Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => Aircraft and Vehicles => Topic started by: Crumpp on February 03, 2006, 05:26:04 PM
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Here is why some historians are skeptical of widespread use of 100/150 Grade in the 8th USAAF:
Here are the Technical Orders covering the fuels USAAF aircraft are permitted to use. I have the complete order with all revisions from Oct 1944 until May 1945 covering the period in question when 100/150 grade was adopted.
First the orders. I have scanned the title page from each order. The underlined portion of the notes specifies that a copy of each TO will be included in every Pilot's Handbook of Flight Operating Instructions.
Every type of fuel used by the USAAF had to have a Technical Order specifying it's conditions of use by specific model number engine and type of airplane. You can see in the USAAF derating instructions that TO 03-5A-66 is the specific instructions for 91/96 octane.
There should have been thousands of these TO's printed for 100/150 grade fuel instructions use if the fuel became the standard for the 8th USAAF. As such no TO was ever issued.
(http://img136.potato.com/loc24/th_a720a_TO.jpg) (http://img136.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc24&image=a720a_TO.jpg)(http://img19.potato.com/loc24/th_20d94_TO2.jpg) (http://img19.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc24&image=20d94_TO2.jpg)(http://img142.potato.com/loc24/th_1c208_TO3.jpg) (http://img142.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc24&image=1c208_TO3.jpg)(http://img107.potato.com/loc24/th_9aeb0_TO4.jpg) (http://img107.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc24&image=9aeb0_TO4.jpg)
(http://img130.potato.com/loc24/th_011bf_TO5.jpg) (http://img130.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc24&image=011bf_TO5.jpg)
This fact cast's serious doubt onto the claim of any widespread use of 100/150 grade in the 8th USAAF. It cannot be explained away with "it was locally acquired" or a "local command" order. That explanation would be reasonable ONLY for a very short period of time in an emergency. The USAAF requires a TO be published and included in all Pilots Handbook of Flight Operating Instructions.
As for the wealth of supply division documentation. All fuels require a specification order from supply. This order lays out not only the technical details defining the specific fuel but allocates who gets what and how much they are authorized to have on hand. It is the supply regulations on the fuel governing everything dealing with procurement, storage, allocations, etc..
The presence of documentation from supply detailing or outlining these parameters has no bearing on operational use. It is perfectly natural to expect information to flow back and forth as these details are gathered and the groundwork laid for proper supply when the fuel is adopted. A Technical Order not documents from supply division covers operational use.
All the best,
Crumpp
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So whats new here that hasn't been covered in the last 4 threads (at least) on the exact same subject?
I dont see anything you have not already claimed. Why are we going here again?
Shall we all cut and paste the other pages?, we can save ourselves a lot of typing.
I looked at your docs, they dont contradict anything, they just point out Air Force Wide "typical fuels" for the entire USAAF. Nobody said that P-51s in CBI used it, or that P-38s in the PAC used it, or that P-47Ds in PAC used it.
The topic is specific to USAAF 8th AF, Fighter Command , post 6-44 , P-51s and P-47s, UK based.
Im gone from this one untill I see something really new, but Im sure others will jump on in.
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I've got to agree with Squire. While these docs show no sign of 150 octane being approved on global basis, they also don't contradict any of the evidence from the other threads. Notice that table A only provides "Fuel grade recommended". Taking into account that the evidence presented in the other thread all came from sources much closer to the event in question, I would say that the case for 150 octane use by the 8th AF is still exceedinly strong. We are after all talking about a fuel that was locally aquired, and was used by only part of one of the 16 air forces for less then a year.
This is like hearing a prison warden say "Sodomy isn't on my list of approved activities in my prison", then hearing prisoner Bob say "Big Jimmy raped me the other day in the shower", then hearing prisoner Jimmy say "Man, I cornholed little Bobby the other day", then looking at the medical report from the prison's doctor saying that prisoner Bob had to spend the night in the infirmiry due to rectal trauma, then seeing the security tape from the shower showing the man on man action, and concluding from all of that: "The Warden said sodomy isn't approved, so I doubt it's ever occured here. Bob, Jimmy and the Doctor are all just making stuff up - and they were just wrestling for the soap in that video".
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While these docs show no sign of 150 octane being approved on global basis,
They show no sign of it being approved for general use anywhere. There is no TO!!
You could not just shove fuel into a USAAF aircraft. While alternative fuels could be used, there was set proceedure that includes securing a TO for an adopted fuel.
The claim of locally acquired thru local command authority does not fly except for a very short duration.
The USAF historians are not making a judgement because they have a "Luftwaffe bias". The facts are simply different and only one side is being presented on these boards.
It was not optional what grade of fuel you could use on a continual basis in the USAAF.
(http://img22.potato.com/loc124/th_64fde_TO6.jpg) (http://img22.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc124&image=64fde_TO6.jpg)
All the best,
Crumpp
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SO what are all those other docs about then? Are they mere fabrications? What use of 150 octane do you believe occured in the 8th AF FC?
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SO what are all those other docs about then?
As for the wealth of supply division documentation. All fuels require a specification order from supply. This order lays out not only the technical details defining the specific fuel but allocates who gets what and how much they are authorized to have on hand. It is the supply regulations on the fuel governing everything dealing with procurement, storage, allocations, etc..
The presence of documentation from supply detailing or outlining these parameters has no bearing on operational use. It is perfectly natural to expect information to flow back and forth as these details are gathered and the groundwork laid for proper supply when the fuel is adopted. A Technical Order not documents from supply division covers operational use.
Are they mere fabrications?
Certainly not. Nor are they being presented with an intention to deceive either.
What use of 150 octane do you believe occured in the 8th AF FC?
In my personal opinion it's use was much more extensive that I originally thought. The quick answer is I think they very much tried to adopt it but just ran into more trouble than it was worth in the end. It was stockpiled throughout the summer of 1944 in anticipation of it's adoption, the fuel came into use for operational testing, peaked in late 1944 and finally died out in early 1945 with the "pep" solution being the straw that broke the camels back. When the solution to fixing the "pep" issues became "return to the original problems" and the war was in the final stages of ending, all thoughts of formally adopting 100/150 grade were put aside. Hence it was not used in the post war period. The United States certainly had the capacity to do and in fact discussed it. It was not chosen to be produced in any form during or post war.
First some quick background on some of what I have uncovered in my research. It is evident from reports on the state of aircraft fuel that high octane fuel was very much desired by all sides. It is equally evident that all sides were experiencing technical difficulties with octane levels above around 148 octane. I say that number because the Germans using hydrogenation experimented with 148 octane fuels but ran into the similar problems with fouling, separation, etc.. They even tried various oil-tar mixtures to overcome some these problems and it just did not work.
I found it very interesting that the United States in discussing the same topic and considering the state of engine technology, mission profiles, fuel development, production capacity, basically the whole picture settled on 100/145 grade as the next major aircraft fuel. The Germans settled on the equivalent to 100/143 for C3. So independently both nations came to the same conclusions on the state of fuel technology.
Here is an example of how these high-octane fuels were pushing the limits of engine technology:
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/p-38-75inch-wer.jpg
The conclusion is the engine failed because it was being operated at the limits of the metallurgy not the fuel.
Now lest look at were our MAP limits come from.
This is preliminary flight testing to estabilish MAP limits for actual testing.
A Material Command Memorandum dated 13 May 1944 on "Preliminary Flight Tests of Fighter Aircraft Using PPF 441 Fuel at Increased War Emergency Rating" concluded:
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/150-grade-fuel.html
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/eng295.jpg
In the actual service test no recommendations were made!
An Army Air Force Proving Ground Command Report “Service test of Nominal 100/150 Grade Fuel” dated 7 July 1944 determined the effect of nominal 104/150 grade fuel on the performance and maintenance of P-51B, P-47D, and P-38J airplanes.
Conclusions:
a. In view of the inconclusive nature of test results, it is not possible to make any definite decision concerning the operational use of nominal grade 104/150 fuel and the attending higher emergency power ratings.
b. Only three of the nine original test aircraft finished the specified test.
c. At this station, only very minor malfunctions and failures were traced specifically to the action of the nominal grade 104/150 fuel.
d. Maximum performance of all three types of aircraft was aided materially by the new power settings permitted with the new fuel.
Only 3 of the 9 aircraft tested completed the testing and no recommendations were made as to operational use.
Here we see 7 stations received an unknown quantity of fuel:
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/150-fuel-13-june44-b.jpg
And a memo from one of those stations:
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/361st-24june44.jpg
7 stations are not even close to the entire 8th AF FG's. It's a good number for operational testing though.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Here we see 7 stations received an unknown quantity of fuel:
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/150-fuel-13-june44-b.jpg
And a memo from one of those stations:
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/361st-24june44.jpg
7 stations are not even close to the entire 8th AF FG's. It's a good number for operational testing though.
Those 7 stations and their units as of June 44 are:
375 - Honington - 364th FG - P-38 (switched to P-51 in July 44)
377 - Wattisham - 479th FG - P-38 (switched to P-51 in Sept 44)
373 - Leiston - 357th FG - P-51
378 - Fowlmere - 339th FG - P-51
356 - Debden - 4th FG - P-51
357 - Duxford - 78th FG - P-47 (switched to P-51 in Dec 44)
374 - Bottisham - 361st FG - P-51
That's 7 of 15 fighter groups of the 8th AF. The very next line of that first report states that the rest of the fields will be supplied June 12th, but doesn't list them by number.
We have pics and statements from groundcrew of the 357th talking about using the fuel. We have the same for the 78th - a pic of a Mustang, as well as a statement from groundcrew describing converting their new mustangs to use the fuel (this would indicate that it was in use from June through at least the rest of 1944). We also have a document from the 361st describing how the 150 octane replaced their existing fuel. This all corroborates those fuel deliveries.
We also have pictures of 352nd and 353rd FG aircraft remarked for 150 octane, which would indicate that the report was correct in saying that the fuel was delivered to the rest of the FC fields. And we also have Freeman's book which mentions the 355th FG carrying out the operational testing of the 150 PEP grade in Feb of 45.
So we're looking at between 9 and all 15 fighter groups using the fuel, probably from June '44 until at least to March '45 (when the 150 PEP grade was introduced), if not all the way to V-E day. In July and August of 1944 alone 8th FC flew over 30,000 sorties, and claimed 500+ aerial kills.
Just to put that in perspective, by early 1945 the VVS only had 398 La-7s in front line air force units, and only 291 were combat ready. By May of 45 over 2000 La-7s had reached the front, but only 115 were lost in combat. That gives you an idea of how much action they saw before the end. The Japanese only built around 400 N1K2-Js! The Typhoon and Tempest were only credited with 246 and 239 aerial kills respectively FOR THE ENTIRE WAR!
So even at the low end, we are looking at widespread use in combat - far more so then many of the popular planes in AH. And (wink-wink HTC) certainly more then enough to justify their inclusion for ToD as well as perk rides in the MA I would think.
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That's 7 of 15 fighter groups of the 8th AF. The very next line of that first report states that the rest of the fields will be supplied June 12th, but doesn't list them by number.
Ok. This is certainly backs up the attempt to adopt the fuel. We know the fuel was available from the supply side. Where is the specification order?
It's not optional and one would have been done if it was officially adopted. Once more there would be thousands of references to it available.
So we're looking at between 9 and all 15 fighter groups using the fuel, probably from June '44 until at least to March '45 (when the 150 PEP grade was introduced),
However, your leaving out the whole period of fatal accidents which led to need for "pep" in the first place. The consumption of 100/130 fuel increases during this time not decreases. This indicates the fuel was put aside until the technical difficulties were worked out. The lack of a Specification Order and Technical Order back this up.
All of the documentation gathered from the supply side deals solely with the time period before problems occurred.
Once again we return to the lack of a TO on the fuel. It was not optional either nor could any USAAF commander just "float" on the emergency use clause. One would have been done and issued with every aircrafts operating instructions.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Neat pic:
(http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/78thfg-p51-150grade.jpg)
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We've seen it before shorty.
It does not prove large scale operational adoption. It proves at least one plane used it during an unknown time period.
All the best,
Crumpp
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I found it very interesting that the United States in discussing the same topic and considering the state of engine technology, mission profiles, fuel development, production capacity, basically the whole picture settled on 100/145 grade as the next major aircraft fuel. The Germans settled on the equivalent to 100/143 for C3. So independently both nations came to the same conclusions on the state of fuel technology.
115/145 (not 100/145) was a compromise fuel. Higher octane fuel was desired.
"In June 1944 the Industrial Planning Committee of the Aeronautical Board issued its compromise proposal for improved aviation fuel. This proposal was based on engine performance, engine performance, production capacity, requirements and logistics. All factors considered, the best compromise fuel was 115/145, although the future availability of 120/150 was desired."
Aviation Gasolin Production and Control
AAF Historical Study 65
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Originally posted by Crumpp
We've seen it before shorty.
It does not prove large scale operational adoption. It proves at least one plane used it during an unknown time period.
All the best,
Crumpp
Generally, some kind of TO, or order from the AAF Commanding General, is required before painting new fuel requirements on planes.
Your "No TO" is sort of like the coelacanth. Sort of taking a chance saying it doesn't exist just because you haven't seen it.
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115/145 (not 100/145) was a compromise fuel. Higher octane fuel was desired.
Of course it was desired.
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If it was too problematic, why would it have been desired?
BTW, the TOs you posted refer to only US manufactured gasoline. Have you given any though to the fact that 100/150 was brewed only in GB, and was not US fuel. Manufacturers did not rate their planes and engines on foreign fuel, only US fuel. Manufacturers would have had to import fuel solely for the purposes of rating their planes and engines on it. Ratings on 100/150 were generally set by the AAF HQ of the Material Command.
It wouldn't make any sense to print ratings on 100/150 fuel in POHs for planes that served in regions where it wasn't available. 100/150 fule was too limited in availability - only in England, and only to VIII FC fighters.
The US Navy experienced this in 1947 when 115/145 became the primary AV fuel. Printed ratings on 115/145 were circulated to units with only 100/130 and a rash of blown engines occurred. There was a virtual stand down on modifying planes to use 115/145 fuel until it was made very clear under what circumstances the plane could use the new ratings.
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If it was too problematic, why would it have been desired?
The atom bomb was desired in 1939. Took a little longer to get though.
Ratings on 100/150 were generally set by the AAF HQ of the Material Command.
Exactly, there would be both a TO and an SO for the fuel as per USAAF regs. It had to be done.
All the best,
Crumpp
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There was a virtual stand down on modifying planes to use 115/145 fuel until it was made very clear under what circumstances the plane could use the new ratings.
So why is it so hard to believe they did the same with 100/150 grade?
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Originally posted by Crumpp
Exactly, there would be both a TO and an SO for the fuel as per USAAF regs. It had to be done.
All the best,
Crumpp
Again, those ratings come from the manufacturer. US manufacturers didn't rate there engines on foreign fuels - which 100/150 was. They rated them on standard US fuels. It's understandable, then, why 100/150 wasn't included.
I also think you are being entirely inconsistent in your arguments. You are suggesting that the statement that planes HAD to operate on the listed fuels was gospel. Then you state 150 was used more than you originally thought. If 150 was used at all, then the aforementioned rule must not have been as rigid as you suggest. If no TO for 100/150 fuel exists, then that must not have been an absolute requirement, either.
The preponderance of the evidence I've seen suggests 100/150 was the primary fule used in VIII FC. I've heard of problems using that fuel, too. What I haven't heard is that the use of 100/150 was abandoned.
Right now, Crumpp, your argument is going no where.
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Originally posted by Crumpp
So why is it so hard to believe they did the same with 100/150 grade?
115/145 became THE standard AV fuel after that.
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Originally posted by ShortyDoowap
115/145 became THE standard AV fuel after that.
As mentioned before, the Mustangs operating off Iwo Jima escorting the B29s were using the 115/145 fuel.
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Doolittle was a genius when it came to Octane usage.
Karaya
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115/145 became THE standard AV fuel after that.
Crumpp says:
I found it very interesting that the United States in discussing the same topic and considering the state of engine technology, mission profiles, fuel development, production capacity, basically the whole picture settled on 100/145 grade as the next major aircraft fuel. The Germans settled on the equivalent to 100/143 for C3. So independently both nations came to the same conclusions on the state of fuel technology.
If no TO for 100/150 fuel exists, then that must not have been an absolute requirement, either.
Sure it was, only the fans thinks otherwise.
Says so right in the regulations:
(http://img143.potato.com/loc3/th_45449_TO6.jpg) (http://img143.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc3&image=45449_TO6.jpg)
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Originally posted by Crumpp
So independently both nations came to the same conclusions on the state of fuel technology.
Again, you've missed the point. 115/145 was a COMPROMISE fuel. The US wanted 120/145 but it was easier to produce 115/145 in large quantities. Therefore, your statement is wrong. The US conlude the higher octane fuel was PREFERRED, but produced 115/145 for produtiona nd logistical reasons.
Sure it was, only the fans thinks otherwise.
Says so right in the regulations:
You've missed this point, too. If a TO was absolutely required, then why was a SINGLE plane modified to utilize 100/150? And we aren't talking about one plane either, were talking about the whole of VIII Fighter Command. Obviously, if NO TO exists, the rule wasn't hard and fast.
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Again, you've missed the point. 115/145 was a COMPROMISE fuel.
The US conlude the higher octane fuel was PREFERRED, but produced 115/145 for produtiona nd logistical reasons.
Not to be smart just to clarify, I am pretty sure you mean production and logistical reasons.
So lets examine what we know about 115/145 grade.
”They” being the services, preferred 100/150 grade but the realities prevented the preferred fuel from being produced.
I will buy that.
However I noticed that you leave one key portion those realities considered out of your post:
(http://img12.potato.com/loc8/th_8eb59_compromise.jpg) (http://img12.potato.com/img.php?loc=loc8&image=8eb59_compromise.jpg)
Engine technology certainly was a portion of the decision making process. As the P38 engine failures and the consistently high failures with high-octane fuels all organizations experienced, the fuel was pushing the limits of the engines. Granted these same engines had progressed beyond 130 grade limitations.
why was a SINGLE plane modified to utilize 100/150?
Because a TO is not required an emergency as stated in the regulations. However the instructions are clear in covering emergency use. If the fuel was to be officially adopted, a TO was required and would have been in the works at HQ, Air Technical Services. The regulation is clear that commanders have the authority to use other fuels in an emergency based on sound technical advisement. It is also clear that there is a process to be followed and outlines that process.
It's not an official fuel yet so the orders are not published.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Originally posted by Crumpp
I will buy that.
120/150, not 100/150.
However I noticed that you leave one key portion those realities
I already pointed that our in my previous quote. You must have missed that.
Clearly, with respect to engine performance, 115/145 still gave acceptable performance (not superior performance). Otherwise, 120/150 would not have been preferred. And it clearly says 115/145 was a compromise fuel, NOT the preferred fuel.
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And it clearly says 115/145 was a compromise fuel, NOT the preferred fuel.
Compromise yes.
Between:
Engine technology certainly was a portion of the decision making process. As the P38 engine failures and the consistently high failures with high-octane fuels all organizations experienced, the fuel was pushing the limits of the engines. Granted these same engines had progressed beyond 130 grade limitations.
All the best,
Crumpp
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Sadly, here the real proof of the use of high grade octane fuel by USAF:
(http://us.st11.yimg.com/store1.yimg.com/I/badcattoys_1883_5106046)
Gatt ducks and runs away under fire ....
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Gatt, can you give me your address? I still have that GORE-TEX (R) flame resistant suit you lent me a while ago and my flak vest is in good shape! :D
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Nice Model Gatt, you build that?
All the best,
Crumpp
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Neg Crumpp ;),
its a huge 1/18 plastic model by 21st Century Toys. Take a look here:
http://www.badcataviation.com/21cetoai.html
P.S.: Grazie per gli auguri Gian! :)
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Di niente! :) Next year I'll make you even a gift!
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150 grade fuel consumption.
From documents POWE 33/990 33/991 33/992 33/985.
Figures in 1000's barrels.
7.3 barrels = 1 ton.
Theatre.
UK.
June 1944----- 184
July 1944-----283
August 1944-----218
September 1944-----169
October 1944-----183
November 1944-----140
December 1944-----193
January 1945------123
February 1945-----131
March 1945-----149
April 1945 -----119
May 1945-----17
North West Europe.
January 1945-----15
February 1945----17
March 1945-----52
April 1945-----89
May 1945-----32
Neil.
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Thanks for posting that Neil. Those numbers seem to agree strongly with the information from this document:
(http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v513/kracerx/Nov44150grade_1doc.jpg)
1000/7.3 = 137 tons per 1000 barrels. 140,000 barrels for Nov 44 gives us about 19,200 tons consumed.
This just makes it that much more clear that the 8th AF was indeed using 150 octane for all their fighters from June/July onward, that ADGB was employing it with some of their squadrons, and that the 2nd TAF switched over to it at the beginning of 1945.
Hopefully HT will see fit to model some of these - particularly the 8th AF fighters as they are going to be playing a key role in Combat Tour.
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19,200 tons.... that's it.... ???
Hell a single B-52 holds more than that, I bet!!!!
Considering the 10s of thousands of fighters flown nonstop, every day, multiple sorties per day, that's a drop in the bucket. I don't have any numbers to manipulate myself, but the evidence simply isn't there.
Hell, if the collective lot of you crucify Kurfurst for claiming C3 was used in 109K-4s when all he had was an actual order, telling units to use it and you don't even have that, I think you're coming off rather 2-faced and biased.
You are, as Hitech has put it, cherry picking the data.
I'm no expert, but reading this and previous posts on the matter (many many many repetitive posts), the persona non grata Crump had the better argument. You tell ME that the most red-taped, indoctrined, no-individual-thinking-allowed US military is not going to put in print via order or manual that this gas is used, and that pilots are going to be using it anyway? I'm not going to believe you.
It was tested, that's been proven. It was never adopted. The arguments about this make perfect sense, and that seems to be the case.
So, basically, the burden of proof is up to you. Find a document that says the 8th AF was ordered to use 150 octane gas, some sort of TO like Crump suggested, or some official document that says as much.
Tons of fuel means nothing to this argument. It takes a lot of fuel to thoroughly test something out, as well. They were still having problems with 150 octane well past the war, into 1947, so I doubt very much that they'd be using it in 1944 on a widespread scale.
Okay, this is to cover my bellybutton about this post here, I just typed. I'm not necessarily against modeling 150 octane in AH. I'm against claiming it's needed because a few rare planes in one small group, based in England, tested the gas and found it unfeasible for long term use. It's like saying that the Do335 was tested in a combat zone, so it must have seen combat during the military and weapons testing part of its lifespan development. There's no proof because all the records that late in the war were destroyed or simply lost in the first place. It's like that. You can't have a double standard, and the standard has already been set. This 150 octane argument just doesn't live up to it.
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19,200 tons.... that's it.... ??? Hell a single B-52 holds more than that, I bet!!!!
according to my calculations 19,200 tons is 6,144,000 gallons of fuel . Yes millions . Thats b-52 sure is a gas hog lol. 38
EDIT: The b-52 holds 46,000 gallons of fuel. 6,144,000 equals 22,840 full p-51's/wo dt's so thats about 760 p51 sorties a day for a month. With 2 75 gallon DT's its around 490 p-51 sorties a day per month .
Disclaimer im no math scholar
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Originally posted by Krusty
19,200 tons.... that's it.... ???
Hell a single B-52 holds more than that, I bet!!!!
Considering the 10s of thousands of fighters flown nonstop, every day, multiple sorties per day, that's a drop in the bucket. I don't have any numbers to manipulate myself, but the evidence simply isn't there.
Why do you post if you have no numbers or evidence? A single P-51, with 2 110 gallon drop tanks carries 489 gallons. At 378 gallons to a ton, 19,200 tons is 7,257,600 gallons. That would be enough for 14,841 P-51 sorties where they burned every ounce of fuel.
From this (http://www.8thafhs.org/combat1944b.htm) link we can add up the 8th AF fighter sorties for Nov of 1944, and see that they flew 12,836 operational sorties for the month. Thus, the 19,200 tons consumed was plenty to cover their operational sorties as well as other flying.
Hell, if the collective lot of you crucify Kurfurst for claiming C3 was used in 109K-4s when all he had was an actual order, telling units to use it and you don't even have that, I think you're coming off rather 2-faced and biased.
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I wasn't involved in that discusion, and have never expressed an opinion on the matter. Seeing as how it's completely unrelated to the topic of this thread, 8th AF useage of 150 octane fuel, I'll move on.
You are, as Hitech has put it, cherry picking the data.
I'm no expert, but reading this and previous posts on the matter (many many many repetitive posts), the persona non grata Crump had the better argument. You tell ME that the most red-taped, indoctrined, no-individual-thinking-allowed US military is not going to put in print via order or manual that this gas is used, and that pilots are going to be using it anyway? I'm not going to believe you.
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Care to point out which data I'm "cherry picking"? Your assumption that the USAAF in world war 2 was "the most red-taped, indoctrined, no-individual-thinking-allowed" force is the problem here. What is that based upon? Your assumption. Just to step outside the fuel debate here, there are a lot of examples of 8th AF units doing things differently. Take painting aircraft - the 8th was known for gaudy paint jobs, and after factories started delivering aircraft without paint some units would continue to paint their aircraft in various custom camo schemes. Or look at the guns of the P-51B - they had a tendency of jamming, so instead of just dealing with it and waiting for a fix to arrive from the US, some clever mechanics rigged feed motors from B26 gunner positions to solve the problem.
Or better yet, how about the writing of General Kepner, the Commander of 8th Fighter Command himself:
A fighter pilot may well read these pages with a red pencil in his hand marking a passage here and there with the thought, "That's for me", then practice, try out and develop the technique until it becomes part of his own, or if it doesn't work out, discard it. It is by such basic learning, plus imagination, expirement and test in combat that all techniques have been developed, and all great fighter pilots have won their many battles.
Kepner wrote that as the forward to a tactics manual that he had put together assembling the thoughts of some of his more successful pilots at the time (May 1944). That idea of "if it works use it, if not, change it" is an example of the common-sense attitudes of the 8th, which as you can see came from the top down.
It was tested, that's been proven. It was never adopted. The arguments about this make perfect sense, and that seems to be the case.
So, basically, the burden of proof is up to you. Find a document that says the 8th AF was ordered to use 150 octane gas, some sort of TO like Crump suggested, or some official document that says as much.
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A memo (http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/11-2-44-doc.html) from Eisenhower himself requesting materials for the fuel at the highest urgency. Or how about it being specifically mentioned here (http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v513/kracerx/282_1092759114_us2.jpg) that the 8th AF adopted the fuel. Or specific mention here (http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v513/kracerx/282_1092759146_us3.jpg) saying that ALL replacement fighter aircraft being recieved by the 8th AF were being converted for use with the fuel. Or how about approval from the engineering division to use higher power settings with the 150 octane fuel, seen here. (http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/75inch-clearance-v-1650-7.jpg) Similar documents exist for the P-47 and P-38. Or how about the statements of a published historian on the subject, seen here. (http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v513/kracerx/Fuels.jpg)
All of this was posted in the previous threads along with statements from actual 8th AF personel describing fueling with 150 octane, modifying aircraft for 150 octane, and using the increased power settings operationally. All of those references are for Mustangs, which is critical because as it states here (http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/25225-doc.html), operational testing was carried out with P-47s and P-38s, not P-51s. And we have pictures of 8th AF P-51s remarked for 150 octane fuel.
So we have document evidence that high command wanted the fuel to be used, that it was tested, that the aircraft were approved to use it, that it was delivered to all of the airbases(replacing the 100 octane that they had), that it was supplied and consumed in quantities more then sufficient to support ALL of the 8th AF's fighter ops by ALL of their units, and on top of that we have statements from the pilots and mechanics corroborating this, as well as photo evidence corroborating this.
The only evidence that was presented here and in the other threads to counter this was:
- a Techinical Order giving instructions for using low octane substitute fuels, which the last revision on was dated after the war
- a document showing worldwide consumption of 100 octane fuel, from which no 8th AF specific information could be drawn
- an unreadable chart showing fuel consumption and reserves, followed by a statement that the 8th couldn't have used 150 octane because they wouldn't have enough for reserves - this was answered by this (http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/25-1-44-doc.html) document which clearly showed that a reserve had already been created and that supply was sufficient
- a chart showing USAAF fuel consumption in the ETO (with no specific mention of units, air forces, or fuel grades), which was claimed showed that there wasn't enough fuel for the number of sorties flown- this was shown to be false as I compared the 8th AF fighter command sorties totals to the supply of 150 octane fuel and showed that it was more then sufficient
- a chart showing the 9th AF in the MTO, with no date on it, which was claimed to show that the previous doc only listed 8th AF fuel consumption. Since the 9th AF was originally created in the MTO, and only later moved to the ETO, it's clear that the document was from earlier date. Not to mention that the fuel consumption totals on the previous chart must have included both 8th and 9th AF fighters, as the 8th AF couldn't possibly have come close to burning the totals listed knowing how many operational sorties they flew.
In short, there IS NO "counter-evidence" that we have seen yet that is applicable to what we are talking about.
Tons of fuel means nothing to this argument. It takes a lot of fuel to thoroughly test something out, as well. They were still having problems with 150 octane well past the war, into 1947, so I doubt very much that they'd be using it in 1944 on a widespread scale.
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Tons of fuel do matter when enough is being both delivered and consumed to support EVERY operational flight by 8th AF fighters. It does matter when it replaced the 100 octane fuel they had been using. It does matter when we have loads of documents, as well as statements from veterans who were there, and photos that support this.
Okay, this is to cover my bellybutton about this post here, I just typed. I'm not necessarily against modeling 150 octane in AH. I'm against claiming it's needed because a few rare planes in one small group, based in England, tested the gas and found it unfeasible for long term use. It's like saying that the Do335 was tested in a combat zone, so it must have seen combat during the military and weapons testing part of its lifespan development. There's no proof because all the records that late in the war were destroyed or simply lost in the first place. It's like that. You can't have a double standard, and the standard has already been set. This 150 octane argument just doesn't live up to it.
As I pointed out above, there is a ton of proof in the shape of period documents, statements from veterans and photos. Also the comparison with the DO335 is silly. We're talking about the entire 8th AF FC's operations from June/July of 44 through the end of the war. We're talking a force of around 1000 fighters, flying 10-20k sorties a month for 9 months straight. Thats tens of thousands of sorties, and accounts for thousands of kills and probably around 1000 losses. That's a HUGE part of what Tour of Duty is going to simulate. Hardly "a few rare planes in one small group".
Compare that to the N1K2 - all of 393 production aircraft built. Or how about the F4U-1C - all of 200 built. Not to mention aircraft like the Me163 or Ta152. Now obviously if these were modeled they should be perk planes in the MA, but don't we want Combat Tour to model the aircraft as they were actually used by the 8th AF?
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I'm with Krusty on this one.
All we need is a few sqn logs showing 150 being used. (similar to the ones we have for the Spit 9 in May 44 / Spit 14 in July 44 / Spit 16 in Dec 1944).
You would expect there to be some somewhere mentioning the change over happening.
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Peak monthly requirements.
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/26-5-44-doc.html
P51 group = 1,285 tons per month
P47 group = 1,767 tons per month
P38 group = 1,960 tons per month.
Deliveries expected.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/DCP_0207.JPG
Deliveries start.
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/150-fuel-13-june44-b.jpg
Actual use showing the split August 1944.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/DCP_0173.JPG
October 1944 estimates.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/DCP_0177.JPG
Actual consumption December 1944.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/DCP_0194.JPG
General statement April 1945.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/DCP_0192.JPG
North West Europe April 1945.
http://hometown.aol.co.uk/JStirlingBomber/DCP_0193.JPG
Neil.
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Originally posted by Kev367th
I'm with Krusty on this one.
All we need is a few sqn logs showing 150 being used. (similar to the ones we have for the Spit 9 in May 44 / Spit 14 in July 44 / Spit 16 in Dec 1944).
You would expect there to be some somewhere mentioning the change over happening.
Like this (http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/361st-24june44.jpg) one?
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Was thinking more along the lines of something equivalent to this sqn ops record -
Shows 165 Sqn (Spit LF IX) changing over to 150 grade.
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no165_25lbs2.jpg
Notice the 5.5.44 entry stating 25lbs boost. 150 grade was needed for 25lbs boost.
There has to be something equivalent for USAF units that used 150 grade.
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Like this,
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/5feb45-request.pdf
Neil.
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Hi Neil quick question -
One of your docs shows 49,000 barrels of 150 used by the RAF Aug 1944.
49,000 x 35 (ish) = 1715000 gallons (UK)
Given worst case scenario -
Spit max internal fuel = 112 + 90 external (rare) = 202 max.
That gives -
1715000 / 202 / 31 (Aug) = 274 flights per day.
Best case
Spit internal fuel 85
That gives
1715000 / 85 / 31 = 650 flights per day.
Both assume total fuel usage per flight which is unlikely.
Given that the actual average config was probably somewhere in-between, it starts to look like either there were a lot of Spits running 150 grade by Aug 44, or other RAF aircraft were also using 150.
Any idea if any other RAF aircraft used 150 (maybe the mossie?)?
Thanks.
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A simple conclusion then?
High grade fuel was available in some quite large quantities and was used/spent in large quantities, - right?
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As for the Luftwaffe's quantities (Since the Allied bombing campaign was ineffective for anything except cities...sorry, couldn't resist) here is a cookie for you.
Late war, - 1945ish. This exmple is from April.
JG-6 commanded by Barkhorn get 150 brand-new 190D's delivered. They could only fly patrols of FOUR aircraft at a time due to fuel shortage.
Source: "The encyclopedia of Aircraft of WWII" editor Paul Eden.
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Originally posted by Neil Stirling1
Like this,
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/5feb45-request.pdf
Neil.
That's a very interesting document Neil, but I don't think it's good enough.
It's a memo inquiring about the possibilities of doing something. Not a statement that "that something" is being done or has been done.
It states that Doolittle only requested 3 months' worth of 100/150 fuel, only 3 months. Seems to me that's part of the testing process.
I don't know how long the fuel was tested (it seems to have been a long, drawn out, process), but this looks like merely part of the planning stages. Nothing definite.
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Testing took place back in spring of 1944, and after that the 8th AF requested it be sent to all their fighter fields.
See here (http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/25225-doc.html) from March/April 1944, and here. (http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/26-5-44-doc.html)
Note in the second document that they specifically mention that test results were satisfactory, and that necessary modifications can be carried out at the individual fields.
So we can clearly see that it was tested successfully, was requested for all their fighters, and the modifications for higher boost could be carried out at the fields.
Next we see the fuel actually delivered to the fields
here (http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/150-fuel-13-june44-b.jpg) and here. (http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/361st-24june44.jpg)
Note that this second document is written by the Ground Exec Officer of the 361st FG, clearly stating that their 100 octane was replaced with 150 octane.
Right after this we have a combat report from a P-51 pilot describing using the higher boost settings made possible by 150 octane:
Captain L. Carson of the 357th wrote of a 25 July 44 combat: "I was at house top level, flat out at 72 inces of HG (Mercury, manifold pressure) and 3,000 rpm."
Olmsted, Merle C., To War With the Yoxford Boys, The Complete Story of the 357th Fighter Group, (Eagle Editions Ltd., Hamilton, Montana, 2004), p. 100
This is critical because the P-51 wasn't involved the in the previous operational testing, this is clearly evidence support that the 150 octane was distributed to all the 8th AF fields, and their aircraft were modified to use it.
Then we have Neil's data showing 150 octane consumption levels throughout this period, which were enough to support all of the 8th AF's fighter ops.
Then we have this (http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v513/kracerx/Nov44150grade_1doc.jpg) document from Nov 1944, continuing to show the high demand for 150 octane from the Eighth Air Force.
In December, the 78th FG converted over to P-51s, and we see the following statements from veterans of that unit:
Upon converting to P-51s, the 78th Fighter Group undertook the following: "A few of the tasks were installing wing tank pressurization kits; G-suit hookups; guns sighted in; invasions strips removed; engine boost set to draw seventy two inches; landing gear switches modified; compass swung; blower switches installed; K-14 gunsights mounted; making fifty pairs of P-51 wing covers; fourty-one seat covers; repacking 155 dingies; 112 type S-1 and 170 type B-8 backstyle parachutes; and sewing up 98 silk pilot scarves."
Fry, Garry L., Eagles of Duxford, The 78th Fighter Group in World War II., (Phalanx Publishing Company Ltd. St. Paul, MN, 1991.) p. 89.
James Tuder, crew chief with the 78th Fighter Group recalled: "My pilot aborted a mission one day while we were using 150 octane fuel in the Mustangs. It was colored purple with dye to expose fuel leaks, not green like the 100/130 octane gas.
Fry, Garry L., Eagles of Duxford, The 78th Fighter Group in World War II., (Phalanx Publishing Company Ltd. St. Paul, MN, 1991.) pp. 106-107.
Clear statements that the 150 octane fuel was being used, and that the airplanes were modified for the higher boost settings it allowed.
Then we see the document that Neil posted below. In it, in Feb of 1945 Doolittle is requesting that 150 octane be supplied to his units on the continent. In december, 2 of the 8th's 15 fighter groups moved to the continent. We can see that their request to supply the fuel on the continent was rejected, and ultimately those two fighter groups both moved back to england before the end of the war. The interesting points of this, are that we can see again that there was demand for the fuel at the highest level, that the document clearly states that the 8th switched over to 150 octane, and that it states that the 8th's depots are modifying every fighter they recieve to use 150 octane before those replacements go to their individual fighter groups.
Next we have another combat report, now from March of 1945 describing using the higher power settings allowed by 150 octane fuel.
Captain L. Carson of the 357th wrote of a 30 March 1945: "I had the throttle through the gate at 72 inches of mercury and 3000."
Olmsted, Merle C., To War With the Yoxford Boys, The Complete Story of the 357th Fighter Group, (Eagle Editions Ltd., Hamilton, Montana, 2004), p. 121.
And finally we have pictures from a variety of fighter groups, that have remarked their Mustangs for 150 octane:
78th Fighter Group (http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/78thfg-p51-150grade.jpg)
353rd Fighter Group (http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/353fg-macaffee.jpg)
352nd Fighter Group (http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v513/kracerx/487fs150.jpg) with a blowup here (http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v513/kracerx/487fs150-crop.jpg)
357th Fighter Group (http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/357thfg-desert-rat.jpg)
Once again, all Mustangs which as we saw above, weren't part of the early operational testing.
So we have:
1. Positive test results
2. Request for fuel, noting that mods can be carried out by service crew
3. Supply of fuel to all 8th Fighter group stations, replacing the old grade, including notes from an individual fighter groups XO attesting to the same thing
4. A combat report from a pilot describing operational use of the higher boost settings, that would only be available on an aircraft modified for 150 octane fuel (by a unit that wasn't involved in the previous testing)
5. Documents showing consumption of 150 octane, in quantities large enough to support ALL of the 8th's fighter ops
6. Statements showing the 8th's specific monthly demand for 150 octane
7. Further statements from ground crew describing modifying new aircraft for use with 150 octane, and using it operationally
8. A document showing the 8th requesting 150 octane for their 2 fighter groups on the continent, which also states that the 8th DID switch over to 150 octane, and that they are modifying every replacement aircraft they recieve to use 150 octane at the depot level
9. Another combat report from a pilot describing operational use of the higher boost settings, that would only be available on an aircraft modified for 150 octane fuel
10. And pictures from four different P-51 fighter groups showing aircraft remarked for 150 octane use - critical because the P-51 wasn't involved in the 8ths operational testing of the fuel that took place back in April/May of 44.
All of this ranging in date from June of 1944 to March of 1945, and not one peice of it indicates that there was any "testing" going on after June - just operational use by all of the 8th's Fighter Groups.
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Hi Kev,
August 1944
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/backfire-2.jpg
Ball park, 320 aircraft 60 of these Mossi's. The Spit IX' sqn,s did not revert to 100/130 once replaced by the Mk XIV's .
Incidently the Mustang III sqns had around 24 aircraft per sqn.
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/315sqdn30jul44.jpg.
More http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/150-grade-fuel.html
Neil.
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Sable, thanks for the info on early testing, however I wouldn't say "was tested successfully" because they had problems with the fuel and the engines well after that. The knocking problems and engine wear and whatever the rest of the other forum threads mentioned, those continued til the end of the war, and basically 100 octane was doing the same job so they didn't need 150 (and didn't get 150 octane into reliable use until after 1947 -- when they still had corsairs blowing engines).
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Still needs to be explained....what happened to the fuel????????
It was there, cleared, and spent. So how accurate are you going???
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Originally posted by Krusty
Sable, thanks for the info on early testing, however I wouldn't say "was tested successfully" because they had problems with the fuel and the engines well after that. The knocking problems and engine wear and whatever the rest of the other forum threads mentioned, those continued til the end of the war, and basically 100 octane was doing the same job so they didn't need 150 (and didn't get 150 octane into reliable use until after 1947 -- when they still had corsairs blowing engines).
It says quite clearly in the document:
1. The Eighth Air Force have requested that the VIII Fighter Command Stations be supplied immediately with grade 150 aviation fuel for use in P-47, P-51 and P-38 planes.
2. The fuel has been tested in service and the results have been such that the fuel is desired as soon as its supply can be implemented.
So by the definition of the 8th AF (and their's is the only one that matters here, since we are talking about the 8th AF's use of the fuel) it was good enough that they wanted 150 octane supplied to all their stations. And as we can see from the other documents, and statements of veterans who where there, it was supplied, and consumed operationally.
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Tested, distributed, spent, used and whatever. It got sent and spent. Should be enough right?
Not everybody but there sure was a heck of it around.
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Just spotted some new related documents that Mike and Neil have up on their web site. (http://www.spitfireperformance.com/150grade/150-grade-fuel.html)
This (http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/359th-150grade-1jul44.jpg) one is from the engineering office of the 359th FG and mentions the changeover to 150 octane (and the boost modification to the aircraft) that took place in June '44.
This (http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/78thfg-supply-dec44.jpg) one describes the supply of 150 octane fuel to the 78th FG, and this (http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/78thfg-eng-rep-dec44.jpg) one describes modifying their new Mustangs to use the higher boost settings allowed by 150 octane fuel.
Finally there is this (http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/339th-fuel-report-1march45.jpg) one, showing the fuel consumption of the 339th FG for Feb 1945 - note that there was no 100/130 on hand or consumed. All the fuel used was either 150 octane or PEP (which was the "newer brand" of 150 octane using etheyline dibromide), and all the plain 150 octane was gone by the end of the month. This is interesting, in that it shows that the 339th definitely switched over to the new PEP grade in February of 45, and we can look at the results of their missions and get an idea of what kind of maintenance problems were brought on by this fuel. Here (http://www.web-birds.com/8th/339/mission.html) we can see a mission breakdown for the 339th FG. Looking through Feb, March and April of 45 we can see that there were only a handful of aircraft damaged or lost due to maintenance issues or engine failures on takeoff. Given that each mission represents somewhere around 50 sorties, it's clear that the additional maintenance issues of the PEP grade fuel weren't preventing them from operating effectively.
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In honour of absent friends, let me provide the traditional replies:
"You're talking production, not consumption."
"No fighter pilot would agree to 150's performance-robbing characteristics."
"It was a special project only."
"Not one technical order can be found."
"Continental Europe includes the U.K."
"Short-range, anti-V-1 missions only."
"Fantasy, I tell you. All fantasy."
Aaaaaa-mennnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn.