Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => The O' Club => Topic started by: Yeager on June 04, 2007, 01:45:10 PM
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Haven't heard much talk about this anywhere but I am noticing some threatening rhetoric (and other rhetoric) coming from Vlad.
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/06/04/russia.putin.ap/index.html
As far as Im concerned we should not be putting US missle defences up in Europe to defend Europe from Iranian or NKorean missles. Thats Europes job, not ours.
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Originally posted by Yeager
As far as Im concerned we should not be putting US missle defences up in Europe to defend Europe from Iranian or NKorean missles. Thats Europes job, not ours.
Agreed.
Vlad does seem a bit *****y about all this. I don't blame him, honestly. With this shield in place, how can he bully his neighbors around? Geez, it's getting harder and harder to get things done at gunpoint in this day and age.
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Geez, George had him over to his place and gave him a brand new cowboy belt and all, and now this...
seems like Vlad has been misbehaving a lot in the past year...
as to whether we should help with a missle shield for the NATO, i don't know... on the one hand it seems prudent... but not sure we should pay for it all.
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We have said no to the missile shield, and a number of others will too over here. Its mostly the eager-to-please new nato members who sais yes. The shield is useless and is only good at starting a new new-killar arms race.
I hope all european nations comes to their senses and sais no to this crap.
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As far as Im concerned we should not be putting US missle defences up in Europe to defend Europe from Iranian or NKorean missles. Thats Europes job, not ours.
Yeager - so you agree that all US missile tracking equipment that gives the US early warning of missile attack should be removed from the UK? You know, the equipment that any anti-missile system relies on?
It isn't there to protect the UK. It isn't there to protect Europe. It protects YOU.
Feel free to try and find some other land in the same GPS coordinates as the UK. These new NATO entrants get no direct protection from the anti-ballistic missile system. You need them as much as they need you.
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To protect WHO ?!
no really, as if some of you really care about Yurop, c'mon
please build this kind of toy on YOUR homeland, thank you.
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Didn't you know that Team America protects everyone for free, ghost?
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Dowding,
Am referring to the proposed radar sights in Eastern Europe and the placement of American ballistic missle interceptors in Eatsern Europe (I believe).
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Yes... they are there to protect america from missiles.
They can also shoot down missiles sent from Russia. This upsets the balance so now the russians will build more nukes and also put more shorter ranged nukes close to the sites so they can target the radars and the anti-missile systems.
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I believe the point is to have the interceptor missiles, hit the enemy missiles while they are in the boost phase... Before they can reach escape velocity, and before their warheads separate and go completely ballistic...
After that they are almost impossible to hit...
Vlad Putie, and his ex soviet cronies, are having problems at home.... So they need something, to distract their people, from their nefarius activity at home...
Also It's alittle like France, sour grapes, because the world really doesn't give a ratsass about what they say anymore...
OG
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Yes.. from sertain parts of europe they can be shot down while on the way up I belive. Problem is.. that works for shooting down russian missiles too.
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i see a new russian missile shield in Cuba coming...
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I highly doubt that such a defense system will work properly. It will just be a kind of Maginot Line which costs much money and will be in the case of cases worthless.
Then there are no iranian missiles which could reach Europe.
And why should they?
Iran is not the enemy of Europe and Europe not the enemy of Iran.
In contrary there are still good relation ships with european nations.
Even with the embargo there are still close economical ties.
Some few examples:
France, Italy and Germany have built or are building production centres in Iran which produce copies of Renaults, Fiat and Mercedes.
There is even a discussion to build a Transrapid railway system in Iran - done by a german company.
Also Iran and many european nations have also historical ties reaching hundreds of years back to history and still active today.
The simple "Iran will attack Europe - so we must protect Europe by installing defense missiles in Poland" is like one of these propaganda stories we heared before many wars.
There is no hate between Iranians and europeans. And no danger of an iranian attack.
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how wonderful, peace in our time.
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if NATO doesn't want the missle shield in Europe, i agree that we shouldn't put it there. maybe we need to re-think NATO...
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Whoever thinks this missile system doesnt work needs to do there homework. This system has interecepted missles in flight before. Personally I think any who wouldnt want antimissile defense is a complete and utter retard. This isnt about just about America its about the worlds terrorists using scuds and other SRBMS (and ICBMS). Those bloody Americans saved the world from speaking German but what do they know now. There was a time when the half of Europe wanted us dead maybe we should return the favor. That toy may save millions of lives so you make your decision. Better yet we keep it for ourselves and be in complete control of the World......please....by the way you can take NATO and shove it where the sun dont shine.
Ungrateful bastards.....
CFYA
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Originally posted by Gunthr
seems like Vlad has been misbehaving a lot in the past year...
Comrade Putin only talks. Relax, guys. He's quite good in covering-up actual dismantling the country for profit of a handful of crooks. People like me are a sad nuisance for them. Like 90% of ethnic Russians.
I am more interested in what goes on in Stavropol' now, where our beloved Chechens declared a blood revenge like "we'll kill 20 Russian for one Chechen". Forget all this rhethorics, it's only "shaking air". We all are waiting for Militia disarming Russian population from legal smooth-bores, so Caucasian scum will feel easier killing us. So it goes. Anyway - it's a problem of neophite EU members if they care that our missiles are aimed at them now. We got enough to char em all in 10 minutes after a button is pressed.
It's called "democracy", meaning - YOU are responsible for the acts of the leaders YOU elected. If they make YOU a target for a megaton thermonuclear blast - then don't blame barbaric Russians.
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It's been a while since anyone played the "we saved your asses" card. Well done, CFYA! :rofl
Edit: in the interest of maintaining electronic communication nuances, the above was written in sarcastic jest.
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Originally posted by Boroda
It's called "democracy", meaning - YOU are responsible for the acts of the leaders YOU elected. If they make YOU a target for a megaton thermonuclear blast - then don't blame barbaric Russians.
Nah. I think I'll still hold the guy who shoots me in the face accountable regardless of whatever douchbag is in public office. Our country has been historically shot in the face as well as in the back whether we were minding our own business or meddling in other parts of the world.
Anyway Boroda, I read an article this morning that says Putin has an extremely high approval rating there. Is he as popular with the masses as the article claimed?
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In truth we HELPED save ALOT of souls. Now 60 odd years later we are the tyrants of the world. :noid
The only thing saving you from a nuclear death is MAD.
Might be nice to have another solution besides nuclear winter. Maybe Ill finally get that snow in Florida I have always wanted. I dont think the fallout can get this far!!:rofl
Ryan
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Originally posted by babek-
There is no hate between Iranians and europeans. And no danger of an iranian attack.
Babek, they know better - they were told about it on TV! Everyone knows (tm) that TV never lies!
Noone gives a flying **** about Iranian steel industry that needs electrical power and it is growing so Iran needs all that nuclear power. It's not on TV.
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If you don't want the missile 'defense' system in your country then you should hold your 'own' government accountable for the decisions it makes.
The US asked Russia for help on both the North Korea and Iranian issues. Russia helped by selling anti-aircraft missile's to Iran. They countined to help the US by selling additional weapons in Venezuelan. In fact Russia seems to have no problem "stuffing" the Middle East with its own weapons in order to 'help' the US. Now they are cross when a plan is devised that doesn't require their special 'help'.
I would be more than happy to see us not place missiles any where if Russia would not sell Nuc technology to unstable countries that would imprison you if you 'draw' a cartoon pic of Muhammad or have a western style looking hair cut.
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russian missiles are rusting hulks just like the russian navy.
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Originally posted by VOR
Anyway Boroda, I read an article this morning that says Putin has an extremely high approval rating there. Is he as popular with the masses as the article claimed?
90% of people never employ their own brain, I hope you understand it :(. They will vote for a creature like comrade Putin even starving to death just because he said NATO is bad-bad.
Sorry, I don't have good sarcastic-enough materials about the situation here written in English :( My opinion is generally close to what Dmitriy Puchkov posts on http://www.oper.ru - but it's all in Cyrillic.
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Originally posted by john9001
russian missiles are rusting hulks just like the russian navy.
wanna check it out? c'mon. I bet you'll be surprised.
The best proof is that i sit here in Moscow and don't hear air-raid sirens. I'll get several megatons blowing over my head 30min (flight time from North Dakota) after your leaders will think we can't strike back. And your leaders don't buy all that is said on TV, otherwise we couldn't talk here, being too busy catching rats for dinner.
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We should have rearmed the Germans and marched east and punched old uncle joe in the snot locker.
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Keep it. The missile shield is useless and a money pit. It can only stop a very limited attack, like a terrorist ICBM (lol only Americans can come up with such BS). Against the Russians or any other ICBM/SLBM capable nation it is useless.
Didn't the USS Cole attack teach you guys anything? They didn't use an anti-ship missile, they used a couple of guys in a rubber dinghy. The terrorists don't need a fancy complicated piece of technology like a huge rocket to deliver a nuke, they only need one brave guy and a truck in Mexico.
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Originally posted by Viking
Didn't the USS Cole attack teach you guys anything? .
yes, don't let the state department dictate refueling procedures for US war ships.
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Originally posted by soda72
If you don't want the missile 'defense' system in your country then you should hold your 'own' government accountable for the decisions it makes.
The US asked Russia for help on both the North Korea and Iranian issues. Russia helped by selling anti-aircraft missile's to Iran. They countined to help the US by selling additional weapons in Venezuelan. In fact Russia seems to have no problem "stuffing" the Middle East with its own weapons in order to 'help' the US. Now they are cross when a plan is devised that doesn't require their special 'help'.
I would be more than happy to see us not place missiles any where if Russia would not sell Nuc technology to unstable countries that would imprison you if you 'draw' a cartoon pic of Muhammad or have a western style looking hair cut.
Iran "unstable"!?
What can be more stable then Islamic theocracy?!
RF officially stopped selling any defense-related stuff to DPRK this month.
Selling SAMs is harmless to anyone but aggressors. Face it like you did in Indochina 40 years ago. You ain't going to win without losses. More SAMs everywhere will secure poor people from being bombed to "stone age" by "democratisators".
Venezuela pays money, we sell our product. What's wrong with that? Capitalism, isn't it? We don't give our Kalashnikov's automats made in Izhevsk for free.
Well, you probably have obvious moral problems. Justifying bold aggression and mass-murder isn't what I expected from American Democracy that I was taught to love in Soviet school.
Sorry. Respected Moderators please delete this post if You find it inappropriate.
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Viking........did it ever occur to you that its already stopped ICBMS? It has on more than one ocassion! What more do you need to prove its a viable weapons system?
Also why are the ruskies so up in arms if it dont work?
All for a very expensive potatoe gun? Use your brain here.
I know for a fast that this system can kill anything in the air regardless of flight profile. All depends on how much that little target is worth to you.
The missiles arent cheap to say the least.
Do you even know the details of this missile system? What type of warhead? Missile flight profile? Anything?
If you do I will be completely amazed!
Shut up before you kill you comrades in the future.
CFYA
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Originally posted by Mr No Name
We should have rearmed the Germans and marched east and punched old uncle joe in the snot locker.
Feel happy that JVS didn't throw your so-called "armies" into the Atlantic as Soviet Marshals suggested. It was estimated as 2 weeks of walking across France and West Germany without any opposition - you guys couldn't ever compare to Germans.
I am not getting really ugly here, or am I?...
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Originally posted by CFYA
Viking........did it ever occur to you that its already stopped ICBMS? It has on more than one ocassion! What more do you need to prove its a viable weapons system?
Alriiiiiiiiighty then, someones been watching a few to many Bond movies.
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I guess the films, thermal images, and radar data I have seen mean nothing. Maybe that was all a dream.:noid
Ignorance is bliss.:aok
<>......nevermind hardly anyone worth saluting
CFYA
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Originally posted by CFYA
Viking........did it ever occur to you that its already stopped ICBMS? It has on more than one ocassion! What more do you need to prove its a viable weapons system?
It has not stopped any ICBM, it has successfully intercepted dummy targets. However I have no doubt that it can successfully intercept an ICBM. However no ICBM/SLBM capable nation would just launch one or a couple missiles at the US if it came to nuclear war; they would launch all of them. And such an ABM system would even be overwhelmed by France’s modest arsenal of some 200 warheads. The only protection this system will provide is against a “rogue launch” of a very few warheads. Terrorists don’t work that way, not even in Tom Clancy novels.
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Originally posted by CFYA
Viking........did it ever occur to you that its already stopped ICBMS? It has on more than one ocassion! What more do you need to prove its a viable weapons system?
Also why are the ruskies so up in arms if it dont work?
All for a very expensive potatoe gun? Use your brain here.
I know for a fast that this system can kill anything in the air regardless of flight profile. All depends on how much that little target is worth to you.
The missiles arent cheap to say the least.
Do you even know the details of this missile system? What type of warhead? Missile flight profile? Anything?
If you do I will be completely amazed!
Shut up before you kill you comrades in the future.
CFYA
My distant friend, my military speciality in the Uni was S-200 SAM technical division officer. 250km range, 40km alt guaranteed kill. ABM capability. Special warheads 20 kiloton, called "improved reliability" 5B28-H (Cyrillic). Our sites were the first targets for your Minutemens.
More to say, I live in the world's only city protected by a WORKING missile shield. Capable of intercepting 5-10 warheads, but you guys still can't match it.
And Viking is right. Missile shield is a useless waste of money. Keep paying your taxes for illusionary security, we don;t mind. It's Euros who will be marked as targets for Iskander short-range missiles, so - leave it to them.
Give me a list of US SAM (AA-defense) kills, if there were any. USSR performed a first ballistic missile interception on March 4th 1960. Good 'ol S-75 knocked out your U-2 at 20km alt on May 1st 1960 over Urals. So Bush was quite reasonable asking for assistance.
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Like this one
THADD (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=geHT3wDOb50&mode=related&search=)
This just one of the many films available to the public.
Like I said do your research.....
CFYA
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Quick arithmetics:
US is going to deploy 110 ABMs.
A "reliable" launch takes two missiles per target (I don't count incidents like Lybia-86 when colleagues got 2 launches-2 kills). So it's 55 warheads intercepted in ideal conditions. Like 10 Soviet MIRVs. Go dig yourself a shelter, at your own expense, taxes you pay go down the drain.
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Originally posted by CFYA
Like this one
THADD (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=geHT3wDOb50&mode=related&search=)
This just one of the many films available to the public.
Like I said do your research.....
CFYA
Single dummy targets, not hundreds of incoming ICBM or SLBM warheads with chaff and decoys.
Originally posted by Boroda
Give me a list of US SAM (AA-defense) kills, if there were any.
The US Patriot system did score a few hits on Iraqi scuds in Israel during the first Gulf War. In the second Gulf War they managed to shoot down a British Tornado. I think that’s about it.
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Your telephone poles couldnt even hit the SR71. You know how many pilots laughed at your foolish attemps to shoot it down. What about the mig designed to catch it? Failure....
As far as your "missile defense"......dont make me laugh. Those NUCLEAR tipped intercept missiles have a generous kill radius and are not even in the same league as THADD. Your shooting 1 SRBM to kill another SRBM/ICBM. Do you have any idea what it takes to kill one missile using a kinetic warhead?
Oh by the way....one unit has the ability to destroy 16 incoming threats. One hundred or so of these are planned. Yes maybe a few get through, perhaps even a dozen. But rest assured you will be a smoking hole in the ground no matter who or where you are with relativly low losses (for nuclear event)
By the way the US had a nuclear land based intercept missile in late 60s.....old technology.
Your boring me with your absolute lack of knowledge of US missile systems.
CFYA
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Originally posted by Viking
Single dummy targets, not hundreds of incoming ICBM or SLBM warheads with chaff and decoys.
50% of Soviet ICBMs payload are chaff, inflatable decoys and active ECM stations.
Originally posted by Viking
The US Patriot system did score a few hits on Iraqi scuds in Israel during the first Gulf War. In the second Gulf War they managed to shoot down a British Tornado. I think that’s about it.
According to my sources (see above, I got into mil education right in 1991) Patriot's kill ratio against Scuds was like 5%. Most of the missiles were so "upgraded" that they blew up on launchers or OTW up. Original Soviet design simply didn't have enough range and payload to reach Israel. "Don't be a scud be a patriot" - another propaganda hook.
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I understand national pride, but geez....
In 1945? A confrontation between Red Army and Allied Armies?
So ya think two weeks, before Russian pig farmers could be raping the hot paris chicks huh?
Ivan, Dude, you've been watching too much propaganda.....LOL!!!
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Originally posted by Boroda
Selling SAMs is harmless to anyone but aggressors.
So you agree a missile 'defense' system in Europe is harmless to Russia since it only targets aggressors. Thanks for clarifying ;)
Originally posted by Boroda
Venezuela pays money, we sell our product. What's wrong with that? Capitalism, isn't it? We don't give our Kalashnikov's automats made in Izhevsk for free.
Try selling cars, tv's, or refrigerators like all the other Capitalists. In the end you might find the world a safer place, and much more profitable..
The rest of your response is not worth my time replying to...
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Well the European missile shield sounds alot more cost effective than
the US variant...how much could it possibly cost to roll over and play dead?
:D
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Originally posted by CFYA
Your telephone poles couldnt even hit the SR71. You know how many pilots laughed at your foolish attemps to shoot it down. What about the mig designed to catch it? Failure....
LOL Blackbirds were flying over uninhabited tundra just for fun. Who cares if noone lives there?... S-200 takes 14 hours (officially, noone ever met that requirements) to dispatch from the wheels, noone tried to ruin your games :) After Vietnam you guys know that we are experts in AA ambushes, don't you? if you don't - then expect some trouble like in Yugoslavia 1999 :D
LOL yankees teaching bloody ivans about aircraft defense. Ever heard an air-raid siren? I got all my school in the basement bombshelter when i tested a hand siren in the late-80s. when i hear a siren test i really almost drop down "heels towards the flash".
LOL - i needed a third LOL in the beginning of the paragraph :D
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The Patriot missile system was flawed but held a impressive record considering it was doing a job it was never designed to do. The intercept rates were from 20 to 30 percent range depending on the threats flight profile and when the target was engaged. The Patriot was design to be a high altitude SAM not a ballistic interceptor.
Whatever sources claiming the Patriot exploded randomly are propoganda in there own right. The Patriot was based on a solid rocket motor that was hardly changed through out the missile systems life and proved extremely realiable.
Yawn
CFYA
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Originally posted by OdinGrunherze
I understand national pride, but geez....
In 1945? A confrontation between Red Army and Allied Armies?
So ya think two weeks, before Russian pig farmers could be raping the hot paris chicks huh?
Ivan, Dude, you've been watching too much propaganda.....LOL!!!
Grun, is it you?! I hope to send you some small present with Dima ;)
Red Army in 1945: several millions of angry veterans. Professionals in killing. Opposed by the world's toughest army and defeating it. Armed with incredible weapons.
They'll simply walk through "allied" forces without even noticing them. A walk to the "last sea" like Ghenghiz. Just to wash boots in salty water.
US fought in the Pacific for 3 years, and Red Army defeated Japanese continental 1.5 million army in 2 weeks losing less then 10 thousand servicemen. Sorry guys.
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@Boroda: Yes - US-TV never lies. So the mighty iranian starships are soon orbiting Earth and must be stopped by the energy shield which was stolen from Emperor Ming by Buck "Bush" Rogers, who is ready to save the planet ;)
But interesting is that here some US-members are blaming Russia for selling equipment to Iran.
On the same time the USA is supporting countries like Pakistan and Saudi-Arabia with equipment.
The same Pakistan, which is one of the main supporters of the Taliban, who are killing US- and other allied soldiers in Afghanistan.
The same Saudi-Arabia which defines itself the leading sunnite nation and so supports the sunnite terrorist organisations like the sunnite Al Qaida who are killing US- and other alied soldiers in Iraq or the sunnite palestinian groups which are now destabilizing Lebanon.
Its very easy to think in stereotypes. Here the bad russians and the instable iranians.
But it would be more wise to check the nations who are supported by the own side.
Then it would become clear that nations like Pakistan or Saudi Arabia are much more instable than Iran. That they are supporting exactly those terrorists (Taliban + Al Qaida) who are fighting the USA.
And that especially the shi ite Iran is a bitter enemy of these sunnite terror-groups.
On the other hand it could be easier to watch US TV showing the incoming iranian Starships made in Russia. :)
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Blackbirds over uninhabited land??
Yeah I guess all those pictures of your nuclear armed bomber fleet must have come from Stalingrad.:noid
The SR71 had could go anywhere in the Soviet Union in wanted to. There wasnt a single thing any of your missiles could do about it. Them some good rockets there ruskie!!!:noid
CFYA
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Originally posted by CFYA
The Patriot missile system was flawed but held a impressive record considering it was doing a job it was never designed to do. The intercept rates were from 20 to 30 percent range depending on the threats flight profile and when the target was engaged. The Patriot was design to be a high altitude SAM not a ballistic interceptor.
Whatever sources claiming the Patriot exploded randomly are propoganda in there own right. The Patriot was based on a solid rocket motor that was hardly changed through out the missile systems life and proved extremely realiable.
Yawn
CFYA
I meant Iraqi Scuds exploding on launchers. Sorry, sometimes I have problems - English is my second language.
"The intercept rates were from 20 to 30 percent range depending on the threats flight profile and when the target was engaged. " - exactly what I meant! :D Divide American stats by five - and you'll get the actual ratio. LOL it's like 78 Sabres lost in Korea :) We got more engine shields then that and captured one F-86 undamaged!
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And the Russians said they werent in Vietnam.:noid
You might want to rethink your statements on chaff.
In a ballistic trajectory against a high power doppler radar it would prove very ineffective. I would explain it but you would never believe or nor understand. I am a Yankee what do I know!!!:D :aok
Also theres this thing called radio black out do to plasma blocking radio waves. Hence rendering ECMs largely ineffective during most of the flight.
Again what do I know
Again yawn
CFYA
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Originally posted by CFYA
The SR71 had could go anywhere in the Soviet Union in wanted to. There wasnt a single thing any of your missiles could do about it. Them some good rockets there ruskie!!!:noid
I only can say that You are badly misinformed.
71s flew across the North Pole and never crossed the USSR shoreline even at such sunny beautiful places as Taimyr. Anyone closing as far as 250km to a nearest Navy base gets punctured by our 60,000 steel pellets in a 300 kg warhead :)
Or do you decline the fact that Gary Powers got shot over Sverdlovsk on May Day 1960?
Just in case you didn't know: my Uncle scored 4 kills as a targeting officer on S-75 in Vietnam. Plus two more in Egypt. Name an American SAM officer with such a score, do me a favor please!
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You do know Francis Gary Powers was in a U2 correct? Other than the extreme altitude 80,000 ft approximatly the intercept posed no problems once you got to that alt. Heck its top speed was only a little under mach 1 at altitude!!
The SR71 flew miles higher and 4 times faster. They rountinely did deep recon runs in the heart of the Soviet. Despite the fact that hundreds of missiles were fired at the SR71 not one ever scratched the paint. I read about one causing an unstart tho.....thats a violent event but rather commom and not a safety issue.
Your 300kg warhead is junk when the guiadance platform cant cope with the closure rates. :)
Or the altitude...
Or the speed....
Or the fact that the SR71 was almost as fast as your state of the art missiles.....
Or the fact that margin for launching a SAM from any one site was less than a minute....
Shall I go on??
Keep spilling!!!
CFYA
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Hi Boroda.
Nice to meet colleague :)
May I introduce myself - guidance officer, C-125 "Pechora"
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Originally posted by CFYA
And the Russians said they werent in Vietnam.:noid
You might want to rethink your statements on chaff.
In a ballistic trajectory against a high power doppler radar it would prove very ineffective. I would explain it but you would never believe or nor understand. I am a Yankee what do I know!!!:D :aok
Also theres this thing called radio black out do to plasma blocking radio waves. Hence rendering ECMs largely ineffective during most of the flight.
Again what do I know
Again yawn
CFYA
Above mentioned Uncle was a director of combat-program department in Sary-Shagan test-ground. Worked on ABMs. In 1975 they achieved accuracy enough to trade 1 megaton warhead for a conventional one, and the problem was only in detecting fake targets. As soon as they could detect a real threat in a cloud of targets falling on them fro over the horizon - they abandoned a nuclear ABM warhead.
Go ask me about explosive electro-magnetic generators when you speak about "plasma blocking radio". Go block a couple of terawatts. OTOH it's easier to blast one orf the eggs over stratosphere to blind your radars. Yes I am an Asian Jewish Bolshevik on my Shaggy Mount (tm) and not worth talking to. And I look like a hippyish Orthodox priest with long hair and a beard. So it goes. And I work in an institute that made a Bomb back in 1949. I work there just for fun, comrade Putin almost succeeded in starving all the scientists (i am only an engineer in IT support - don't mistake me for a Scientist)
hehe high power doppler radar %) auto-tracking on speed and distance - explain us the difference and try to invent AC maneuvers to "drop" such auto-tracking.
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Originally posted by Vad
Hi Boroda.
Nice to meet colleague :)
May I introduce myself - guidance officer, C-125 "Pechora"
I studied in MVTU, 125-ka - MIREA? ;)
You shot the bloody missiles, pressed the button, all the fun, while I was only a person wearing chem-protection suit in brown oxydizer vapor :)
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I dont understand half that post and the other half I dont even feel the need to try and explain.
You will have your opinon.......
CFYA
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Originally posted by Boroda
I studied in MVTU, 125-ka - MIREA? ;)
You shot the bloody missiles, pressed the button, all the fun, while I was only a person wearing chem-protection suit in brown oxydizer vapor :)
LPI (Leningrad Polythech).
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What oxidizer? Nitrogen Tetroxide? Nitric Acid?
CFYA
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Originally posted by CFYA
Viking........did it ever occur to you that its already stopped ICBMS? It has on more than one ocassion! What more do you need to prove its a viable weapons system?
CFYA
Still waiting on your link to these ICBM shootdowns.
(the one crappy piece of evidence so far has been a link to a controlled test of a shootdown of a missile trying to simulate a scud, technically a TBM, a long way from an ICBM).
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Agrees with everything Boroda said.
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I rather the money was spent on the problems we have with our own border. Anytime the U.S. does anything to help Europe all we get is grief.
Leave them to their socialist yearnings, let them cozy up to that wonderful big bear in the East. They don't want our help, they don't even like the U.S. So why force the issue? Cut the cord let them go about their business and let's take care of our own problems.
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ROFL Shifty.. you havent read up on this at all have you?
The shield placed in europe is there to protect America... not europe
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Umm, as I recall...Moscow has a missile sheild system in place.
So if the USA and Europe develop one...oh wait, that's unfair and destabilizing?
Pffft whatever.
Sooner or later, they'll chuck Putin and get a real democracy going. This fool wants the glory days of 1988 again. You know, long lines, empty grocery stores...BUT...an impressive military movement!
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LOL Nielson you're jumping conclusions AGAIN. Of course it's there to protect America , and Europe. Europe doesn't want it, don't put it up. Protect ourselves and leave Europe out of it.
You're typical of the everything American is evil attitude across the Atlantic. I say leave your kind to their own devices.
Europe is like the retarded kid in school, you can protect him from the bully, you can try and help him get through class. Then in return he wipes his boogers on your desk.
No thanks.
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Originally posted by Boroda
US fought in the Pacific for 3 years, and Red Army defeated Japanese continental 1.5 million army in 2 weeks losing less then 10 thousand servicemen. Sorry guys.
LOL They were already beaten and they just didn't want to believe it. It took 2 A-bombs to convince them.
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Thank you for the offer Sir, but Europe is in no need of your protection. The armies of Europe tally more troops, tanks, missiles and combat aircraft than any other continent, including North America. We tried the Maginot line earlier. Didn't work.
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Originally posted by Viking
Thank you for the offer Sir, but Europe is in no need of your protection. The armies of Europe tally more troops, tanks, missiles and combat aircraft than any other continent, including North America. We tried the Maginot line earlier. Didn't work.
now if only the folks in washington would agree. while you're at it please send them a memo on the UN, it needs a new building. it would be preferable if it was located somewhere in cloggyland.
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I rather the money was spent on the problems we have with our own border. Anytime the U.S. does anything to help Europe all we get is grief.
Leave them to their socialist yearnings, let them cozy up to that wonderful big bear in the East. They don't want our help, they don't even like the U.S. So why force the issue? Cut the cord let them go about their business and let's take care of our own problems. - Shifty
i'm leaning this way too, even tho it was agreed that an attack on one signatory of the NATO countries would be regarded as an attack on the all, therefore, the protection of any one NATO signatory is the same as protection of all NATO signatories, esp if that signatory is paying for the protection ( the missle defense shield).
if a simple majority in NATO don't want it, i'd say that they are failing to abide by the mission of NATO as agreed on after the end of the Cold War, when the mission of NATO was changed from protection of NATO members against Soviet attack to mutual protection of NATO members against any military attack. If a simple majority of NATO members do not want to honor this agreement, we can legitimately pull out of it.
we can take care of ourselves. while we're at it, lets drastically reduce all foreign aid and focus that money on our own country. my impression is that most of our foreign aid is a cynical effort anyway, meant to control and influence and we are regarded with contempt by the beneficiaries.
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Originally posted by Boroda
Feel happy that JVS didn't throw your so-called "armies" into the Atlantic as Soviet Marshals suggested. It was estimated as 2 weeks of walking across France and West Germany without any opposition - you guys couldn't ever compare to Germans.
I am not getting really ugly here, or am I?...
I didn't realize the Russian Army had a force of combat cockroaches - the only thing that survives atomic blasts from what I understand. I assumed the Japanese were the only ones who thought we only had 1 atomic bomb to toss. Considering the lack of understanding at the time of what would have happened if a-bombs were tossed around Europe, it's very likely they would have been used - assuming the Russians could throw our 'so-called "armies" ' into the Atlantic. That would have been a tragedy for all sides. I'm glad we'll never know.
Glove
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Originally posted by Gunthr
we can take care of ourselves. while we're at it, lets drastically reduce all foreign aid and focus that money on our own country. my impression is that most of our foreign aid is a cynical effort anyway, meant to control and influence and we are regarded with contempt by the beneficiaries.
Areed. I even agree with the Europeans. No American missle defence system in Euope. I don't see the problem.
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From what I read, my impression is the missile defense in Europe is the counterpart of the token missile defense on the U.S. west coast and Alaska: a small force able only to stop a few warheads from a limited attack as from North Korea or Iran or some James Bond villain terrorists.
Both systems would not deter China or Russia, and hence not destabilize any existing arms agreements.
Both China and Russia should welcome such limited missile defense systems as they presumably would help pinpoint the origin of any rogue attacks, hopefully intercept any limited attacks, and thus be much less likely to trigger any retaliation against China or Russia.
The scenario gets much more complicated if hostiles manage to launch missiles from within China or Russia. Even the best hotline communication would have trouble explaining that.
It is a tribute to world sanity that so far a nuclear exchange has been avoided. Between nations that want to live, deterrence has been workable. Governments understand that any defense against a mass nuclear attack can be overwhelmed.
For suicidal terrorists, no deterrence has yet proven effective at any level of conflict. Like exterminating hornets, the best tactic is to kill them in their nests, not swat at them after they launch.
Like it or not, the best strategy against terrorists is to devise mutually beneficial accomodations that help them value living more than dying, peacefully cooperating instead of destructively competing in basic survival needs. We're very good at destroying bodies but not so effective winning minds.
Ultimately a terrorist is anyone who has so much less power than his opponents that the only way he perceives he can change what he perceives as injustices is to strike by any means possible to cause as much grief and damage as possible to his perceived oppressors even if it costs his life, which to him has become unbearable anyway.
It helps if the terrorist is assured of a better life in the hereafter, especially if deeds against the perceived oppressors will magnify his reward.
So how do we fight such swarms of suicidal zealots? Exterminate all of them? Not likely. Win their leaders' minds? Great idea. Now, wonder how that can be done?
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In my opinion, Roosevelt and Churchill conspired to allow the Soviets to defeat most of Hitlers army before Jun 6 1944.
It wasn't so much that we couldn't have tackled the German, but if your bigger friend has an axe to grind, and wants to take on the enemy, you get behind him really fast. Just makes sense really.
Every American should be thankful the Russian army was up to the task. Saved millions of Allied lives. Even then, Hitler damn near wiped Russia out. Just Hitlers military stupidity saved the Russians.
I also think the missle shield thing is probably just a political ruse.
If so, Putin seems to have taken the bait.
"For suicidal terrorists, no deterrence has yet proven effective at any level of conflict. Like exterminating hornets, the best tactic is to kill them in their nests, not swat at them after they launch. "
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Exactly.
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For suicidal terrorists, no deterrence has yet proven effective at any level of conflict. Like exterminating hornets, the best tactic is to kill them in their nests, not swat at them after they launch.
Like it or not, the best strategy against terrorists is to devise mutually beneficial accomodations that help them value living more than dying, peacefully cooperating instead of destructively competing in basic survival needs. We're very good at destroying bodies but not so effective winning minds. - Halo
well, which do you mean, Halo? kill terrorists in their nests? or "help" them acquire your values (which they hold in contempt)???
actually, killing them in their nests IS the best way to "help" terrorists acquire your values. a dead terrorist is good, benificial terrorist.
true, we have not been successful at winning terrorist minds. :lol
on the other hand, the terrorists have been somewhat successful at winning liberal minds among the Democrat political party...
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Originally posted by Gloves
I didn't realize the Russian Army had a force of combat cockroaches - the only thing that survives atomic blasts from what I understand. I assumed the Japanese were the only ones who thought we only had 1 atomic bomb to toss. Considering the lack of understanding at the time of what would have happened if a-bombs were tossed around Europe, it's very likely they would have been used - assuming the Russians could throw our 'so-called "armies" ' into the Atlantic. That would have been a tragedy for all sides. I'm glad we'll never know.
Glove
Fortunately, history doesn't know conditional tense.
But I wouldn't rely on nuke in this scenario. One thing is to drop the bomb on the unprotected towns on far East whithout any own troops around, and abslolutely another thing is nuke troops on front lines in the center of Europe where they are in direct contact with your own troops .
There were no ICBMs in that time, and all Russian production were concentrated in Ural. Good luck to fly there!
Just for the record, I'm more than happy that neither Stalin nor Truman tried this scenario.
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Wow the cyber tape measure is out in full force. I think I will step back from this one.
Everyone has there opinion.....no matter how much error might be in them.
CFYA
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Good graphic here of the commie threat.
http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-23399182-details/Blair+challenges+Putin+as+missiles+storm+escalates/article.do
The only person threatening europe with nuclear war is old uncle Vlad.
Maybe this missile shield is a good idea :rolleyes:
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Sorry, guys, I just don't understand - you are all playing fools, or you really have comprehension problems?
Make me a favour, take a look on a globe. Russian missiles will never fly to America over Europe. Missiles are always launched in direction of Earth rotating. They will be launched on the East - North-East from Siberia and Central Russia. Just few will be sent on West to destroy Europe, and most likely it will be middle and short range non ballistic missiles, defence is useless against them.
And who is talking about that 10 defence missiles. The USA put them there just to shut the mouth of Europe - "We are protecting you against Iran and North Korea attack!". Russia is talking about radar. It is important part of global US defence system, actually it will work as early warning radar. It is necessary part of global sysem because you need to know ASAP characteristic of missiles trajectories on the first part of the fly. And this radar covers the central part of Russia where most of mobile ICBMs are disposed.
BTW, 10 missiles can be very easily changed to 10000 missiles if you have all infrastructure in place.
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Guys it is all irrelevant. Once the missiles start flying what does it matter that the US or Europe is glowing a little less than Russia or China? We'll all be dead anyways.
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I see where your coming from Vad on your last point but your incorrect in your launching direction. If a suprize attack on the USA from Russian base ICBMs would go directly over the North Pole. Rockets are normally launched with direction of the Earth to maximize payload. Even then the difference your talking about is only 10 percent compared to launching against the rotation of earth. Look at American based radars. There is a vast array stationed in northern Canada pointed north. The shortest distance is over the artic region giving the least amount of time to mobilize defense and attack forces.
You make a good point.....if nuclear weapons are used either heat, radiation, or nuclear winter will be the end of all of us.
CFYA
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Originally posted by Viking
Guys it is all irrelevant. Once the missiles start flying what does it matter that the US or Europe is glowing a little less than Russia or China? We'll all be dead anyways.
Exactly! And this is the reason why all country in the world who have ICBMs shouldn't try to change existing balance. This balance has worked great for the last several tens of years, and should still be in place.
New US defence system is actually changing this balance. I don't want to say that our american friends will immediately launch all their missiles to Russia when this defence will be completed. No.
But with this defence in case of crisis like Cuban crisis our american friends possibly could be a little less cautious than they should be. And possibly could make a mistake pressing Russia too far. In this case there is a little possibility that Russia will take ofence, and will test this new American defence system, just to prove its useless. Or our American friends will try to test russian guidance officers how fast they can press the buttons.
Yes, we will all have few minutes to live after that, but the main idea of balance is "WE ALL".
While we all belive in this "WE ALL", we will be alive.
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Originally posted by Shifty
LOL Nielson you're jumping conclusions AGAIN. Of course it's there to protect America , and Europe. Europe doesn't want it, don't put it up. Protect ourselves and leave Europe out of it.
You're typical of the everything American is evil attitude across the Atlantic. I say leave your kind to their own devices.
Europe is like the retarded kid in school, you can protect him from the bully, you can try and help him get through class. Then in return he wipes his boogers on your desk.
No thanks.
Calm down kid. No need to start inventing things just because you dont know whats going on in the world. jeebuz
:lol
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CFYA, the US had a missle defense in the 70s. It's costs were over the top just like the technical details of the intercept missiles. (Search for Sprint/Spartan videos)
At the end of the day the soviet answer was "uhkay. we'll just build even more nukes" and the system was scrapped.
Why would you need to upset the balance of power once again?
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Im over this arguement....
IMO I would spend every dime I had on a missile defense network capable off stopping every last object.
Maybe then the Russian government would shut up for a change.:noid
CFYA
BTW I know all about Spartan/Sprint even the Niki Hercules which is largely still classified.:aok
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Originally posted by Nilsen
Calm down kid. No need to start inventing things just because you dont know whats going on in the world. jeebuz
:lol
Just more of the arrogance on display you try to mask as intelligence.
:lol
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Originally posted by Boroda
Quick arithmetics:
US is going to deploy 110 ABMs.
A "reliable" launch takes two missiles per target (I don't count incidents like Lybia-86 when colleagues got 2 launches-2 kills). So it's 55 warheads intercepted in ideal conditions. Like 10 Soviet MIRVs. Go dig yourself a shelter, at your own expense, taxes you pay go down the drain.
OK - so what you just proved was that in fact, a US missile shield in Europe ISN'T actually a threat to Russia. You know, maybe they really do want to just provide some limited protection against some terrorist idiots who buy some N. Korean missiles and mate them up with some future Iranian Nukes.
Hey - Europe is free to make their own decisions. If they don't want it, I say don't force the issue. If, some day in the future, during a dispute with a nuclear-armed Iran, some european power faces nuclear blackmail because they can't intercept an inbound missile, then they can rethink the policy.
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As far as the Radars in Europe being "necessary" to protect America, don't worry - we've got plenty of other coverage.
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As far as the Radars in Europe being "necessary" to protect America, don't worry - we've got plenty of other coverage.
Without RAF Fylingdales, about 60 miles from where this post is being written, you haven't got jack.
At the end of the day cooperation benefits both the US and Europe on EW data. It's just a shame some Yanks haven't got an ounce of humility to admit that they actually need other people to help themselves. There are fools on both sides of the Atlantic, but I guess being an American board the percentage game comes into play.
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Originally posted by Shifty
Just more of the arrogance on display you try to mask as intelligence.
:lol
:lol yes I am the arrogant one.
Find somewere else to troll :D
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Originally posted by CFYA
[..]IMO I would spend every dime I had on a missile defense network capable off stopping every last object.[..]
And the new one does that?
And it is worth pursuing, spending money on it, considering it might trigger development of better missiles?
Look, i'm not necessarily against any kind of missile defense, but what is the new system going to change? it's an honest question.
With the publicly available information, i dont see any use at all except for stirring up russian missile development - and it's not like the East/West haven't been able to kill everbody for decades already.
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we have jack and he is watching you right now.
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:noid
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Originally posted by Nilsen
:lol yes I am the arrogant one.
Find somewere else to troll :D
So glad to see you admit it. That's the first step to recovery. :p
As far as telling me to go away, because you don't like what I have to say... That's just more of the same arrogant attitude. At least your aware of the problem though.:aok
Now if you're tired of this game......
1. Maybe you could take the time point out to me in your opinon why an anti missile system is not going to help make Europe safer?
I agree with you, it's not without it's benefits to America. However I fail to see how a way to protect Europe from missile attack can just be brushed off as bad. I fail to see why anyone in this day and age would not jump at a chance to counter this threat.
2. Is it because you feel missiles from the Middle East or Persian Gulf are no threat to Europe now, or in the future?
The western world traditionally fails to take threats from Middle East and the Far East seriously. It always bites us in the butt. New York, London, Munich, Pearl Harbor, Singapore, just to name a few.
3.Or do you just think it will lead to another arms race that will end the world?
That's what everybody said about Reagan's actions in the 80's, it led only to the peaceful end of the Soviet Union.
4.Why is a technology designed to defeat what's universally agreed as the most dangerous weapon mankind has ever produced a bad thing?
I happen to think anti missile technology is da bomb! But that's just me.:D
Now I do agree with you if the people of Europe don't want it, don't put it in there. Maybe not for the same reason as you do, but I agree.
Kid.... ;)
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It will render theater type ballistic missiles (and unoffically ICBMS as well) ineffective unless launched in the numbers. Rogue nations and terroists would be hard pressed to get the numbers needed to overload the system. However a nuclear nation such as Russia has the quantity to bust thru the defenses.
The Russian government knows that this system wont change the status quo with the US. Its simply not designed for the Russian threat. However they would really scream if we had a space based laser. Didnt I read a budget report about that somewhere?
This weapons system is designed to cover large areas including all of Europe. We already have DEW lines in northern Cananda to cover our American butts. (Distant Early Warning) The radar station in Europe is there for the Europeans despite whatevery one would like to think. Personlly I say screw the European nations who dont want it. Let the missiles keep right on going!
Politics period...
CFYA
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Originally posted by Shifty
4.Why is a technology designed to defeat what's universally agreed as the most dangerous weapon mankind has ever produced a bad thing?
It doesn't. It defeats the delivery vehicle. They don't have to be fired by ICBM. In fact, it's the least effecient, most expensive, and most obvious way to do it.
Personally, the "arms race", imho, has never stopped. It's no longer direct competition (my n00k is bigg3r than ur n00k). It's simply ongoing development. USSR makes killer SAMs. We make stealth. We deploy Aegis cruisers. The Chinese deploy advanced anti-shipping missles. North Korea loads up on ballistic missiles. We put a laser on a 747 and roll out THAAD.
It's never going to end. If the world united under one banner right this very moment, we'd still be developing weapons, so when we eventually found aliens, we'd outgun them too.
If Putin is upset and not just using it for a dog & pony show, then he's upset because it impinges on their ability to sell military technology. I get mad too when somebody takes food off my plate.
That's my 2 pennies anyways.
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Originally posted by indy007
It doesn't. It defeats the delivery vehicle. They don't have to be fired by ICBM. In fact, it's the least effecient, most expensive, and most obvious way to do it.
Good point. I know it doesn't destroy the warhead it'self. I understand as well at this point in time a nuke snuck into a country would present more of a threat than say an ICBM from Iran. Once the missile is in flight least effecient or not , you have to try and stop it.
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Well said, Indy
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Originally posted by indy007
If Putin is upset and not just using it for a dog & pony show, then he's upset because it impinges on their ability to sell military technology. I get mad too when somebody takes food off my plate.
Long range early-warning systems in Eastern Europe cover onst of the Westen-Russian airspace, and it really makes us upset.
Such systems are the first targets for nuclear or even conventional attack, and this shouldn't make Czechs and Poles happy.
Moscow ABM point-defense system was built according to 1972 ABM treaty, that was inspired by the US, that were unable to make a complete ABM shield themselves. Spartan, Zeus and other things were probably at the stage we had back in 1960. Recently US withdrew from ABM treaty, and as a result RF is re-arming our ICBMs with MIRVs.
What really worries us is that ABM system can probably deal with a retalliation strike in case someone in the West will return to their ordinary state (off the rocker) and launch the first strike. That's why we now develop hypersonic maneuverable re-entry vehicles that make current (and future) ABMs useless.
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has the mighty russia found money to pay it's army yet? or to buy fuel for it's fighters?
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I wouldn't throw stones that large. We'll be in the same boat ourselves before too long if the greatest contribution John Q is willing to make is a magnetic sticker purchase. ;)
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I get the sobering feeling that the typical Russian mind needs to believe it is consantly at war with someone, or something, in order to function at a basic level.
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Originally posted by Boroda
Long range early-warning systems in Eastern Europe cover onst of the Westen-Russian airspace, and it really makes us upset.
Such systems are the first targets for nuclear or even conventional attack, and this shouldn't make Czechs and Poles happy.
Moscow ABM point-defense system was built according to 1972 ABM treaty, that was inspired by the US, that were unable to make a complete ABM shield themselves. Spartan, Zeus and other things were probably at the stage we had back in 1960. Recently US withdrew from ABM treaty, and as a result RF is re-arming our ICBMs with MIRVs.
What really worries us is that ABM system can probably deal with a retalliation strike in case someone in the West will return to their ordinary state (off the rocker) and launch the first strike. That's why we now develop hypersonic maneuverable re-entry vehicles that make current (and future) ABMs useless.
Pavel,
I'm grabbing this from one my old posts when talking about Boost Phase BMD. Remember I worked for Fred Lamb who was the project lead on the American Physical Society's Boost Phase BMD study.
If you want the answer to the BOOST PHASE BMD question - it is as follows....
Boost-phase intercept systems for defending the United States against ballistic missile attack are being actively considered as a major part of a national missile defense strategy. Spending
on such systems by the U.S. Department of Defense is growing, and there is a prospect of much larger expenditures in the future. Boost-phase intercept weapons would seek to disable attacking missiles during the first few minutes of flight, while the missiles’ boosters are still burning and before they have released nuclear, chemical, or biological munitions.
The technical aspects and feasibility of such weapons are the subject of this report. In spite of the growing interest in boost-phase intercept systems and the increasing resourcesbeing committed to developing them, little quantitative information about their technical
feasibility, required performance, and potential advantages and disadvantages is available to the public. Consequently, the American Physical Society (APS) convened a study group
of physicists and engineers, including individuals with expertise in sensors, missiles, rocket interceptors, guidance and control, high-powered lasers, and missile-defense-related systems,
to assess the technical feasibility of boost-phase intercept systems. The Study Group has based its assessments solely on information found in the open literature about ballistic missiles and missile defense. We have supplemented this information
by our expertise in science and engineering and have confined the assessments reported here to those that can be made with confidence by applying the fundamental principles of rocket propulsion, signal detection and processing, guidance and control, and laser beam propagation. In many instances, as documented throughout this report, we have performed our own analyses to address important issues and to assure ourselves of the validity of our conclusions.
Our main conclusions are the following:
1. Boost-phase defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) hinges on the burn time of the attacking missile and the speed of the defending interceptor rocket. Defense of the entire United States against liquid-propellant ICBMs, such as
those deployed early by the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (China), launched from countries such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and Iran, may be technically feasible using terrestrial (land-, sea-, or air-
based) interceptors. However, the interceptor rockets would have to be substantially faster (and therefore necessarily larger) than those usually proposed in order to reach the ICBMs in time from international waters or neighboring countries willing to host
the interceptors. The system would also require the capability to cope with at least the simplest of countermeasures.
2. Boost-phase defense of the entire United States against solid-propellant ICBMs, which have shorter burn times than liquid-propellant ICBMs, is unlikely to be practical when all factors are considered, no matter where or how interceptors are based.
Even with optimistic assumptions, a terrestrial-based system would require very large interceptors with extremely high speeds and accelerations to defeat a solid-propellant ICBM launched from even a small country such as North Korea. Even such high-
performance interceptors could not defend against solid propellant ICBMs launched from Iran, because they could not be based close enough to disable the missiles before they deployed their munitions.
3. If interceptor rockets were based in space, their coverage would not be constrained by geography, but they would confront the same time constraints and engagement uncertainties as terrestrial-based interceptors. Consequently, their kill vehicles (the final homing stage of the interceptors) would have to be similar in size to those of terrestrial-based interceptors. With the technology we judge could become available within the next 15 years, defending against a single ICBM would require a thousand
or more interceptors for a system having the lowest possible mass and providing realistic decision time. Deploying such a system would require at least a five- to tenfold increase over current U.S. space-launch rates.
4. The Airborne Laser now under development could have some capability against liquid- propellant missiles, but it would be ineffective against solid-propellant ICBMs, which are more heat-resistant.
5. The existing U.S. Navy Aegis system, using an interceptor rocket similar to the Standard Missile 2, should be capable of defending against short- or medium-range missiles launched from ships, barges, or other platforms o U.S. coasts. However,
interceptor rockets would have to be positioned within a few tens of kilometers of the launch location of the attacking missile.
6. A key problem inherent in boost-phase defense is munitions shortfall: although a successful intercept would prevent munitions from reaching their target, it could cause live nuclear, chemical, or biological munitions to fall on populated areas short of the target, in the United States or other countries. Timing intercepts accurately enough to avoid this problem would be dicult.
__________________
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Boost-phase missile defense systems would disable attacking missiles while their rocket motors are burning by hitting them with an interceptor rocket or a laser beam. For ICBMs, this phase of flight typically lasts 3 or 4 minutes. Boost-phase defense has been proposed as a way to avoid the problems faced by midcourse defense systems, which are intended to disable the attacking missile’s warheads after they have been deployed. The midcourse approach is complicated by the need to counter multiple warheads, submunitions (“bomblets”), lightweight decoys, and other countermeasures. The Study Group was asked to evaluate boost-phase intercept systems that would defend
the United States using land-, sea-, air-, or space-based interceptor rockets or an airborne laser now being developed. Space-based laser systems were not included because
the technology needed for such systems would not be ready within the 10- to 15-year period considered. The Study did not consider the feasibility of the communications, command, control, and battle management that would be required. Nor did it consider policy issues, such as the arms control, strategic stability, or foreign policy implications of testing or deploying a boost-phase defense.
Developing and deploying a reliable boost-phase missile defense would be a major undertaking likely to require a decade or more to complete. We therefore considered missiles that might be developed or acquired by North Korea and Iran during the next 10 to 15 years. These countries were the focus of the Study because the U.S. government has expressed concern specifically about them. According to U.S. intelligence estimates, neither of
them currently has a credible ICBM capability but they are projected to develop or acquire ICBMs within the next 10 to 15 years. The Study Group also considered defense against
ICBMs launched from Iraq. With the changed political situation arising from the events of the Spring of 2003, an ICBM threat from Iraq appears unlikely for the foreseeable future.
We have nevertheless retained the analysis of the Iraq threat in the body of our report, to illustrate the requirements for defending against ICBMs from a country that is intermediate
in size between North Korea and Iran. We began by identifying boost-phase intercept systems that could work in principle and
then determined the system performance that would be required to defend the entire United States, the contiguous 48 states, or only the largest U.S. cities. The attacking missiles were assumed to be similar to the first ICBMs developed 30 to 40 years ago by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Both liquid- and solid-propellant missiles were considered, because either type could be developed or acquired within 10 to 15 years.
Key Issues
Hitting the Missile. An important question in boost-phase defense is whether the kill vehicle carried by the interceptor could actually hit a long-range missile, given the inherently unpredictable acceleration that is normal for an ICBM in powered flight and the possibility of programmed trajectory-shaping or evasive maneuvers. Assuming interceptors can reach the missile during its boost phase, we find no fundamental obstacle to homing on the missile accurately enough to hit it. To do so, however, the kill vehicle would have to be very agile and would need to carry enough fuel to continue adjusting to the missile’s acceleration
until the moment of impact. We determined that kill vehicles capable of meeting these requirements would be substantially heavier than those that some have suggested for boostphase
intercept. Our analysis of this agility requirement and its implications for the weight of the interceptor are key new aspects of this study. Time. Time is short for boost-phase defense because ICBMs burn out quickly: in roughly 3 minutes for solid-propellant missiles and 4 minutes for liquid-propellant missiles.
But the time actually available is substantially shorter than the duration of the burn. Even systems with state-of-the-art tracking sensors would require 45 to 65 seconds or longer to
detect the launch of a potentially threatening rocket and determine its direction of flight well enough to fire an interceptor (that is, obtain a firing solution).
Additional time must also be allowed for the decision to fire. We have analyzed the decision times that would be provided by various boost-phase defenses. “Decision time” as used here also includes any additional time required for communication between system elements, estimating the performance characteristics of the attacking missile and its trajectory, resolving uncertainties in the performance of the defense system, and other operational factors.To be successful, the intercept would have to occur before the missile gives its munitions the velocity needed to reach the United States. This velocity could be attained as early as
40 seconds before the missile would normally burn out.
Due to the potentially similar flight profiles of ICBMs and space launchers, in many cases the defense system would not be able to distinguish a peaceful space launch from an
ICBM attack. In these cases, the defense would have to shoot at every rocket, unless it had been established as nonthreatening before it was launched.
Extending the time for intercept beyond the boost phase into the ascent phase (defined here as the period after the missile’s final stage has burned out or its thrust has been terminated but before it has deployed all its munitions and decoys) would not increase the available time significantly. The reason is that once the missile’s thrust has been terminated, it could deploy its munitions and any decoys or countermeasures quickly, possibly in less than a second. With so little time available, interceptors would need to reach high speeds very quickly. Taken together, the short time available for intercept and the size of the kill vehicle needed to hit an unpredictably accelerating ICBM would require large interceptors. In some cases, they would have to be larger and faster than the ICBMs themselves and would have to
accelerate four times more quickly. Such interceptors have never been built and would push the state of the art. Range. The useful range of interceptor rockets is restricted by practical limits on rocket speeds and by the short time available for intercepting the attacking missile. The range of he Airborne Laser is also limited, both by constraints on its power and by the distance ts beam can propagate through the atmosphere and remain focused. Consequently, boostphase defense would be possible using interceptor rockets only if they could be positioned close enough to the required intercept locations, generally within 400 to 1000 kilometers. Defense would be possible using the Airborne Laser only if it could be stationed within 300 to 600 kilometers of the intercept points. The required intercept locations are typically
hundreds of kilometers downrange from the missile launch site, which would further restrict nterceptor basing options.
In general, boost-phase defense using terrestrial (land-, sea-, or air-based) rocket interceptors or the Airborne Laser requires that the missile’s flight path during its boost phase be accessible from international waters or from neighboring countries willing to host U.S. interceptors. The feasibility of boost-phase defense therefore depends not only on the performance of the attacking missile and the speed of the interceptor, but also on the size
of the country that launches the missile, the direction of the missile’s flight, and the local physical and political geography.
Shortfall.
If a missile were hit during its boost phase by an interceptor, it wouldprobably lose thrust quickly, but the missile (perhaps in fragments) and its munitions would not fall straight down. Instead they would continue on ballistic trajectories, falling to Earth short of their target but possibly on populated areas. Thus, unless the missile’s munitions were disabled by the collision—which cannot be assumed because they are loosely coupled to
the missile and hardened to withstand re-entry at hypersonic speeds—a successful intercept could cause live munitions to fall on populated areas. These areas would not be in the
attacking country but might well be in countries friendly to the United States or in the United States itself.
This problem is inherent in boost-phase intercept. Our analysis indicates that it would be extremely dicult to time intercepts to avoid causing live munitions or debris to hit populated areas. This problem would be eliminated if the interceptor could reliably destroy the missile’s munitions, but doing so would be much more dicult than simply disabling the missile’s booster rocket.
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Space-Based Interceptor Requirements.
Boost-phase interceptors fired from orbiting
satellites could in principle defend the United States against ICBMs launched from anywhere on Earth. While their coverage would not be constrained by geography, spacebased interceptors would have the same time constraints and engagement uncertainties as terrestrial-based interceptors. As a result, their kill vehicles would have to be at least as massive as the kill vehicles of terrestrial-based interceptors. Because a satellite orbiting at ow altitude spends so little time over a single spot on Earth, many interceptor-carrying satellites would be needed to defend against even a single missile. The precise number of
satellites and the total mass that would have to be placed into orbit would depend on the type of ICBM as well as the speeds, accelerations, and masses of the interceptors and their
kill vehicles, which would in turn depend on the technology available. Based on the technology that could, in our judgment, be developed within the next 10 to 15 years, we find that a thousand or more interceptors would be needed for a system having the lowest possible mass and providing a realistic decision time. Even so, the total mass that would have to be orbited would require at least a five- to tenfold increase over current U.S. space-launch rates, making such a system impractical
The Airborne Laser’s Performance.
A laser weapon now in development has also
been proposed for boost-phase defense. The Airborne Laser is being developed to disable short- or medium-range ballistic missiles by illuminating them with a powerful laser beam from distances of several hundred kilometers, heating them suciently to cause the structure of the missiles to fail. In principle, this weapon could also disable long-range missiles during their boost phase. Because the laser beam could reach an ICBM within a fraction of a second, its speed is not an issue. However, the range of the Airborne Laser is limited by the distance its beam can propagate through the atmosphere and remain focused. Assuming that it works as planned, its useful range would be about 600 kilometers against a typical liquid-propellant ICBM. This range would be sucient to defend the United States against such ICBMs launched from North Korea but insucient to defend against such missiles launched from Iran, unless the laser could be stationed over the Caspian Sea or Turkmenistan. Because solid-propellant ICBMs are more heat-resistant, the Airborne
Laser’s ground range against them would be only about 300 kilometers, too short to defend against solid-propellant ICBMs from either Iran or North Korea.
Countermeasures.
While boost-phase intercept would not be susceptible to some of the countermeasures to midcourse intercept that have been proposed, there is no reason to think it would not face any countermeasures. E ective countermeasures to boost-phase
intercept by interceptor rockets could include launching several ICBMs at nearly the same time or deploying rocket-propelled decoys and jammers. Furthermore, ICBMs could be programmed to fly evasive maneuvers that might overwhelm the agility and guidance and control capabilities of the interceptor or exhaust its propellant. Shortening the boost phase would also be an e ective countermeasure: it would be practically impossible for any interceptor rocket to reach an ICBM with a boost phase of 2 minutes or less, even if it were launched from a very small country. Countermeasures against the Airborne Laser could
include applying ablative coatings or rotating the ICBM to reduce the amount of heat the missile absorbs, launching multiple missiles to overwhelm the Airborne Laser’s capabilities, or attacking the aircraft carrying the laser.
Defending the United States
We considered the e ectiveness of boost-phase intercept for defending the United States against ICBMs from the two specific countries of concern, North Korea and Iran. The results summarized here for these countries are based on a series of optimistic assumptions. In particular, we have made optimistic assumptions about the missile detection and tracking
capabilities available to the defense. Also, we have not fully taken into account the many uncertainties likely to be present in any real engagement, such as uncertainties about the performance of the attacking missile and its trajectory, ignorance of the missile’s target, and the unpredictable natural variations in any missile’s flight. Nor have we accounted for possible operational delays in processing and transmitting information. All of these factors would make boost-phase intercept more dicult.
We found that terrestrial-based interceptors that burn out in 40 to 50 seconds and reach speeds of at least 6.5 to 10 km/s would generally be required to defend against ICBMs launched from North Korea or Iran. As noted above, such interceptors would have to be substantially larger and capable of higher performance than any that have yet been built or deployed. In a few situations, a 5-km/s interceptor would work against slow-burning liquid-propellant ICBMs. The time available would be significantly greater for very slowly burning liquid-propellant ICBMs having burn times of 5 minutes or longer, but a defense
that would work only against missiles as slow as the slowest-burning missiles ever built would risk being ine ective. North Korea. Defense of all 50 states against typical liquid-propellant ICBMs launched from North Korea would require interceptors with speeds of 6.5 km/s (almost as fast as ICBMs) based in Russia or the Sea of Japan and fired within about 40 seconds of obtaining
a firing solution. The intercept locations for most ICBM trajectories from North Korea would be over China, hundreds of kilometers inside its border. Such interceptors would have ranges as long as ICBMs. Consequently, firing them toward China to intercept a
North Korean missile could be mistaken for an attack on China, Russia, or other countries.
The Airborne Laser might provide an alternative defense against liquid-propellant ICBMs. To defend against typical solid-propellant ICBMs and provide more than a few seconds of decision time would require interceptors that could reach speeds of about 10 km/s, 50 percent faster than a typical ICBM, in one-quarter of the time it would take an ICBM to reach its maximum speed. The interceptors would have to be based in Russia or the Sea of Japan and fired within 30 to 40 seconds after a firing solution was obtained. Such interceptors could be mistaken for o ensive weapons. Iran. To defend the entire United States against liquid-propellant ICBMs launched
from Iran using interceptors based in conventional locations would require basing 10-km/s interceptors in the Persian Gulf, and even this deployment would provide only about 15 seconds
of decision time. More decision time would be possible only if interceptors could be based in unconventional locations, such as Turkmenistan or the land-locked Caspian Sea. A system with 6.5-km/s interceptors based in either of these locations could provide a decision time of about 30 seconds.
Defense of the entire United States against solid-propellant ICBMs launched from Iran appears impractical; even a system with 10-km/s interceptors based both in the Caspian
Sea and in Turkmenistan or Afghanistan would provide less than 10 seconds of decision time, which is unlikely to be adequate for an operational system.
Defending Only a Portion of the United States.
We also considered the feasibility of defending only the contiguous 48 states or only the largest U.S. cities against ICBMs
launched from North Korea or Iran. In most cases, this would be no easier than defending all 50 states. If, however, a boost-phase defense were not solely responsible for intercepting
all missiles from these countries, the required system performance would be less demanding. Interceptors could hit liquid- or solid-propellant missiles launched from these countries
toward some U.S. targets. Such a system could provide a partial defense; for instance, for one U.S. coast but not the other. Coupled with an e ective midcourse system, a partially
e ective boost-phase defense could improve protection of some targets by hitting missiles before they deploy decoys that could overwhelm the midcourse layer. This possibility, however, depends on the midcourse system’s being able to handle the unpredictable debris generated by a boost-phase intercept while engaging the warheads, which most likely would
survive the intercept. Such a capability would be dicult to achieve.
Defending Against Short- or Medium-Range Missiles Launched from O shore.
Missiles that could be used for a sea-based attack probably are already available to nations of
concern to the United States. The Aegis radar system is adequate for tracking such missiles provided it is within a few tens of kilometers of the missile launch location, and a missile similar to the Navy’s Standard Missile 2 is adequate for such an engagement withoutsignificant modification.
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NOW FOR THE FINDINGS.....
The Study Group analyzed boost-phase defense against liquid-propellant ICBMs, which the United States may face initially, and against solid-propellant ICBMs, which the nation
may face later. The basic parameters of systems that could counter these threats in a variety of geographical situations were identified. In the course of analyzing these systems,
the Study Group identified many significant limitations to boost-phase intercept, especially when confronting solid-propellant ICBMs. However, it made no judgment as to whether any or all of these limitations would rule out deployment of such systems on operational, political, or economic grounds. The analysis in the main body of this report supports the following findings. A number (or letter) in parentheses indicates the relevant chapter (or appendix), section, or subsection of the supporting material.
1. Intercepting missiles during their boost phase presents major challenges not faced
by midcourse-intercept systems.
• Midcourse systems have 20 to 25 minutes to observe and intercept threatening
warheads (A.2); boost-phase intercept systems could have 4 minutes or less to
detect, track, and intercept potentially threatening missiles (4.4, 5.4–5.6, 10.4, 15).
• In midcourse flight, the trajectory of a warhead is ballistic and highly predictable
(B); in powered flight, the trajectory of a missile is inherently unpredictable. This
unpredictability results from uncertainty about the intended target, the e ects of the
missile’s maneuvers to manage its energy, shape its trajectory, or evade intercept,
and its unpredictable thrust variations (4, 12.4, 15.2).
2. The e ective ranges of boost-phase hit-to-kill interceptors, whether land-, sea-, air-, or space-based, are limited by the short duration of ICBM boost phases and practical limits on interceptor fly-out velocities. The range of the Airborne Laser is limited
primarily by the distance its beam can propagate through the atmosphere while remaining focused, and to a lesser extent on its power. These limitations have the following consequences:
• In a hit-to-kill boost-phase defense, the time remaining after an interceptor is fired is so short—less than 170 seconds for a liquid-propellant threat missile and less than 120 seconds for a solid-propellant threat missile—that the defense could fire only once, either a single interceptor or a salvo of interceptors fired virtually simultaneously. There would be no opportunity to recover from a misfire or failure of an
intercept attempt (5.4–5.6).
• Boost-phase defense with interceptor rockets would be possible only if the rockets could be positioned close to the intended intercept point. The intercept point is
xxxiii
xxxiv Findings typically 400 to 500 kilometers from the missile launch point. The interceptors typically must travel at least 500 kilometers from the interceptor base to reach the intercept point (5.4–5.6).
• Terrestrial-based boost-phase defense—both by interceptors and airborne lasers— also depends on the size of the country that launches the missile, the direction of the missile’s flight, and access to areas adjacent to that country, determined by local
physical and political geography (5).
• Boost-phase defense using terrestrial-based interceptors could not defend the United
States against accidental or unauthorized launches of ICBMs from the interiors of
large countries such as Russia or China (5).
3. The large and unpredictable variations of ICBM boost-phase trajectories and the short time available for engaging them drive the requirements for any boost-phase kinetic kill interceptor.
Factors contributing to uncertainties in the intercept point include:
• Random and systematic errors in the defense detection and tracking system’s measurement
of position and velocity and estimate of acceleration of the attacking
missile (10.1.4, 12.3.1).
• Lack of knowledge of the missile’s target (15.2).
• Normal or induced thrust-time variations of the threat booster (15.2).
• Intentional trajectory shaping, including lofting or depressing the trajectory and
maneuvering to manage energy (15.2).
• Intentional evasive maneuvers, such as dog-legs or other maneuvers (12.4).
• Lack of knowledge of the potential type or characteristics of the threat (3.3).
• Uncertainties in the method and times at which the missiles’ warheads or submunitions
would be deployed (15.2, A.2.2).
These uncertainties reduce the time available for the engagement and require kill-vehicle maneuver velocity and acceleration substantially greater than is generally recognized. These e ects are discussed in Chapters 5 and 12.
4. The only way a boost-phase defense can assure that lethal warheads will not strike a defended area is to disable the attacking missile before the earliest time it can
achieve the velocity needed to carry its munitions to that area, because the defense does not know the particular target. This time is uncertain because the missile may fly various trajectories and execute a variety of maneuvers to manage its energy or
evade the defense (4.1, 5.1.3, 5.2.1, A.2).
5. A robust boost-phase defense against ICBMs would require modern space-basedsensors to detect launches and provide initial tracking information needed to launch
interceptors. Even so, it would take at least 45 to 65 seconds to detect the launch of an ICBM and establish a track of its trajectory accurate enough to launch an inter-ceptor. Such sensors would also be needed to provide continually updated tracking information to the interceptors as they fly to the target. A system such as the high-altitude Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS-High) now under development
Findings xxxv could perform these functions if the boost-phase defense requirement is included in
its design (10.4).
• While radars with sucient sensitivity exist, geographic constraints and horizon limitations would require a modern space-based missile warning and tracking system, such as the planned SBIRS-High system, for the earliest detection and initial
tracking (10.4). The existing Defense Support Program (DSP) system could provide aunch detection and initial tracking, but it would take 30 seconds longer to obtain a firing solution than a system such as SBIRS-High (10.4). Consequently DSP would be useful only against slow missiles, and only if the fastest interceptors were used (5.9.2).
• Additional time margin would be required to allow for the decision to fire and any other intentional or system delays. We use the term “decision time” to encompass any time required beyond the zero decision time case (5.1.3).
6. While boost-phase defense against slow-burning liquid-propellant ICBMs not em-ploying countermeasures appears technically feasible for some geographic scenarios,
the much shorter burn times typical of solid-propellant ICBMs using even 40-year-old technology call into question the fundamental feasibility of any boost-phase inter-
cept of such threats at useful ranges—no matter where or how the interceptors are based—even with the most optimistic assumptions about detection and track times
(5.3, 6.11, 8.6).
• While liquid-propellant ICBMs typically have powered flight times of 4 minutes or more, solid-propellant missiles typically have three boost stages that burn a total
of 3 minutes or less (3.4). This di erence is crucial.
• No matter where or how they are based, interceptors would typically have to travel
500 kilometers or more, requiring prohibitively high flyout velocities (in excess of orbital velocity) and very high accelerations to reach solid-propellant missiles before they have achieved the velocity required to deliver their payloads to the United States (5.3–5.6).
• By comparison, against liquid-propellant ICBMs, small two-stage terrestrial-based interceptors having modest burnout velocities of only about 5 km/s, such as the largest-sized interceptor that could meet the constraints of the Aegis cruiser vertical
launchers or deployment by bombers, could marginally engage threats at about 500 kilometers (5.3). Interceptors having velocities similar to those of ICBMs would provide greater decision time and range for this case but still could not engage
solid-propellant ICBMs.
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7. According to U.S. intelligence estimates, North Korea and Iran could develop or acquire solid-propellant ICBMs within the next 10 to 15 years (3.3). Boost-phase defenses not able to defend against solid-propellant ICBMs risk being obsolete when
deployed.
8. The time constraints imposed on any boost-phase defense system by the short du- ration of ICBM boost phases would pose significant real-time decision issues.
• In most situations, interceptors would have to be fired within a few seconds after confirmation of the launch of a large rocket to intercept it in time to defend the
xxxvi Findings United States (5.3). The decision to fire interceptors would have to be almost automatic (5.3–5.6).
• Because of the potentially similar flight profiles of ICBMs and space launchers, in many cases the defense system would have diculty distinguishing a space launch from an ICBM attack. In these cases, the defense would have to shoot at every
rocket, unless it had been identified as non-threatening before it was launched (10.4).
9. Despite the variations and uncertainties inherent in the boost-phase trajectories of ICBMs, our analysis indicates that a kill vehicle incorporating current sensor and
guidance technology could home on ICBMs in powered flight with a precision com-patible with direct hit-to-kill requirements, assuming the kill vehicle’s booster could place it on a trajectory that would take it within homing range of the ICBM. The
kill vehicle would also have to meet certain critical performance requirements. Critical kill-vehicle performance requirements include:
• Capacity to shift from guiding on the rocket’s exhaust plume to guiding on the rocket body. The Study Group believes this requirement in particular requires
more investigation (10.4).
• Ability to acquire and track the rocket body within the plume at ranges of at least 200 kilometers and with sucient precision, using sensors on board the kill vehicle
(12.3).
• Sucient kill-vehicle acceleration (7–8 g initially and 15 g in the end game), velocity for maneuvering (2 km/s for terrestrial-based and 2.5 km/s for space-based kill vehicles), and guidance system response (0.1 second or less) (12.5).
These requirements would result in kill vehicles with masses substantially greater than is generally appreciated. In our judgment, kill vehicles using technology that would
be available in the next few years would have masses on the order of 90 kilograms to 140 kilograms: 90 kilograms for the total divert velocities of 2 km/s that would be required for most ground- and air-based interceptors and roughly 140 kilograms for 2.5-
km/s divert velocities that would be appropriate for space-based interceptors and the fastest ground-based interceptors (14.4).
10. Although a successful intercept would prevent munitions from reaching their target, live nuclear, chemical, or biological munitions could fall on populated areas short of the target, in the United States or other countries. This problem of shortfall is
inherent in boost-phase missile defense.
• Warheads and submunitions are loosely coupled to the final stage of the ICBM and cannot be assumed to be destroyed by an intercept that destroys or disables the ICBM booster, as borne out by numerous destruct events during flight tests (13.1).
• After an intercept, the munitions and debris will continue on a ballistic trajectory,
albeit one that is shorter than intended by the attacker (5.8).
• The warheads or munitions and debris of an intercepted missile will not fall on the country that launched it (5.8).
• Preventing warheads or submunitions and debris of intercepted missiles from hitting the territory of U.S. friends and allies would sometimes require the defense to intercept
missiles within a time window as small as 5 to 10 seconds, greatly complicating
the already daunting intercept management problem (5.8.1).
• Given the unpredictable variations in trajectories and thrust that characterize ICBMs in powered flight, it is not clear that the intercept can be timed to occur
within the narrow window required (5.8.2). The problem of controlling shortfall could be avoided if the boost-phase defense system could destroy the missile’s warheads or submunitions during boost, rather than simply disabling the booster. This is a much more dicult task, and it has not been established
that it can be accomplished (13).
11. Airborne interceptors o er some unique advantages for boost-phase defense, but they also have significant limitations in defending against ICBMs. They could be de-
ployed more quickly than land- or sea-based interceptors in response to new threats, but several backup aircraft equipped with interceptors, as well as refueling aircraft and defensive air cover, would be required for every airborne-interceptor aircraft on
station (16.5.3).
• An interceptor of any given size has a slightly greater range if launched from a highaltitude platform, because it uses less energy to overcome gravity and aerodynamic drag as it flies out toward its target. However, the constraints on the size and weight of missiles that an aircraft can carry limit the flyout velocity of high-acceleration airborne interceptors to about 5 km/s (16.5.3).
• Because of their limited flyout velocity, airborne interceptors could engage ICBMs only in situations comparable to the situations in which a 5 km/s surface-based interceptor could engage them. Consequently, using airborne interceptors to defend the United States against long-burning liquid-propellant ICBMs would be possible only if the required intercept locations are within about 500 kilometers of the nterceptor-carrying aircraft (5.3.2, 5.5.1).
Concluding remarks
In assessing the feasibility of boost-phase missile defense using hit-to-kill interceptors or the ABL, we attempted to make optimistic assumptions to bound the performance of such
systems. In some cases we made assumptions that appear technically possible but may not be realistic on other grounds. An important example is the assumption in some of our analyses that interceptors could be fired as soon as a target track has been constructed, without allowing additional time for decision or assessment. In other cases we simply examined the performance that would be required to make the system workable, without
making any judgment about whether such components could realistically be deployed. An example of this kind is our consideration of an interceptor having a flyout velocity 40 percent
higher than an ICBM’s velocity. We emphasize that the choices made in this study were used to obtain upper bounds on performance; their use does not imply that the Study Group endorses these choices as realistic in all cases. Given the results that follow from our assumptions, we conclude that while the boost phase technologies we studied are potentially capable of defending the United States against iquid-propellant ICBMs at certain ranges of interest, at least in the absence of countermeasures, when all factors are considered none of the boost-phase defense concepts studied would be viable for the foreseeable future to defend the nation against even first-generation solid-propellant ICBMs (5, 6.11, 8.6).
FOR THE FULL REPORT GOTO
http://www.aps.org/public_affairs/p...ports/nmd03.cfm
Boost Phase Defense Timeline - PROBLEMS with it.
http://www.aps.org/media/pressreleases/nmdfig2-2.pdf
Potential Impact Sites
http://www.aps.org/media/pressreleases/nmdfig5-3.pdf
Interceptor Basing areas:
http://www.aps.org/media/pressreleases/nmdfig5-10.pdf
Hypothetical Interceptor Models - LOOK AT IT
http://www.aps.org/media/pressreleases/nmdfig16-9.pdf
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Originally posted by VOR
I wouldn't throw stones that large. We'll be in the same boat ourselves before too long if the greatest contribution John Q is willing to make is a magnetic sticker purchase. ;)
That's a pretty large stone in it'self. I see a lot of people poke fun at the sticker people. This is just my observation, and yes it is with some predjudice I'll warn you up front.
When my son was wounded in February, I made this observation.
The total strangers that would come to the hospital to visit him, had those stickers on their cars.
The people that brought him gifts had those stickers on their cars.
The little old ladies that brought hand made quilts , yes many of them had those stickers on their cars.
If you go to DFW to pick up a person coming back from the war in Iraq, or Afghanistan, the perfect strangers standing there greeting them with gifts, and thank yous will have those stickers on their cars.
People who have come to my house over the years to get address where they could send my sons care packages when they were deployed had those stickers on their cars.
I'm kind of fond of those people, at least they're doing something besides watching American Idol and shop.
:)
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OFMG How many times do I have to tell you Russians(and some Europeans)? Read carefully...
The stations in Europe are not meant to help with protecting the continental US. The DEW(Distant Early Warning) line up in Canada has this responsiblity. Also US has launch detection coverage over the entire globe. Either of these 2 assets provide the US with all the early warning we need!! This defense system in EU is for EU and no one else!!!!How much simpler can I explain this?????????:furious
Some the most ignorant people are present in this thread. I have never seen blind stupidity and hatred so prevailant before. Russia will not be happy until they fire there nukes in anger......period.
Good Day!!!
CFYA
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One thing I saw NO mention of is a spaced based laser.
A fleet similar in size to the gps system could handle a liquid or solid ICBM threat.
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Originally posted by Yeager
I get the sobering feeling that the typical Russian mind needs to believe it is consantly at war with someone, or something, in order to function at a basic level.
My Mother, born in 1945, belongs to a first generation that didn't see wars so far. Usually we get invaded 2 times every century, and last 4 times that you probably can remember - it was from the West. We got some reasons to be paranoid.
We can't afford using 50% of budget on defense now, but we still have Strategic Missile Corps and changed our doctrine accordingly :( Having Russia poor means that you have to prepare for a pre-emptive strike :(
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Originally posted by CFYA
The stations in Europe are not meant to help with protecting the continental US. The DEW(Distant Early Warning) line up in Canada has this responsiblity. Also US has launch detection coverage over the entire globe. Either of these 2 assets provide the US with all the early warning we need!! This defense system in EU is for EU and no one else!!!!How much simpler can I explain this?????????:furious:
Tell me why did the US object when USSR was rumoured to build an early warning radar deep inside it's own land back in mid 80-s?
AFAIK USSR was the first to make a global "Missile Attack Warning System" (SPRN, Sistema preduprezhdeniya o raketnom napadenii) back in 70s-80s. We can still detect a single submarine missile launch globally. Can YOU?
You build your missile-warning systems in EU and thus make them legitimate targets. So it goes. In some certain cases of global confrontation they'll be knoched out to simply raise stakes bluffing. Minimax.
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Originally posted by Boroda
Usually we get invaded 2 times every century, and last 4 times that you probably can remember - it was from the West. We got some reasons to be paranoid.
I hope your not talking about WW2. You guys started out WITH Hitler by invading Poland.
Don't believe me? Look up the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Only reason you might say that you were invaded was because Hitler did it BEFORE Stalin could.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molotov-Ribbentrop_Pact
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That may be true Tango, but Germany did nevertheless invade Russia in 1941.
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Originally posted by Viking
That may be true Tango, but Germany did nevertheless invade Russia in 1941.
As can be said of most countries, mine included, if you lie down with dogs, you often get up with fleas.
Funny thing is, Stalin came out on top. He made a pact with Hitler, and Hitler screwed him. So Stalin made a pact with Churchill and FDR, to get revenge on Hitler, and then Stalin screwed Churchill and FDR. And in the end, he ended up with most of what he wanted when he joined Hitler, and probably more. And he sure as Hell didn't give a damn about the millions of Russians who died getting it for him.
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Originally posted by Viking
That may be true Tango, but Germany did nevertheless invade Russia in 1941.
As I said, Hitler invaded Russia before Stalin could invade Germany.
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Originally posted by Captain Virgil Hilts
As can be said of most countries, mine included, if you lie down with dogs, you often get up with fleas.
Funny thing is, Stalin came out on top. He made a pact with Hitler, and Hitler screwed him. So Stalin made a pact with Churchill and FDR, to get revenge on Hitler, and then Stalin screwed Churchill and FDR. And in the end, he ended up with most of what he wanted when he joined Hitler, and probably more. And he sure as Hell didn't give a damn about the millions of Russians who died getting it for him.
Go read some books on USSR/France/UK negotiations in Moscow in Aug 1939.
Funny to hear such accusations from a country that openly traded with nazis until the very end. I know, business is business. Private enterprising my ass.
I am sick of discussing this with illiterates who can't read a single book by a British author that I recommend, maybe it's banned in so-called "free world"?
Edit: Hary Truman said in 1940 that US should join the European war only to exaust both parties. In 1939 "allies" totally screwed up negotiations so JVS had to sign a pact that offered peace. Do you seriously think that he had to send Soviet soldiers to die for the guaranties given to Poland by France and UK when they openly stated that they can't deploy a handful of troop against Hitler in first 6 months?!
You guys always switch to Stalin/Hitler when you lose a discussion, don't you?
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Funny to hear such accusations from a country that openly traded with nazis until the very end. I know, business is business. Private enterprising my ass.
After Hitler declared war on the US there were some companies that still tried to do buisiness with Nazi Germany, but that was stopped. Before war was declared, US companies could trade with who they chose to. I don't think most Americans considered Nazi Germany a threat to the US. Most Americans viewed the war that had started in Europe as just another European problem.
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Originally posted by Boroda
Funny to hear such accusations from a country that openly traded with nazis until the very end. I know, business is business. Private enterprising my ass.
Its called a "FREE COUNTRY". The government doesn't have total control over companies, unlike Russia.
Theres good and bad with being a free country. Perhaps your country should try it some time instead of having ALL bad.
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Originally posted by Tango
Its called a "FREE COUNTRY". The government doesn't have total control over companies, unlike Russia.
Theres good and bad with being a free country. Perhaps your country should try it some time instead of having ALL bad.
LOL companies have total control over govt? :D We are moving fast towards this version now :(
Catch-22 with an episode when US B-25s bomb their own airfield. True freedom.
Opel was owned by GM since mid-30s IIRC.
US bomber crews had maps with some areas marked as "no bomb drop under any conditions", because American capital was invested there.
I know how your companies bypass govt embargos, we had three Convex supercomputers in our Institute since late-80s. Marx said that a capitalist will sell his mother into slavery for 300% of profit. Finally it's only a sacred Private Enterprising...
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Borada.........you are the best....russia is the best......your comrades are the best......you are the best......your missiles are the best.....your submarines are the best.....your satelites are the best....you are the best.....there you go.
Having said that I will eat my capitalist pizza, in my capitalist house, in a capitalist town, with capitalist food, and wonderful capitalist vehicles.
If you represent most russians I deeply regret being alive at a time like this. Its no wonder we havent been in a nuclear war.
Quote...Tell me why did the US object when USSR was rumoured to build an early warning radar deep inside it's own land back in mid 80-s?
Only the russians are stupid enough to build an early warning radar deep inside there own country. The fact of the matter is to be effective the radar would be placed at the border if not beyond. This is done to give the maximum amount of warning possible. Radar is still line of sight. At least until someone defys physics and bends radar. It cannot see over the horizon. I highly doubt the objection ever occured (prove me wrong). In order to be useful its very exsistence would have been kept secret. You need to attend a school not swayed by russian propoganda.
The fact of the matter is you also have not disputed hardly any of my claims on other subjects which leads me to belive your knowledge of US weapons is far from complete. Half your post have made no sense and the other half have been utter garbage. I challenge you to prove me wrong in anything I have writen. This is to be done with proof....your word has no merit in my mind.
Good day
CFYA
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And yes we have been able to detect a global missile launches for many decades.
As far as your submarines.....if the captain farted we would know before his comrades had the chance to smell it. Most of your boats are notoriusly easy to find and identify. Would it matter if I told you we could identify a submarine by listening to the frequencies output the power plant and prop noise. Every sub has a individual noise that makes it stand out.
CFYA
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Originally posted by CFYA
Only the russians are stupid enough to build an early warning radar deep inside there own country. The fact of the matter is to be effective the radar would be placed at the border if not beyond. This is done to give the maximum amount of warning possible. Radar is still line of sight. At least until someone defys physics and bends radar. It cannot see over the horizon. I highly doubt the objection ever occured (prove me wrong). In order to be useful its very exsistence would have been kept secret. You need to attend a school not swayed by russian propoganda.
LOL. I should quote on Russian forums, you, your'e awesome! EW radar station, a huge phase array like in Olenegorsk (and I saw that one myself, it's titanic) was rumoured to be built near Krasnoyarsk. Now check with the globe and try to imagine the distance with main population and industrial centers. I think it was Toad who screamed here that we couldn't violate the treaty the US withdrew from 15 years later :D
Originally posted by CFYA
The fact of the matter is you also have not disputed hardly any of my claims on other subjects which leads me to belive your knowledge of US weapons is far from complete. Half your post have made no sense and the other half have been utter garbage. I challenge you to prove me wrong in anything I have writen. This is to be done with proof....your word has no merit in my mind.
Thank you for your compliments to Russia/USSR above, I can only say the same thing about you. And I'd prefer my own socialist glass of caedar-nut vodka with herring and hot potatoes or some caviar-bread-and-butter :D
Originally posted by CFYA
Good day
CFYA
You definetly need some more geography lessons. It's late night here. Have a nice day youself :D
Homework: try to understand why we needed an EW radar in Krasnoyarsk, look at economical map of the USSR, possible ICBM trajectories, middle-range missile ranges, their deployment locations in mid-80s, and watch Dr. Strangelove - there is a good picture from which directions of inbound B-52s. Also ask Toad about where he "plotted ingress routes" in late-70s. Ah, sorry. also check ICBM elevations and how far they can be seen over horizon.
Try Googling for "krasnoyarsk early warning radar". Look at a beautiful propaganda masterpiece I found: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1282/is_n16_v40/ai_6563414 I love people excavating such bull**** and revealing it for public access 20 years later :)
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Originally posted by CFYA
And yes we have been able to detect a global missile launches for many decades.
As far as your submarines.....if the captain farted we would know before his comrades had the chance to smell it. Most of your boats are notoriusly easy to find and identify. Would it matter if I told you we could identify a submarine by listening to the frequencies output the power plant and prop noise. Every sub has a individual noise that makes it stand out.
CFYA
LOL how many US subs are now bravely floating in White Sea? :D
You are more and more funny with each post ;)
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Originally posted by CFYA
Only the russians are stupid enough to build an early warning radar deep inside there own country. The fact of the matter is to be effective the radar would be placed at the border if not beyond. This is done to give the maximum amount of warning possible. Radar is still line of sight. At least until someone defys physics and bends radar. It cannot see over the horizon.
CFYA
Mua-ha-ha!
No, only American are stupid enough to build an early warning radar and intercept missiles against North Korea and Iran threat not near the borders of that countries (somewhere in Japan, South Korea, Iraq, Israel) but near Russian borders!
You've just confirmed Putin's words - that system in Europe is not against North Korea or Iran. It's against Russia.
You are clever guy. Although. only complete idiot can't see the obvious facts.
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Originally posted by Boroda
LOL how many US subs are now bravely floating in White Sea? :D
You are more and more funny with each post ;)
And how many Russian subs are sitting in Russian harbors, rusting, and leaking radiation? Not that they didn't rust and leak radiation when they were actually operational.
No one is funnier, or more deluded, than you Boroda.
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If I posted FACTS would you even change one thought in that mind of yours?
If you listen I can explain why this system has no bearing on Russia's capabilities to target the US. I will explain it in depth once again IF you can at least approach it with an open mind.
How bout it?
CFYA
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the problem lies in, this toy can also be used for an attack, period.
who would like such a thing close to his backyard ? anyone?
...and dont start a talk about a peacefull nation...just look at
the globe and whats really going on today.
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This particular TOY cannot be used in a attack role. The missile doesnt even have a warhead for christ sake.:noid
I highly doubt it could manuever well enough to impact a fighter undergoing high g manuevers. Since there are no explosives on board it would have to be a direct hit.....the probality of that happening are slim and none. And forget ground targets because the thing would hardly scratch the soil.
Ignorance is bliss and some people will excersize that right to the fullest extent possible.
CFYA
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Originally posted by CFYA
If I posted FACTS would you even change one thought in that mind of yours?
If you listen I can explain why this system has no bearing on Russia's capabilities to target the US. I will explain it in depth once again IF you can at least approach it with an open mind.
How bout it?
CFYA
As you can see I listened you, and even reply. Moreover, I provided some facts, but you didn't want to approach them with an open mind. You even didn't try to read them, or reply to them.
Facts:
1. According to you EW system isn't effective being far from point of launch. Is it fact or not? Do you confirm your words.
2. According to you (older posts) russian missiles will fly North (yes, you were correct, it will be N-NE not NE-E as I said), so ther is no sence to use defence missiles in Europe against Russian ICBMs
3. According to you this system covers Europe, not USA against North Korea and Iran missiles
It's youf statments, isn't it?
My statements (I said them already):
1. It would be much better to defence Europe (and USA, BTW) against North Korea and Iran threats near their boards, not ours. It would be much more effective and less costly for the USA (Japan and Iraq are already yours)
2. Nobody is talking about missiles in Poland. 10 missiles - it's nothing. We are talking about radar. As you've said the most efficient EW radar is that which is near the border. You are right.
3. This radar will be one the first target for our nuke missiles. And it's right, because it's real threat for Russian security.
How's about it?
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you missunderstud me, no need to change this toys, they dont need a warhead,
and still they can be used in a tactical attack to destroy enemy missiles...
am i wrong?
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Originally posted by CFYA
If I posted FACTS would you even change one thought in that mind of yours?
So far you mostly post opinions. and, believe me, not the clever ones.
Originally posted by CFYA
If you listen I can explain why this system has no bearing on Russia's capabilities to target the US. I will explain it in depth once again IF you can at least approach it with an open mind.
How bout it?
You can try, but on a level you showed above - I am afraid it will be another joke for quoting on Russian forums :(
We will be always against NATO/US (enemy) activities near our borders. We withdrew from Eastern Europe, refrained from arms race - and you keep pressing on us, immediately forgetting about all promises you made, like NATO non-spreading eastwards.
Now you speak about Russian "energy weapons", "gas blackmail" etc, forgetting that it was you who taught us "capitalism". So your side runs a PR campaign explaining how barbaric and undemocratic we are, trying to make Russian monopolies give you oil and gas cheaper (or just for free). OTOH we have elections soon, so Putin's useless threats and rhethorics are aimed at looking "patriotic" (fooling the public opinion) and at the same time protecting profits of parasitic Russian financial groups. It's the political and economical side.
Military side is that it leads to re-deployment of mid-range ballistic missiles that render US "ABM system" even more useless then it is supposed to be, at the same time giving Russian side no time to launch a retaliation strike before the button is pressed by justifying enemy mid-range missiles deployment in Europe again. It all leads to less stability, I hope you understand it. It will be like 10min instead of 40min between launch and first blasts over my house in Moscow. And if "blue" side will have 50% probability that there will be no retaliation launch - your leaders will press the button immediately. Both sides will. So it goes.
I sometimes use "blue" and "red" side because on US military maps "red" arrows mean hostile, and on Russian maps hostile arrows are "blue".
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Originally posted by CFYA
This particular TOY cannot be used in a attack role. The missile doesnt even have a warhead for christ sake.:noid
I highly doubt it could manuever well enough to impact a fighter undergoing high g manuevers. Since there are no explosives on board it would have to be a direct hit.....the probality of that happening are slim and none. And forget ground targets because the thing would hardly scratch the soil.
Ignorance is bliss and some people will excersize that right to the fullest extent possible.
CFYA
Missiles with no warheads are called fireworks. Most of conventional mid-range and long-range SAMs can be fitted with "special payload".
USSR could knock incoming ICBM warheads with conventional warheads since 1975, but according to what Wolfala found on the Net they still use megaton charges in Moscow point-defense.
Above I explained how ABM system can ruin the balance.
OK, nice to talk, but I have to go to bed - will have to get up for work in less then 5 hours. :(
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Would you deny the fact that russian ICBMs will go north over the pole to strike US assets?
If so why would you say a missile system with only a few hundred kilometer range to the east(and some what south) is designed to intercept Russian missiles?
Answer this one...
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Sorry....the missile system the US wants to deploy in Europe is a kinetic kill vehicle. In other words it destroys the target using the combined velocity of both vehicled. THAAD stands for Theater High Altitude Area Defense. This is the system in question. It uses NO WARHEAD. Wether it be nuclear, or convential. Do a google search......not just my opinion.
CFYA
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Originally posted by CFYA
Would you deny the fact that russian ICBMs will go north over the pole to strike US assets?
If so why would you say a missile system with only a few hundred kilometer range to the east(and some what south) is designed to intercept Russian missiles?
Answer this one...
Sorry, I don't understand, is this question addressed to me?
I've already answered this question. But you are ignoring my answer... :(
Edit: just in case. Yes, you are absolutely correct.
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Vad that question was directed to Boroda...
However I think you and me agree on certain points.
Yes inorder to be effective the radar has to be as close to launch point as possible in order to give the most warning.
Yes this system would be in place to stop incoming threats to Europe.
(On that note, the US is not saying this particular site is designed to stop North Korean threats. It is more or less grouping threats together in attemp to explain why the system was desgned in the first place. The sight in Poland is for protection from Iran. Other sights near Korea would be for defending local assets from Korean missiles. North Korea and Iran have nothing in common other than using the same system at both locations. Neither location is capable or intended to protect anyone from both threats. Make sense?)
The US has a spaced base launch detection system. We do not absolutly have to have a EW radar anywhere on the ground. In fact I am not sure if the DEW lines are still operational. Your arguement is that the detection of Russian ICBM launch (which is what your saying this is used for) is the biggest threat to Russia correct?
My counter to that is we already have had sateilites in the air for some time specificly to detect Russian attacks.This negates your whole arguement. What is your reponse?
This missile system is a threat to any nation launching ballistic vehicles.
Poland is seperated from mainland Russia by hundreds of miles and 6 countries. IMO this is not the borders of Russia.
Did I miss any questions?
CFYA
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Originally posted by babek-
I highly doubt that such a defense system will work properly. It will just be a kind of Maginot Line which costs much money and will be in the case of cases worthless.
Then there are no iranian missiles which could reach Europe.
And why should they?
Iran is not the enemy of Europe and Europe not the enemy of Iran.
In contrary there are still good relation ships with european nations.
Even with the embargo there are still close economical ties.
Some few examples:
France, Italy and Germany have built or are building production centres in Iran which produce copies of Renaults, Fiat and Mercedes.
There is even a discussion to build a Transrapid railway system in Iran - done by a german company.
Also Iran and many european nations have also historical ties reaching hundreds of years back to history and still active today.
The simple "Iran will attack Europe - so we must protect Europe by installing defense missiles in Poland" is like one of these propaganda stories we heared before many wars.
There is no hate between Iranians and europeans. And no danger of an iranian attack.
Yes there is no need to protect France or Europe since they gave them nuclear reactors.. "We are friends". And we all know that Muslim extremists would never attack european targets.
I seem to remember there was a non aggression pact between Germany and Russia at the outbreak of WWII... They were "officially friends" and we all know how well that woprked out between the two "friends"..
Somebody needs a pinch to wake up and see this for what it really is..
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Originally posted by Boroda
We will be always against NATO/US (enemy) activities near our borders. We withdrew from Eastern Europe, refrained from arms race - and you keep pressing on us, immediately forgetting about all promises you made, like NATO non-spreading eastwards.
So you blame the US for eastern block nations joining NATO? Perhaps if your country hadn't invaded them and made them slaves they wouldn't be so eager to defend themselves by joining NATO.
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Originally posted by CFYA
Yes inorder to be effective the radar has to be as close to launch point as possible in order to give the most warning.
Great. I don't completely agree with that, but it's irrelevant to this discussion, and I take your arguments completely.
Yes this system would be in place to stop incoming threats to Europe.
(On that note, the US is not saying this particular site is designed to stop North Korean threats. It is more or less grouping threats together in attemp to explain why the system was desgned in the first place. The sight in Poland is for protection from Iran. Other sights near Korea would be for defending local assets from Korean missiles. North Korea and Iran have nothing in common other than using the same system at both locations. Neither location is capable or intended to protect anyone from both threats. Make sense?)
Sorry, it doesn't make sense.
Threats to Europe from where? From North Korea? As you said it is not against North Korea, it's too far from there. The US, according to your words, said the same but I didn't see that in public sources. Bush has been telling about threat from North Korea.
From Iran? But why didn't you try to set this system near Iranean borders? Turkey, Greece, Iraq, Israel (much closer, at least), Pakistan. Don't tell me that they hate you and wouldn't allow you to set up this stuff on their soil.
And, by the way, you contradict your President, he said that a lot of times - this defence is against Iran and North Korea, period. I don't think I have to search Google to prove that.
One more thing. Iran doesn't have and in near future won't have missiles capable to hit Europe. There is no sense for Iran to attack Europe, Europe is the biggest Iran's trade partner. Actually, they even don't have any problems in their relationships. Why? North Korea doesn't even know that there is something named "Europe", they are too far on East.
The US has a spaced base launch detection system. We do not absolutly have to have a EW radar anywhere on the ground. In fact I am not sure if the DEW lines are still operational. Your arguement is that the detection of Russian ICBM launch (which is what your saying this is used for) is the biggest threat to Russia correct?
My counter to that is we already have had sateilites in the air for some time specificly to detect Russian attacks.This negates your whole arguement. What is your reponse?
ok :) But why do you need this system in Eastern Europe? If you can detect even Russian missiles you for sure can detect North Korean and Iranian missiles. To shoot them down is much easy to have anti-missiles near their boards not in Poland. You know, it will be too late to shoot them down there, they will explode anyway. Poor Poland....
This missile system is a threat to any nation launching ballistic vehicles.
Greate!!! Wonderful!!! You've said that!
Yes, Russia can launch ballistic vehicles, and this is threat for Russia. Russia is acting accordingly.
From this point, I don't see anything where we are not agree.
Poland is seperated from mainland Russia by hundreds of miles and 6 countries. IMO this is not the borders of Russia.
Did I miss any questions?
CFYA
Hundreds of miles is nothing for missiles. About six countries... ok, I've always known that geography is not strong sute of Americans but 6 is really too much :)
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From memory there is Ukraine, Belarus, Lithunia, Latvia, Estonia, and Little Russia so I count 6. If you want to get technical....its 5. I count the that little bit a Russia on the Poland border as a rogue state. Incorrect or not.....
Further more this system shoots missiles down as they reenter. This is not a boost phase interceptor. Its reentery kill vehicle. That is why its not on the Iranian border. It is simply not capable of chasing a boosted ICBM down. The reason we are concerned with Iran is Korea as sold them the technology to build vehicle reaching Europe. By there very nature nuclear weapons are designed not to blow up with out being triggered. If impacted there would be a fallout but doubtfully an explosion.
Iran.....In short they do not have the capability to strike Europe today but the technology is in there hands.
CFYA
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Originally posted by CFYA
From memory there is Ukraine, Belarus, Lithunia, Latvia, Estonia, and Little Russia so I count 6. If you want to get technical....its 5. I count the that little bit a Russia on the Poland border as a rogue state. Incorrect or not.....
Ok, but they are not like this
P(Poland) - U -B- L -L -E - and finally Russia.
They are like this:
E-R
P-R
P-L-L-R
P-B-R
P-U-R
Sorry, but there is no 6 countries between Poland and Russia.
Further more this system shoots missiles down as they reenter. This is not a boost phase interceptor. Its reentery kill vehicle. That is why its not on the Iranian border. It is simply not capable of chasing a boosted ICBM down.
Ok, it's something new. I've never seen that anybody anywhere disclosed details about that system.
I have no intention to say that you are wrong. I just kindly ask you to give me a link to reliable sources. Otherwise it will be some kind of problem where we are not to say being completely disagree but we have some ground to be not completely agree.
The reason we are concerned with Iran is Korea as sold them the technology to build vehicle reaching Europe.
Right now North Korea has missiles which theoretically can hit something not far from Japan, and in practice can't hit anything far from 200 meters from the point of launching. If Iran bought that rockets I don't understand why did you even think about them? There are lot of idiots on this planet, are you worrying about all of them?
Sorry, it was joke. I don't know North Korenean technology, but I think you don't know too.
By there very nature nuclear weapons are designed not to blow up with out being triggered. If impacted there would be a fallout but doubtfully an explosion.
It's not true. Yes, destroyed warhead can't blow up. But all warheads being damaged will self-destructed, and all that AMS at the best can damage warhead and force self-destruction.
Sorry, I was trained as guidance officer of C-125 (NATO classification "Goa")
Among others we can work against tactical missiles on the end part of the trajectory. We were told too many times that it will be our last shot...
I'm very glad to hear that our officers were wrong, and American warheads are designed another way.
But Russins are designed that way.
Iran.....In short they do not have the capability to strike Europe today but the technology is in there hands.
CFYA
This world is changing so fast that before Iran will get technology Russia and USA will destroy this f...g world. Just to be the first.
Really, it's a little bit offensive, you know. The USA and the USSR spent a lot of time, money and lives to create that weapons, and what? Iran came and got that all glory! No, we (Russia and USA) were the first, its our right and privilege to powder this little planet!
Nice...
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Vad,
I'll attempt to answer your questions about THAAD since I did much of my thesis work on it during college, and take my A&P with one of the guidence system designers in Palo Alto from Lockheed. Basically i'm gonna dump one of the THAAD whitepapers I did during university on you.
Theater Missile Defense: A technical and historical evaluation of TMD Systems and the proposed Theater Missile Defense.
Alexander Wolf
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Executive Summary
Former President Ronald Regan’s March 1983 speech announcing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) rekindled the flames of a major policy debate. This policy shift came complete with its own acronym—GPALS for Global Protection Against Limited Strikes.
However, with the conclusion of the Gulf War in 1991, only a few months passed when the threat of Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBM) to deployed U.S. forces was fully realized. This was a devastating indictment to the U.S. theater missile defense capabilities or lack there of. The Department of Defense (DOD) spelled out the essence of TBMs and the political and military incentives for acquiring them in the final report to Congress on the Gulf War:
The Gulf War was not the first time in which ballistic missiles were used, and there is no reason to think that it will be the last. Ballistic missiles offered Saddam Hussein some of his few, limited successes and were the only means by which he had a plausible opportunity (via attacks on Israel) to achieve a strategic objective. While the Patriot did help to counter Saddam Hussein’s use of conventionally armed Scud missiles, more advanced types of ballistic missiles, some armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads, will likely exist in the inventories of a number of third world nations.
The planned US TMD system is designed to intercept incoming warheads after their release by the missile, and before reentry into the atmosphere. This system would be a mid-course defense, being land based and exo-atmospheric with no explosive warhead, but instead relying on the kinetic energy of the interceptor to destroy the reentry vehicles. In this paper I will outline how the human operator analyzes attack information, and his options to that information.
Section 1: Introduction
The concept of “Theater Missile Defense” or TMD has been a question in the minds of U.S. leaders and the military since the conclusion of the Gulf War in 1991. While a consensus may be emerging on the need for some kind of Theater Missile Defense, there is currently no agreement on the technical feasibility of such hit-to-kill systems.
While National Missile Defense is still in its planning stage, plagued by cost overruns and political wrangling, TMD is an evolving concept that is beginning to look more appealing to many people.
TMD, as presently defined, consists of lower tier and upper tier defense systems. Those systems for the lower tier are Patriot Advance Capability-2 (PAC-2) and (PAC-3).
The upper tier utilizes the Theater High Altitude Area Defense missile system (THAAD). This paper will discuss the following:
• Section 1: Introduction
• Section 2: A Brief Historical Perspective on TBM Defenses
• Section 3: The Patriot’s History and Field Performance
• Section 4: PAC-3 and Lower Tier Development
• Section 5: THAAD and Upper Tier Development
• Section 6: Will Technology Work?
• Section 7: What should be done?
• Section 8: Human Factors Considerations
Section 2: A Brief Historical Perspective of TBM Defenses
TMD is not a new concept. Its origin, as with many other rocket and guided missile concepts, can be traced to the 1950s at the Army’s Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama. At that time, ballistic missile defense was an outgrowth of air defense, specifically the Nike family of air defense missiles, which began in the 1953-1955 timeframe.
The Nike Zeus is aerodynamically very similar to the Nike Hercules, just scaled up. However, the Nike Zeus was designed for a very different mission - it was designed to perform an interception of ballistic missile reentry vehicles (RV) at high altitude. Like Nike Hercules, it was a two stage missile but instead of using the Nike Ajax booster, a new booster was used which was the largest single chamber solid rocket motor produced in the U.S. at that time delivering over 450,000 lbs. of thrust.
The Nike Zeus had a very short life as it only had a small number of launchers before being replaced by the Nike Zeus B.
The capability of the missile was constrained by a 200-mile range restriction that was issued by Secretary of Defense Wilson in 28 November 1956. This restriction was rescinded 12 months later once Sputnik 1 had orbited the earth. This then allowed the U.S. Army to develop the Nike Zeus B that overcame some of the limitations already present and known in the Nike Zeus A.
It was not until January 1963 that development started on a redesigned Nike Zeus system called Nike X. Compared to Nike Zeus, this system consisted of two missiles, phased array radars and higher capacity data processing. The Nike EX missile, which was a longer and heavier version of the Nike Zeus B missile, performed an exo-atmospheric interception of the RV. Another shorter range missile also was required, which was called Sprint, which provided a last ditch defense against warheads that had either evaded the Nike EX or which had been let through. Through the use of phased array radars and high performance computers, the system was able to track and intercept multiple targets at once.
By October 1965 the design for Nike X had been completed and contracts were let. The Prime contractor for Nike EX was Western Electric Company, which was under direction of Huntsville Alabama. Bell Telephone Laboratories had research and development responsibility while McDonnell Douglas Astronautics, under direction from Bell, was responsible for missile development.
This system was essentially the system that went operational despite numerous changes in the name of the program. With each change of program name came a change in deployment, rather than a change in hardware.
For Patriot, the concept for an all weather non-nuclear air defense missile began in the early 60’s by the U.S. Army Missile Command. The Patriot’s first test launch was in 1970, with full-scale development work completed by 1981. The first production examples were then delivered in 1982, however a number of hardware and training problems arose. In order to keep the Patriot in line with future technological developments, the missile has undergone several improvements to increase its capabilities. PAC-1 capability was achieved in 1986 with the successful interception of a LANCE target TBM. The PAC-2 modification involved software changes in the Fire Control Radar, as well as a new missile warhead casing, with enhanced explosives and a fusing system with a second set of forward-angled beams designed to optimize warhead detonation against targets with a very high rate of closure. The deployment of PAC-2 during Operation Desert Storm marked the first use of TMD in a combat situation.
Section 3: The Patriot’s History and Field Performance
The Patriot missile system was not the spectacular success in the Persian Gulf War that the American public was led to believe. There is little evidence to prove that the Patriot hit more than a few Scud missiles launched by Iraq during the Gulf War, and there are some doubts about even those engagements.
The public and Congress were misled by definitive statements of success issued by the administration in Washington and by the Raytheon representatives during and after the war. It is probable that many of the individuals giving such statements, including the President of the United States and Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, were not aware at the time that the claims of PAC-2’s success were false.
The speed of the Scuds, the limitations of the Patriot missile system, and the confusion with targeting difficulties caused by the breakup of the Scud missile as it reentered the atmosphere seem to have contributed to the high failure rate.
Regarding video footage taken during the Gulf War, a panel of expert witnesses disagreed over the reliability of video footage of Patriot engagements that seemed to show Patriots consistently missing the Scuds at which they were aimed. Dr. Theodore Postol of MIT explained:
The Patriot can be thought of as a platform which carries a shotgun that sprays pellets at the target it is to destroy....if the Patriot fires its pellets at a range much greater than 5 to 10 meters from its target, it will be increasingly unlikely that even one pellet will hit the target. Thus, a 30 meter miss distance is nine times less likely to damage the target than a 10 meter miss and a 100 meter miss is 100 times less likely to damage the target. This means that if miss distances much larger than 100 meters are observed, the result will be a near zero probability that even one pellet from the interceptor will have hit the target.
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The Patriot was not designed to explode upon impact with its target, thus, the explosions in the sky were a misleading indicator of success for both troops and the public. The system also cannot determine if the Patriot missile actually hit its intended target. It can only determine that it detonated near a point in space where it calculated the target should be, sending back a "probable kill" indicator, or that the missile missed and, therefore, detonated to self-destruct. At least 45 percent of the 158 Patriots launched in the war were launched against debris or false targets.
Even for those warheads correctly targeted, the Patriot must detonate within a few meters of the Scud to have a high probability of destroying the warhead, according to the Army. However, the Patriot's fuse could detonate at up to six times the required miss distance, resulting in an extremely low or no probability of kill, yet the computer would still record the engagement as a probable kill.
In addition to the probable kill indicator and other tracking data, the Army assessment relies heavily on reports of ground damage. In every case a warhead kill was claimed, the absence of ground damage is cited as evidence of Patriot success. However, intelligence officials that collected many of these reports from military personnel in the war say that they are unverified, contradictory, erroneous and misleading. Many of the Scuds claimed as warhead kills landed in the desert, the sea or sparsely populated areas.
Finally, some Scuds that were not engaged by Patriots exhibited characteristics identical to those cited as evidence of Patriot interceptions. Such characteristics are pitting in the Scud’s airframe, scorch marks, missing missile debris, or unexploded warheads.
The Gulf War illuminated the troublesome reality that rogue states increasingly have access to missile technology and weapons of mass destruction that could threaten U.S. troops abroad. With the limited success of PAC-2 in Operation Desert Storm, this promoted a broad reassessment of the importance of BMD from defense against strategic missiles to defense against the more technically manageable Theater missile threat. As a result of these reevaluations, this led to the expansion and planned improvement of existing anti-TBM weapons systems.
Section 4: PAC-3 and Lower Tier Development
PAC-3 (formerly ERINT) began in 1983 but came of age in 1994 when the ERINT was chosen for PAC-3. The PAC-3 uses hit-to-kill as its prime kill mechanism, as opposed to PAC-2 with a proximity warhead detonation. The PAC-3 is designed to use the Patriot launcher unit, as well as the existing Fire Control Radar. The actual missile is 5.2 meters in length weighing about 315kg. Its PAC-2 brother weighs in at nearly 900kg for the same length. As a result of this weight reduction, the PAC-3 can engage TBMs at twice the altitude and protect 16 times the ground area of PAC-2 missiles deployed during Operation Desert Storm.
It is important to recognize that PAC-3 was specifically designed to intercept short-range TBMs and cruise missiles over a wide range of closure speeds and altitudes. PAC-2 was rolled into Saudi Arabia and Israel as it was conceived as a system for use against high altitude aircraft and fast movers. It was later rolled in through SDI as a last ditch ballistic missile defense. PAC-2 and PAC-3 will comprise the lower tier of any theater missile defense.
Section 5: THAAD and Upper Tier Development
The THAAD system is envisioned as an easily transportable battery of weapons capable of hit-to-kill intercepts of incoming tactical and theater ballistic missiles at heights as much as 20 to 150 times greater then those defended by Patriot.
This would then allow the current air defense systems to preserve their primary mission of anti aircraft defense, while being backed up by the PAC-2 and PAC-3 lower tier defensive architecture. Current U.S. Army predictions indicate that THAAD is capable of addressing 80 % of the current TBM threats.
The THAAD system, with launchers and fire control units, is based on air transportable trucks. It is capable of being cued to fire by either space-based sensor satellites such as Brilliant Eyes or the 9.2m2 I/J-band Ground-Based Radar. The radar in question is capable of acquiring targets upwards of 1000km distant.
The actual missile is 6.2 meters long, weighing in at 900kg. The missile is a single-stage, solid-fueled weapon capable of both exo and endo-atmospheric intercepts. What is unique about THAAD is that it employs thrust vectoring technology for maneuvering and a high performance liquid-fueled Divert-and-Attitude-Control System (DACS) for terminal seeking in the forward nosecone, which separates from the missile body before impact.
Section 6: Will Technology Work?
There’s a common perception that the U.S. missile defense programs have yet to prove that hit-to-kill capability can be achieved with sufficient reliability under plausible real world circumstances. The TMD and NMD development programs are intended to prove the viability of hit-to-kill by the time the systems are to be deployed in the 2005-2008 timeframe. There have now been six successful intercepts by hit-to-kill systems. The much-publicized failure experienced by missile defense proponents doesn’t impute the technological development. Instead they have been attributed to quality-control problems, schedule issues, and lack of adequate resources.
A serious issue facing TMD deployment is that of countermeasures. Webster defines countermeasure as an action or device designed to negate or offset another; especially: a military system or device intended to thwart a sensing mechanism (as radar).
It is a well-known fact that with any new weapons platform a countermeasure to it will be developed given enough effort. With this in mind, the attacker has a strong advantage because the defense must commit to a specific technology and architecture before the attacker does.
Because the defender would not know what countermeasures are likely to be used in a possible attack, the defense must thereby commit oneself to a test program for all plausible threats within the weapons system that is being developed.
The countermeasure threat is very complicated, but is present with every weapons system in existence. For TMD, one can overwhelm the defense by producing too many false targets, or decoys for the THAAD or PAC-2 or 3 to target. There are several classes of decoys: (1) replica decoys, which replicate the warhead as closely as possible; (2) decoys using anti-simulation, in which the warhead itself is disguised to mimic a decoy. By using anti-simulation, the attacker can disguise the warhead in several ways; by using radar reflective materials such as a balloon; by using electronic decoys, or by using infrared (IR) flares.
Reducing the radar cross section of the warhead reduces the range at which the THADD or PAC-3 can effectively detect and intercept it.
To counter any developments in IR seeker technology, a nitrogen shroud could cool the actual RV, reducing the range at which IR sensors could detect the warhead.
Decoys are particularly suited for THAAD, which operates in the exo -atmospheric envelope of space. Decoys would then travel at the same speed of the actual reentry vehicle until being separated by atmospheric drag.
Replica decoys look the same as the warhead to sensors, but are much lighter in weight. If successful, the use of replicas would leave the defense with the choice of firing at either every possible target, or letting the warhead penetrate to the lower tier engagement zone of PAC.
An attack using replica decoys might consider capitalizing on the small differences between the warhead and decoys to the engagement sensors. One way to address this problem would be to make the warhead look as strange as any other decoy, all being dissimilar from each other. Each decoy would have a different Radar cross-section (RCS), some with smaller weights, others with heavier weights then the actual RV.
With anti-simulation, the attacker takes the ruse one step further by modifying the appearance of the warhead. The attacker simulates the decoy in place of the warhead, which greatly complicates the defense designed. The attacker can either use decoys to disguise the warhead, or exploit the advantages of signature diversity by using decoys that vary in appearance, differing from the warhead and each other.
One possible anti-simulation strategy would be to enclose the warhead in a metal Mylar balloon. This would be released with a large number of empty balloons. Because radar cannot penetrate the metal, the warhead is in effect hidden from view, covering its approach until hitting the outer atmosphere, leaving it to be engaged by late fired upper tier or lower tier elements.
Chaff is the oldest trick in the book, but an effective one at that. Rather than hiding the warhead within a balloon, you can hide it within a cloud of radar reflective metal strips for less then $1.99. Since radar can’t penetrate each chaff cloud, each cloud would in effect act as a solitary decoy, thereby hiding the approaching RV. Of course, the THAAD could be equipped with an IR seeker in lieu of the primary radar for terminal guidance.
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Another method at defeating the upper tier is to use electronic decoys to drown out the reflected radar signals. Since the inception of electronic counter measures (ECM), the objective of jamming has been to disrupt, degrade and deny the threats kill chain — the sequence of events that must occur for a threat to successfully engage and kill a target. This involves the identification of the threat system’s kill chain elements, followed by the exploitation of the kill chain’s vulnerabilities. The weakest link or links of the kill chain are usually threat-system dependent. Robustness is achieved by not relying on the disruption of one element of the chain, but rather by disrupting or degrading multiple kill-chain elements. It should also be noted that disrupting or degrading the kill chain can begin days before the missile launch, in the context of information warfare or information dominance.
"Once radar was established as an important means of detecting and locating enemy ships, aircraft and missiles, it could be only a matter of time before somebody thought of jamming it." Jamming systems designed to defeat radars were developed nearly simultaneously with the first radar tests and deployments. If radar designs were constant, defeating the radar system would be simple. Unfortunately, radar improvement and countermeasure response involve a continual cycle of response and counter-response. As radar-system lethality improves, platform survivability and mission success degrades, and an improved countermeasure response is necessitated.
Section 7: What Should Be Done?
The emerging ballistic missile capability of potential adversaries could pose a serious threat to the national security strategy, military operations abroad, and, territorial interests to the United States. It is in my opinion that development of PAC-3 and THADD into an operations capable TMD system should be pursued, with regard to the technologies, systems, and architectures with which to meet the security challenge posed by TBMs.
On the basis of the above discussion, it is clear that the United States requires missile defenses considerably more capable then those provided by any previous administration in the past. The defenses deployed must be capable of defeating a threat that cannot be fully defended at this moment but that appears to be growing at an appreciable rate by renegade states abroad. To deter pursuit of ballistic missile options, if possible, and defeat those threats that cannot be deterred, such defenses need to have a demonstrated capability, as early as feasible, to engage a technologically sophisticated TBM threat.
Emerging ballistic missile capabilities could provide as many surprises in the next 7 years as they have in the past 12. Planning now to address the expected evolution of the ballistic missile threat as well as the likelihood for any surprises requires focusing R&D on follow-on defenses to THAAD and PAC.
The United States requires a theater missile defense program with maximum flexibility in research, development and testing. This will allow for the best chances that deployed defensive capabilities could maintain pace with an evolving threat and might help dissuade nations hostile to the United States and its allies from pursuing ballistic missile options. At present, the United States faces an emerging threat that will be relatively limited in both numbers and technical sophistication. But there is no reason to believe that, left unopposed, the current threat to U.S. forces abroad will remain small and simple.
Section 8: Human Factors Considerations
To intercept and destroy incoming RV’s, the system must first detect the launch of the ballistic missile and determine the general direction the missile is traveling. The United States currently operates a system of early warning satellites in geo-synchronous orbit that us infrared sensors to detect the hot plume of a missile booster.
The data from the early warning satellites would be fed to the battle management center, located at the THADD launch vehicle BMC. Based on the length of time the booster burns, the launch location, and the rough trajectory information provided by the early warning satellites, the battle management center would determine whether the missile poses a possible threat to the US forces an whether the THADD system might have the intercept it.
The job of the defense us technically more complex and thus, more difficult then the offense. Any defense must be active, and thereby respond to any outside stimulus. In contrast, the offense can be entirely passive, its actions independent of what the defense does. Compounding the problem is the availability of time. With ICBM’s, the human element in the loop has roughly 30 minutes with which to make a decision. With theater ballistic missiles, since the range is roughly 1/8 that of the ICBM, time is cut to a short 3-5 minutes. If that wasn’t enough, the confusion that would almost certainly accompany an actual attack would complicate the job of defense.
Not only must the defense be effective to be useful, but in most cases the defense must also know with a high level of confidence how effective the system is. Effectiveness and confidence level are two very different things, but both are needed to describe a system. Effectiveness is the property of the system, and testing is used to determine what the effectiveness is. Confidence level describes how well the systems effectiveness is known as a result of testing.
Indeed, consistent with its mission of intercepting nuclear warheads, THADD has a design requirement of 95 percent effectiveness with 95 percent confidence against a small scale missile attack. Yet, an effectiveness of 95 percent is rarely—if ever—achieved by a complex military weapons system that faces countermeasures, even after years of use.
As illustrated previously, there are significant time restraints with TBM’s and ICBM’s given their deadly payload. The problems with Human Operator Limits in Tracking (Chapter 10 – Manual Control) are immense. These are: processing time, information transmission rate, predictive capabilities, and processing resources.
When a missile launch is detected by an early warning DSP satellite, when dealing with processing time and human response, there is a lag which is extremely harmful. This lag could be caused by shock of the launch, in essence human nature taking over. Often this could lead the defensive operators to lose track of what is required of them: launch location, target discrimination, determine if the missile poses a threat, and if so, how to engage the threat.
The amount of bandwidth in this system is a function of how many targets are being tracked by the operator. If the system is saturated, the operators predictive capabilities will be lessened and a missile might breech the protective cover of the defense. One possible way to mitigate this would be to have many operators controlling increasingly smaller sectors of responsibility so their decision making is clearer when deciding to launch or remain in yellow hold.
While humans are rarely put into real world environments where they must track inputs at bandwidths so high that processing limits become an issue, this is the reality for any battle management commander dealing with incoming missiles. Here, Prediction and Anticipation come to the forefront of the problem. The BMC must predict where the missile will be in a point in space, and if they determine the missile is a threat, the interceptor sent up to try and attack the incoming missile. Because of the immense speeds involved with an intercept, upwards of 5 km/sec – the system and system operator are required to make a decision based on information which may not be completely reliable depending on the sensors used and circumstances under which the launch was detected.
For example, although Russia’s arsenal of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles has decreased since the end of the Cold War, its overall destructive potential hasn’t diminished. Given the desperate situation of the Russian economy, this deterioration is thought to be as far spread as the nuclear command and control systems. This has, in turn led to the United States concern of an accidental or unauthorized launch (by operator error or equipment failure), or by a few individuals acting without authorization, or due to a false indication of a missile launch. Such was the case back in 1998 with a Norwegian Rocket, which was fitted with parts of a Trident DII stage. This stage set off alarms to Russian early warning outposts of an inbound missile, and Russia was within 10 minutes of launching its missile volley in response to this error. What makes this error even more egregious is that the Command and Control was informed of this Satellite launch, but the information had never reached the field commanders.
Ways of improving the current decision making system are complex given the many parameters taking place during a suspected missile attack. Some of those are the current political situation, if the missile is a satellite carrying booster, or an actual missile meant for attacking. One way to reduce the reaction time of the missile defense would be to automate the launch decision process. That is, to launch on warning. The tradeoff is of course false alarms, but depending on the location of the launch unit, especially if it is located in a theater of battle, you have two choices. A little bit of fratricide, or a nuclear detonation. Both are poor choices, but when faced with the latter, I choose fratricide. Sadly, it is the world in which we have created for ourselves to live within.
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References:
(http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/ABM_THAAD_Missile_Components_Early-Phase_lg.gif)
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/missiledefense/images/thaadpic1.jpg)
(http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/images/missile_defense/thaad_fig3.jpg)
Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War Pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act 1991, DOD, April 1992, Pg 11
USGAO, Feb 92, IMTEC-92-26, Patriot Missile Defense, Software Problem Led to System Failure at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, Pg. 15
Janes Land-Based Air Defense Systems: 1999-2000, Pg. 73
Foundation For the Future – The ABM Treaty And National Security
Janes Land Based Air Defense Systems: 1999-2000, Pg. 79
House Government Operations Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security April 7, 1992
One Hundred Second Congress First and Second Sessions, 1991 – 1992, Pg. 31
Janes Land Based Air Defense Systems 1999-2000, Pg. 67
Countermeasures A technical evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US NMD, Pg. 133
The MX ICBM and National Security, Pg. 54
Countermeasures A technical evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US NMD, Pg. 135
Countermeasures A technical evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US NMD, Pg. 136
Thomas Wright, USMC; NSA, Fort Meade, Maryland (Verbal Conversation on phone)
Price, Alfred. The History of U.S. Electronic Warfare., Pg. 55
References
Janes Land-Based Air Defense; Tony Cullen and Christopher F. Foss; 1999-2000.
Countermeasures; A technical evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US NMD, Union of Concerned Scientists, MIT Security Studies Program, April 2000
Boost Phase Intercept: Implications for Theater Missile Defense; Lt. Col. Wolson Guilbeaux, Jr; University of Illinois Urbana Champaign, ACDIS, 1996
Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies; OTA Assessment, 99th Congress. September 1985
Regional Security and Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles; William A. David, Jr, 1986
Missile Defense and American Security; A Sensible National Policy; Peter D. Zimmerman, May 1996
Foundation For the Future: The ABM Treaty And National Security; 1990
CW5 Thomas J. Wright (Uncle); National Security Agency/Central Security Service
9800 Savage Road, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000
Defense against Ballistic Missiles: Dept. Of Defense OTA Report, April 1984
SDI and The Alternatives: Simon P. Worden, 1991
The MX ICBM and National Security, Colin S. Gray, 1981
The Ballistic Missile Threat Handbook, Jack Spencer, The Heritage Foundation, 2000
USGAO – United States General Accounting Office, Sept 92, NSIAD-92-340; Data Does Not Exist To Conclusively Say How Well Patriot Performed
USGAO - United States General Accounting Office, Jan 94, NSIAD-94-107BR, Ballistic Missile Defense; Information on Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
USGAO - United States General Accounting Office, Feb 92, IMTEC-92-26, Patriot Missile Defense, Software Problem Led to System Failure at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
USGAO - United States General Accounting Office, Feb 92, IMTECH-92-18; Strategic Defense Initiative; Changing Design and Technological Uncertainties Create Significant Risk
USGAO - United States General Accounting Office, June 97, NSIAD-97-134; Operation Desert Storm; Evaluation of the Air Campaign
Price, Alfred. The History of U.S. Electronic Warfare. Westford, Massachusetts: The Murray Printing Company, September 24, 1984.
Engineering Psychology And Human Performance: Christopher D. Wickens, Justin G. Hollands
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This radar will be one the first target for our nuke missiles. And it's right, because it's real threat for Russian security.
Just curious.....why would Russia waste a nuke on a radar site? That would be major overkill wouldn't it? Wouldn't it also incur the wrath of the entire world if Russia used a nuke?
To much risk for to little gain imo.
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Originally posted by Elfie
Just curious.....why would Russia waste a nuke on a radar site? That would be major overkill wouldn't it? Wouldn't it also incur the wrath of the entire world if Russia used a nuke?
To much risk for to little gain imo.
Wouldn't be a nuke, but an SS-21 or a SS-26 with a conventional warhead depending how closely they were fired. (http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row/ss-21-DNSN8307097.jpg)
Both were designed for taking out Patriot sites.
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Thank you, Wolfala.
Ot, let say that your answer is removing some of my concerns:.
1. It's not EW radar
2. This system can protect Europe only, it's not designed to defend the USA.
3. By design it should destroy warheads completely not damage them, so it should prevent nuclear blow. Never believe in possibility of such precision but ok, I'm not a specialist, and world has done long way since "Goa"
Looks like that's all.
But we still have one question you didn't answer.
Why now?!
As it comes from the name this is theater defence system, it should be very mobile by design. I remind that I read somewhere you are going to deploy this system at the end of this year. I may be incorrect but anyway, it shouldn't take years for deployment this system on positions. We have at least several years before Iranian missiles will be real threat if any. So, the question is: why are you going to deploy this system right now?
There is no Iranian TBMs yet but there is Russian. Could you tell me being on Russian position wouldn't you consider this American action as provocation? Wouldn't you ask yourself: why do they do that? They want to see our reaction?
Ask yourself what would be American reaction if Russia deploys similar system somewhere on Cuba or Venezuela. Just to protect them against threat from Iran, just in case.
Russia is seeing this as uprovoked act of increasing military forces near our boards. And Russia has to act, you just didn't leave them a choice.
Question: why did you do that? You didn't anticipate the reaction? I don't think so.
Me as well as the most of Russians including Putin see this act as unprovoked unfriendly action against Russia. And I tried to explain you that we have some grounds to believe in that. And I absolutely agree with decision to set up some targets in Europe for our missiles. Any provocation should have some responce.
Nothing personal, just politics.
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Originally posted by Vad
Thank you, Wolfala.
Ot, let say that your answer is removing some of my concerns:.
1. It's not EW radar
2. This system can protect Europe only, it's not designed to defend the USA.
3. By design it should destroy warheads completely not damage them, so it should prevent nuclear blow. Never believe in possibility of such precision but ok, I'm not a specialist, and world has done long way since "Goa"
Why now?!
As it comes from the name this is theater defence system, it should be very mobile by design. I remind that I read somewhere you are going to deploy this system at the end of this year. I may be incorrect but anyway, it shouldn't take years for deployment this system on positions. We have at least several years before Iranian missiles will be real threat if any. So, the question is: why are you going to deploy this system right now?
Ask yourself what would be American reaction if Russia deploys similar system somewhere on Cuba or Venezuela. Just to protect them against threat from Iran, just in case.
Reason for why now is, who knows - its the jack-off president on our end who came up with this brainstorm.
Reason for its positioning, if you positioned it in Turkey, a launch from say, Iran - the missiles would still be in their Boost Phase. Since the system is not designed as a Boost Phase Intercept, as you know, from reading the 400 page APS study I posted - the problem with Boost Phase Intercept is lack of time available in the decision making process. Lets look at the graph below.
(http://www.fpsboard.org/suppl-mat/APSreport_timeline.jpg)
With a Boost Phase System, you need an interceptor with a fly-out velocity that actually exceeds the fly-out velocity of the ICBM it is intercepting. That makes the interceptor twice as massive as the ICBM - the physics are mind boggling and it does not scale well.
(http://www.physicstoday.org/vol-57/iss-1/images/p30fig1.jpg)
(http://www.physicstoday.org/vol-57/iss-1/images/p30fig3.jpg)
As THAAD is designed to get the re-entry vehicles in the end-game, that is - when they are exo-atmospheric, your decision time isn't as much of an issue. DSP Satellites detect the launch, and you wait until you are in the intercept envelope. There is no risk of accidentally shooting down a rocket that is launching a satellite.
Either way, the timing is ****ed. Missile defense has been a money pit since the 1950s, nuclear tipped interceptors work the first time with the obvious caviet of you blind your radars after the first intercept. The moscow system in-place since the mid 80s with an upper tier Gorgon interceptor with a 1MT warhead does the intercept out of the atmosphere. Set that off, you EMP 1/2 of Russia and Europe and your back in the 18th century.
The lower tier component of that, the Gazelle was similar in function to the Sprint missiles located in North Dakota composing the lower tier of the system. They only had a 10Kt warhead, but detonating those in the lower atmosphere was found would contaminate upwards of 70 miles of area, which would make moscow largely unlivable. So in 1998, the RF Strategic Rocket Forces switched over to conventional warheads - which would make it as effective or less effective then the Patriot PAC-2 during Gulf War 1. As you know, they didn't work too well.
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Originally posted by OdinGrunherze
I believe the point is to have the interceptor missiles, hit the enemy missiles while they are in the boost phase... Before they can reach escape velocity, and before their warheads separate and go completely ballistic...
After that they are almost impossible to hit...
Vlad Putie, and his ex soviet cronies, are having problems at home.... So they need something, to distract their people, from their nefarius activity at home...
Also It's alittle like France, sour grapes, because the world really doesn't give a ratsass about what they say anymore...
OG
I won't pretend to understand the technology, but yesterday Air Force officials and contractor Boeing IDS launched a missile in California, and it intercepted a simulated missile launched in Alaska, that dummy warhead would have hardly been in the boost phase by the time the California-based intercept missile reached it. That distance was 3200 miles, roughly the distance from the East coast of the US to the West coast.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070928/ap_on_re_us/missile_defense_1