Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => The O' Club => Topic started by: cav58d on April 06, 2006, 05:16:18 PM
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U.S. Cuts Role Of Apache for Deep Attack
U.S. Cuts Role Of Apache for Deep Attack
By GREG GRANT
04/03/06
Battlefield experience in Iraq has shown that the U.S. Army’s premier attack helicopter, the AH-64 Apache, is highly vulnerable to small-arms fire. Therefore, it will no longer play a prominent role in the service’s deep attack mission, said the Army’s head of doctrine.
Gen. William Wallace, who commanded ground forces in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, and now heads the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, said he would shake up the way the Army conducts deep attack operations.
“Less integration of Apache helicopters,” more Air Force ground-attack aircraft, and “more use of Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, perhaps even with unitary rounds that are long-range precision,” Wallace said Feb. 16 at the Association of the United States Army’s winter symposium in Fort Lauderdale, Fla.
Questions about helicopter survivability arose early in the Iraq war when 34 AH-64 Apaches undertook a deep attack mission against a Republican Guard division positioned south of Baghdad. Every airframe was hit by ground fire, one Apache was downed, and 27 of the 33 that returned to base were so heavily damaged they couldn’t fly until repaired. Since 2001, the Army has lost 85 helicopters in Iraq and Afghanistan to ground fire and combat-related accidents.
Helicopter survivability has become a top priority, the Army’s aviation chief, Paul Bogosian, said at the January Army Aviation Symposium in Washington. The Army has rushed cockpit missile warning systems and advanced countermeasures dispensers to equip all its helicopters in Iraq and Afghanistan, part of a $1.5 billion Army investment in helicopter survivability.
Army aviators are changing their tactics and training to conduct running fire missions with guns and rockets to minimize their exposure to ground fire, Brig. Gen. Edward Sinclair, commander of the Army's Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Ala., said in a recent interview.
A report by the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division, detailing lessons learned during the invasion and occupation of Iraq, said Army attack aviation was better suited to providing close air support to friendly ground forces than in the deep attack role.
The same report said the Army’s OH-58 Kiowas performed better than the Apaches in urban areas because their pilots were trained to fly close to the ground at high speed and use buildings and trees as cover.
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The same report said the Army’s OH-58 Kiowas performed better than the Apaches in urban areas because their pilots were trained to fly close to the ground at high speed and use buildings and trees as cover. :)
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WASHINGTON — The only retreat by U.S. forces in their stunningly successful invasion of Iraq last year has sparked a re-examination of the battlefield role of Apache helicopters in the face of fierce criticism that the aircraft is ill-equipped for future wars.
The retreat near Karbala last March 24 ended a strike deep behind enemy lines by 30 Apache Longbow helicopters, part of the Army's 11th Aviation Regiment based in Illesheim, Germany, and Fort Hood's 1st Battalion, 227th Aviation Regiment.
The Boeing helicopters, the most advanced in the U.S. inventory, bristled with high-tech missiles and enemy detection devices, but they were turned back by a barrage of low-tech ground fire.
The failed raid led the Army to change the way Apaches will be used in future conflicts.
Instead of training for strikes deep behind enemy lines, Apache pilots now get drilled more for close-air support of ground troops, and for fighting in urban settings.
New training also stresses more coordination with Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps fighter jets and aerial drones. Such coordination was lacking in the Karbala raid.
Army aviators are now being taught speed and maneuverability, lessons dusted off from the Vietnam era, when choppers also faced a substantial threat from small-arms fire.
On the night of the failed Karbala raid, the Apache crews intended to destroy one of Saddam Hussein's best units, the Republican Guard Medina Division, and to clear a path for the Army's lead ground unit — the 3rd Infantry Division.
Saddam's forces were positioned near the city of Iskandariyah, 250 miles inside Iraq, just north of Karbala and some 30 miles south of Baghdad.
The 3rd Infantry was pushing north on Day 5 of the war, already in central Iraq and heading toward the Karbala Gap, named for a narrow passage between the city of Karbala and Lake Razzaza.
Shortly after leaving their base, the Apaches, flying at up to 120 mph close to the ground, were ambushed in a blizzard of gunfire and anti-aircraft flak. The pilots of the two-person helicopters halted their advance and pulled into a hover to return fire.
After all 30 Apaches had been raked by Iraqi fire, they broke off the fight and limped back to their desert base. One chopper was forced down, and its pilots — David Williams and Ronald Young — were held captive for three weeks.
Army Gen. Barry McCaffrey, a retired commander from Gulf War I, said the failed attack "was nearly a modern day 'Charge of the Light Brigade,'" referring to a Crimean War battle in 1854 in which an English brigade of 600 men suffered devastating losses when charging the Russian army.
The Congressional Research Service, an investigative branch of Congress that conducted an assessment of last year's U.S. invasion, concluded Apache forces that night had come perilously close to "a near disaster."
After the failed raid, Army officials junked plans for most Apache deep-attack missions and instead emphasized armed reconnaissance and close-air support for ground troops.
It was an abrupt shift in strategy. Lt. Gen. William Wallace, who commanded Army operations in Iraq during Gulf War II, said the helicopters "didn't perform the same role that I had envisioned for attack aviation."
The Longbow has a sophisticated fire-control radar system that can track up to 256 targets simultaneously and shoot up to 16 tank-killing Hellfire missiles. The missiles can be fired several miles away from a target so the aircraft doesn't have to fly too close to danger.
In the Karbala raid, commanders ordered pilots to obtain visual identification before attacking enemy positions, reducing some of their technical advantage.
In their counterattack, the Iraqis used rifles and low-tech anti-aircraft weapons, but in a highly organized, sophisticated way.
According to the 3rd Infantry's report on the conduct of the war, the Iraqis had employed "ambush experts" to defeat the Apaches.
Col. William Wolf, the 11th Regiment's commander, said in an interview that enemy forces had hidden anti-aircraft guns in the tree lines and in urban areas. The Iraqis had dramatically improved their ability to target Apaches since Gulf War I, when the choppers earned a reputation as a war horse, destroying hundreds of Iraqi pieces of armor in the open desert.
The new tactics were on full display the night of the raid when the ambushers focused their fire at the exposed flanks and rear of the aircraft, forcing them to pull into a hover so they could find their attackers on the ground and return fire. But the hover mode made the Apaches potentially more vulnerable.
It's this technological disparity between a low-tech enemy and the U.S. Apache force that has critics, even some in the Army, questioning what sort of role the aircraft should play in future conflicts. Enemies are likely to behave as the Iraqis did last spring and exploit the $24 million Longbow's vulnerabilities with swarms of $50 rocket-propelled grenades.
The experience of the Karbala raid loomed large last month when Army leaders terminated the $38 billion Comanche helicopter project. The Comanche was supposed to function alongside the Apache as a deep-strike attacker.
In announcing the termination, Gen. Richard Cody, the Army deputy chief of staff, alluded to Longbow experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan that he said negated the need for the Comanche.
"What we're seeing on the battlefield is (anti-aircraft) weapons systems, and where they're being employed is much more sophisticated in terms of target acquisition," Cody said.
Loren Thompson, director of the Lexington Institute, a defense think tank in Arlington, Va., is skeptical about the future role of the Apache.
The Longbow "is the most capable attack helicopter ever built, so if it can't operate safely in a place like Iraq, that has to raise questions about the whole concept of attack helicopters," he said.
For all the Apache fleet's technological superiority, it has stark limitations against an enemy that dispersed its troops and hid them among farmhouses, date groves and palm trees and urban areas.
Maj. Gen. David Petraeus, chief of the 101st Airborne Division, candidly conceded the limitations of the assault helicopter.
"The Iraqis dispersed very early. ... They weren't massed in the way we want usually for Apache operations," he lamented.
Retired Air Force Gen. Merrill McPeak, a former Air Force chief of staff, is perhaps the fiercest Apache critic.
The prime lesson from the failed raid, McPeak asserts, is that attack helicopters are highly vulnerable to enemy ground fire. Compared with fixed-wing aircraft, Apaches are slow, low-flying and loud, easily spotted by the enemy, he said in an interview.
McPeak argues the Army should have abandoned using choppers for anything other than ferrying troops after Vietnam, where the Army lost about 5,000 helicopters and scores of crews. Most of those choppers were dual-use Hueys that could both move troops and attack.
"If evidence were enough to decide an issue, this would have been decided long ago," McPeak said of the use of helicopters for attacking targets. The Karbala ambush "is further confirmation of a track record that is being ignored."
The former Air Force chief's comments reflect at least in part a decades-long rivalry between the Air Force and the Army, with the Air Force maintaining destruction of targets behind enemy lines should be its domain, leaving Army helicopters the role of supporting ground troops.
Air Force Secretary James Roche sounded the same theme last week, telling reporters a major result of Gulf War II is that the Air Force likely will take over greater responsibility for deep attack missions like the Apache's.
Army Chief of Staff Gen. Pete Schoomaker has "done away with his (Comanche) deep penetrating helicopter and is saying, 'You guys go do that,'" referring to the Air Force, Roche said.
Nevertheless, Army officials assert that criticisms of the Apache are off target.
Col. Michael Riley, who assessed the Apache Longbow performance in Iraq for the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, points to numerous successful Apache missions in Iraq after the failed raid.
Within two days of the U.S. retreat, for example, Apache forces had regrouped and changed tactics, he said. An Apache strike by the Army's 101st Airborne Division was successful because the attack included close coordination with artillery strikes and fixed-wing Air Force aircraft that bombed the enemy.
"Pundits look at the failed raid and say, 'Look, Apaches don't work'" on the modern battlefield, Riley said. "But it was an anomaly."
That's also the view of McCaffrey, the retired general, who has studied the Karbala raid.
McCaffrey, who teaches at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, said the assault was doomed from the outset because of poor planning and execution — and not because of any inherent flaw in the chopper's mission or capabilities.
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Part 2
The Apache pilots, McCaffrey wrote in the Armed Forces Journal, a military trade magazine, "lifted off exhausted, at maximum load conditions, in a single column, to fly at low level over major urban concentrations, under enormous ground fire, to attack deep objectives almost completely unsupported by the joint battle team."
The Army's own post-mortem of the attack revealed Wolf, the 11th Regiment commander, had deviated dramatically from Army doctrine in carrying out the attack by launching his mission without a joint battle team.
That doctrine says attack helicopters should be used alongside other weapons — primarily artillery and Air Force or Navy fighter/bomber aircraft — that will soften up and tie down the enemy before the helicopter strike.
But Wolf's Apaches mounted a strike virtually on their own, with no help from those other elements.
"We can't fight as an independent force out there, and that I think was one of the issues with (the raid)," Riley said.
The Apache was designed to counter the Soviet Union's formidable Red Army threat against Western Europe. When the helicopter was conceived in the early 1970s, the Apache's main mission was to go up against a Soviet onslaught into West Germany, swoop low under radar, pop up, hover and shoot missiles at enemy tanks.
Gulf War I gave the Apache its first opportunity to show its potential as an attack weapon. The Pentagon says the 274 Apaches deployed made an impressive showing in that war, knocking out an estimated 500 tanks along with scores of other vehicles.
Army officials are fiercely protective of the Apache and assert it always will have a role, even if the aircraft drops the deep-strike missions it was designed for.
"Recommend re-addressing attack aviation doctrine," the 3rd Infantry report on Gulf War II concluded, so pilots are better trained for other types of operations "as opposed to deep attack operations."
Brig. Gen. E.J. Sinclair, commander of the Army's aviation center at Fort Rucker, said in an interview that major Apache training changes began immediately after the war.
"To say we are never going to do a deep attack with the Apache is wrong," Sinclair said. "There may be instances where we have to."
On a fast moving battlefield, an Apache squadron may be needed to rapidly confront enemy concentrations 30 to 45 miles behind the front lines.
"Call it whatever you want. But to me that is still deep maneuver," he said.
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I actually believe that soon the battlefield vehicles will be switching to squad operated levels. I mean that the vehicles will be small and meant to be used directly by a squad for squad sized tactics.
I.E. Kinda like a really really big SAW.
To actually make the pilot one of the grunts, and not just someone to cover the grunts would increase effectiveness and power.
The marines almost have it with their Aviators, but I think they need to be on a more dedicated scale.
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Whos bright idea was it to hover when you are taking fire? Does that not strike anyone else as really really stupid?
Does the Marine Corp have the same issues or do they just use the cobra for close air support? Is the cobra harder to kill? I heard it was far more reliable in gulf war one.
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The Apache was not meant for close air support.
The Apache was designed to pick off tanks in a European theater from several miles out.
Since it's design, the threat of hordes of Soviet tanks has given way to "small intensity conflicts"
The Apache is survivable yes, once it takes rounds, it has many redundant systems. But able to stop even the smallest of bullets from doing damage? nope.
Not much armor at all. Heck, the side windows on the thing are plastic.
It was primarily designed to launch Hellfire missiles. not to use the 30mm on multiple small targets.
BTW, I would listen to anything General Cody has to say on the Apache. I got to the unit only days after he left command, yet people talked about him and the way he did business for years.
He was an Apache pilot in the first gulf war in the " Task force Normandy" (google it) raid where several Apache's from the 101st hit the radar facility opening the door for the Air Force.
Tapakeg
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this has been a problem since the end of WW2 when Gen Lemay got his separate "air force". the AF got all fixed wing aircraft and the army got left with helos. when the army needs a air strike they have to call the AF.
the marines are self contained, they have their own air wings, armor,arty,navy, and they are well coordinated.
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Originally posted by GtoRA2
Whos bright idea was it to hover when you are taking fire? Does that not strike anyone else as really really stupid?
Does the Marine Corp have the same issues or do they just use the cobra for close air support? Is the cobra harder to kill? I heard it was far more reliable in gulf war one.
in answer to your first question, helo pilots dont always realize that they are being shot at.
to your second question, marine cobra pilot training is geared more towards close air support and not ground attack.
ground attack=shooting at stuff on the ground that is not on the frontlines
close air support=killing stuff that is shooting at the good guys
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It was my understanding that the Apache was supposed to be beHIND the advancing armor columns---as it can look waaaayyy out ahead, and plink off a few at the same time
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Originally posted by bj229r
It was my understanding that the Apache was supposed to be beHIND the advancing armor columns---as it can look waaaayyy out ahead, and plink off a few at the same time
Kiowa fits more to this task.. it can fit two hellfires too!
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Does the cobra have more armor? Since it has always been a CAS chopper?
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Originally posted by GtoRA2
Does the cobra have more armor? Since it has always been a CAS chopper?
No,
The Marine Heli pilots are trained more to shoot and scoot - where the Army guys were to pop up on the battlefield - scan whats around, and plink off what they can detect. So not much scooting, but a lot of hovering around and 'sensing'.
Wolf
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Originally posted by Wolfala
No,
The Marine Heli pilots are trained more to shoot and scoot - where the Army guys were to pop up on the battlefield - scan whats around, and plink off what they can detect. So not much scooting, but a lot of hovering around and 'sensing'.
Wolf
And the Army couldnt figure out that doing this when taking fire is a bad idea?
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Originally posted by GtoRA2
And the Army couldnt figure out that doing this when taking fire is a bad idea?
Thats why we have TRADOC GtoRA2. Training and Doctrine Command is the US Army General Command College where they do lessons learned - we have a project out there at FT Leavenworth run under General Wallace and he is a kickass kind of guy, make no mistake about it. The guy was 11th armored, so for the everyday guy that might not mean much - but that means he was Red Team - he played the bad guy at the National Training Center - knows the bad guy tactics inside out (In his case, Soviet and then Iraqi) so he is the stick by which all the services measure each other.
So reviews like this are part of its job to point out the deficiencies in current doctrine. But you know the principle of primacy? The first thing taught is the one most easily remembered, regardless if it is wrong? Well, in a cold war fulda gap context, hovering over a hitech battlefield may have been the correct way to do it.
But low intensity urban conflict - when ever tom, dick and quadaffi can wave an AK or SKS at you, it isn't.
Also, the Marine Air Wing is a shock force which is an organic component to the ground units - the Army Air Cav, and someone can correct me on this - operates as a modular unit to a brigade, if a brigade does not possess 1 (they will share) - and largely as an independant unit communicating back to a TOC having no direct contact with the ground units they support. Its not a shock force - in the clear defination of the word.
Lesson learned.
Wolf
Suggested reading:
http://www.edefenseonline.com
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We should buy some Mi-24s and the russians to fly them. Thats what I never got is why the russians amoured their windscreens agaisnt small arms, but you can down a blackhawk with a pistol.
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it is hard to shoot down a blackhawk with a pistol if not impossible. the engine and drive shaft are armored with kevlar (i have seen it in person and it was confimred by an air national gaurd officer who proceded to stand on the opened engine cover and jump up and down on it while it was still attached to the helo). also, they are equipped with bullet proof glass making them eccedingly difficult to shoot down with small arms. this is in stark contrast to the helicopter that it replaced (Heuey) which in one instance was shot down with a bow and arrow.
also, Mi-24s do not fit American doctrine as they are not very meneuverable because of their large size. they do, however posess the capability to carry a squad of infantryman in addition to their formitable armament.
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They need the BF2 choppers.
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Originally posted by Pongo
They need the BF2 choppers.
Heh, no kidding, I hit one once with two tank Main gun rounds and it still flew away.
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Looks like the a10 might still have a few years of service left in her. I know if I had the choice what aircraft I would chose for close ground support.
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The doctrine just a few years ago was that no one single part of the Army fought alone. They were all to use the combined arms doctrine. That is the belnding of multiple weapons systems in concert to overwhelm and destroy the enemy. It also means using more than one service branch to get the job done IE navy or Air Force assets as combat multipliers.
Experiance has shown that sending one group, unsupported, is stupid. The experiance listed in earlier posts is confirmation of that simple concept. Infantry is not the do all, be all, any more than Armor, Aviation, Artillery etc. is when used in a conflict. As much as any troopie would like to think, any one part of the military can't do it all. It is really a team effort that gets the best results. Armor Infantry and Aviation working in concert to control the battlefield.
Helicopters are not tanks, tanks are not impervious and troops can't just get accross the battle field and do it all either. All the services have something to add to a victory and in some cases are absolutely essential to avoid a defeat.
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The AH-64 is bad As@ as someone who was thie at the Karbala gap I no all about them getting chewed up but the all made back. They were not alowed to cross the Euphrades bridge forgive my spelling of it I was a 12B. Because of of all the AA guns the were tould to hold I no because we all ways had CAS or them on call the LT or are FSO would stay on Net just in case they were need them. I have some good pic`s of them flying right up to it but they never did cross till we had it secured and some not so good ones of them all shot up I got this after we took the airport. In OIF3 thir call sign was Viper the were a flying ORF foce for patrlos in Bagdad and I am shure else were in Iraq. I can tell if were not for the Viper element some of the patrols would have been in big trouble. Thir is nothing like geting on the net and calling for viper and seeing 2 AH-64 show up in minutes just remmber to were you glint tape. As far as small arms I can tell you that least of the your prombles for patrols out in sector it IED`S and VBIED`S aka car bombs are the real worry. The big deal with Viper is they just can`t open up like OIF1 to use hellfires they must first go through Brgade same for the 30m on it. I dont care what some good idea fairy thinks about this.You go on a patrol and you will whant them on call!
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Originally posted by scot12b
The AH-64 is bad As@ as someone who was thie at the Karbala gap I no all about them getting chewed up but the all made back. They were not alowed to cross the Euphrades bridge forgive my spelling of it I was a 12B. Because of of all the AA guns the were tould to hold I no because we all ways had CAS or them on call the LT or are FSO would stay on Net just in case they were need them. I have some good pic`s of them flying right up to it but they never did cross till we had it secured and some not so good ones of them all shot up I got this after we took the airport. In OIF3 thir call sign was Viper the were a flying ORF foce for patrlos in Bagdad and I am shure else were in Iraq. I can tell if were not for the Viper element some of the patrols would have been in big trouble. Thir is nothing like geting on the net and calling for viper and seeing 2 AH-64 show up in minutes just remmber to were you glint tape. As far as small arms I can tell you that least of the your prombles for patrols out in sector it IED`S and VBIED`S aka car bombs are the real worry. The big deal with Viper is they just can`t open up like OIF1 to use hellfires they must first go through Brgade same for the 30m on it. I dont care what some good idea fairy thinks about this.You go on a patrol and you will whant them on call!
I broke my brain trying to read that. You might want to hook up with HT. He needs more coaders..>
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? Frogive my spelling I no am not that good at typing but your point I do no more about this then some guy who watches the military CH or history CH .3ID 3/7 INF BN E-CO SSG OIF1 and OIF 3 Thank you.
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I appreciate the insight. Thanks for doing the work too.
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Hey Scott,
Don't sweat the spelling or grammer. I got the message and didn't have much trouble.
One of my best teachers in the Army was my first shirt when I was the Company CO. His typing wasn't the greatest either but the letter and the "1'st Sgt Commendation" he wrote to me when I left command it about my most treasured momento from all the years I have in the service. He was a great man and an even better friend. I am looking for him now but when he retired he seemed to just disappear.
to you and the other NCO's who really make things happen.