Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => Aircraft and Vehicles => Topic started by: Angus on April 26, 2008, 12:13:09 PM
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LW and the Red airforce, - yess.
I am looking at the order of battle or at least some rough numbers, particularly the LW, as well as types. Was the 109F already there? When did the 190 start there?
So, anyone ;)
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Oooh, I have the order of battle for the Luftwaffe at the start of Barbarrossa, I think. Lemme see if I do.
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There is an interesting post on the UBI forum: http://forums.ubi.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/63110913/m/6131057895
It presents the German OOB for 21. June 41 and also the source for it: "Barbarossa - The Air Battle: July - December 1941", Appendix 1.1, by Christer Bergstrom
On 21 June 1941, Reichmarschall Hermann Goring's Luftwaffe comprised a total of 4,389 aircraft. 2,598 combat aircraft (1,939 serviceable) had marched up between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, ready for the invasion of the Soviet Union: 929 bombers, 793 fighters, 376 dive bombers, 78 Zerstorer, 102 reconnaissance aircraft, 60 ground-attack aircraft, plus 200 fighters and Zerstorer in reserve, and 60 miscellaneous types. These aircraft were tactically divided as follows:
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Luftflotte 1 (Generaloberst Alfred Keller) in East Prussia:
K.Gr.z.b.V 106 - Ju52.
2(F)/Ob.d.L - Do215. At Norkitten.
Westa 1 - miscellaneous. At Jurgenfelde.
Fliegerkorps I (General der Flieger Helmuth Forster)
4., 5/JG 53 Pik As - Bf109F. At Neusiedel.
Stab, 1., II., III./JG 54 Grunherz - Bf109F. HQ: Lindental.
Stab, II., III./KG 1 Hindenburg - Ju88A. HQ: Powunden.
Stab, I., II., III./KG 76 - Ju88A. HQ: Gerdauen.
Stab, I., II., III./KG 77 - Ju88A. HQ: Heiligenbeil.
5.(F)/122. At Jurgenfelde.
Fliegerfuhrer Ostsee (Oberstleutnant Wolfgang von Wild)
K.Gr.806 - Ju88A. At Prowehren.
1.(F)/125 - He59. At Fischhausen.
2, 3.(F)/125 - He114 and Ar95.
Luftgaukommando 1 (Generalleutnant Richard Putzier) (reserve)
Erg.Gr./JG 52 - Bf109E. At Neuhausen.
Erg.Gr./JG 54 - Bf109E. At Neuhausen.
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Luftflotte 2 (Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring) in Poland:
Stab, I., III./JG 53 Pik As - Bf109F. HQ: Krzewica.
IV./KG.z.b.V.1 - Ju52.
Stab, 2.(F)/122 - Ju88A, Bf110, Bf109E. At Warsaw.
Westa 26 - Bf110, Do17Z, He111H. At Warsaw-Bielany.
Fliegerkorps VIII (General der Flieger Wolfram Freiherr von Richtofen)
Stab, II., III./JG 27 - Bf109E. HQ: Subolevo.
II./JG 52 - Bf109E, Bf109F. At Subolevo.
Stab, I., II./ZG 26 Horst Wessel - Bf110. At Suwalki.
II.(S)/LG 2 - Bf109E. At Praschnitz.
10.(S)/LG 2 - Hs123A. At Praschnitz.
Stab, 1., 8., 9./KG 2 Holzhammer - Do17Z. HQ: Arys-Rostken.
III./KG 3 Blitz - Do17Z. At Suwalki.
Stab, II., III./St.G.1 - Ju87B. At Radczki.
Stab, I., III./St.G.2 Immelmann - Ju87B, Ju87R, Bf110. At Praschnitz.
2.(F)/11 - Do17P. At Suwalki.
Fliegerkorps II (General der Flieger Bruno Loerzer)
Stab I., II., III., IV./JG 51 - Bf109F. HQ: Siedlce.
Stab, I., II./SKG 210 - Bf110. HQ: Radzyn.
Stab, I., II./KG 3 Blitz - Do17Z, Ju88A. At Deblin.
Stab, I., II., III./KG 53 Legion Condor - He111H, He111P. HQ: Radom.
Stab, I., II., III./St.G.77 - Ju87B, Bf110. HQ: Biala Podlaska.
1.(F)/122 - Ju88A, Bf110. At Warsaw.
Luftgaukommando II (General der Flieger Hellmuth Bieneck) (reserve)
Erg.Gr./ZG 26 - Bf110. Poznan area.
Erg.Gr./JG 51 - Bf109E. Poznan Area.
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Luftflotte 4 (Generaloberst Alexander Lohr) in Rumania:
K.Gr.z.b.V.50 - Ju52
K.Gr.z.b.V.104 - Ju52
4.(F)/122 - Ju88 [misc], Bf110. At Reichshof.
Westa 76 - He111H, Ju88A, Bf110. At Reichshof.
Fligerkorps V (General der Flieger Robert Ritter von Greim)
Stab, I., II., III./JG 3 - Bf109F. HQ: Hostynne.
Stab, I., II., III./KG 51 Edelweiss - Ju88A. HQ: Krosno.
Stab, I., II./KG 54 Totenkopf - Ju88A. At Lublin-Swidnik.
Stab, I., II., III./KG 55 Greif - He111H, BF110. HQ: Labunie.
4.(F)/121 - Ju88A. At Zamosc.
Fliegerkorps IV (Generalleutnant Kurt Pflugbeil)
Stab, II., III./JG 77 - Bf109E, Bf109F. HQ: Bazau.
I.(J)/LG 2 - Bf109E. At Janca.
Stab, I., II., III./KG 27 Boelcke - He111H. HQ: Focsani-South.
II./KG 4 General Wever - He111H. At Zilistea.
3.(F)/121 - Ju88A, Bf110. At Ramnicul-Sarat.
Deutsche Luftwaffenmission Rumanien (Generalleutnant Hans Spiedel)
Stab/JG 52 - Bf109F. At Bucharest and Mizil.
III./JG 52 - Bf109E, Bf109F. At Mizil and Pipera.
Luftgaukommando XVII (General der Flak Friederich Hirschauer) (reserve)
Erg.Gr./JG 77 - Bf109E. Vienna area.
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Luftflotte 5 (Generaloberst Hans-Jurgen Stumpff) in the Nordic countries:
The Luftwaffe forces in the Nordic countries were grouped into Generaloberst Hans-Jurgen Stumpff's Luftflotte 5, which on 21 June 1941 could muster a total of 240 aircraft. The main units were KG 30, I./KG 26, parts of JG 77, and IV.(St)/LG 1. But only part of this force was brought up against the Soviet Union. These were organized in Fliegerfuhrer Kirkenes under Oberst Andreas Nielsen.
On 21 June 1941, the following units stood at Oberst Nielsen's disposal:
5./KG 30 at Banak (northern Norway) with ten Ju88s [misc]
IV.(St)/LG 1 at Kirkenes (northern Norway), with thirty-six Ju87s [misc]
I./JG 77 at Kirkenes with ten Bf109E and Bf109T
Stab/ZG 76 at Kirkenes with six Bf110s
1.(F)/124 at Kirkenes with three Ju88s [misc]
1.(H)/32 at Kemijarvi and Rovaniemi (northern Finland) with seven Hs126s and three Do17P
1./KuFlGr 406 at Banak with He115s and Do18s.
Also, two He111s and two Ju88s of a weather reconnaissance Schwarm and eleven Ju52s of a Transportstaffel were attached to Fliegerfuhrer Kirkenes.
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Added to the aircraft of the Luftwaffe should be 190 liaison aircraft, 252 aircraft of the army reconnaissance aircraft specially assigned to the Panzer troops. To the German Air Force was added the combined strength of the Rumanian Air Forces - plus small Slovakian, Croatian, Italian and even Spanish aviation units. In 1941, these Air Forces contributed with an additional 980 combat aircraft against the USSR.
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Much more detailed than what I have, which is just for 109 units:
(Unit\CO\Operations HQ (I think?)\Variant\Est-Serv)
Luftlotte 1 (Northern Sector)
Stab JG54\Maj. Hannes Trautlof\Lindental\109F\4-3
I/JG54\Hubertus von Bonin\Rautenberg\109F\40-34
II/JG54\Dieter Hrabak\Trakehnen\109E and F\40-33
III/JG54\Arnold Lignitz\Blumenfeld\109F\40-35
II/JG53\Heinz Bretnutz\Neusiedel\109F\40-35
Luftlotte 2 (Central Sector)
Stab JG27\Wolfgang Schellmann\Sobolevo\109E\4-4
II/JG27\Wolfgang Lippert\Berzniki\109E\40-31
III/JG27\Max Dobislav\Sobolevo\109E\40-14(!)
II/JG52\Erich Woitke\Sobolevo\109F\39\37
Stab JG51\Werner Molders\Siedice\109F\4-4
I/JG51\H-F Joppien\Staravis\109F\40-38
II/JG51\Josef Fozo\Siedice\109F\40-23
III/JG51\Richard Leppla\Halaszi\109F\38-30
IV/JG51\Freidrich Beckh\Crzevica\109F\38-26
Stab JG53\Frh G von Maltzahn\Crzevica\109F\6-6
I/JG53\Wilfried Balfanz\Crzevica\109F\35-29
III/JG53\Wolf-Dietrich Wilcke\Sobolevo\109F\38-36
Luftlotte 4 (Southern Sector)
Stab JG3\Gunther Lutzow\Hostynne\109F\4-4
I/JG3\Hans von Hahn\Dub\109F\35-28
II/JG3\Lothar Keller\Hostynne\109F\35-28
III/JG3\Walter Oesau\Modorvka\109F\35-34
Stab JG52\Hans Trubenbach\Bucharest/Mizil\109F\4-3
III./JG2\Gotthard Handrick\Mizil/Pipera\109F\43-41
Stab JG77\Bernhard Wodlenga\Bacau\109E\2-2
II/JG77\Anton Mader\Roman\109E\39\19
III/JG77\Alexander von Winterfeld\Bacau\109E/F\35-20
I.(JaBo)/LG2\Herbert Ihlefeld\Janca\109E\40-20
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LUSCHE :aok
"On 21 June 1941, Reichmarschall Hermann Goring's Luftwaffe comprised a total of 4,389 aircraft. 2,598 combat aircraft (1,939 serviceable) had marched up between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, ready for the invasion of the Soviet Union:"
That was what I was looking for. But Barbarossa with less than 2000 servicable aircraft....blimey.
Some extra 2000 would have come in handy.
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At that moment (22.06.41) VVS (Western Division Group; general Ivan Kopets) had 1560 fighters and bombers
377 - SB
42 - Pe-2
22 - Ar-2
24 - Yak-4
75 - Su-2
424 - I-16
262 - I-153
73 - I-15
233 - Mig-3
20 - Yak-1
8 - Il-2
This group lost 738 planes on the 22.06.41:
528 were destroyed on the airfields
133 were shot down by geman fighters
18 were shot down by A-A guns
53 did not return back from missions for unknown reasons
6 lost due to crashed/forced landings
General Ivan Kopets committed suicide in the end of the day.
P.S I do not have the exact info about the other VVS groups on this day.
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That was what I was looking for. But Barbarossa with less than 2000 servicable aircraft....blimey.
Some extra 2000 would have come in handy.
That is questionable. With the aircraft they had the Luftwaffe was able to completely destroy the Red air force in 1941. The German army advanced faster than the Luftwaffe managed to follow, even when using abandoned Soviet airfields. And with the onset of winter and all the operational difficulties that entailed, air power was really just a minor, perhaps insignificant part of the Battle of Moscow where the Red Army defeated the Germans and IMHO won the war.
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So another 2000 = good. Faster hopping.
And they didn't completely destroy the red air force, just almost. The red airforce finally turned the tables on LW around or at Stalingrad.
BTW, the LW had quite some losses despite their insane kill ratio, and were below the thousand when at the gates of Moscow if I recall right.
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No, a larger Luftwaffe would only mean a bigger logistical nightmare for the German supply units trying to keep the forward fields operational. And the Luftwaffe did not take heavy losses. The reason less than a thousand aircraft were involved in the Battle, and only half of those were serviceable, was because only one army group attacked Moscow: Army Group Center. The rest of the Luftwaffe were supporting the other two army groups. But neither the Luftwaffe or the Red Airforce flew any significant number of sorties in the battle due to weather conditions and the onset of winter. If the Luftwaffe had twice as many aircraft available they wouldn't have any more serviceable aircraft due to the supply difficulties. They would just wake up to 2000 frozen engines instead of 1000.
If you are proposing in the paper you are writing that (due to the BoB not happening) a larger Luftwaffe would have won the war for Germany, I'm afraid I don't agree. The Luftwaffe was already of sufficient size to render the Red Airforce combat-ineffective, and once winter set in air power would not play a significant part in the war until the spring of 1942. The Red Airforce that fought at Stalingrad was largely a completely rebuilt force. The planes that the Luftwaffe invaded with in 1941 were largely obsolete and replaced with newer models by the summer of 1942.
I don't see how Germany could have won the war, with or without the BoB.
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The other half of the LW had to have it's logistics TOO, for it was already in use! From the Arctic down to the French Atlantic coast, and also in the Med, - that is quite something, and many many Special tasks.
And where was the LW air transport when it was most needed on the eastern front? Dead or elsewhere in some quantity. As for 2000 frozen engines, well if you can wake up 1000, you can wake up 2000 :D Especially if they're not frozen at all due to the advance being swifter, as well as a better spare transport due to partial airlift, - not all needed spares were that heavy. I'd see more of an ordnance problem there.
And do not forget, as mentioned by you, that there were other fronts, much further south, - another climate zone. Fighting conditions in Ukraine at the south are favourable for a month more than in the North....
BTW, it took a while untill the Germans found out the startup trick. Got to look when roughly. You know this one right?
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The Luftwaffe's logistics were land based: Trucks and horses. The transport aircraft did not transport the fuel and ammunition and spare parts needed to keep the Luftwaffe flying. The engineers that built the new airfields or repaired captured Soviet airfields were also earthbound. The Luftwaffe's logistical train was not damaged in the BoB, nor did the Luftwaffe lose many transport planes during the BoB, and the serious losses in transports suffered in Africa and the Mediterranean didn't occur until the summer of 1942, well after the Battle of Moscow was lost. When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union the Luftwaffe had a larger logistical train per aircraft than normal due to the losses in the BoB.
The advance would not be swifter with a larger Luftwaffe. As I've said the German army was already advancing faster than the Luftwaffe, and a larger Luftwaffe would have even more trouble keeping up due to the increased demand of fuel supply and spare parts. The Germans didn't lose the battle because they didn't have enough planes. They lost because they overstretched their supply lines and ground to a halt, allowing the Russians to regroup and counter attack a German army essentially out of fuel and ammunition. The Luftwaffe played a very small part in the battle and was hard pressed to do anything under the difficult circumstances. They had nearly 1000 planes supporting Army Group Center, but were only able to keep 500 or so serviceable. Had they had 2000 aircraft they would still only have been able to keep 500 serviceable, if that many. And those that were serviceable were grounded most of the battle due to weather condition and the winter.
I get the distinct feeling that you have already made up your mind, and are just trying to find supporting evidence for your theory. Tell me I'm wrong.
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Look here, the logistics, especially in the first vital weeks of the advance, are already WITHIN range, especially of attack and Jabo missions. The problems of hauling goods kicked in when the fields were far inside the front, and had a bad road connection. But from border based airfields at first, there is no way you can convince me that fewer aircraft (and pilots) were a better choice.
Nor that a much higher amount of reserves would have been bad.
As for the bad road connection, yes, I know. But just not at all times. And then there is no way that a better airlift would not have helped. It was not just about hauling tonnage and fuel, it was vital spares etc etc.
BTW, a serious transport loss in the med occured before Barbarossa, i.e. Crete.
The later transport losses were mostly in Tunisia at the time of Stalingrad, but that's not Barbarossa.
IMHO the Luftwaffe did play a major part. They were vital in the anti-tank role and they were practically the key to making the blitz so fast. And they came close to wiping out the Red airforce.
For victory, IMHO, the Axis needed more of everything, including time. But to repeat, I think just 2000 aircraft for that big an operation was to small, - it just happened to be what they could muster.
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http://www.rkka.ru/22/vvs/lvo.htm (Leningrad military district)
http://www.rkka.ru/22/vvs/pribovo.htm (Baltic military district)
http://www.rkka.ru/22/vvs/zapovo.htm (Western Military District)
http://www.rkka.ru/22/vvs/kovo.htm (Kiev Military District)
http://www.rkka.ru/22/vvs/odvo.htm (Odessa Military District)
http://www.rkka.ru/22/vvs/dba.htm (Long Range Aviation)
In case you have trouble translating it you can use http://world.altavista.com/
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http://ilpilot.narod.ru/vvs_tsifra/index.html is also good. It also have info from later in the war.
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Tell me Angus: When did the German army stop its advance to wait for Luftwaffe support? Never. The Luftwaffe they had was fully capable of destroying the Red Airforce and gave full support to the German army before the army advanced beyond Luftwaffe range. More planes would not have allowed the German army to advance faster, and would not have made any difference at the Battle of Moscow. Germany would still have lost the war, more planes or not.
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Lookie here Lumpy. Quite a statement! Tend to disagree, but where would the world be without it ;)
Anyway, I am claiming that a stronger LW would have been better and the strength applied was a matter of availability rather than choice. (Hmmm, I think I prefer to use just 2000 for the job????)
One delay in the punchthrough for Barbarossa to be successful was due to the Cauldron Battles or "Kesselschlact" plan which basically aimed at annihalating the Red army rather than defeating it. It caused some delay for the German army under perfect conditions! They got lagged by just not pinching USSR troops into "bags" or "kettles" but spending the time for boiling them. Around there, both transport and air support hurries things up. And these were in the high summer, and transport was going...okay. Much of this was in range from secure airborne positions.
Then there were strongpoints that took quite an artillery beating and so on and caused quite some delays.
Then came the big swing southwards. It absolutely changed things, caused lots of driving, completely delayed the northern campaign, and as for the ground forces, had the LW hopping.
Then back, focus north, go for Moscow. Sorry Gerry, wintertime! When winter hit on the second of December 1941, the German army was at the outskirts of Moscow, - so close was it.
Have to look better in the airstrength at the time, but I feel pretty certain that more all the time would have been better.
BTW, oddly enough, I don't quickly recall any info of fuel shortage at the time. Just spares and such.
And then the final. Since I am digging into this, I am very happy for the debate and every flaw you find in my points. You have helped a lot, and keep trucking, I'll perhaps send you a book or two for it! Really!
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http://www.rkka.ru/22/vvs/lvo.htm (Leningrad military district)
http://www.rkka.ru/22/vvs/pribovo.htm (Baltic military district)
http://www.rkka.ru/22/vvs/zapovo.htm (Western Military District)
http://www.rkka.ru/22/vvs/kovo.htm (Kiev Military District)
http://www.rkka.ru/22/vvs/odvo.htm (Odessa Military District)
http://www.rkka.ru/22/vvs/dba.htm (Long Range Aviation)
In case you have trouble translating it you can use http://world.altavista.com/
For us to pressed in time, would you sharethe big picture in some few words?