Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => Aircraft and Vehicles => Topic started by: MiloMorai on January 22, 2006, 06:24:18 AM
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What were the receive/transmit ranges?
- a/c to a/c
- a/c to ground
- ground to a/c
How did they compare to Allied radios?
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Quartz.....
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AFAIK, compared to the Brits sets, they actuallly sucked ...
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Either it didn't make a difference or not good enough.
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The FuG 10 Aircraft Radio System was the German Luftwaffe equivalent to the British T1154/R1155 - but was of far superior construction.
Frequency range
MF: 300-600 kHz, HF: 3000-6000 kHz
Effective range
MF: 200-500 km HF: 1000-2000 km
RF power output
Telegraphy: 70 Watts
Telephony: 40 Watts
Antennas
2 antennas: Fixed or trailing antenna, selectable at antenna remote control box. Trailing antenna is remote-controlled.
DC power input
max. 800 Watts.
(http://www.qsl.net/ab4oj/1ststeps/t1154_sm.jpg)
British T1154/R1155
(http://www.qsl.net/ab4oj/1ststeps/e10k.jpg)
German FuG 10
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Originally posted by Angus
AFAIK, compared to the Brits sets, they actuallly sucked ...
A little bird tell you, or did you 'hear it from some one'?
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Yeah, it was Goering - he intended to buy a British radio after the war! ;)
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Yes actually Bruno.
Want a name :D
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Isn't Göring universally recognized as the war's biggest buffoon?
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Well, he did give the opening to some of the best WW2 gags if that's what you mean :D
Not all his comments or even decisions were that far off though.
Just most :D
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Originally posted by Angus
Yes actually Bruno.
Want a name :D
That's kind of the point Angus. This forum used to be a good place to learn things. Now its just a forum where folks can try to one up each other. If folks present information related to a topic then at least they could do is provide some source or a direction as to where the information came from so those who are interested in the topic can go 'check for themselves'.
Now do a search of your posts and read how times you just write:
'I have heard...'
or
'Some one said...'
Those types of replies are a complete waste of time. If you can't be bothered to give a source then what's the point of a reply like the one you gave?
Not only that that but it's not even correct. German, RAF and AMI radios are very comparable to each other.
A statement like:
they actuallly sucked
...should be backed up with something more then an 'I heard...'
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Dear Bruno.
Do a search of your own posts and dig up actual quotes or information from a well published source(s) as well. My memory usually proves right, - not perfect, but pretty...good. And I do try to stay honest with it.
I recalled German pilots being unsatisfied with their radio sets for most of the war. I recalled those of them who flew allied aircraft to be impressed with the quality of the radio sets. I recalled the LW having problems with their wireless transmissions and inter-communications as soon as the BoB.
(Belive there was a raid called off, but while the fighter force stayed on the ground the bombers still went off, - thus unescorted, - somewhere near Eagle day)
I do not take many notes, although I do for some points of research. The stuff I read through is quite a lot, both in German and English. I usually read twice through the pile. Helps remembering you see......
Anyway, what I found was quick and easy. A german Pilot complaining about the radio set quality. (In my head I am sure he claimed the Allied sets were better, wish I'd had a taperecorder with me at the time).
Gunther Rall, - "Mein Flugbuch", p. 214
Happier :D
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If you stick around tomorrow, I'll type up the text. Can you read German, or shall I quote the English version of the story ??????????
(Not a translation, a different piece)
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I can read German as well as a few other languages
I post sources in my posts as required, do that search. I never say stuff like 'Well I heard it sucked'. Even when a source isn't explicitly given there's enough detail contained that any one who is so inclined can verify what I typed.
Unfortunately your 'If I recalls' and 'I thinks' and 'I heards' rarely prove to be factual. At best they are anecdotal and subjective when and if they can be verified.
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Ive heard that german radio's were poor compared to allied on the military channel. Problem is most people actually believe the stuff said on TV . Most of the time their lucky to get the plane model right , never mind the specific details like radio function . But if it's on TV it must be true right ? lol
38
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I don't know about German radios but I do know that many programs in the History channel and or Military channel have gotten many things wrong. Partly due to the fact those channels are made to entertain while trying to teach stuff of what happened, like Mcdonald's or KFC of history. Sure you'll be full but that doesn't mean it's healthy. The analogy would be sure you're being put aware of the things that happend but that doesn't neccesarily mean that what you're watching is the most informative and accurate. But it has one good point,in the fact it raises awarness of those things. They're always fun to watch but in short doses.
PS Sorry for the Hijack carry PWN! :D
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So Bruno where exactly did your info come from since you seem to feel the need to get up Anguss arse?
If folks present information related to a topic then at least they could do is provide some source or a direction as to where the information came from so those who are interested in the topic can go 'check for themselves'.
I don't see any references in this statement.
Not only that that but it's not even correct. German, RAF and AMI radios are very comparable to each other.
Or does your advice only work for others?
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So Bruno where exactly did your info come from since you seem to feel the need to get up Anguss arse?
Read Harry's reply, he posted specs for the FuG 10, there was/is no need for me to repeat it. I guess I can post them for the FuG 7 or 16 but what's the difference, Angus 'heard' they sucked...
Or does your advice only work for others?
My advice was specific to one person who consistently posts 'I think' and 'I heard', just do a search.
Aren't you the guy that faked his death a while back? Stick to what you know...
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Ahh, Bruno
"Unfortunately your 'If I recalls' and 'I thinks' and 'I heards' rarely prove to be factual"
No, they have a habit of sticking. Read the last summary of the infamous slats thread to see how sticky they can be :D
That said, I'm digging on the radios. I was wrong about the BoB raid though, - it was more of a communication problem than the radios.
Rall mentions that they didn't get a proper radio before they had the 262.
Than one sticks, but there is an explanation to that one as well. Would you want to guess what it is?
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Of course LW radio equipment was improved upon through out the war but that's different the blanket statement 'they sucked'. If you ever find a source to support that please post it...
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I have two little coins into your slot Bruno.
From books.
1. Not all LW 109's during the BoB had a radio for it was regarded as "not the most needed gadget, and 109's in Spain flew without Wireless with good results"
2. Rall refers to the radio equipment as very good - in a 262. Finally clear of the disturbances caused by the magnettos in the 109.
"Endlich ein Funkgerat, das nicht durch die Zundanlage des triebwerks gestört wird"
Now it is your turn to tell me it's rubbish ;)
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Did bombers and fighters have the same radios.
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I rather think they didn't. Weight you see.
Oh, and my referrence to the BoB was about radios after all. Apparently there were wrong christals installed, - the effect being bombers flying off while not knowing that the operation was cancelled.
Fink was there. (LW)
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The allied radios used quartz. This makes them not only more precise for frequency tuning (no problems with frrequency shift) but allows the radio to generate more power.
As the name implies they are made from quartz, a naturally occurring form of silicon, although most of that used for electronics applications is manufactured synthetically these days. The components rely on the remarkable properties of quartz for their operation. When placed into an electronic circuit a crystal acts as a tuned circuit. However it has an exceptionally high Q. Ordinary LC tuned circuits may exhibit values of a few hundred if carefully designed and constructed, but quartz crystals exhibit values of up to 100 000. Apart from their Q, crystals also have a number of other advantages. Their stability is remarkably good with respect to temperature and time. In fact most crystals will have these figures specified and they might typically be ±5 ppm (parts per million) per year for the ageing and ±30 ppm over a temperature range of 0 to 60 degrees Celsius.
http://www.radio-electronics.com/info/data/crystals/xtals.php
This means for the same voltage input, the allied radios gave more RF output.
Sirs: In proportion to size these little glass like quartz wafers are perhaps the most remarkable of all the tools science has given to war. When the story of the almost incredible progress in research and manufacture of radio crystals can be told, it will prove to be a tale of one of the war's greatest achievements. No less significant will be the fruit of these advancements to a new world at peace where crystals will be the vibrating hearts of most telecommunication equipment. Gerald James Holton, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
One piece of equipment which they ordered was a VHF transmitter-receiver for aircraft use employing 4 crystal units in the transmitter and 4 in the receiver. The equipment was made by the Bendix Corp. and the crystal units were the DC-11 and the DC-12 types. Thisset, with a few modifications became the SCR-522, the most important airborne set in the U.S. Air Force and its crystal unit became the CR-1.
The problem of ageing was especially severe in the CR-1unit used by the Air Force because these units operated at higher frequencies and required closer tolerances. As a temporary measure orders were issued by Wright Field that all quartz plates must be able to withstand the test of scrubbing with soap and water and a toothbrush. Soon each Signal Corps Inspector and each crystal finisher was equipped with a toothbrush and a dish of soapy water. The directive was a boon to the toothbrush industry but contributed little to the solution of the ageing problem.
By the end of 1943 it had been shown that quartz blanks which had been etched to frequency exhibited very small changes of frequency and activity even when subjected to tropical conditions. However considerable opposition existed to the idea of etching and much valuable time was lost in investigating other approaches before the decision was made to require etching. This was due to a reluctance to specify a manufacturing process which might require rewriting of the specifications and renegotiating of contracts and to a wise policy of specifying test results instead of manufacturing procedures. Yet it was impossible to depend upon inspection procedures to insure that crystal units would remain useable and a vast amount of work had failed to reveal any other manufacturing procedure which would do so.
Consequently a Conference of all Crystal Manufacturers was called on July 11-12, 1944 in the old Stevens Hotel in Chicago. The problem was explained in detail and the proposed remedy was presented. There was no time to rewrite the specifications or to renegotiate contracts so the manufacturers were asked to convert their production processes from hand lapping to etching. It was expected that units made by the etching process might be more expensive. Again the industry rose to meet a challenge. The manufacturers went back to their plants and converted to the new process with such success that they produced satisfactory units at a lower cost. As one example, Ken Ross, who had converted his coil winding plant in Chicago to a facility for making FT-243 crystal units, designed and built a continuous etching system which, with four operators, turned out as many finished crystal units as 20 operators finishing by hand lapping. The Ross system was soon widely copied throughout the industry.
http://www.ieee-uffc.org/fc_history/bottom.html
German radios relied upon vaccum tubes with require more energy per output, generate more heat, and are subject to frequency shift.
Additionally the LW fighter were smaller dimensionally. They simply could not carry a vacuum tube radio large enough to give them the range needed to co-ordinate their entire effort in the air.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Bloody hell Crumpp, magnificent summary.!!
Although, I am confused about the size problem. The radios were usually located aft, so in theory one had the whole fuselage to play with. Well, on the RAF fighters normally.
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The radios were usually located aft,
The radios are larger than you think and the spaces smaller in the LW fighters.
The allied fighters were dimensionally larger, especially the huge fighters the US liked to build.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by MiloMorai
Did bombers and fighters have the same radios.
bombers and Recce used FuG 10, fighters used FuG 7 then FuG 16
Site with some relevant info.:
Collection of German W.W.II. Radios (http://www.armyradio.com/arsc/customer/pages.php?pageurl=/publish/Articles/William_Howard_German/German_Radios.htm)
FuG 10 (http://www.armyradio.com/arsc/customer/pages.php?pageurl=/publish/Articles/William_Howard_German/German_Aircraft_Radios.htm#FuG%2010)
FuG 10
American Manufacturers have exhibited considerable interest in captured Axis equipment, wherever it has been shown. The following detailed description of the German FUG-10 panel used in bomber and reconnaissance aircraft should, therefore, prove useful.
The German FUG-10 panel, or rack, contains two transmitters and two receivers. One transmitter and its companion receiver operate in the 300-600 kc hand. The other transmitter and its associated receiver operate in the 3000-6000 kc band. Both units employ CW and MCW operation. No voice communication is used. In addition, the following units are mounted on the panel: A remote-controlled direction-finder operating in the 100-1100 kc band, a blind-landing device operating in the 28-32 Mc band, and an inter-phone system which serves to supply communication to the aircraft crew as well as to interrupt the CW transmission for purposes of ground homing.
Equipment is non-crystal controlled and relies on capacitance compensation for frequency satiability. Facilities are available for tuning a predetermined spot on a dial to a master-signal station which is undoubtedly maintained on frequency by crystal control.
Transmitter Units SL and SK
These instruments each contain 3 type RLI2P 35 valves, which are indirectly-heated pentodes of 35 watts anode dissipation. One valve as master oscillator drives an output stage using two tubes in parallel. Master-oscillator and output circuit primary tuning is by iron cored variometer driven through backlash-compensated gearing from a single tuning control.
Electrically the high-frequency and medium-frequency transmitter units differ in detail only. Looking at a circuit diagram of the high-frequency unit SK, and it will be seen that the master oscillator is of the Colpitts type. Certain of the fixed condensers are of the high-negative coefficient ceramic type giving a considerable degree of temperature compensation. A small neutralising condenser is provided. The normal use of the transmitter is for c.w. communication, keying being carried out in he master oscillator and power-amplifier grid circuits. Special uses are radiotelephone transmission on the 5K unit with grid modulation, and impulse transmission on the SL unit.
The radio-telephony facility when provided requires an additional switch unit accessible to the wireless operator and a press-to-talk button for the pilot. The switch unit sets the output-stage grid bias to the correct value and provides modulating signals via the intercommunication amplifier. The pilot's radio-telephone requirements are catered for in later installations by a separate transmitter-receiver.
The impulse modulation feature was used to provide ground stations with a signal suitable for the taking of direction-finding bearings free from night error, but has been discontinued in the latest installations. The repetition frequency of this type of modulation is 300 impulses/sec and the impulse duration 500 micro sec. The generating oscillator and shaping output stage are incorporated in the intercommunication amplifier unit, the output being applied to transmitter power-amplifier grid circuit under the control of the main system switch. Power output is between 40 and 69 watts throughout both frequency bands on c.w.
The mechanical construction of the transmitter units is of light-alloy die castings are used for the several sub units, which are bolted together to form the complete transmitter. Plug-and-socket interconnections are used between the sub-units, and the captive fixing screws are identified by red paint. In both transmitter and receiver units the large-diameter dial revolves on a stub-axle and is calibrated in frequency, the scale subtending some 300 degrees. The hub of the dial carries four notched discs for the rapid selection of pre-set spot frequencies. Locking and unlocking of any one disc is accomplished by turning through 90 degrees the appropriate one of four coin slotted screws, visible on the front face of the dial hub. The spring-loaded stop-levers are interesting in that they are pivoted on an eccentric spindle which can be rotated through 180 degrees.
Receiver Units EL and EK
The receivers are of the super heterodyne type with one signal frequency amplifying stage. The EL unit, covering 300 to 600 kc/s, has an intermediate frequency of 140 kc/s with a total band width of 1 - 0 kc/s at 6 dB attenuation. The EK unit, covering 30 to 60 Mc/s, has an intermediate frequency of 14 Mc/s and a band width of 8 kc/s at 6 dB attenuation. The signal / noise ratio in each case approaches the theoretical limit determined by first tube and circuit noise. One micro volt (C.W.) applied through 50 ohms gives signal to noise ratios of 20 dB and 17 dB respectively, and the total gain at this input is such that the telephones receive 50 mw and 2.5 mw respectively. The second channel attenuation figures are 78 dB and 70 dB.
One type of tube, the Telefunken RV.12P 2000, is used throughout these receivers and also in the intercommunication amplifier and miscellaneous tube circuits. It is a small indirectly-heated pentode with a side-contact base and ring seal. The overall length is 5 cm, and the bulb diameter 2 cm. The moulded valve holder carries integral contact springs to make the top-cap grid connection and to earth via the metal frame. Input and output capacitance's are both approximately 4mmfd The mutual conductance is 2 -4 mA/volt, and the heater current 0.07A at 13 volts. The FuG 10 equipment uses a total of 25 tubes of this type.
A circuit diagram of the medium-frequency receiver EL 5. shows there is no automatic gain control, and the manual gain control operates on r.f. and 1st i.f. stages only. Radiotelephony reception is not provided. A separate local oscillator is used with a pentode frequency changer and anode - bend detector. The i.f. transformers have separately screened adjustable, iron-cored coils with fixed tubular ceramic condensers. Coupling is by capacitance connected between appropriate tapings to enable a standard type of variable trimmer to be used.
In the EK receiver the heterodyne oscillator is controlled by an on-off switch. The EL receiver differs in having the oscillator permanently on, and using a 3- position switch associated with two small ceramic condensers to give zero - beat or heterodynes 1000 c/s below or above intermediate frequency. This facilitates accurate inter-tuning of the transmitter to the receiver and ground station, and provides a means of eliminating interference from an adjacent channel. Mechanical design is on the same lines as the transmitter units with dimensions slightly smaller. Click-stop details are identical.
Two Aerial-Matching Units are used, one for the trailing aerial and one for the fixed, mounted as near to the fair lead and deck insulator as possible. Each unit contains two tapped variometer for tuning on h.f. and m.f. ranges, and iron-cored auto - transformers for matching aerial resistance to the 50-ohm feeders.
Most LW radios were built by Lorenz, originally a subsidy of American company (I T & T IIRC). As with all things produced in Germany during the war quality suffered as the war progressed due to the lack of materials and declining production standards.
Range wasn't an issue with the radios on board aircraft and in air control was maintained on the Gruppe/squadron level. Master signal stations (Ground) used crystal / quartz sets and had plenty of range / and powerful receivers to maintain control of the air.
Angus,
In every discussion about the LW you only ever source Rall (I don't how times I have seen you site p.214 of Mein Flugbuch). There were more pilots in the LW then Rall. The problem that Rall describes could easily be addressed with proper insulation and grounding.
As for for your BoB reference, on board LW radio sets didn't use crystals as Crumpp said. In Spain radio technology was still rather raw and during that time not many nations produced reliable on board radios so I don't why bring that up. The Commies were using hand signals...
LW raiders sometimes shut their radios off. Not only did radios work for communication but for navigation RDF, IFF etc... With out more information about those LW bombers failing to get the 'call off' message there could 1000 reasons. That alone doesn't support you claim that LW radio equipment 'sucked'.
Ami bombers ran into the same problems where the target was switched to a secondary target or a raid called off due to weather. A section of the stream failing to turn back or switch target.
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Very nice :)
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Equipment is non-crystal controlled and relies on capacitance compensation for frequency satiability.
Range wasn't an issue with the radios on board aircraft
It most certainly was an issue.
air control was maintained on the Gruppe/squadron level.
Exactly as they could not coordinate large interception efforts. The Luftwaffe had to push actual control down to lower levels which meant:
Master signal stations (Ground) used crystal / quartz sets and had plenty of range
Is also true. However they did not control anything. Mostly they broadcast a "running comentary" on the location of the bomber stream.
The Reichsjaegerwelle could not reach the length and breadth of the Operational area in order to communicate with all the fighters in the air over Germany, France, Holland, etc...
"Y" control was also very fickle with only roughly 50 percent of the S.E. fighters being equipped with it in the first place.
and powerful receivers to maintain control of the air.
No such thing. The best you can do to recieve is built a good antenna. However it is subject to the law of reciprocity.
The operation of antennas, and telescopes in general, are governed by electromagnetic theory and diffraction theory plays an important role. In order to understand this, one first needs to know the reciprocity theorem. This theorem states that the telescope operates the same way whether it is receiving or transmitting radiation.
http://web.haystack.mit.edu/urei/tut6.html
So it will work only as good as the poorest antenna in the system. So while you may be blowing his socks off transmitting with a high dB gain antenna and the poor antenna will hear a poorer signal but most likely readable in the case of the Luftwaffe. When the poor antenna transmits, the high dB gain antenna will hear nothing or very little.
An amplifier could help but the absence of signal means nothing to amplify. An unreadable transmission really loud is still an unreadable transmission. It is just louder static.
Additionally these radios used the VHF spectrum. This spectrum properties mean it primarily uses ground wave propogation and is a "Line of Sight" radio.
http://members.aol.com/svennord/radio.htm
So you are dealing with the curvature of the earth, antenna, power output, and the height of the aircraft to determine range.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Exactly as they could not coordinate large interception efforts. The Luftwaffe had to push actual control down to lower levels which meant:
Sure they could and they did. Gefechtsverband were made of multiple Gruppen or even mixed Geschwadern. These formations were large consisting of bomber killers, close escort and top cover. Range wasn't issue as they formation wasn't spread out over hundreds of miles like the Ami bomber streams and escort. Communiction between the sections was not overly difficult. You wouldn't need or want every one using the R/T and chatting betwen each other. Only those leading the section.
Is also true. However they did not control anything. Mostly they broadcast a "running comentary" on the location of the bomber stream.
The Reichsjaegerwelle could not reach the length and breadth of the Operational area in order to communicate with all the fighters in the air over Germany, France, Holland, etc...
"Y" control was also very fickle with only roughly 50 percent of the S.E. fighters being equipped with it in the first place.
More nonsense. The LW command and control from the ground was very sophisticated and they could easily maintain control and direct the Gefechtsverband to sections of the bomber stream the were least protected by escort even very late in the war. This information came from recce, ground observers and various stations through out WETO. All relayed through the command and control structure and relayed to the pilots even in flight.
Here's a link to SES's site that goes into LW command and control:
GYGES (http://www.gyges.dk/)
In February 1942 the Y-Linien system was introduced, and it was in widespread use in early 1943. The Y-Linien Stellungen tracked the fighter formation, reported to the Jafü, and the Jlo could now direct up to 5 fighter formations at the same time. (Y-Verfahren (Jagd). After the BIG reorganization this process was performed from the GefStd of the JD.
No such thing. The best you can do to recieve is built a good antenna. However it is subject to the law of reciprocity.
Nonsense, search signal amplifier, you can definitely boost the signal. Search for pic of LW communication antenna. They were plenty big enough
The rest of your post is just clutter and no reply is needed.
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Nonsense, search signal amplifier, you can definitely boost the signal.
At first sight, one can think of using instead some modest antenna made of a piece of wire, compensating that with supplying the receiver with amplifier strong enough to give the end result as if much better antenna have been used. That, of course, is not the case, since every amplifier creates noise that makes the reception worse, if not impossible. This fact is the cause for a radio-amateur saying that "Antenna is the best HF amplifier."
http://www.mikroelektronika.co.yu/english/product/books/rrbook/chapter3/chapter3b.htm
So don't talk to me about nonsense.
Communiction between the sections was not overly difficult.
Well According too Generalleutnant Josef ('Beppo') Schmid, Kommandant, I. Jagdkorps:
(http://img133.potato.com/loc188/th_a77a1_German_fighter_Control.jpg) (http://img133.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc188&image=a77a1_German_fighter_Control.jpg)
What he says fits the technology and science of the equipment in use. He was also a rather involved participant in fighter control.
Makes him more credible in my book than your "nonsense".
All the best,
Crumpp
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Did you look through that whole site you linked to? Here I will save you some time:
3.2. The Simplest Amplified Radio Receiver (http://www.mikroelektronika.co.yu/english/product/books/rrbook/chapter3/chapter3c.htm)
The most obvious shortcoming of the receiver described in the previous chapter is that it can perform the sound reproduction loud enough only in case when the programme from some local or very powerful radio transmitter is being received, which can create very strong signal in the reception antenna. The reception of signals from other transmitters is too weak. The only thing that can be done is either to increase the length of the antenna, which, of course, does have its limits, or to insert an amplifying stage into the receiver.
3.7. Receiver with the HF Amplifier (http://www.mikroelektronika.co.yu/english/product/books/rrbook/chapter3/chapter3e.htm)
In HF amplifier the signal coming from the radio station is being amplified in its original form. In our case, this means that AM signal is led at input of the HF amplifier, and on its output the same shaped signal is obtained, only with bigger amplitude. This device got its name because it is used to amplify HF signals, although more precise term for it is the Selective Voltage Amplifier (that's how it is called in professional books).
"Antenna is the best HF amplifier."
Antenna design is important that's why I suggested you do an image search. Of course if there is no signal to 'amplify' then an amplifier would be pointless.
As for your scanned image please provide a source. What book is that from and who is the author? With what you provided there is not enough for me to comment on.
I will say that the LW command / control worked down through the Jagddivision (post Feb '42 Jafü later through JD). The LW were fighting over occupied territory. There were listening and broadcasting stations, as well as radar sites for tracking both enemy/ friendly aircraft and nav aids, through out each JD/Jafü. For example check this map to see the operational areas for the various divisions tasked with combating Western Allied air power:
RLV map (http://www.lesbutler.ip3.co.uk/jg26/gradnetzwhite.gif)
We are not talking about extreme ranges like HAM radio or even the ranges of Allied radio. There wasn't a single 'radio station' broadcasting to:
.. all the fighters in the air over Germany, France, Holland, etc...
If you read through SES's site I linked it explains it...
As for who posts the 'nonsense' it's clear to most on this forum, as well as on a few others, that you post nothing but nonsense. That hasn't changed with this thread.
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I would think the 190 had a good space for radio, - you could stuff a man in there.
BTW, wasn't that how Rudel got away from being caught by the Russians?
Oh, my infallable memory again :D
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And, BTW, 109 was very loud in the cockpit. Not sure of the 190 though.
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We are dealing with VHF radios, Bruno. NOT HF.
The marconi whip vertically polarized antenna(FuG16) on the aircraft does not have the dB gain. It requires more power output to get the range than the aircraft equipment could produce.
The wire dipole used on the FuGVII is a little better with the exception it is a horizontally polarized antenna. VHF spectrum has poor horizontal propogation.
The polarization of an antenna or orientation of the radio wave is determined by the electric field or E-plane. The ionosphere changes the polarization of signals unpredictably, so for signals which will be reflected by the ionosphere, polarization is not crucial. However, for line-of-sight communications, it can make a tremendous difference in signal quality to have the transmitter and receiver using the same polarization. Polarizations commonly considered are linear, such as vertical and horizontal, and circular, which is divided into right-hand and left-hand circular.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antenna_theory
I will say that the LW command / control worked down through the Jagddivision (post Feb '42 Jafü later through JD).
I would say it worked because they pushed operational control down to the lowest level possible to overcome the communications shortcomings. Just as Generalleutnant Josef ('Beppo') Schmid, Kommandant, I. Jagdkorps says.
Unfortunately this meant that they could rarely attack in mass nor were they flexible in their response. While the allies could communicate with all of their aircraft, the Luftwaffe could not.
In 1945 the Germans came out with a 5 channel radio system that did allow them to coordinate their effort. Of course by that point it made little difference in the outcome.
The book is a reprint of the Post War POW interrogations and debriefs.
I would think the 190 had a good space for radio, - you could stuff a man in there.
I would have thought so too. That compartment is all you have. Past that bulk head and things get tight. You don't want to put much weight back their either if you can avoid it. It moves the CG rearward.
With the Zusatzkraftstoffbehälter im rumpf the CG is pushing the safe limits in the FW-190A8. Flying a man in the back was a rare occurrance. You certainly could not engage in combat due to instability of the rearward CG.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Same problem as with later Spitfires with rear tanks as well as the Mustang.
Oh, and stuffing a person in there was an absolute exception, - case of emergency.
Hadn't thought of the extra tank though.
BTW, the Brits operated on VHF already in 1940. The first sets were not that good, - i.e. during the BoB, but they soon got an upgrade (with the Mk II I belive).
During the BoB you could say that range was just 40 miles.
In 1941 the range was better, and sound quality just fine. I have a hilarious story of just that, hehe. Will see if I type it up.
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"And, BTW, 109 was very loud in the cockpit."
Of course.
The exhaust stacks were in the lower part of the engine cowling generating huge noise, whereas in better a/c the exhaust stacks were in the upper part ie. straight in front of the c-pit and thus generated less noise. :p
-C+
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Gimme an hour or two and I'll give you 3 pilot's view of cockpit's noise.
(Their combined kills are something close to 300 I belive)
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Originally posted by Angus
2. Rall refers to the radio equipment as very good - in a 262. Finally clear of the disturbances caused by the magnettos in the 109.
"Endlich ein Funkgerat, das nicht durch die Zundanlage des triebwerks gestört wird"
Now it is your turn to tell me it's rubbish ;)
It only shows your and Rall’s lack of understanding. The 262 didn’t have magnetos, and how exactly is magneto interference the fault of the radio set anyway? Seems to me the problem was that MB failed to shield their engine electrics properly. Common problem in WWII.
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Originally posted by Angus
Gimme an hour or two and I'll give you 3 pilot's view of cockpit's noise.
(Their combined kills are something close to 300 I belive)
Why don’t you dig up some quotes from allied pilots as well? I once read a Spit article about a pilot who when he started the engine thought he heard a rattle. After listening for a few seconds the rattle went away and he looked up to see the ground crew were laying on the ground and his crew chief waving for him to shut the engine off. What he thought was an engine rattle was actually his guns emptying all their ammo across the field. :D
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I've heard .303's emptying hundreds of rounds, and they are actually not that noisy.
The 3 pilots include one Spitfire pilot. It's a 1000 pages though....I'm digging like Tom, Dick, and Harry all put together....
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Oh, and Harry, tsk tsk tsk:
"It only shows your and Rall’s lack of understanding. The 262 didn’t have magnetos, and how exactly is magneto interference the fault of the radio set anyway"
We are both well aware that there are no magnetos there. It's your lack of understanding that we understand that. That is, - they never got away from the problems incurred by the magnetos....
Add to that, a noisy cockpit...
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Originally posted by Angus
We are both well aware that there are no magnetos there. It's your lack of understanding that we understand that. That is, - they never got away from the problems incurred by the magnetos....
Then why did you even bring it up? This thread is about “German a/c radios”. And why did Rall express himself in that way? “Finally a radio that does not get disturbed by the power plant”. If he (and you) really understood he would have said: “Finally a power plant that does not disturb the radio”. Naw, I think your hairy troll-ass is backpedaling for all it’s worth.
Engine interference was a problem in all piston engined aircraft at that time. In the Lanc the radio and intercom had a constant high pitch whine because of engine interference. It’s just that the pilot whines more in Rall’s 109.
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We are dealing with VHF radios, Bruno. NOT HF.
No shyte, you brought up HF, read your quote:
This fact is the cause for a radio-amateur saying that "Antenna is the best HF amplifier."
You linked to a site thats discussing amature HF radio. I simply replied with comments from your own link that shows that an amplifier can be used, even with HF...
The marconi whip vertically polarized antenna(FuG16) on the aircraft does not have the dB gain. It requires more power output to get the range than the aircraft equipment could produce.
Range wasn't an issue. The lack of power from the on board radio can be taken into account for on the ground by Antenna desing and by boosting the signal via an amplifer. Range to the master control station wasn't that great.
I would say it worked because they pushed operational control down to the lowest level possible to overcome the communications shortcomings. Just as Generalleutnant Josef ('Beppo') Schmid, Kommandant, I. Jagdkorps says.
What's the name or ISBN of the book...
Unfortunately this meant that they could rarely attack in mass nor were they flexible in their response. While the allies could communicate with all of their aircraft, the Luftwaffe could not.
Do you need me to site examples of LW mass formations even late in the war?
Here's a couple
On 2 April '44 450 B17s and B-24s of the 15th AF were sent to bomb targets in Styr. They were escorted by P-38s and P-47s. In reponse I. Jagdkorp sent up 226 fighters from 3./JD as well as fighters from 7./JD. (JG 27). They were dircted to target from the ground through as series of vectors and made contact with the bombers at 7000m near Graz. The fighters weren't in one giant formation, they were in formation by group / unit of about 30 to 50 fighters.
And one more:
Kaczmarek: a German view of the air war (http://members.aol.com/falkeeins/Sturmgruppen/contents.html)
7 July '44 1,129 Fortresses and Liberators of the US Eighth Air Force set out from England to bomb aircraft factories in the Leipzig area and the synthetic oil plants at Boehlen, Leuna-Merseburg and Lutzgendorf. The AGO Focke Wulf works in Oschersleben were a particular target for the bombers even now as the emphasis of the bombing war was switching to the destruction of oil production centres. At about eight o'clock that morning the initial Luftlagemeldung ( air situation report ) was received in the 'Heimatflakbatterien' in Magdeburg. The Würzburg-Riesen ( long range radar ) had detected large air movements over East Anglia. As the bomber formations droned into Germany Alarmstufe 1 ( alert ) was given to all flak batteries and as the bombers approached the Münster-Osnabruck area the civil population was warned and smoke pots on the ground began to generate smoke screens over potential targets.Luftflotte Reich gave the order for the defending fighters to assemble over Magdeburg. It was a beautifully clear day . Dense condensation trails could be seen up in the stratosphere . There was a continuous deep roaring of the bomber formations. The bombers by-passed the intense flak barrage heading towards the Leipzig area. Further Luftlagemeldungen arrived . In the air the fighter controller was passing a stream of intercept vectors to Major Walther Dahl , Kommodore JG300, at the head of a Gefechtsverband escorted by Gruppen of JG 300. IV./JG 3 were also airborne. Leading the Fw 190s of his Stabsschwarm west of the intended target Dahl caught sight of his quarry: box after box of bombers heading east. The plan was for the Sturmjäger escorted by sixty Bf109s, to attack the hundred mile long bomber stream at its mid-point. Although the lead and trail bomber formations were heavily escorted, the flanks were covered by small forces making random sweeps. Major Walter Dahl led his forces in behind a Group of Liberators without any interference from escorts. They were to close to point-blank range before opening fire. Dahl had swung his force in behind the Liberators of the 492nd Bomb Group which, as luck would have it, were temporarily without fighter cover.
Allied perspective:
Disaster over Oschersleben (http://members.aol.com/falkeeins/Sturmgruppen/blitzluftschlacht.html)
The Luftwaffe, in fact, was well organized on 7 July 1944. Liberators especially equipped to monitor enemy fighter frequencies actually heard the attacking ZG 26 pilots ordered to hit the "third formation" (i.e., the 14th Wing) as the "first formation" had too many escorting fighters protecting it.
The main enemy concentration from Magdeburg plus reinforcements from Southwest Germany, as many as 175 single engine and 125 twins in all, unleashed their attacks against the center of the column. Although one squadron of the leading 389th Group moving into Halle lost three bombers to enemy fighters when it strayed from the parent force, and the 489th lost one over Aschersleben, the majority of the attacks were hammered against the 14th Wing attacking Bernberg. As noted earlier the 44th Group was flying direct-ly behind the 392nd at a three minute interval. At the IP (the 44th noted in its mission report) "FOUR GROUPS OF B-24'S CAME IN FROM THE EAST AND IT BECAME NECESSARY TO SWING TO THE RIGHT... FIGHTER SUPPORT WAS EXCELLENT." In other words, the 492nd was now exposed to attack from the rear, and all local escort had gone with the 44th. Thus was the fate of the 492nd again sealed.
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You linked to a site thats discussing amature HF radio. I simply replied with comments from your own link that shows that an amplifier can be used, even with HF...
Wow!
You don't get it. The antenna is the best amplifier. Adding anything else only works to a very narrow point and there is nothing that can amplify a signal that is not present.
For frequency selection HF radios would have given them the range needed. It would have been harder to pass data over and would have been subject to interception more readily than the LOS VHF. I was illustrating that any power amplifier interfers with the reciever. It just happenend to be an HF amp on the website.
You will effect your reception much more by building a higher dB gain antenna than you will hooking up an "amplifier". Only Radio Shack, Sears, or whoever you gave money too for that thing, benefits. The benefits to the reception are negliable.
That, of course, is not the case, since every amplifier creates noise that makes the reception worse, if not impossible.
http://www.mikroelektronika.co.yu/english/product/books/rrbook/chapter3/chapter3b.htm
And that is not a characteristic of the HF spectrum. That is a characteristic of ALL RF energy.
The major problem though is the fact there IS no signal to amplify. Unless of course LW fighters were operating in Near Earth Orbit. The radios they used where Line of Sight VHF!
The aircraft did not carry a powerful enough receiver to have duplex communications at all times.
There is a little known phenomenon called the curvature of the earth that blocks the path.
In fact your fandom reaches to a level that your trying to show a Jagdkorp Commander was wrong in relating his own experience at controlling the Defense.
Your post does nothing except reinforce EXACTLY was Generalleutnant Josef ('Beppo') Schmid relates.
http://img133.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc188&image=a77a1_German_fighter_Control.jpg
Let's look at the your example:
The bombers by-passed the intense flak barrage heading towards the Leipzig area.
However on that day, the USAAF hit many targets all over Occupied Europe:
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): Mission 458: 1,129 bombers and
756 fighters are dispatched to attack synthetic oil plants, aircraft assembly
plants and engine works, airfields and an equipment depot, marshalling yards
railway station and railway repair shops in Germany; 37 bombers and 6
fighters are lost:
1. Of 373 B-24s, 102 hit Lutzkendorf and 64 hit Halle oil plants, 90 hit
Bernburg and 73 hit Aschersleben aircraft plants and 8 hit targets of
opportunity; they claim 39-5-10 Luftwaffe aircraft; 28 B-24s are lost, 1
damaged beyond repair and 126 damaged; 3 airmen are KIA, 11 WIA and 274 MIA. Escort is provided by 224 P-38s, P-47s and P-51s; they claim 46-1-16
Luftwaffe aircraft; 1 P-38 and 3 P-51s are lost (pilots are MIA).
2. Of 303 B-17s, 64 hit Bohlen and 51 hit Merseburg oil plants, 67 hit
Kolleda and 32 hit Lutzkendorf Airfields, 22 hit targets of opportunity and
16 hit Gottingen marshalling yard; 2 B-17s are lost and 112 damaged; 3 airmen are WIA and 20 MIA. Escort is provided by 185 P-38s, P-47s and P-51s; theyclaim 9-0-1 Luftwaffe aircraft in the air and 3-0-1 on the ground; 1 P-47 and 1 P-51 are lost (pilots are MIA).
3. Of 453 B-17s, 114 hit Leipzig/Taucha, 79 hit Leipzig/Mockau, 35 hit Leipzig/Heiterblick and 15 hit Leipzig/Abtnaundorf oil plants, 46 hit Leipzig bearing industry, 35 hit Kolleda Airfield, 19 hit Leipzig Station and 7 hit Nordhausen; 7 B-17s are lost, 2 damaged beyond repair and 152 damaged; 15 airmen are KIA, 5 WIA and 50 MIA. Escort is provided by 247 P-47s and P-51s; they claim 20-0-2 Luftwaffe aircraft in the air and 1-0-0 on the ground; 1 P-51 is damaged beyond repair (pilot is WIA).
Mission 459: 6 of 6 B-17s drop leaflets in France and Belgium during the
night. 19 B-24s participate in CARPETBAGGER operations during the night.
The Germans could not control all the aircraft intercepting to have real time co-ordination in the air attacking at once.
They had a few shining examples however when circumstances fell into place. To characterize the system though as reliable is pure nonsense.
The allies could co-ordinate their efforts in the air. They had better radios including HF sets which could talk from anywhere in skies of Europe back to England or even Italy. HF uses Skywave propogation and are not Line of Sight.
From one HQ, the allies could control their entire effort in the air in real time. The Germans could not.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Wow fellas never thought a question about A/C radios would bring the piss and vinegar out like this :)
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Wow!
You don't get it. The antenna is the best amplifier. Adding anything else only works to a very narrow point and there is nothing that can amplify a signal that is not present.
No you don't get it. There was a signal present as you can see it the accounts posted above. They had radios, they used them and they worked so there was a signal. LW master station antenna were more then adequate.
You linked to an amature radio sight and cherry picked a paragraph that said:
That, of course, is not the case, since every amplifier creates noise that makes the reception worse, if not impossible. This fact is the cause for a radio-amateur saying that "Antenna is the best HF amplifier."
They are talking about AM / HF radio on that site. If you read that site they say in following paragrahs; speaking about the very same amature AM / HF radio:
The most obvious shortcoming of the receiver described in the previous chapter is that it can perform the sound reproduction loud enough only in case when the programme from some local or very powerful radio transmitter is being received, which can create very strong signal in the reception antenna. The reception of signals from other transmitters is too weak. The only thing that can be done is either to increase the length of the antenna, which, of course, does have its limits, or to insert an amplifying stage into the receiver.
and
In HF amplifier the signal coming from the radio station is being amplified in its original form. In our case, this means that AM signal is led at input of the HF amplifier, and on its output the same shaped signal is obtained, only with bigger amplitude. This device got its name because it is used to amplify HF signals, although more precise term for it is the Selective Voltage Amplifier (that's how it is called in professional books).
So your own source doesn't agree with you over what you posted about AM / HF radio.
As for VHF the master stations didn't require line of sight for duplex communication with fighters in the air. In one of the examples I gave Dahl's formation was vectored over very mountainous terrain to engage 15th AF bombers. Obviously there was a 'signal'.
The range from the master station to the fighters was never that far and well with in range of on board radio as well as RDF and IFF.
On a side note:
Duplex communication was never that important for intercept. Many times the LW pilots were ordered to leave there R/T off or complete radio silence to avoid the possibility of the allies triangulating their signals. Many times the Allies could jam LW communication or give out false vectors etc... The LW did this too to the Allies.
Your post does nothing except reinforce EXACTLY was Generalleutnant Josef ('Beppo') Schmid relates.
You haven't established that Schmid said any such thing. What we have is you posting a cropped scan that never mentions Schmid and doesn't include a page number or book title. With your constant 'cherry picking' of facts no one will take your word for it. What is the ISBN or the name of the book where that scan comes from?
However on that day, the USAAF hit many targets all over Occupied Europe:
So? the LW didn't have the forces to engage every raid or every section of a bomber stream. When 3./JD sent out 226 fighters on 2 April '44 that represented the entire operational day fighter strength of the division.
The example I gave for 7 July '44 only deals with Luftflotte Reich whose forces concentrated on the raid headed towards Oschersleben . The LW never had the strength to hit the every section of a bomber stream or every stream. My example doesn't say anything about what was going on else where. Other LW squadrons in other sections were dispatched against some sections of those other raids.
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Oh and read the description of the FuG 10 I quoted above (See Harry's Reply as well). It mentions HF and MF frequencies not VHF. Neither the FuG 10 or FuG 7 were VHF.
The FuG 16 didn't enter service until well into '44...
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Neither the FuG 10 or FuG 7 were VHF.
No the FuG 16 was VHF. The radio that replaced the FuG VII in 1943.
http://noding.com/la8ak/29b.htm
Find a fighter the FuG 10 was used in??
It was a bomber radio.
So frequency control in FuG 10 had to be by a free-running oscillator. But the working conditions could hardly been more unfavourable. The transmitters of the FuG 10 were of the MOPA type (Master Oscillator Power Amplifier = VFO/PA). In the final amplifiers two RL12P35 pentodes were in parallel. The oscillator used the same 35W pentode in order to provide sufficient driving power for the final amplifier (Photo 2). A good solution from a logistic point of view, hut a technological nightmare for the development engineers. Almost all German transmitters used grid block keying of all stages. This made full break-in possible. Therefore the VK) stage would only warm up during transmissions. The stage never reached a stable temperature, due to the intermittent operation. The internal dimensions of the valves in the VFO and final amplifier, and with them the inter-electrode capacitances, were constantly changing, resulting in frequency drift.
The recently developed ceramic capacitors, having controlled temperature coefficient, opened the way to counter the frequency drift. But they could not follow changes in environmental temperature immediately due to their thermal lag. This problem was solved by increasing the surface. Where, for instance, a 100pF capacitor was required ten capacitors of 10pF in parallel were used and mounted at strategic locations within the transmitter. However, this did not help in the case of the inter-electrode capacitances of the valves that changed quickly when the Morse key was operated, but Lorenz also countered this problem. There were available not only capacitors with a controlled temperature coefficient but also ones with a controlled loss resistance. Capacitors of this kind were included in the tuned circuit of the oscillator. The RF current flowing through them during transmission heated the capacitors in step with the valves and so frequency drift was sufficiently eliminated.
The low air pressure in a high-flying aircraft can cause sparking in the variable capacitors of a transmitter. This can be avoided by increasing the spacing between the plates, but this also increases the dimensions of the capacitor. This was not a viable solution for the FuG 10 transmitters, covering 300-600kHz for the long wave (S10L) and 3000-6000kHz for the short wave transmitter (S10K), packed in a cabinet of only 210 x 220 x 220mm and delivering 70-80 watts to the antenna. Here the invention of the dust iron cores by Hans Vogt brought the solution. Instead of varying the capacitance of the tuning circuits these were fixed and the inductance varied by using variometers. Inside the sphere-shaped coils on their ceramic formers were cores of sintered dust iron. The variometers of the master oscillator and final amplifier were ganged and tuned by a single knob.
None of these solutions equal the performance of quartz. The Germans made it work because they had too. It was not a reliable system in comparision.
http://noding.com/la8ak/10a.htm
No single engines fighters used the FuG10:
Starting from 1939, it became the preferred equipment for larger aircraft with several crew members (e.g. Ju 88, He 111, DO 217, ME 110).
http://www.qsl.net/ab4oj/fug10e/fug10e.html
As for the FuG VII and FuG VIIa, it was phased out by 1943 when the need for a long-range coordinated control was not an issue.
The book:
TABLE OF CONTENTS
chapter title authors Source
List of Figures and Maps
INTRODUCTION David C. Isby, editor
GLOSSARY
SECTION 1 - The Defense of the Reich
Chapter 1: Reich Air Defense in World War II. A Strategic-Tactical Survey Von Rohden (compiler) USAFHRA file 512-045-4. OB from AUL 940.544943 R737e
Chapter 2: The Overall Defense of the Reich 1940-44 (January) Weise USNARA RG-338 D-111 Foreign Military Studies
Chapter 3: Development of Nightfighting July 1940 - 15 September 1943 Kammhuber USAFHRA file 519.601
SECTION 2- A Battle of Increasing Numbers and Technology
Chapter 4: Technical and Communications Equipment Used in the Reich's Defense von Rohden AUL 940.544943 R737e
Chapter 5: German Nightfighting from 15 June 1943 to May 1945 "Beppo" Schmid USAFHRA file 519.601
Chapter 6: German Dayfighting in the Defense of the Reich from September 15, 1943 to the End of the War "Beppo" Schmid USAFHRA file 519.601
SECTION 3 - Developing Technology to Defend the Reich
Chapter 7: Fighter Control Galland USAFHRA file 519.601
Chapter 8: Luftwaffe Radars Martini USAFHRA file 519.601
Chapter 9: Luftwaffe Radars and Radios OKL Staff USAFHRA file 519.601
Chapter 10: the Me-262: Development, Experience, Success and Prospects Messerschmitt German Naval Archive, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C
SECTION 4 - Applying the Technology: Operations and Tactics
Chapter 11: Commanding the Night Fighters Kammhuber USAFHRA file 519.601
Chapter 12: Night Fighter Control Ruppel USAFHRA file 519.601
Chapter 13: Night Fighter Direction Sandmann USAFHRA file 519.601
Chapter 14: Night Fighter Operations Sandmann USAFHRA file 519.601
Chapter 15: Night Fighter Tactics (NJG 4) Schnaufer USAFHRA file 519.601
Chapter 16: Night Fighter Tactics (NJG 6) Scholls USAFHRA file 519.601
Chapter 17: Night Fighter Missions Scholls USAFHRA file 519.601
Chapter 18: Fighting the P-61 Ruppel USAFHRA file 519.601
SECTION 5 - Summing Up
Chapter 19: Looking Back Von Rohden AUL 940.544943 R737e
Biographies editor
A new English-language collection of immediate postwar writings by senior Luftwaffe commanders and fighter pilots is in print. Entitled FIGHTING THE BOMBERS: THE LUFTWAFFE'S STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ALLIED BOMBER OFFENSIVE; it is being published by Greenhill in the UK and Stackpole in the US. It is currently available on both US and UK Amazon.com web sites. I edited the volume.
Those familiar with the previous volume done by Greenhill, THE LUFTWAFFE FIGHTER FORCE: THE VIEW FROM THE COCKPIT will find this similar. However, it is not simply the bits that would not fit into the first volume. Rather, these are a selection of immediate post-war interrogations and writings by a number of key figures in the Luftwaffe. I believe such post-war accounts, while by no means the last word, are valuable and should have a broader availability than being in the archives at Maxwell AFB. This volume is much more an attempt at putting together a narrative from multiple Luftwaffe viewpoints.
The book itself is 256 pp, hardbound, with a glossary. The book is illustrated with lots of b&w photos and drawings throughout. The table of contents shows the source. USAFHRA is the US air Force historical Research Agency. Appendix B-4 holds a listing of file 519.601 material. AUL is the Air University Library (reproduced typescript). USNARA is the US National Archives.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1853675326/102-8219486-0993745?v=glance&n=283155
they worked so there was a signal.
Umm Yeah!:huh And how do you prove the ones they did not hear? Maybe ask someone who was there?
The man in charge of JagdKorps I says differently. Sorry but he was there and you were not.
In HF amplifier the signal coming from the radio station is being amplified in its original form.
Guess your not tracking. Instead of quiet garble, you get loud garble. Which is exactly what I said in the beginning.
That, of course, is not the case, since every amplifier creates noise that makes the reception worse, if not impossible. This fact is the cause for a radio-amateur saying that "Antenna is the best HF amplifier."
http://www.mikroelektronika.co.yu/english/product/books/rrbook/chapter3/chapter3b.htm
The site is explaining the importance of the antenna to the receiver. The principal it lays down above does not change for the duration of the article. Nowhere does it contradict the above statement.
You simply assume it does because it goes on to explain radio receiver amplification.
All electronics emit RF energy. The more power the more interference. Your are talking about increasing the power at the point of reception, you know.
You think it might interfere with that antenna attached to it???
You don't get it. The antenna is the best amplifier. Adding anything else only works to a very narrow point and there is nothing that can amplify a signal that is not present.
All the best,
Crumpp
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The FuG VII is a Medium Frequency radio that just reaches into the low HF range.
(http://img137.potato.com/loc154/th_4095e_FuG7.jpg) (http://img137.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc154&image=4095e_FuG7.jpg)
Medium Frequency range:
Mediumwave signals have the property of following the curvature of the earth (the groundwave) at all times, and also reflecting off the ionosphere at night (skywave).
Which is probably why it was phased out. MF would give you excellent range if you were on the ground. In some cases hundreds of miles.
Unfortunately most airplanes in flight are not on the ground or near it.
The Skywave propagation of MF is unpredictable at night. HF is much more predictable for long range Skywave propogation.
However being such a low frequency for the HF spectrum it useful is doubtful for skywave propagation.
Since the ionosphere often reflects HF radio waves quite well, this range is extensively used for medium and long range terrestrial radio communication. [/b]However, suitability of this portion of the spectrum for such communication varies greatly with a complex combination of factors:[/b]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_frequency
This is why HF radios generally cover the entire HF spectrum. Best Frequency to use changes considerably during the course of the day/night.
The usable frequencies fall between the Lowest Useable Frequency and the Maximum Useable Frequency.
Maximum usable frequency (MUF) describes, in radio transmission, using reflection from the regular ionized layers of the ionosphere, the upper frequency limit that can be used for transmission between two points at a specified time. This index is especially useful in regard to shortwave transmissions.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maximum_usable_frequency
The lowest usable high frequency (LUF), in radio transmission, is that frequency in the HF band at which the received field intensity is sufficient to provide the required signal-to-noise ratio for a specified time period, e.g., 0100 to 0200 UTC, on 90% of the undisturbed days of the month. The amount of energy absorbed by the lower regions of the ionosphere (D region, primarily) directly impacts the LUF.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lowest_usable_high_frequency
And the best frequency for the conditions is the Frequency of Optimum Travel:
n the transmission of radio waves via ionospheric reflection, Frequency of Optimum Transmission, often abbreviated FOT, is the highest effective (i.e. working) frequency that is predicted to be usable for a specified path and time for 90% of the days of the month. The FOT is normally just below the value of the maximum usable frequency (MUF). In the prediction of usable frequencies, the FOT is commonly taken as 15% below the monthly median value of the MUF for the specified time and path.
The FOT is usually the most effective frequency for ionospheric reflection of radio waves between two specified points on Earth.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frequency_of_optimum_transmission
Considering the HF spectrum is 3mHz to 30mHz, the 750KHz that the FuG VII reaches into it is a very narrow slice. Highly unlikely it will fall into the usable band.
All the best,
Crumpp
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The Brits were already into VHF in 1940. But Crumpp has brought up a lot of interesting stuff.
And as for Harry's answer, - I'll rather take the words of a Wartime ace than some "Tom, Dick or Harry" from the internet. I do not know whether the 262 sported a different radio (well, it's more spacious aft fuselage than a 109, apart from being a newer design alltogether), but the main point is that they didn't get out of the way of the magnettos disturbing quite a bit.
Not sure as well over what frequency the magnettos give "noise", but if you've been in a piston engined aircraft and on the radio, you'll bloody well know that this is not a problem today. And the frequency today? Lower or higher???????
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Find a fighter the FuG 10 was used in??
It was a bomber radio.
What did I say Crumpp? Here I will quote myself for you:
bombers and Recce used FuG 10, fighters used FuG 7 then FuG 16
None of these solutions equal the performance of quartz. The Germans made it work because they had too. It was not a reliable system in comparision.
They did not have to be 'equal to quartz'. The ranges and distances weren't that great. It was plenty reliable in terms of a functional design. Of course like all things German late in the war production quality was suspect due to poor materials and quality control.
There used to be a TOCH forum member (Old TOCH) by the nic of Radiomonitor. He was a Luftwaffe radio operator (he was there). He wrote in an old post that can be found on LWAG:
From TOCH!:
Radiomonitor
Radio Equipment
Thu Sep 19 07:54:39 2002
80.33.178.189
02.09.19-0636z---Radio Equipment in German fighters, bombers and transport aircraft was during the WW2 superior to the equipment of British and American similar equipment, both in construction details, performance and handling. The fighters' FuG16 and FuG17 - radio telephone equipment - working on 39 mHz upto 47 mHz were constructed in moduls, were lightweight and assembled for quick tuning and easy and quick maintenance. The radios also worked as direction finding - df - equipment, and for "Zielflug", i.e. homing devices, using the radio beacons in the German airspace. The equipment was usually built-in in the aft section of the aircraft, with distance-tuning from the pilot's seat - The ground control officers had even so-called transponder facility, i.e. a radio equipment which could identify "friend and foe" in the air, as well as usual commanding mode traffics-vy73-KAL-(former Luftwaffe radio operator)+
I have a contact email for him and I sent him a message. Maybe he will clear things up..
The email bounced. There is no TOCH member currently registred as 'Radiomonitor' and I currently can't ask him to clarify.
Guess your not tracking. Instead of quiet garble, you get loud garble. Which is exactly what I said in the beginning.
It's you making the assumption of 'garble' no one else. I said the antenna design was important but as it says this quote:
The most obvious shortcoming of the receiver described in the previous chapter is that it can perform the sound reproduction loud enough only in case when the programme from some local or very powerful radio transmitter is being received, which can create very strong signal in the reception antenna. The reception of signals from other transmitters is too weak. The only thing that can be done is either to increase the length of the antenna, which, of course, does have its limits, or to insert an amplifying stage into the receiver.
If the transmitter / signal is too weak, as would be the case with range, inserting an amplifying stage into the receiver will allow the transmission to be heard. Remember you brought up 'range':
They simply could not carry a vacuum tube radio large enough to give them the range needed to co-ordinate their entire effort in the air.
I said:
Range wasn't an issue with the radios on board aircraft and in air control was maintained on the Gruppe/squadron level.
Then you did your little pee dance and jumped to 'no signal', 'garbled signals', on board equipment 'not powerful enough' and 'bad antenna' etc...
The site is explaining the importance of the antenna to the receiver. The principal it lays down above does not change for the duration of the article. Nowhere does it contradict the above statement.
You also said (in reponse to amplifiers):
No such thing. The best you can do to recieve is built a good antenna. However it is subject to the law of reciprocity.
Your source contradicts you, not itself. The article is clear despite your 'cherry picking'
In HF amplifier the signal coming from the radio station is being amplified in its original form. In our case, this means that AM signal is led at input of the HF amplifier, and on its output the same shaped signal is obtained, only with bigger amplitude. This device got its name because it is used to amplify HF signals, although more precise term for it is the Selective Voltage Amplifier (that's how it is called in professional books).
Now I gave you examples of LW air-to-ground communication on a large scale. If you question those examples email the webmasters. Falkeins posts on several forums and is a published author. You can ask him if he might:
ask someone who was there
try LEMB...
In Norbert Hannig's book 'Fighter Ace' he writes of radio (posted for no real reason other then to ad-lib some sarcasm; I need the work):
pg 79:
Our call sign was 'Rotkäppchen', I recall, and the weather was ideal for our mission. A solid layer of high cloud covered the base, but off to the north, in the direction of the front, this gave way to clear blue sky. We took off and headed northwards in a steady climb. Almost as if on cue ground control, Anton 1, came on air:
"To cyclists in area Schlum, single furniture van nearing the front heading north, Frage Viktor?"
Frage Viktor? damn doesn't ground control know that LW radios don't work? They can't possible expect a clear answer from fighter with bad antennas and radio with no power...
This account goes on describing R/T air - air communiction between the flight.
Hannig describes another incident where while escorting a group of bombers here he hears the:
Triumphant cries of 'Abschuß'
and then
Suddenly the unmistakeable tones of Nowotny, the Kommandeur I Gruppe and one of our leading Experten over the R/T:
"There's another one! Pauke! Pauke!"
- attack, attack!
Man with all that 'garble' and lack of signal how could Hannig recognize Nowotny's 'Austrian' voice...
All crews don't report to ground control, only the leading elements. The location of friendly aircraft is tracked via IFF and there's no need for 'running' commentary. GCI gave vectors and directed those in the air to the fight. It was up to the the flight leader to pick targets and decide upon attack and withdrawal strategies.
Until my book order arrives I still can't comment of Schmid. That book didn't get good reviews but for $24 USD WTF, we will see...
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Originally posted by Angus
I would think the 190 had a good space for radio, - you could stuff a man in there.
I think you could even squeeze two in...gulp.:eek:
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What did I say Crumpp? Here I will quote myself for you:
Then why bring it up in a discussion on daylight fighter control?
Except to strawman when the relevant facts do not lead to the conclusions you wish them too?
The ranges and distances weren't that great.
Sure, Late in the war by the time it was long past making a difference, the system did become adequet. The ranges decreased daily as the allies closed in.
Radio Equipment in German fighters, bombers and transport aircraft was during the WW2 superior to the equipment of British and American similar equipment, both in construction details, performance and handling.
You quote a BBS posting?? That's your proof?
If the transmitter / signal is too weak, as would be the case with range, inserting an amplifying stage into the receiver will allow the transmission to be heard.
And the wheel goes round and round, round and round....
Once again. Only to a very small point.
All electronics emit RF energy. The more power the more interference. Your are talking about increasing the power at the point of reception, you know.
Additionally if your reception is poor, amplifying a poor signal results in a louder poor signal.
It's not magic and does not create reception.
Range wasn't an issue with the radios on board aircraft and in air control was maintained on the Gruppe/squadron level.
Range was the issue. That is why control had to be pushed down to the Gruppe level and below.
Your source contradicts you, not itself.
I really don't think you even understand what the article is saying. It clearly does not contradict anything written in the antenna portion.
Let's not cherry pick our quotes either Bruno.
While I did say this:
No such thing. The best you can do to recieve is built a good antenna. However it is subject to the law of reciprocity.
If you bother to read further in the same post I also wrote:
An amplifier could help but the absence of signal means nothing to amplify. An unreadable transmission really loud is still an unreadable transmission. It is just louder static.
Obviously I am aware that Reciever amplifiers exist. Difference is your lack of understanding of their capabilites and place in communications.
They do not create signal nor can they deduce the meaning of a poor signal and they can only amplify within the narrow confines of interference.
The Antenna is the best amplifier available.
All crews don't report to ground control, only the leading elements.
Read the begining. Nowhere does anyone claim the Germans did not use ground control. You keep posting these anecdotes with little understanding of the argument. Much less the equipment.
On a strategic level, the Germans were unable to compete. They could not launch fighters from Holland, Berlin, and France with the idea of controlling them to intercept the bomber stream at a specific point simutaneously.
Why? They needed better radios.
That book didn't get good reviews
:rofl
:cry
All the best,
Crumpp
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Man & a Woman ;)
There was a woman escaping on that day Rudel got away. Nobody knows who she was.
Wonder where I read up on that though.
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Then why bring it up in a discussion on daylight fighter control?
You said:
We are dealing with VHF radios, Bruno. NOT HF.
I replied with an FYI that only the FuG 16 was VHF and said:
Oh and read the description of the FuG 10 I quoted above (See Harry's Reply as well). It mentions HF and MF frequencies not VHF. Neither the FuG 10 or FuG 7 were VHF.
In order to point out that both the FuG 10 and FuG 7 were MF / HF. I never mentioned 'dayfighter' in reference to the FuG 10. In fact if you read the FuG 10 description as I suggested you could where I answered Milo's question as to whether the FuG 10 was used in fighters or bombers.
Sure, Late in the war by the time it was long past making a difference, the system did become adequet. The ranges decreased daily as the allies closed in.
The ranges were never that great early in the war either. In Fact LW dayfighter range was considerably smaller.
One thing about your 'line of site' in regards to the FuG 16 and VHF (quasi-optische Sicht). When I said range wasn't an issue I included that LW ground stations were well distributed through out the operational areas ( Jafü / JD). Fighters would switch between ground stations. The grounds stations were linked upwards through the command and control structure.
I think a better term would be 'direct path' since since VHF band using low power and small antenna like the LW used with FuG 16 did require an unobstructed path for best reception.
VHF ranges by nature are 'limited' for example the approximate effective range numbers I have for the FuG 16 are:
Air-to-air traffic:
30 km at 300
200 km at altitude.
Ground-to-air traffic:
100 km at 1000m
200 km at 4000m
250 km at 6000m
These ranges may or may not be 100% accurate but they are supported by the following:
Lt. Henning (USA) wrote in 1946:
About the middle of the 1941, the FuG-16 apparatus began to come into use on multiengined(?) aircraft. This covered a frequency band from 38.6 – 42.2 megacycles for R/T only and was used chiefly for air-to-air communication and fighter control. The Tx is of the electron coupled oscillator type with following amplifier. The receiver is a nine tube superhet with AVC and low temperature coefficient inductances.
The same type of pentode is employed thought the different connections for the various functions. Both Rx and Tx have adjustable stop tuning, which may be set for predetermined frequencies together with optional remote control equipment. The effective range for air-to-air traffic varies height being about 30 km at 1000 ft to 200 km at great heights. For ground-to-air traffic, the range is approximately 100 km at 3000 ft increasing to 200 km at 13,000 ft.[\quote]
The LW weren't complete idiots and planned for their effective radio ranges by distributing equipment through out their operational areas (Jafü / JD etc). Even in the East where the ranges were much greater. This makes sense for other reasons as well. For one the Allies wouldn't not be able to knock out the LW communication structure as easily.
Those ranges I listed aren't a product of poor radio design. For example,
the rule-of-thumb in determining the maximum direct path distance (the distance to the horizon) between an aircraft and a ground station, in nautical miles, is equal to the square root of the aircraft height, in feet, above the underlying [flat] terrain.
For air-to-air communications the LOS distance is the sum of two 'distance to horizon' calculations: i.e. One aircraft at 5000 feet the other at 10 000 feet: the maximum LOS distance will be 70 + 100 = 170 nm. It may be a bit more than that because of wave diffraction at the intervening horizon. Intervening mountain terrain may reduce the distance.
So when I said range wasn't an issue in was the context that it was not something that could not be over come. It was...
You quote a BBS posting?? That's your proof?
My 'proof' of what? Everything I typed is supported by fact while you dance a jig switching directions as many times as possible.
They do not create signal nor can they deduce the meaning of a poor signal and they can only amplify within the narrow confines of interference.
The Antenna is the best amplifier available.
I didn't say an amplifier created a signal. I said that weak signal could be boosted enough to compensate for range. You then jumped to 'no signal' 'garbled signal' etc..
I never said the site was incorrect I said you were incorrect when you stated clearly:
No such thing. The best you can do to recieve is built a good antenna. However it is subject to the law of reciprocity.
The statement 'no such thing' is not ambiguous. My replies about 'amplifiers' are specific and are supported by your own source.
Read the begining. Nowhere does anyone claim the Germans did not use ground control.
You are saying that the German on board radio / antennas weren't powerful enough to transmit to ground control, or at least some percentage of the fighters in the air could not. My reply is 'they all didn't need to'. All they needed to hear was the instructions from their flight leader. Are you saying that the on board radios couldn't even transmit between fighters a few thousand meters away?
You keep posting these anecdotes with little understanding of the argument.
Those anecdotes address your specific claim:
While the allies could communicate with all of their aircraft, the Luftwaffe could not.
On a strategic level, the Germans were unable to compete. They could not launch fighters from Holland, Berlin, and France with the idea of controlling them to intercept the bomber stream at a specific point simutaneously.
They communicated well enough, there was no need for one command to have control over every fighter in western Europe. There was coordination between commands as shown in those 'anecdotes'.
They did attack specific points of bomber stream en mass and caused considerable losses at those points. The LW was defeated not due to 'bad radios' but because they couldn't put up the numbers necessary to combat Allied air superiority.
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There certainly seems to be no problem with the range then.
More of a question about reception and reliability.
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Range was only part of the problem. Statement (b) clearly qualifies range as an issue. The fighter radios lacked the range for reliable duplex communication.
The system was plagued by a number of technical and training issues. To characterize it as efficient or adequet is pure fandom revision of History.
(http://img101.potato.com/loc24/th_edef7_German_fighter_Control.jpg) (http://img101.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc24&image=edef7_German_fighter_Control.jpg)(http://img11.potato.com/loc24/th_0e30a_German_Fighter_Control_2.jpg) (http://img11.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc24&image=0e30a_German_Fighter_Control_2.jpg)(http://img15.potato.com/loc24/th_20d8a_German_Fighter_Control_3.jpg) (http://img15.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc24&image=20d8a_German_Fighter_Control_3.jpg)
I think a better term would be 'direct path' since since VHF band using low power and small antenna like the LW used with FuG 16 did require an unobstructed path for best reception.
It required an unobstructed path for ANY reception.
You are saying that the German on board radio / antennas weren't powerful enough to transmit to ground control, or at least some percentage of the fighters in the air could not.
That is what your clouded fandom vision thinks I am saying.
Nowhere do I claim the Germans could not communicate in the air. I am saying their system was not reliable nor effective in gaining strategic control of the battle. They could not coordinate large strikes at the same time from different parts of the Reich. Their control was just not good.
Just as GeneralLeutnant Schid says, they had local control. Although they did attempt to coordinate theater wide responses via ground communications before the aircraft launched, once in the air, the Gruppe or Staffle was an independant unit.
The allies had the advantage and could coordinate strikes flooding the Reichs airspace and overloading the defenses. Not only did they grossly outnumber the Luftwaffe, but they had the force multiplier of effective strategic control.
From your statements on the reciever amplifier, it is obvious you do not understand the technical side of communications although you are struggling to do so.
You still have no clue and fail to understand that a reciever amplifier is not a miracle or magical piece of equipment. On the reciever end, the antenna is what matters with any amplification being a band-aid or worse, interference.
All the best,
Crumpp
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The fighter radios lacked the range for reliable duplex communication.
As already explained there was no pressing need for 'duplex communication' between all crews and the ground as it says in your scanned image. In fact the allies where perfectly capable of triangulation LW transmission signals. Duplex communication, especially those transmissions coming for the fighters back to ground, would give away the location of the LW formation. There are many instances where the LW pilots were ordered to leave there R/Ts off or to maintain complete radio silence. There was no need for every LW fighter in the air to maintain a running commentary with GCI.
Nowhere do I claim the Germans could not communicate in the air. I am saying their system was not reliable nor effective in gaining strategic control of the battle. They could not coordinate large strikes at the same time from different parts of the Reich. Their control was just not good.
Sure they did, I gave examples do you need more? The example I gave for 2 April '44 is recounted in Jadwaffe: Defending the Reich 1944-1945, Vol 3, Section 5, in the chapter entitled: 'Mass against Mass 1 - Gefechtsverbänd, pg 209. It states that mulitple fighter units from mulitple JD (from JD 3 and 7) were sent up, and then vectored to target via GCI in a coodinated attack on the Allied bombers headed toward Styr. This was all the fighters available within range.
just as GeneralLeutnant Schid says, they had local control. Although they did attempt to coordinate theater wide responses via ground communications before the aircraft launched, once in the air, the Gruppe or Staffle was an independant unit.
Local control at the (Jafü / JD) as controlled from the ground. In the air the at the Gruppe or Staffel level. Even the Allies didn't have single control of all their fighters / aircraft in the air over Europe. The LW would have never intercepted Allid bombers if the only instruction from the ground they received was 'pre-flight'. The bombers didn't fly straight to target. They were tracked and vector updates were sent from the ground up to the fighters, just as described in my examples.
The allies had the advantage and could coordinate strikes flooding the Reichs airspace and overloading the defenses. Not only did they grossly outnumber the Luftwaffe, but they had the force multiplier of effective strategic control.
The Allies didn't have a single command structure either. They did not have a single 'radio' station' popping out orders to every allied fighter plane in the sky. You over state their 'strategic control'. The allied victory was simple, put up more numbers then the LW, engage the LW when ever possible and shoot them down. That didn't require a lot of micro-management from the ground. The LW could track allied radio communication as well. The Allies didn't need a running commentary back to the ground either. Radio discipline and brevity was practiced on all sides.
From your statements on the reciever amplifier, it is obvious you do not understand the technical side of communications although you are struggling to do so.
My statements are clear and supported by your own source. Its you who jumped from 'amplifiers' don't exist to 'they can't possibly work'. It's you who claimed 'LW on board radios (or some %) were to weak to send out a signal over range' and / or that they could only send out 'garbled signals' and could not be heard on the ground. What I said was that weak signals due to range could be amplified so that they could be heard. Just as it states on the site you linked. Anything else read into that is on you.
In HF amplifier the signal coming from the radio station is being amplified in its original form. In our case, this means that AM signal is led at input of the HF amplifier, and on its output the same shaped signal is obtained, only with bigger amplitude. This device got its name because it is used to amplify HF signals, although more precise term for it is the Selective Voltage Amplifier (that's how it is called in professional books).
Same shaped signal with bigger amplitude...
LW radio communication was jammed, it was manipulated (false information being given out by the allies as GCI), it was used against the LW (the Allies could trace / triangulate radio signals and vector their fighters to intercept LW formations well before they reached the bombers). All these were real problems. None of them would have been overcome by putting Ami radio sets in LW aircraft.
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Same shaped signal with bigger amplitude...
What?? Do you know what that means?
Same garble only louder.
Crump Says:
They could not coordinate large strikes at the same time from different parts of the Reich. Their control was just not good.
Bruno says:
Sure they did,
Guess you and General Schmid will just have to disagree.
They were tracked and vector updates were sent from the ground up to the fighters, just as described in my examples.
No has claimed anything different. You just argue for the sake of arguing.
Of course the Germans had a system in place for controlling fighters. You contend that it was a great reliable system on par with what the allies used. It was not.
It is a question of reliability.
Let's look at your claims:
Range wasn't an issue with the radios on board aircraft
Not according the Schmid. see comment (b) in the documents posted in my last reply.
Again, you seem to know more about it than the man who actually directed Luftwaffe fighters in battle.
Your own source lists the range of two-way communications with the FuG16 series.
Air-to-air traffic:
30 km at 300
200 km at altitude.
Nowhere has the argument for all fighters using radios came up in this thread. We are discussing the Formation leaders communications with the Ground Controller. Two-way communications, i.e., both radios can talk to each other.
Now go look at a map of Europe. It's much bigger than 200km's.
They did not have a single 'radio' station' popping out orders to every allied fighter plane in the sky.
Umm the 8th USAAF did coordinate its efforts among multiple Fighter/Bomber Groups and could coordinate a response to the developing defensive conditions in the air. The Germans had little or no capability to do this.
This was especially used when USAAF Fighter Groups began ranging ahead of the bombers.
Typical 8th USAAF Fighter Escort Screen:
http://img134.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc253&image=3575b_Fighter_Escort.jpg
Its you who jumped from 'amplifiers' don't exist to 'they can't possibly work'.
What a silly statement. As I pointed out in the very same post you keep pointing too as "proof" I was denying receiver amplifiers did not exist, I talk about the characteristics of a receiver amplifier’s engineering limits.
The only “jumping around” is in your mind.
You do not understand the engineering trade-offs I pointed out. Receiver Amplifiers are far from magic and the antenna is the best bet for good reception.
Speaking of Antennas lets look at some German propagation charts from a study of the effect of frequency on range.
This study shows the range of data found from various studies on frequency selection. The power out varies from 100 watts to 20,000 watts. Much more power than the FuG VII put out.
(http://img144.potato.com/loc24/th_0fc26_Title.jpg) (http://img144.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc24&image=0fc26_Title.jpg)(http://img16.potato.com/loc24/th_4577a_Page_1.jpg) (http://img16.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc24&image=4577a_Page_1.jpg)(http://img142.potato.com/loc24/th_82814_Page_2.jpg) (http://img142.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc24&image=82814_Page_2.jpg)(http://img11.potato.com/loc24/th_14a38_Day.jpg) (http://img11.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc24&image=14a38_Day.jpg)
The FuG VII is a much shorter-range radio with a frequency range of 2.5mHz to 3.75mHz only.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Same garble only louder.
'Garble' in the this thread was an invention of you.
Guess you and General Schmid will just have to disagree.
Schmid hasn't typed anything in this thread. First off read your scan, no where does Schmid mention range. You say that its implied in 'B' when it's clearly not.
Second, Schmid didn't dictate that section of the book. The information was compiled from post war interviews / interrogations contained in Schmid's file. The data is compiled, filtered and interpreted by the author. That's the some total of Schmid's contribution. Until I receive my copy of the book that's all I can say. However, it is comical that you keep claiming 'Schmid' said such and such. No direct quote from Schmid is included in this thread nor in your scan.
Not according the Schmid. see comment (b) in the documents posted in my last reply.
B states (from your scan):
The absence of small. modern wireless sets and, resulting from it, the lack of a simple procedure making possible a simultaneous exchange of communications with all crews.
Nothing about range...
Your own source lists the range of two-way communications with the FuG16 series.
Of course it does. I also stated that range wasn't an issue because there were multiple ground control stations. Fighters in the air were simply passed on to the next station. Those stations were part of the command and control structure and linked back up through the chain of command. The range limitation of VHF was well known and planned for.
A late war 109 would be lucky to be able to fly 600 miles or stay in the air much longer the 2 1/2 hours at min power. They didn't need radios with range much greater then 200km.
Nowhere has the argument for all fighters using radios came up in this thread.
Sure it has, by you and in your scan (part B, see above: all crews
You wrote:
While the allies could communicate with all of their aircraft, the Luftwaffe could not.
and
The Germans could not control all the aircraft intercepting to have real time co-ordination in the air attacking at once.
Now go look at a map of Europe. It's much bigger than 200km's.
No you go look at a map of Europe that has LW radio ground sattions placed. There wasn't a single LW radio station in downtown Berlin broadcasting orders to every LW aircraft on the planet.
As I pointed out in the very same post you keep pointing too as "proof" I was denying receiver amplifiers did not exist,
What?
The phrase 'no such thing' is as clear as it gets...
Receiver Amplifiers are far from magic and the antenna is the best bet for good reception.
As I said mulitple times of course antenna desgin is important. Antenna at the ground stations were well desgined and functional. You claimed that due to range the fighters in the air couldn't communicate with ground stations because their transmission power wasn't strong enough. In repsonse I said the ground stations could use an amplifier to boost that signal. You assume that any amplification means either instant static and thus the transmission will impossible to make out or that 'longer range' automatically means 'garble' at best, or no signal at worst.
Your source explains how an amplifier can be used to:
In our case, this means that AM signal is led at input of the HF amplifier, and on its output the same shaped signal is obtained, only with bigger amplitude.
I never said anything about 'magic amplifiers'. Quote where I said otherwise.
Umm the 8th USAAF did coordinate its efforts among multiple Fighter/Bomber Groups and could coordinate a response to the developing defensive conditions in the air. The Germans had little or no capability to do this.
When the individual groups were in the air they weren't lead from the ground. A coordinate effort is what the LW did, see my examples. Mulitple Geschwadern from mulitple divisions were directed against a single section of an attacking bomber stream using the maximum amount of forces available with in range.
Over on AAW2 Kurfürst wrote:
I'd very much argue about massed Allied formations, from what I've seen they operated at Group strenght as well for the simple reason that's was about the maximum the flight's leader could handle. Difference was, they had more Groups present, this was simply due to their greater resources, not any technological factor.
He is right
The Group and individaul flight leaders directed the flight. They had planned partrol areas and/ or sections of the bomber stream. Escorts could be distributed along the bomber stream covering more of the stream and reducing the time it took for the fighters to respond to an attack at any given point. Those fighter groups responding to LW attacks along the stream weren't directed by ground control but from the bombers calling for help in air. Allied air to air range had to be greater to cover those streams. The allied aircraft had the range to cover those distances.
Just like the LW the allies or their respective 'air forces' (8 th 9 th etc...) did not have one ground station directing all aircraft in the air. This also true once the allies liberated France. Stations were scattered about and linked up the chain just like the Germans did.
You contend that it was a great reliable system on par with what the allies used.
What I said was in terms of radios:
German, RAF and AMI radios are very comparable to each other.
Ask the Finns they used all 3 as well as VVS equipment. In fact Fins kept FuG 7s in their G-2s and they weren't upgraded with FuG 16 like their G-6s. Everything I have read said they preferred the German and Ami sets over all others. Maybe a Finnish member ofthis forum can add something.
and this in terms of command and control:
The LW command and control from the ground was very sophisticated and they could easily maintain control and direct the Gefechtsverband to sections of the bomber stream the were least protected by escort even very late in the war. This information came from recce, ground observers and various stations through out WETO. All relayed through the command and control structure and relayed to the pilots even in flight.
My examples show that.
I never used the words:
great reliable system on par with what the allies used.
In reference to either. Quote where I said otherwise...
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And the wheel goes round and round.....
On range, wonder why the radios were an issue if they worked reliably and could talk whenever needed??
I think you have it all figured out.
Generalleutnant Schmid was just extremely unlucky not have you to tell him how reliable and wonderful the German Fighter Control system was in truth.
The German radios were wonderful and just misunderstood pieces of technology.
Quartz really does not give you a better radio. The engineers are wrong and Bruno is right.
Buy the book and read it yourself.
David C Isby is the author. According to him, the book is just:
Rather, these are a selection of immediate post-war interrogations and writings by a number of key figures in the Luftwaffe.
What is written by him is clearly defined in the book. I certainly agree with this reviewer:
I agree with both reviews previousl published here. David Isby is the editor of this volume, and he's done a magnificent job. The individual pieces by former Luftwaffe officers tell compelling stories, although more could be done to annotate each piece to explain technical details that were familiar to the speakers, but no longer command any common knowledge some sixty years after the end of the war. All too often, current histories of this sort lack essential groundings in the times and circumstances of events that are related, and all too often, they are "dumbed down", supposedly to appeal to the widest range of readers. This book does not do so, and readers should be encouraged to read the material, and then to ask questions. Granted, this is an area for specialists, but for those who want to see what first-hand information looks like, this is a good place to start.
Instead of attacking it just because you do not like the information.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1853675326/102-8219486-0993745?v=glance&n=283155
All the best,
Crumpp
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The statement:
No such thing. The best you can do to receive is built a good antenna. However it is subject to the law of reciprocity.
Is true.
Little theory for you Bruno as it is obvious you do not understand.
All antennas are judged in relation to the "isotropic" or Doublet in Free Space. This is a theoretical antenna with perfect electrical characteristics.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isotropic_antenna
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isotropic_radiator
However, thru careful antenna construction you can easily construct an antenna with many times more power than the isotropic.
For example, an antenna with a diameter of 2 m and an efficiency of 0.55 would have a gain of 8685 at the C-band uplink frequency of 6 GHz and wavelength of 0.050 m. The gain expressed in decibels (dB) is
10 log(8685) = 39.4 dB. Thus the power radiated by the antenna is 8685 times more concentrated along the boresight direction than for an isotropic antenna, which by definition has a gain of 1 (0 dB).
http://www.aticourses.com/antennas_tutorial.htm
And of course applying the law of reciprocity we know that this same antenna will receive 8685 times more concentrated in that direction.
Which is a significant increase in our ability to communicate. Much more effective than just doubling our power out.
Of course if we just increase the power on the receiving end past a certain point it begins to interfere with the actual signal we are trying to pick up in the first place! Diminishing returns from an engineering viewpoint.
Radio Shack is laughing all the way to the bank when they sell you that reciever amplifier that you go home and hook up to the same exact antenna you had before.
Frequency selection and antenna selection are much more important to communications than power out or power received.
There are literally thousands of Amateur Radio Operators who communicate thousands of miles on 1 watt.
All the best,
Crumpp
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I haven't attacked the book, I haven't even read it. You keep posturing this debate between me and Schmid. I haven't seen Schmid post anything yet. If he has please quote it .What we have is you posting a scan then you telling us 'what it really means'. 'B' really refers to 'range' for example. Well 'B' could mean many things. Until the book arrives and the context of that scan is put into perspective I have no judgment of the book.
The German radios were wonderful and just misunderstood pieces of technology.
Quartz really does not give you a better radio. The engineers are wrong and Bruno is right.
Quote one place I said any of that. I quoted for you the exact words I used, should I do it again?
As for your second posts:
Nothing you posted in regards to 'antenna' automatically means LW air to ground communication was 'garbled' or there was 'no signal'. Nothing you posted proves that an amplifier would mean nothing but 'interference'.
I said antenna design is important several times.
I don't shop at Radio Shack so I don't care what they sell. However, as it says in the quote I provided from your source:
The only thing that can be done is either to increase the length of the antenna, which, of course, does have its limits, or to insert an amplifying stage into the receiver.
You may not like that, or the fact Radio Shack 'laughing all the way to the bank', so email the web master of that site and start a consumer group to let the public know how evil Radio Shack is.
The book should arrive sometime early next week and once I get it and read it I will comment.
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Thanks for all your input Bruno. :aok
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The only thing that can be done is either to increase the length of the antenna, which, of course, does have its limits, or to insert an amplifying stage into the receiver.
The limits they are talking about are physical room.
The limits of size/cost limits are much wider for a government agency than a private individual.
Not many people have the room on their property to erect an 8 wavelength terminated long wire cut to 2.5 MHz.
The most important element in a radio circuit is the antenna. You may have a powerful transmitter and a frequency, but without the correct antenna, communication will be less than desirable, if not impossible.
http://www.radiowavz.com/html/antennas_and_propagation.HTM
Frequency used matters more than power out too.
Nothing you posted in regards to 'antenna' automatically means LW air to ground communication was 'garbled' or there was 'no signal'.
Bruno,
I have not posted any absolutes. I have no made the claim LW radios did not work. They did. It is a matter of reliability and being able to use your fighter control system as a force multiplier. Because of the technological and training limits, it appears they could not do so reliably.
However Schmid says in his portion of the book which according to the author is a reprint of Schmid's statement explaining the Dayfighter System of Ground Control from Sep. 1943 until the End :huh :
a. lack of space in SE German fighters did not permit to carry several or bulkier or more modern wireless sets in the airplane.
Here Schmid relates that German communications technology was not up to par with the allies. They needed both more modern equipment and the room to carry it.
Least that is what I get out of it. Maybe it means something else to you Bruno??
b. absence of small, modern wireless sets and resulting from it, the lack of a simple procedure making possible a simultaneous exchange of communications air ground with all crews.
I wonder what simple procedure he is talking about?
Looks to me like he is talking about pushing the "push to talk" button on the handset and speaking into the microphone to the ground controller. He is talking about radios used for communications, not beacons or IFF, unless of course we assume he was senile, crazy, or simply an idiot.
In that case there is the possibility he is talking about bus rides or something else.
Either way if you cannot talk to all the people you need too when you need too, then your communications system is not reliable.
c. The difficulty in tuning in of German Radio sets involving bad R/T connections, in contrast to the quartz controlled enemy radio sets affording very clear R/T connections.
Wonder what bad R/T connections means to you? It means to me that you’re not communicating when you need too. Your communications system is experiencing the inability to talk and garbled or unreadable transmissions.
Otherwise you would have good connections as opposed to bad ones.
Maybe your thinking the wires fall off the radio? If that was the case then the lack of quartz would hardly be the issue. Good solder and guns would be the focus.
I still have to wonder though how the bad connections equal the good reliable communications in your mind?
(http://img131.potato.com/loc69/th_af1c6_German_fighter_Control.jpg) (http://img131.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc69&image=af1c6_German_fighter_Control.jpg)
All the best,
Crumpp
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So, the oarsman complains about his boat.
I don't find it hard to belive that the LW had a quality problem, but it affecting their overall strategy in such a big manner, I find harder to belive.
Well, just me maybe....
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Well, just me maybe....
To me it is pretty obvious that their control methods were not ideal and had to be adapted to the equipment issues.
In the very first line of Schmids discussion he states:
In contrast to Nightfighting, the means of control for fighter control by day were by necessity much simpler. Reasons for this were:
http://img131.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc69&image=af1c6_German_fighter_Control.jpg
Night fighter control involves controlling one fighter onto one target or to an area where the targets are the most dense. The fighter then takes over to locate the target visually or with it's own onboard sensors.
Day fighter control involves controlling massed formations against massed formations. In order to win the war of percentages, the Germans needed a system that could control multiple units precisely to place them were the numerically superior enemy was the weakest and the Germans were positionally and numerically advantaged in a coordinated effort. The equipment simply was not available to them to do this.
All the best,
Crumpp
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The limits they are talking about are physical room.
Ya think..? :rolleyes:
I have not posted any absolutes. I have no made the claim LW radios did not work.
What have you have said over and over is 'no signal' and 'garble' and stuff like the following:
Unfortunately this meant that they could rarely attack in mass nor were they flexible in their response. While the allies could communicate with all of their aircraft, the Luftwaffe could not.
However Schmid says in his portion of the book which according to the author is a reprint of Schmid's statement explaining the Dayfighter System of Ground Control
If you read the top of your scan it isn't a 'list of issues that Schmid says cost the LW the war'
It states:
Means of Control
In contrast to night fighting, the means of control for fighter control by day were by necessity much simpler. Reason for this were:
The word used used is simpler and then goes on to the list the reasons why.
The words:
inadequate
unreliable
costly
aren't used...
However, I don't have the book to put your scan into any sort of context.
the lack of a simple procedure making possible a simultaneous exchange of communications air ground with all crews.
The above certainly doesn't mean 'range' as you claimed. It could mean any number of things and I won't speculate until I have read the book.
In regards to Schmid it may be just as Angus said:
So, the oarsman complains about his boat.
This wouldn't be unique, you find this same sort of thing from many of the leading LW (Galland), Wehrmacht and NSDAP personalities following their defeat. I will find out when the book arrives.
Either way if you cannot talk to all the people you need too when you need too, then your communications system is not reliable.
The LW 'communication system' wasn't reliable late in the war due many issues. Allied ECM that made communication impossible at times and at other times more of a risk to the LW. This has nothing to with the reliability of the LW on board radio design. Had the LW had the same resources as the allies they would have mounted their own ECM on the same scale and affect.
Wonder what bad R/T connections means to you? It means to me that you’re not communicating when you need too. Your communications system is experiencing the inability to talk and garbled or unreadable transmissions.
It could mean any number of things. I already listed several through out this thread. Again the fighters in the air didn't need to keep a running conversation with the ground or vice versa.
I said German materials, production and quality all suffered as the war progressed. I said the the allies were able to listen in on LW communications and were able to jam then, to pass false info, to triangulate etc...
The problem is that you assume any 'communication' issues that Schmid speaks of, or any any other 'communication' obstacle the LW faced, was simply due to inadequate design of their equipment. The LW would have faired no better had they had AMI radios in all their aircraft. As I said many times the LW flew with their R/Ts ordered turned off rather then risk giving away their position to the allies.
For example even in Bodenplatte, when JG 53 was bounced, no one had their radios on. They couldn't warn each other or be contacted by GCI to warn them of the presence of allied fighters. The radio at that point in the war were more a hazard to them then the any benefit they could have gained through 'clear communication with the ground'.
I still have to wonder though how the bad connections equal the good reliable communications in your mind?
I never said that. I said the LW radios were reliable enough. You claim bad radios cost the LW the war. No radio, however advanced, would have made any difference.
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Day fighter control involves controlling massed formations against massed formations. In order to win the war of percentages, the Germans needed a system that could control multiple units precisely to place them were the numerically superior enemy was the weakest and the Germans were positionally and numerically advantaged in a coordinated effort. The equipment simply was not available to them to do this.
Sure it was and they did, I gave examples. A little later tonight I will post more if you like.
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One thing about Isby's book. When I said the reviews were not that great I didn't mean the ones on the Amazon site.
I meant the reviews for others on various forums from knowledgeable folks who bought and read the book.
David Isby posts over at TOCH and here's a link to a thread where he announced a new book:
NEW BOOK - LUFTWAFFE & THE WAR AT SEA (http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=1874)
Not necessarily a review of 'Fighting the Bombers: The Luftwaffe's Struggle against the Allied Bomber Offensive' but one of the more fair treatments of Isby's work.
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Then there is always the possibility of asking living pilots from the era about the stuff. Well, ... still, if any TomDick&Harry always says they didn't know doodly-squat, - then what's the use?
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Hardly a fair treatment of David Isby's work.
I encourage anyone to read the entire thread. Instead what we have is a case of academic snobbery on the part Richards or Anton. He gets called out on it as well.
David Isby does not edit the documents for content. He remains faithful to what was contained in them to the point of repeating errors. The value is one can see what was expected or thought at the time. This is stated numerous times in the book.
The errors mainly have to do with Professor Willi Messerschmitt's report on the state of Me 262 development.
Sure it was and they did, I gave examples.
You have held up a handful of individual pilots generalizations and some anecdotes made under unknown conditions. They could have been circling the controller station for all we know.
Using this paltry evidence you have attempted to refute the conclusions of a man with years of experience commanding a JagdKorps. He used the Luftwaffe Fighter Control daily commanding units in the air.
Once more all the technical facts and science backs up Schmids conclusions.
Galland also recognized the weakness of the system. According to him, commanding just 10 units in the air from the same HQ was a "serious problem" to control. Had the war continued, equipment was in development which would have allowed for up to 50 units to be controlled at short notice. However this never made it into operation.
While the Allies were controlling thousands of bombers with thousands of fighters escorting, the Luftwaffe had difficulty with a few hundred in the air.
All the best,
Crumpp
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If this is in the book, "die ersten und die letzten" It happens to be beside my pillow right now.
I can dig it up if you give me a chapter or page, then I'll type it up, risking the wrath of my wife though ;)
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It's not IIRC. Gallands comments are reprinted directly from the transcripts of his post war interrogations and debriefs. They are printed in Isby's book.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Ooohhh.
A good read?
ISBN???????????????
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A good read?
Yeah did you read that thread Wotan linked over at TOCH?
Read it. It is worth it and gives some really good reviews. It also blows Wotan smear campaign against this book out of the water.
Read the whole thing and not just the first few post's.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Hardly a fair treatment of David Isby's work.
Sure it is. It offers criticism and counterpoint and leaves the final opinion up to the reader.
This is stated numerous times in the book.
That maybe but we aren't talking so much about what Isby wrote or Schmid is claimed to have said but what you say 'they really meant'. If you offer the comments attributed to Schmid as irrefutable evidence of your position then its only fair that your source get a proper examination. Not everyone thinks Isby's book is well done, some think it was 'adequate' and that's what that thread shows. Interestingly enough those writing on behalf of the book are at best 'lukewarm' in their assessment in that thread.
You have held up a handful of individual pilots generalizations and some anecdotes made under unknown conditions. They could have been circling the controller station for all we know.
A handful is greater then the 1 source you offered, Schmid via Isby.
I don't have time right to dig through my books but I can sure post more then a 'handful' of examples.
once more all the technical facts and science backs up Schmids conclusions.
Your 'technical facts' shows nothing that every doesn't already know. Your conclusions OTOH are the issue.
Galland also recognized the weakness of the system. According to him, commanding just 10 units in the air from the same HQ was a "serious problem" to control. Had the war continued, equipment was in development which would have allowed for up to 50 units to be controlled at short notice. However this never made it into operation.
Galland was one of the biggest:
So, the oarsman complains about his boat.
He blamed eveyone and everything but rarely acknowledged his own failings. Let's hope Schmid is a little more credible.
Had the war continued, equipment was in development which would have allowed for up to 50 units to be controlled at short notice.
More nonsense, the allies were well ahead of the LW technical curve in terms of ECM. A more advanced radio would not have made a bit of difference in LW operational strategy.
Angus,
A good read?
The book Crumpp is talking about (and the only book) is the one discussed in that thread. There's a link to it up further in the thread in one Crumpp's posts.
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More nonsense, the allies were well ahead of the LW technical curve in terms of ECM. A more advanced radio would not have made a bit of difference in LW operational strategy.
Wotan's opinion. Actually that is one point most them agree on. Allied ECM had little effect and did not hinder operations.
Not everyone thinks Isby's book is well done, some think it was 'adequate' and that's what that thread shows. Interestingly enough those writing on behalf of the book are at best 'lukewarm' in their assessment in that thread.
Your main argument was that Isby's work was Isby's words filtering and reinterpreting Schmids observations.
Wotan says:
The information was compiled from post war interviews / interrogations contained in Schmid's file. The data is compiled, filtered and interpreted by the author. That's the some total of Schmid's contribution.
Which is complete fiction you made up to try and discredit Schimds observations because it does not fit your opinion.
It is Isby's lack of synthesis that causes some contention.
Isby says:
My goal was never to do synthesis. I was not paid for #$%ing synthesis! Nor was it my objective. People want to hear from those who were involved at the time as well as those who have the benefit of 60 years work. It was to select and present a group of documents in their historical context, raise warning flags where approrpriate, and provide an annotated bibliography and description of the authors.
You get all of this for less than a xerox copy of the original documents, plus pretty pictures and maps.
http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=1874&page=2
A handful is greater then the 1 source you offered, Schmid via Isby.
Actually there are quite a few with the same opinion. Schmids was the only one I posted.
I would say David Isby's sources are in a much better position to judge the system they used daily to command the Luftwaffe Dayfighters than a few anecdotes from pilots who hear radios working.
Especially since your demonstrated weak grasp of radio theory does not seem to understand the science and technical facts back up there conclusions. Your fandom clouds your vision, Wotan.
Let's hope Schmid is a little more credible.
Oh probably not Wotan. You have it nailed on the head. They all have no credability and in a few hours surfing the net you have proved what utter idiots they were.
:lol
All the best,
Crumpp
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Wotan's opinion. Actually that is one point most them agree on. Allied ECM had little effect and did not hinder operations.
Yeah they flew around with their R/T ordered off just for the hell of it. The allies weren't monitoring their radios, triangulation transmissions or jamming them, they didn't need to because everyone knew that the LW radios didn't work... :rolleyes:
Your main argument was that Isby's work was Isby's words filtering and reinterpreting Schmids observations.
Mr. Isby states:
David Isby is the editor of Fighting the Bombers, The Luftwaffe Fighter Force, Fighting the Invasion and Fighting the Breakout .
Filtering and interpreting is what an Editor does. It is he who structures the book into 'historical context'. The Editor is the one who decides on what's important to include or to exclude as extraneous etc...
Actually there are quite a few with the same opinion. Schmids was the only one I posted.
I would say David Isby's sources are in a much better position to judge the system they used daily to command the Luftwaffe Dayfighters than a few anecdotes from pilots who hear radios working.
Read that thread, see what folks like Tony Williams and SES say about the 'sources'.
Especially since your demonstrated weak grasp of radio theory does not seem to understand the science and technical facts back up there conclusions. Your fandom clouds your vision, Wotan.
I posted nothing on 'radio theory'[?]. Everything I posted in regards to an 'amplifier' is correct and shown to be so by your own source...
Nothing you posted contradicts that.
Oh probably not Wotan. You have it nailed on the head. They all have no credability and in a few hours surfing the net you have proved what utter idiots they were.
That is yet to be seen. I will judge that once the book arrives. As for the credibility of those things attributed to Schmid, it was pointed out in that thread by Isby:
German language versions of most of the documents do not currently exist. While the US Army Foreign Military Studies series and the US Air Force Karlshrue studies were prepared in German laguage versions and then translated (with significant exceptions), this was not the case with many of the earlier efforts. Any German language versions were apparently considered working papers and did not make it into the archival files or onto the microfilm where they have rested since 1945.
He didn't have access to most of the original german language documents.
As SES in his replies points out:
The interrogations seem to have been conducted in German by interrogators, who did not have a good understanding of many of the subjects they asked questions about. Bluntly put: They asked stupid questions and got silly answers.
Subsequently the reports were translated to English by translators, who did not have a good grasp of operational notions or German military terminology.
and later writes:
If the original German transcripts, devoid of spelling errors, erroneous geographical locations etc., had been published, the book would have been of value as a collection of source material. Now it suffers from a translation, which can only be graded D minus, and some of the interrogated personnel had an incorrect perception of facts and events. These accounts cannot be trusted without cross reference to original German documents on the same subject.
If you cling to Isby's book as the end all, 'word of God' on this subject then its fair game to point out that not everyone shares your opinion.
Oh probably not Wotan. You have it nailed on the head. They all have no credability and in a few hours surfing the net you have proved what utter idiots they were.
Surf the net? It was through your extensive googling that you came up with that useless and pointless 'radio theory' crap that has little to do with anything posted in this thread.
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that useless and pointless 'radio theory' crap that has little to do with anything posted in this thread.
Wotan,
I have been sending message around the world for 30 years on that "useless and pointless" radio theory. It is obvious you do not grasp the technical intricacies. Many of the statements you have made in this thread are contrary to the science.
German language versions of most of the documents do not currently exist.
That is because they are allied documents, Wotan, not Luftwaffe. They are the post war de-briefs and POW interrogations of Luftwaffe personnel from the end of the war. IMHO they have a large degree of creditability. They give the reader a picture from the perspective of the Germans.
I am not going to argue about Isby's book. People can read the link. As was already posted on another board, this Richards guy has done this kind of thing before to others. The only reason it concerns you is the fact you are losing the argument.
He has a PhD in History and feels anyone who does not meet those qualifications is not capable of producing a quality history text.
Baloney. The vast majority of the aviation history books and periodicals are written and published by enthusiast not historians. Many of them do a much better job too. I have purchased far too many "picture books" or "my theory of how it happened" books.
Filtering and interpreting is what an Editor does.
Too many "Historians" do not separate fact from supposition in their work. Isby at least respects the reader enough to do so in his works. I plan on doing exactly the same. What I "think" will be clearly delineated from what I know to be fact.
Although I love History and very much respect the work that goes into getting a PhD. I count many advanced degreed Historians among my friends. Friends who help me tremendously with my own research. Many of them went into the field because of a passion for History. Let's be real though, many others went into the field because it was the quickest and easiest degree to get. The History majors were far from the last bastion of the Ivory Tower. It is a field where an advanced degree is a necessity to eat.
http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=1874&page=2
Read that thread, see what folks like Tony Williams and SES say about the 'sources'.
Sure, I absolutely agree with Tony Williams. Great example of the point he is making is the use of GM-1 and C3-Enspritzung together in my research or 100/150-grade extensive use. Both are areas in which there is plenty of documentation, photos, and "facts" to make a case of operational adoption that may not be true. I have documents ordering the use of the BMW801TH in early 1943. Did that happen??
Documents must be carefully weighed in context with events and cross referenced with other documentation.
In this case, the author does not violate anything as he makes no supposition and offers up the documentation with the original context unedited.
They are the primary sources almost all published works use as well.
If the original German transcripts, devoid of spelling errors, erroneous geographical locations etc., had been published, the book would have been of value as a collection of source material. Now it suffers from a translation, which can only be graded D minus, and some of the interrogated personnel had an incorrect perception of facts and events. These accounts cannot be trusted without cross reference to original German documents on the same subject.
True but this statement invalidates every non-German publication in existence. For example, we have at least 5 different translations of the FW-190 Flugzeug-handbook. All of them have differences and even native Germans will argue over the exact meanings of the original German. Not a very valid point in my book and simply points out the inherent fallacy of second and third hand knowledge. My advice would be learn to speak German so you can join in with the Native speakers and argue.
Better yet, go talk to someone who actually at the event or used the equipment, like Schmid.
Wotan you obviously do not understand the difference between existence and effectiveness.
Yeah they flew around with their R/T ordered off just for the hell of it. The allies weren't monitoring their radios, triangulation transmissions or jamming them, they didn't need to because everyone knew that the LW radios didn't work...
Nowhere did I say the allied ECM capability did not exist, I said it was not effective according to those who were subjected to it.
(http://img139.potato.com/loc24/th_77ef6_allied_jamming.jpg) (http://img139.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc24&image=77ef6_allied_jamming.jpg)(http://img144.potato.com/loc24/th_c60f1_Allied_achivements.jpg) (http://img144.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc24&image=c60f1_Allied_achivements.jpg)(http://img42.potato.com/loc24/th_004e2_jamming.jpg) (http://img42.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc24&image=004e2_jamming.jpg)
All the best,
Crumpp
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This Crumpp:
"That is because they are allied documents, Wotan, not Luftwaffe. They are the post war de-briefs and POW interrogations of Luftwaffe personnel from the end of the war. IMHO they have a large degree of creditability. They give the reader a picture from the perspective of the Germans"
Is a very honest, and very very thought out statement from you, and I wholeheartedly agree.
I get kicked about for using anecdotes from post war autobiographies too much to support a point, but I cannot avoid being a bit sceptical on German statements made in the height of Nazi power, where the wrong word could actually flush you down the ladder, all the way to rot front or further.
The LW staff that joined later on with NATO for instance, have given a very good description of so many items within the WW2 era, - their world, - and this time, there was all to gain and nothing to loose.
Free and undisturbed transmission that time ;)
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I have been sending message around the world for 30 years on that "useless and pointless" radio theory. It is obvious you do not grasp the technical intricacies. Many of the statements you have made in this thread are contrary to the science.
Quote those 'many statements'... All you posted about 'radio theory' is copy-n-pasted from the web links you dug up while googling.
That is because they are allied documents, Wotan, not Luftwaffe. They are the post war de-briefs and POW interrogations of Luftwaffe personnel from the end of the war. IMHO they have a large degree of creditability. They give the reader a picture from the perspective of the Germans.
The initial interviews and interrogations were done in German then translated to English and published in the various 'studies'. The originals can no longer be located. The parts we are concerned with (chapters 6 - 8 in the book) can be found in 'USAFE Posthostilities Investigation, German Air Defenses, AFHRA, file no. 519.601' as noted in your post of the chapters.
Kitchens overall opinion of the value of Isby's work isn't what is in contention. Since you made Isby's book the 'last word' on this subject then its perfectly reasonable to explore what value it has to this discussion.
If as SES suggests (and I will find when the book arrives) it is full of:
They asked stupid questions and got silly answers.
and bad and inaccurate translations then its value is meaningless as the 'end all source' you seem to think it is...
Sure, I absolutely agree with Tony Williams. Great example of the point he is making is the use of GM-1 and C3-Enspritzung together in my research or 100/150-grade extensive use. Both are areas in which there is plenty of documentation, photos, and "facts" to make a case of operational adoption that may not be true.
So you finally admit GM-1 was never serialized? I, and others, told you that 2 1/2 years ago and you argued just as hard that it was as you are arguing in this thread... Should I check back in 2 1/2 years to see if you changed positions on this subject?
FYI:
They spanked you in that other thread about 8th AF usage of 150 grade fuel. While I agree that the evidence for widespread 150 grade usage by the 8th is weak, you certainly didn't mount a convincing argument in that thread.
Documents must be carefully weighed in context with events and cross referenced with other documentation.
That's right, and Isby himself doesn't say his work is the 'end all source' you claim it is. He states:
My goal was never to do synthesis. I was not paid for #$%ing synthesis! Nor was it my objective. People want to hear from those who were involved at the time as well as those who have the benefit of 60 years work. It was to select and present a group of documents in their historical context, raise warning flags where approrpriate, and provide an annotated bibliography and description of the authors.
There's nothing wrong with that, especially if the book is cheaper and quicker then ordering the original documents. But as Adam in that thread says:
To whatever degree, those of us who frequent this board are of a learned background and similarly such publications as Fighting the Bombers and Luftwaffe and the War at Sea sahould be seen as a necessary and acceptable part of the overall study of history. Whether we like it or not the writtings of Galland, Donitz, Hitler, Churchill or whoever are necessary aspects of history and as such deserve their place - untouched and uninterpreted by modern authors, historians, "exerts" or enthusiasts alike, despite - or perhaps because of - their short-falls and misrepresentations (Look at Churchill and his recounting of Dieppe). Without the coloured views such as Churchill's multi-volume works on the Second World War, Galland's First and the Last, Knockes, I Flew for the Fuhrer, etc all history would be lkeft with would be the likes of Mr Anotn (non-personal) that can only view the world with annotated bibliographies and footnotes. History is not black an white, rather it is coloured by the subjective understanding and intepretations placed upon it by the evidence left behind. Evidence such as that which was edited and published by Mr. Isby.
The question in this thread isn't whether or not works like this are 'a necessary and acceptable part of the overall study of history'. What is important, in the context of this discussion, is determining the value of the information contained in such a book as 'the end all source' as you present it. Until I readthe book all I have is 'your word' on it.
Whether or not Kitchens dismisses the work out of hand due to Isby's lack of PhD is of much less importance to this discussion.
Nowhere did I say the allied ECM capability did not exist, I said it was not effective according to those who were subjected to it.
The image you scanned doesn't say anything about 'effectiveness' it says:
(f) The absence of large scale jamming and deceptive radio activity.
Jamming and 'deceptive radio activity' weren't used on a 'large scale' (massive jamming, used every mission etc...) but were used and effective when employed. The allies were well ahead of the Germans in terms of ECM. But like with the U-boats it may have been more useful to the allies to have the LW transmitting so they could monitor and triangulate transmissions.
Once the Allied fighters were deployed in advance of the bombers they were able to locate and break up the Gefechtsverbänd as they formed up. I am sure locating these battle formations and destroying then were all apart of the allied strategy.
I am not sure what you want those other scans to convey?
In regards to last scan:
The LW Gefechtsverbänd were envisioned to be about 50-60 plane formations. 10 formations of that size would mean 500-600 fighters. The LW were rarely able to deploy that number of fighters. The Gefechtsverbänd at times would be made of up no more then 20 aircraft. A quick flip through the 'Jadgwaffe: Defending the Reich' and Reschke's 'JG 301/302 Wild Sau' it seems that the average number of LW fighters sent up against Ami bombers was in the range of 200-250.
We can go round and round I guess but I need to read the book. I maybe completely wrong but I doubt it...
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So, rephrase time?
Brunos Point: LW radios fine, Bodenkontrolle fine.
Crumpp's point: LW radios Garbly, Bodenkontrolle, a slight mess.
My humble point: LW radios not the best, Bodenkontrolle, - not sure yet.
Or?
How about cutting it to simple?
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Oh, as a sidenote, since the RAF's fighter command managed to hold their control relatively accurate on some 150-200 fighters in the air already in 1940, the system being very much in it's infancy, as well as keeping double that number of fighters on standby and under control (11 group vs 12th, 10th and 13th), - - - I tend to think it unlikely that the LW should not be able to level that in 1943-44, especially with 2-3 times the alarm time as a NORM.
Overlooked, over and again.
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Great example of the point he is making is the use of GM-1 and C3-Enspritzung together in my research
No they tried to use them together as in at the same time.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Hi,
in the lot of replys, did someone answer the initial questions(iam to lazy to real all this)??
"What were the receive/transmit ranges?
- a/c to a/c
- a/c to ground
- ground to a/c
How did they compare to Allied radios?"
Looks to me that Bruno is a bit off topic, cause the question wasnt 'Was the Luftwaffe able to coordinate the Jagdgruppen with the available radio equipment".
If the allied equipment was better, the resulting question would be: " Would the Luftwaffe have been more successfull with the advanced radio equipment?"
Actually comments regarding the sound quality and loud engines are same off topic, as long as the pilot was able to understand understand. Its realy nice that Rall was happy about the better sound quality in the 262, but realy, who care? I never did read anywhere that the radio sound quality in german piston engine fighters was unusable.
Edit: Btw., wasnt the navigation system (placed in the compass) also somewhat a part of the radio system?? Actually i dont know the name of this system, neighter i know exact how it work. Someone told me it point the pilot to the needed direction.
Greetings, Knegel
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Looks to me that Bruno is a bit off topic, cause the question wasnt 'Was the Luftwaffe able to coordinate the Jagdgruppen with the available radio equipment".
Sure it was:
Angus stated:
they actuallly sucked
Then Crumpp set out to prove that and added a few claims on his own like:
Exactly as they [LW GCI] could not coordinate large interception efforts.
and
Unfortunately this meant that they could rarely attack in mass nor were they flexible in their response. While the allies could communicate with all of their aircraft, the Luftwaffe could not.
and
The aircraft did not carry a powerful enough receiver to have duplex communications at all times.
I can post more quotes from Crumpp's claims but you would be better off re-reading the thread. The point of contention is whether or not LW radio, as well as command and control, were reliable enough and/or actually 'worked' well enough not to hinder Luftwaffe tactical and strategic operations.
Crumpp used FIGHTING THE BOMBERS: THE LUFTWAFFE'S STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ALLIED BOMBER OFFENSIVE as Edited David C. Isby (Isby is listed as Editor) as his primary source for his claims... I have the book and read most of it but there's nothing contained with in it that changed my points in this thread. You can order / buy USAFE Posthostilities Investigation, German Air Defenses, AFHRA, file no. 519.601 which is what is reproduced in part in Fighting the Bombers in those chapters relevant to this discussion.
Here's another quote by Schmid that can be found in Robert Forsyth's Jagdwaffe Defending the Reich 1944-'45 Vol 5 Sec 3 pg 195:
Generalleutenant Schmid wrote that:
'...the striking power of the few remaining daylight fighter units assigned to Reichsverteidigung remained unbroken. Whenever weather conditions permitted the concentrated employment in close combat formation in a single area, noteworthy success was achieved in bringing down enemy aircraft and keeping our own losses to a reasonable limit. The success of our defensive operations over Berlin on 6 and 8 March (FYI: LW shot down 349 bombers in March '44) gave ample evidence of the fighting morale of our fighter pilots and of their ability to execute effective combat despite the technical inferiority of their aircraft... If the Reichsverteidigung had 1000-1200 fighters available, it would doubtless have been in a position to alter the situation in the air, at least by day, in Germany's favor within a ver short period of time, assuming of course, that there was no appreciable increase in American fighters.'
Crumpp said:
On a strategic level, the Germans were unable to compete. They could not launch fighters from Holland, Berlin, and France with the idea of controlling them to intercept the bomber stream at a specific point simultaneously.
Why? They needed better radios.
What I have said is that LW radio and command and control was effective enough given the size of their available forces. A 'better radio' would have made little or no difference in how the war progressed through '44. The LW were never able to compete with Allied numbers and those lack of numbers are what limited the LW strategy (that and the stupidity of On-High) . On innumerable occasions the LW were able to concentrate what fighters they had, all through out 44, on sections of the Allied bomber streams and cause considerable losses. They were able to do this because their radios and command and control systems worked well enough.
One other thing Willi Unger of 11./JG 3 said that one of the major hindrances of the LW defensive strategy was that the lack of the total number of day fighters meant that Reichsverteidigung units were 'scattered across the Reich'. As such they had to fly long distances to reach the bombers and / or to form up with other units. Many times LW fighters ran low on fuel before they made contact, or intercepted the bombers late, or missed them all together.
Unger wrote:
The operational bases of our fighter units in Reichsverteidigung were spread all over Germany. Attempts to maintain strength at critical times and in critical areas were made by the rapid deployment of fighters to northern or southern Germany. Several Gruppen from various airfields would combine in the air and were then led from the ground to attack the approaching bombers. This did not always work. The bombers often cheated by flying towards one town then changing course to bomb a completely different target. As the endurance of our fighters flying with an auxiliary drop tank was a maximum of 2.5 hours, we were often forced to break off. There was no question of German fighters having the advantage, only disadvantages, since the numbers of American escort fighters were far superior to us and they also operated at higher altitude.
My point being is that better radios would have changed none of that.
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My point is the Luftwaffe did not have the technical assest's available to them to turn their control methods into a force mulitplier.
As it was they had to adopt simpler control measures that further divided their already grossly outnumbered forces.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Ahem.
The first radio controlled and harmonized Radar guided interception of the war was the LW. In 1939.
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Being a radio technician that fixes and modifies radios (vhf and uhf only). Portable, mobile or mountain top repeaters from component level to antenna. (not an engineer yet, but working on it)
I would say Crumpp knows his stuff.
Hell, I got bored reading most of the replys here in this thread.
Bruno needs to realize that Crumpp is trying to tell him something and that Bruno hasn't caught on yet.
Maybe we should start the discussion over by having each "contender" to state in 1 paragraph without facts, just statements, what each is trying to say. Then go from there.
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Ok. German radios more "white" noisy.