Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => Aircraft and Vehicles => Topic started by: Lance on March 15, 2002, 08:29:52 PM
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Did the Japanese effectively do us a favor by destroying our battleships at Pearl Harbor? If these had been available to oppose Japan after the outbreak of the war, would Nimitz have adhered to more traditional naval doctrine?
Essentially, I am wondering to what degree Nimitz' embracing of the new power of naval air was foresight on his part or due to necessity as most of his battleships were sunk or heavily damaged in Pearl Harbor.
If anyone has any particular insights, toss 'em out.
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Big guns are loud.
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With the battle ships the US would likely have implemented Case orange and lost the battle ships and the carriers to long lances in early 42. So I would think that what you say is true. But its more true that the US was saved from its own doctrine by pearl harbour.
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here's another one
can't remember where i saw this but during the pearl harbour attack there was a very large fuel depot/refinery close by that was untouched by the attack had that been destroyed it would have set back us naval ops back 6-9 months.
japanese pilots flew over or near this but was not on there target list so they ignored it
so that means that midway would not have happened the way it did the japanese would have been basically unopposed. and with out the losses of ships they would have pretty much had free reign of the pacific.
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Pongo, what the flip is case orange? That is the first I have heard of it.
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Case Orange(might have gotten the name wrong ill look) was the US war plan for war in the pacific. Involving a containment in the far east while the pac fleet rolled to a confrontation with the IJN. The Japanese equivilent relied on a picket of fleet subs to patrol aircraft to locate the USN and force a night battle. The Japs hoped to counter the greater tonnage of the USN by effective use of Long lance at night and intensive training in night shooting.
Going by the results of the first few engagements at Guadicanal the Pac fleet would have got spanked quite badley befor they could learn the error in their ways and learn to trust thier Radars and avoid the Long lance.
Certainly the string of fierce and costly but non conclusive night engagements in Iron Bottom sound taught the USN how to effectivly counter the Japanes at night.
If you replace those string of battles with one Jutland size all or nothing battle then the War might have gotten very interesting.
As Case orange involved including the fleet CVs as an intregal part of the fleet. They would have been very much at risk.
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Even if Nimitz had stuck to the old BB- backboned fleet , the US wouldve still produced a crapload more battleships than the IJN.
Engagements would also have been somewhat "balanced". US had incredible fire control systems and radar, but the IJN had monsters like the Yamato and the Musashi (and a 3rd, Shinano, being built). They made the Bismark look like a patrol boat. Plus with USN having cracked the IJN codes... well, i'd say things are stacked into the USN favor.
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Thanks, Pongo.
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This question can never truly be answered, maybe without pearl harbor, the U.S. would have remained a "neutral" support nation.
Imagine that hitler would have taken russia, europe and asia, imagine this; the u.s and the nazi empire as close friends, exchanging shnaps for whisky. :eek:
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Your right Alpha. But these things can be fun to theorize about.
It certainly could be mused that America might not have gone to such a major war footing without pearl. Maybe resolve might have wavered for such a long costly war.
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Good point AlphaTwo. Roosevelt was leaning towards war but he didn't have a lot of support. I wonder if an invasion of Britain would have triggered a US response.
Charon
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Unlikely Charon.
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what if the US carriers had been at pearl? would the Japs had managed to capture Midway and Hawaii? Would we speak Japanese now, at least on the West Coast?
I think that even if the US battleships had been left intact after the attack, the naval war would have been the same. The fact that carriers are such a formidable weapon would have emerged eventually.
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what if the US carriers had been at pearl? would the Japs had managed to capture Midway and Hawaii? Would we speak Japanese now, at least on the West Coast?
IMO, the end result of the war would have been the same, but the pacific conflict would have been longer by at least a year. Midway would have fallen, Hawaii might have fallen but I think they would have had to do it as part of the initial attack, and as a main thrust at the expense of other operations. However, by 1943, once we got cranking in the shipyards and other industries, the war was a foregone conclusion.
Charon
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Had the carriers been destroyed it would have been longer than a year, guaranteed. The US didn't have all of the resources for the battleships let alone the CV's.
Charon you are absolutely right, Roosevelt had too many investors in the German Reich. Henry Ford's picture was behind hitler's desk. Ford had given Hitler many trucks for military purposes. My grandfather despised FDR for all that he was worth until his death in May 1998. He was a Marine and fought at Guam, Okinawa and the cleaning up of China. FDR had split the Marines in half 3 Marine Divisions per Theater and my grandfather never forgave him for that.
Germany would never have captured Russia, it would have been the worst battle on record, IMO. The Intelligence Bureau headed by Sir William Stephenson was impressive. The whole Barbarossa offensive was delayed three months because of Tito and he "supposed uprising in Romania and the Balkans". This was all false info. that was being fed to the Reich's highest officials. Read "A Man Called intrepid" by Sir William Stephenson. He actually was prevented from writing this until 1973 so names would not be extruded from CIA operatives and in the British Spy Rings. This is one of the best books I have ever read having ANYTHING to do with WWII.
As long as Hitler was in charge they could only bully around the smaller countries, not Russia. this is my opinion. This is a fun topic to discuss and I hope this may come to the top of the list again.
Jay
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Yeah, it did the allies a favor, by bringing the US into the war of course, bit mistake for Japan
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An intact BB fleet might have been able to rescue the tens of thousands of troops trapped on the Philippine Islands, which would have really helped the war effort if they could have pulled it off.
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Originally posted by Jack55
An intact BB fleet might have been able to rescue the tens of thousands of troops trapped on the Philippine Islands, which would have really helped the war effort if they could have pulled it off.
I think this was what both sides were planning before the war - the great battleship engagement somewhere around the Phillippines. I do not hold much confidence that the US would have done well.
- oldman
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Originally posted by Oldman731
I think this was what both sides were planning before the war - the great battleship engagement somewhere around the Phillippines. I do not hold much confidence that the US would have done well.
- oldman
What are you talking about oldman? So long as the engagement took place in daylight, perfect weather, and the enemy didn't manuever, the US would have kicked the crap outta the IJN!
-Sikboy
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Carrier doctrine and its effective use were already being studied and devolped by the USN long before Pearl Harbor. There were 2 exercises in the 30's that really proved the potential of carrier power. There was a mock raid on the Panama Canal by planes from the Saratoga and an eerie mock raid on Pearl Harbor by planes from Lexington and Saratoga (I think those were the two carriers) that was very similar to what happened on December 7.
The loss of the battleships at Pearl only accelerated the development of the carrier doctrine used by the USN. It did not cause it to actually occur. There were many men in the upper echelons of the USN that were fighting to prove that the carrier was the capitol ship of the future, and this was well before the start of the war with Japan.
If you want to know more about this, I suggest reading "The Fast Carriers: the forging of an air navy." It gives a lot of insight into what was going on behind the scenes in the USN prior to the start of the war and during the war.
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In support of Mathman's contention that Carrier Warfare was being well thought out pre-WWII, In his book Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0870215582/qid=1020715129/sr=1-2/ref=sr_1_2/002-4872269-9450450) Wayne, Hughes states that many of the Airdales had even overestimated the killing power of the CV before the war.
[from memory]
Prior to the outbreak of war, elements of the US Naval command considered that a CV would contain the offensive firepower to sink 3 carriers. That is, a Carrier had an offense/defense of 3/1. In the end though, it turned out to be closer to 1/1. In this case, Naval command hadn't underestimated the utility of the CV, but rather, overestimated it.
Sorry I don't have page number citations, but that book is packed away in a box at home lol.
-Sikboy
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As important as the carrier battles of '42 were, it was not until late '43 and '44 though that the power of the carrier was truly realized and appreciated. As a matter of fact, Spruance was still thinking that there was going to be a major surface action as late as Operation Forager (the Marianas Campaign).
As interesting as this argument is, what I find even more interesting is the fact that given the impact that the 4 CV battles of '42 had on the course of the war, the admirals were still planing on a major surface engagement. The reason for this seems to stem from the fact that major admirals (like Nimitz and Spruance) were the ones that were shaping doctrine and they had little personal experience with the air arm.
The political infighting between the brown shoes (airmen) and the black shoes (traditional navy) during the war was very bitter and deep. Some very interesting conflicts (particularly concerning Admiral King) arose. Some of them even seem so bad as to make me wonder how the war in the Pacific was won as quickly as it was (relatively speaking).
Anyways, this is a cool topic.
-math
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Originally posted by Mathman
As important as the carrier battles of '42 were, it was not until late '43 and '44 though that the power of the carrier was truly realized and appreciated. As a matter of fact, Spruance was still thinking that there was going to be a major surface action as late as Operation Forager (the Marianas Campaign).
Surigao Straight. Old School bellybutton kicking, Big Iron style. Also, while the CV battles of 42 can not be dismissed as unimportant, neither can the surface actions off Guadalcanal. Both elements were very important, and both contributed to the outcome of the campaign. Both sides also tended to overstate their cases as well. We can see this just by reviewing the missunderstanding of CV offensive power I noted above, as well as the Insistance on maintaining "plan orange" as the likely head of a IJN USN clash.
Air Vs. Surface power is a constantly changing animal. In 1941 Air held all the cards. The BBs lost at Pearl were not designed to defend themselves from Air Attack. But the new battleships coming out were. By the time we got to the Iowa, fugettaboutit.
!!!WARNING!!! COUNTERFACTUAL, REHTORICAL QUESTION AHEAD!!!
I'd be interested to see how the attack would have gone had the BBs at Pearl had adiquate AA defenses. And we're not just looking at shear number of guns, but also at things like proximity fuses on AA shells.
This point-counterpoint advance of Air vs. Surface power has yet to abait. In the late 70's Air power once again held all the cards. But by the 1986 launching of the USS Bunker Hill (The only ship I ever served on, had to work it in here somehow lol). the SPY-1 Radar/SM2 Missile/Verticle launch system had taken the lead. Since then, Airpower has been working to regain superiority. New Air-launched missiles coming out of Russia have been desigined to get past Aegis. But not to worry, the race continues, as the next generation of Air Defense system is developed.
I guess that my whole point is that these things change much faster than Beauracracy does. And while our technology may be ready to fight todays war, often our policy is ready for yesterdays.
-Sikboy