Aces High Bulletin Board

Camp David: a tragedy of errors
Blaming Arafat for the failure of the peace process is a dangerous mistake
By Robert Malley and Hussein Agha
From The Guardian July 20, 2001
In accounts of the July 2000 Camp David summit and the following months of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, we often hear about Ehud Barak's unprecedented offer and Yasser Arafat's uncompromising "no". Israel is said to have made a historic proposal, which the Palestinians, once again seizing the opportunity to miss an opportunity, turned down. The failure to reach a final agreement is attributed, without notable dissent, to Yasser Arafat.

As orthodoxies go, this is a dangerous one. Broader conclusions take hold. That there is no peace partner is one. That there is no possible end to the conflict with Arafat is another. For a process of such complexity, the diagnosis is remarkably shallow. It ignores history, the dynamics of the negotiations, and the relationships among the three parties. It fails to capture why what so many viewed as a generous Israeli offer, the Palestinians viewed as neither generous, nor Israeli, nor, indeed, as an offer. Worse, it acts as a harmful constraint on American policy by offering up a single, convenient culprit (Arafat) rather than a more nuanced and realistic analysis.
 
Each side came to Camp David with very different perspectives. Ehud Barak was guided by a deep antipathy toward the concept of gradual steps that lay at the heart of the 1993 Oslo agreement. He discarded a number of interim steps, even those to which Israel was formally committed - including a third partial redeployment of troops from the West Bank, the transfer to Palestinian control of three villages abutting Jerusalem and the release of Palestinian prisoners. Concessions to the Palestinians would cost Barak precious political capital that he was determined to husband until the final, climactic moment.
 
Seen from Gaza and the West Bank, Oslo's legacy read like a litany of promises deferred or unfulfilled. Six years after the agreement, there were more Israeli settlements, less freedom of movement, and worse economic conditions. Behind almost all of Barak's moves, Arafat believed he could discern the objective of either forcing him to swallow an unconscionable deal, or mobilising the world to isolate and weaken the Palestinians. Those who claim that Arafat lacked interest in a permanent deal miss the point. Like Barak, the Palestinian leader felt that permanent status negotiations were long overdue; unlike Barak, he did not think that this justified doing away with the interim obligations. In many ways, Barak's actions led to a classic case of misaddressed messages.
 
When Barak reneged on his commitment to transfer the three Jerusalem villages - a commitment he had specifically authorised Clinton to convey to Arafat - Clinton was furious. In the end, though, and on almost all these questionable tactical judgments, the US either gave up or gave in, reluctantly acquiescing out of respect for the things Barak was trying to do. If there is one issue that Israelis agree on, it is that Barak broke every conceivable taboo and went as far as any Israeli prime minister had gone or could go. Even so, it is hard to state with confidence how far Barak was actually prepared to go. Strictly speaking, there never was an Israeli offer. Determined to preserve Israel's position in the event of failure, the Israelis always stopped one, if not several, steps short of a proposal.
 
The ideas put forward at Camp David were never stated in writing, but orally conveyed. In the Palestinians' eyes, they were the ones who made the principal concessions. Arafat was persuaded that the Israelis were setting a trap. His primary objective thus became to cut his losses rather than maximise his gains. That did not mean that he ruled out reaching a final deal; but Palestinian negotiators, with one eye on the summit and another back home, could not accept the ambiguous formulations that had served to bridge differences between the parties in the past and that later, in their view, had been interpreted to Israel's advantage; this time around, only clear and unequivocal understandings would do.

The Camp David proposals were viewed as inadequate: they were silent on the question of refugees, the land exchange was unbalanced, and much of Arab East Jerusalem was to remain under Israeli sovereignty. To accept these proposals in the hope that Barak would then move further risked diluting the Palestinian position in a fundamental way. Meanwhile, America's political and cultural affinity with Israel translated into an acute sensitivity to Israeli domestic concerns and an exaggerated appreciation of Israel's substantive moves. The US team often pondered whether Barak could sell a given proposal to his people, including some he himself had made. The question rarely, if ever, was asked about Arafat.
 
Designed to preserve his assets for the "moment of truth", Barak's tactics helped to ensure that the parties never got there. Many inclined to blame Arafat alone for the collapse of the negotiations, point to his inability to accept the ideas for a settlement put forward by Clinton on December 23, five months after the Camp David talks ended. The president's proposals showed that the distance travelled since Camp David was indeed considerable, and almost all in the Palestinians' direction. Arafat thought hard before providing his response. But Clinton was not presenting the terms of a final deal - rather "parameters" within which accelerated, final negotiations were to take place. With only thirty days left in Clinton's presidency, the likelihood of reaching a deal was remote at best.
 
Offer or no offer, the negotiations that took place between July 2000 and February 2001 make up an indelible chapter in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Taboos were shattered, the unspoken got spoken, and, during that period, Israelis and Palestinians reached an unprecedented level of understanding of what it will take to end their struggle. When the two sides resume their path toward a permanent agreement - and eventually, they will - they will come to it with the memory of those remarkable eight months, the experience of how far they had come and how far they had yet to go, and with the sobering wisdom of an opportunity that was missed by all, less by design than by mistake, more through miscalculation than through mischief.

The full version of this article appears in the August issue of the New York Review of Books.
Robert Malley was adviser to President Clinton on Arab-Israeli affairs; Hussein Agha is senior associate member of St Antony's College, Oxford

another terrorist lover  
smile now when they blow up a mall, building, school in your town
 Eagler

If someone is against violence, I don't see how he could be terribly sympathetic to the Palestinians.
oldman

So what college are you attending? Berkely seems quite active these days in anti-semetism.
Ripsnort  

There will be no peace in the Middle-east untill one side defeats the other and peace can be enforced.
OZkansas  

I’m not sure I can take any side. I do have a question though. What would any other county do if bombs where going off in there country every other day or so for the last 18 months? I’m not sure I totally agree with the actions taken but that doesn’t mean that I can’t understand why they are doing it.

Arafat had the ability to stop this with the creation of Palestinian state, he choose the all or nothing approach. He’s just as responsible as anyone else.
Zippatuh

Yup, that’s right. Arafat is blameless and has nothing to do with the current situation. Then why the hell are we talking to him then if he has nothing to do with it and has no control?

Step up to the plate or sit down. He isn’t doing either.

The argument of still occupying Palestinian land, pre ’67 land, get over it. They’re not getting it back, it will never be negotiated, so saying they are blowing things up because they think the flag should be different over Tel Aviv is crap. It’s not going to happen.

The only reasonable argument for occupation can be made with post ’67 land. Was it right in the first place to move in and plant a flag saying, “Now this is Israel”. No, but it’s not going to change. If indeed this is the fight then it will never end even if the “Palestinian” area is made to be recognized as a state.

From the sound of it we may be straddling the same fence. I’m just not as vocal against Israel as you seem to be. There is so much mud around both camps that anything that can be said has an immediate response from the other side.

What should have been quoted was the kindergarten remark because that’s exactly what is going on here. “Oh yeah! Well, he started it!”

Who started it, who is responsible, how it came to be like this, and where the blame should be placed is exactly what is wrong with the whole situation. Try and correct the situation not find out who the blame should be placed on.

Which leads to the other more constructive thread you started.
 Zippatuh

Originally posted by babek-
Now they plan to build a wall - a really good idea to waste money even faster.
East Germany has shown how expensive it is to build and maintain such a wall.

So - after they all loose enough money - they maybe will reconsider their policy.

It will be interesting to see when the economic effects will get a new negative record because of the actual policy and how the people there react when the next reducements are made.

Originally posted by wsnpr
The State sponsored terrorism by Israel under the guise or 'self defence' is no excuse. Sharon and the Israeli leadership are not interested in peace short of a Greater Israel and buffer zone. Period. All Sharon is insuring is the future continued attacks against Israelis by desperate Palestinian people (mainly those who have lost innocent family and friends from Israeli Military attacks, so called collateral casualties) who no longer have hope of self determination. Hatred and killing breeds more hatred and killing. So, who is retaliating against who?

BTW, I am pro-Israeli AND pro-Palestinian.

Originally posted by Hortlund


Recognize these two quotes wnspr? I dunno if its just me, but that first quote of yours doesnt seem very pro-Israeli actually...

Hypocrite. [/B]