Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => The O' Club => Topic started by: Chairboy on December 31, 2007, 02:53:24 PM
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http://www.sanluisobispo.com/news/local/story/232979.html
Witnesses report seeing the plane doing 'barrel rolls' before the crash, don't know what the real story is. Wolfala, did you know this guy?
Best wishes to the family, sad news.
(BTW, what the heck is it w/ Cirrus's and crashes? I saw a figure describing a fatality rate 3x that of comparable aircraft, adjusted for fleet size)
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Sorry to have heard.
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Tom Leveque is the person that died in the crash according to the story. My last Cirrus was his demo plane... 415TL... he was a regional sales director for Cirrus.
He was a very experienced pilot. I can't believe he was doing barrel rolls.
It sounds like the easy conclusion to jump to, based on often unreliable early data, is "pilot was performing aerobatic maneuvers and crashed". Perhaps this is true, perhaps not.
I'm not one to complain about speculation based on very little information, I think it's healthy. But I do think it is all too tempting in cases like this to declare "stupid pilot trick" (with a quiet "if true") and not really put any effort into thoroughly considering alternatives that might fit the early information. If we assume "oh, that stupid pilot, that could never happen to me" we will statistically be on safe ground but we lose the chance to learn or consider alternatives. Some accidents are NOT caused by pilot error.
So, how about considering some alternative possibilities for causes or contributing factors?
Here's some sheer speculation of alternate scenarios off the top of my head...
1. Pilot is making a high speed pass over friends house (safe altitude or buzzing, your choice), hand flying, and suffers a medical incapitation, airplane rolls and descends into the ground.
2. Pilot is descending at cruise speed and suffers airframe failure (aileron falls off, for example). Aircraft rolls and hits the ground.
3. Pilot is flying at relatively low level on autopilot while photographing his friends house; autopilot fault causes aircraft to roll unexpectedly while pilot's attention is diverted.
My point is not to suggest that any of the above is a likely or actual explanation, nor am I saying that these scenarios make the pilot blameless. I'm not trying to defend (or accuse) anyone. The pilot is of course usually the cause of the accident. But it doesn't serve safety to ignore alternatives in these discussions.
Although Thom could be boisterous and loved to "cut-up" on the ground as much I did, I NEVER saw him do anything dangerous or unsafe in an airplane. In fact, he was always the voice of professional calm reason whenever I wanted to stretch my experience envelope sooner than he thought I was prepared. His flight planning and preparation was meticulous, his aircraft control and knowledge base were excellent. In short, there was nothing in his manner or attitudes that would lead me to think he would EVER do acro in a Cirrus, nor anything else patently unsafe.
At every migration, Thom made it a point to seek me out to say "hello" and have a beer or three while catching up on where our flying has taken us over the last year. Nothing in those conversations lead me to think he was becoming any less conscientious a pilot with time.
I hope that further investigation contradicts what I have read here about the cause of the accident and the events that lead up to it, because I really don't want to think of him as a screw-up who played stupid pilot tricks that got him killed.
Unfortunately, no matter how you slice and dice this one, it looks like a stupid pilot trick scenario (unless the data module somehow implicates a systems failure). Will know that when they pull the data cards this afternoon.
Wolf
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I hope it was just a bad description by the witnesses on the ground. Glad you're ok, W, I don't know many of the Cirrus owners in that area and was worried when I heard the story.
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As for statistics,
When analyzing aircraft fleet accident rates, you must consider yearly utilization hours per aircraft. For instance, my aircraft alone has seen 500 hours of operation this year. How many aircraft on the field have you seen that have seen 50 hours in a year let alone 500?
* There is a trend in all airplanes toward decreasing utilization with age. Further, it is particularly striking with the SR22, more than any other airplane.
* Many new Cirrus A/C "seem" to be purchased by relatively new pilots who are still chasing hours and ratings. Flying is 'new' to many of them so any excuse to fly brings the SR out of the hangar.
* Cirrus aircraft are flown cross country IFR at a higher rate than average for light aircraft
* the product innovation and comfort with Cirrus attracts people to fly more
* Cirrus marketing has done a great job of selling the value of personal transportation to people who travel
Because of these and other factors, Cirrus airplanes have a much higher hours-per-year usage than the GA average. Although the FAA does not gather the necessary utilization information to know for sure, estimates of average Cirrus usage are about 200 hours per year vs about 50 hours per year GA light plane average. Aircraft usage/year rates are important when comparing fleet accident rates.
Past 36 months
As of December 1 2007, the fatal accident rate for Cirrus airplanes was 1.44 per 100,000 flying hours over the past 36 months. We use a 3-year average because, with a modest fleet size of 3,600 airplanes flying about 500,000 hours per year, the accident rate varies substantially with only a few accidents.
2007 year to date
For example, in the first six months of 2007, there was only a single accident so the rate is 0.33 per 100,000 hours.
Past 12 months
In the past 12 months, there were 7 accidents for a rate of 1.11 per 100,000 hours.
Lifetime of the fleet
In the life of the SR2X fleet since mid-1999, there were 31 accidents in 2.1 million hours for a rate of 1.50 per 100,000 hours.
GA fleet
This compares to the overall general aviation rate of 1.33 for 2006 (ref Nall report), which represents a tough comparison because it includes corporate jets and turboprops that have a significantly better accident rate than single engine piston airplanes. When twin-engine and turbine aircraft are excluded, the single-engine piston rate is 1.86 fatal accidents per 100,000 hours flown.
(http://www.cirruspilots.org/uploaded_images/28-298112-Fatalaccidentratebyquarter.jpg)
Now it's 31 fatal accidents involving 62 fatalities and 9 survivors.
Fatal accident rates are still hovering around the GA accident rate of 1.33 fatal accidents per 100,000 hours of flight time:
* 1.11 accidents per 100,000 hours in past 12 months
* 1.46 accidents per 100,000 hours in past 36 months
* 1.51 accidents per 100,000 hours for the fleet of 3600 airplanes flying 2.1 million hours since certified
One aspect of this downturn is the bad weather in the fall and winter. Tim Giesler had a flash of insight and created this visualization of the impact of flying in different seasons:
The 3-dimensional bar chart shows the effect of separating accidents and flight hours by quarter of the year, with more recent years near the front. Generally, good weather is April to September (quarters 2 and 3) and not-so-good weather is from October to March (quarters 4 and 1). This cumulative trend, taking all of the past accidents and flight hours when broken down equally by quarter, shows that there are distinctly different rates of accidents in good weather months than bad weather months. The summer rate is about 0.85 and the winter rate is about 2.00 accidents per 100,000 hours.
Q3 has a distinct valley because of very few accidents, and Q2 is recovering nicely from some early accidents as shown by the steep downward slope. In contrast, Q4 shows a persistent trend of more accidents in October, November and December, the quarter with the highest number of accidents. Maybe it suggests that Cirrus pilots have trouble adjusting to lower visibility, poorer weather conditions, and to earlier darkness.
Of course, what about adjusting the number flight hours for each quarter?
If you reduce the flight hours in the bad weather months by just 12%, then the fatal accident rate is about 3 times higher in October to March than April to September!!
The accident tables since birth. In 90% of these, it was the pilot, and you notice a lot of FIKI accidents. Plastic planes don't like flight into ice anymore then their metal ones.
0 Duluth, MN 23-Mar-1999 Experimental test-flight accident, not included in Cirrus production fatal accidents counts, occurred during pre-production flight testing when aileron jammed. SR20 prototype was not equipped with a CAPS parachute. Test pilot Scott Anderson is memorialized by the ANDOE waypoint for the outer marker on the ILS runway 27 approach to Duluth.
1 Sierra Vista, AZ 10-Apr-2001 Non-instrument rated pilot departed with old weather information over mountainous terrain in deteriorating weather, including mountain obscuration and icing.
2 Parish, NY 24-Apr-2002 Two experienced pilots who had just picked up their new Cirrus SR22 were practicing aggressive maneuvers when the plane entered a flat spin. Failure to deploy the parachute resulted in impact with terrain.
3 Angel Fire, NM 28-May-2002 Plane impacted terrain near top of ridge during departure under high-density altitude conditions in an SR20. The POH does not have takeoff distances for those conditions.
4 Las Vegas, NM 3-Nov-2002 Non-instrument rated pilot travelled long distances across country and impacted rising terrain under lowering cloud layer. Altimeter read 1,000 feet above elevation of impact point.
5 Hill City, MN 18-Jan-2003 Early morning night flight before sunrise under an overcast by non-instrument rated pilot. Low altitude flight over rising terrain.
6 San Jose, CA 23-Jan-2003 Plane impacted terrain during approach to Reid-Hillview airport in IMC by newly certifcated instrument-rated pilot with some ATC confusion with intended destination contributed to pilot workload.
7 Pamplona, Spain 12-Oct-2003 Plane collided with trees and ground in the mountains near Pamplona, Spain, while flying under a VFR flight plan. Last radio contact was at 1,500 feet.
8 Greenwood, SC 19-Apr-2004 Plane impacted terrain during takeoff by SR20 over gross weight without lowering flaps.
9 Park Falls, WI 10-Sep-2004 Plane impacted river 1,000 feet short of runway during instructional flight, which may have included simulated emergency power-off descent during gusty wind conditions.
10 Belgrade, MT 4-Dec-2004 Plane impacted trees while maneuvering close to mountain ridge during a photo mission with a glider.
11 Coconut Creek, FL 15-Jan-2005 Pilot experienced confusion and disorientation during an IMC departure, reporting avionics problems to ATC, but also following instructions intended for another airplane.
12 Hood River, OR 20-Jan-2005 Plane impacted terrain during short night VFR trip in lowering weather conditions by instructor-rated pilot returning to home field.
13 Norden, CA 6-Feb-2005 Pilot reported icing at night over mountains at 16,000 feet, attempted to climb but began accelerated descent; parachute was deployed at very high speed and separated from the airframe.
14 Arco, MN 11-Dec-2005 Plane impacted terrain during VFR flight in area where IMC and marginal VMC conditions prevailed. Parachute activation was due to ground impact.
15 Sylva NC 29-Dec-2005 Plane impacted terrain during departure from uncontrolled airport in marginal VFR conditions with intent to pick-up IFR clearance enroute.
16 Lancaster, CA 10-Jan-2006 Plane impacted terrain while student pilot and instructor were practicing return-to-airport maneuver.
17 Stuart, FL 4-Feb-2006 Plane impacted ocean during an IMC positioning flight with pilot reporting instrument problems and requesting return to airport.
18 Edgewater, MD 11-Jul-2006 Plane impacted terrain during go-around after attempted landing on short 2,500 foot runway.
19 Indianapolis, IN 28-Aug-2006 Passenger activated CAPS after pilot became incapacitated resulting in a high-speed impact into a shallow pond; witness reported seeing parachute in reefed condition; three passengers required back surgery and pilot suffered fatal trauma.
20 Maybell, CO 15-Sep-2006 Pilot reported icing at 14,000 feet, made several altitude changes, when ATC lost contact; plane impacted terrain at 7,100 feet and a portion of fuselage was dragged by parachute for 2 miles across Colorado/Wyoming border; parachute believed to have been deployed by impact forces.
21 Manhattan, NY 11-Oct-2006 Cory Lidle and CFI Tyler Stanger impacted an apartment building in Manhattan, NY, while flying VFR in the Hudson River corridor.
22 Meadview, AZ 25-Oct-2006 Pilot reported icing at 13,000 feet and impacted terrain in flat attitude; parachute was deployed by impact forces.
23 Statesville NC 27-Oct-2006 Plane impacted terrain following go-around after ILS approach in IMC conditions.
24 Huntersville, NC 30-Nov-2006 Plane impacted terrain during night/IMC instrument approach where the instrument rated pilot made several erratic maneuvers failing to turn to the approach, descending below descent path, changed airspeed and heading.
25 Young, AZ 17-Dec-2006 Plane impacted terrain while flying VFR in mountainous terrain in dusk/night conditions with IMC conditions and freezing level of 6,500 feet in the area.
26 Greenland 2-Feb-2007 Ferry pilot reported loss of oil pressure and maneuvered towards island in vicinty of Greenland, ditched the airplane, but was found dead in water with broken leg.
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27 Queenstown, South Afrida 17-Mar-2007 Pilot attempted approach and landing in IMC. (South African accident, not in NTSB database)
28 Swan Hills, AB 13-Aug-2007 Plane impacted guy wires of lookout tower while flying VFR in low ceilings over rising terrain. (Canadian accident, not in NTSB database)
29 Maybrook, NY 21-Nov-2007 Plane impacted terrain during second approach in low visibility and low ceilings at night (2 am). (Not yet in NTSB database)
30 Fairbault, MN 25-Nov-2007 Plane impacted terrain adjacent to the runway in gusty wind conditions, reportedly during a second landing attempt or aborted landing
31 Jagel, Germany 28-Nov-2007 Plane impacted power lines at night while flying paralel to a highway in low ceilings, reportedly attempting to contact the nearby military airport
This table lists the 13 known activations of the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System in production Cirrus SR2X airplanes since the introduction of the SR20 in 1999. Data current as of November 23, 2007.
COPA collects this information from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), except for international accidents that come from other national safety boards or news reports. Some accidents involve post-impact deployment of the parachute, which are not included. Two activations involved unsuccessful parachute deployments, which are included. Two activations involved fatalities, which are also included. Hence, the notion of "parachute saves" in which people survived a landing under parachute requires an activation, successful deployment and survivors. Of the 13 activations, there were 11 saves with a total of 24 survivors.
Seq# Location Date Synopsis
1 Lewisville, TX 3-Oct-02 Historic first CAPS deployment in a production aircraft when pilot experienced loss of aileron due to improper maintenance, in which the aileron hinge bolt was not safety wired. Pilot maneuvered to safe area and deployed CAPS. Plane was repaired and flew again.
2 Lethbridge, AB, Canada 8-Apr-04 Pilot reported loss of control in VFR flight at night at high altitude over the Manashee Mountains in Canada. Parachute risers were used to recover airplane by helicopter. (Canadian accident, not in NTSB database)
3 Fort Lauderdale, FL 10-Apr-04 Pilot experienced erratic instrument behavior at low altitude in IMC immediately after takeoff, so immediately activated CAPS and worried about alligators in the swamp.
4 Peters, CA 19-Sep-04 Plane stalled and lost control at high altitude in VMC over cloud deck, pilot attempted recovery from inverted spiral dive but decided to activate CAPS before entering the clouds. Descent took over 5 minutes while Bill and Barbara Graham arranged items in cockpit for a secure and safe landing in a walnut grove.
5 Norden, CA 6-Feb-05 Pilot reported icing at 16,000 feet and started climb but descended rapidly below radar coverage. CAPS parachute was deployed at high speed, well above Vpd of 133 knots, and failed, departing the airframe before impact.
6 Haverstraw, NY 30-Jun-05 Pilot lost conciousness during approach, awoke to discover plane in redline descent, recovered airplane attitude but felt numbness in his legs and activated CAPS. Landing in water of Hudson River, but had time to break window with egress hammer, exit plane, recover life vest, and swim part way to shore. Pilot suffered fractured vertabrae in back and brain tumor that caused loss of conciousness
7 Childersburg, AL 13-Jan-06 Pilot encountered severe icing above 8,000 feet and loss of control, so immediately activated CAPS.
8 Wagner, SD 6-Feb-06 Pilot experiences loss of control in IMC shortly after takeoff, so immediately activated CAPS.
9 Indianaoplis, IN 28-Aug-06 Pilot became incapacitated shortly after departure, passenger activated CAPS, although witness observed reefed parachute during descent into a small pond in a residential neighborhood. Pilot died from blunt force trauma and three passengers suffered serious back injuries
10 Bull Bay, Jamaica 25-Sep-06 Passenger activated CAPS when observed fuel leaking from wing. (Jamacian accident, not in NTSB database)
11 Sydney, Austraila 6-Feb-07 Pilot experienced loss of engine power, activated CAPS but rocket trajectory was abnormal and parachute failed to deploy. Pilot and passenger were seriously injured.
12 Luna, NM 9-Apr-07 Pilot reported instrument problems in IMC and activated CAPS when terrain warning system activated. Plane impacted trees and came to rest inverted with empennage broken off.
13 Nantucket, MA 12-Aug-07 VFR pilot reported IMC conditions on approach to Nantucket airport; declined an instrument approach and activated CAPS. Parachute reported to have tangled with communications tower, causing plane to heavily impact ground
The other consideration is that in greater then 90% of these fatal accidents, the pilots were not COPA members (http://www.cirruspilots.org) which is the owners organization for the SR-2X type. There were 3 accidents involving COPA members vs 25 involving non-COPA members. That includes fatal, survivable and CAPS parachute activations.
The organization is highly safety orientated - and it is being advocated for insurance that new owners participation be mandatory based on those statistics.
Besides saving lives using the chute, several other factors are clearly associated with fewer fatal accidents:
- COPA-member vs.non-COPA-member: 3 vs. 25
- mechanical cause vs. pilot error: 1 to 18 (with 9 TBD)
- time in type (only 4 with >150 hours in type)
- VMC vs. IMC: 9 to 19 (and, flying VFR into IMC accounts for 10 fatal accidents).
So, weather matters, experience/training matters, being prepared and willing to pull the chute matters, avoiding the typical pilot errors matters, and -- somehow -- COPA membership matters.
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Very interesting Data Wolflala :aok
It seems that VFR into IMC is still the big winner for pilot error.
I cant help but wonder if having the BRS/CAP is a contributing factor to some pilots being more willing to push the envelope? I think these devices are beginning to be misused as a primary safety device in the absence of good safe piloting.
I like the one where the passenger activated the BRS when they saw the fuel leak. That'd be a lot of unnecessary damage to repair if it could have been addressed by returning to the airport and rechecking the cap.:lol
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I think the real issue is managing expectations regarding accidents. Even if you believe that Cirrus has in fact succeeded in building a much safer airplane , it is foolish to think that will prevent fatal aviation accidents in Cirrus planes.
Food for thought: Based on accident data for 2007 (as yet incomplete for the year):
Cessna 182: 16 fatal accidents with 33 people dead;
Cessna 210: 9 fatal accidents with 11 people dead;
Mooney: 8 fatal accidents with 11 people dead;
The list goes on...
There are a lot of pilots out there killing themselves and their passengers. Blame the airplane if you want, but I bet most of the 55 deaths above, plus the tragic fatal Cirrus accidents this year will ultimately be laid at the feet of decisions and actions made by the pilot in command. I doubt many of the accidents listed above should really be deemed "C182 accidents" or "Mooney accidents", rather they are terrible aviation accidents where the pilot happened to be flying a Cessna or a Mooney. The same goes for the fatal accidents in SR22s this year.
As a group at COPA we tend to view things as "an SR22 has killed another pilot" rather than "another pilot has killed him/herself in a Cirrus."
I, for one, feel safer in my 20 than in any other plane I've owned or flown as PIC - including a Mooney 201. That, however, does not make me a safer pilot. That part is my responsibility, and not Cirrus's.
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I agree with you 100%.
The responsibility for safety lies solely at the feet of the PIC and not the aircraft or the manufacturer.
The point I was getting at was that pilots (particularly newer ones) are viewing the BRS/CAPS as a primary safety device rather than exercising common sense and caution. It should be used as a resort item.
The reason Cirrus uses the BRS/CAPS system as standard equipment is rooted in what I believe is an unsafe situation anyway, but that's a whole different soap box. The Cirrus aircraft when flown inside POH and pilot limits is a capable and efficient aircraft.
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Well, the short version is they put it in there to get around having to spin certify it which I think is a crock of **** to begin with. Every design should be spun - end of story.
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I agree entirely. This is why I believe the Cirrus design is flawed and inherently unsafe. Capable and efficient but still unsafe.
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Well,
By that logic we know that C310s aren't safe because they don't spin - or they flat spin more accurately. V-tail Bonanza's crackup all the time because of high speed pullouts and doctors. Mooneys, well - are Mooneys - you can't die without trying - but I know 1 turn in those eats 1000 feet from a student forgetting about right rudder and me in the right seat. Its not that the SR's won't spin - they will, and they will recover.
What happens is folks transpose the parachute being there as a crutch for proper stick and rudder technique and torque it over. Its no less safe then anything else when flown within the limits.
Some still try to say that about the Mitsubishi MU-2. However, it really is one of if not THE best small twin turbo-prop ever built. Many are still flying with over 10,000 hours. You just need to know how to fly one.
Every design is a compromise - like you said, if you work within the published limits - its all good.
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I didn't think the SRs' had any demonstrable spin recovery apart from the 'chute? If they can indeed be recovered using conventional techniques then I'll rethink my opinion. Apart from the SRs' I think every one of those aircraft you mention needed to demonstrate spin recovery for certification.
I do agree that there are things that will bite you on almost any type if you are ignorant of them. It's one of the reasons that check rides exist.
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I can bullseye 3 guys I know personally who have spun a 20 or a 22 and recovered.
I'll copy and paste you a post of 1 of those guys named Rock who wrote up his experience.
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Let’s get this out of the way right up front - I already know that I was a moron, idiot, dummy, stupid - take your pick - I already know that I wasn’t thinking and I already know that I was very very lucky. Trust me this really got my attention - I have done a lot of analysis of my decision making procedures and learned a lot about myself personally - the way my mind works or doesn’t work and my attitude about the inherent risks of flying. I only report this because I think I might have done something almost nobody has done before and I lived to tell about it and I think there are some things to be learned from this.
It was a nice Saturday morning, I had agreed to take a non-pilot friend up for a couple of hours just for fun. We headed north because that’s where the pretty country is from Phoenix. We ended up landing at Sedona for breakfast. Sedona is a beautiful place to fly into but it’s a non-controlled airport and it’s busy on a Saturday morning. Most pilots prefer to land on runway 3 and depart on 21. After breakfast we were at the runup area for runway 21 waiting for a couple of planes to land on 3, I had already run thru my checklist and done the runup and was ready to takeoff, it was hot so I opened my door while we waited. My takeoff window finally opened and onto the runway I went and off we go, within a few seconds it was clear that I had forgotten to close my door (this wasn’t my first time), yea I know what the POH says to do but I wasn’t going back to SEZ just to close my door. I decided we’d stop at Cottonwood about 15 minutes away. In the mean time I figured I’d slow down and try to close the door without landing, I’ve tried it before but never after I had slowed and I figured I’d try a slip into it or a slip away from it, as you already know I couldn’t close the door.
Then I got the bright idea, since I was already at 80 knots with 1/2 flaps I would demonstrate how nicely the Cirrus handles a power off stall, something we have all done 100s of times. I reduce the power and watch the speed bleed down, I’m ready for the recovery - I’m thinking pitch down-full power - keep coordinated - I watch the ball - I watch the airspeed - I point out the buffet and explain what’s happening - I’m primed and ready to recover when the nose breaks. Exactly when the break comes my door flies open, not just a little but all the way to the stops - this catches me so completely by surprise that I let go of the controls and grab the door to keep it from being ripped off the plane while at the same time going to full throttle with my right hand - this was an unconscious reaction based on the fact that I had already programmed myself for the recovery. I feel the right wing start to dip and I step on the rudder but in the next instant we are upside down with the world going around in circles - I hold the rudder to the floor while the plane makes 1-2 turns and suddenly it changes direction, this change was surprisingly violent, I stomp on the other rudder peddle and very quickly the plane violently switches back to spinning in the original direction. I have lost interest in my door and it’s now flapping like a bird and I don’t really care if it stays attached. At this point I very clearly remember thinking “THIS ISN’T WORKING, START OVER FROM THE BEGINNING --- POWER TO IDLE” I look at my right hand and notice that I was still at full power and think to myself “THAT’S REALLY STUPID”, I pull the power back and then think “NUTERALIZE THE CONTROLS” I look at my left hand to see if I am hanging onto the controls-I’m not and then I think “OPPOSITE RUDDER” and about that time it quit spinning, I gently raise the nose-add power and turn back to DVT forgetting my plan of landing to close the door.
I nonchalantly said “that was pretty cool” and my passenger said “that was really cool what was that”, I answered “that was a spin”. Jake asked if I practiced those and calmly I told him that everyone had to practice stalls but we should really also practice spins and I apologized if I had scared him too much to which he answered “I looked over at you to see if you were scared you were as calm as a cucumber so I figured everything was under control” -- ignorance really is bliss.
Start to finish something less than 10 seconds and about 1000 feet of altitude.
What did I learn? More than I can really list here but some of the biggies are:
1. I learned how freaking fast things can go to hell in an airplane.
2. I learned not to take any phase of the flight lightly, I knew the door was open and I should have followed the POH – slowed down and landed as quickly as possible – forget the demonstrating stalls until the plane was in a condition to be flying.
3. I learned that just like most planes the Cirrus will spin in an instant (yea I know you have to be uncoordinated to spin, I was coordinated until I got distracted and forgot to fly the plane)
4. I learned that just like most planes the Cirrus will recover from a spin if you follow the correct procedures and you have enough altitude.
5. I was happy to learn that in a real life and death emergency I didn’t scream all the way to the ground, I was able to logically apply my knowledge to solving the problem – at least this time
6. I was NOT happy to learn that in an emergency it is possible to become so task-fixated that you get tunnel vision – I never thought about CAPs until after it was all over – I’d like to think that if the plane wasn’t responding to my input I would have given up and used CAPs but I honestly don’t know that for sure. People can ask how the guy with his family in Northern Arizona could flat spin all the way to the ground last month, I can tell you how and it scares the poop out of me thinking about it.
There’s about 100 more things I learned about flying and about myself but you get the picture.
Thanks for taking the time to read this I know it was long.
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I know the designer wrote a pretty long piece which i'll try to link for you in PDF which i'll host at this URL. It also has some articles on guys who have spun them a lot.
http://www.cirruspilots.org/uploaded_images/28-302843-ANINTRODUCTIONfromDALEKLAPMEIER.pdf
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OK I accept your information and sources. :)
I stand corrected that the Cirrus design does indeed have the ability to recover from a spin and also within acceptable altitude loss boot. Why then was this capability not demonstrated for certification?
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Perhaps it was answered in the PDF I linked ya to.
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I saw why they left it out of the POH, and in some respect that's fair enough. But to use the BRS/CAPS to "shortcut" the certification process could be viewed as irresponsible. If the aircraft does indeed have an acceptable spin recovery technique then it should have been demonstrated at certification. If they chose for reasons of prudency to leave it out of the POH, then that's just fine.
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I haven't read the PDF, so if this is covered there, I apologize. I read a writeup from one of the european test pilots (where Cirrus HAD to demonstrate spin recovery) who said essentially Yes, it can be recovered, but it's a very difficult recovery.
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I know that the General Aviation community is very safety conscious.
However, I'd like to compare the modern general aviation accident rate to the accident rate during the Golden Age of aviation. I think it'd be interesting just to see. I'll do some scrounging.
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One theory I had about the Cirrus crashes relates to slow flight. Here's my assumptions:
1. Cirrus states that a spin is to be recovered via CAPS.
2. Spins are hard to start, but happen primarily in slow flight.
3. Use of CAPS essentially destroys the aircraft.
With this in mind, I figure that:
Cirrus pilots are much less likely than other pilots to spend time in slow flight because #2 and they are trained that a spin will result in #3, the plane potentially being written off. Less slow flight, fewer stalls, less familiarity with that part of the performance envelope and can't respond as ably when crap goes down.
If any of those assumptions are wrong, let me know. It's just a theory I've been playing with to try and figure this out. It's a fine aircraft, just some bad accident figures.
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When comparing accident stats, it's worth noting that about 22,000 Skylanes have been built, about 20 times as many as Cirrus.
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Originally posted by Chairboy
One theory I had about the Cirrus crashes relates to slow flight. Here's my assumptions:
1. Cirrus states that a spin is to be recovered via CAPS.
2. Spins are hard to start, but happen primarily in slow flight.
3. Use of CAPS essentially destroys the aircraft.
With this in mind, I figure that:
Cirrus pilots are much less likely than other pilots to spend time in slow flight because #2 and they are trained that a spin will result in #3, the plane potentially being written off. Less slow flight, fewer stalls, less familiarity with that part of the performance envelope and can't respond as ably when crap goes down.
If any of those assumptions are wrong, let me know. It's just a theory I've been playing with to try and figure this out. It's a fine aircraft, just some bad accident figures.
1. It states the Approved method is via CAPS. Consider that 90% of the stall spin accidents happen in the traffic pattern at less then 1000 feet - its kind of a moot point at that altitude - normal recovery or parachute.
With choice #2 you might have a chance - choice #1 ain't gonna happen.
The parachute was a core element of the airplane based on Alan K's mid air life saving experience in an ultralight.
The parachute was there before any wings were designed, any elevator travel limits considered etc.
The requirements to PROVE spin recovery are very expensive and Cirrus simply made an argument to the FAA that the presence of a parachute was equal or superior to proving spin recovery so the expensive testing was not required.
I understand that the aircraft was indeed spun by test pilots and it recovered normally and within certification limits, otherwise it would not have been certified under the Normal category.
2. You really gotta **** up to spin the thing. Any plane will spin if you give it enough yaw. Hell a snap roll is essentially a spin in the horizontal plane. Simply, you either gotta get distracted from what you are doing (such as with the guy having his door fly open while he's in slow flight), or really force the plane to do something it does not want to do. I mean, i've flown Extra 300's with Ramzey and if you sneeze your looking at the world from another perspective. And a lot of GA planes - I'd venture most certified since the 50s are going to give you a lot of cues ahead of time before that plane gets away from you.
Lets take the wing design with the cuffs on the outboard leading edge having a different airfoil - so when the inside of the wing is stalled you still have roll control through the stall because the outside of the wing is still not stalled. Now you keep ****ing with it and go over that edge and you are out of coordinated flight - do something stupid like kick in full rudder at high AOA and zero airspeed - you'll find out quickly the timing wasn't right for that.
3. Not necessarily - but thats why you have insurance. Your not interested in salvaging the plane when you think you are going to die. Although, there have been a few that were rebuild after landing in trees or soft terrain. Mostly what you endup replacing are the landing gear and probably the main spar since it would absorb a majority of the impact energy.
The thing about Statistics Chair - the 172 has been around 50 years and through about 15 variants. So your stats pool isn't really pure since they are some franking boxes still in service.