS.
Many of the Luftwaffe mistakes can be attributed to this statement Squire:
Richard Overy commented that prewar air theory largely avoided the difficult question of the appropriate level of supply to sustain airpower.
Which you touch on your post. A purely air campaign had never been waged before. There was no military theory or doctrine in place for the Luftwaffe to draw upon. The hard lessons of the campaign ultimately contributed to them losing the war. Lessons the Allies would take to heart 4 years later in their campaign to win air superiority for the Invasion of Europe.
All the best,
Crumpp
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See Rule #4
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Crumpp: I don't get your radius number, or even range numbers into something that makes sense, neither do I see any sense in your "ample warning time over the North sea".
Firstly, the Spits and Hurris as well as the 109's had very similar RANGES, - RADIUS being the half, EFFECTIVE RADIUS, being a certain number subtracted from the Radius.
As for the warning time from over the North sea (Which I, BTW, think came mostly from Denmark), It was as ample as on the south coast. Radar range from the coast of Britain, and no more. Very well something else than the alert time the LW had when the USSAF started hitting in daylight,- they had to cruise over a "friendly set" of countries before getting into Germany. I have posted some distances, AFAIK, on this thread before.
Now, there are some things you post, that really leave me baffled. Such as:
"There were no single engine fighter stationed in Norway which could even reach England for the Luftwaffe"
Of course not!!!!!! The 109's were ALL on the SE front, where they could get at the RAF, while the RAF FC's fighters had to be on the whole island circle to counter what they were supposed to, the German BOMBERS, which could reach every corner of the island, be it from Belgium, Bretagne, Calais, Denmark or Norway.
No matter how it's twisted, the numbers give something like 1.5 to 2 109's for each Spit+Hurry on the whole southern of England, counting 10th, 11th and 12th group versus the 2 luftflotten. Actually, Squire's summary in this thread gives a very nice view on this, - I have something I wrote down today as well, and I will post it, - but Squire put it much nicer. Will post it anyway ;)
So be it for now, I'm tired and off to bed. Keep pondering though, (I told you that the BoB is more than it seems), - and Milo, - patience is a virtue, - cool off and post :)
Nightie folks :)
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I don't get your radius number,
Radius is the distance an aircraft can fly and return on best cruise.
Combat radius is the distance an aircraft can fly and still be able to use full boost or a higher boost setting. It is usually set at 20 minutes of "combat time". This increases the fuel consumption and shortens the aircrafts ranges.
While the Bf-109 and the Spitfire might have had similar a similar radius, obviously the DB601 was thirsty at higher manifold pressures.
The Spitfires did not have to return to their assigned base after a sortie. They always had the option to land at the nearest friendly field and refuel. One of the big advantages of fighting over your own territory.
No matter how it's twisted, the numbers give something like 1.5 to 2 109's for each Spit+Hurry on the whole southern of England, counting 10th, 11th and 12th group versus the 2 luftflotten. Actually, Squire's summary in this thread gives a very nice view on this, - I have something I wrote down today as well, and I will post it, - but Squire put it much nicer. Will post it anyway
Squires numbers are the same I have been using. Nothing is twisted, Angus.
Maybe you should let the USAF know they are drawing the wrong conclusions after gathering all the facts.
This article seeks to clarify the part played by logistics in the Battle of Britain and how it shaped the outcome. For brevity, the analysis focuses primarily on the single-seat fighters deployed by the respective air forces. It was in this arena that the Luftwaffe needed to prevail if it were to achieve air superiority over southern England and, in so doing, defeat the Royal Air Force.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443#continue
The figures for Fighter Command are somewhat higher than those quoted in other sources but have been taken directly from PRO AIR 20/2307.
Only 400 repaired Bf 109s were accepted by the Luftwaffe in 1940, equivalent to just 21 percent of new production. Harold Faber, Ed, Luftwaffe, Sidgwick and Jackson, 1979, 203.
Single-Seat Fighter Production [19]
Germany Great Britain
1939 1,541 1,324
1940 1,870 4,283
1941 2,852 7,064
1942 4,542 9,849
1943 9,626 10,727
Luftwaffe Order of Battle--August 1940 [33]
Establishment Strength Serviceability
Bombers 1,569 1,481 998
Dive-bombers 348 327 261
Single-engine fighters 1,011 934 805
Twin-engine fighters 301 289 224
Reconnaissance 246 195 151
Ground attack 40 39 31
Coastal 94 93 80
Total 3,609 3,358 2,550
Fighter Command Order of Battle--11 August 1940 [35]
Establishment Strength Serviceability
Hurricanes 723 721 656
Spitfires 366 374 334
Total 1,089 1,095 990
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_5
All the best,
Crumpp
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Lol, we all have differnt data.
Well, I've been looking into the books and got some goodies coming.
Here are some little facts.
1. 10th group had to fight Luftflotte III. Southhern units saw quite some action from the first phase on to the shift when LW turned to London.
2. 11th group saw the full action of all phases against Luftflotte II, as well as some from Luftflotte III in the channel fights.
3. 13th group had to guard the side against Luftflotte V. They saw little action.
4. 12th group missed quite a bit of the party untill the LW turned on London.
5. 11th group shot down roughly as many aircraft as all the other groups PUT TOGETHER.
My numbers on the LW strength are basically the same as squires. I'll post them anyway, as well as compiled kill claims. I also have some day-to day engagement figures brewing.
All of the sources are on print, I rely on Shores quite a bit, but I have Deighton, Gilbert, J.Johnsson and some more. Oddly enough they all give mostly the same account, - RAF being heavily outnumbered and not being able to balance the numbers until late in the autumn.
LW's policy of raiding all airfields is oddly as well, considered to have brought them quite close to victory, not the contrary.
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11th group shot down roughly as many aircraft as all the other groups PUT TOGETHER.
We all know the reliability of Battle of Britain claims. Too attempt to draw any conclusions from either sides claims is rather silly.
I rely on Shores quite a bit, but I have Deighton, Gilbert, J.Johnsson and some more.
Question becomes when these references were written and did they have access to:
The figures for Fighter Command are somewhat higher than those quoted in other sources but have been taken directly from PRO AIR 20/2307.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_5
All the best,
Crumpp
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Lol Crumpp, are you indicating that the 11th group then overclaimed while the others did less of that. In relation, I mean. That looks like a straw to me.
Anyway, the numbers I used were from Shores, a list of confirmed claims BTW.
I forgot to name John Alcorn as a source, he has been researching the scores and their reliability since 1970. It's the best piece of work put together that I have yet seen.
His numbers are relatively close to Shores, hard to see, for they don't use the same timeframe. (Shores uses July to November). But Alcorn goes further, he lists the days engaged for each squadron their losses, and the reliability of the claims.
No way getting around it really, half the BoB seems to be 11th group, be it claims, kills, losses or days in the air.
I looked at your link. The PRO is not unaccessible at all and I bet Shores spent quite some time there. Heck even I have been there! I was actually looking for something particular and did not find it but Shores seems to have dug it up somewhere else! But yes the PRO is a great source indeed, although there is still informatin about that isn't there.
Anyway, I haven't been able to find any evidence of bigger interceptions than some 250 RAF fighters - while 100 seems already to be quite big news.
All the best till next post ...
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Originally posted by Crumpp
We all know the reliability of Battle of Britain claims. Too attempt to draw any conclusions from either sides claims is rather silly.
Question becomes when these references were written and did they have access to:
All the best,
Crumpp
Does not matter since the 10, 12, 13 and 11 Group claims are contemperary.:rolleyes: (10G claims + 12G claims + 13G claims = < 11G claims). Your problem rears its head again. No conclusions are being drawn.
Shore is the standard refererence for any researcher worth his salt.
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The normal flying radius of the Spitfire Mk I was 575 miles.
Radius is the distance an aircraft can fly and return on best cruise.
Angus, Crumpp is confused, to use a nice word, again. If one uses the number and definition Crumpp gives above, then the Spitfire has a range of 1150 miles. Wait till Kurfy sees that claim.:eek: :D
2 x radius = diameter, or 'range'.
Normal range, not radius, of the Spit I was 575mi.
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Normal range, not radius, of the Spit I was 575mi.
Your correct I misread it. Point was that almost every RAF base was within easy range of London. Within a very short period of time the RAF could move forces within the theater.
As the RAF says, over 900 serviceable RAF single engine fighters were available to intercept the Luftwaffe in August 1940.
A far cry from your gross exaggeration of 2:1 odds in 109's to RAF single fighters!
Milo says:
The 109s did pretty good? Not with 51.5% of the LW casualities being 109s and out numbering the Spits and Hurries of 11 Group by at least 2:1. (11 Group being the main combat area)
The reality is the RAF Spitfires and Hurricanes outnumbered the Luftwaffe 109's. At least according to the RAF's own strength reports!
The figures for Fighter Command are somewhat higher than those quoted in other sources but have been taken directly from PRO AIR 20/2307.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_5
Shore is the standard refererence for any researcher worth his salt.
I am sure he got many things right, Milo.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Not the only words you misread.
Still have your problem Crumpp.
Nice to see that you think 11 Group was the WHOLE bloody FC of the RAF.
"out numbering the Spits and Hurries of 11 Group by at least 2:1."
You need a reading comprehension refresher coarse.
Now you can keep on twisting and manipulating numbers like another poster does but it does not change the fact that 11 Group was out numbered by the LW.
11 Group, is not Fighter Command
11 Group, is not Fighter Command
11 Group, is not Fighter Command
11 Group, is not Fighter Command
11 Group, is not Fighter Command
Keep repeating Crumpp until you understand.
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"out numbering the Spits and Hurries of 11 Group by at least 2:1."
Looks like they got plenty of support Milo when fighting the Luftflotte II!
Not the whole Luftwaffe.
11 Group was far from outnumbered 2:1 and had numerical parity with the RAF single engined fighters as shown.
Unless of course you want to contend that Fighter Command did not bring any of it's additional single engine fighters to the battle.
By August they outnumbered the Luftwaffe 109's.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Since one can't edit post after a short time, you can change: '11 Group was out numbered by the LW force opposite them'. Should not really have to add those words as it was Luftflotte 2 and 3 that were the major LW particpants in BoB, with Luftflotte 2 opposite 11 Group.
Your last post illustrates your problem very nicely Crumpp.
Only 11 Group is mentioned. No where is support from other Groups mentioned.
Aug 15
Luftlotte 2
109s > 544
other a/c > 1358 (ie bomber types)
RAF 11 Group
Spit/Hurries > 418
Now our dear Crumpp thinks that these 1358 other a/c are going to fly unmolested in the British airspace of 11 Group and the Spits/Hurries will only oppose the the 109s flying in British airspace of 11 Group. How nieve of him. At least half of the Spit/Hurries will have to go after those 1358 other a/c.
So if all the a/c on both sides participated in one huge air battle on this day in Aug, then the 109s would out number the Spit/Hurries tasked with taking care of them by 2.6:1. Looks like I underestimated my 'gross' exageration. And so began Crumpp's 'problem' in this thread.
Now Crumpp you can 'nickel and dime' all you want, but the numbers show that the Spit/Hurries of 11 Group were out numbered by the a/c of Luftflotte 2 including the 109.
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Hello Crumpp.
Not yet have I brought my summary of some numbers and engagements - well it's a computer problem actually :(
Anyway, what must be kept in mind is really this: The BoB chops down in many phases, i.e. channel fight, radar hits, airfield hits, and then London Bombed.
In the channel fight you have 10th and 11th group. In the radar hits the same. The airfield hits were almost exclusively 11th group. Then, when London got hit, you have some part of 10th, much of 11th, and some piece of 12th group participating.
With 100% strength those available could muster at best some 300-400 aircraft to intercept, - and the biggest number I have found to have made interception in a day within a short timeframe is 250, - the biggest by far. The German escorts that day were some hundreds more.
An interception of 100 fighters seems to have been quite some news.
It all boils down to the same pot, and hereby I really think you haven't read too much up on this, - The BIG WING DEBATE. If your theory sticks anywhere, there wouldn't have been one. Ok, for the less knowledgable who might come across this thread, - in short:
The RAF 11th group under the control of Park, were operating in small groups, but operated rather switftly. Things however start getting sour when 12 aircraft have to attack some 100 bombers with another 100 as escorts. So, there is this big fight within the Fighter command. Some want biger interception units to form up. Park and Dowding point out that there simply isn't TIME enough (this is during the attacks on 11th group airfields).
Okay, Park and Dowding keep in control, and IMHO keep the RAF's FC from being destroyed. LW then Switches to London. Suddenly the big wing theory can actually function. There is TIME to set up a big force, - the LW has to cross a bit more space on the plotting table. The big wings work as far as the daylight and clouds allow. LW gets hit with a steadily growing PROPORTION of fighter command. And London, being the target, day after day, well just scramble and grab some alt once LW activity is detected and head for London! Some good proportion of 12th group, as well ast 11th and some 2 squadrons or so of the 10th can possibly make it to the show.
Big numbers hit the LW on the 15th of September. I have seen the figure 250. The escorts may still have been that many over the area - haven't got the number yet. Must have been a shock to the LW, and the RAF was vigourous. Big wing theorist gained more support, and the true winners of the BoB, Park and Dowding, got demoted, while the big wing theorist Leigh-Mallory got the chair.
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Now our dear Crumpp thinks that these 1358 other a/c are going to fly unmolested in the British airspace of 11 Group and the Spits/Hurries will only oppose the the 109s flying in British airspace of 11 Group. How nieve of him.
The argument was not whether all the LW aircraft outnumbered the Spitfires and Hurricanes by 2:1, it was the single engine fighter vs single engine fighter.
Guess it must be convienant for you to change the argument.
For brevity, the analysis focuses primarily on the single-seat fighters deployed by the respective air forces. It was in this arena that the Luftwaffe needed to prevail if it were to achieve air superiority over southern England and, in so doing, defeat the Royal Air Force.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443
At least half of the Spit/Hurries will have to go after those 1358 other a/c.
Did not seem to matter in your last discussion on the Luftwaffe in 1944.
All the best,
Crumpp
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From Crumpp:
"The argument was not whether all the LW aircraft outnumbered the Spitfires and Hurricanes by 2:1, it was the single engine fighter vs single engine fighter."
Correct. We (you and me mostly) are now tugging about those numbers.
May I point out that it was within the power of II Flotte to mount in a single raid, more 109's than the whole Hurricanes and Spitfires available to the 11th group of Fighter command, and there was never a chance to make the interceptions with all squadrons, - there was action enough, but not enough time for all to make it to the fray.
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May I point out that it was within the power of II Flotte to mount in a single raid, more 109's than the whole Hurricanes and Spitfires available to the 11th group of Fighter command, and there was never a chance to make the interceptions with all squadrons, - there was action enough, but not enough time for all to make it to the fray.
Sure, depending on the time frame you reference. I don't think at anytime though it was quite as dramatic as 2:1.
The RAF experienced nothing on the scale of the Luftwaffe’s numerical disparity in the bombing campaigns of early 1944.
Which is what would have been required to win such a campaign now that the theory is formulated and battle tested.
All the best,
Crumpp
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I've seen it documented much more dramatically. Like 2 squadrons engaging some 600 escorts, - the whole mass of Luftflotte 1 available escorts. Later on more joined the fray, it was 1:3 at best.
Think it was early Sept.
24th of August, from Johnny Johnsson's big Circle, p 142:
"At breakfast time the bombing began with small unopposed raid against Great Yarmouth ,and shortly afterwards five strong patrols , numbering about one hundred aeroplanes in all, reconnoitred south-east England, from the coast to Biggin Hill, and were challenged only by a brace of Spitfires.
Two hours later during the mid morning two seperate raids, each consisting of a bomber wing, well protected with 109's, missed their primary target, Manston, and dropped their bombs near Cantebury. Only a few minutes elapsed before a Heinkel wing, escorted by twice as many fighters, headed towards Dover, where it was tackled by some twenty Spitfires and Hurricanes, who failed to get through to the bombers before they dropped ....."
Where does that leave you?
Shortly thereafter, the LW moves inland to get at airfields more to the North. 109's have to return and many bombers start getting shot down on the return. This fuelled a dispute between the fighters and the bombers and Göring was right in the middle of it. What follows, p. 145:
"Göring supported the bomber commanders, and had some harsh and unfair things to say about the fighting qualities and morale of his fighter arm. He had already decided to switch the bombers of Luftflotte 3 from day to night operations, and the fighters of this air fleet would assist those of Luftflotte 2. In future, Göring ordered the bombers would have close, high, and top fighter escorts; there would be three fighters for every bomber."
So Squire's tip about fighters being moved between flottes seems to have some ground. This leaves you with what - oh nearabouts 2:1 if RAF makes a very good scramble. Which they didn't, - p.145 again
"Since the RAF usually intercepted in small packets, rarely more than a squadron strong, life was not to hard for the escorting pilots"
On the 7th of September the RAF made it to action, - but the LW raid was big. The RAF finally made it to action with the Duxford Wing for two reasons - the leader (Bader) disobeyed patrolling orders and the LW force had headwind so it moved slower towards the target.
Still, Bader didn't catch them before they were already on the way home, - so where would that leave a squadron from Lincolnshire, Yorkshire or Wales?????
Anyway, Bader still hadn't got the altitude so he attacked the whole force with 36 fighters while climbing.
There were 21 defending squadrons in action so the odds can't have been that bad, but they attacked SINGLY, not even in Pairs which was Park's plan. That leaves a horrible ratio to say the least - like 1 to 10 or perhaps even 1 to 30!!!!!
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Like 2 squadrons engaging some 600 escorts
The Luftwaffe would have been very hard pressed and very lucky to have anything even near 600 escorts in the air at once.
Where does that leave you?
Does not change a thing. I am sure to him it seemed that way.
So Squire's tip about fighters being moved between flottes seems to have some ground.
You don't seem to understand the significance of the RAF having more fighters than the Luftwaffe.
On the 7th of September the RAF made it to action,
I hope not, the RAF had more fighters in August than the Luftwaffe. By September their numerical superiority would have increased even more.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
The argument was not whether all the LW aircraft outnumbered the Spitfires and Hurricanes by 2:1, it was the single engine fighter vs single engine fighter.
Guess it must be convienant for you to change the argument.
The point which you can not get into your head is the British fighters had 2 enemies > the 109 and the bombers. The British fighter force would be split between the enemy a/c types. The main objective of the British fighters was to knock down German bombers, not German fighters and the greater number of British fighters would go after the bombers.
Change the arguement? Nope, only your problem would see that.
What you do Crummp is compare the base numbers of fighters on both sides, without considering how the British used their fighters. I repeat, less than 1/2 the British fighters in the air at any specific time would target the 109s.
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Crumpp, 600 escorts are documented.
It is also well documented how many RAF could get TOGETHER, - the highest numbers I find are some 20 squadrons or 250 fighters.
I have now also found it documented that after a certain timeperiod the fighters of Gruppe III were also fighting 11th group.
So....a flood coming in :D
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Crumpp: first wave ;)
From Shores, 7th of Sept 1940. 1st big raid on London.
348 Bombers, 617 fighters.
That's the Day mentioned from Johnny above. All in all some 20 squadrons of the RAF are defending.
From Martin Gilbert, same day: 300 bombers and 600 fighters.
On the 15th of September, he actually gives 230 bombers and 700 fighters.
Gilbert also provides some LW sortie numbers. On a good day there could be 2 sorties while there still was daylight.
13/8 1.485
14/8 1.270 fighter and 520 bomber.
ORDER OF BATTLE
(well, the numbers I have)
Spits and Hurricanes of the RAF, 8. Aug 1940
10th group 7
11th group 19
12th group 11
13th group 12
LUFTWAFFE
Luftflotte II
5 JG's of 109's, 2 ZG's of 110's
Luftflotte III
3 JG's of 109's, 1 ZG of 110's
Erpr.Gruppes are not included in this list.
That makes, none the less, according to your own sources, 800 109's or so, as well as 224 110's. Might have to subtract a few because of the Erpr.gruppes.
BTW, your RAF numbers look to me as a tad high. From the timeframe I have I get 588. It probably includes the NF's, and OTU's, as well as squadrons being formed and some reserves.
Anyway, you put something up
"Point is that almost every RAF base was within easy range of London. Within a very short period the RAF could move force within the theater"
Could have and should have...Scotland , Wales and even N-Ireland do not have the time to intercept a raid heading even as far as London. And another thing enters the equation. Luftflotte V. There is a lot of heavy industry in the NE of England, - Newcastle, Sunderland etc., While there are also big NAVY bases which need to be covered. While the RAF had the option of leaving half the island naked (which the LW thought they had), they DIDN'T. 13th group saw little action, - but served as a somewhat welcome rest for rotation perhaps.
In the meantime, the 109's could and did Exclusively work on the south.
The biggest number of RAF fighters making it to the mix, - that I found so far, were all available squadrons from 11th group, the Duxford wing, and 2 squadrons from 10th. Those are able to make it decently when the Luftwaffe has some headwind, and/or are hitting well inland. Yet, as you can see if you scroll upwards and re-read a little, the highest number attacking at once, is some 36 aircraft. Didn't find any bigger yet.
To those down to 12, attacking hundreds, it has been described as that the LW fighters were so dense that they were like the escalator on Piccadilly Circus!
Now the quest is yours. Find me bigger numbers ;) Actual engagements in the south of England where 109's get swamped by RAF fighters, and please, while yer at it, prove Gilbert and Shores to be publishing rubbish.
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From Shores, 7th of Sept 1940. 1st big raid on London.
AS I said, hardly typical. You citing the largest raid the Luftwaffe was ever able to assemble during the BoB and holding that up as the "average".
The Luftwaffe single engine fighters were on average outnumbered in as many engagements as the Spitfires.
The RAF simply had more single engine fighters than the Luftwaffe did. At least according to the RAF strength reports. According to even Shacklady and Morgan, 808 Spitfires entered service during the 116 days of the BoB!!
Luftflotte V.
Anything coming out of Luftflotte V inherently had plenty of warning.
Luftflotte III
Hardly an effective player. Simply just did not have the range to fight effectively nor reach many of the targets.
Angus, I have provided documentation for all the general conclusions made. You keep pulling up exceptions trying to claim them as the rule.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Crumpp: I cannot see any evidence of the RAF mounting all their might on the south-east corner.
What I DID find is that this is wrong:
"Luftflotte III
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hardly an effective player. Simply just did not have the range to fight effectively nor reach many of the targets."
Firstly the 109's from Flotte III HAVE the range to tackle with 11th group.(140 miles all the way to London, the southern coast airfields are within some 100 miles))
Secondly, they were very close to 10th group and jostled with them in the first three phases of the battle (channel, radar airfields)
Thirdly, they 109's from III got the orders to move and help out with the London escorts in the 4th phase of the battle, while the bombers were assigned to Night bombing. (Merseyside for instance)
Then there was always Luftflotte V. I don't know what you mean when you say that there was ample warning. Radar range remains the same, bomber speeds remain the same. Anyway they had their try with 13th group.
Then finally, the RAF had a problem that has not been mentioned yet. It wasn't really aircraft or rather aircraft replacement shortage, - it was pilot shortage.
Oh and I don't really see me pulling up any particular exceptions I pulled up the raids in which the RAF got to gether the biggest force against the LW's biggest force. It's quite interesting to look at earlier engagements, - when the RAF really was throwing in penny-packets.
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Reading Galland now. Stumbled across this:
"Als am Nachmittag des 7. September sich die Deutchen Gescwader uber der Kanalkuste versammelten, Bomber, Stukas, Jager und Zerstörer, insgesamt weit uber 1000 Flugzeuge."
Quickly, that means: "on the afternoon on September the 7th the German Wings assembled over the channel coast, Bombers, Stukas, Fighters and Destroyers, totallyng well over 1000 aircraft"
And here:
"Zu beginn dieser vierten Phase der Schlact betrug unsere angrifsstarke etwa 400-500 bomber und 200 Stukas. Den begleitschutz flogen rundt 500 Jager und 200 Zerstörer. Ihnen standen nach damaliger deutscher shatzung nicht wesentlich mehr als 200 einsatzbereite britische Jager gegenuber"
Meaning roughly:
"In the beginninng of the 4th phase of the battle, our offensive strength included some 400-500 bombers and 200 Stukas. The escorts flew around 500 fighters (109) and 200 destroyers (110). Opposing them, according to our estimate, were not much more than 200 available british fighters"
He includes a sweet little map where Luftflotte III bombers and fighters are seen pointed to London.
He counts the major daylight raids on London as 38,- hardly an exception.
I'll post some more later.
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You need to check the times and OOB for the incoming raids, Angus.
Only one raid on 7 Sep 1940 did the BF-109's outnumber the intercepting RAF single engine fighters. On that raid, the Luftwaffe took no casualites and successfully fended off the RAF fighters.
The other two raids came in at earlier and later times. In both raids the incoming 109's were outnumbered by the intercepting RAF single engine squadrons. In those the Luftwaffe took losses.
"In the beginninng of the 4th phase of the battle, our offensive strength included some 400-500 bombers and 200 Stukas. The escorts flew around 500 fighters (109) and 200 destroyers (110). Opposing them, according to our estimate, were not much more than 200 available british fighters"
Well the RAF strength reports say differently. I have no doubt General Rall was told that less than 200 RAF fighters were available according to LW intelligence. The facts though are very different.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Crumpp: 11th Group is not RAF. The defenders were 11th group, 2 squadrons of 10th group, and 3 from 12th group. The attackers were every available 109 from both Luftflotte II and III as escorts, as well as the 110's
That BoB website although rather good, needs to be looked at with some knowledge. Such as the claims department,- those are unconfirmed claims. The claims I have summed up from Shores are confirmed claims, and those from Alcorn are quite well verified.
The Quote is from Galland, not Rall. Rall's squadron was pulled out after a week in the channel fight due to severe losses.
And yes, the LW did belive that 11th group was the bulk of the RAF. It was a shock to them to find out that the NE area was well defended when they probed it with luftflotte V. Even N-Ireland and N-Scotland had Hurris and/or Spitfires.
BTW, all Single engined fighters include Defiants and Gladiators. In big reports there might be more types included. I am however looking into Spits and Hurrys only.
And additionally there were Blenheims. Mostly for night ops. But one Blenheim squadron of the Coastal command also made some action and had some 14 kills.
In the eyes of the LW it all looked pretty much the same be it this or that group or coastal command. So it sticks out rather nicely how the RAF seemed to be getting bigger while the LW was bleeding,- while that is not so far away from the truth ;)
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A little more.....
From Reach for the Sky Brickhill's work on Bader.
"It was 11 group battle and 12th group was held back to cover Englands industrial heart north of London. Burning for the fight, Bader rang Leigh-Mallory and pleaded to be embroiled but Leigh-Mallory told him: "We can't put all our eggs in one basket Bader. You've got to hang on and wait""
This applies in August 1940.
On we go.
"The lull ended on 24th of August. That evening 110 German fighters and bombers moved towards London, but were intercepted over Maidstone and fled. Next day they were bombing Portsmouth and Southampton, savagely attacked by defending fighters. Then it was Dover, Folkstone, The Thames Estuary and Kent. Time and again the great formations ploughed steadily across the channel and clashed bloodily with the spearheads of 11 group. But 11 group losses were heavy too; they fought in squadrons, twelve aircraft against fifty or a hundred or two hundred because there were not enough squadrons and some had to be held in reserve. Air vice marshal Park, the A.O.C. never knew where the next attack was coming from or when. The plot of a hundred plus on the board might be a feint, to draw all his fighters up so that when they had to land to refuel and re-arm the main attack could sweep in unimposed"
So, you see, the 12th group lads were indeed held back.
The Duxford wing first makes a successful engagement on the 30th of August. Bader went on to press on using more squadrons at one, describing as this:
"One squadron against a formation of a hundred or more is pretty sticky"
The Duxford wing makes it's first big hit on the famous 7th September. With inferior altiude the attacked escorted bombers (109's and 110's). Bader got hit by a 109 that day, and also saw some feathers of the Luftwaffe falling. Must be a kill if the enemy slams into the ground.
So, you see, the LW did loose aircraft on the 7th, they also had 109's over the target. As for this website on the day:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/september7.html
It does not match any of my books! Nothing at all.
Here comes Shores:
"It was afternoon on 7 September before the first attack came in on London - and so vast was the formation that only London could be the target. A total of 348 bombers from KG1, 2, 3, 26, and 76, escorted by 617 fighters - nearly 1000 aircraft - headed for the east London docks, which were brutally bombed. 19 and 41 Squadrons (Spitfires), 111 and 249 squadrons (Hurricanes) intercepted first, but the inexperienced pilots of 249 were hard hit by the escorts, losing six aircraft, although only one pilot was killed. More squadrons joined the running battle, including elements of the Duxford wing from No 12 group. Seventy one victories were claimed by 17 squadrons, but actual losses amounted to 34, 12 of them bombers and seven Bf 110's................................With dusk 318 Heinkels and Dorniers returned to stoke the fires started during the day; London's ordeal had begun."
And that's from the RAF site, - it doesn't match:
"First wave totalling some 100 aircraft crossed the coast but activities were confined to Kent. A second wave commenced to cross the Coast at 1718 hours, some 250 aircraft being plotted in five raids, the activity spread to an area from East of Kenley covering the Thames Estuary to as far North as Duxford. No 12 Group provided 5 Squadrons to assist No 11 Group during this engagement"
Looks to me as in INCOMPLETE compilation. Or maybe Shores, Johnny, Galland and the rest are all dead wrong?
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Originally posted by Angus
Reading Galland now. Stumbled across this:
"Als am Nachmittag des 7. September sich die Deutchen Gescwader uber der Kanalkuste versammelten, Bomber, Stukas, Jager und Zerstörer, insgesamt weit uber 1000 Flugzeuge."
Errr, if you refer to Galland's 'the firsts and the lasts', it's isn't quite reliable everywhere when it goes to numbers - he wrote the book in 1953, and most likely lacked decent sources or those were still classified, and he worked from memory.
To illustrate, he writes on the commence of the Battle of Britian:
"The German Luftwaffe back then had apprx. 2500 combat-ready warplanes, as opposed to 3600 warplanes available to the British. The numerical disadvantage could have been, to some extent, evened out with our technological superiority, but this, especially in the case of fighters, was not merited to prudent planning. True, that back then the Me 109 was the world's finest fighter and between 1935 and 1940 it was superior to all enemy types." etc.
You see there are some troubles with the numbers, but what is certain, the LW did not have any numerical advantage over the RAF in the Battle of Britain in fighters, in fact there was a slight numerical disadvantage for them, not to say the other factors like radar, home turf etc. Despite that, they gave a bad beating to the RAF over Dunkirk and fought very favourably during BoB, causing more losses than they suffered themselves, and succeeding in forcing the RAF to evacuate to most southern airfields and concentrate around London, at the edge of the 109's range, depleting British pilot reserves badly.
"Rall's squadron was pulled out after a week in the channel fight due to severe losses."
Hmm, that puts your sig about Ralls 'experience' with Spitfires into context. He had, basically, spent a week over the Channel, I am not sure if he met Spits at all, and the next time he met them was over the Russian front in 1943, shooting down a few MkVs. ;)
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Hello Kuffie. Nice having you back.
Well.....
Firstly Galland was in the middle of the pool, and his numbers tend to fit rather well with other sources. I have it here listed down to Staffels what the LW had on the S-SE front, and it is obvious what part of the RAF was facing them. The fighter stock of the RAF equalled the LW, but they could not all be there. Other stuff to look after you see.
Actually, at the time of the BoB the RAF had aircraft scattered all around the world, so it must be taken carefully what stock numbers say. They even had squadrons up here, - in Iceland! (Submarine hunting and intruder interceptions).
As for Rall I'll Type it in later. It were indeed Spitfires on some occasions (not that it matters), and those shot down one squadron leader after the other untill he was on the top ;) Oh Galland's quote on the Spitfire vs the 109: "Erheblich Wendiger" :D
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Angus,
I never said the Luftwaffe did not take casualties on 07 Sep 40..
The one raid in which the Luftwaffe did have numerical superiority, they took no casualties and prevented the RAF from attacking the bombers.
Big difference.
You cannot change the fact the RAF generally had numerical parity or superiority in single engine fighters for most of the Battle of Britain.
No amount of wishing or pilot anecdotes will alter that.
The figures for Fighter Command are somewhat higher than those quoted in other sources but have been taken directly from PRO AIR 20/2307.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_5
Even the RAF says over 500 RAF single engine fighters participated on 7 Sep 40.
Spitfire - 223
Hurricane - 398
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/september7.html
Due to the amount of overclaiming, it is ridiculus to even attempt to hold up either sides "claims" as proof of any damage done.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Crumpp:
I am working with confirmed kills not the ones from the Website. Well actually, I haven't been working with anything from the website at all!
I just happen to have some metres of books, and they all seem to be in harmony, be it something written in 1953 or 2000.
As for this one:
"You cannot change the fact the RAF generally had numerical parity or superiority in single engine fighters for most of the Battle of Britain."
I AM NOT CHALLENGING THAT! THIS IS AN ABSOLUTELY TRUE STATEMENT!
But, - while the LW applied the most of their force, the RAF was fencing them with some half of theirs. So, that is my point.
You can roll about as much as you want in the stock department I am looking into the numbers in engagements the numbers in squadron service, the numbers that clashed in the air.
Anyway, off I must go, gotta bake a cake =;)
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Oh, dear, saw a flaw, so have to post. Cake will wait. Crumpp: I am serious you need to learn a tad more reading.
Here are your words, and you are quoting the same link as I posted, the same as I had posted as well:
"Even the RAF says over 500 RAF single engine fighters participated on 7 Sep 40.
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Spitfire - 223
Hurricane - 398"
And here is the text from the link:
"Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 7th September 1940
Blenheim - 44
Spitfire - 223
Hurricane - 398
Defiant - 20
Gladiator - 9
Total - 694 "
So, you mixed up available aircraft with participating aircraft. You bad!
As well as this: I don't see (on a swift notice) any reference other than internet from you.
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I am working with confirmed kills
Over claiming resulted in each side having several hundred erroneous "confirmed" kills.
So, you mixed up available aircraft with participating aircraft. You bad!
No I listed the aircraft the RAF says were available for the fight.
Angus you have not listed any sources, just typed!
All the best,
Crumpp
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Angus,
did you not know that BoB was a 'fighter vs fighter' battle? :eek: The LW bombers were just a mirage.
"But, - while the LW applied the most of their force, the RAF was fencing them with some half of theirs. So, that is my point."
The LW fanbois just can't comprehend that, can they?
So if you listed the available a/c Crumpp, why did you say paticipate? Angus caught you. :D
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Wonder why the RAF does not list the number of Model 022A Fords being driven in London in September 1940?
That information would be just as relative then wouldn't it?
Do we need to discuss the definition of available again?
All the best,
Crumpp
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Jeeez Crumpp, let the straw go!
"--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I am working with confirmed kills
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over claiming resulted in each side having several hundred erroneous "confirmed" kills.
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
So, you mixed up available aircraft with participating aircraft. You bad!
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No I listed the aircraft the RAF says were available for the fight.
Angus you have not listed any sources, just typed!
All the best,
Crumpp"
To answer this:
1. I am working with confirmed confirmed and confirmed kills, verified kills, where you need either a wreck, a POW, or a LW loss report. NOT the claims on the RAF site you qoute.
2. You did mix up AVAILABLE and PARTICIPATING, this again applies to all of the RAF groups, - including Scotland and so on.
3. I have listed my sources, just not pages and ISBN and so on at all times. Clutch that one if you like. Please cut and paste some text and ask me for the page and ISBN and I'll be happy to reply :D
4. That Ford model relativeness is out in the blue. What are you thinking?
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Yeah Angus Prague was nice, and made more sense throughly checking the bottom of beer kegs than to argue so much about past events. ;)
Anyway, for 7th September. I don't get why so much debate must be there... hell, just read the RAF's site you are all qouting:
Patrols:
Own
During the night of 6th/7th September - 34 patrols involving 44 sorties.
During the day of 7th September - 143 patrols involving 817 sorties.
Enemy
It is estimated that about 120 enemy aircraft operated over Great Britain during the night 6th/7th September and 700 during the day of 7th September.
So, the RAF was putting up some 871 fighter (sorties), the LW was putting up much less than that, ie. those ~700 estimated by the RAF (and they would tend to overestimate) was figthers and bombers alike.
Obviously, 7th September wasn't a particularly busy day for the LW, but it hurt the RAF more than usual, with 27 of their aircraft with 14 pilots killed or missing.
BTW Angus, you correctly note that obviously not the entire RAF was put up in the air - for the same reasons why do you assume the LW would always putting up the entire strenght, it would be just as silly on their part, it's basic military doctrine to always keep some reserve, let some units rest/refit for a day etc.
RAF ingle groups fighters however would fly more than just one sortie per day, just getting up, shooting, than landing for a quick refuel and rearm and go back). The LW sorties would take longer time escorting the bombers over england and back, and they'd wait longer for the bombers to refit for a 2nd sortie, if there was such. It's quite obvious they'd do less fighter sorties, but spend more time in the air.
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Obviously, 7th September wasn't a particularly busy day for the LW, but it hurt the RAF more than usual, with 27 of their aircraft with 14 pilots killed or missing.
Yet the RAF claimed 74 LW a/c as destroyed. Note I said claimed.
21 Me109 - 21 aircrew
22 Me110 - 44 aircrew
4 Do17 - 12 aircrew
18 Do215 - 72 aircrew
6 He111 - 24 aircrew
So just in the above, a total of 173 aircrew (using 4 aircrew in a bomber). That does not include those in 'probable' and 'damaged' a/c. If half of these were killed, it is still 6 times more than the aircrew the RAF had KIA/MIA.
RAF day sorties - 817 for an a/c loss rate of 3.3%.
LW day sorties - 700 for an a/c loss rate of 10.6%.
The RAF averaged ~6 a/c per patrol.
How about the LW fanbois producing some LW sortie numbers instead of using the Brit numbers?
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British claims for LW losses vs. British estimations of LW sorties, that is a major waste of time and bandwidth.
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Originally posted by Kurfürst
British claims for LW losses vs. British estimations of LW sorties, that is a major waste of time and bandwidth.
So provide the data (sorties & losses) for the LW instead. You are suppose to be the German expert. Are you afraid to?
What I posted shows how you make a big deal out of RAF losses even though German losses were heavier.:eek:
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Typical Isegrim, to use RAF estimates of Luftwaffe figures when they favour his argument.
Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy, gives the figures for the 7th September afternoon raid on London as:
348 bombers, accompanied by "everything Osterkamp could muster, a toal of 617 Bf 109s and Bf 110s"
In response:
"All the 21 squadrons within 70 miles of London were either at readiness or in the air"
Losses for the raid were 14 German bombers, 16 109s and 7 110s, the RAF lost 23 fighters and 6 pilots.
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Hehe, I think the website can be discarded. Picking some data from it and not other makes no sense.
The data I have been using matches the one Nashwan just entered. So we have Steven Bungay, Johnny Johnsson, John Alcorn, Martin Gilbert, Adolf Galland,Douglas Bader and Christopher Shores, all stating the same thing.
I think that weights a bit more than a website.
The website none the less has good chunks in it, for it's basically the day's reports, - the info the RAF received at the time. How comes nobody quotes this:
"It is estimated that about 120 enemy aircraft operated over Great Britain during the night 6th/7th September and 700 during the day of 7th September"
700 is not far from 1000 you know, and I very much suspect that the higher number arrived later, either through Enigma, or in post war surveys of LW reports.
As for debating about past events, or clinging on to certain dates, I must say that debaiting about anything at all is always pointless if the participants cannot read, or will not accept absolutely established facts.
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The figures for Fighter Command are somewhat higher than those quoted in other sources but have been taken directly from PRO AIR 20/2307.
That "Website" is an article from a professional military logistocal publictation.
I would say it is much more credible than any anecdotes or book published 20 years ago.
There has been a wealth of new information uncovered on the airwar recently Angus, particularly the Luftwaffe.
You might be impressed with your sources. Me, I will take the British Government, the RAF, and a professional publication.
When my copy of PRO AIR 20/2307 arrives it will be interesting to see what else it contains.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Most of the anecdotes I pick are verified from the logbooks.
Squadron ops books are based on logbooks and/or pot-mission debriefing.
The website contains what seems to be partially incomplete day-to-day collection of events.
It is data from 65 years ago Crumpp and only from the RAF.
It is as correct as it was - then.
It does not contain LW data. Just what the RAF saw.
LW sends 1000 aircraft according to beforementioned sources, RAF spots 700.
It's like losses and claims. While a loss according to the sources of the one that it occured to, - say LW - remains ABSOLUTE, - the claim remains debatable.
So, if the LW sais they sent 1000 aircraft, and have it on record, while a RAF website sais they saw 700 I tend to belive the LW.
If the LW sais they lost 30 aircraft while the RAF claims 70 I tend to belive that the LW did lose 30, maybe more.
Do you get what I am saying ?
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Originally posted by Nashwan
Typical Isegrim, to use RAF estimates of Luftwaffe figures when they favour his argument.
[/B]
Just for the record, you are the notorious freud here, not me.
Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy, gives the figures for the 7th September afternoon raid on London as:
348 bombers, accompanied by "everything Osterkamp could muster, a toal of 617 Bf 109s and Bf 110s"
In response:
"All the 21 squadrons within 70 miles of London were either at readiness or in the air"
Losses for the raid were 14 German bombers, 16 109s and 7 110s, the RAF lost 23 fighters and 6 pilots. [/B]
We can safely ignore this - if it's not made up by you of course, as it's often the case - since it disagrees with the RAF's own daily reports, as noted above.
Typical Nashwan, he manipulates the evidence to rewrite history.
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Kuffie, can you please explain your last post?
Nashwan was quoting Bungay.
Bungay sais the same as ....Galland, who sais the same as Bader, who's numbers have been looked into by Gilbert, Shores, Alcorn and so on. Post war file browsing from both sides takes place. Numbers get polished to the absolutely possible detail.
So, I can not see Nash rewriting history, and selective picking from websites remains as what it is, - rubbish!
Or would you perhaps pick the RAF claims from the website as an absolute?
If you do, the LW had 10% losses that day.....:D
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It is data from 65 years ago Crumpp and only from the RAF.
Until now Angus, the RAF strength reports were more of a mystery than the Luftwaffes.
It is rather easy to line up the numbers to see that the RAF had numerical superiority in single engine fighters for much of the Battle of Britain.
It has been done ad nauseum in this thread. You cannot take a one day exception and hold that as the general rule.
The general trend for the Battle of Britain is:
1. For the formations which the defending single engine fighters outnumbered the attacks, few losses were suffered by the Luftwaffe.
2. On raids in which numerical parity existed, both sides took relatively equal casualties. This was done by the skillful use of radar ground control.
3. For raids in which the defenders outnumbered the attackers, the Luftwaffe took proportionate casualties. Again this was done with the skillful use of radar ground control.
Certainly no individual aircraft performance conclusions can be reached from any of the battles. The claim of the RAF single engine fighters holding off vastly superior numbers of Luftwaffe single engine fighters is simply not true.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Crumpp:
"It is rather easy to line up the numbers to see that the RAF had numerical superiority in single engine fighters for much of the Battle of Britain."
As far as I can see, the lines crossed. At the Fall of France the RAF was down to 400, their aircraft production doing more than patching up through the BoB, while pilot shortage was a more serious issue. I don't think we disagree there.
The day I quote, the 7th of Sept is only exceptional in the way, that is marks the beginning of the London raids, and both sides clashed with full force, so to speak. I have referred to it because I found quite much data on it. Eagle day is well covered also, and 15th of September as well.
Galland chops the battle down into 5 phases, which is pretty fair,- Channel fight, radar strikes, FC strikes, London bombed and then at night only.
It is only at phase 4 that the RAF manages to strike big raids with several squadrons at once,- untill then, for quite obvious reasons (TIME) most of the interceptions were 1-2 squadrons, - 12-24 aircraft. If they made a bounce they had success,- diving through the fighter screen, getting some bursts, and then mixing it with the escorts.
If the were unsuccessful the escorts would chop them up badly.
This here:
"The claim of the RAF single engine fighters holding off vastly superior numbers of Luftwaffe single engine fighters is simply not true."
Who claimed this? Holding off???????
I have given ample quotes on little interceptions against big groups. They existed whether you bang your head against it or not. They existed, and caused big debates within the RAF, - eventually leading to the demotion of Park and Dowding and the rise of Trafford Leigh-Mallory. This is the famous BIG-WING debate, which is well covered in every book about the BoB.
In fact, Johnny Johnsson and Bader never agreed on the issue, - I have read a letter from Bader to Johnny from long long after the war, where they are still debating.
Fact remains: Untill the LW started bombing London, the RAF mostly intercepted in squadron size.
You have yet to show me some authentic quotes on big interceptions.....
But the smaller ones were not totally bad you know. The escorts could not endlessly follow the attackers, for there would be more and more, again and again. The radar saw to that. Although not perfected (read up on the battle of barking hill), the radar made sure that the interceptors made a lot of contact. And when the LW stretched inland and gave the RAF some 20 minutes more to react, the squadrons could finally asseble into bigger packets. This is the famous essence of the BoB day, - all available squadrons (some 40% or so of RAF single engined fighters) were successfully thrown at the full punch of the Luftwaffe, while the Luftwaffe had not realized that the RAF actually had that many. What were available reserve squadrons on BoB day (Another very famous moment) should LW make an extra raid? NONE! Both had the full swing going!
Galland realized, none the less, that the RAF had both fewer fighters and were "technically" inferior to the 109 (slower). He puts this so:
"Ich kann von dem kampf der britischen jagdflieger nicht anderes als mit höchster Bewunderung berichten. Zahlenmessich und auch technisch unterlegen, unermudlich und tapfer kampfend, sind sie in diesen fur England wohl schwersten Zeiten des krieges zweifellos die retter des Vaterlandes geworden"
Why did the LW draw back? Because the shortening daylight made only 1 raid possible per day, the RAF seemed to be growing, the escorts had to short range to do their job properly, and the LW had taken quite a beating.
Galland puts the failiure largely on the limited range of the 109. But it all adds up, doesn't it......
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"The claim of the RAF single engine fighters holding off vastly superior numbers of Luftwaffe single engine fighters is simply not true."
Wow!!
How many times do we have to go over this in the same thread?
Check around 2 pages back and I believe it is also reprinted again on Page 4.
The 109s did pretty good? Not with 51.5% of the LW casualities being 109s and out numbering the Spits and Hurries of 11 Group by at least 2:1. (11 Group being the main combat area)
Is a clearly a gross exaggeration that is wrong. We were not comparing total aircraft. It was claimed that the 109 outnumbered the Spitfires and Hurricanes 2:1.
And that somehow that could reflect on RAF single engine fighter performance.
Your wrong. Don't go throwing up a strawman or change the subject.
I have given ample quotes on little interceptions against big groups.
In comparision of total aircraft, yes the Luftwaffe had more. That was never an issue in this discussion. They did not have the overwhelming mass required to win a war of attrition.
You have given ample evidence of single individuals relating what they could see in their very very limited view of the battlefield.
None of which contradicts any of the documented strength reports.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Ahemm, Crumpp.
"Is a clearly a gross exaggeration that is wrong. We were not comparing total aircraft. It was claimed that the 109 outnumbered the Spitfires and Hurricanes 2:1."
Cut this clear. The 109's equalled roughly the Spits and Hurricanes put together.
The 109's only worked on the south clashing with merely the half of the RAF's Hurricanes and Spitfires. Because of the ranges, of course.
That actually, as a matter of fact, goes pretty near 2:1
To add on that, the RAF usually intercepted in squadron packets.
Now, your turn. Please find me some data on swarms of RAF fighters intercepting less their numbers.
And then this:
"You have given ample evidence of single individuals relating what they could see in their very very limited view of the battlefield"
Those individuals? Bader? Galland? Big names in the battle, Galland climbing fast to the top meeting with Hitler, Göring etc, while also fighting, while Bader is corresponding with Leigh Mallory as well as being in the battle. You're being silly here, - the rest I have quoted to are post war historians, (excluding Johnsson). ALL BIG GUNS IN THE BUSINESS.
To top that, Galland and Bader became firm friends, and compared their tactics and stories very well. So did Rall and Johnsson, by the way!
If you want to check back on the pages, I belive you will find some input from yourself that I have put to sleep, by the way.
I'll see if I have the time to pick them up. Well, somebody else might ;)
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Ahemm, Crumpp.
"Is a clearly a gross exaggeration that is wrong. We were not comparing total aircraft. It was claimed that the 109 outnumbered the Spitfires and Hurricanes 2:1."
Cut this clear. The 109's equalled roughly the Spits and Hurricanes put together.
Correct conclusion and yes we are comparing frontline single engine fighters.
The 109's only worked on the south clashing with merely the half of the RAF's Hurricanes and Spitfires. Because of the ranges, of course.
That actually, as a matter of fact, goes pretty near 2:1
To add on that, the RAF usually intercepted in squadron packets.
Not really. It's been covered in this thread several times in this thread. In fact you contradict yourself in this statement above.
All the best,
Crumpp
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You still have your problem, eh Crumpp?
As of Aug 13/16 1940:
Luftflotte 2 had 544 109s.
11 Group had 352 Spits(6 squadrons)/Hurries(16 squadrons).
So, a ratio of 109s to 11 Group is 1.55:1 in the LW's favor.
On Sept 6/7 1940:
Luftflotte 2 had 667 109s.
11 Group had 352 Spits/Hurries.
So the ratio of 109s to 11 Group is now 1.89:1 in the LW's favor.
That is not even considering the the RAF fighters would be split between taking on the German fighters and the German bombers. :eek: The German bombers were the primary targets for the RAF fighters, not the LW fighters. If half the RAF fighters went after the bombers, the ratio is 3:1 to almost 4:1 in the LW's favor.
Oh, that's right the LW bombers were only a mirage.
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Hehe, you forget Luftflotte III ;)
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11 Group had 352 Spits(6 squadrons)/Hurries(16 squadrons).
Interesting that your numbers remain the same for 11 Group over a three-week period during the battle. Guess they suffered no losses nor did not benefit from the greater number of single engined fighters the RAF had in service at all.
So your contention must be that the RAF has the wrong numbers? That implies incompetence of the highest order if they could not even keep track of the numbers of Fighters they had in service.
Luftwaffe single engine fighters for August according to German sources:
Single-engine fighters 1,011 934 805
RAF numbers for September for according to PRO AIR 20/2307:
Fighter Command Order of Battle--11 August 1940 [35]
Establishment Strength Serviceability
Hurricanes 723 721 656
Spitfires 366 374 334
Total 1,089 1,095 990
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_5
Although the main battle area took place there, 11 Group was not the only RAF Group to fight in the battle. That has been proven. All the RAF Groups were within easy range of the RAF single engined fighters.
Luftflotte III ability to influence the battle was severely impaired due to the lack of range of the 109. London was 40 miles beyond the normal combat radius of the Bf-109E from the closest Luftwaffe fighter base.
Even then only a small percentage of their combat power could be brought to bear on 11th Group.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/luftflotteIII.html#lehavre
All the best,
Crumpp
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Christopher Shores reports the following strengths of Luftwaffe and RAF fighters on hand.
As of 8/10/40
Bf 109s: 934 on hand, 805 servicable (combat ready)
Bf 110s: 289 on hand, 224 servicable (combat ready)
For the month of August, 1940 average daily availablity of aircraft to Fighter Command.
1,061 - 1,181 on hand, 708 - 764 sevicable (combat ready)
These numbers include Spitfires, Hurricanes, Gladiators and Defiants. My understanding reading Shores is that Fighter Command Blenheim's Mk.I F types were counted as part of the total fighter number.
On 8/8/40 there were 30 operational Hurricane squadrons, 20 operational Spitfire squadrons, 3 operational Defiant squadrons and a single squadron still flying Gladiators. Six squadrons were flying the converted Blenheims.
One reason the RAF fought at a numerical disadvantage was that the Luftwaffe was able to concentrate their numbers, whereas the RAF had to spread their fighters over the whole of southern England.
Note also this notation concerning the fighter levels defined in PRO AIR.
"(36.) The figures for Fighter Command are somewhat higher than those quoted in other sources but have been taken directly from PRO AIR 20/2307. Nevertheless, it is the trend that is important rather than precise strength levels."
In historian lingo this is saying; "these numbers will be disputed by many who have researched fighter strength levels, but exact numbers are not as important as the context of events." Which can be further interpreted as admitting they are not willing to go to battle defending the PRO AIR numbers. This type of notation is common when the author is trying to avoid readers focusing on incidental details that would diminish their primary goal.
My regards,
Widewing
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PRO AIR 20/2307
Reports 990 servicable single engine RAF fighters in August.
That comes from this document:
Hurricane and Spitfire aircraft: strength, production and wastage
http://www.catalogue.nationalarchives.gov.uk/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATID=1762649&CATLN=6&Highlight=&FullDetails=True
All the best,
Crumpp
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Crumpp, will you do something about that problem of yours.
The 109s did pretty good? Not with 51.5% of the LW casualities being 109s and out numbering the Spits and Hurries of 11 Group by at least 2:1. (11 Group being the main combat area)
Note is says the Spitfires and Hurricanes of 11 Group. The opposing German force was Luftflotte 2.
Aug 13/16 1940:
Luftflotte 2 had 544 109s.
11 Group had 352 Spits(6 squadrons)/Hurries(16 squadrons).
So a ratio of 1.55:1 in the LW's favor if, and only if, the fighters of 11 Group ignore the LW bombers.
Now you can twist, manipulate data and do what ever else you want to, but the odds were in the German's favor, 11 Group vs Luftflotte 2.
Yes Widewing, Crummp just can't get this though his knoggin.
One reason the RAF fought at a numerical disadvantage was that the Luftwaffe was able to concentrate their numbers, whereas the RAF had to spread their fighters over the whole of southern England.
And it was just not southern England but the whole of Great Britain, even to bases 600mi from London.
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In historian lingo this is saying; "these numbers will be disputed by many who have researched fighter strength levels, but exact numbers are not as important as the context of events." Which can be further interpreted as admitting they are not willing to go to battle defending the PRO AIR numbers. This type of notation is common when the author is trying to avoid readers focusing on incidental details that would diminish their primary goal.
No that kind of terminology is common when new information is presented that many will find unpalatable. We are talking about British pride in the concept of the "few" holding off the "many" being eroded.
Being a professional military publication, they are not so much concerned with national perceptions or pride. They are concerned with discovering the facts and fighting future war.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by MiloMorai
Yes Widewing, Crummp just can't get this though his knoggin.
One reason the RAF fought at a numerical disadvantage was that the Luftwaffe was able to concentrate their numbers, whereas the RAF had to spread their fighters over the whole of southern England.
And it was just not southern England but the whole of Great Britain, even to bases 600mi from London.
Indeed, Fighter Command had to deploy assets north to counter the threat of Luftflotte 5, based in Norway with nearly 200 combat aircraft.
My regards,
Widewing
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Indeed, Fighter Command had to deploy assets north to counter the threat of Luftflotte 5,
You should probably read up more on Luftflotte V's participation in the BoB and the amount of warning the RAF had in raids coming out of Norway.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
You should probably read up more on Luftflotte V's participation in the BoB and the amount of warning the RAF had in raids coming out of Norway.
All the best,
Crumpp
Why do you resort to personal slights?
Luftflotte5 conducted its first and last raid on August 14. Unfortunately, (as I stated) Fighter Command had resources deployed to counter this. 63 He 111s escorted by 21 Bf 110s were intercepted by Spitfires and Hurris, shooting down 7 of each type. Another He 111 was dispatched by a Blenheim. Later in the afternoon, 50 Ju 88s (without escort) flying from Denmark bombed Driffield airfield, but lost 7 bombers and many more damaged.
Luftflotte 5 was effectively out of the BoB, but Fighter Command still retained units north because the threat remained. After KG26 and KG30 redeployed to Luftflotte 2, Fighter Command shifted some squadrons south. However, the fact remains that for all of August, 15 FC squadrons deployed north.
My regards,
Widewing
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Luftflotte 5 was effectively out of the BoB,
Correct.
The British had Ultra intercepts to confirm this so they knew a large force chasing phantoms was not needed.
To imply otherwise is just not true.
Fighter Command still retained units north because the threat remained.
The units maintained in the north were primarily there to rest and refit. Protection from any threat from Luftflotte V was hardly taxing duty.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Been watching this thread with interest.
Few bits of info.
In the ealry stages the battle was borne almost exclusively by 11 group.
Was not until the LW started bombing London that 12 group and 10 group was used regularly.
Shortly after this Leigh-Mallory and Baders "Big Wings" (i.e. mass attacks) were utilised, prior to this raids were 'typically' intercepted by relatively small (16-20) numbers of fighters, as Dowding was trying to preserve his forces.
Sidenote - Just caught an snippet from Gunther Rall, in his opinion the LW never recovered from the losses sustained in the BoB.
[edit] Just dug thorugh an old book.
This is what is listed as total (i.e. 10,11,12 and 13 groups) RAF strength as of July 1 1940.
1st figure avail, 2nd fig serviceable.
Hurri - 463, 347
Spit - 286, 160
Defiant - 37, 25
Blenhein - 114, 59
Airfleets 2 and 3 were still redeploying and it would be some weeks before at full strength, but on July 20 could call on
Bf109 - 809, 656
Bf110 - 246, 168
Ju87 - 316, 248
Buffs - 1131, 769
Airfleet 5
Bf109 - 84 (unknown if serviceable or total)
Bf110 - 43, 32
Buffs - 129, 95
So I suppose if you take OVERALL single fighter strength for both sides it is only slightly biased towards the LW, but when you consider that the full might of airfleets 2 and 3 were thrown against mainly 11 group, the 2:1 in favour of the LW looks more likely.
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but when you consider that the full might of airfleets 2 and 3 were thrown against mainly 11 group, the 2:1 in favour of the LW looks more likely.
Couple of points your missing.
1. The Luftwaffe single engine fighter units never achieved "full strength". They became even smaller as the battle progressed.
Read the article I posted. The Luftwaffe did not have a plan in place to fix large numbers of aircraft nor did they manufacture new ones at any increased production rate.
2. Luftflotte III and Luftflotte II combined their "might" only once. On 07 Sep 1940, the day Angus has chosen as his typical example.
The Luftwaffe never did that again. They lost whole stafflen out of Luftflotte III when they ran out gas and had to ditch.
So I suppose if you take OVERALL single fighter strength for both sides it is only slightly biased towards the LW,
Are you thinking the RAF did not use the aircraft they manufactured?
You have to ask yourself what makes more sense.
Did the Luftwaffe violate a principal of war by not having the necessary numerical superiority in fighters?
Today we know an air force needs a minimum of a 6:1 numerical advantage in air superiority fighters over an opponent to achieve total air superiority in a pure air campaign.
This theory is based off historical experience and draws lessons from all applicable conflicts.
The Luftwaffe was the first air force in history to attempt to achieve total air superiority in a pure air campaign. No theory or experience existed for them to draw lessons or model.
The Luftwaffe thought they had a 2:1 advantage in single engine fighters and a 3:1 advantage in all planes. Remember though, their intelligence estimates were wrong.
By using radar ground control, the RAF was able to multiply it's force by having them attack were they could gain advantage.
Even on 7 Sep 40 this occurred. The first Luftwaffe raid from ErprGr 210 was escorted by 21 Bf-109's and an equal number of Bf-110's. 4 RAF squadrons were sent to intercept and the Luftwaffe took casualties. The late afternoon raid was the same story again with ErprGr 210 being escorted.
The middle raid was escorted by almost the entire combined strength of Luftflotte II and Luftflotte III single engine fighters. Only two bombers from KG 30 were lost due to flak on that mission. JG26 filed six claims against the attacking "spitfires".
The handful of times the Luftwaffe was able to achieve a anything close to a 2:1 numerical advantage they inflicted greater losses than they took. 1.55:1 is about the largest advantage in the air the Luftwaffe was ever able to gain.
However the vast majority of the encounters things were even in single engine fighters or with the Luftwaffe 109's outnumbered due to the insistence that the Bf-110 was an effective escort fighter.
OR You can believe
The Hurricane and the Spitfire were so superior to the Bf-109 that they could fight outnumbered 2:1 and win?
The Bf-109, Spitfire, and Hurricane were design contemporaries. The assumption is RAF was years ahead of everyone else in aeronautical engineering to have produced two such world beating fighters.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Think your missing a few points -
I was pointing out that rather than OVERALL numbers you should be looking at 'area' numbers.
As I said the majority of the battle was borne almost exclusively by 11 Group, against them was the 2nd and 3rd LW airfleets.
By combined I meant not neccesarily at the same time, but also raids at different times.
In the early stages Dowding only ever 'typically' comitted a small number (16-20) of aircraft to intercept the raid, the objective being to break up the raid not necessarily shoot anything down.
Once the LW turned to bombing airfields 12 Group started to be used to cover the airfields while 11 Group continued to be used to intercept the raids. 12 Group's performance in this role was less than stellar, mainly due to Leigh-Mallory's and Baders attempt to get their "Big Wings" together.
In fact after the BoB the RAF carried out a wargame in which "Big Wings" were utilised from the outset, the result was a dismal failure.
Once the LW turned their attention to bombing London this now released 12 Group and allowed them to be used also to attack the incoming raids also. In addition parts of 10 group could also be used.
In fact the 1st time the LW was met by the combined forces of 10,11 and 12 group was not until 15 Sep, the famous "How many reserves have we got?" question Churchill asked.
The second raid of 15 Sep was met by approx 170 Spits and Hurris.
Big Wings consisted of at least 3 sqns, the minimum level of fighters required to meet the LW on something approaching equal terms.
So this is how I see it
Early stages - LW big advantage in numbers due to Dowdings use of typically only 16-20 aircraft to intercept a raid.
Mid stages - LW advantage less as 12 Group got used more.
Late stages - LW little or no advantage once the combined use of 10,11 and 12 Groups was possible, and "Big Wings" were utilised.
Of course for the North, the RAF would have a full advantage as no 109's could make the Scandinavia to S. Scotland/N.E. England crossing.
However you look at the numbers the majority of the LW assault was met mainly by only 11 Group up until the very late stages of the BoB.
Not getting into how many were shot down by either side, until the day they drain the English Channel we'll never know for sure.
Suffice to say the LW sustained big enough losses that in became intolerable.
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Wonderful Kev; you took almost all words out of my mouth!
One thing missing, - I belive 10th group had some joustles in the first three phases of the fight - as opposing Luftflotte III.
And Crumpp: Again on the 7th of September it probably marks the day that the RAF was first able to intercept with big numbers. The really big day was just as well Sep the 15th, and basically, quoting Galland then the LW threw up as much as they could muster in 38 daylight raids. Cannot remember the date when they put Luftflotte III bombers to night raids, - but they didn't do it with the 109's!!!
As for this:
"Although the main battle area took place there, 11 Group was not the only RAF Group to fight in the battle. That has been proven. All the RAF Groups were within easy range of the RAF single engined fighters.
Luftflotte III ability to influence the battle was severely impaired due to the lack of range of the 109. London was 40 miles beyond the normal combat radius of the Bf-109E from the closest Luftwaffe fighter base.
Even then only a small percentage of their combat power could be brought to bear on 11th Group."
Once and again, Luftflotte III fighters were transferred to escort on the London raids. Once and again, the Luftflotte III original 109 bases are only 140 miles from London. Once and again, that is a vastly shorter distance than the bulk of 10th, 12th and the whole of 13th group. Once and again, 13th group did NOT move south to fight.
Then this cookie:
"Luftflotte III and Luftflotte II combined their "might" only once. On 07 Sep 1940, the day Angus has chosen as his typical example. "
Regarding bombers only, - perhaps, - and relative to daylight bombing.
Look at the numbers from Eagle day, and the 15th as well.....
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Wasn't missing out 10 Group from the ealry stages. Just that in the main 11 Group bore the brunt of the attacks early/mid stages.
Sept 7 - Saw all 21 sqns around London up to intercept the first bombing raid on London. Against them was almost 1000 (debated here I believe, maybe closer to 700?) aircraft, 1/3 of them bombers. A formation 1.5 miles high, covering 800 sq miles. (Must have been awe inspiring whichever side you were on)
Sep 9- Airfleet 3 were swapped to night-ops and the start of regular interceptions of raids by 60-70 Spits and hurris.
Sep 15 - All avialable Spit/Hurris from 10,11, and 12 Group (170 total) intercept the 2nd raid of the day.
Sep 18 - First real use of "Big wings" by Dowding. Unescorted formation of Ju-88 attacked by 100+ fighters.
Sep 30 - 2 waves of 200+ aircraft engaged by 12 sqns of 11 Group.
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I was pointing out that rather than OVERALL numbers you should be looking at 'area' numbers.
Even looking at the "area numbers" the conclusions are the same.
The Luftwaffe did not have a huge numerical advantage for all but a tiny portion of the battle if you include the Luftwaffe force movements as well.
Your assumption of RAF tactics changing the numbers of aircraft is wrong.
Post-war analysis agrees that Dowding and Park's approach was best for 11 Group.
The "small wing" vs. "big wing" is irrelevant to the strategy. It makes no difference whether 4-6 squadrons enter the battle as individual units or whether they enter it as a single formation.
There are still 4-6 squadrons in the fight. Most Air Forces subscribe to the "small wing" theory, giving the small unit leaders the greatest amount of tactical flexibility.
The major obstacle for "small wing" tactics is pilot navigational skill. This tactic became much easier to do with Radar Ground Control.
Not to enter the "big wing" or "small wing" debate in this thread though.
The issue caused intense friction between Park and Leigh-Mallory, as Leigh-Mallory's 12 Group were tasked with protecting 11 Group's airfields whilst Park's squadrons intercepted incoming raids.
The Luftwaffe was successful in the airfield portion because it forced the RAF to divide their equal forces. The Germans knew the targets and could concentrate their equal single engine fighter forces over them. Had they stuck to this strategy, they would have won but IMHO it would have been a Pyrrhic victory as they did not have the numerical superiority to deal with the RAF.
Dowding was a shrewd strategist and IMHO does not receive the recognition he is due.
In spite of this RAF Fighter Command was able to achieve high levels of efficiency, at times achieving interception rates greater than 80%. The R/T problems were solved late in the battle with the adoption of Very High-Frequency (VHF) radio sets which gave clearer voice communications, had longer range and provided multiple channels. For all its faults the RAF had a system of ground control that allowed its fighters to be where they were needed. The Luftwaffe, with no such system, was always at a disadvantage.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Britain
The shift to London took much of the pressure off the British air force and allowed it to concentrate, all of its efforts against the Luftwaffe. British bases no longer needed fighter protection, and the Royal Air Force was able to concentrate its fighters against the now predictable Luftwaffe.62
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/warden/wrdchp03.htm
The RAF did not attempt to turn back every Luftwaffe formation that penetrated their airspace. They concentrated their defense against formations they knew they could defeat or inflict casualties.
This can easily be seen in the response to the 07 Sep 1940 Raids. On the one occasion the Luftwaffe was able to field a 1.55:1 ratio of single engine fighters, the RAF essentially offered token resistance where the Germans were strongest. They concentrated their forces to attain numerical superiority on the weaker Luftwaffe raids inflicting proportionate casualties to their numerical advantage in single engine fighters.
The Case III air superiority fight can be won if the air commander employs his forces well. If he concentrates, if he accepts some penetrations in order to maul others, and if he develops and uses a good warning and control system, he can beat a larger air force. Conversely, if he tries to defend everywhere, if he commits his forces piecemeal, if he fails to concentrate, he will lose -- and may even lose against a much smaller air force if the attacker outsmarts him.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/warden/wrdchp04.htm
At no point during the campaign was a super Spitfire or Hurricane holding off 2:1 odds of Bf-109's. The concept is laughable except as a vehicle to increase national pride or push a gaming agenda and has no basis in fact, military history, theory, or strategy.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Crumpp has already been told that most of the fighters of Luftflotte 3 were tranferred to Luftflotte 2.
On can plainly see this in the OoBs for August and September.
The first Luftwaffe raid from ErprGr 210 was escorted by 21 Bf-109's and an equal number of Bf-110's. 4 RAF squadrons were sent to intercept and the Luftwaffe took casualties.
ErprGr 210, Denain, Bf 109E/Bf 110C/D, 26 on hand, 17 operational.
So we have 59 LW a/c opposed by up to 36 RAF fighters if all 36 intercepted at once.
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Crumpp you are incorrect -
Tactics did change from Dowding/Parks initial early battle strategy of using only 16-20 aircraft to turn back raids to using 60-70 in early Sept, then finally "Big Wings" in mid Sept.
Sep 15th was an 'anomly' in terms of relavtive strengths. As it became obvious that a major attack was on the way ALL available fighters from ALL 3 groups were scrambled.
Yes it matters how they enter the battle -
If they come in in small groups they are easier to deal with than if they come in as a large formation.
MA is a great example - the snail trail from one base to another is much easier to deal with than a similar sized mission arriving all at once.
Yup, Dowding/Park both got a raw deal IMO, mostly due to the friction between them and Leigh-Mallory/Bader.
Yup Dowding specifically refused to send up fighters against pure fighter raids, instead concentrating on mixed or purely bomber raids that could cause significant damage.
Sep 7 - was also one occassion were a single sqn of Hurricanes (249 Sqn) was attacked by 60 109s, thats 4 or 5 : 1 odds. Your point being?
LW was successful in hitting the airfields also because of Leigh-Mallorys/Baders insistance on trying to form up their Big Wings, and on more than one occassion went chasing raids instead of covering airfields.
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ErprGr 210, Denain, Bf 109E/Bf 110C/D, 26 on hand, 17 operational.
Yeah I guess their bombs would not have hindered them in air-to-air combat???
Or the mission unsuccessful if they dumped them???
Geez, quit grasping at straws.:rolleyes:
Yes it matters how they enter the battle -
I was not clear; you have misunderstood me, or the concept of the tactics.
The point of small wing tactics was not to attack the enemy piecemeal. That would be rather stupid and I do not think the "big wing" debate would even be an issue if that was the case.
The tactic involved small units arriving at the same place and time taking the path that works best for them to get there. The individual formation leaders had control of reaching the rendezvous point.
Most air forces use "small wing" tactics today. They simply work the best and allow the most tactical flexibility and individual initiative.
Big Wing tactics involved everyone forming up together and flying under one central formation leader.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Small wing tactics were largely dependent on the little time. Big wings forming up required more time, and did not become practical before the LW swithced inland.
Although Park preferred 2-3 squadrons to hit at once, that was often not even the case, - even on the 7th, most squadrons fought singly.
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Yeah I guess their bombs would not have hindered them in air-to-air combat???
Or the mission unsuccessful if they dumped them???
Geez, quit grasping at straws.:rolleyes:
No grasping at straws Crumpp.
The primary mission of the RAF fighters was to take on the bombers, NOT take on the LW fighters. You find this impossible to grasp. If the RAF fighters forced the LW bombers to jettison their bombs, the mission of the RAF fighters was partialy successful.
Btw, that is a LW advantage of 1.6:1.
The tactic involved small units arriving at the same place and time taking the path that works best for them to get there. The individual formation leaders had control of reaching the rendezvous point.
The RAF fighters did not all arrive at the same place and at the same time.
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Still unsure why this is a Spit/Hurri v 109 when it comes to the BoB.
In reality it was Spit/Hurri v all aspects of the LW.
Its seems absurd to even discuss it in a fighter v fighter aspect as it clearly wasn't.
"The Few" comes from the FACT that "A Few" (compared to LW strength) managed to halt the vaunted LW in its tracks in the Summer of 1940.
10 fighters v 10 fighters + 80 bombers is still 10 v 90 no matter which way you look at it.
On the few occassions that similar numbers of fighters only engaged each other the losses were about the same.
As has been said the primary target of both the Spit and Hurris were the bombers, not the fighters.
As an intersesting aside - Even in 1940 the RAF were replacing its aircraft losses by nearly a 3:1 ratio over the LW. Nearly 500 single engined fighters per month were being produced Jun/July/Aug as opposed to Germanys average of 156.
Getting the pilots to fly them was the problem.
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The RAF fighters did not all arrive at the same place and at the same time.
Please find where I claim this did not happen?
It was not the intention of small wing tactics. While some attacks did occur piecemeal, most did not.
To claim otherwise is simply wrong.
This success is why "small wing" tactics are the standard for modern air forces today.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Still unsure why this is a Spit/Hurri v 109 when it comes to the BoB.
Because single engine fighters are the type designed to win air supeiority.
You cannot win it with a bomber.
the analysis focuses primarily on the single-seat fighters deployed by the respective air forces. It was in this arena that the Luftwaffe needed to prevail if it were to achieve air superiority over southern England and, in so doing, defeat the Royal Air Force.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443
Getting the pilots to fly them was the problem.
Germans replaced pilots at a slower rate than the RAF as well.
The Luftwaffe simply did not have the numerical superiority required to win total air superiority in an air only campaign. Compounding this was their lack of increased production, slow reconstitution program, and slow pilot replacement system.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Agreed, but the aim of the RAF in the BoB was not to win air superiority, but to survive by inflicting unacceptable losses on the LW as a whole, with the primary targets being bombers, the ones who could damage the RAF the most (aircraft prod, airfields etc).
so to try limitng it to a pure fighter v fighter aspect cant and wont work.
10 Spits/10 hurris v 20 109s/80 bombers still equals 20 v 100 no matter how you slice it.
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Agreed, but the aim of the RAF in the BoB was not to win air superiority, but to survive by inflicting unacceptable losses on the LW as a whole.
Correct, it was on the defensive with the objective of keeping the Luftwaffe from gaining total air superiority.
Single engine fighters are the most important factor in winning air superiority.
Again, you cannot win air superiority with a bomber. The 8th AF rediscovered this in late 1943.
10 Spits/10 hurris v 20 109s/80 bombers still equals 20 v 100 no matter how you slice it.
See above.
bombers, the ones who could damage the RAF the most (aircraft prod, airfields etc).
Please find anything to back up this assumption. Bombers offered little threat to Fighter Command itself.
Both airfields and production facilities were rapidly repaired.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Again agreed
But when you remeber the LW all but brought the RAF to its knees just by constant bombing of airfields with raid after raid after raid, the pure air superiority aspect gets a little blurred.
It was the change of target to London that allowed the RAF to regroup and rearm, and more importantly get a little rest.
I have little doubt had the LW continued bombing airfields etc the outcome may have been different.
To say bombers offered little threat to FC itself is wierd. If you can't replace downed aircraft that has a DIRECT affect on FC.
Thats like saying it was no worth the allies bombing German Industry as it had no direct affect on the LW.
Anything that has a direct affect on your capabilites is a threat.
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But when you remeber the LW all but brought the RAF to its knees just by constant bombing of airfields with raid after raid after raid, the pure air superiority aspect gets a little blurred.
Not because of damaging the airfields but the Luftwaffe strategy forced the RAF to divide it's forces. 10 Group protected 11 Group airfields while 11 Group intercepted Luftwaffe formations. This means an entire Group was removed from the fight unless that particular airfield was under attack.
The RAF Groups were much more operationally flexible than the Luftflotte's. They constantly worked in each others "areas" and were sent where needed. The "area" was more a place to land than a boundry they must operate in.
A Luftflotte was viewed as a completely seperate and independant organization. Think of it as a task force with each having their own fighters, bombers, transports, and general aircraft. For example, Luftflotte II bore the brunt of the fighting for the Luftwaffe. Luftflotte III on occasion was assigned daylight targets but for the most part was charged with conducting the "night blitz". During the Luftwaffe's big push on London, they were assigned daylight targets seperate from Luftflotte II.
Generally you will not find Luftflotte III fighters escorting Luftflotte II bombers or attacking Luftflotte II targets.
Other sources give slightly different figures, but most agree that the Luftwaffe deployed an effective strength of slightly more than 900 Bf 109 fighters out of some 1,000 aircraft. This comprised the bulk of their single-seat fighter force. Approximately 150 aircraft remained in other theatres, including Germany, to defend against possible Bomber Command attacks. [34] By comparison, Fighter Command could field 52 squadrons of Hurricanes and Spitfires, nearly 1,100 aircraft (Table 3).Thus, in terms of single-seat fighters, the opposing air forces were fairly evenly matched, albeit Fighter Command was outnumbered more than 3:1 overall.
Of course, these figures only provide an opening balance. Not unexpectedly, the strength of the respective air forces changed over the course of the summer and autumn as attrition took its toll. However, when looking at the overall picture, Figure 3, it is evident that Fighter Command steadily fielded more single-seat fighters as the battle progressed. In fact, as the Royal Air Force grew stronger, the Luftwaffe grew weaker. [36]
What makes this all the more surprising is that Fighter Command's operational losses were significantly higher than those suffered by the Luftwaffe's fighter force (Figure 4). This was equally true for the Battle of France as it was for the Battle of Britain. Thus, for 4 months, July-October 1940, Fighter Command lost more than 900 Hurricanes and Spitfires [37] compared to 600 Bf 109s recorded by the Luftwaffe quartermaster returns. [38]
Of course, operational losses do not tell the whole picture since they exclude accidents and other wastage.
At the height of the battle, Fighter Command's total wastage in Hurricanes and Spitfires was more than 180 percent of its operational losses, compared to 140 percent for the Luftwaffe's Bf 109s.
It could be argued that a better test of relative strength is serviceability.
All in all, it seems safe to conclude that serviceability remained fairly constant in Fighter Command throughout the battle, somewhere between 80 and 90 percent. [43]
The Luftwaffe figures, drawn from quartermaster returns, indicate that the serviceability of the single-engine fighter force fell from slightly more than 80 percent at the start of the battle to close to 70 percent by autumn. These are also somewhat higher than other sources might indicate. Indeed, Richard Overy suggested that the number of serviceable Bf 109s could have fallen to as low as 40 percent of the total strength in October l940. [44] If, as discussed previously, operational wastage was actually higher than recorded, then availability may well have fallen to these levels. What is not in doubt is that Fighter Command, unlike the Luftwaffe, was largely able to sustain the serviceability of its fighter force.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_3
All the best,
Crumpp
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Which all fits with one of my original posts were I said the RAF probably came close to achieving a 1:1 ratio (fighters) by end Sep. By which time the BoB was all but over, yes there still nuisance raids through Oct, but never again at the levels of early Sep.
12 Group were usually tasked to protect 11 Groups airfields. Most of the time 12 Group either arrived late, or failed to show as they were off chasing raids instead.
In fact 12 Group couldn't be fully utilised until the target switch to London, partly range issues.
To say that bombers couldn't threaten FC directly is absurd.
There is no point shooting down the enemy at say 2:1 if the enemy is turning out replacement aircraft at 3:1..in the long run, you lose.
If Britain was turning out replacement aircraft at approx average of 5000:166 July/Aug/sept with bombing, imagine how it would have been without bombing.
The BoB might of finished earlier.
Serviceability - Problem wasn't serviceable aircraft, but finding pilots to fly them. No point having 100 serviceable aircraft and 10 pilots.
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To say that bombers couldn't threaten FC directly is absurd.
Did unescorted bombers directly threaten the Luftwaffe in 1943 or win air superiority over Europe?
Which all fits with one of my original posts were I said the RAF probably came close to achieving a 1:1 ratio (fighters) by end Sep. By which time the BoB was all but over, yes there still nuisance raids through Oct, but never again at the levels of early Sep.
Yes but the RAF started the battle with pretty much a numerical parity in single engine fighters.
They took higher losses IMHO due to squadron level tactics of using "Vics" and the fact their pilot quality was generally lower at this time in the war than the Luftwaffe.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Look at the deployment of the alleged equal number of single engined fighters.
You seem to think everyone of them was flying out of 11 groups airfields.
I suppose we could quibble over the word directly - In my opinion if bombing results in fewer aircaft replacements, destroyed airfields, destroyed maintenance areas, thus hindering my ability to put a larger fighter force in the air, that directly affects me. IMO.
If I bomb your only aircraft fuel refinery, although not a direct attack on your aircraft, it directly affects you.
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Look at the deployment of the alleged equal number of single engined fighters.
No I don't. Difference though being the RAF Groups worked together defensively. The Luftflottes worked independantly as I stated earlier.
Just counting 11 Group's strength is not correct. It does not show the RAF defensive strength.
Showing total numbers for either side does not complete the picture but it does give relative strengths and capabilities.
In my opinion if bombing results in fewer aircaft replacements, destroyed airfields, destroyed maintenance areas, thus hindering my ability to put a larger fighter force in the air, that directly affects me. IMO.
Yes it does hinder their ability until the damage is repaired and loss made up. If the effect only last's a day and is made up the following day, then it is not hindering the strategic ability of the force.
All the best,
Crumpp
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But a large number of them didn't have the range to be involved in the early stages of the BoB.
In fact 13 Group only ever was used as a rest and re-coup area or to counter Northern raids. Yet they still had Spits/Hurris based up there (164 Spits/Hurri on July 1st)
A closer approxiamtion for the early stages would be 11 Group strength vs Airfleet 2/3.
Mid stages you could begin to include 12 Group.
Late stages all three, 10/11/12.
Northern raids was 13 Group v Airfleet 5 (yes RAF had advantage there)
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Serviceability - Problem wasn't serviceable aircraft, but finding pilots to fly them. No point having 100 serviceable aircraft and 10 pilots.
They had pilots, Kev.
Fighter Command's losses were begining to exceed their ability to replace them during the attacks on the airfields.
It was estimated their system would have collapsed in a few weeks if they had continued to sustain losses at that rate. At the tip of the spear they had pilots but mathmatically they could not have replaced them as fast they were losing them.
It was not longer an issue when the Luftwaffe switched to bombing London. This freed up the Group securing airfields and allowed them to go after the Luftwaffe raids.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Yes but until the switch to London they were running out of them.
As I said the problem was never replacing aircraft losses, but finding people to put in the cockpit.
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"Did unescorted bombers directly threaten the Luftwaffe in 1943 or win air superiority over Europe?"
Oranges and Apples Crumpp - again, look at geography. 30 miles of a neutral water does not equal cruising over HUNDREDS of miles of hostile territory while the territory, as such, remains an Ally!
Shame on you, you should really not enter something that naive!!!
(I rather tend to belive that already in 1940 the RAF alone could have reduced Calais to absolute rubble if you see what I mean)
As for the Pilot aspect - Kev, again has this absolutely right. However partially this was a bit of a RAF screwup. There were many well trained pilots available within coastal command the RN, and Bomber command, - they just needed to be converted. The LW did this exact mistake in the late war and converted many a pilot through a "crash course" to fly a 109 and/or 190. By that time, the RAF and USSAF had many many pilots. You know this part.
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Oranges and Apples Crumpp
Only in your mind, Angus. To Military planners is the same thing.
The Luftwaffe was flying to the extent of it's range over hostile territory in 1940 just as the USAAF was doing in 1943.
So please tell us the big differences?
And drop the drama.
Angus says:
As for the Pilot aspect - Kev, again has this absolutely right.
These were desperate times for the RAF, which was also taking many casualties in the air. Aircraft production could replace aircraft but replacement pilots were barely keeping place with losses, and novice flyers were being shot down in droves. Most replacements had as little as nine hours flying time and no combat training. The Luftwaffe referred to these pilots as "cannon fodder". At this point the multinational nature of the RAF came to the fore. With many pilots from the Dominions already serving in Fighter Command — Australians, South Africans, New Zealanders and Canadians — they were bolstered by the arrival of fresh Czechoslovakian and Polish squadrons. In addition there were other nationals, including Free French, Belgian and even a Palestinian pilot serving amongst the squadrons.
The RAF at least had the advantage of fighting over home territory. Pilots who bailed out of their shot-down aircraft could be back at their airfields within hours. For Luftwaffe aircrews, a bail out over England meant capture, while parachuting into the English Channel often meant drowning or death from exposure. Morale began to suffer and kanalkrankheit or 'Channel Sickness' — a form of combat fatigue — began to appear amongst the German pilots. The replacement problem was even worse than the British.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Britain
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Please find where I claim this did not happen?
It was not the intention of small wing tactics. While some attacks did occur piecemeal, most did not.
To claim otherwise is simply wrong.
Sure if you say so.
Deighton, pg216 Sept 15
S/L Kent of #303 sent 9 of his Hurries to the attack bombers and led the remaining 2 to take on the 50 escorting 109s when he could not contact the Contoller to have #229, which was heading away from the Germans, to assist him.
This happened more than you think. On another day only 2/3 of the units engaged.
Deighton, pg212 for Sept 7
"It has been suggested that the intercepted Enigma signals that British intelligence supplied to Dowding and Park (althiugh not to the other commanders) warned them of the German intentions, but on the English side of the Channel Park had no idea that London was the target of this daylight raid."
So much for Crumpp's claim about Ultra. This the biggest raid so far and the Brits were totally in the dark about it.:eek: This raid was ~1000 a/c, split 1/3 bombers, 2/3 fighters.
The RAF Groups were much more operationally flexible than the Luftflotte's. They constantly worked in each others "areas" and were sent where needed. The "area" was more a place to land than a boundry they must operate in.
Sure it was. That is why there was a crisp note from the 12 Group commander, Leigh-Mallory, that complained of an 11Group a/c shooting down an a/c in the 12 Group area.
Deighton pg 206
"In the 20 minutes it took a Spitfire to climb to 20,00ft, even the slow German bombers could travel 80 mi. Added to this was the imperfection of the radar, which was now suffering from regular jamming. Few Controllers commited the bulk of their forces if the weather was good enough to wait for a confirmed visual."
I wunder how the 109s of JG53 made it home to the Cherbourg area after escorting KG51 to Ventnor and Portsmouth on Aug 12?
Deighton, pg 202, Aug 31
"1300 fighter sortie flown to protect 150 bombers"
Kev/Angus, the use of total numbers is an excuse the LW fanatics use to justify the LW loosing BoB.
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Crumpp: About the distance!!!!! AGAIN!!!!!
"Only in your mind, Angus. To Military planners is the same thing."
Milo just pointed out the numbers from scramble to 20K and how much the inbound raid would travel in the meantime. The difference in the late war USSAF raids on Germany is VAST. Absolute oranges and apples.
It compares rather well to the LW trying to cruise in daylight over the whole of England up to Newcastle (from the south) while the south would typically be a British occupied area with flak, radar and some airfields, however rather not any targets.
With all the time gone on this thread, did you ever ponder a little over an atlas, - even with a ruler in your hand.
Absolute oranges and apples!
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Ultra -
While useful only gave a limited view.
It provided the LW OOB but not things like serviceable aircraft or total strengths.
It could on rare occassions give clues to the LW 'likely' level of activity, good example is 'Eagle Day'. They knew something was going on, but not exactly what the LW was up to.
Theres also another account, as I said earlier of 249 Sqn losing 6 of their Hurricanes after being bounced by 60 109's.
Old book but by Sept 7 -
LF2 could still field 519 109's
LF3 a further 90 109's
Even allowing for only 50% that still puts approx 300 109s against a total combined force (10,11,12 Groups) on Sep 15 of 170 Spits/Hurris.
I know its an assumption but as it would have considered a "max effort" 50% is probably even a little on the low side.
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The difference in the late war USSAF raids on Germany is VAST.
Well educate us on the difference Angus instead of posturing about it.
Other than relative distances there is none. The Luftwaffe in the West was even smaller than the RAF in 1939.
So much for Crumpp's claim about Ultra.
Not my claim.
Then there were the vital contributions of Ultra to air warfare in the winning of the Battle of Britain, and in permitting the British to mount such an effective (if vain) defense of Crete against the German paratroop and glider forces that Hitler lost faith in airborne warfare and used these specially trained troops as infantry in future operations. All of this is presented in engrossing detail.
http://www.cia.gov/csi/kent_csi/docs/v20i1a04p_0002.htm
The British had been making use of radio intercept information since early 1940 when "The Bomb" was put into operation at Bletchley Park. This first useful result was related to the Luftwaffe.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/ultra/navy-1.html
I saw Deighton's book in Barnes and Noble's. I did not purchase it as it seemed more fandom than a History.
Kind of like those Civil War buffs that try and justify a battle's conclusion based on the number of nails in the confederate boots.
All the best,
Crumpp
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I know its an assumption
Yes it is and one that does not jive with the documented facts.
Kev/Angus, the use of total numbers is an excuse the LW fanatics use to justify the LW loosing BoB.
So the theory being the RAF produced all those planes but did not use them in their most desperate hour....
:confused:
Do we really think the British are that stupid? What were they saving them for? To be used after the occupation by the resistance?
That is even more laughable than "Super Spitfires and Hurricanes" theory!!
All the best,
Crumpp
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On the "Eve of the battle" - July 1
Combat ready
RAF - 507 Spits/Hurris split between 10/11/12/13 Groups, some 300 at 11 Group alone (90+ Spitfires).
LW - 656 Bf109 between LF 2 and 3 (not at full strength till few weeks later then possibly 750 Bf109's)
Considering 11 Group bore the brunt of the battle 2:1 odds look about right.
I have no idea where 1,100 comes from, even including Defiants and Blenheims total serviceable strength still only = 591 aircraft.
If you include all serviceable aircraft types in LF 2 and 3 the total = 1935.
[Edit]
Yes I do
Total aircraft is approx 1000 for RAF, but in that case total aircraft for LF 2 and 3 = 2651
These figures are total strengths, not serviceable, and you still have to allow for the RAF being split into 4 Groups of which 1 bore the main attacks.
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RAF - 507 Spits/Hurris split between 10/11/12/13 Groups, some 300 at 11 Group alone (90+ Spitfires).
You guys keep insisting that 11 Group fought alone. It very much did not. Although the battle took place primarily in 11 Group's area, it is quite clear that both 10 Group and 12 Group were regular participants.
In the first phase maybe. During this phase large scale action did not occur from either side.
In this stage of the battle, the Luftwaffe was in effect probing the British defences - looking for weaknesses before a major assault could be launched to exploit them.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/phase1.html
In Phase II when the Luftwaffe begins large scale actions we see the RAF responed with combined Group defenses. This is when 10 Group becomes responsible for protecting 11 Group airfields while 11 Group intercepts incoming Luftwaffe raids.
I have no idea where 1,100 comes from,
It comes from this document:
PRO AIR 20/2307
http://www.catalogue.nationalarchives.gov.uk/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATID=1762649&CATLN=6&Highlight=&FullDetails=True&j=1
All the best,
Crumpp
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Crumpp:
"You guys keep insisting that 11 Group fought alone. It very much did not"
Yes it did.
That's why they also had about as many kills as all the other groups put together.
That applies to claims, and presumably better to confirmed kills verified to LW losses, - for 12th group rather tended to overclaim more than others.
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As that doc is down as listing RAF aircrew strength, does it list numbers of pilots, or number of aircraft?
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Yes it did.
Not according to the RAF.
As that doc is down as listing RAF aircrew strength, does it list numbers of pilots, or number of aircraft?
I do not know for sure. I think it list's both but will know for sure when it gets here. My copy was sent out by airmail Friday.
All the best,
Crumpp
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CC Crumpp
Just that the figures I gave for July 1 serviceable 590+ aircraft, also lists 1200 pilots.
Why 1200?
Well not all RAF planes were Spits or Hurricanes, instructors and pilots at OCU were included, pilot was a still a pilot if aircraft was unserviceable.
So it would be quite possible to have 1200 pilots but only 590 serviceable Spits/Hurris/Defiants/Blenheims combat ready..
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So it would be quite possible to have 1200 pilots but only 590 serviceable planes.
Sure but that document lists:
Fighter Command could field 52 squadrons of Hurricanes and Spitfires, nearly 1,100 aircraft (Table 3). Thus, in terms of single-seat fighters, the opposing air forces were fairly evenly matched, albeit Fighter Command was outnumbered more than 3:1 overall.
All the best,
Crumpp
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11 Group
Spitfire - 8 Sqns , 92 planes
Hurricane - 17 Sqns , 217 planes
12 Group
Spitfire - 5 sqns , 53 planes
Hurricane - 3 Sqns , 39 planes
13 Group
Spitfire - 6 Sqns , 64 planes
Hurricane - 9 Sdns , 77 planes
Assorted other types
9 Sdns , 98 planes
10 Group I don't have anything detailed at the moment.
Approx 77 Spits
Approx 130 Hurricanes
But even from those figures you can see Dowding clearly expected (correctly) that 11 Group would be hit hardest.
These are total strength, NOT serviceable figures.
At the same time (July 1st) the RAF had 1200 pilots.
Hope that doc arrives soon, hopefully shed a lot of light on the subject.
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Deighton's book is more pro LW and anti RAF. Can't be that bad as Kurfy uses it all the time.
You guys keep insisting that 11 Group fought alone. It very much did not. Although the battle took place primarily in 11 Group's area, it is quite clear that both 10 Group and 12 Group were regular participants.
My, my, what happened to the 13 Group Spitfires and Hurricanes? We can now dismiss the 13 squadron of Spits and Hurries (208 a/c) from the total number of s/e fighter a/c the RAF had to oppose Luftflotte 2 and 3.
Regular participants? Yet 11 Group's claims were the ~sum of the other 3 Group's claims?
Not my claim.
You were the one who posted someone elses claim, ego: your claim. So, so much for that statement since the Brits had no inkling of the BIG attack.
Fighter Command could field 52 squadrons of Hurricanes and Spitfires, nearly 1,100 aircraft (Table 3). Thus, in terms of single-seat fighters, the opposing air forces were fairly evenly matched, albeit Fighter Command was outnumbered more than 3:1 overall.
And you can't into your noggin that the LW bombers had priority for RAF fighters.
This being the typical scenario: "S/L Kent of #303 sent 9 of his Hurries to the attack bombers and led the remaining 2 to take on the 50 escorting 109s."
So the theory being the RAF produced all those planes but did not use them in their most desperate hour....
Do we really think the British are that stupid?
That is correct. They all were not in the air at the same time and in the same place unlike the LW which consentrated the greater proportion of their a/c in Luftflotte 2 in Aug and even an even greater proportion in Sept. It is not the Brits that are being stupid.
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when fix ta 152 flight models1!!1
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A good site on Bob, http://www.battleofbritain.net/0019.html
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From the link, Document 15.
"Once Britain realised the value of Enigma and how important a part it could play, it was thought that only two commanders in the Royal Air Force, ACM Hugh Dowding and AVM Keith Park knew of its existence other than certain members of the War Office. In actual fact, historian Martin Gilbert has found that because messages were very slow in being deciphered, the information was often 48 hours old before it could have been handed to Fighter Command, and that Fighter Command C-in-C ACM Hugh Dowding did not know of its existence until October 16th 1940 when Dowding was added to the list of people that were made aware of Enigma's existence. In reality, most 'Ultra' decrypts were of limited value during the Battle of Britain, mainly due to the slow deciphering of the machine. The Germans changed the rotors of the machine daily which meant that each day the British had to determine which had been changed so that any codes could continue to be broken.
It is a well known fact that Enigma was of great assistance to the British from 1941 onwards when they were able to decipher the codes more quickly and efficiently. But it is not a proven fact that Enigma was of any assistance to ACM Hugh Dowding."
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So When Luftflotte V's mission turned out to be a disaster for the Luftwaffe due to the Pilot training issues, and the Luftflotte V was taken out of the fight, Dowding would have known thru Ultra decrypts, right?
Great article on the Battle of Britain:
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443
All the best,
Crumpp
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Nice point Milo.
Gilbert's work is in a way the best work of WW2 History, and by far the most detailed on day-to-day events globalwise as well as little odds as Enigma, that I have yet seen. The book I have is a heavy read, and rather depressing really, but absolutely full of rather reliable data.
Deighton, - well, yes, he is a bit of a Luftwobble, - but he has man nice points. "Fighter" has some not-to-good patches in it, but also very many interesting points. "Blood, Tears, and Folly" is a very good read, - but since I have seen some cockups in his work, I rather read this with some awareness.
Shores is really good. Detailed and very reliable. Some of his work is a tad dry though.
John Alcorn's article of the top guns of the RAF is very much based on Shores work, with excessive extra work put into it. Some 20 years of research or so.
It must be valued how much work these guys have put into this. I mean, when you add it up, none of us here has enough lifetime to plough through what they did! On top of that, they have had first rate contact with both WW2 pilots and commanders, generals and planners, - both sides.
It all boils down to some conclusions of course, and to be able to look at this all with a clear head.
That said, I must mention Galland and Johnsson, Bader, Rall and the rest.
Their biographies cannot be so easily discarded as "a narrow view".
After all, they were, in the war and/or after, in contact, they had time to compare what they had been going through, they worked together, they were Generals, Air Marshals, Inspectors, and again, friends. They compared their notes, and reading the both sides, there is never the conflict of this thread............;)
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After all, they were, in the war and/or after, in contact, they had time to compare what they had been going through, they worked together, they were Generals, Air Marshals, Inspectors, and again, friends. They compared their notes, and reading the both sides, there is never the conflict of this thread...
So at a time when documents where still classified or missing they could sit down and share state secrets with one another to compare notes.
OK.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Well:
"So at a time when documents where still classified or missing"
Their logbooks weren't, and they had been, as Galland, in very high positions.
Guys like Galland CREATED many of the documents.....
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Their logbooks weren't, and they had been, as Galland, in very high positions.
That has nothing to do with his willingness or anyone else's willingness to divulge state secrets.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Oh, come on, what aspect about the BoB would Galland sit on, years and years after the war had passed?
Those guys joined hands, exchanged informations, worked for NATO, and became good friends. IMHO one of the few "sweet" things in the long list of WW2 aftermath.
Galland went to Bader's funeral. Bader's sons went to Galland's. Rall was a good friend of Johnny Johnsson, Hub Zemke, and Gabresky. When Johnny was buried in England, Rall stayed at his son's home (London).
To sum up, they pretty much compared their stuff, and when you read their work, there is not much of a conflict. So what to divulge?
Speaking of that, there is a lot of data getting lost rather than being retrieved, - the bulk of things adding to history is the refining of available data. I bet Galland saw and got to know stuff that one can not easily find on paper today.
As with Rall. I have got answers from him that I could not find on hundreds of pages.
Sadly, we're loosing them one by one. But their work stayes there.
Did you read Galland? Rall? Johnny? Bader?
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The Ex-German servicemembers may or may not have had any legal obligations to safeguard secrets of the former German Government depending on the regulations of the Federal Republic of Germany.
The British serviceman very much did have a legal and binding duty to protect classified information. It is not only the document that is classified, Angus. It is the information it contains as well.
All the best,
Crumpp
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I know of the PRO documents that are being made public now, mostly secret service stuff. 50 years of discretion.
But as for the order of battle or squadron strenghts and locations, ops books, and more the is no secrecy and has not been for a long time.
Johnny was still writing at the time of his death, and although the books from him that I have are older, one of them seems to be written as a teaching book of air to air tactics. Rall's book is from last year, Galland's "Ersten und die Letzten" from the fifties, (He was involved in much more writing), and so on. Point being, that it does not seem to make much difference when the work is done, - it all goes in rather good harmony.
So, what secret divulging do you expect to expose? What is your point in the relation of divulging to this thread? A great serviceman conspiracy?
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But as for the order of battle or squadron strenghts and locations, ops books, and more the is no secrecy and has not been for a long time.
You better check on that. Those are exactly the things that are classified. The Strength Report I just ordered from the PRO was classified.
No conspiracy at all Angus. Just the facts.
All the best,
Crumpp
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A summed up strength report from what? Secret service?
I've been there Crumpp, and seen what's on the table. I rather doubt you'll find some secret armies lurking there, especially those unknown to VIP's such as Galland. Well it's your time, and I'm all ears ;)
If you go to London make sure to have time for the PRO. It's some 45 minutes from central town. But the coolest IMHO is the photo archive of the IWM in S-London.
Best of luck ;)
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I've been there Crumpp, and seen what's on the table.
Then I am sure you noticed the big stamp marked "SECRET" on many of the documents, Angus. The majority of these documents were not declassified until the mid-1970's and some where not declassified until recently.
No conspiracy, just the law.
All the best,
Crumpp
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A big batch of intel docs were declassified last year. 50 years and older.
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Point proven.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
So When Luftflotte V's mission turned out to be a disaster for the Luftwaffe due to the Pilot training issues, and the Luftflotte V was taken out of the fight, Dowding would have known thru Ultra decrypts, right?
Great article on the Battle of Britain:
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443
Your problem strikes again Crumpp.
Fighter Command C-in-C ACM Hugh Dowding did not know of its existence until October 16th 1940 > Ultra that is. By mid Oct the battle was well on its way winding down in daylight ops.
Oh and your link might be great for you but is only so, so in reality.
Better, be sure http://www.battleofbritain.net/
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Gilbert has in his work, a lot of detailes about where and when information from Ultra and Enigma was being used. I'll peek into it today.
I remember on swift glance that Bletchley knew the rough strenght of the LW through Ultra, and perhaps even LW losses over Dunkirk. The question remains how far it was passed on.
It does not change the basic facts though that 13th group stayed (well there was rotation) and yet again 11th group bore the brunt of the fight.
If I find a moment I'll sum up the confirmed kills and sort them by group. N.B. that those are not claims but definate kills.
BTW, some of the best scoring squadrons such as the Polish, were formed amazingly late! So, I'll have to dig into Shore's squadron lists to be able to find who's who!
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Fighter Command C-in-C ACM Hugh Dowding did not know of its existence until October 16th 1940 >
Milo you clearly do not understand how intelligence agencies operate.
There is no requirement for a Commander to know the source of intelligence. He simply receives the information from his intelligence section.
The fact that Hugh Dowding was read on to Ultra simply demonstrates an increase in Ultra's capabilities or an attempt to streamline the lines of communication.
So your "proof" demonstrates a clear lack of understanding of government organization and their workings.
I remember on swift glance that Bletchley knew the rough strenght of the LW through Ultra, and perhaps even LW losses over Dunkirk.
Yes it was in place and the RAF received the benefits of the intelligence it gathered. It was able to deliver more real time actionable intelligence later on but was very viable for determining strengths, disposition, and long term intentions in mid-1940.
All the best,
Crumpp
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"Once Britain realised the value of Enigma and how important a part it could play, it was thought that only two commanders in the Royal Air Force, ACM Hugh Dowding and AVM Keith Park knew of its existence other than certain members of the War Office. In actual fact, historian Martin Gilbert has found that because messages were very slow in being deciphered, the information was often 48 hours old before it could have been handed to Fighter Command, and that Fighter Command C-in-C ACM Hugh Dowding did not know of its existence until October 16th 1940 when Dowding was added to the list of people that were made aware of Enigma's existence. In reality, most 'Ultra' decrypts were of limited value during the Battle of Britain, mainly due to the slow deciphering of the machine. The Germans changed the rotors of the machine daily which meant that each day the British had to determine which had been changed so that any codes could continue to be broken."
"So, did Enigma help Dowding on August 15th 1940 as Winterbotham stated in Bickers book. If this is true, then why didn't Enigma help Dowding when Kenley and Biggin Hill aerodromes were taken by surprise on August 18th 1940. And why didn't Enigma help Dowding when London was attacked on September 7th 1940. If they knew that an attack was to be made on London, why did Dowding ask AVM Keith Park to leave 11 Group HQ and join him in a conference at Fighter Command HQ.
On these theories, we can only be led to believe that the writings of John Ray are the more correct, which in turn means that Dowding did not have access to Enigma, and further to that, Intelligence had still not been able to efficiently interpret and decypher the German codes accurately during the time of the Battle of Britain."
Yet he did not recieve this intelligence that was so essential for the defence of GB during BoB that you claim that he did.
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The evidence is Dowding was not recieving info from Ultra. On the 15th, when Luftflotte III mounted their raids against the NE, the commander of 13 Group, Richard Saul, was on leave, and he wasn't recalled. On the 7th September, when the Luftwaffe switched to attacking London, Park, commander 11 Group, was at the air ministry for a scheduled conference with Dowding. The controllers in 11 Group thought right up until the raid passed over London that it was about to split up and seperate groups would go for the airfields. That's why the interceptions of the raid were so patchy.
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Crumpp:
"Milo you clearly do not understand how intelligence agencies operate.
There is no requirement for a Commander to know the source of intelligence. He simply receives the information from his intelligence section."
I am afraid you are quite wrong here. A little whiff of Enigma being eavesdropped for instance, could have lead to the Germans instantly (and very successfully) switching wheels. No ears any more then.
It was used coldly and carefully, and since the Germans had their sources as well, useful application of the gathered intelligence had to be allocated or related to some other source. So, there was a "needed" source, - something logical enough for the Germans not to get suspicious.
That carefulness was costly on the short run. But the Germans never caught the smell ;)
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Hehe, now this post goes Le Carré style :D
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I am afraid you are quite wrong here.
Angus,
My whole adult life I have been in the Military. Much of it a Commander. What do you do?
In actual fact, historian Martin Gilbert has found that because messages were very slow in being deciphered, the information was often 48 hours old before it could have been handed to Fighter Command,
Messages were slow so it's value for tactical employment is limited. However it was a useful tool for determining strategy.
On these theories, we can only be led to believe that the writings of John Ray are the more correct, which in turn means that Dowding did not have access to Enigma, and further to that, Intelligence had still not been able to efficiently interpret and decypher the German codes accurately during the time of the Battle of Britain."
Author's speculation and not documented fact.
I remember on swift glance that Bletchley knew the rough strenght of the LW through Ultra, and perhaps even LW losses over Dunkirk.
You can bet enigma was used. If it was used in Dunkirk, it was used in the Battle of Britain. Dowding did not have a "need to know" the source, only the information for much of the battle. IMHO this was due to the speed at which the German Codes could be broken. As this speed increased and the intelligence value became "tactically actionable" he would have required DIRLAUTH and been "read on" to ULTRA.
A little whiff of Enigma being eavesdropped for instance, could have lead to the Germans instantly (and very successfully) switching wheels. No ears any more then.
Which is exactly why the Commander does not need to know the source. He only "needs" to know the source if it becomes of tactical value, the collection vehicle is integrated into his command structure, or for C3 he requires DIRLAUTH.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Hehe, Crumpp:
"Angus,
My whole adult life I have been in the Military. Much of it a Commander. What do you do?"
I am a Farmer. That does not have to mean I don't qualify for something else.
It does not mean that I am deprived of common sense.
It actually means that I am an "officer", for Nobody bosses me around except the government.
It means that I have to have people under my command all the time.
My only military experience is this:
A) Hunter and shooter (as well as butcher) for some 20 years.
B) A flip with Eastwood and the U.S.M.C. for some weeks.
C) Have been in various aircraft under various circumstances :D
Anyway, you're asking "WHO ARE YOU TO QUESTION MY EXPERTIZE OF MILITARY MATTERS", if I may be so humble to rephraze your "pill"
It still boils down to common sense. You can be in in the army for another 20 years for that sake, - 2+2 still remain......as 4.
or?
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Angus,
I know you are farmer. If you have not been in the Military then you have not been in the military. Your experience is different, not diminished.
You have common sense, sure. So when someone with experience says, "This is how this works..." what do you usually do?
Your absolutely right in your assumption of "too much of a good thing can be bad". If the enemy discovers his C3 is compromised he will change his codes.
However, it would not have been Dowding's decision. He would have been fed exactly what was needed to keep the country safe from German invasion.
ULTRA decrypts would have been very useful for winning the battle and keeping the strategic focus. For knowing things like Order of Battle, disposition of enemy forces, and the main effort.
Good example is the Battle of the Atlantic. To keep the Germans from knowing we had broken their codes very few submarines were sunk using ULTRA decrypts of their locations.
Most we simply routed our ships around them. The result was the same and the submarine threat was neutralized.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Many of the best at Bletchley park were....not in the military.
I think you are overestimating the hour-to-hour value of Ultra.
Oh and an hour does matter!
But in the Battle of the Atlantic it was invaluable. Very much in big general decisions as well.
Read Gilbert, he dug into that quite well. I'll fish some nice bits out for ya as well.
Oh edit:
Did you know that one of the first Enigma's was caught in the summer of 1940 very close to where I live! A single RAF aircraft managed to subdue a submarine!
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I think you are overestimating the hour-to-hour value of Ultra.
It had little value tactically. The RAF had radar though.
Do not underestimate the value of the information ULTRA could provide. Especially it's ability to keep strategic focus.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Hehe, Crumpp:
"Especially it's ability to keep strategic focus."
ABSOLUTELY
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OK,
AIR 20/2307 arrived today.
After looking it over, I very much have to agree with the USAAF Logistics’ command article.
The Germans simply did not have the strength to take on the RAF. Combined with the British production and wastage replacement programs make it very unlikely the Luftwaffe could have won the BoB.
The figures for 7th July show the RAF having:
On hand ready to fight in RAF service squadrons:
Spitfires - 349
Hurricanes - 546
Ready for issue that day to the RAF :
Hurricanes - 224
Spitfires - 113
Ready for issue within 4 days:
Hurricanes - 64
Spitfires - 20
Under preparation as of 7 Jul 40:
Hurricanes - 55
Spitfires - 25
Aircraft in CRO undergoing repair :
Hurricanes - 135
Spitfires - 100
It is also clear the RAF increased the size of their squadrons. On the 14 Jul 40 they had 6 Spitfire Squadrons at 22 P/A and 13 Spitfire Squadrons at 18 P/A out of a total of 19 Spitfire Squadrons. All 33 Hurricane squadrons were at 22 P/A when the report begins on 7 Jul 40.
So an RAF squadron was about 2/3rd's or more as large as a Gruppe. For example, in JG26 during the month of June, the Gruppes averaged 16-25 A/C on hand.
I would post the document but picture hanger is down. Anyone have hosting space?
It has quite a bit of very interesting information on losses, production, and wastage recovery.
Certainly the “outnumbered 2:1 in single engine fighters” line is complete BS.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Still have your problem Crumpp. You still can not get it into your head that while the greater proportion of the LW's s/e fighters were in combat over southern England, all the RAF s/e fighters were not all engaged in combat over southern England with the LW's s/e fighters. Those RAF s/e fighters that were in combat also had to engage LW bombers, while the LW s/e fighters only had to engage RAF s/e fighters.
The figures for 7th July show the RAF having:
On hand ready to fight in RAF service squadrons:
Spitfires - 349
Hurricanes - 546
That is 18 Spitfires/squadron and 16 Hurricanes/squadron. That gives an average of 2 extra pilots for the Spitfire squadrons and 6 extra pilots for the Hurricane squadrons.
11 Group
16 Hurricane squadrons > 255 a/c
6 Spitfire squadrons > 108 a/c
for 363 s/e fighters.
13 Group had 4 squadrons of Spitfires(72 a/c) and 9 squadrons of Hurricanes(144 a/c) which could not and did not participate in the air battle over southern England. (216 s/e fighters)
Not all of the 12 and 10 Group s/e fighters participated in the air battle over southern England either.
On Aug 10 1940, Jafü2, 'on hand':
Stab, I/JG 26 Audembert - 42
II/JG 26 Marquise-Ost - 39
III/JG 26 Caffiers - 40
Stab/JG 3 Wierre au Bois - 3
I/JG 3 Grandvilliers - 33
II/JG 3 Samer - 29
III/JG 3 Desvres, Le Touquet - 29
Stab/JG 51 Wissant - 4
I/JG 51 Pihen bei Calais - 32
II/JG 51 Marquise-West - 33
III/JG 51 St. Omer-Clairmarais - 32
Stab, I/JG 52 Coquelles - 42
II/JG 52 Peuplingues - 39
III/JG 52 Zerbst - 31
Stab, I/JG 54 Campagne-les-Guines - 38
II/JG 54 Hermelingen - 36
III/JG 54 Guines-en-Calais - 42
total - 546
Jafü 3, will post anyways, had 'on hand':
Stab, I, II/JG 2 Beaumont-le-Roger - 73
III/JG 2 Le Havre - 32
Stab/JG 27 Cherbourg-West - 5
I/JG 27 Plumett - 37
II/JG 27 Crèpon - 40
III/JG 27 Arcques - 39
Stab/JG 53 Cherbourg - 6
I/JG 53 Rennes, Guernsey - 39
II/JG 53 Dinan, Guernsey - 38
III/JG 53 Brest, Sempy - 38
total - 305
I. Fliegerkorps had 313 bombers.
II. Fliegerkorps had 395 bombers.
9. Fliegerdivision had 178 bombers.
total - 886
bombers = Ju88, He111, Do17, Ju 87
With 62% of the LW strength of Luftflotte 2 being bombers, then the RAF s/e fighters of 11 Group would split in a simular proportion. That leaves 136 s/e fighters of 11 Group to take on the 546 s/e LW fighters of Jafü2. That is a ratio of 4.0:1.
What does June 1940 LW numbers have to do with BoB?
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Originally posted by Karnak
Flying boats may be added at some point, but the H8K2 is iffy to say the least. The amount of 3D modeling required for it's cavernous and complex interior would make it very, very time consuming to make. Given how few were built on top of that and even though it would be a useful aircraft in the MA it probably won't be added.
ahhhh nooo! my dream is gone! :cry
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Originally posted by FDutchmn
ahhhh nooo! my dream is gone! :cry
Dont cry. The 'too few' arguement has been bested before. Look at the C.202/205 for example.
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13 Group had 4 squadrons of Spitfires(72 a/c) and 9 squadrons of Hurricanes(144 a/c) which could not and did not participate in the air battle over southern England. (216 s/e fighters)
Actually Milo, the RAF rotated squadrons quite frequently.
Do you have some documentation on your numbers?
These numbers are correct and reflect exactly what the RAF had in the battle according to there own strength reports:
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_5
Your numbers for Jafü 2 show the aircraft "on hand" not the serviceable numbers. The serviceable aircraft is about half of the "on hand".
This is one on the major differences between the RAF and Luftwaffe. The RAF squadrons were not burdenend with their own major repairs.
This is a problem the RAF squadrons do not have to deal with in their reporting system either. Damaged aircraft are written off and signed over to the C.R.O.. Civilian Repair Organization issues a new aircraft that day and proceeds to repair the damage one which is issued to a new squadron upon completion of the repairs. The RAF squadron stays up to strength and can focus on the daily maintenance needed to fight.
Your RAF Squadron maintenance was divided into three sections:
This was altered to a three-flight arrangement under which two flights undertook day-to-day maintenance and the third flight all major inspections and repair.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_2
One flight was swapping out aircraft, making repairs which could be completed by the next duty day, and inspecting aircraft. The others where keeping up the day to day maintenance of the squadron.
The Luftwaffe Geschwaders were for the most part fixed it themsleves or they lost an aircraft until it could be repaired in Germany.
Day-to-day maintenance was the responsibility of mechanics attached to each staffel. [29] In the field, major repairs and overhauls (such as routine replacement of the Bf 109 Daimler-Benz 601 engine after just 100 hours flying time) fell to the workshop section attached to the group headquarters company. Work expected to take longer than 2 days was transferred, where possible, to regional workshops based at major airfields, which were established to undertake major repairs or modifications. At this stage of the war, however, these workshops were all located in Germany.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_2
Your Squadron strengths are off. An RAF squadron during the Battle of Britain had 22 planes and pilots according to the RAF. Some had 18 A/C but most had 22.
16 Hurricane Squadrons = 352
6 Spitfire Squadrons = 132
That is 484 planes just for 11 Group.
Not all of the 12 and 10 Group s/e fighters participated in the air battle over southern England either.
Sure but some of them did without a doubt. They only needed 3 squadrons to reinforce 11 Group to achieve numerical parity with Jafü 2 at full strength. Of course we know that the servicable numbers run around half the full strength allocations in the Luftwaffe.
The RAF had 32 Hurricane squadrons and 19 Spitfire squadrons available at the beginning of the battle.
The RAF easily had numerical parity with the Luftwaffe in single engine fighters from the beginning of the battle. Combined with a production output almost 4 times the German aircraft industry and a more streamlined logistical system it is easy to see that the Luftwaffe stood very little chance of achieving it's goals.
Your conclusions Milo are just not supported by the facts.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Actually Milo, the RAF rotated squadrons quite frequently.
Do you know what rotates means? One squadron left and was replaced by another. So when a squadron from 13 Group went south, a squadron from the south went north. The number of squadrons in each Group stayed the same. You do have a comprehension difficulty.
See one of the links already posted for the squadrons in each Group.
Did you forget what you have posted Crumpp?
"The figures for 7th July show the RAF having:
On hand ready to fight in RAF service squadrons:
Spitfires - 349
Hurricanes - 546"
So, 895 s/e fighters spread all over the UK.
Divide that by the numbers of squadrons (51) and the average number of s/e fighters in a RAF squadron is 17.5.
Your the one that gave number for RAF s/e fighters 'on hand' ready to fight in RAF service squadrons.
349/19 = 18.4 Spitfires/squadron
546/32 = 17.1 Hurricanes/squadron
Your numbers for Jafü 2 show the aircraft "on hand" not the serviceable numbers. The serviceable aircraft is about half of the "on hand".
471(servicable)/546(on hand) x 100 = 86.3% When did 86.3% become a half?
The RAF easily had numerical parity with the Luftwaffe in single engine fighters from the beginning of the battle.
Still have that problem Crumpp. It is not about parity BUT about the numbers that met in combat over southern England. RAF s/e fighters had to deal with LW bombers which decreased the number of RAF s/e fighters that would have met the LW s/e fighters in combat.
Combined with a production output almost 4 times the German aircraft industry and a more streamlined logistical system it is easy to see that the Luftwaffe stood very little chance of achieving it's goals.
The discussion is not about the LW's goals.
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Your the one that gave number for RAF s/e fighters 'on hand' ready to fight in RAF service squadrons.
Is it beyond your comprehension to understand the difference in acountability procedures between the two forces?
I should not be surprised as the exact same thing threw off the Allies on more than one occasion. Look at the Dieppe raid. The RAF announced a big victory after Ultra intercepts broke out the evening status report for the Luftwaffe.
On hand ready to fight in RAF service squadrons:
Milo, I have AIR 20/2307 in my hand. I told you what the RAF says it had in combat! You keep disputing it because it does not fit your argument.
In fact there is a handwritten note dated 18-2-46 that states "figures in column (b) and (g) are authentic for historical purposes."
The document was declassified in Sep 1970.
So the note was written and included in the report when the document was still classified.
All the best,
Crumpp
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It is not about parity BUT about the numbers that met in combat over southern England.
The whole discussion stems from your ridiculus statement about the RAF fighters being outnumbered 2:1 by Bf-109's.
However you seem to suggest the English were idiots and did not apply their combat power. According to you they just left it in Scotland not placing it when and where it was needed.
From the RAF's own reports though we know your assumption is completely wrong.
Milo Says:
The 109s did pretty good? Not with 51.5% of the LW casualities being 109s and out numbering the Spits and Hurries of 11 Group by at least 2:1. (11 Group being the main combat area)
Then when you saw your mistake you modified your claim to include the bombers. Little mitigation so you could have some shred of truth to hang onto and not look like a complete idiot in your fandom.
Milo Says:
It is not a gross exageration that 11 Group was outnumbered 2:1 especially when there was LW bombers that also had the attention of RAF fighters.
The RAF clearly had numerical parity in single engine fighters at the begining of the Battle of Britain. Due to their increased production and some good Logistical planning they got stronger as the battle progressed not weaker.
You keep coming back to the bombers, Milo. That has never been in dispute that the Luftwaffe had more aircraft than the RAF. However a bomber could not win air superiority no matter how many the Luftwaffe flew over England.
As the USAF Logistical Journal article points out:
the analysis focuses primarily on the single-seat fighters deployed by the respective air forces. It was in this arena that the Luftwaffe needed to prevail if it were to achieve air superiority over southern England and, in so doing, defeat the Royal Air Force.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443
Something the Luftwaffe High Command never recognized until too late in 1944.
They, like you, incorrectly focused on bombers.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Fill pages and pages and pages it yet does not change the fact that the brunt of the BoB was a fight between 2 Luftflotten and 1 1/2 - 2 RAF groups. That's also why only 1 group scored more than all the others put together.
Logical isn't it.
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So you are disputing what you told us?
"The figures for 7th July show the RAF having:
On hand ready to fight in RAF service squadrons:
Spitfires - 349
Hurricanes - 546"
Divide that by the numbers of squadrons (51) and the average number of s/e fighters in a RAF squadron is 17.5.
That the RAF could replace its losses in a/c I am not disputing. Those other numbers you gave were not 'on hand' ready to fight in squadron service .
It is not me that has a comprehension problem.
The whole discussion stems from your ridiculus statement about the RAF fighters being outnumbered 2:1 by Bf-109's.
And this is where you lack of comprehension shows.
The 109s did pretty good? Not with 51.5% of the LW casualities being 109s and out numbering the Spits and Hurries of 11 Group by at least 2:1. (11 Group being the main combat area)
11 Group is not all of the RAF's FC. Why do you have such a hard time understanding?
However you seem to suggest the English were idiots and did not apply their combat power. According to you they just left it in Scotland not placing it when and where it was needed.
What is so hard to undestand that the fighters in 13 Group did not participate in the air battles over southern England, on the same day, at the same time, that the fighters of 11 Group were in combat with the LW?
You keep coming back to the bombers, Milo. That has never been in dispute that the Luftwaffe had more aircraft than the RAF. However a bomber could not win air superiority no matter how many the Luftwaffe flew over England.
You just can't comprehend that the RAF FC had to deal with the LW bombers as well as the LW's fighters. The greater threat was the LW's bombers, NOT the LW's fighters. Were the Brits to be idiots to let the LW bombers roam over southern England unmolested? You are saying that the Brits were idiots.
Then when you saw your mistake you modified your claim to include the bombers. Little mitigation so you could have some shred of truth to hang onto and not look like a complete idiot in your fandom.
No mistake for you are being clueless. For the umpteenth time. While the whole of the LW's fighters could take on the RAF fighters, the RAF fighters also had to deal with the LW bombers. It is not me that is looking like a complete idiot. As can be seen, your 'problem' rises again.
Fandom? Not me but, be sure, you.
The LW fanboys always add in the 8th AF bombers when 'talking' about the airwar over Germany. So for LW fanboy Crummp, the same does not apply during BoB. :eek:
by Angus Fill pages and pages and pages it yet does not change the fact that the brunt of the BoB was a fight between 2 Luftflotten and 1 1/2 - 2 RAF groups.
All because of a paper pushing numbers cruncher has a problem. He can twist and manipute numbers til the sun turns blue but it still does not change the fact that the RAF's FC fighters were out numbered, in combat, by the LW's fighters in southern England because the RAF fighters also had to deal with the LW bombers.
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Tomorrow I am going to Scotland. Remind me to ask the locals if their fighter squadrons flew south to fight the Huns :D
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Those other numbers you gave were not 'on hand' ready to fight in squadron service .
According to the documents they are the numbers in the fight.
still does not change the fact that the RAF's FC fighters were out numbered, in combat, by the LW's fighters in southern England because the RAF fighters also had to deal with the LW bombers.
Not according to the facts, Milo.
The RAF's numbers line up with the most probable course of action and the most common sense reason the RAF won the Battle of Britian.
They were able to apply the correct amount of combat power at the right moment.
Certainly not the aircraft performance miracle you want us to believe.
From a strategic view what make more sense?
1. PRO 20/2307 strength numbers as listed by the RAF are correct. With the RAF's numerical parity in Single Engined fighters, good intelligence, and use of Radar Ground Controllers they had the capability to apply combat power on the battlefield where they could achieve superiority.....
OR YOUR VERSION
2. The Spitfire and Hurricanes fought grossly outnumbered by the 109's. Through super performance where able to take older or contemprary fighter designs and fly rings around the Germans who were just plain idiots inspite of the superior fighter tactics employed by the Luftwaffe. Tactics universally adopted by all combatants by the end of WWII and still used today.
Version 2 sounds good for drumming up a little national pride. For a military strategy though it is rather stupid.
Divide that by the numbers of squadrons (51) and the average number of s/e fighters in a RAF squadron is 17.5.
I misread the column. On 07 July 1940 all RAF squadrons stood at 18 aircraft and pilots. They increased the size of the squadrons from there.
Hardly matters Milo as it has nothing to do with the original contention. Clearly the RAF had numerical parity in singl engined fighters. The total number of aircraft does not change and the overall conclusion remains the same. Nice attempt at a strawman argument though.
All the best,
Crumpp
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the RAF fighters also had to deal with the LW bombers.
Sure Milo,
The argument is not whether the Luftwaffe had more aircraft. Yes the RAF had to deal with Luftwaffe bombers.
However your forget that the Luftwaffe had to protect those bombers. Unlike your silly assumption that:
While the whole of the LW's fighters could take on the RAF fighters,
The men leading those formations did not have the benefit of real time intelligence or hindsight. They could not commit their entire force against a few incoming fighters. Why? There mission was to protect the bombers. Without the use of Radar Ground Controllers the Luftwaffe Flight leaders would not have known if their were more RAF fighters inbound. This left holes in the escort screen open for incoming RAF squadrons to attack the bombers before the other Luftwaffe escorts could respond.
In short, the escort would be stripped away in proportion to the attacking force.
Given you past flights of fancy, I am not surprised I have to point this out.
This is why the Luftwaffe lost. With numerical parity, the majority of the time in a perfect engagement the Luftwaffe could only match RAF fighter stength. On a rare occasion they did grossly outnumber the RAF defenders. When that happenend, the RAF took proportional casualties. On the rare occasion the RAF grossly outnumbered the Luftwaffe single engine fighters. When this happenend, the Luftwaffe took proportional casualties.
In 1944 when the situation was reversed, the allied fighters had enough numerical superiority that they could outnumber the attackers in the air to air fight on average and maintain an escort screen.
War of attrition is all about the averages.
All the best,
Crumpp
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It is not me with the reading problem Crumpp.
The figures for 7th July show the RAF having:
On hand ready to fight in RAF service squadrons:
Spitfires - 349
Hurricanes - 546
These are the a/c the RAF in the squadrons that could meet the LW fighters and bombers in combat. Not all were able to meet the LW bombers and fighters in combat as they were not all based in southern England.
Excluded from the 895 number would be those in 13 Group and, for arguement sake, say 60% of those in 10 and 12 Groups.
Ready for issue that day to the RAF :
Hurricanes - 224
Spitfires - 113
These are that a/c the RAF in reserve and did not meet the LW fighters and bombers in combat. These were used to replace any RAF fighters that were lost or went U/S.
Must be getting desperate because of your problem to start making up idiotic stories. That is to be expected when you can't comprehend that at any particular time the LW had more fighters in air in combat than the RAF did.
You can keep posting total numbers for each side but that is not what happened in reality.
I misread the column. On 07 July 1940 all RAF squadrons stood at 18 aircraft and pilots. They increased the size of the squadrons from there.
Yes you do that all the time, mis-read and then the multi page threads start.
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These are the a/c the RAF in the squadrons that could meet the LW fighters and bombers in combat. Not all were able to meet the LW bombers and fighters in combat as they were not all based in southern England.
Not all the Luftwaffe flew out either Milo.
Luftflotte II bore the brunt.
Excluded from the 895 number would be those in 13 Group and, for arguement sake, say 60% of those in 10 and 12 Groups.
Ready for issue that day to the RAF :
Hurricanes - 224
Spitfires - 113
Specualtion on your part and nothing more. Not worthy of serious discussion. The RAF has printed the numbers and you continually manipulate purely speculative statistics to meet your requirements.
These are that a/c the RAF in reserve and did not meet the LW fighters and bombers in combat. These were used to replace any RAF fighters that were lost or went U/S.
Not a story Milo. It is what happenend. You can read about in JG26 War diaries, JG53 "Pik As", or any of the decent Luftwaffe Geschwader histories.
As opposed to your laughable " the entire Luftwaffe fighter force fought against a few RAF fighters".
These are that a/c the RAF in reserve and did not meet the LW fighters and bombers in combat. These were used to replace any RAF fighters that were lost or went U/S.
BS. Those numbers are Hurricanes and Spitfires the RAF had in service squadrons.
The reserve numbers come out of the A.S.U. listings Milo. That stands for "aircraft storage units" and those held the RAF fighter reserves.
Certainly, the RAF rested a few squadrons. They also had the capability since the fight was over their home turf, to reinforce or rotate units on very short notice.
However to think they put themselves at an insurmountable numerical disparity to rest 40% of their forces is just plain silly. They distributed their strength to meet the enemy where they thought he was the strongest.
Good strategy and preparation won the BoB.
Not your theory of Tie Fighters and the Force.
Read the article put out by one of the worlds most professional Air Forces today:
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443
Please point out to us the part about "Magic Planes and Fairy dust winning the battle for the RAF".
All the best,
Crumpp
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You must have sniffed some of that fairy dust Crumpp, because what you said here:
"to think they put themselves at an insurmountable numerical disparity to rest 40% of their forces is just plain silly. They distributed their strength to meet the enemy where they thought he was the strongest"
Is exactly where you are falling. They actually DID HAVE roughly half of their force out of the action. Rotations occured of course, - BEGINNING with squadrons being moved out of the battle BEFORE new ones were brought back. Some squadrons got formed during the battle, - notably the polish ones.
You can find numbers of aircraft in production, or post your link another 12 times, - you can complain about no source of the heaps of data as well as anecdotes brought in, but you have brought very little meat on yer bones yet. What you are claming (if that can be put together as a thesis) is actually something I have never seen anywhere before, and since I have already seen you make obvious mistakes already in this thread without being able to swallow even a correction, I tend to put my penny on the analysiz of a group of historians which were already looking at your declassified documents years ago.
So, again, please find some data where RAF fighters generally or repeaditly swamped LW fighters.
Go to the 7th of September and then the 15th. Those are the dates when the RAF managed to get the most of THEIR fighters into successful engagements. Yet you had the spine to try and revert it!
JEEZ
:huh :huh
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They actually DID HAVE roughly half of their force out of the action. Rotations occured of course, - BEGINNING with squadrons being moved out of the battle BEFORE new ones were brought back. Some squadrons got formed during the battle, - notably the polish ones.
Not according to the RAF website or their own strength/loss reports.
So, again, please find some data where RAF fighters generally or repeaditly swamped LW fighters.
Please find where I claimed this, Angus? Once more you are fighting ghost's which do not exist.
Study the battle. The RAF did not win by opposing the Luftwaffe where they were strongest. They won by concentrating on the smaller raids and winning the war of averages.
Here is what I said:
With numerical parity, the majority of the time in a perfect engagement the Luftwaffe could only match RAF fighter stength. On a rare occasion they did grossly outnumber the RAF defenders. When that happenend, the RAF took proportional casualties. On the rare occasion the RAF grossly outnumbered the Luftwaffe single engine fighters. When this happenend, the Luftwaffe took proportional casualties.
All the best,
Crumpp
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I can go cut&paste in this thread to find a lot of things where you'r asumptions were wrong.
The main fuel for the fire was about how the odds were in the engagements remember?
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I can go cut&paste in this thread to find a lot of things where you'r asumptions were wrong.
Please feel free to point them out, Angus.
The main fuel for the fire was about how the odds were in the engagements remember?
Exactly and 2:1 in the Luftwaffe's favor is hardly representative of the average engagement.
1:1 is much more realistic.
All the best,
Crumpp
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It fills me with dismay to have to pick out the boulderdash, but alas, I may well do so when I return from 13th group area after the weekend.
This is the main issue though:
"Exactly and 2:1 in the Luftwaffe's favor is hardly representative of the average engagement.
1:1 is much more realistic"
And that is where I tend to disagree.
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This is pure and simple BS......Why throw the MKV back to 41?........If we are going to fight a 41 war then lots of plans should dissapear instead of being added......Goodbye to lots of 109s and the 51-D. and Many many others.
Simple Question.......Why revert the SpitV and IX to early 41 versions and add crappy high speed later versions?
Did someone whine about the Spits we had until management gave in?
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Originally posted by Pieper
This is pure and simple BS......Why throw the MKV back to 41?........If we are going to fight a 41 war then lots of plans should dissapear instead of being added......Goodbye to lots of 109s and the 51-D. and Many many others.
Simple Question.......Why revert the SpitV and IX to early 41 versions and add crappy high speed later versions?
Did someone whine about the Spits we had until management gave in?
The Old spitfire 5 (with +16 boost) was reverted back to 1941 specifications (+12 boost) because the old spitfire 5 from last version uses 1942 specifications... In short,, previous spit 5 version was placed to mid-war plane category and now it is placed back to early-war category (and thats where it should be!)
By the way sooo many people lobbied for Suggested, complete Spitfire lineup for Aces High and here's how they brreak it down...
1940:
Spitfire Mk Ia
1941
Spitfire Mk Vb
1942
Spitfire Mk. IX
1943
Spitfire LF Mk. VIII
1944-1945
Spitfire F.Mk XIV
Spitfire LF.Mk XVI
now that's the complete spitfire lineup :)
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Wake up thread. I have BoB data inbound. Or should I make a new thread?
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Originally posted by 1K3
The Old spitfire 5 (with +16 boost) was reverted back to 1941 specifications (+12 boost) because the old spitfire 5 from last version uses 1942 specifications... In short,, previous spit 5 version was placed to mid-war plane category and now it is placed back to early-war category (and thats where it should be!)
By the way sooo many people lobbied for Suggested, complete Spitfire lineup for Aces High and here's how they brreak it down...
1940:
Spitfire Mk Ia
1941
Spitfire Mk Vb
1942
Spitfire Mk. IX
1943
Spitfire LF Mk. VIII
1944-1945
Spitfire F.Mk XIV
Spitfire LF.Mk XVI
now that's the complete spitfire lineup :)
Please stop saying XIV and XVI are 1944/45, they are BOTH 1944.
Even giving the XVI and the XIV max boost would still put them in 1944.
1st use 25lbs boost LF IX (same XVI) May 1944.
1st use 21lbs boost F XIV mid/late 44.
In relaity the XVI at 18lbs is no better than 1943 LF IX at 18lbs, so really its only 1943.
Thats like saying the spit V was 1944 because some were still used then.
The only 1945 Spit would be the F.21
The XVI and XIV will cover 1944/45 because we haven't got the F.21 (prob never will).
Yes new thread for extra data please :)
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Will have to take some quotes from this one as well, or just put it up into main points. Those are where basically I was disagreeing with Crumpp.
1. Number of aircraft clashing in the air, - RAF & LW
2. Usage of the different groups. and Luftflotten
3. Range of which RAF groups were vectored for interception.
4. Usage of Enigma to RAF high command (group leaders and Dowding)
And to some,,,,the outcome.
1. Claim by groups
2. Post war confirmed kills as compared to LW losses.
3. Blaims and theory, why Dowding and Park were demoted.
I have very much of this data, and am still reading through the newest volumes in my "archive", but looking at the thread, I can see that I was very very very right, and that I gave a promise to line that up.
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RAF - 1,547 aircraft
Luftwaffe - 1,887 aircraft
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Britain
I would say the 109 held it's own pretty good:
Read a good book about LW pilots and one of the LW pilots is quoted as saying something along the lines of this, "The only reason we lost BOB was because every time we got shot down we were imprisoned or killed, when we shot down an RAF they just parachuted to the ground and got in another plane" I'm not sure which pilot it was, its in a book called "LW Aces" Been about a year or so since I have read it so I don't remember which LW ace said it
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Kills will never be known for sure.
Both sides vastly inflated claims, to the point that at least the LW high command was convinced the RAF was down to few dozen planes.
Short of draining the English Channel I don't believe the true figures will EVER be known.
The only thing not in dispute is that the RAF inflicted heavy enough losses to win.
Gunther Rall even said the LW never fully recovered from the Battle of Britain.
Of course it's easy to 'hold your own' with a numerical advantage.
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roughly 1200 to 800 I have
Compiling....
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Ok this will stay as main issue.
1. Number of aircraft clashing in the air, - RAF & LW
2. Usage of the different groups. and Luftflotten
3. Range of which RAF groups were vectored for interception.
4. Usage of Enigma to RAF high command (group leaders and Dowding)
And to some,,,,the outcome.
1. Claim by groups
2. Post war confirmed kills as compared to LW losses.
3. Blaims and theory, why Dowding and Park were demoted.
I'll post a link to the thread here anyway , when it pops up.
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Get a copy of The Battle of Britain-Then and Now.
It covers all the losses with entries for each and the details on both sides including non combat losses. It breaks them down by units on both sides.
We've been down that road before
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Did you see John Alcorn's study?
I have that, as well as some work of Shore. But thank's for the tip ;)
I bough a book recently, - John Ray's book about the BoB. It's mostly about Dowding and Park, the big wing contraversory and why Dowding and Park were moved. Anyway, one of the main reasons is failing to bring the full force of the RAF into the fray.
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Wow, 6 pages and have we "decided" on what the loadout was?
Just curious.
Karaya
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Oh 60 rpg?
Got a wee hijacked. Well, just name a thread with 3+ pages...it definately got cooked up.