Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => The O' Club => Topic started by: wulfie on August 30, 2002, 04:22:56 AM
-
I used to get paid to research this stuff. I've had the opportunity to look over files, and reports, etc. that most people who actually have lives don't really have the time or inclination to search out.
I don't have a ton of free time right now, so I'm going to start with Yamamoto. If you like what you read and want to see more then let me know and I'll move on to Patton and then Rommel and maybe some others...
===
Yamamoto (I can post alot more in a week or so when I have more time):
A big name with the IJN in the history books. But *did you know?*
A few years after the end of WW2, U.S. Naval Intelligence undertook a very ambitious task - they rounded up all surviving (which was alot, due to copies routed up to fleet HQ) IJN surface warfare AARs, and translated them all, and compared them to USN and all available Allied surface warfare AARs.
The result, compiled by Paul S. Dull, is maybe the best book ever written on surface warfare actions in the Pacific during WW2. It is titled 'A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945' (by Paul S. Dull, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 0 87021 097 1).
Anyone interested in the history of surface warfare engagements in the Pacific in WW2 should have a copy of this book. It is one of the rare cases where a single book can be considered a 'bible' for an entire 'realm' of warfare history.
The level of detail is astonishing - charts showing the exact time, direction, and spread of torpedoes fired by individual destroyers in a surface engagement where there was 20+ suface combatants on each side.
The book also goes a long way towards 'debunking' the 'myth' of Yamamoto - as a fleet commander he really wasn't very impressive. He actually made several very crucial mistakes. He had a tendency to divide his forces where there was no reason to do so, and this allowed the Allies to fight the IJN at much better odds in several crucial engagements in 1942 and early 1943.
For a truly amazing example of superb command of surface warfare elements, get this book and read about the surface warfare actions conducted by the IJN during the battle for Guadalcanal.
Did you know that due to superior optics and a large disparity in night engagement exercises/training (in the favor of the IJN in both cases) that IJN 'lookouts' actually outperformed USN radar equipped ships on a fairly regular basis in 1942 and 1943 (i.e. IJN lookouts were spotting USN warships at night *before* USN radar equipped warships were picking up those same IJN warships on radar?).
===
Coming soon...
1. There was a very specific reason that German operational commanders held Patton's units in much higher regard than any other U.S. Army units...anyone have an idea about what I am talking about?
1A. U.S. Army units took very heavy casualties in NWE during WW2 when they should not have (according to several DoD studies). The reasons for this don't involve 'Patton attacking too much' (more on this later).
2. Rommel isn't on the 'top 20 list' for German operational/strategic commanders in WW2 according to a very detailed DoD study conducted in the 1950s and 1960s that involved the interviewing of many WW2 German operational/strategic commanders. More on this later.
Mike/wulfie
-
Wulfie, please do continue. Interesting. Thanks :)
-
Great wulfie
BTW why not post this in the History forum?
-
who the hell reads the history forum?
Carry on, Wulfie, I'd like to know more. If anybody else gripes about this subject being inappropriate in the 'O' Club, just stick a picture of HiTech in a bikini driving a 67 malibu up in here.
-
Very excellect work and you are correct that book is awesome. I mean like I almost totally flipped out it was so cool.
-
cool cant wait for the rest!
-
Damn teaser... :)
On the next exciting episode of "WW2 History with Wulfie...."
:p
-
Very cool Wulfie, but I have one question, which I shouldn't even ask until I've read the book, but since it's just conversation, I'll ask it anyhow.
In his book "Fleet Tactics: Theory and Pracitce" Capt. Wayne Hughes mentions that "[the] Modern decision to mass [naval units] depends on defensive considerations... When defenses are weak, then a dispersed force indicated." (248).
With this in mind, it would seem to me (especially if coupled with what you have said about Japanese Detection ranges compared to the US) that split forces would have been a sound tactical choice for a surface night engagement. It sounds (without knowing the details) like good tactics but bad results.
On the other hand, Hughs is talking about an offensive/defensive disparity of like 3/1 (as in each ship has the offensive capability to destroy 3 of the enemy ships, if given the first strike) I believe this is more analogous to WWII Carriers than to surface combatans. I don't know, what do you think?
-Sikboy
-
Picture all of us sitting around in a circle, cross legged and mouths agape in wonder.
Tell us more Uncle Wolfie!!!!!
-
Yes would love to read all you have.
Be nice and "Uncle Wulfie" might tell you the story of the big bad "Butcher Bird"!:D
Frodo
-
Hi Wulfie, thank you. Do you have any idea where I can order this book?
-
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0870210971/qid=1030725611/sr=8-1/ref=sr_8_1/104-2781109-9927948?v=glance&s=books&n=507846
dh
-
Originally posted by wulfie
1. There was a very specific reason that German operational commanders held Patton's units in much higher regard than any other U.S. Army units...anyone have an idea about what I am talking about?
1A. U.S. Army units took very heavy casualties in NWE during WW2 when they should not have (according to several DoD studies). The reasons for this don't involve 'Patton attacking too much' (more on this later).
Mike/wulfie
Without taking the time to do any research (I'm at work with no books at hand), I'll take a WAG at these two.
1. Because Patton managed to finagle better equipment? And perhaps due to the quality of his engineers and arty.
2. Lack of proper cold weather gear and their tanks sucked.
Both answers are WAG I'd like to point out.
-
Originally posted by Dune
Without taking the time to do any research (I'm at work with no books at hand), I'll take a WAG at these two.
1. Because Patton managed to finagle better equipment? And perhaps due to the quality of his engineers and arty.
2. Lack of proper cold weather gear and their tanks sucked.
Both answers are WAG I'd like to point out.
Dune,
You're way off base in number one. The equipment was the same. Patton did require that it be maintained. The more likely cause is that he kept the Germans moving and didn't let them set up a creditable defense. AS soon as the presure was relieved, IE Pattons suppies were stretched to the breaking point and he HAD to stop, The Germans were able to consolidate positions and reform a defensive posture. When you keep the enemy running he can't stop to set up a prepared position. Paton covered in 6 weeks what had been estimated would take 6 months. The lagging offensives by Monti held up the front leaving Patton dangerously exposed.
In all fairness, supplies were stretched very thin as the transportation infrastructure (read rail roads) wasn't there to get the supplies to the rapidly moving front lines.
The cold weather gear was a factor, but that was also due to the supply and logistics situation that progressed far beyond what anyone expected during the push forward.
The tank situation WAS a major problem We had numbers but until the guns got to the high velocity 90 mm size, penetration of the German tanks was very iffy at any but close range frontally and more reliably from the sides and rear. That is one of the reasons Patton didn't want heavy stuff like sandbags on the tanks as it would slow them down. Speed and numbers were the greates advantages American armor had then. We also didn't have the diesel experiance the Germans had. Patton wanted diesels as he realised gas powered tanks were far more likely to burn from hot shrapnel than diesel tanks were.
Keep this stuff coming. This is great material!
-
Mav
The TIger one, two and Panther all had gas engines I think? Did the Panzer IV?
-
Originally posted by Horn
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0870210971/qid=1030725611/sr=8-1/ref=sr_8_1/104-2781109-9927948?v=glance&s=books&n=507846
dh
Thanks, I just added it to my 'wish list' ;)
-
c'mon wulfe fork over the info before I go to sleep here at work... c'mon.. do it..
-
My favorite Patton story is the Olympics in 1912.
From memory so check this if you like. He competed in the Pentathlon (not the same one Jim Thorpe competed in, but a "military" version, and the one still in today's Olympics.
It is based on the concept that a single soldier must get a message to his headquarters. He must swim, run, ride an unfamiliar horse, fence and shoot. Not sure about the order.
Patton did so well in 4 out of the 5 catagories that he would have won the competition with even a fair performance in the shooting event. He screwed the pooch however and finished well back in the pack (like 23rd or something) and ended up 5th or 6th in the overall totals.
-
Originally posted by wulfie
2. Rommel isn't on the 'top 20 list' for German operational/strategic commanders in WW2 according to a very detailed DoD study conducted in the 1950s and 1960s that involved the interviewing of many WW2 German operational/strategic commanders. More on this later.
Mike/wulfie
Rommel's fatal flaw was his grasp (or lack of) of logistics.
His daring was also matched with his total disregard with the problems of supply and logistical requirements.
His impulsive advances often left his supply lines over stretched and weakened, and his constant moves to the front often made the overall strategic supply demands left to his chief supply officer who was a lowly major in 1941, and other difficult decisions left to the excellent Afrika leaders like Cruewell, Nehring, and Bayerlein.
Rommel's excellent tactical moves were often based on his highley efficient Fernmeldeaufklarung, the Afrika Korp's mobile radio monitoring service.
Tronsky
-
The Hurtgen forrest chewed up about 25,000 Americans.
-
Originally posted by GtoRA2
Mav
The TIger one, two and Panther all had gas engines I think? Did the Panzer IV?
OOPS!!!!!! my bad. :o Shoulda checked my references first. Yep they had the Maybach HL 230 V-12 gas engine.
-
IIRC, Patton put a hold on M-26s from replacing Shermans because they were too heavy to cross pontoon bridges. Doesn't matter if you have a gas or diesel engine, if a 88mm or 75mm from a Tiger or Panther hits your Sherman, you are out of comission. What a lunatic (Patton).
-
Originally posted by fdiron
IIRC, Patton put a hold on M-26s from replacing Shermans because they were too heavy to cross pontoon bridges. Doesn't matter if you have a gas or diesel engine, if a 88mm or 75mm from a Tiger or Panther hits your Sherman, you are out of comission. What a lunatic (Patton).
If you can't get the armor accross the bridges to get into combat, they are totally ineffective. Rivers were a fairly significant obstacle in Europe. That is, if you want to believe that is why they were kept out of combat. The 88 would penetrate the frontal armor of the M26 as well. On the other hand, the M26's gun (90mm) could penetrate the tiger as well.
The M26 was blooded after an emergency call by the Army General Staff. All available M26's were ordered to Europe to get them into the theater ASAP after the experiance in the ardenes. Twenty tanks, all that were available, were shipped to Europe in January of 1945. By the beginning of February they were issued to the 3rd and 9th Armored division.
In short, they were not available for general use until too late in the war. On the other hand by August 1945 2,435 had been built. Some saw action in the Pacific and there were being staged in prepararion for the invasion of Japan.
-
Rommels ememies had radio intercepts, excellent logistics and vast numerical supperiority..and he still out fought them. He may not be in the top 20 German generals(who else in the german army had to fight accross a sea?) but he would have easily been the best the allies had.
-
Rommels ememies had radio intercepts, excellent logistics and vast numerical supperiority..and he still out fought them.
Rommel had the best tactical intelligence of any commander during the war.
The allies had Ultra, which gave updates on the German supply situation, troop movements etc. It was usefull on a strategic scale, but not tactically. It often took days to decode a particular message.
Rommel was reading the reports sent by the US military attache in Cairo, Fellers. Fellers sent incredibaly detailed reports, giving the location of individual battalions, reports on morale, details of special operations, even the timing of Lord Gort's aircraft (it was shot down and Gort killed). Feller's reports were decoded practically in real time.
-
Originally posted by Pongo
Rommels ememies had radio intercepts, excellent logistics and vast numerical supperiority
As Nashwan has already noted, Rommel's radio intercepts and intelligence were far superior than the British armies.
While the British army often outnumbered the German tanks by 3 to 1, the British tanks were often inferior for desert warfare, a large number needing complete rebuilds due to inadequate preparation in shipping. Quite often the British tanks were obsolete before even being shipped from Britain.
but he would have easily been the best the allies had.
Rommel was only mirroring Major-General R.N O'Connor's offensives in 1940, where he routed the Italian army with the Western Desert Force with only 500 killed and 1,373 wounded.
Tronsky