Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => Aircraft and Vehicles => Topic started by: hazmatt on August 11, 2019, 04:36:43 PM
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Why the P-38 Flunked in Europe (Robert F. Dorr)
Celebrated as one of the Pacific War’s best fighters, Lockheed’s Lightning earned a less-than enviable reputation in European air combat.
The American fighter pilot spotted two indistinct shapes cutting diagonally across a road just slightly above and in front of him. They were blemishes in motion. Twelve o’clock high, he thought. He rechecked his armament switches, rammed his throttles to full power and went down low, as low as he dared, hugging the treetops. The afternoon shadow of his P-38 Lightning raced across French hedgerows and fields as the pilot sought to identify the other two aircraft. He wanted them to be Focke-Wulf Fw-190s, falling nicely into the crosshairs of his nose-mounted 20mm cannon and four .50-caliber machine guns.
Captain Robin Olds kicked left rudder, slid his pipper across the nearest plane’s left wing and, in an instant of epiphany, saw the Iron Cross painted on the rear fuselage. Until that instant, he hadn’t been certain the planes were German. Olds shot down one of the Fw-190s moments later, then followed the second into a violent left break, fired and watched the pilot bail out. It was August 14, 1944, and Olds had just used his P-38 Lightning to rack up the first two of his eventual 13 World War II aerial victories.
“I loved the P-38 but I got those kills in spite of the airplane, not because of it,” Olds recalled. “The fact is, the P-38 Lightning was too much airplane for a new kid and a full-time job for even a mature and experienced fighter pilot. Our enemies had difficulty defeating the P-38 but, as much as we gloried in it, we were defeating ourselves with this airplane.”
It was, Olds hastened to add, “the most beautiful plane of our generation.” And it fought well in the Mediterranean and the Pacific. So what happened in northern Europe, and how could things have gone so wrong?
A survey of Stateside training bases in 1941 showed that 87 percent of prospective pilots requested to be assigned to the big, sleek, twin-engine Lockheed Lightning. “We were in awe of the P-38,” said future ace Jack Ilfrey. “It looked like a beautiful monster.” “If you were a boy in America, you wanted to fly it,” said another future ace, Winton “Bones” Marshall. “If you played with Dinky metal toys and balsa wood airplane models, you wanted to fly it.” On the eve of Pearl Harbor, the P-38 captured the imagination of young Americans like no other fighter. Eighth Air Force commander Lt. Gen. James H. “Jimmy” Doolittle would later call the P-38 “the sweetest-flying plane in the sky.”
With tricycle gear, twin booms and a centerline fuselage pod brimming with guns, the P-38 was powered by two 1,600-hp Allison V-1710-111/113 liquid-cooled engines driving three-bladed, 9-foot Curtiss Electric propellers. Although a fully loaded Lightning weighed more than 10 tons—nearly twice as much as a P-51 Mustang—a skilled pilot could fling the P-38 around like a lightweight. The problem was that while American pilots were generally well trained, they weren’t well trained for a complex twin-engine fighter.
Struggling to keep the air campaign over Europe alive in the face of disastrous bomber losses, the U.S. Army Air Forces rushed two P-38 combat groups to England. On October 15, 1943, the 55th Fighter Group became the first to conduct operations. The Lightning men mixed it up with Me-109s and Fw-190s on November 6, and racked up their first aerial victories. “We were arrayed against the Luftwaffe and they were facing us head-on,” one of the pilots said, “and we were not winning.”
The P-38 performed usefully but suffered from a number of problems. Its Allison engines consistently threw rods, swallowed valves and fouled plugs, while their intercoolers often ruptured under sustained high boost and turbocharger regulators froze, sometimes causing catastrophic failures.
Arrival of the newer P-38J to fill in behind the P-38H was supposed to help, but did not help enough. The J model’s enlarged radiators were trouble-prone. Improperly blended British fuel exacerbated the problems: Anti-knock lead compounds literally seethed out and became separated in the Allison’s induction system at extreme low temperatures. This could cause detonation and rapid engine failure, especially at the high power settings demanded for combat.
The P-38’s General Electric turbo-supercharger sometimes got stuck in over-boosted or under-boosted mode. This occurred mainly when the fighter was flown in the freezing cold at altitudes approaching 30,000 feet, which was the standard situation in the European air war. Another difficulty was that early P-38 versions had only one generator, and losing the associated engine meant the pilot had to rely on battery power.
In an article on ausairpower.net, Carlo Kopp noted that in their early days in the European theater, “Many of the P-38s assigned to escort missions were forced to abort and return to base. Most of the aborts were related to engines coming apart in flight….[due to] intercoolers that chilled the fuel/air mixture too much. Radiators that lowered engine temps below normal operating minimums. Oil coolers that could congeal the oil to sludge. These problems could have been fixed at the squadron level. Yet, they were not.”
Eighth Air Force historian Roger Freeman described how bravery plus the P-38 was not enough during a mission on November 13, 1943, “an unlucky day for the 55th. In typical English November weather, damp and overcast, forty-eight P-38s set out to escort bombers on the target leg of a mission to Bremen; one turned back before the enemy coast was crossed and two more aborted later. At 26,000 feet over Germany, pilots shivered in bitterly cold cockpits, flying conditions were unusually bad, and the probability of mechanical troubles at that temperature did not help. Again outnumbered, the 55th was heavily engaged near the target as it strove to defend the bombers, for which it paid dearly. Seven P-38s fell, five to enemy fighters and the others to unknown causes.” Another 16 Lightnings limped home with battle damage.
Things got better. The arrival of the improved P-38J-25 and P-38L models, modified on the production line based on lessons learned in Europe, helped, but problems remained. Lightning pilot 2nd Lt. Jim Kunkle of the 370th Fighter Group remembered: “The critical problem with us was we didn’t have much heat in the cockpit. On high altitude missions it was very cold. And we didn’t have the engine in front of us to help keep us warm. Bomber guys had those heated blue union suits that they wore but we tried heated clothing and it didn’t work for us.”
The only source of heat in the cockpit was warm air ducted from the engines, and it was little help. Lightning pilots suffered terribly. “Their hands and feet became numb with cold and in some instances frost-bitten; not infrequently a pilot was so weakened by conditions that he had to be assisted out of the cockpit upon return,” wrote Freeman.
Major General William Kepner, the fiery commanding general of VIII Fighter Command, wondered, as so many others did, why the P-38 wasn’t producing the results everyone wanted, and what to do about it. Asked to provide a written report, 20th Fighter Group commander Colonel Harold J. Rau did so reluctantly and only because he was ordered to.
“After flying the P-38 for a little over one hundred hours on combat missions it is my belief that the airplane, as it stands now, is too complicated for the ‘average’ pilot,” wrote Rau. “I want to put strong emphasis on the word ‘average,’ taking full consideration just how little combat training our pilots have before going on operational status.”
Rau wrote that he was being asked to put kids fresh from flight school into P-38 cockpits and it wasn’t working. He asked his boss to imagine “a pilot fresh out of flying school with about a total of twenty-five hours in a P-38, starting out on a combat mission.” Rau’s young pilot was on “auto lean and running on external tanks. His gun heater is off to relieve the load on his generator, which frequently gives out (under sustained heavy load). His sight is off to save burning out the bulb. His combat switch may or may not be on.” So, flying along in this condition, wrote Rau, the kid suddenly gets bounced by German fighters. Now he wonders what to do next.
“He must turn, he must increase power and get rid of those external tanks and get on his main [fuel tank],” Rau wrote. “So, he reaches down and turns two stiff, difficult gas switches (valves) to main, turns on his drop tank switches, presses his release button, puts the mixture to auto rich (two separate and clumsy operations), increases his RPM, increases his manifold pressure, turns on his gun heater switch (which he must feel for and cannot possibly see), turns on his combat switch and he is ready to fight.” To future generations this would be called multi-tasking, and it was not what you wanted to be doing when Luftwaffe fighters were pouring down on you.
“At this point, he has probably been shot down,” Rau noted, “or he has done one of several things wrong. Most common error is to push the throttles wide open before increasing RPM. This causes detonation and subsequent engine failure. Or, he forgets to switch back to auto rich, and gets excessive cylinder head temperature with subsequent engine failure.”
Another P-38 pilot described the multi-tasking challenge this way: “When you reduce power you must pull back the throttle (manifold pressure) first, then the prop RPM, and then the mixture. To increase power you must first put the mixture rich, then increase prop RPM, then increase manifold pressure. If you don’t follow this order you can ruin the engine.” Rau added that in his own limited experience, his P-38 group had lost at least four pilots who, when bounced, took no evasive action. “The logical assumption is that they were so busy in the cockpit trying to get organized that they were shot down before they could get going,” he wrote.
Couldn't post all due to character limit. (full story in link)
https://www.historynet.com/p-38-flunked-europe.htm
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Lockheed’s Lightning earned a less-than enviable reputation in European air combat.
Thanks for the nice article. Wholeheartedly agree. You can come up with dozens of excuses, but the 47 and 51 did fine in the 8th, and the 38 did not.
- oldman
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:cheesy:1) P-38K
2) Just shove everything forward at the same time. Or you can “Climb the hill right to left, descend the hill left to right.”
3) The P-38 was pushing the limits of fighter design in its time. The technological hurdles were not sufficiently overcome in time to make them preeminent in Europe, but make no mistake, the P-38 took the heaviest hits and softened up the Germans long before the Mustang arrived. The Mustang benefited from the sacrifices of the P-38 groups.
4) It was the PERFECT airplane to fight the Japanese in the Pacific Theater.
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Interesting article. It really puts into perspective what they had to do at a moment's notice to be able to fight, and all we do is hit P for WEP. The P-38 would definitely be overwhelming for a new pilot, especially when you throw in all of the mechanical and technical problems it was plagued with early on.
I agree that it was great for the Pacific - but I'd say most if not all US fighters were superior to their Japanese counterparts from mid-1942/1943 on.
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The P-38 also suffered from doctrinal and tactical issues that had nothing to do with the aircraft itself. First, when the P-38s began long range escort, they were essentially the only aircraft capable of carrying out the task, and their numbers were far lower than the enemy defense units. This meant that they were going to be significantly outnumbered. Also, defensive doctrine dictated that the fighters stick with the bombers (similar to problems the Luftwaffe had during the Battle of Britain). The arrival of the P-51B heralded a great increase in the numbers of escort fighters, which in turn corresponded to a change in tactics, allowing fighters to attack enemy aircraft ahead of the bombers, breaking up their attacks and pursuing them. The invasion of Europe also secured bases closer to enemy targets, allowing the P-47 to carry out more escort missions deeper into enemy territory as well, further advancing the allies' advantage of numbers in the air war.
Mike
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The P-38 also suffered from doctrinal and tactical issues that had nothing to do with the aircraft itself. First, when the P-38s began long range escort, they were essentially the only aircraft capable of carrying out the task, and their numbers were far lower than the enemy defense units. This meant that they were going to be significantly outnumbered. Also, defensive doctrine dictated that the fighters stick with the bombers (similar to problems the Luftwaffe had during the Battle of Britain). The arrival of the P-51B heralded a great increase in the numbers of escort fighters, which in turn corresponded to a change in tactics, allowing fighters to attack enemy aircraft ahead of the bombers, breaking up their attacks and pursuing them. The invasion of Europe also secured bases closer to enemy targets, allowing the P-47 to carry out more escort missions deeper into enemy territory as well, further advancing the allies' advantage of numbers in the air war.
Mike
Absolutely.
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Absolutely.
As I said. Excuses.
The air war in Europe was won by the P-47. The 51 got the glory, the 38 was the goat. But the 47 killed the Luftwaffe's best and brightest, before the 51 had a chance to get there in numbers.
- oldman
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In reading about the 47 vs 51 I came across a line that said the 47m had air brakes... are those modelled in ah3?
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As I said. Excuses.
The air war in Europe was won by the P-47. The 51 got the glory, the 38 was the goat. But the 47 killed the Luftwaffe's best and brightest, before the 51 had a chance to get there in numbers.
- oldman
As I said. Excuses.
The air war in Europe was won by the P-47. The 51 got the glory, the 38 was the goat. But the 47 killed the Luftwaffe's best and brightest, before the 51 had a chance to get there in numbers.
- oldman
Bull.
The P-47 could barely get across the beach while the Lightning was taking the fight to Germany outnumbered 5:1 (and sometimes worse) against the peak-level Luftwaffe.
When daylight bombardment hung in the balance it was the P-38 that held the line. It is by far the most underrated American fighter of the war, and quite possibly the most vital. It had performance nothing else could match in many areas—all of them extremely useful.
The P-38 paved the way for the also-rans to follow along and steal the credit. The P-38 also carried half the load of the long-range escort mission during the first part of 1944 when the Luftwaffe cratered, having born virtually all of it alone in mid- to late-1943.
Dogging on the P-38 in the ETO is an example of party-line parroting.
The same kind of stupid decisions that hampered the P-38 also hampered the P-47. These aren’t excuses, they’re reality. Doolittle changed the paradigm, but by then the P-38’s ETO fate for high altitude escort had already been decided. It’s too bad because it was one heck of an airplane.
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In reading about the 47 vs 51 I came across a line that said the 47m had air brakes... are those modelled in ah3?
The P-47 has dive flaps not air brakes, same as the P-38. They are modeled for compression relief. They let you dive a little faster before you lose pitch control.
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Robin Olds flew both in combat (both air-to-air and air-to-ground) and would take the P-51 over the P-38 any day of the week. I trust his judgement over armchair pilots like myself. If you want to argue about who decimated the Germans, all roads lead to the Eastern front that drained the Luftwaffe of pilots and planes, many of which were lost to obsolete aircraft. You don't win by flying expensive hi-tech planes like the P-38 or Me262. You win by with hordes of whatever you can get your hands on cheapest and fastest, hence the proliferation of obsolete aircraft throughout the war including types like the P-40. The P-51 was the F-16. The P-38 was the F-15. You could produce way more P-51s for way less money in way less time, and for the most part they were equal or better planes in the roles that were needed. Once the war in Europe was ending, the P-51s were heading that way, too... because we had a lot of them and they were fast and long ranged.
My biggest beef with the P-38 notwithstanding all the flaws already mentioned in the original post was the wing. It is the most important aspect of any aircraft. The P-38's wing was not suited for high speed flight, so much so that it needed a brake to keep it from going too fast at a time when all the other fighters were already faster and trying to approach 500 mph as the war went on.
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Bull.
The P-47 could barely get across the beach while the Lightning was taking the fight to Germany outnumbered 5:1 (and sometimes worse) against the peak-level Luftwaffe.
When daylight bombardment hung in the balance it was the P-38 that held the line. It is by far the most underrated American fighter of the war, and quite possibly the most vital. It had performance nothing else could match in many areas—all of them extremely useful.
The P-38 paved the way for the also-rans to follow along and steal the credit. The P-38 also carried half the load of the long-range escort mission during the first part of 1944 when the Luftwaffe cratered, having born virtually all of it alone in mid- to late-1943.
Dogging on the P-38 in the ETO is an example of party-line parroting.
The same kind of stupid decisions that hampered the P-38 also hampered the P-47. These aren’t excuses, they’re reality. Doolittle changed the paradigm, but by then the P-38’s ETO fate for high altitude escort had already been decided. It’s too bad because it was one heck of an airplane.
...um...
I think most historians agree that the cream of the Luftwaffe was defeated by the end of the Berlin raids in early March, 1944. From 1943 through the beginning of the Berlin raids in March, 1944 there were two P-38 groups in the 8th, the 55th and 20th. Two. The third gruoup, the 364th (P-38s), flew its first combat mission at the beginning of the Berlin raids (and lost 16 planes that month). During the first of the Bigweek raids (in February, 44) the 8th sent fewer than 100 P-38s, fewer than 75 P-51s, but over 650 P-47s. The 4th FG didn't fly its first P-51 mission until March 2, well after Bigweek. By contrast, this was perhaps the height of the 56th and 78th fighter groups, with Gabreski, Mahurin, Johnson, the other Johnson, Schilling, Roberts...the list goes on. It isn't like the only combat occurred directly over Berlin. The escort range problem was solved by a combination of drop tanks and sending the fighter groups to rendezvous with the bomber formations at different locations along the bombers' routes. In the spring of 1944 the P-47 could make it to within 70 miles of Berlin using these techniques.
Whatever reasons people pick to excuse the P-38s, those groups didn't begin to succeed - by comparison with their 47 and 51 colleagues - until they switched to P-51s. The 38 just was not a useful high-altitude fighter, at least not until the war was nearly over in Europe, and by then the 38 had been banished from the Eighth.
- oldman
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...um...
I think most historians agree that the cream of the Luftwaffe was defeated by the end of the Berlin raids in early March, 1944.
Uhm.... You’re not listening.
The P-38 did the heavy lifting in 1943. The Mustang glory days of 1944 were alongside the P-38. The Mustang didn’t break the back of the LW, but the case can be credibly made that the P-38 did. The Mustang simply helped (alongside the P-38 and to some extent the Jug) as it ramped up from 1944 on.
The Mustang (and Thunderbolt for that matter) benefited from the learning curve, sacrifices, and killing performed by the P-38 on deep penetration escort missions to the heart of Germany when it was THE FIRST AND ONLY airplane that could do it.
From 1943 through the beginning of the Berlin raids in March, 1944 there were two P-38 groups in the 8th...
Key words: In the 8th.
But two groups that can reach Germany and protect bombers are ultimately far better than six groups that can’t, particularly when the job is long range bomber escort.
In the spring of 1944 the P-47 could make it to within 70 miles of Berlin using these techniques.
Which were bloody darned useless in 1943 (since they didn’t “exist” yet) when the Lightning groups were going it alone while the Jug pilots were back at base (out of gas) having a beer.
Whatever reasons people pick to excuse the P-38s, those groups didn't begin to succeed - by comparison with their 47 and 51 colleagues - until they switched to P-51s. The 38 just was not a useful high-altitude fighter, at least not until the war was nearly over in Europe, and by then the 38 had been banished from the Eighth.
- oldman
Blah blah blah. The P-38 was sawing the Luftwaffe to pieces with great success out of the Med—including to Germany. The Eighth Air Force was clearly lacking in many areas it appears where operating the P-38. Thus the flaw is not the airplane.
Never mind that the Ninth AF was more than happy to take the castoff P-38s and P-47s in trade for their promised P-51s.
And your vaunted 4th FG was whining like a bunch of babies about the P-47, so it must have clearly been a POS because of their subsequent success in the P-51. /sarc
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Robin Olds flew both in combat (both air-to-air and air-to-ground) and would take the P-51 over the P-38 any day of the week. I trust his judgement over armchair pilots like myself. If you want to argue about who decimated the Germans, all roads lead to the Eastern front that drained the Luftwaffe of pilots and planes, many of which were lost to obsolete aircraft. You don't win by flying expensive hi-tech planes like the P-38 or Me262. You win by with hordes of whatever you can get your hands on cheapest and fastest, hence the proliferation of obsolete aircraft throughout the war including types like the P-40. The P-51 was the F-16. The P-38 was the F-15. You could produce way more P-51s for way less money in way less time, and for the most part they were equal or better planes in the roles that were needed. Once the war in Europe was ending, the P-51s were heading that way, too... because we had a lot of them and they were fast and long ranged.
My biggest beef with the P-38 notwithstanding all the flaws already mentioned in the original post was the wing. It is the most important aspect of any aircraft. The P-38's wing was not suited for high speed flight, so much so that it needed a brake to keep it from going too fast at a time when all the other fighters were already faster and trying to approach 500 mph as the war went on.
The wing was fine. The airplane was operating in a regime that wasn’t well understood. Once it was the airplane was modified to deal with it and it could handle any piston airplane the Germans sent at it.
As for Robin Olds, he is only one man. His views on the P-38* are not monolithically shared by the broader group of P-38 aces in the ETO, and certainly not in the Pacific.
It was a great machine hampered by terrible leadership. Was it perfect? No, certainly not until the late-model Js came along, but it provided escort to places nobody else could go and fought the critical battles of 1943 outnumbered and held the line. The P-51 couldn’t do much of anything better than a P-38 could+.
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*+ But I happen to love the Embraer Legacy 650 compared to the G550 which outperforms it in most respects. Why? Reliability, cockpit size, pilot comfort, and systems. Is it the jet to reach Lebanon nonstop from Texas? No. I like it any way. So goes the P-38 vs the P-51.
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As for Robin Olds, he is only one man. His views on the P-38* are not monolithically shared by the broader group of P-38 aces in the ETO, and certainly not in the Pacific.
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*+ But I happen to love the Embraer Legacy 650 compared to the G550 which outperforms it in most respects. Why? Reliability, cockpit size, pilot comfort, and systems. Is it the jet to reach Lebanon nonstop from Texas? No. I like it any way. So goes the P-38 vs the P-51.
In other words, Olds preferred the Mustang but that doesn't mean it was because it was the better performing airplane. In many areas it was not.
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The Mustang didn’t break the back of the LW, but the case can be credibly made that the P-38 did.
Hey, that's great! I've been waiting for years - decades, even - to see someone show that the P-38 broke the back of the Luftwaffe. ESPECIALLY in light of the records of the 20th and 55th FGs.
- oldman
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Hey, that's great! I've been waiting for years - decades, even - to see someone show that the P-38 broke the back of the Luftwaffe. ESPECIALLY in light of the records of the 20th and 55th FGs.
- oldman
You have the right to be wrong.
The P-38 was there when it counted. Without it the strategic bomber offensive would have collapsed. Your fixation on only the 8th reveals a massive blindspot worthy of note, but hey, don't let facts get in your way!
The Germans didn't have pilots to throw away. Every P-38 kill in 1942-43 was worth ten in late-1944. Hell, the entire Western Front at one point was only defended by a couple hundred German pilots. Just like the Japanese in the Solomons, the critical battles in 1943 killed Axis pilots that couldn't be replaced.
The Mustang gets too much credit. The P-38 not enough. The Jug? Okay if you wanted to fight over the French coast, but by the time it could finally go anywhere the P-38 had already done the hard part (for a full year before the Jug even showed up, btw) all the while outnumbered, hampered by bad tactics, and forced by the very nature of the endeavor into a steep learning curve.
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The P-38 was a poor high altitude fighter. No going around that. In the ETO high altitude escorts was the main mission, hence the P-38 was not particularly good at it. It was assigned this role because there was no one else. Once P-47s matured and fitted with external tanks, they pretty much replaced all but 2 FGs in the 8th airforce. P-47s counted for a hell of a lot more kills than the 38 during that critical time when the LW was still in its prime. Once P51s started to arrive it was clear that they were the better tool for the job, and not less important, the most economic tool for the job - costing half a P-38 and significantly cheaper than a P-47 (especially the operating costs).
In the MTO and PTO the main mission was not high altitude escorts. Combat happened at lower altitudes where the P-38 could shine. In the 9th airforce, combat happened at fairly low altitudes and the missions allowed the P-38 to show its versatility as a ground pounder that can instantly turn into a formidable fighter after releasing its bombs - this was perfect for the 38 and conditions at which it was better than the 47 and 51.
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The P38 was the best they had at the time for escorts, even though german planes could always disengage from a fight by diving, something P38 could not follow, when odds were stacked against them.
German pilots liked the idea of having 2 engines flying over water.
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In other words, Olds preferred the Mustang but that doesn't mean it was because it was the better performing airplane. In many areas it was not.
Many years ago, the 479th had a mini-Con and we were able to meet Robin Olds. He was asked the same question by the leader of our little virtual squadron and Old's answer wasn't clear cut as someone stated. He said it depended on the circumstances. For ground attack sorties, he would have preferred to be in the P-38, to him the P-51 was too vulnerable to ground fire and not suited for ground attack missions. For air to air engagements, he preferred the P-51, because it was much more simple to fly but over all, he thought the P-38 was a dream to fly. Remember, like most of the 479th, he had extensive training and flight time in the P-38 before they left to the ETO.
One thing he said that has stuck with me all these years is that the P-38, at least in the 8th AF, suffered as much from the bomber mentality of the 8th high command than from any mechanical or technical failures on the part of the P-38. While the history of the P-38 in the ETO might not have been stellar, it shined in all the other theaters.
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The P-38 was there when it counted. Without it the strategic bomber offensive would have collapsed.
Well. You're just making stuff up now.
- oldman
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The P38 was the best they had at the time for escorts, even though german planes could always disengage from a fight by diving, something P38 could not follow, when odds were stacked against them.
German pilots liked the idea of having 2 engines flying over water.
And when a German dove away he was no longer a threat to a bomber. Mission accomplished. Not being a smartass, just making a point.
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Many years ago, the 479th had a mini-Con and we were able to meet Robin Olds. He was asked the same question by the leader of our little virtual squadron and Old's answer wasn't clear cut as someone stated. He said it depended on the circumstances. For ground attack sorties, he would have preferred to be in the P-38, to him the P-51 was too vulnerable to ground fire and not suited for ground attack missions. For air to air engagements, he preferred the P-51, because it was much more simple to fly but over all, he thought the P-38 was a dream to fly. Remember, like most of the 479th, he had extensive training and flight time in the P-38 before they left to the ETO.
One thing he said that has stuck with me all these years is that the P-38, at least in the 8th AF, suffered as much from the bomber mentality of the 8th high command than from any mechanical or technical failures on the part of the P-38. While the history of the P-38 in the ETO might not have been stellar, it shined in all the other theaters.
Interesting info—and far more balanced than some are leading us to believe. As for leadership failures, he was definitely one to spot those as he made a career out of calling out those types. I agree with him completely. Thanks for sharing that. :salute Olds would have been a neat guy to meet. :cheers:
I met a couple of P-38 aces (among many other pilots/aces, both Axis and Allied) back around 1992-93 at a banquet I attended while an undergrad. They had effusive praise for the airplane, as one might imagine. Also met Blakeslee there. I’ve told that story before. Hilarious guy.
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Well. You're just making stuff up now.
- oldman
Yeah, okay then. Good comeback. /sarcastic blue
BTW, Schweinfurt and Regensburg just called. They want to know how sustainable your 25-plus percent single-mission heavy bomber loss rate is. :aok :rofl
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Agreed. The P-38 is awesome. Not quite as awesome as Zack but close!
Sent from my Moto Z (2) using Tapatalk
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It is amazing how few parts you really need to keep one in the air.
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It is amazing how few parts you really need to keep one in the air.
:rofl :rofl :rofl
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I read the book "A Higher Calling" a while back and I remember a part where he and his wingman were bounced a flight of 38's and knocked some down, he mentioned something to the affect them not fighting back very quickly. It seems that the pilots may have been to busy flying the plane. Wish I could find the exact quote but I gave the book away.
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And when a German dove away he was no longer a threat to a bomber. Mission accomplished. Not being a smartass, just making a point.
True, remember though this was written after the war, interviewing surviving GAF pilots.
They compared the P38 with P47,P51, as the latter two could hunt them down and kill them in a dive.
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Thanks. I'll delete it. why would you quote it though? lol
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I threw some ideas out off the top of my head hoping that it would get others to think of their own ideas.
I believe that if we want to come up with a solution we throw out our ideas, which make other people think of other ideas which they throw out there which makes other people think of ideas etc.
I never said my ideas were going to be any good. My goal was to get others to think instead of complain.
I could care less if you say all my ideas suck, but, if you do, please sprinkle a little of your genius ideas in here instead of just beaching.
Wrong thread.
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Why the P-38 Flunked in Europe (Robert F. Dorr)
Celebrated as one of the Pacific War’s best fighters, Lockheed’s Lightning earned a less-than enviable reputation in European air combat.
The American fighter pilot spotted two indistinct shapes cutting diagonally across a road just slightly above and in front of him. They were blemishes in motion. Twelve o’clock high, he thought. He rechecked his armament switches, rammed his throttles to full power and went down low, as low as he dared, hugging the treetops. The afternoon shadow of his P-38 Lightning raced across French hedgerows and fields as the pilot sought to identify the other two aircraft. He wanted them to be Focke-Wulf Fw-190s, falling nicely into the crosshairs of his nose-mounted 20mm cannon and four .50-caliber machine guns.
Captain Robin Olds kicked left rudder, slid his pipper across the nearest plane’s left wing and, in an instant of epiphany, saw the Iron Cross painted on the rear fuselage. Until that instant, he hadn’t been certain the planes were German. Olds shot down one of the Fw-190s moments later, then followed the second into a violent left break, fired and watched the pilot bail out. It was August 14, 1944, and Olds had just used his P-38 Lightning to rack up the first two of his eventual 13 World War II aerial victories.
https://www.historynet.com/p-38-flunked-europe.htm
Perhaps an interesting historical note. My father Bert Marshall, Jr was 354SF/355FG CO who witnessed Old's second victory and noted that he was alone. He recognized the P-38 as 479th FG. When he landed He put in a call to the 479th to note what he had seen to Zemke - and that is how Robin was credited with both kills that day. For some reason Old's combat film didn't work or was inconclusive.
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Ah, the great debate P-38H/J vs P-51B in ETO.
Points: The P-38H and early J w/o LE wing tanks had about the same range as the P-51B w/o 85 gal fuse tanks so the range was about equal. The P-38H/J until post J-15 was plagued by turbo, overcooling radiator and operational procedures imposed by 8th AF against recommendations by both Lockheed and Allison related directly from entering combat at low(er) cruise speeds, and spooling up by ramming throttles rather than change RPM, then boost. The cockpit arrangements for fuel tank selection and overall twin engine controls complexity plus terrible heating in the cockpit rendered reaction times in a crisis to be a major issue. All major issues relating to mission aborts and losses. The P-38 effectiveness as a function of operational fighters at the IP was very low. As an unintended consequence it had a unique and distinctive disadvantage as being immediately identifiable due to size and plan form by LW - leaving German pilots the option of fight or 'move along'. Last and mentioned before was the compressibility/pitch down issue resulting from dives at altitudes above 20K - rendering them helpless to chase or evade in the dive.
As noted above the P-38 was useful primarily as a scarecrow in ETO operations for the 8th AF until the J-15 arrived - not as a major destroyer of LW s/e fighters and pilots.
Comments have been made that the P-38 'broke the back of the LW'. Ditto the P-47. The LW began significant force migrations of experienced squadrons and pilots from both Ost and Sud fronts in late summer 1943 - peaking May 1944. The point is that the LW forces opposing the 8th AF were primarily LuftFlotte 3 with JG 26 and JG 2 plus JG 11 in western GY. Between late August 1943 and early May the LW moved 30+ staffeln to the daylight defense of Germany.
Prior to the first combat sortie of the 354th FG P-51B on December 1, 1943 the 20th/55th scored 24, Mustangs 0; Thereafter Dec/Jan/Feb P-38s scored 69.5, Mustangs 141.5; Mar/Apr P-38s scored 49, Mustangs 590; May P-38s (including all 9th AF operational) 27.5, Mustangs 433.
Evaluate the 'effectiveness' with regards to destroying the LW prior to D-Day? Scarecrow - not Destroyer.
Big Week was mentioned above. So, with 10 P-47D FGs flying escort, 2 P-38 FGs and 2 P-51 FGs the scores against the LW were 78, 10 and 65 respectively. The P-47D was flying Penetration and Withdrawal while the P-38 and P-51B were flying Target Escort.
Note: when LW attacked Mustang and Lightning escort near the target they had overwhelming (theoretically) numerical superiority over the escorts.
The fighters were turned loose in January so the ability to pursue and destroy did not alter the P-38 effectiveness vs the P-51, it continued to suck.
Victory Credits care of Frank Olynyk and will be published in my new book.
Regards,
Bill Marshall
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You have the right to be wrong.
The P-38 was there when it counted. Without it the strategic bomber offensive would have collapsed. Your fixation on only the 8th reveals a massive blindspot worthy of note, but hey, don't let facts get in your way!
You may have missed the memo, 8th AF deep penetrations were stopped after October 14th disaster. Didn't return to middle Germany until two P-38 and one P-51B FG were operational for limited target escort. The 15th was just getting started but not significant on the LW ability to oppose the 8th.
The Germans didn't have pilots to throw away. Every P-38 kill in 1942-43 was worth ten in late-1944. Hell, the entire Western Front at one point was only defended by a couple hundred German pilots. Just like the Japanese in the Solomons, the critical battles in 1943 killed Axis pilots that couldn't be replaced.
Luftflotte 3 was the primary LW force on the Kanal Front and operating quite wll against the P-38 - which had far more losses than Victory credits November 1943 through December 31 1943. They weren't making a dent on the LW effectiveness save forcing the deployment of T/E Zerstroyers further east. Although the Germans did not produce the necessary experience in new fighter pilots, they were far more successful than the Japanese.
The Mustang gets too much credit. The P-38 not enough. The Jug? Okay if you wanted to fight over the French coast, but by the time it could finally go anywhere the P-38 had already done the hard part (for a full year before the Jug even showed up, btw) all the while outnumbered, hampered by bad tactics, and forced by the very nature of the endeavor into a steep learning curve.
The P-47C/D was providing target escort into western Germany well before (July Blitz Week) the 55th arrived for operations in the ETO. It wasn't until the P-38J-10 was being retrofitted with 55 gal LE Tanks (beginning in December 1943) that the 38 could
The Jug was a more dangerous opponent to the 109/190 at bomber altitudes for the reasons I posted above regarding high altitude issue for the P-38H/J. That said, the P-47D-16 w/internal plumbing for external tanks combined with factory external racks as well as the retrofit of same capability in the earlier P-47Ds Did enable escort past Brunswick which, in turn, enabled them to engage more often during the big March-May battles where the P-47D far outscored the P-38 - both in aggregate, in air to air ratios and in sortie ratios - but both were behind the P-51B. The combat radius of the P-47D-16 was 425mi with 2x150 gallon externals.
The conditions in the Pacific were fine for the P-38. Long missions over water at optimal (low) cruise speeds and higher temps at all altitudes enabled the P-38 pilots to set throttle and RPM in advance of target area and most potential combats - and they almost always had an altitude advantage immediately - unlike ETO. Until mid 1944 the P-38 had an immediate advantage of 100mph TAS - unlike the ETO. No real issues in dive/compressibilty - unlike the ETO. Twin engine reliability over water, but in ETO flying on one engine over Germany was a near death sentence - and for strafing it was a Big target with TWO major vulnerabilities attached to it. The P-38 ratio of ground scores to losses was far below both the P-47 and the P-51.
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I think the interesting note to all this is that if our cartoon planes were modeled with the complexity of the real aircraft that there would be a few that suddenly became hanger queens.
Another example would be how difficult the 109 was to take off and land with it's narrow track landing gear.
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I appreciate the effort put into the discussion by all involved.
Your victory totals lack context. (“Ninety percent of shark attacks take place in less than three feet of water.” Gee, no kidding.) Raw numbers comparisons between three airplane types on a single mission don’t tell you why that happened.
The P-38 is modestly, if not highly, underrated. It was there when nobody else was at a time when the LW was ascendant. It had a very low total loss rate and could range all over Europe when nothing else could come close, and it did so for about a year before the P-47’s disastrous ETO debut.
Deep penetrations or not, for many perilous months the Germans could out-persist the Jug until it had to RTB. They could not do that to the 38. It was a pioneering enterprise all around for which far too much blame is rained upon the airplane. The 8th AF simply never figured out how to use it right while everyone else did—or at least the former took too long to do so.
Every fighter opposed by a P-38, kill or not, was one less going after a bomber. Scarecrows work. Escorts were effective, though admittedly improvement was needed. What was learned by both the 38 and the 47 helped the Mustang groups later. The P-38 was cutting into the Germans and applying pressure. They simply could not replace their losses, especially with the Russians adding to the misery. This alone, a war of attrition, would have seen us victorious without the P-51 or extended range P-47s.
Excepting a handful of Spitfires, for a protracted period of time the 38 was the only airplane in the USAAF that could take the fight to the enemy and be even remotely in the same league. North Africa, the Med, Italy...Germany itself. Even at a level slightly above parity, the Germans were losing.
People who bash this airplane are simply driven by a biased agenda. Saying the P-38 “suck[ed]” is borderline idiotic. It’s also the easy way out because it is essentially non-controversial being the common misperception.
As for considering being easily identified a liability, maybe *you* didn’t get the memo so ask George Preddy to send it over.
Beyond that I have a headache from this.
(I enjoyed reading Bud Fortier’s book. Bert Marshall was mentioned quite positively as I recall, which I mentioned in another conversation long ago. Good stuff.)
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Since everyone else has I think I should state my opinion on the 38.
Based on what I've read 1vs1 the Germans did not see to think it was a threat. Mostly from what I've read the overwhelming numbers is what they felt they could not compete against. I don't think it would have mattered if it was the 38, the 47, 51 any other aircraft that would have been the turning point unless the massive numbers where there.
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And yet many 38 pilots felt it was superior to any German piston once the dive flap arrived.
The 38's 8th AF kill ratio is also misleading. The Spitfire, considered by many to be the best pure Allied dogfighter didn't do much beyond parity against the 109 during the Battle of Britain--and scored fewer victories than the Hurricane. Context is everything.
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I appreciate the effort put into the discussion by all involved.
Vraciu - I appreciate your comments about my father.
Your victory totals lack context. (“Ninety percent of shark attacks take place in less than three feet of water.” Gee, no kidding.) Raw numbers comparisons between three airplane types on a single mission don’t tell you why that happened.
The context perhaps could have been clearer. What I could have said is that the P-38 set records for single day losses in air to air combat against the LW from November through February, had the highest loss rates of 9th and 9th FC and had the lowest effective rates (i.e. a/c dispatched vs a/c that completed a mission) when compared against the P-47 and the P-51. What is remarkable is the P-51B first entered combat operations in December 1943, 18 months after the P-38, had bugs that most new new fighter entries had due to terrible Material Command vetting processes, but Still out performed the two P-38 FGs in the ETO which had both a pilot and operational experience advantage.
So, The mission was "To Destroy the LW in the air and the ground" - which at least puts in context a definition of 'operational effectiveness as declared by the CO of the 8th AF. I didn't mention aircraft destroyed on the ground but for both important metrics, the ratio of destroyed to a/c lost to airfield strafing and the number destroyed, the Mustang was Far superior - and statistically superior to the P-47D
So, what did you have in mind regarding context?
The P-38 is modestly, if not highly, underrated. It was there when nobody else was at a time when the LW was ascendant. It had a very low total loss rate and could range all over Europe when nothing else could come close, and it did so for about a year before the P-47’s disastrous ETO debut.
You may have missed the Mustang I/IA operations which began in operations in spring or 1942 and fighting the LW for months before the 1st and 14th even got to England? Further, their superior performance at low/middle altitude - better than the P-38E/F/G/J gave them even footing against the Fw 190. You may have missed that they were flying to Germany and Denmark when the early P-38 experience went no further than Paris at not very happy 'exchange rates' vs the LW
Deep penetrations or not, for many perilous months the Germans could out-persist the Jug until it had to RTB. They could not do that to the 38. It was a pioneering enterprise all around for which far too much blame is rained upon the airplane. The 8th AF simply never figured out how to use it right while everyone else did—or at least the former took too long to do so.
Vraciu - the missions the 55th and 20th flew did reach Bremen versus P-47D w/108 gallon tanks turning back 75 mies earlier, but remember the P-38H didn't have LE fuel tanks and were too few and too easy to fight to be very effective at target support. That said, the P-38 in equal number to the P-47C/C WOULD have been more effective.
Every fighter opposed by a P-38, kill or not, was one less going after a bomber. Scarecrows work. Escorts were effective, though admittedly improvement was needed. What was learned by both the 38 and the 47 helped the Mustang groups later. The P-38 was cutting into the Germans and applying pressure. They simply could not replace their losses, especially with the Russians adding to the misery. This alone, a war of attrition, would have seen us victorious without the P-51 or extended range P-47s.
Good points - but the two best Mustang FGs (ALL in - every theatre) NEVER flew a combat mission in the P-38 or the P-47 (or the P-39s they trained in). The 354th, had they not been saddled with P-47s for a couple of high scoring ETO months Nov/Dec/Jan and Mid Fed would have been the top FG in AAF, topping 56th and 475th. The 357th was 3rd in A to A for all of ETO and MTO and specifically more than all the top P38 FG that started ops in 1942, two years earlier.
The statistics I presented to you were solely air to air VC extracted from my database and Frank Olynyk's which are the USAF official VC tallies. They are extremely revealing to the relative performance of the P-38 and crews in the most demanding high threat environment for AAF during WWII. I'm not picking on the P-38. In the vernacular - "it is what it is". The airplane was versatile, great 1938 design, very well improved, always limited by the wing and T/E complexity as well as the Allison/GE system combo. It was expensive to buy, 2x to operate, 2x to maintain. - But IT was Not a great ETO escort fighter. Period.
Excepting a handful of Spitfires, for a protracted period of time the 38 was the only airplane in the USAAF that could take the fight to the enemy and be even remotely in the same league. North Africa, the Med, Italy...Germany itself. Even at a level slightly above parity, the Germans were losing.
See above for Army Co-Operation Command deployment for the Mustang in early 1942 through EOW - long before the P-38 was flying ops over Germany.
People who bash this airplane are simply driven by a biased agenda. Saying the P-38 “suck[ed]” is borderline idiotic. It’s also the easy way out because it is essentially non-controversial being the common misperception.
Actually I apologize for saying it sucked - because clearly it 'didn't' - but the debate was ETO and for that argument, it was 'deficient' compared to the P-51B.
As for considering being easily identified a liability, maybe *you* didn’t get the memo so ask George Preddy to send it over.
Beyond that I have a headache from this.
(I enjoyed reading Bud Fortier’s book. Bert Marshall was mentioned quite positively as I recall, which I mentioned in another conversation long ago. Good stuff.)
Everybody that flew with dad went out of their way to tell me how much they though of him - both as a fighter pilot and as a leader of men. He went from #4 in flight four to squadron ops officer in 10 days - scored on on a Ju 87 on day 1 and made ace faster than anybody in the 355th FG (59 days later), was a Major for a month and ran both the 354th FS and Dpty Gp CO responsibilities for six weeks and ended up commanding the 355th at the end of the war. I was the luckiest son to ever live.
Headache duly noted - I had the same experience during a long running debate with Bodie over the same topic, specifically the ETO. Whether you fit in the category, the legion of P-38 apologists always play 'what if' instead of 'stick with the facts, just the facts, ma'am".
It just wasn't a very good escort in the context of expectations in the ETO. Published fact from both command observations and historical perspectives.
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Headache duly noted - I had the same experience during a long running debate with Bodie over the same topic, specifically the ETO. Whether you fit in the category, the legion of P-38 apologists always play 'what if' instead of 'stick with the facts, just the facts, ma'am".
It just wasn't a very good escort in the context of expectations in the ETO. Published fact from both command observations and historical perspectives.
You’re making it hard to reply to your points because they’re in line with mine but I’ll try.
Yes, based on what was expected it didn’t live up to its potential early on. Some of this was doctrinal, some was driven by operational errors (like high RPM, low MP cruising which turned the oil into sludge due to low temps—the reasons for this are manifold, pun intended).
The context in regard to aerial victories depends on circumstances. It doesn’t require a kill to be a success. Based on dim memories I note the following points:
- P-38 employment and utility differed between the 8th and 9th AFs with the latter being much more successful. This points to factors other than just the airplane itself.
- The P-51 with the 8th AF ranged ahead of the formations while the P-38s remained at altitude. This will affect kill totals on a mission by mission comparison basis. The Mustangs had a longer leash than the Lightning’s did.
- Before the Mustang arrived the P-38 had already stymied the LW. Galland himself admitted as much. The fact that the Me-110 was no longer viable was a massive win for the Americans. Loss rates went from 20-percent to less than five BEFORE the Mustang arrived. The P-38 had such an impact that German night fighters were being deployed to day operations which had the ancillary effect of helping the British loss rate.
(Also 650 bombers escorted to Bremen ?? by P-38s without loss—or no more than about five—long before Mustangs arrived showed it could do the job. This was not a fluke and was repeated more than once.)
- The MTO units involved in escort duties outperformed their 8th counterparts in the same role. They also beat MTO-based Mustang and Jug units overall throughout. One squadron that switched from then 38 to the 51 saw no increase in success.
- The P-38 flew a fraction of the total ETO sorties compared to the P-47 and P-51 but did so at the peak of German opposition.
At the end of the day, the P-38 was not fully-developed until 1944 by which time the P-51 and P-47 had come along with similar performance. Someone stated it best on another site: An airplane that would have been a world-beater in 1942 and 1943 became an also-ran in 1944-45.
I can’t help but think the crash of the prototype on a publicity stunt was the difference between these two outcomes, but that’s an emotional response.
I had some other thoughts but they escape me. I’ll throw them in later. Not an apologist, just don’t like people ganging up unfairly on anyone or anything especially without the proper context. The more people bash the P-38 the more I like it.
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Before the Mustang arrived the P-38 had already stymied the LW. Galland himself admitted as much.
I expect we will not get a reference for this remarkable conclusion.
Drgondog, salute to you for your fine analysis of P-51 and its operational history. Many of us have followed it for years. And we all admire your father (although many of us will contest your statement that he was the best father anyone could have!). But give it up here; you will not get the last word.
- oldman
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- The MTO units involved in escort duties outperformed their 8th counterparts in the same role. They also beat MTO-based Mustang and Jug units overall throughout. One squadron that switched from then 38 to the 51 saw no increase in success.
Which squadron, of which fighter group, of which air force? Also when did they convert to the P-51?
How did the other P-38 squads in their group fare after converting to the P-51? Likewise, the other P-38 squadrons in their air force.
Point being: you're drawing conclusions based on 1/3rd of the experience of a single fighter group and 1/6 or less of an entire air force. That's flimsy logic at best.
Furthermore, the time of transition and which air force this squadron belongs to matters because, for example, if it were in the 15th AF in spring 1944 then it's chances of encounter Luftwaffe fighters would decrease significantly based on the lack of fighters stationed in central Italy. May have been no more more than 6 total squads of German fighters of "on paper" strength at the time. Most German fighter units moved to northern Italy or out of Italy all together.
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Using the exact same logic as everyone here.
You cannot make a blanket statement that the P-38 was inferior to the Mustang just because the 8th AF alone had trouble with it.
Don’t lecture me about statistics. I used to do that for a living. Why do you think I am objecting to the knee jerk 38 bashing? Because it’s based on broad strokes purely devoid of context to explain them—nevermind ignoring contradictory evidence.
(Also, off the top of my head I think the 479th went from the P-38 to the P-51 with no change in their performance. I will have to check on that though as it may have been someone else.)
MTO Lightning’s were in the fight from basically day one (North Africa) of the 38’s full scale entry into the fight against the Germans and they outperformed (and outscored) fellow 47 and 51 units (combined) throughout the war. The top scoring P-38 outfit in the MTO would have ranked in the top five-ish in the ETO, AHEAD of just about every 47, 51, and Spitfire equipped group. The same context you’ll use to negate this achievement is the same one I’ll use to defend the airplane in the 8th.
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I expect we will not get a reference for this remarkable conclusion.
Drgondog, salute to you for your fine analysis of P-51 and its operational history. Many of us have followed it for years. And we all admire your father (although many of us will contest your statement that he was the best father anyone could have!). But give it up here; you will not get the last word.
- oldman
You ever read “The First and the Last”? Start there. I read it the first time in eighth grade some 35+ years ago. Otherwise, the internet has this marvelous search engine feature. Go get ‘em, Tiger. :aok
As for his research, even D-dog is admitting I am making valid points (without getting butthurt smartass over it, to boot). But again, don’t let facts mess up your narrative or interfere with your ill-informed anti-Lightning bias!
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“[Through the first 10 months of 1943] 8AF bomber losses averaged 9 percent a
month. Once long-range escorts began acompanying the bombers in November, the
figured dropped to 3 percent.”
(Schweinfurt was 25% with short-legged Jug escorts.)
As the source notes, it wasn’t because the P-38 was an uberfighter, it was simply there, and that presence had an impact.
Even Hap Arnold praised the work of the P-38 and spoke with disdain regarding the performance of the P-47.
The LW was stymied in December of 1943 per Galland’s admission. Their efforts to stop the bombers had failed. Not even a Big Week could save them. With an American airplane rolling off the assembly line every 18 seconds they were swamped.
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Using the exact same logic as everyone here.
You cannot make a blanket statement that the P-38 was inferior to the Mustang just because the 8th AF alone had trouble with it.
Don’t lecture me about statistics. I used to do that for a living. Why do you think I am objecting to the knee jerk 38 bashing? Because it’s based on broad strokes purely devoid of context to explain them—nevermind ignoring contradictory evidence.
(Also, off the top of my head I think the 479th went from the P-38 to the P-51 with no change in their performance. I will have to check on that though as it may have been someone else.)
MTO Lightning’s were in the fight from basically day one (North Africa) of the 38’s full scale entry into the fight against the Germans and they outperformed (and outscored) fellow 47 and 51 units (combined) throughout the war. The top scoring P-38 outfit in the MTO would have ranked in the top three (or four-ish) in the ETO, AHEAD of just about every 47, 51, and Spitfire equipped group. The same context you’ll use to negate this achievement is the same one I’ll use to defend the airplane in the 8th.
I actually agree with your overall defense of the P-38. I just think that specific piece of evidence is weak for the reasons I gave. You may find that it does not actually support your argument if you dig into the specific details that you alluded to.
FYI, If you read Johannes Steinhoff's "Messerschmitts over Sicily, you will find that the German pilots, including Steinhoff himself, were of the opinion that the P-38 was superior to the 109G-6 in every regard.
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I actually agree with your overall defense of the P-38. I just think that specific piece of evidence is weak for the reasons I gave. You may find that it does not actually support your argument if you dig into the specific details that you alluded to.
More specific details are difficult to type with two thumbs on a cellphone.
The general point is that for every 8th AF 38 group someone wants to bash we can point to one in the MTO having success with the same mission. This means the truth lies beyond simply saying the P-38 was no good.
FYI, If you read Johannes Steinhoff's "Messerschmitts over Sicily, you will find that the German pilots, including Steinhoff himself, were of the opinion that the P-38 was superior to the 109G-6 in every regard.
Much respect for his opinion, and I am not entirely surprised to hear it, but I’ll go against my own argument by saying his assertion isn’t monolithic. However, Galland also ultimately considered the 109’s days over and advocated cessation of production.
The P-38 was like a rock thrown into a pond. The ripples it cast radiated out long after the rock was no longer plainly visible.
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This means the truth lies beyond simply saying the P-38 was no good.
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No one is saying simply THAT.
The argument is very specific to the special conditions in the ETO and the role of a high altitude escort fighter. P-38 records are pretty uniformly accepted to be steller regarding everything else it did.
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Using the exact same logic as everyone here.
You cannot make a blanket statement that the P-38 was inferior to the Mustang just because the 8th AF alone had trouble with it.
The only blanket statement that is still worthwhile based on the past exchanges is the P-38 failed to meet expectations for long range escort in the ETO - for a myriad of reasons (not 'ideas') as noted above. For your benefit, the emergence of the P-38 as the fighter everyone expected occurred after D-Day, specifically in July when the P-38 had a great day over Leipzig with Landers leading a sweep on July 7. The J-15 w/o dive flaps proved to be a nice airplane after months of thrashing aroung the engine/turbo/aftercooler issues and simplifying the fuel selection and installing the second generator for cockpit heating and redundancy. Had That airplane been available in that configuration October 1943 through D-Day, we wouldn't be having this discussion.
Don’t lecture me about statistics. I used to do that for a living. Why do you think I am objecting to the knee jerk 38 bashing? Because it’s based on broad strokes purely devoid of context to explain them—nevermind ignoring contradictory evidence.
Prefer not to debate the statistical discussions here. I devoted a significant body of attention to the ETO focusing on the relative 'experience' of the P-38H/J, P-47C/D and P-51B through June 5, 1944 where my first volume ends. The primary sources were a.) 8th AF Operational Mission Summary Reports (a lot of reading and transcribing day to day 8th FC summaries imbedded, b.) Freemans 8th AF Mighty Eighth War Diary (Day by day compilation summary of the 8th mission reports), c.) Don Caldwell's Day Fighters - In Defense of the Reich which is a day by day LW mission summary as well as the credits and losses of the LW defending against the 8th and the 15th.
For us to have a meaningful and historically accurate dialogue on the P-38's operational experience/wins/losses in the ETO, I feel that you have to at least absorb Freeman's War Diary and look carefully at the summary VC/loss data for each mission. He distilled the 8th AF Mission Summary Data to get there. He made some mistakes, I know I will also, but they won't be 'feelings or emotional' based on my admiration for the Mustang.
(Also, off the top of my head I think the 479th went from the P-38 to the P-51 with no change in their performance. I will have to check on that though as it may have been someone else.)
The 479th flourished in August/September 1944 under Zemke's leadership, and continued when the 479th converted to P-51 even after Zemke went down in T-Storm. By the way, as long as anecdotal references are made, consider that Zemke as a superb combat CO leading P-47/P-38 and P-51 FG a.) was 'irritated' that Schilling/Landry made decision Not to convert to P-51 while he was on leave in April/May and b.) stated that the Mustang was the superior escort fighter compared to the P-38/P-47 on basis of range and maneuverability/performance versus the LW fighters. See Freemans book "Zemke'.
Back to the 479th - In my book "Our Might Always", I show that the 479th emerged as the best air to air FG in context of VCs to air to air loss rate, It was far better statistically than the other 3 P-38 FGs and was at the top in Mustang comparisons.
MTO Lightning’s were in the fight from basically day one (North Africa) of the 38’s full scale entry into the fight against the Germans and they outperformed (and outscored) fellow 47 and 51 units (combined) throughout the war. The top scoring P-38 outfit in the MTO would have ranked in the top five-ish in the ETO, AHEAD of just about every 47, 51, and Spitfire equipped group. The same context you’ll use to negate this achievement is the same one I’ll use to defend the airplane in the 8th.
Actually, the P-38s operationally did Not outscore the Mustang FGs when they (31st, 52nd, 325th and 322nd) converted to Mustangs. See USAF 85, Olynyk's or my VC data base. One shocking statistic is the even the 332nd outscored the 1st, 14th and 82nd FG from their conversion date to P-51B/C in July 1944 through VE day. The P-38 groups were slower to have an all 'J-15, then -25, then P-38L' TO&E compared to 9th AF but were equipped with LE tanks on J-15s in May/June to be able to escort to Ploesti, for example. If you need additional proof, pull the USAF 85 and do it the hard way, day by day, squadron by squadron to make the comparisons.
Those three FGs, which started in 8th and were ripped from Eaker in Fall 1942, carried the load in 1943 for 12th AF, before the formation of the 15th - and they carried the load in long range escort for the 15th until April 1944 when the 31st and 52nd converted from Spits, then the 325th from P-47s, then the 332nd from P-40/P-47s.
Last but not least. I'll have to go back and re-read Galland's various books for both the quote and context of Steinhoff comments about the P-38. My recollection is that during a Fighter Conference of Galland and his Gruppenkommodore/Gruppe leaders that all the Kanalfront/Germany leaders were expressing derision of the P-38 as an air fighter, Steinhoff demurred and stated that the P-38 was a 'dangerous foe' in the Med. I don't believe that he ever stated that the P-38 was better than the Bf 109G in every way. That said, the P-38 with functioning engines Was a 'dangerous foe' in the hands of a good pilot. But, for all the reasons I stated above, including its large size and compressibility issues in the ETO, the 109 could frequently take advantage of the P-38 by choosing fight or flight, or simply split-ess in an unfavorable situation.
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No one is saying simply THAT.
The argument is very specific to the special conditions in the ETO and the role of a high altitude escort fighter. P-38 records are pretty uniformly accepted to be steller regarding everything else it did.
I am seriously about to bang my head on the desk here.
You can not dismiss doctrinal mistakes and OPERATOR ERROR specifically by the 8th AF when airplanes in other commands PERFORMING THE SAME ROLE did just fine.
The myriad reasons for this are not excuses as some people wish to believe. They are valid REASONS. The P-38 wasn’t the only airplane to suffer boneheaded decisions by commanders, either. Yet despite all this, it’s mere presence made a tremendous difference.
The reason the Lightning is claimed to not have lived up to its potential early on in the ETO (a claim that is accurate but more nuanced than it appears) is because it had so much potential to begin with.
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Actually, the P-38s operationally did Not outscore the Mustang FGs when they (31st, 52nd, 325th and 322nd) converted to Mustangs. See USAF 85, Olynyk's or my VC data base. One shocking statistic is the even the 332nd outscored the 1st, 14th and 82nd FG from their conversion date to P-51B/C in July 1944 through VE day. The P-38 groups were slower to have an all 'J-15, then -25, then P-38L' TO&E compared to 9th AF but were equipped with LE tanks on J-15s in May/June to be able to escort to Ploesti, for example. If you need additional proof, pull the USAF 85 and do it the hard way, day by day, squadron by squadron to make the comparisons.
Those three FGs, which started in 8th and were ripped from Eaker in Fall 1942, carried the load in 1943 for 12th AF, before the formation of the 15th - and they carried the load in long range escort for the 15th until April 1944 when the 31st and 52nd converted from Spits, then the 325th from P-47s, then the 332nd from P-40/P-47s.
Last but not least. I'll have to go back and re-read Galland's various books for both the quote and context of Steinhoff comments about the P-38. My recollection is that during a Fighter Conference of Galland and his Gruppenkommodore/Gruppe leaders that all the Kanalfront/Germany leaders were expressing derision of the P-38 as an air fighter, Steinhoff demurred and stated that the P-38 was a 'dangerous foe' in the Med. I don't believe that he ever stated that the P-38 was better than the Bf 109G in every way. That said, the P-38 with functioning engines Was a 'dangerous foe' in the hands of a good pilot. But, for all the reasons I stated above, including its large size and compressibility issues in the ETO, the 109 could frequently take advantage of the P-38 by choosing fight or flight, or simply split-ess in an unfavorable situation.
Good timeline. I haven’t read some of this stuff in over two decades, unfortunately. I’ll have to re-absorb it and fashion a response. An analysis of these numbers would require other info to be precise (and I already have a dozen variables in my head that I would have to account for) but I am curious to know the comparative exchange rate once MTO Groups with Mustangs were fully involved compared to their Lightning brethren.
As to the rest... Your inline quotes and some of this above makes many of my points and destroys oldman’s claim that these are “excuses”.
And yes, I agree, had the airplane of 1944 been around in 1942-43 the discussion would be different. Ultimately, however, the Germans were at their nadir in November-December of 1943 or so. In another six months they would be throwing 100-hour pilots into the fray.
(Forcing a 109 to Split-S and run is a victory in and of itself, btw. He’s out of the fight. Those numbers cannot be accounted for anywhere except perhaps bomber loss rates.)
When a P-38 group is jumped, winds up fighting outnumbered 12:40 then 24:40, and takes down 16 Germans for the loss of 7 you cannot call that a failure by any measure. You’ve just knocked a JG out of the war with losses you can replace but he cannot. Sure, the LW can perhaps stick someone in the seat but that person is not as capable as the man he replaced.
The P-38 in the 8th AF didn’t have to be a world-beater to be successful, it simply had to be there, but it was a lost opportunity to bend the curve further caused in part by self-inflicted wounds.
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Utoh. I just found this:
Designated NA-99, the P-51A Mustang was ordered in numbers of 1,200 by the U.S. Army in August 1942. No ground attack here, no dive brakes, just pure fighter. This was the best fighter the U.S. had below 22,000 feet. This according to the AAF School of Applied Tactics at Orlando, FL.
http://www.mustangsmustangs.net/p-51/variants/p51a
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Utoh. I just found this:
Designated NA-99, the P-51A Mustang was ordered in numbers of 1,200 by the U.S. Army in August 1942. No ground attack here, no dive brakes, just pure fighter. This was the best fighter the U.S. had below 22,000 feet. This according to the AAF School of Applied Tactics at Orlando, FL.
http://www.mustangsmustangs.net/p-51/variants/p51a
Which brings up another point. Allison-powered airplanes of all kinds suffered performance problems at altitude. The P-38 was the only one that ever solved it sufficiently until the advent of the F-82 (which itself took a performance hit compared to its Merlin-powered P-82 predecessors).
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The reason all the Allison-engined fighters (except the P-38) did rather poorly at altitude was that the AAF was all-in on turbosuperchargers to the point that they never specified a two-stage mechanical supercharger for the Allison engine. Only the P-38 and P-47 carried turbosuperchargers, and only the P-51 ended up with a two stage mechanical supercharger (mated to a British engine). The P-39 was originally designed with a turbo for its Allison, but it was removed from the design by the AAF.
Mike
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Good timeline. I haven’t read some of this stuff in over two decades, unfortunately. I’ll have to re-absorb it and fashion a response. An analysis of these numbers would require other info to be precise (and I already have a dozen variables in my head that I would have to account for) but I am curious to know the comparative exchange rate once MTO Groups with Mustangs were fully involved compared to their Lightning brethren.
As to the rest... Your inline quotes and some of this above makes many of my points and destroys oldman’s claim that these are “excuses”.
And yes, I agree, had the airplane of 1944 been around in 1942-43 the discussion would be different. Ultimately, however, the Germans were at their nadir in November-December of 1943 or so. In another six months they would be throwing 100-hour pilots into the fray.
(Forcing a 109 to Split-S and run is a victory in and of itself, btw. He’s out of the fight. Those numbers cannot be accounted for anywhere except perhaps bomber loss rates.)
When a P-38 group is jumped, winds up fighting outnumbered 12:40 then 24:40, and takes down 16 Germans for the loss of 7 you cannot call that a failure by any measure. You’ve just knocked a JG out of the war with losses you can replace but he cannot. Sure, the LW can perhaps stick someone in the seat but that person is not as capable as the man he replaced.
Vraciu - the very Best victory credit day for the P-38FGs in the ETO before July 7, 1944 was 11-3-1 vs 5 losses on March 18, 1944, another 11 vs 5 on 2-10-44. For 2-10-44 it was 20th 6 vs 4, 55th 5 vs 1.
For 3-18-44 it was 20th 7 vs 4, 55th 3 vs 1, 364th 1 vs 0.
As to LW losses, a high % bailed out and lived to fight another day. Zero % of the P-38 losses returned to fight, save some that ditched and were rescued by Allies.
The 'operational exchange' for P-38s in Nov/Dec 43, Jan 44 was 17 vs 17 for Nov; 4 vs 5 for Dec (with 2 FG); and 18 vs 22 (with 2 FG). In Feb 1944 prior to Big Wee it was 20 vs 19. Big Week through enf of Feb was 17 vs 6 (best month for combined P-38 FG's).
What day before July 7 did you have in mind for your '16 vs 7' scenario?
The P-38 in the 8th AF didn’t have to be a world-beater to be successful, it simply had to be there, but it was a lost opportunity to bend the curve further caused in part by self-inflicted wounds.
Well, No. 'Success' was well defined by Spaatz/Doolittle for 8th FC based on D-Day imperatives - namely destroy the LW in the air and on the ground. Absolute air superiority over the Beach head was demanded by Eisenhower as a critical cusses factor - and air to air losses were insignificant to that imperative.
In contrast to first the shorter ranged P-47D, it was deficient by comparision to that metric. In comparison to the P-51B, both the P-47D and P-38J fell far behind the P-51B. By D-Day, the P-51B VC's over LW in air was close to the combined totals of both the P-47D and P-38J, and the comparisons became more pronounced as the P-51B/D dominated the long range escort role and P-38s started shipping to 9th AF and 15th AF in the MTO.
One cannot place the blame even largely on 8th AF leadership. They weren't 'trying to make the p-38 fail to meet expectations'. If you want to find the root causes to the ETO high altitude issues, point to both Lockheed and Material Command for poor pre-operational testing for High Altitude cold engine and cockpit conditions in 1939 through 1943.
The Eglin Air Proving Ground yanked that testing away from Wright Field - but far too late to wring the P-38, P-47C/D and P-51B out BEFORE Cass Hough was handed 'buggy airplanes' in the ETO. The P-51B by comparison sorted out the primary engine/aftercooling issues in weeks, although the engine mount bolts and occasional man gear door opening in a dive were nasty surprises. A note here: The AAF never contemplated using the P-51B as long range escort until the crisis of Blitz Week made it clear that the B-17 could not really defend itself.
As to forcing a 109 or 190 to split ess as 'plus' - yeah but they simply out dove the P-38 and climbed back to get in the game again. When the P-38 went into compressibility control lock to evade, it was simply shot down by a faster chasing pilot with superior dive speed and controllability.
Summary, Arnold was not as previously noted. sanguine on the P-38 to perform the job in the ETO but he also had zero choice in July 1943 and issued the command that ETO/8th BC had priority on all subsequent P-38s produced, and ordered the P-51B to route to the ETO, then over rode Vice Air Marshall Leigh Mallory (via Portal) in making the P-51B, then tasked to 9th AF as TAC, to be re-assigned TDY to 8th AF. He also ran roughshod over his TAC command at AAF-HQ by yanking the P-51B from battlefield supremacy to air supremacy - All Theatres.
On your question about MTO operations, I have all the VC's by all US operated a/c for 12th and 15th AF but do not have an accurate count on losses. I read and compiled data from 2000+ MACRs to get my ETO stats. Not enough years left to do the same for MTO. If you doubt my bold comments that the 332nd Mustangs outscored each of the 15th AF P-38 FG's, pull your USAF 85 (not quite as good as Olynyk or my files - but the new stuff is synch'd with USAFHRC current data).
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I cannot keep doing this if we are going to do inline responses. It’s too hard to keep up and I lose track of all the things I have to refute. Much of your info is simply wrong.
"16 vs. 7" pre-July 07? I'll do you one better. 29 January 1944, 20th FG went 10-1-1 for the lost of zero (or one, depending on the source).
07 July, 1944, 20FG downed 25 of the 77 LW aircraft destroyed that day, the highest of any Group.
These seem to me to be examples of the potential for the airplane when flown by good pilots with capable leaders. (This is not to say the 20th didn’t have its hands full any way, because it did. It was taking on a formidable opponent and holding serve.)
The leadership doesn’t have to TRY to screw up, it simply has to make bad decisions. This was done in spades for a long time until drop tanks were finally used to their potential and Doolittle started making changes to tactics. This is common knowledge. For someone writing a “history” book I am shocked that you seem oblivious to this. The 8th AF’s record relative to their brethren in the MTO lies directly at the feet of its leadership along with other factors that are dismissed as “excuses” rather than resolvable causes.
The fight against the JG I mentioned resulted in their WITHDRAWAL. (One of the German pilots said it was an absolute slaughter. They were no match for the P-38s in their 190s.) If German pilots were not lost then there would be no need to have done this—nor to ultimately put sub-100-hour noobs and bomber pilots into JGs to replace losses. [I am not limiting my discussion to the ETO, either, so your attempt to discredit me doesn’t apply.]
The Germans could not replace their losses with equal pilots. The Americans could.
A 109 diving out of the furball is not going to “simply climb back up into the fight” but so be it. Let him. He'll just be that much closer to bingo and further out of position than where he started. The reduction in bomber loss rate to 4% from a far higher average proves it worked. The inability of the LW to do anything about it also proves it.
Say what you want. The P-38 WAS effective and anyone who says it wasn’t simply can’t do math or is driven by another agenda.
(And nobody “simply” shoots down a P-38. This isn’t an arcade game. Outnumbered 5:1 and holding, for the sake of argument, a kill ratio around parity shows you’re not an easy kill.)
The P-38 was taking on peak-level opponents. The Mustang came in as a relief pitcher with the benefit of a weakened foe, better ROE, and overwhelming numerical superiority, things the P-38 never had up to that point—if ever.
As for victory totals, the Jug flew twice as many sorties. The P-51 nearly three times as many. If both didn’t ultimately outscore the P-38 then something would seem dreadfully wrong.
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It is interesting to look into victory claims compared with actual downed planes during the 43-45 time frame, the only book I can find that actually compare this is : The Lufwaffe over Germany, Defence of the Reich, ISBN 978-1-85367-712-0
"I am seriously about to bang my head on the desk here"
-film or it didn't happen :) :old:
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I cannot keep doing this if we are going to do inline responses. It’s too hard to keep up and I lose track of all the things I have to refute. Much of your info is simply wrong.
Oh, did we take our white inspection gloves off and start thumping your chest? OK.
"16 vs. 7" pre-July 07? I'll do you one better. 29 January 1944, 20th FG went 10-1-1 for the lost of zero (or one, depending on the source).
Not quite true. 29th claim of 10-0-1 reduced to 7-2-2. That said - I was pointing out that 11 VC was the Top combined Daily scores of all four operational P-38 Fighter Groups until July 7 - which I mentioned above (BTW the 19 of the total 26 score for P-38s belonged to the 55th FG led by Landers that day. The 20th had 7 and lost their top ace (7.33) James Morris to an Me 410.
As to sources, on VC's I use USAF 85 as publicly available for debates, but Olynyk and mine are exactly in line with current USAFHRC totals. For losses I use the 7000+ MACRs for ETO VIII FC. For quick Bomber losses I use Freeman's M8 WD. For quick Fighter VCs and Losses I use Kent Miller's Fighter Units and Pilots of 8th AF. Kent also sifted through MACRs but our individual assignments vary - but largely agree.
Roger Freeman's compilations of VC's and losses for VIII BC far more accurate than his fighter data - because he used the Mission Summaries which correctly included CLAIMS but the 8th AF Victory Credits Board sifted them into AWARDS.
07 July, 1944, 20FG downed 25 of the 77 LW aircraft destroyed that day, the highest of any Group.
Nope, BTW the next best day for the ETO P-38 was September 26th when the 479th scored 18 w/P-38 and 7 w/P-51 during their transition. The next best after that were the 11 score days - in 11 1/2 months of combat ops since October 15, 1943,
These seem to me to be examples of the potential for the airplane when flown by good pilots with capable leaders. (This is not to say the 20th didn’t have its hands full any way, because it did. It was taking on a formidable opponent and holding serve.)
On July 7, the 20th scored 2 Me 410a and 5 FW 190A-8 Sturms - heavily armored and 'sluggish' at high altitude - and the 8th AF top P-38 ace (Morris w/7.33) was shot down by the formidable Me 410 that he shot down. BTW, Morris was the Only P-38 pilot in ETO to shoot down four German fighters in a day.
As an aside, the top P-38 ace score in the MTO was 12 (Brezas 14thFG and Sloan 82nd FG) against combined Italian and German aircraft.
The leadership doesn’t have to TRY to screw up, it simply has to make bad decisions. This was done in spades for a long time until drop tanks were finally used to their potential and Doolittle started making changes to tactics. This is common knowledge. For someone writing a “history” book I am shocked that you seem oblivious to this. The 8th AF’s record relative to their brethren in the MTO lies directly at the feet of its leadership along with other factors that are dismissed as “excuses” rather than resolvable causes.
Ahh no - and I devoted a considerable amount of print on this topic in my new book. First, the P-38E was first modified to carry 150 and 165 gallon tanks (and pressurize them) in 1941. All succeeding production P-38s were so equipped. The P-38H that arrived in ETO in Aug/September 1943 (20th and 55th) were so equipped. Doolittle didn't assume command of 8th AF until January 1944. Doolittle issued the 'Pursue and destroy' order in mid January and it formally went into effect on January 24th. Both Schmid and Galland stated separately that this was as close to a formal 'turning point' for the LW as could be dated. At this time there was one operational P-51B Fighter Group and two P-38 FG's operational in Dec and Jan, 1944. In those two months the 354th FG destroyed 52 and the 20th/55th Combined destroyed 37. The ratio for the next month with the 357th coming on board mid month prior to Big Week was 89.5 (P-51) to 32.5 (P-38). The ratio in March with 4 P-51 Groups and 3 P-38 Groups was 251 to 26. March is the very first month when P-51 sorties equaled the P-38 sorties.
Please be specific if you have 'bad leadership' in mind? Pretty serious accusation, isn't it?
The fight against the JG I mentioned resulted in their WITHDRAWAL. (One of the German pilots said it was an absolute slaughter. They were no match for the P-38s in their 190s.) If German pilots were not lost then there would be no need to have done this—nor to ultimately put sub-100-hour noobs and bomber pilots into JGs to replace losses. [I am not limiting my discussion to the ETO, either, so your attempt to discredit me doesn’t apply.]
Hmm - don't know what your sources are but I choose Prien, Caldwell and Muller for sanity checks. On January 29 during the Frankfurt mission, JG 1 was GROUNDED due to weather. The LW lost a total of 45 fighters as follows: Jagdivision lost 30 (no Fw 190s) - 19 Me 110s and 11 Bf 109s from JG 3 and JG 27 and JG106. Jagddivision 4 lost 11- 9 Fw 190s from JG2, 5 FW 190s from II./JG 26 and one Bf 109E from JG 107. If you wish to further avoid 'discrediting' please look to page 190 of Caldwell's "Day Fighters in Defense of the Reich". I recommend it as single best compilation of LW units defending against 8th and 15th AF.
The Germans could not replace their losses with equal pilots. The Americans could.
Yep, true. That said (and you need to dig on this) the LW in defense of Germany drew on experienced units mostly by stripping the Russia and Med forces and moving them west - approximately 30 Staffeln between December and April alone - as well as re-trained bomber and transport pilots for replacement pool.
A 109 diving out of the furball is not going to “simply climb back up into the fight” but so be it. Let him. He'll just be that much closer to bingo and further out of position than where he started. The reduction in bomber loss rate to 4% from a far higher average proves it worked. The inability of the LW to do anything about it also proves it.
Say what you want. The P-38 WAS effective and anyone who says it wasn’t simply can’t do math or is driven by another agenda.
(And nobody “simply” shoots down a P-38. This isn’t an arcade game. Outnumbered 5:1 and holding, for the sake of argument, a kill ratio around parity shows you’re not an easy kill.)
The P-38 was taking on peak-level opponents. The Mustang came in as a relief pitcher with the benefit of a weakened foe, better ROE, and overwhelming numerical superiority, things the P-38 never had up to that point—if ever.
And yet you keep babbling on without sources and data for everyone to see what in hell you are talking about. Tell us when the peak level opponents disappeared' - was it like overnight on November 30th , 1943 - never to be seen again? Or what? Please cite the sources for "5:1", define 'relief pitcher' - (normally brought in when the starter can't cut it - otherwise if the batting order is weak, why change)? ROE the same for P-38 and P-51 after December 1st but I have documented disparate results favoring equal Mustang sorties in December through March - against the same competition, same odds over the same targets, with same or LESS combat experience for the P-51 pilots until the 4th converted in late February after Big Week.
Say again, what Didn't the P-38 have up 'to that point' - BTW, what is 'that point' - can you tell me which date(s) you are talking about?
As for victory totals, the Jug flew twice as many sorties. The P-51 nearly three times as many. If both didn’t ultimately outscore the P-38 then something would seem dreadfully wrong.
Vraciu - it seems that you are more 'comfortable' dealing in generalities. Between October 15th 1943 and June 5th 1944 the P-38 flew APPROXIMATELY the same sortie total as the P-51B - both were initially 1:6 (P-38 October 1943 to P-47); 2 to 8 (P-38 to P-47), 1:8 (P-51 to P-47) on December 31, 1943; 2 to 9 for P-38, 1:9 for P-51 at end of January; 3 to 11 on the 1st of March for both the P-38 and P-51. Are you still with me on this 'ratio thingy'?
March brought a ramp up of P-51 and 9th AF P-47s. April brought more P-51, P-38 and P-47 FGs into ops.
At the end of May the combined 9th and 8th AF TO&E for P-38, P-47 and P-51 - ALL flying escort to the VIII BC - were six P-38 (20, 55, 364, 367, 370, and 479FGs); eight P-51 (4, 339, 352, 354, 355, 359, 361 and 363FGs); Fourteen P-47 (56, 78, 353, 356, 358, 362, 365, 366, 368, 371, 373, 404, 405 and 406FGs). Sources Maurer-Maurer and Frank Olynyk. (They match)
So pick the months you want to whine about sortie balance, 'equal and relentless foe', 'foe with diminished capacity', target assignment mix, fighter pilot quality, etc. Or as you are prone to do, whimper and say that 'there you go again - discrediting me'.
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It is interesting to look into victory claims compared with actual downed planes during the 43-45 time frame, the only book I can find that actually compare this is : The Lufwaffe over Germany, Defence of the Reich, ISBN 978-1-85367-712-0
"I am seriously about to bang my head on the desk here"
-film or it didn't happen :) :old:
Don C did an excellent job in his "Day Fighters in Defense of the Reich" - much better than LWOG, although I cite both' extensively in my new book.
Claims vs Credits vs Actuals study has been a significant part of my Historical research over the past 30 years. I find that a best guess of 'actual 8th AF VC' vs 'recorded and published LW Losses, including Damaged and Damaged/repaired' yield about 85% of Awards.
I found two categories of discrepancy; The famous 'last seen smoking in a spin for Fw 190 - a favorite and documented evade maneuver by LW pilots, as well as a/c chased into ground for a crash landing. If that sucker didn't burn out it was liable to be back in service.
That said, IMO the 8th and 9th AF were Far more rigorous than all the other Air Forces (or USN for that matter).
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Trying to reproduce the spin-on-demand 300mph in the FW190-A8 in AH only produce a full roll to the left - losing 50mph, something I try to avoid since netlag produce an impossible target that settles behind the higher speed chaser that will become a target instead. I was not aware of that before Pervert told me, after his D9 got radiator hit during our melee sessions.
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It is interesting to look into victory claims compared with actual downed planes during the 43-45 time frame, the only book I can find that actually compare this is : The Lufwaffe over Germany, Defence of the Reich, ISBN 978-1-85367-712-0
"I am seriously about to bang my head on the desk here"
-film or it didn't happen :) :old:
Ha ha. :)
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Vraciu - it seems that you are more 'comfortable' dealing in generalities. Between October 15th 1943 and June 5th 1944 the P-38 flew APPROXIMATELY the same sortie total as the P-51B - both were initially 1:6 (P-38 October 1943 to P-47); 2 to 8 (P-38 to P-47), 1:8 (P-51 to P-47) on December 31, 1943; 2 to 9 for P-38, 1:9 for P-51 at end of January; 3 to 11 on the 1st of March for both the P-38 and P-51. Are you still with me on this 'ratio thingy'?
March brought a ramp up of P-51 and 9th AF P-47s. April brought more P-51, P-38 and P-47 FGs into ops.
At the end of May the combined 9th and 8th AF TO&E for P-38, P-47 and P-51 - ALL flying escort to the VIII BC - were six P-38 (20, 55, 364, 367, 370, and 479FGs); eight P-51 (4, 339, 352, 354, 355, 359, 361 and 363FGs); Fourteen P-47 (56, 78, 353, 356, 358, 362, 365, 366, 368, 371, 373, 404, 405 and 406FGs). Sources Maurer-Maurer and Frank Olynyk. (They match)
So pick the months you want to whine about sortie balance, 'equal and relentless foe', 'foe with diminished capacity', target assignment mix, fighter pilot quality, etc. Or as you are prone to do, whimper and say that 'there you go again - discrediting me'.
Generalities are fine. They often show us the forest because all we notice are trees. Besides, people seem more than happy to state the airplane sucked and paint with a broad brush. I simply painted over their nonsense.
Drop tanks were not effectively employed. I am well aware of the subterfuge used to plumb the airplanes against Air Corps directives. This is of no use in combat when you have a General who sees them as useful only for ferrying. It took a lot more effort than necessary to bring drop tanks into proper use. Bloody noses are powerful motivators I guess.
I've been pulled away from my original point. The airplane fought against top tier opponents while heavily outnumbered and held the line. In fact it did better than that and helped rescue daylight bombardment from total collapse in the last quarter of 1943. The reasons it didn't do even better are manifold but point to factors beyond the airplane.
Could it have been better? Yes. Should it have been better sooner? Yes. But it was hardly a failure. The 8th suffered from self-inflicted wounds as much as anything else. Other Commands did much better with the same airplane flying the same missions. It is what it is.
Beyond that this discussion is going in circles as you're straining gnats in an attempt to look smart while missing the big picture. Never mind that you're mocking a point you previously conceded. That's disingenuous.
Also, I politely asked you to stop with the inline text. You can't do that one courtesy so I am done parlaying with you. I can't track all this on a tiny cellphone screen.
(Edit in: And lest anyone think I am angry, quite the contrary. See below.)
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No hard feelings, BTW. Good luck with the book. Let us know when it comes out. :cheers:
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... netlag produce an impossible target that settles behind the higher speed chaser that will become a target instead. I was not aware of that before Pervert told me...
What does this mean?
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No hard feelings, BTW. Good luck with the book. Let us know when it comes out. :cheers:
Same... I will be interested in a.copy.
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What does this mean?
If you stall a wing at high speed you slow down.
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Guess I wasn't clear enought:
"netlag produce an impossible target"
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For the chaser- according to Pervert it looks like you, instead of throwing it into a stall-spin, do a perfect roll jumping to the left quite a bit, and slow down but keep altitude and lose 50mph. impossible to follow unless you can drop gear at 300mph.
As an alterative you can pullup though, while I dive to 300mph go level and the procedure will repeat itself again until I run out of altitude, or friends/ enemies get involved i the fight.
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What you're describing is a high speed snap roll.
Guess I wasn't clear enought:
"netlag produce an impossible target"
Since you shoot the plane on your PC that makes no sense.
These are easy claims to test.
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its very easy to do, just do a fast pullup with a 190a8 with 4*20mm and 50-75% of fuel , fly straight at about 300mph, and it all happens automatically, how it looks from the enemy perspective I do not know.
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I understand snap roll, dropping speed etc. What I'm confused about is:
"netlag"
Is this referring to latency? Lag pursuit?
Websters hasn't heard of this word.
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I understand snap roll, dropping speed etc. What I'm confused about is:
"netlag"
Is this referring to latency? Lag pursuit?
Websters hasn't heard of this word.
Making up words is how we get new words. :D
I guessing the netlag reference combined with "impossible target" refers to the combined effects of internet travel time, quick aircraft movement reversals, and the flight smoothing code. I'm not saying it's a problem but I think that's the reference.