Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => Aces High General Discussion => Topic started by: SgtPappy on November 05, 2008, 10:46:48 PM
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In a book I read (Spitfire Late Marque Aces 1942-2945) stated that the No1 wing/RAAF was sent to Morotai in early 1945 as the 1st TAF. Apparently little gains were made, no fighters were encountered and Caldwell was getting angry due to the wasted potential of him and his men. The book was written with a bit of a bias by Alfred Price. He says that MacArthur simply didn't want any non-Americans to share in the glory.
I just wanted to see everyone's take on this, because such lack of combat does seem fishy. I know it couldn't have been the Spitifre's range because Spit8's on 90 ImpGallon DT's can fly from Morotai to Mindanao and back with a good amount of gas to spare, especially in 1945 when a lot of combat was taking place over the Philippines. The RAAF could have attacked the Japanese at Mindanao in early 1945, diverting some forces from Luzon where the Americans were attacking.
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MacArther not wanting to share the glory! :O
That would not be entirely out of character for dugout Doug. :devil
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I'm sure the men serving under him would have been only too happy to share 'the glory'.
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For whatever reason, that period of history gave us numerous military leaders who upon reflection turned out to be egomaniacs. MacArthur was one, but so was Patton and Montgomery. Those are just the three on the Allied side that are easiest to bring to mind.
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April 14, 1945 8 of the ranking RAAF officers including Caldwell who was a Group Captain at the time, offered their resignations all at once due to what they considered wasteful operations from Moratai.
It's covered in some detail in "The Air War Against Japan 1943-1945" by George Odgers, published as part of the official history of the Aussies at war by the Australian War Memorial.
One of my Spit XII hero's was an Aussie by the name of Barney Newman, seen below in his Spit XII of 41 Squadron with the squadron mascot "Perkin". After his time with 41 he went back to the Pacific with 79 Squadron RAF flying Spit VIIIs. He was killed on one of those 'wasteful' missions in August 45 when he went down strafing. Some thought he hit a tree. There were 3 Newman brothers who all served with the RAAF. His older brother F.O. J.R. Newman was killed flying Beaufighters with 30 Squadron RAAF in September 43. The youngest brother survived. He was a gunner on RAAF Bostons.
It's not identified as Barney Newman's Spit VIII, but it's the one in the photo in Late Marque Spitfire Aces, page 81. Note the 41 Squadron badge under the cockpit.
(http://i152.photobucket.com/albums/s199/guppy35/BarneyNewman.jpg)
Almost forgot I had it in the photo collection. Barney Newman and his 79 Squadron Spitfire VIII
(http://i152.photobucket.com/albums/s199/guppy35/Newman79.jpg)
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I know the yanks hated having the RNZAF around cos we nicked their parts all the time, maybe the aussies were worse (not surprising given their ancestory).
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Clive Caldwell and Bobby Gibbs weren't to happy with the situation at the time for the previously stated reasons, and did a bit of complaining about it as well.
The RAAF tried to shut them up by bringing up charges of using there spits to fly grog in for the boys. I think that 1 of the guys actualy had a bit of art work put on his spit with "Have a Grog" as the caption as a statement. I think they ended up with a repramand.
Some of the ground troops werent to happy either with risking there lives on isolated garrisons that were "withering on the grape vine", when they could have been used in a push north.
I new an old Digger that was with the first Aussie troops allowed into Japan after the surrender, he used to show me a sword he collected from a Japanese officer in New Guinea.
He used to say that Mac Arthur only wanted his boys in on the job, but I am sure that the Yank Troops would have been happy to share their foxholes with anybody willing to help.
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This subject is an interesting one and this BBS isn't really a place where it is likely to illuminated successfully.
That said, there are two parts to your question that aren't necessarily linked inextricably. The Spitfire and the mutiny are separate matters. The first TAF mutiny had more factors than a simple reaction to the Supreme Commander's strategic views.
Politically there was a strong push in Washington by the Dutch to regain control over the NEI. There was a similar concern about re-establishing control over North Borneo and Malaya by the British. These pressures didn't carry much weight at the strategic sharp end, as Macarthur knew that his possession of the Philippines had effectively isolated all Japanese forces to his west. They were a pure political concern. Okinawa was now taken and the fight was clearly headed to the home islands.
About the same time expressions of concern were raised about possible threats to the vast fuel supply chain needed to keep the gigantic war machine rolling to Japan. The nearby East Indies and Borneo oil fields were still in Japanese hands and denied to the Allies even if they were no now use to Japan. (Remember why this Pacific war started?)
It was decided to send Australian troops to recapture North Borneo. Under agreements long in place, the RAAF were to provide the main air support to Australian operations. The army goes, so does the RAAF. In April 1944 North Borneo looked like a backwater (as distinct from today of course).
The oilfield concerns provided impetus to the political pressure about relieving the East Indies and Malaya. There were moves to send Dutch troops to Australia for the NEI liberation operations. London saw an opportunity to regain some territory and prestige in the area. The Australians didn't like being taken out of the main thrust to Japan to be "wasted" in what they saw to be a backwater sideshow to shore up the British Empire. This was also reflected at the highest level of Government. They believed that they had earned the right to sit at the surrender table and weren't happy about the possibility of being cut out now the end game was nigh.
That is just the basic background. There were many internal factors at play. The RAAF was split into two arms, Operational and Administrative. The operational commander, Bostock, had a greater affinity with Kenney of the 5th AF than the Admin people in Canberra. In fact it was worse than this; he hated the Administrative boss Jones with a passion. It was mutual. This meant, at best, difficulties in the supply chain to the front. This animosity was no secret from the Officers at the sharp end. There was a feeling that the support people at home were out of touch. The RAAF were forced to draw supplies from US sources. (These were of superior quality which also didn't help morale when Australian supplies became available anyway). At times squadron personnel were forced into unloading ships instead of servicing aircraft. Replacement personnel weren't coming through and tours were being extended. People weren't enjoying the war much.
Group Captain Arthur had been making the case in TAF since the end of 44 that the way they were being used was wasteful. He felt (and it was later borne out) that on some raids they suffered more damage than they inflicted. The local powers that be showed little concern or interest in his view. The local AOC was Air Commodore Cobby a WW1 ace. He was generally accepted as a reasonable person but there was little respect held for his staff. Some further local animosity came out of a beer trading scandal. Simply, the Australians were issued beer. The Americans were issued money but no beer. Some Australians liked money more than beer. A number of Officers became involved in the trade and were dealt with strongly by Cobby's staff. Noses out of joint.
Things were ripe for trouble. Arthur convinced a number of senior Officers to submit their resignations. The papers offered no reason for the resignations and no reasons were forthcoming at interview. Bostock queried them without success. General Kenney himself came down to talk sense and fairplay to them also without success. Jones arrived from Australia, ordered an investigation and sacked Cobby and his two senior staff Officers. It wasn't pretty. Effectiveness of the force had to have been affected.
The investigation was reported in the official war record thusly:
"The fundamental cause seems to have been the conviction of a group of young leaders
that they were engaging in operations that were not militarily justifiable—
a conviction widely shared also by many Australian soldiers and Australian
political leaders . It is perhaps significant that several of them had served
with distinction in a critical period in the Middle East . After that the
operations of 1944 and 1945 were particularly frustrating . The subsequent
inquiry made it clear that almost everyone concerned acted from the
highest motives, and was convinced that, in the crisis, he acted wisely ."
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The Spitfire problem is a little easier.
The greatest shortage as the Allied thrust travelled north west was in fact space. When a new airfield became available it also quickly became crowded. Kenney was very insistent that valuable space wasn't to be wasted. An example of that was his banning of Vultee Vengeances. He reasoned that instead of sending out 12 P40s as fighter cover to 12 Vengeances, he could simply send out 12 Kittyhawks with bombs instead. This saved a huge amount of space on an airfield and also reduced stress on his supply chain.
Spitfires were another aircraft type to be supplied. The supply train from Australia (ultimately the UK) was difficult and at times unreliable. It took time to get them there and then bring them into action. By April 45 there was in fact very little to air to air warfare in the area. The Japanese supply line had been finally cut off.
Before this supply was almost non-existent due to the extraordinarily successful submarine warfare waged by the US Navy. Nothing was safe from them. Not even sampans in the surf! Aircraft parts for even general maintenance weren't forthcoming. A single attack by low level Beaufighters could be enough to completely take a Japanese field out of the equation. They couldn't sustain offensive ops of any real threat after the Philippines fell.
Attack planes and bombers were of far more use to Kenney. The Spitfires weren't outstanding in that role and their pilots viewed ground attacks as misuse. They probably didn't get high priority, but moving 452 from Darwin to Morotai still happened in late 44. There was no need to bring any more certainly. Sporadic nuisance night attacks by Japanese raiders were to be answered by the introduction of P61s.
The first TAF was able to provide Beaufighters, Mosquitos, B24s, Boomerangs and Wirraways and Kittyhawks to support Australian and Allied operations in the area as well as the Spits. The Spits having no real enemy in the air to fight weren't generally able to be used in that role.
79 Squadron had much the same fortunes at Goodenough Island when they took their Spit 5s there in 43.
The straight line distance from Morotai in the Halmaheras to Davao is about 350nm - mainly over water. Spit 8's don't fly that distance, fight and then come home happily. It's not just the Spits that weren't used though. Australian Air field construction units and sigint units went to the Philippines. Not much else. It was kept as a generally all-American show for practical and easily understood political reasons. It's what happened after the Philippines that caused the greater upset.
Here's a Google Map pic of the airfield today.
http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=2.0453381,128.32567&z=15&t=h&hl=en
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"The fundamental cause seems to have been the conviction of a group of young leaders
that they were engaging in operations that were not militarily justifiable—
a conviction widely shared also by many Australian soldiers and Australian
political leaders . It is perhaps significant that several of them had served
with distinction in a critical period in the Middle East . After that the
operations of 1944 and 1945 were particularly frustrating . The subsequent
inquiry made it clear that almost everyone concerned acted from the
highest motives, and was convinced that, in the crisis, he acted wisely ."
Great account, Dantoo, thank you very much.
Boiled down to its essentials, the Brits committed the Australians to a meaningless but dangerous operation just so that they could be fighting somewhere.
Kind of like the Italian campaign.
- oldman
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Really informative, gents! Guppy, I do not have that picture in my book... don't tell me we have different versions of the same book!
Thanks so much Dantoo. I was actually looking at that same airfield as I read your post. However, isn't it so that a Spitfire VIII equipped with a 90-gallon Imperial Drop Tank fly far enough to easily reach Mindanao? Or was the supply train limited with these DT's?
It is too bad, however, that no Beaufighters attacked Japanese positions in Mindanao...I understand that the primary role for the Spitfire was air-to-air combat and that smaller, more mobile obsolete fighters could do the jabo work, though the Spitfire would be the first choice in escorting Beaufighters to attack Japanese positions in Mindanao. Though it was more practical for the US Navy to attack the Philippines, it also makes much sense for the Allies to somehow band together to take the enemy ASAP. However, I do not fully make this claim since I don't understand the politics involved which stopped the Aussies from participating.
It would have been lovely if those chaps could put their crap aside and work hard to defeat the enemy. Perhaps then, less Filipinos, Americans and Australians would have died unnecessarily. Though 'unnecessarily' in itself is up to debate I suppose.
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I've got no information on the availability of drop tanks. I know there were air-ground strikes flown by the 3 Spitfire Squadrons in the Darwin Area out of Melville Island. The distance from Pularumpi to Dili is not much shorter than we are talking about here so they had to have some additional fuel.
The fact is though it would need 90 gal drop tanks to make the round trip and we're only talking as far north as Davao. With those aboard, perhaps they wouldn't be much use in the ground attack role, but they may have been able to do escort duties. They did do some of that with the Beaufighters on other targets. There were better aircraft available in the P38s and P47s for the long range escort. Something of a parallel to the Europe experience.
So there were practical as well as political considerations. These complemented each other.
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If I remember my history right Brit and Aussies Spitfire units had a troubled early history in the ATO and it caused some conflicts with the Americans. Basically their tactics used against the IJN were flawed and it took awhiles for them to change them. Even then the Spit was never the equal of Yank Jabos in range, versatility, and B&Z. The very things that destroyed the IJN.
I'm going from memory but didn't MacArthur himself question whether Spit equipped squadrons could even defend Australian air space, at some time in '42 or '43, after some debacle where a bunch of spits were shot down? Did all this "poisen the well" so to speak between the Allies early on?
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Some info of that time & what happens when the boys have to much time on their hands. Court Martial the Ace - Caldwell V the RAAF
"There is money to be made in liquor up at Morotai, so if you want to earn a few extra shillings you can sell liquor for me"
Caldwell to his batman, Darwin, late November 1944.
In late 1944 Caldwell moved his Spitfire Wing from Darwin to Morotai expecting to see at least some action against the enemy. Over the following months he became embroiled in a battle not so much with the enemy but the RAAF over allegations relating to illegal liquor trading on the 'black market'. This led to his arrest, Court Martial and a far reaching government enquiry into 1st TAF, RAAF.
Up at Morotai
On the 22nd of December, 1944, the first flight of Spitfires from No. 80 Wing led by its Commanding Officer Grp/Cpt Caldwell touched down at Morotai, a small coral island in the Halmaheras Group. The wing had left Darwin to be part of the RAAF's 1st TAF, a mobile strike force equipped with Bostons, Beaufighters, Kittyhawks and now Spitfires. Morotai had developed into a huge army and air force base populated with thousands of US and Australian servicemen. In preparation for the wings move, Caldwell had visited the island in November, 1944 with Squadron Leader Harpham to organise construction of a camp to house the wing's personnel.
The task seemed impossible to achieve as it soon became clear that the RAAF had neither the supplies nor equipment to enable a camp to be erected on the island to accommodate the wing. By contrast, the US Air force on the island was well equipped and had all the necessary machinery and equipment. Caldwell and his adjutant S/L Harpham approached the Americans for help. To obtain the Americans prompt assistance in supplying machinery and equipment and to foster goodwill, presents of liquor were made to a number of American officers. With the invaluable assistance and goodwill of the Americans, the camp was made reasonably habitable by the time the wing started to arrive on the island.
It was during this visit that Caldwell became alive to the possibility of selling liquor to servicemen on the island where demand for the product far exceeded its available supply. Liquor trading between Australian and US servicemen was a common activity in the South West Pacific and New Guinea. In contrast to other theatres of war where it was relatively easy to obtain liquor, recreation and entertainment at the nearest town or metropolitan centre, servicemen in the Pacific had limited avenues of escape from the monotony of camp life. The South West Pacific in WWII was nothing like a tropical paradise; it was an alien environment, sparsely populated with natives whose way of life had changed little since the stone-age. On his return to Darwin Caldwell remarked to his batman Corporal Parker, "There is money to be made in liquor up at Morotai, so if you want to earn a few extra shillings you can sell liquor for me". Parker was of a like mind and willingly took part in the venture. Later Caldwell claimed the remark was never made or at the very least it was misinterpreted by Parker, but subsequent events and investigations provided no support for this claim.
When Caldwell landed on the island with No.452 Squadron he had a bottle of whisky in the cockpit and nearly 5 dozen bottles of whisky, gin, beer and wine in an accompanying C.47 transport loaded with the squadrons equipment and supplies. It wasn't long before Parker came to Caldwell saying he knew of some Americans who wanted to buy some liquor. On Christmas day 1944, Corporal Parker, sold 2 to 4 bottles of whisky he had acquired from Caldwell to some American servicemen. From then on, Parker sold liquor on behalf of Caldwell 3 to 4 times a week in return for a commission or 'tip' of approximately 10% of the proceeds up until the 12th of January. On this day, Parker was out selling liquor for Caldwell when he met up with some American servicemen. While in the company of his new friends he got drunk and the money collected from the liquor sales he had made that day was either lost or stolen from him.
After this incident, LAC (Leading Aircraftsman) Charter, a steward attached to No. 80 wing HQ, started selling Caldwell's liquor. Charter together with LAC Fitzroy and Caldwell's batman Cpl. Parker would load the bottles into haversacks and go around to the various American camps to sell it. Carrying haversacks filled with bottles was heavy work so Charter asked Caldwell if he could get a jeep for them. Caldwell got them a jeep and on the 1st of April Charter, Fitzroy and Parker set off in their new transport to the American camps. Carrying their haversacks, Charter and Fitzroy entered one of the American camps while Parker waited for them in the jeep. Upon entering one the tents they were apprehended by American MP's and taken into custody. After waiting a while Parker assumed they had found some buyers so he returned to No. 80 wing HQ unaware of the fate of his companions in the camp. The next day Parker told Caldwell that Charter and Fitzroy had not returned to camp and it seemed likely they had been caught by the MP's. He advised Caldwell that in the circumstances it would be wise to hide any liquor they had. Caldwell agreed, and Parker took the crates and bottles from Charter's and Caldwell's tent and hid it in a slit trench.
The MP's arrive
Caught red handed by the American MP's, Charter and Fitzroy knew there was little point in denying their actions. They were handed over to the RAAF Service Police where they made full and frank statements. The next day Flying Officer Schweppes, Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal, Service Police Unit, interviewed Caldwell and told him Charter and Fitzroy had made statements to the effect that they had sold liquor on his behalf. At first Caldwell denied he had any involvement in the sales but at a later interview he admitted the airman were indeed telling the truth and also added he had transacted some further sales himself.
In consequence of the investigations made by Schweppes, the AOC of 1st TAF, Air Commodore Cobby, suspended Caldwell from his appointment as CO of No. 80 Wing. On the 10th of April he was placed under open arrest and notified that charges were to be laid against him. The charges related to sales of liquor in breach of ABO 'N' 548 and these breaches constituted conduct to the prejudice of good order and air force discipline under Section 40 of the Air Force Act. Air Board Order 'N' 548 prohibited the importation and sale of alcoholic liquor into the Pacific Area by members of the RAAF. Strictly speaking the importation of a single bottle of liquor for personal consumption was a breach of the order but such an act was unlikely to attract or warrant a charge under Section 40.
A Field General Court Martial was convened on the 18th of April but due to the absence of defending counsel it did not commence until the 21st. Court Martial proceedings had already been taken against Wing Commander Gibbes based on Charters evidence of sales he made on his behalf. The charges were similar to those against Caldwell in that he sold liquor in contravention of ABO 'N' 548 and that in the particular circumstances outlined in the charge, this constituted conduct to the prejudice of good order and air force discipline. Gibbes simply pleaded guilty to all three charges even though he had yet to arrive at Morotai by the date specified in the first charge. He was sentenced to be reduced in rank to Flight Lieutenant but the AOC, 1st TAF varied the sentence to Squadron Leader. By the time Caldwells defence council arrived on the 21st of April, 1st TAF staff were too busy preparing for operations at Tarakan and Borneo to conduct the proceedings so it was decided to dissolve the court and release Caldwell from arrest. This however was not the end of the matter and Caldwell did appear before a Court Martial after the end of the war.
Caldwell's Allegations
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Part II On the 9th of April Caldwell sent a minute to the AOC 1st TAF Air Commodore Cobby giving him his version of events. In the minute he emphasis the exchange of alcohol with the Americans to obtain equipment and supplies for his Wing that were unobtainable from the RAAF. He also gives the impression that the idea of selling alcohol was Parker's and it was he who suggested to him, to sell liquor. Although Caldwell was trying to put himself in the role of a participant rather than principle in the liquor sales, as their commanding officer he readily accepted responsibility for the actions of Parker, Charter and Fitzroy and asked for leniency in their punishment.
In the minute to Cobby, Caldwell went on to say he was aware of liquor sales by officers senior to him in rank and appointment but that no action was ever taken against them. He contended that the 'N' order prohibiting the importation and trading of liquor in the Pacific was an order accepted by all as 'more honoured in the breach than the observance'. As far as Caldwell was concerned, it seemed unjust to taken disciplinary action against him in these circumstances and he asked Cobby to lend protection to him against what he described as 'discriminating punishment'. If this incident was to be used to make an example of him, he requested that Cobby terminate his commission in the RAAF.
Cobby replied to Caldwell's minute directing him to provide details of the alleged sales by senior officers and that as far as he could see there was no 'discriminating punishment' or desire to make an example of him. His request to terminate his commission was denied. With reluctance, Caldwell supplied details as he understood them of liquor sales by senior officers and the use of RAAF aircraft in its transportation. It was this communication that led the government to set up a 'Royal Commission of Enquiry' to investigate the matter.
Royal Commission
On the 11th of May 1945, the Minister of State for Air, Arthur Drakeford appointed John Barry KC (Kings Counsel) to investigate liquor trading in the RAAF with particular reference to the allegations made by Caldwell. In addition to liquor trading, the Commissioner was also directed to investigate why eight senior RAAF officers sought to resign their commissions at Morotai on the 20th of April 1945. These resignations were a separate and distinct issue with no connection to the liquor investigation. Due to the national security implications of the investigation, proceedings were heard in private and the report was not released to the public. The Commissioner wasted no time in gathering evidence and flew up to Morotai to gather statements with the assistance of two police detectives assigned to the commission. A major part of his investigation related to the allegations made by Caldwell in his minute to the AOC of 1st TAF,Air Commodore Cobby.
Caldwell alleged that the AOC's personal aircraft, a Lockheed Ventura was used early in April to transport a 'load of grog' from the mainland to Morotai. The Commissioner found the allegation was substantiated even though he found the term 'load of grog' was a little misleading as there were in fact only 3 cases of beer containing four dozen bottles each. One of the cases were for the medical personnel of the RAAF hospital and the remainder for a party Cobby planned to have for officers of 1st TAF before they embarked for operations on Tarakan. Clearly this importation was a breach of ABO 'N' 548 prohibiting the importation of liquor to the area but importantly the liquor was not used or imported for trading purposes.
Caldwell's allegation with respect to Air Vice Marshal Bladin were based on a conversation he over heard between Bladin and his adjutant S/L Lindeman during a poker game at Morotai. According to Caldwell, Lindeman had been out trying to trade liquor for American cigarettes on behalf of Bladin. At the time Caldwell made the allegation he was unaware of subsequent events involving Bladin's Hudson at Essendon Airport. Bladin left Morotai in a Hudson and returned to Essendon Airport near Melbourne on the 23rd January 1945. Awaiting its arrival were Customs Officials who had received an anonymous tipoff that the aircraft was loaded with American cigarettes. The Customs Officers inspected the aircraft but found nothing. They then went across to Hut 11 where the Hudson crew were billeted. Hidden in the ceiling they found a considerable store of American cigarettes. The commissioner considered the cigarettes were brought to Essendon in Bladin's Hudson, most likely stored in the bomb bay. All those who had been in the Hudson however swore they had no knowledge of the cigarettes. The commissioner simply could not establish beyond reasonable doubt whether Bladin knew the cigarettes were on board the aircraft or whether he had been involved in any trade of liquor for cigarettes. Obviously somebody knew the cigarettes were there, but without an admission of guilt from their own lips the Commissioner was left with only suspicions and inference.
According to Caldwell, Air Commodore De La Rue while touring Dutch New Guinea in 1944 exchanged a bottle of whisky for an American Carbine (rifle). The Commissioner found that although Caldwell honestly believed this event had occurred based on what others had told him, investigations by the commissioner could find no evidence to substantiate the allegation.
Caldwell went on to described how Kittyhawks based at Noemfoor had been used to import liquor. On the 26th of September, the wing leader of No. 78 Wing, W/C L Jackson, together with 4 other kittyhawks took off from Noemfoor for a strike on the Tenimber Islands. They bombed and strafed installations at Saumlak after which the Kittyhawks flew on to Darwin where arrangements had been made to pick up liquor supplies before proceeding back to Noemfoor. With their bottles of liquor loaded in the wing ammo bays and cockpit the Kittyhawks left Darwin on the 30th and returned to Noemfoor. Not surprisingly, they made no attacks on the return journey! At Noemfoor the liquor was distributed amongst the RAAF units and Command house of No.10 Operational Group. Another flight was made on the 4th of October . This time they bombed and strafed installations on Kei Island which is adjacent to Tenimber Island. At Darwin liquor supplies were obtained and Jackson, who had finished his operational tour, remained at Darwin to proceed south to a new posting.
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Part III The question before the Commissioner was whether these flight had any operational value or were they simply an excuse to obtain liquor as alleged by Caldwell. Commissioner Barry found that the first flight had some operational value but it would probably have not been made if had it not been for the possibility of obtaining liquor at Darwin. As for the second flight, Barry dismissed claims by Cobby, Gibson, Jackson and some of the pilots who took part that it had operational value. The commissioner found that the flight was made for two reasons. Firstly, Jackson was keen to return to the mainland after completing his tour of operations at Noemfoor and this flight gave him the quickest and easiest exit from Noemfoor. Secondly, the flight was made to pick up liquor supplies from Darwin. Again Caldwell's allegation was found to be true but the Commissioner also acknowledged that those who authorised the flights and who took part in it, were not at the time aware of the prohibitions contained in ABO 'N' 548.
It was also alleged that shortly after the Tenimbar flights Group Captain Gibson and W/C Strudwick traveled in a Beaufort from Noemfoor to Darwin to inspect No. 80 Wing, who were soon to move north and join 1st TAF. While at Darwin they took the opportunity to stocked up on liquor for the return journey. At Noemfoor they distributed the liquor amongst 1st TAF HQ and units of 77, 78 and 81 Wings. The Commissioner found this to be true but again as with the Kittyhawk flights, those involved were not aware of the prohibitions contained in ABO 'N' 548.
The Commissioners terms of reference went beyond Caldwell's allegations to include all importation and trading of liquor within 1st TAF. He found that many in 1st TAF had imported small quantities of liquor into Morotai for their own consumption or to share with friends but significantly only two officers, Caldwell and Gibbes, were identified as having brought liquor into Morotai for the purpose of selling it for cash. Both had imported liquor in considerable quantities with the express intention of selling it for cash at Morotai. It was Caldwell who conceived the idea of selling alcohol and the Commissioner accepted Parkers evidence that Caldwell said to him at Darwin before embarking for Morotai "There is money to be made in liquor up at Morotai, so if you want to earn a few extra shillings you can sell liquor for me". More than a few shillings was made from the sales by Caldwell. It was estimated by the Commissioner he earned in the order of £475 from the sales, which in 1945 was a considerable sum of money. As the Commissioner pointed out, their involvement in liquor sales only came to light due to Charter and Fitzroy being caught in the act by American MP's. Without their statements nobody, other than the participants, would have known about the sales. There may well have been other officers and airmen in 1st TAF who sold liquor, but unless they were caught by the MP's they were most unlikely to come forward now and admit their involvement. Surprisingly, there were a small number of officers and airmen who did freely admit to the commission that they had breached ABO 'N' 548 and imported liquor, notably not to sell it, but for their own consumption. With the exception of Caldwell and Gibbes only seventeen other members of 1st TAF were identified by the Commissioner as having sold liquor for cash or in exchange for goods, usually American cigarettes. In each of these cases the quantity was only one or two bottles of beer or spirits.
Commissioner Barry examined the effect of breaches of ABO 'N' 548 under the circumstances exiting in 1st TAF, in particular whether the order was so disregarded that Caldwell's conduct could not be deemed to be conduct to the prejudice of good order and air force discipline. Part of his terms of reference was to consider whether a consistent disregard of an order by senior officers, abrogated the effect of the order such that a breach by a subordinate officer could not amount to conduct to the prejudice of good order and air force discipline. He found Caldwell's offences were in a different category to those in his allegations with the exception of those relating to Bladin and De La Rue. Caldwell sold liquor for a high profit and used junior airmen under his command while the senior officers referred to in his allegations imported but did not trade liquor. Allegations against Bladin and De La Rue involved trading in liquor but in both these cases the allegation was not substantiated. In the circumstances existing on Morotai, it could not be claimed that there was an abrogation of the order on the basis of the conduct of senior officers particularly as it relates to the class of breach involving liquor trading as apposed to liquor importation for personal use.
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Part IV The Commissioner found that liquor importation into the Pacific area by members of 1st TAF in RAAF aircraft was a common occurrence. From the evidence available to him these importations were small in quantity and for personal consumption. He was not able to uncover any large scale importation and sale by members of 1st TAF with the exception of Caldwell and to a lesser extent W/C Gibbes. It should be noted that the Commissioner had no authority to enquire into liquor importation and sales by American servicemen in the Pacific. As he pointed out, the mere existence of established prices for liquor in the region suggests there was an active 'black market' for liquor. Clearly this market existed before Caldwell's arrival at Morotai and he was almost certainly only a minor player in it.
General Court Martial
Court Martial proceeding were still pending against Caldwell after the adjournment of the Field Court Martial at Morotai in April 1945. It was not until the 4th of January 1946 a General Court Martial presided over by AVM S Goble was convened at No. 2 Personnel Depot, RAAF, Bradfield Park, NSW. The defending counsel asked for an adjournment to allow them more time to prepare their case. An adjournment was granted and the court reconvened on the 16th of January, 1946.
Four charges were made against Caldwell relating to selling liquor at Morotai. Each charge detailed breaches of ABO 'N' 548 constituting conduct to the prejudice of good order and air force discipline under Section 40 of the Air Force Act. The court took each charge in turn, the first was that between the 22nd of December 1944 and 15th February 1945 he sold liquor through the agency of Cpl. Parker.
The evidence against Caldwell was essentially the same as had been submitted in the Royal Commission, in particular the testimony of Cpl Parker, LAC Charter and F/O Schweppes. There was little the defending counsel could do to disprove the facts of the case as Caldwell had already admitted his involvement in liquor sales with his batman Parker.
Their defence was based on showing to the court that breaches of ABO 'N' 548 by others senior to Caldwell were such as to abrogate the applicability of the order. These events were outlined in a written statement by Caldwell that was submitted to the court. As the prosecution pointed out, much of the content of this statement was irrelevant to the charge before the court. Portions of the statement relating to importation of liquor by senior officers were the same ones that the Commissioner investigated as part of the Royal Commission. Part of the statement read, 'I have heard the Chief of Air Staff (Air Vice Marshal Jones) say himself that he had been informed that his own personal Pilot (Squadron Leader Upjohn) had taken liquor on the C.A.S’s aircraft on occasions between August 1944 and May 1945 when he had been making duty flights to areas outside Australia including 1st T.A.F. However, the Chief of the air Staff made no enquiries of Squadron Leader Upjohn, nor did he direct any investigation into the allegation, nor did he have communication with Squadron Leader Upjohn’s Commanding Officer. To my mind that indicates pretty clearly the real importance attached by the highest ranking Air Force Authority of importing liquor from Australia to the Islands and having sold it'.
To explain his actions, defending council called the highest ranking officer in the RAAF, AVM Jones, Chief of Air Staff to appear before the court. He proved to be a most reluctant witness, loath to answer any questions put to him. He did however confirm that he had been advised by his personal assistant S/L Palmer, of a rumor that Upjohn had transported liquor for sale into the Pacific area between August 1944 and April 1945. Upon hearing this, Jones admitted he did not enquire into the matter or ask Upjohn for an explanation.
It was also argued that Caldwell's conduct did not actually prejudice good order and air force discipline. To this end they had witnesses testify to the high discipline of Caldwell and the Wing under his command. This interpretation was challenged by the prosecution who pointed out that the charge under Section 40 did not hinge on proving actual prejudice to discipline but that the conduct had a tendency to have this effect. Further to this, given the nature of the transaction, any liquor sales would have been made in secret and since no one knew other than the participants to the transaction, it could not therefore have had any effect on good order and air force discipline.
Given that Caldwell admitted involvement in the sale of liquor through the agency of his batman Corporal Parker, the facts were for the most part not in dispute. The question was whether these circumstances amounted to conduct to the prejudice of good order and air force discipline. By the term 'good order', it is meant conduct that is not right and proper judged by the standards of the general community to which the air force belongs. There is little doubt that Caldwell's conduct was not right and proper but it must also be shown to prejudice air force discipline. Defending council presented witnesses who testified to the high discipline of Caldwell and the Wing in which he commanded. As mentioned in the Royal Commission instances of breaches were presented to try and prove an abrogation of the 'N' order. In his report the Royal Commissioner preempted the decision of the court. Essentially Caldwell's breach of the 'N' order was in a different class to those other breaches given in evidence. As the Commissioner and Judge Advocate pointed out, breaches of the 'N' order involving importation of liquor for personal consumption or to give away is in a different category to importation and sale of liquor. The former while technically a breach of the 'N' order, does not constitute an offence under section 40 while the latter, being of a different character, is a breach that in the circumstances does constitute an offence.
On the 18th of January the Court found Caldwell guilty of the first charge. Following the verdict the prosecution advised the court it would not proceed with the second and third charges, leaving only the fourth charge to be dealt with. Caldwell and his defending counsel knew there was little point fighting the last charge given the adverse finding on the first, so Caldwell simply pleaded guilty to the charge. He was sentenced to be reduced in rank to Flight Lieutenant. This sentence was however not as severe as it first appears; Caldwell held the rank of Acting Group Captain with a substantive rank of Squadron Leader; only one step above Flight Lieutenant.
At the time charges were first laid against him at Morotai, Caldwell suggests in his minute to Cobby that the proceedings against him were motivated in a quest to make an example of him and seemed venal in nature and discriminatory. Commissioner Barry could find no evidence to support this but the question still remains as to why charges were persisted with well after the end of the war. After the Barry Commission, there probably would have been ill feelings towards Caldwell by some sections of the air force and government. Whether this was a factor in the decision to proceed with the court martial is a matter of conjecture that is unlikely to ever be resolved.
Closure
A month after his court appearance, Caldwell left the RAAF and returned to civilian life. The Court Martial and Royal Commission did not have any long lasting effect on the RAAF; apart from some negative press comment at the time it was soon forgotten by the public as their thoughts centered on the promise and challenges of peace. As for Caldwell, the personal skills that helped make him such a successful fighter pilot and leader during the war were applied with equal success in the world of commerce. Although his conduct on Morotai was by any standard inappropriate, it can not erase or tarnish his significant contribution to the war effort.
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Briliiant write-up Lyric!
I'll be sure to favourite this thread just in case i need some reference. Where did you gain all this information?
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Briliiant write-up Lyric!
I'll be sure to favourite this thread just in case i need some reference. Where did you gain all this information?
From here. http://www.pacificspitfires.com/index.html