Aces High Bulletin Board

General Forums => The O' Club => Topic started by: fuzeman on June 29, 2020, 08:36:23 PM

Title: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: fuzeman on June 29, 2020, 08:36:23 PM
The Boeing 737 Max made it’s first test flight today on the road to recertification.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Shuffler on June 29, 2020, 11:04:23 PM
It will pass with flying colors.

Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Puma44 on June 30, 2020, 09:56:40 AM
It will pass with flying colors.



No doubt at all. 
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Easyscor on June 30, 2020, 10:06:16 AM
One of the things I read about the FAA's agenda was whether there needed to be training certification on the pilots flying the Max. From what I've heard in here, that would solve most of the problems to begin with.
All those Boeing promises to the contrary, if this comes to pass, it'll cost the company another bundle.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Mister Fork on June 30, 2020, 12:10:55 PM
One of the things I read about the FAA's agenda was whether there needed to be training certification on the pilots flying the Max. From what I've heard in here, that would solve most of the problems to begin with.
All those Boeing promises to the contrary, if this comes to pass, it'll cost the company another bundle.

...and that unfortunately will hurt sales to countries who's airlines won't want to spend the money to properly train their pilots. I.e. most third world country airlines with questionable maintenance records and practices (i.e. Lion Air, Ethiopian Airlines) that were contributing factors to their MAX crashes.

Since Pakistan just found out that a 1/3 of their country civilian pilots had fake pilot credentials , I wonder how many more pilots have fake qualifications/flying hours that get behind machines they have no business flying?
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Puma44 on June 30, 2020, 12:23:58 PM
...and that unfortunately will hurt sales to countries who's airlines won't want to spend the money to properly train their pilots. I.e. most third world country airlines with questionable maintenance records and practices (i.e. Lion Air, Ethiopian Airlines) that were contributing factors to their MAX crashes.

Since Pakistan just found out that a 1/3 of their country civilian pilots had fake pilot credentials , I wonder how many more pilots have fake qualifications/flying hours that get behind machines they have no business flying?

Therein is the root cause of the two Max crashes.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Mister Fork on June 30, 2020, 12:26:38 PM
Therein is the root cause of the two Max crashes.

Has it been determined yet if the pilots of both planes had any real flight school training? That would be very interesting...
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Spikes on June 30, 2020, 12:30:08 PM
Well this will be locked eventually, but anyway...what makes the MAX so different than previous 737s that would require such heavy training for the type? Is it just new technological systems to get acquainted with?
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Shuffler on June 30, 2020, 12:31:45 PM
One of the things I read about the FAA's agenda was whether there needed to be training certification on the pilots flying the Max. From what I've heard in here, that would solve most of the problems to begin with.
All those Boeing promises to the contrary, if this comes to pass, it'll cost the company another bundle.
From what the Boeing pilots in here said.... any that need to be trained, need to be trained in any Boeing as the reaction is the same.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Puma44 on June 30, 2020, 12:32:00 PM
Has it been determined yet if the pilots of both planes had any real flight school training? That would be very interesting...

Unknown.  But, from the viewpoint of a well trained and safe 737 pilot, they lacked the basic competency and ability to handle the aircraft in a non normal situation.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Eagler on June 30, 2020, 12:55:48 PM
Hopefully it is delivered with a training disclaimer that removes Boeing from liability of poorly trained pilots in these other countries.

<S>

Eagler
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Puma44 on June 30, 2020, 01:43:17 PM
Well this will be locked eventually, but anyway...what makes the MAX so different than previous 737s that would require such heavy training for the type? Is it just new technological systems to get acquainted with?

Heavy training will be a by product of the incompetent handling of the two non normal Max crashes and politicians, in my opinion.  Yes, new technology.  But, nothing that can’t be adapted to and flown safely by competent, well trained pilots.  When the 737 NG first came out there was additional targeted training to make the conversion from round dials (ya know, all those clocks) to the flat panel screens.  It was a challenging conversion but, when proficiency built up, very few wanted to fly the round dials because of the large workload reduction of the NGs.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Mister Fork on June 30, 2020, 01:43:19 PM
Unknown.  But, from the viewpoint of a well trained and safe 737 pilot, they lacked the basic competency and ability to handle the aircraft in a non normal situation.

...IMHO that screams fake credentials. Or, poorly trained pilots. The result is the same for both.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Puma44 on June 30, 2020, 02:00:10 PM
...IMHO that screams fake credentials. Or, poorly trained pilots. The result is the same for both.

Or, low time, inexperienced pilots which was another indicator in these incidents.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Spikes on June 30, 2020, 02:11:57 PM
Heavy training will be a by product of the incompetent handling of the two non normal Max crashes and politicians, in my opinion.  Yes, new technology.  But, nothing that can’t be adapted to and flown safely by competent, well trained pilots.  When the 737 NG first came out there was additional targeted training to make the conversion from round dials (ya know, all those clocks) to the flat panel screens.  It was a challenging conversion but, when proficiency built up, very few wanted to fly the round dials because of the large workload reduction of the NGs.
Interesting, I assumed it was along those lines. I just figured these days it would be more common to have newer instruments in most aircraft these days.

Another thing too is - all of the training in the world in a simulated situation won't help you in a real world situation if anxiety takes over for one reason or another. Pilots might go their entire career without getting into a snafu where emergency training has to play a part.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Puma44 on June 30, 2020, 03:14:15 PM
Interesting, I assumed it was along those lines. I just figured these days it would be more common to have newer instruments in most aircraft these days.

Another thing too is - all of the training in the world in a simulated situation won't help you in a real world situation if anxiety takes over for one reason or another. Pilots might go their entire career without getting into a snafu where emergency training has to play a part.

That’s why it important to have highly experienced and well trained pilots sitting up front.  More accumulated aviation muscle memory if something hits the fan.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: FESS67 on June 30, 2020, 04:47:23 PM
Therein is the root cause of the two Max crashes.

No sir, These are contributing factors.  The root cause is further back in the chain.  There are features and decisions around MCAS that are likely to be the true root causes.


I do not think it is right to lay all the blame at the feet of the pilots or airlines when the machine itself was flawed.  If it had not been for MCAS neither of those brand new planes would have crashed.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Puma44 on June 30, 2020, 05:07:53 PM
No sir, These are contributing factors.  The root cause is further back in the chain.  There are features and decisions around MCAS that are likely to be the true root causes.

  • Was there a culture problem at Boeing?
  • Were they desperate to compete against the Airbus offering?
  • Did they in fact conceal information from or deliberately seek to misinform the FAA?
  • Why was MCAS not properly explained to airlines and pilots?

I do not think it is right to lay all the blame at the feet of the pilots or airlines when the machine itself was flawed.  If it had not been for MCAS neither of those brand new planes would have crashed.

Well, we’ll have to agree to disagree.  Pilots are the last line of defense in the event of an emergency event.  If it had not been for inexperienced, possibly incompetent pilots, neither of those jets would have crashed.  The malfunction both jets experienced was recoverable with effective airmanship and situational awareness.  Neither incident demonstrated that. :salute

Boeing does deserve a bloody nose for hiding the MCAS from operators, but not the pummeling it has undergone.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Busher on June 30, 2020, 06:40:17 PM
No sir, These are contributing factors.  The root cause is further back in the chain.  There are features and decisions around MCAS that are likely to be the true root causes.

  • Was there a culture problem at Boeing?
  • Were they desperate to compete against the Airbus offering?
  • Did they in fact conceal information from or deliberately seek to misinform the FAA?
  • Why was MCAS not properly explained to airlines and pilots?

I do not think it is right to lay all the blame at the feet of the pilots or airlines when the machine itself was flawed.  If it had not been for MCAS neither of those brand new planes would have crashed.

Maybe you could share with us your extensive experience in the cockpit of jet aircraft.

I do admire your journalistic capabilities though. You managed to phrase each of your questions like an accusation.

When grossly inexperienced pilots are dispatched in jet aircraft and an abnormal event occurs (and yes I said abnormal-not emergency, because a stab runaway is a non-event for experienced well trained pilots), the results can be biblical. I will also add that the Ethiopian jet should not have been dispatched. It had clearly been faulted for intermittent Air Data Computer failures which ultimately caused the MCAS to intervene when no intervention was needed. Experienced pilots would know that and would have declined to fly the airplane until the fault was rectified.

If I can find fault with Boeing, I could only say that they should not have given the MCAS such force that it could not easily be overridden by average pilot strength which would give the pilots as much time as they needed to disable the stab trim and manually correct the mis-trim situation.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: fuzeman on June 30, 2020, 10:27:52 PM
Well this will be locked eventually, but anyway...what makes the MAX so different than previous 737s that would require such heavy training for the type? Is it just new technological systems to get acquainted with?

No expert of course but they hung bigger engines under the wings and it pushed the nose up more so than older ones when thrust was added, and the pilots were never made aware of the MCAS and how it would effect flight. 
Very simplified, very very.

Juan Browne on blancolirio, https://www.youtube.com/user/blancolirio , had some great videos on the Max. At least I thought he did.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: FESS67 on July 01, 2020, 02:41:04 AM
Maybe you could share with us your extensive experience in the cockpit of jet aircraft.

I do admire your journalistic capabilities though. You managed to phrase each of your questions like an accusation.

That was not my intent.  They are simple questions and there is documented evidence that each of these things was in play.  I understand that correct maintenance and adequate pilot skills are required and in these cases are likely contributing factors, however there is a chorus of people who wish to place all the responsibility on the airlines and none on the manufacturer and that is not a balanced analysis of the accidents.

Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Shuffler on July 01, 2020, 02:58:54 AM
That was not my intent.  They are simple questions and there is documented evidence that each of these things was in play.  I understand that correct maintenance and adequate pilot skills are required and in these cases are likely contributing factors, however there is a chorus of people who wish to place all the responsibility on the airlines and none on the manufacturer and that is not a balanced analysis of the accidents.

So two crashes happened that would not have..... if there were pilots in the cabin.

There are no perfect planes..... pilots get you to your destination in one piece.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: FESS67 on July 01, 2020, 03:36:49 AM
So two crashes happened that would not have..... if there were pilots in the cabin.

There are no perfect planes..... pilots get you to your destination in one piece.

As usual you take a simplistic view of the world.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: UpMaKilt on July 01, 2020, 04:10:55 AM
Or, low time, inexperienced pilots which was another indicator in these incidents.

Other than the FO on the Ethiopian flight, the rest of the pilots had several thousands of hours of flight time.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Shuffler on July 01, 2020, 07:07:58 AM
As usual you take a simplistic view of the world.

Two pilots in those planes and no one died. No plane crash.

You can blame anyone you like for your lawyers. The fact stands. It is simple.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Puma44 on July 01, 2020, 11:35:17 AM
Other than the FO on the Ethiopian flight, the rest of the pilots had several thousands of hours of flight time.

How much time in the 737?  What type aircraft was their other time logged in?
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 01, 2020, 11:42:13 AM
How much time in the 737?  What type aircraft was their other time logged in?

i seem to recall that the Manu pushed that all training you needed to move from the previous version was a video and an ipad. no simulator needed.


semp
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Busher on July 01, 2020, 11:49:42 AM
That was not my intent.  They are simple questions and there is documented evidence that each of these things was in play.  I understand that correct maintenance and adequate pilot skills are required and in these cases are likely contributing factors, however there is a chorus of people who wish to place all the responsibility on the airlines and none on the manufacturer and that is not a balanced analysis of the accidents.

In a properly maintained 737Max, the MCAS would have been invisible to the pilots. It's design goal was to allow a pilot to go from a 737-NG600 (a small model) to a 737-Max8 in the same working day and experience as little handling difference as possible. As a long time airline pilot, I frankly don't see the need but the FAA demands it for "common type" certification. As I said, I do fault Boeing for giving the MCAS the input force it had; I think it's force should have been significant but average pilot strength should have been enough to override it while corrective action was taken.
Who knows, maybe that's what the FAA demanded among other things in the airplane's re-certification.
All of this discussion in the current Covid19 situation is really academic. Airlines are parking the majority of their fleets; some airlines have already failed; Boeing and Airbus can't give their products away so they may fail; and pilots with 10,000 hours of heavy jet experience are looking for work - many will leave the industry forever.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Busher on July 01, 2020, 11:54:38 AM
i seem to recall that the Manu pushed that all training you needed to move from the previous version was a video and an ipad. no simulator needed.


semp

Pilots have been doing that for years. B767 to B757. Airbus 319 to 320 to 321. It's not difficult and as I keep saying, in a properly maintained MAX, the MCAS's input would have been invisible.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 01, 2020, 12:11:47 PM
Couple of points, first to Busher's well made point.

The Lion Air aircraft had a KNOWN MALFUNCTION yet it wasn't repaired and was sent out on a revenue flight anyway. Tough to blame Boeing for that. This known malfunction is evidenced by the fact that the same aircraft had the same problem the day before the crash.

Then as to training: The day before the exact same malfunction occurred. A jump seat pilot saved that aircraft because he KNEW what to do while the two guys actually in the seat did not.

Quote
Indonesian investigators have confirmed the presence of a third, off-duty pilot who reportedly saved a troubled Lion Air Boeing 737 MAX the day before it crashed.

Bloomberg reported that the off-duty pilot was in the jump seat in the aircraft’s cockpit when it developed problems and suggested to the flight crew that they turn off the trim stabilizer system as they struggled to control the plane...

...“The third pilot, who has not been identified, was qualified to fly Max 8s and was deadheading aboard the Oct. 28 flight from Bali’s Denpasar airport to Jakarta,” The Washington Post quoted  Soerjanto Tjahjono, the head of Indonesia’s National Transportation Safety Committee, as saying. “The aircraft encountered the same problems that appear to have caused it to crash a day later.”     https://www.airlineratings.com/news/lion-air-investigators-confirm-presence-third-pilot/

So how is it that one 737MAX jumpseat pilot instantly knew the correct procedure but the two 737MAX pilots actually in the seat did not?

Lastly, just about every well-trained pilot has had it drilled into him/her from day one that if you move a secondary flight control and the aircraft immediately does something abnormal, then you immediately put that secondary flight control back where it was. Had either of the two 737MAX crash crews done THAT...MCAS would not function. Had they returned the flaps to where they were before retraction and subsequently returned to land....no crashes. Yet these two crews apparently did not know this very basic flight training standard.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 01, 2020, 01:03:45 PM
not sure if it's semantics but the third pilot didn't know. he figured out the problem first then fixed the situation.  then again, he wasn't busy flying the plane.


semp
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Puma44 on July 01, 2020, 02:01:06 PM
not sure if it's semantics but the third pilot didn't know. he figured out the problem first then fixed the situation.  then again, he wasn't busy flying the plane.


semp

Apparently, the other two pilots weren’t busy flying the plane either.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: UpMaKilt on July 01, 2020, 03:25:21 PM
How much time in the 737?  What type aircraft was their other time logged in?

lion air; The flight's cockpit crew were captain Bhavye Suneja, a 31 year old Indian national[13] who had flown with the airline for more than seven years and had about 6,028 hours of flight experience (including 5,176 hours on the Boeing 737);[14] and 41 year old Indonesian co-pilot Harvino,[15] who had 5,174 hours of flight experience, 4,286 of them on the Boeing 737

Ethiopia; The captain of the plane was Yared Getachew, 29, who had been flying with the airline for almost nine years[43] and had logged a total of 8,122 flight hours, including 1,417 hours on the Boeing 737.[c] He had been a Boeing 737-800 captain since November 2017, and Boeing 737 MAX since July 2018.[10] At the time of the accident, he was the youngest captain at the airline.[44] The first officer, Ahmed Nur Mohammod Nur, 25, was a recent graduate from the airline's academy with 361 flight hours logged, including 207 hours on the Boeing 737.

Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 01, 2020, 04:05:12 PM
not sure if it's semantics but the third pilot didn't know. he figured out the problem first then fixed the situation.  then again, he wasn't busy flying the plane.


semp

The jumpseat pilot didn't "know"? He clearly knew the long standing Boeing procedure for Runaway Stabilizer Trim. So yeah he "knew" the procedure.

What he did can be summed up succinctly as Analysing the Situation and Taking the Proper Action. That's a phrase most professional pilots have heard many times during their careers. The jumpseater analyzed the situation: Runaway Stab Trim. While he didn't actually throw the switches, he informed the PIC and SIC of the correct, proper action which he clearly KNEW. And which the PIC/SIC apparently DID NOT.

Just as an aside as well: the idea that the jumpseater only figured out the problem because "he wasn't busy flying the airplane".

Guess what! When you sew on that fourth stripe, you are expected to be able to simultaneously fly the aircraft, analyze the situation and take the proper action. It's part of the deal, see? That's what Captains DO. Captains are not supposed to have to rely on a knowledgeable jumpseat pilot to save the day.

Or as they say in the biz...."It's why you get paid the big bucks."
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Busher on July 01, 2020, 06:31:42 PM
lion air; The flight's cockpit crew were captain Bhavye Suneja, a 31 year old Indian national[13] who had flown with the airline for more than seven years and had about 6,028 hours of flight experience (including 5,176 hours on the Boeing 737);[14] and 41 year old Indonesian co-pilot Harvino,[15] who had 5,174 hours of flight experience, 4,286 of them on the Boeing 737

Ethiopia; The captain of the plane was Yared Getachew, 29, who had been flying with the airline for almost nine years[43] and had logged a total of 8,122 flight hours, including 1,417 hours on the Boeing 737.[c] He had been a Boeing 737-800 captain since November 2017, and Boeing 737 MAX since July 2018.[10] At the time of the accident, he was the youngest captain at the airline.[44] The first officer, Ahmed Nur Mohammod Nur, 25, was a recent graduate from the airline's academy with 361 flight hours logged, including 207 hours on the Boeing 737.

I appreciate the numbers game. What is clear with the Ethiopian accident is that in spite of their posted experience, the crew did not know that they were about to attempt to fly a 737 that was not airworthy due a critical air data computer failure.... or worse, their airline management expected pilots to fly when ordered to fly.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: mikeWe9a on July 01, 2020, 06:34:26 PM
Well this will be locked eventually, but anyway...what makes the MAX so different than previous 737s that would require such heavy training for the type? Is it just new technological systems to get acquainted with?

The MAX, due primarily to different engines and a slightly different weight distribution, had flight characteristics that were slightly different from other 737s (nose pitched differently in response to power changes and was more sensitive at high angles of attack, IIRC).  While this isn't inherently harder to deal with, it was DIFFERENT enough from the previous generation of 737 that normally a separate certification would be required.  The MAX therefore had a system (MCAS) designed to make trim changes in flight that would mimic the characteristics of the earlier aircraft such that no additional certification was required (i.e. it behaved just like an earlier model 737).  This was done so that customers would be able to simply add the MAX to their existing 737 fleets without the expense and complications of having to certify some of their pilots for the "new" aircraft and then keep track of WHICH 737 pilots were needed for a given flight.  The documentation and training for this system was apparently deficient. 

Not that it really mattered for the accidents, however, because the failure of that system essentially created a "runaway trim" failure, which is an emergency that is documented and trained for on pretty much any aircraft with electric trim - the crews failed to recognize or deal with that failure, and the procedure for that failure would have allowed the aircraft to be safely landed.

Mike
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 01, 2020, 07:15:37 PM
I appreciate the numbers game. What is clear with the Ethiopian accident is that in spite of their posted experience, the crew did not know that they were about to attempt to fly a 737 that was not airworthy due a critical air data computer failure.... or worse, their airline management expected pilots to fly when ordered to fly.

which the manufacturer failed to install a reduntant system.  insisting they were not needed.   you can argue forever but blame calls on all 3 equally. airline,  pilots and manu.


semp
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Busher on July 01, 2020, 07:51:27 PM
which the manufacturer failed to install a reduntant system.  insisting they were not needed.   you can argue forever but blame calls on all 3 equally. airline,  pilots and manu.


semp

I never absolved Boeing. Read my other posts.. I said more than once that I felt that the output force of the MCAS likely too strong.
But I hate to blow your theory, the MCAS worked as designed but when you fly a broken airplane, it can kill you. It was built with at least 2 air data computers. It cannot be legally dispatched if one is not working. When one fails (which is really rare), all of the automation fails. The airplane remains flyable with manual control and, it takes two well trained experience pilots to ignore faulty information and to disable systems that may respond incorrectly to faulty information from the failed ADC.
As Toad succinctly pointed out, had the Ethiopian pilots simply returned the flaps to their previous position after their retraction caused the airplane to "act up", they could have simply hand flown the airplane to a safe landing. However given the fact that no effort was ever made to reduce thrust from a takeoff setting, I am not convinced that basic operating skills were present.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 01, 2020, 08:46:01 PM
I never absolved Boeing. Read my other posts.. I said more than once that I felt that the output force of the MCAS likely too strong.
But I hate to blow your theory, the MCAS worked as designed but when you fly a broken airplane, it can kill you. It was built with at least 2 air data computers. It cannot be legally dispatched if one is not working. When one fails (which is really rare), all of the automation fails. The airplane remains flyable with manual control and, it takes two well trained experience pilots to ignore faulty information and to disable systems that may respond incorrectly to faulty information from the failed ADC.
As Toad succinctly pointed out, had the Ethiopian pilots simply returned the flaps to their previous position after their retraction caused the airplane to "act up", they could have simply hand flown the airplane to a safe landing. However given the fact that no effort was ever made to reduce thrust from a takeoff setting, I am not convinced that basic operating skills were present.

I totally agree with you except for the pilots were the only ones responsible and the airlines.  perhaps a single code somewhere where if one fails there's a light that turns on, but that was an option that the manu ofeered for another couple of bucks and said it was not needed.

you know what is the best opinion I ever seen after a crash.  was when an airplane flying thru the andes crashed.  pilots were getting both overspeed and stall warnings.  plane went down.

they asked an expert what he would have done, he said if it was me I would have put the plane in cruise control and wait for another airliner that was coming and wait.  but I wasnt there, I dont know what went thru the pilots head and it's easy for me to say do this or do that because i was not there.

it's easy for another pilot to say this is what I would have done, but you werent there at that time in that situation.  I totally believe the pilots messed up, but you werent there. it's easy for you to type from the comfort of your chair but you werent there.  that's what I think.


semp

Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Busher on July 01, 2020, 10:09:05 PM


it's easy for another pilot to say this is what I would have done, but you werent there at that time in that situation.  I totally believe the pilots messed up, but you werent there. it's easy for you to type from the comfort of your chair but you werent there.  that's what I think.


semp

Well, we'll have to agree to disagree. I appreciate that I was not there but 4 decades of flying and an appreciation of what transpired, tells me that no one needed to die for what should have been an "abnormal" (not emergency) incident.
Furthermore, neither of us will ever know how an airplane that was previously faulted for a "grounding" system failure got in the air.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 01, 2020, 11:31:06 PM
Well, we'll have to agree to disagree. I appreciate that I was not there but 4 decades of flying and an appreciation of what transpired, tells me that no one needed to die for what should have been an "abnormal" (not emergency) incident.
Furthermore, neither of us will ever know how an airplane that was previously faulted for a "grounding" system failure got in the air.

1200 bucks, that's what could have saved both airplanes.  except manu didnt think it was needed.


semp
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Shuffler on July 02, 2020, 05:32:44 AM
1200 bucks, that's what could have saved both airplanes.  except manu didnt think it was needed.


semp

The aircraft has a lot of safety items built in costing money. All that can't displace two poor pilots in the cabin.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Puma44 on July 02, 2020, 08:42:07 AM
Looks like the recertification testing is complete.

https://simpleflying.com/boeing-737-max-10-hour-recertification/amp/
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Busher on July 02, 2020, 08:56:52 AM
1200 bucks, that's what could have saved both airplanes.  except manu didnt think it was needed.


semp

I guess I'll have to keep saying, those that take transport jets into the air with un-rectified "grounding" system failures are grossly negligent. The faulty ADC caused the MCAS to intervene... the MCAS did not jump up and bite them.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Puma44 on July 02, 2020, 09:07:17 AM
I guess I'll have to keep saying, those that take transport jets into the air with un-rectified "grounding" system failures are grossly negligent. The faulty ADC caused the MCAS to intervene... the MCAS did not jump up and bite them.

Maybe if you make that statement in bold it’ll be easier to comprehend.

1200 bucks, that's what could have saved both airplanes.  except manu didnt think it was needed.


semp

Competent, well trained pilots, that’s what could have saved both airplanes.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 02, 2020, 09:39:15 AM
Typical.

There's always somebody that thinks just one more gauge can take the place of a competent, well-trained pilot.

Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Puma44 on July 02, 2020, 09:43:24 AM
The core truth.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 02, 2020, 11:49:02 AM
Typical.

There's always somebody that thinks just one more gauge can take the place of a competent, well-trained pilot.

well that one more gauge was just made standard.


semp
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Puma44 on July 02, 2020, 11:57:43 AM
well that one more gauge was just made standard.


semp

To accommodate the lowest common denominator.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Shuffler on July 02, 2020, 12:17:33 PM
To accommodate the lowest common denominator.

Until the next one goes for the record.....
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 02, 2020, 03:06:20 PM
To accommodate the lowest common denominator.

isn't that true for everything new in a plane?


semp
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Puma44 on July 02, 2020, 03:24:15 PM
isn't that true for everything new in a plane?


semp

Not necessarily.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Shuffler on July 02, 2020, 03:38:15 PM
isn't that true for everything new in a plane?


semp

Most are tools for a good pilot.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 02, 2020, 06:49:48 PM
well that one more gauge was just made standard.
semp

Yes, it was. And more than likely yet another poorly trained crew will eventually crash a 737MAX. Add all the gauges you can possibly imagine; that still won't provide protection for a poorly trained, incompetent crew.

BTW... on that comment you made about not being there. Have you EVER been there? Do you hold a PIC Type Rating in ANY aircraft?
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 02, 2020, 07:09:21 PM
Yes, it was. And more than likely yet another poorly trained crew will eventually crash a 737MAX. Add all the gauges you can possibly imagine; that still won't provide protection for a poorly trained, incompetent crew.

BTW... on that comment you made about not being there. Have you EVER been there? Do you hold a PIC Type Rating in ANY aircraft?

nope,  but i did stay at a holiday Inn once.  however i have driven for 38 years and have never cause an accident and only 1 ticket for crossing the double yellow lines.

that makes me an expert lol. i remember reading about a cop driving a car with the accelerator stuck.  i bet that cop had more training than i did in driving a car and yet he crashed the car and killed himself and 3 other people.  easy for me to say i would have put the car in neutral.  which is what i had done before. but i don't know what was going thru his mind and why not do the safest thing.

that's what you guys with superb training do.  you can sit and blame the pilots totally when there's 2 other that i believe equally guilty.

that's what i think anyway.

semp
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 02, 2020, 07:26:10 PM
Pretty much what I figured.

You and those Lion Air/Ethiopian guys at the Holiday Inn.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 02, 2020, 07:48:17 PM
Pretty much what I figured.

You and those Lion Air/Ethiopian guys at the Holiday Inn.

get off your high horse.  from my point of view a 1200 gadget could have prevented, in addition to pilots being told no simulating training needed and to qualify and ipad was sufficient.

pilots were so under trained that they had thousands of hours with no accidents. but of course they were lucky.


semp
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Oldman731 on July 02, 2020, 08:38:05 PM
Competent, well trained pilots, that’s what could have saved both airplanes.


Undoubtedly true.  But Langewiesche's son wrote an article, maybe a year ago, that vividly pointed out that most of the rest of the world does not now, and perhaps never will, have competent, well-trained pilots.  According to him, Airbus figured this out first, and started designing planes that could be flown by...well...by people like me, while Boeing built good planes for good pilots. 

Could be that useless pilots are going to be a fact of life for much of the world, and airliners have to be designed to deal with that.

- oldman
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Puma44 on July 02, 2020, 10:04:10 PM

Undoubtedly true.  But Langewiesche's son wrote an article, maybe a year ago, that vividly pointed out that most of the rest of the world does not now, and perhaps never will, have competent, well-trained pilots.  According to him, Airbus figured this out first, and started designing planes that could be flown by...well...by people like me, while Boeing built good planes for good pilots. 

Could be that useless pilots are going to be a fact of life for much of the world, and airliners have to be designed to deal with that.

- oldman

And that’s just plain scary.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Shuffler on July 03, 2020, 02:48:49 AM
Yup
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Vulcan on July 03, 2020, 03:58:13 AM
Just let the inevitable happen and go Airbus.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Shuffler on July 03, 2020, 07:23:56 AM
Just let the inevitable happen and go Airbus.

Poor pilots crash those too. Only they don't ground all the planes.

The last one was an A320.  Came in too high, too hot, and landing gear not down. ATC warned of alt and speed but pilot just shrugged them off. Plane touched down on the engines then the "pilots" decided to go round. They actually became airborne again..Both engines failed from damage and the plane crashed into houses.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 03, 2020, 09:20:26 AM
get off your high horse.  from my point of view a 1200 gadget could have prevented, in addition to pilots being told no simulating training needed and to qualify and ipad was sufficient.

pilots were so under trained that they had thousands of hours with no accidents. but of course they were lucky.


semp

That's what you (as you have said) think. But despite your stay at the Holiday Inn, you really have no experience in the field, no qualifications in the field and basically nothing at all upon which to base your opinion.

OTOH, multiple people in these 737Max discussions actually hold Type Ratings in many models of the 737, have actually worn the fourth stripe and been in command on hundreds if not thousands of commercial passenger flights, have undergone years and years of training, have actually been instructors giving the training for a Type Rating and actually have successfully handled actual inflight emergencies.

These people disagree with what you think.

But yeah...you slept in a Holiday Inn, so there IS that.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 03, 2020, 09:32:40 AM

According to him, Airbus figured this out first, and started designing planes that could be flown by...well...by people like me, while Boeing built good planes for good pilots.

Yeah, that's what gets trumpeted around. Except if you look at two of the newer products for each company that have been around long enough for meaningful stats, the B-777 and the A330 you'll find essentially identical hull loss accident numbers. It's .42 per million departures for the A330 and .39 for the B-777.

Quote
Could be that useless pilots are going to be a fact of life for much of the world, and airliners have to be designed to deal with that.

- oldman

Could be that, as usual, airline management really is more concerned with pilot cost and pilot training cost than they are with maximum safety. The "acceptable losses" concept.

But hey....just one more gauge and no aircraft will ever crash again, right? It's not pilot proficiency...it's a sufficient number of gauges.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Busher on July 03, 2020, 10:15:06 AM

 

Could be that useless pilots are going to be a fact of life for much of the world, and airliners have to be designed to deal with that.

- oldman

Thanks to the pandemic and the resulting huge roll back of commercial flying, highly experienced well trained jet pilots will soon be a dime-a-dozen.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 03, 2020, 12:32:26 PM
That's what you (as you have said) think. But despite your stay at the Holiday Inn, you really have no experience in the field, no qualifications in the field and basically nothing at all upon which to base your opinion.

OTOH, multiple people in these 737Max discussions actually hold Type Ratings in many models of the 737, have actually worn the fourth stripe and been in command on hundreds if not thousands of commercial passenger flights, have undergone years and years of training, have actually been instructors giving the training for a Type Rating and actually have successfully handled actual inflight emergencies.

These people disagree with what you think.

But yeah...you slept in a Holiday Inn, so there IS that.

and have i ever said i knew how to fly one. i only question your guys blaming only the airline and pilots. Boeing has done responsibility too.

- pushing that flight simulator was not needed
- only thing needed to qualify was a video and an ipad
- not having redundant system for it, now they do


even now they're in trouble with the airforce for leaving trash and tools inside sealed compartments, it makes you wonder what else that hasn't been found.

but seriously my interest is of the state of mind. that's what nobody knows. i would like to know what the pilots you mentioned were thinking when they faced that emergency.


semp

Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 03, 2020, 01:06:18 PM
and have i ever said i knew how to fly one.

That's correct. You have no idea how to fly one. You have no idea of the training required to get a Type Rating in one. You have never been in command of a commercial passenger flight. You have never experienced various inflight emergencies that could result in the loss of the aircraft and passengers. You have never trained pilots in the aircraft or simulators. You have never been authorized by the FAA to issue a Type Rating in a jet aircraft.

Despite all of the above, you are just absolutely certain that the addition of an AOA display to the PFD would have saved the Lion Air and Ethiopian crews.

You don't believe people that have actually DONE most or all of the above things when they tell you the problem goes far deeper than the presence or absence of an AOA gauge on the PFD. When they tell you that given the evidence provided by the FDR and CVR, it's evident that an AOA display WOULD NOT have changed the outcome of the Lion Air and Ethiopian crews.

Quote
i only question your guys blaming only the airline and pilots. Boeing has done responsibility too.

I think if you actually review every 737Max thread since the accidents I don't believe you will find any of the "you guys" that holds Boeing entirely blameless. Boeing clearly could have done some things better and the "you guys" have said so in the other threads.

However, I think virtually ALL of the "you guys" believe that neither of the accidents needed to happen. That the "you guys" believe properly trained, experienced and competent pilots could have safely recovered both aircraft (as happened the day before with the jumpseat pilot giving instruction on the Lion Air aircraft). That the "you guys" believe just adding the AOA display would not have changed the outcome for Lion Air or Ethiopian.

Quote
but seriously my interest is of the state of mind. that's what nobody knows. i would like to know what the pilots you mentioned were thinking when they faced that emergency.

semp

As to what the Lion Air/Ethiopian crews were thinking, I doubt anyone will ever know.

I can only tell you what I was thinking in a very similar flight control/AOA malfunction on a 737 I was flying. I related that experience in one of the other 737Max threads. I was thinking: 1) Maintain aircraft control 2) Analyze the situation 3) Take the proper action. This all occurred in a flash, a tiny fragment of time. I flew the jet, realized we had an AOA malfunction, did not change configuration and continued to climb out to a safe altitude. That's what I was thinking and did.

It's pretty clear that the Lion Air/Ethiopian crews were unable to maintain aircraft control or analyze their situation. Thus they could not, did not take the proper action, despite the fact that both aircraft were completely flyable (again, the proof is Lion Air the day before). And...despite what you think those failures are really not Boeing's fault.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: FESS67 on July 03, 2020, 03:29:17 PM
I am with semp on this one.  There appears to be a chorus of "Hey look at those piss poor pilots, they are to blame!!"  I disagree with that analysis.  I am not saying that the pilots are faultless however my contention is that they were put into a situation that they should not have been put into by a system that was essentially flawed.

Now, before you pilot types go getting bent all out of shape asking how many hours I have spent as a commercial pilot, the answer is none.  But I do not need to be a pilot to read reports and recognize that there are issues at play other than the pilots involved.  Link below and some pertinent extracts.

https://transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/TI%20Preliminary%20Investigative%20Findings%20Boeing%20737%20MAX%20March%202020.pdf (https://transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/TI%20Preliminary%20Investigative%20Findings%20Boeing%20737%20MAX%20March%202020.pdf)

Quote
1) Production Pressures. There was tremendous financial pressure on Boeing and subsequently the
737 MAX program to compete with Airbus’ A320neo aircraft.
12 Among other things, this pressure.......  resulted in extensive efforts to cut costs, maintain the 737 MAX program schedule, and not slow
down the 737 MAX production line. The Committee’s investigation has identified several instances
where the desire to meet these goals and expectations jeopardized the safety of the flying public.

Quote
3) Culture of Concealment. In several critical instances, Boeing withheld crucial information from
the FAA, its customers, and 737 MAX pilots. This included hiding the very existence of MCAS
from 737 MAX pilots13 and failing to disclose that the AOA disagree alert was inoperable on the
majority of the 737 MAX fleet, despite having been certified as a standard cockpit feature.
14 This
alert notified the crew if the aircraft’s two AOA sensor readings disagreed, an event that occurs only
when one is malfunctioning. Boeing also withheld knowledge that a pilot would need to diagnose
and respond to a “stabilizer runaway” condition caused by an erroneous MCAS activation in 10
seconds or less, or risk catastrophic consequences.15

Quote
Boeing received an FAA exception to allow the company to not install on the 737 MAX an
Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS)—a system common in newly type
certificated aircraft since 1982 that displays for pilots aircraft system faults and failures and
helps pilots prioritize responding to multiple or simultaneous indications. The FAA accepted
Boeing’s argument about the impracticality and the economic expense of installing EICAS
on the 737 MAX.22 The 737 family, including the 737 MAX, is the only Boeing commercial.............aircra ft line that does not have an EICAS system installed, which might have helped to alleviate pilot confusion in the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines accidents.


Quote
In March 2016, Boeing sought, and the FAA approved, removal of references to MCAS
from Boeing’s Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM),
36 ensuring 737 MAX pilots were
unaware of this new software and its potential effect on the aircraft’s handling without pilot
command.

Quote
AOA Disagree Alert – Boeing intentionally concealed information from the FAA, its
customers, and pilots about inoperable AOA Disagree alerts installed on most of the 737
MAX fleet, despite their functioning being “mandatory” on all 737 MAX aircraft, and the
FAA has failed to hold Boeing accountable for these actions.

Quote
Boeing provided Lion Air a Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM) on August 16, 2018,
one year after learning that the AOA Disagree alert was not functioning on most 737 MAX
aircraft, highlighting the operation of the AOA Disagree alert. Boeing failed to indicate that
it knew the AOA Disagree alert on the Lion Air 737 MAX aircraft was not operational.43

Quote
Boeing did not acknowledge that the AOA Disagree alerts on an estimated 80 percent of the
737 MAX fleet were inoperative until after the Lion Air crash in October 2018.44
▪ Although the AOA Disagree alert was not a safety-critical component, Boeing knowingly
delivered 737 MAX aircraft to its customers that did not conform to the airplane’s type
certificate, and the FAA has failed to take any measures to hold Boeing accountable for
these actions.

Quote
Boeing’s own analysis showed that if pilots took more than 10 seconds to identify and
respond to a “stabilizer runaway” condition caused by uncommanded MCAS activation the
result could be catastrophic. The Committee has found no evidence that Boeing shared this
information with the FAA, customers, or 737 MAX pilots.
▪ The 10-second reaction time and the potential for it to result in catastrophic consequences
was discovered early on in the development of the 737 MAX program.46

Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Puma44 on July 03, 2020, 04:19:53 PM
I am with semp on this one.  There appears to be a chorus of "Hey look at those piss poor pilots, they are to blame!!"  I disagree with that analysis.  I am not saying that the pilots are faultless however my contention is that they were put into a situation that they should not have been put into by a system that was essentially flawed.

Now, before you pilot types go getting bent all out of shape asking how many hours I have spent as a commercial pilot, the answer is none.  But I do not need to be a pilot to read reports and recognize that there are issues at play other than the pilots involved.  Link below and some pertinent extracts.

https://transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/TI%20Preliminary%20Investigative%20Findings%20Boeing%20737%20MAX%20March%202020.pdf (https://transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/TI%20Preliminary%20Investigative%20Findings%20Boeing%20737%20MAX%20March%202020.pdf)



In every aircraft accident/incident, there is always a chain of events that lead up to something bad happening.  It is up to the pilot(s) to break that chain and prevent the final event from happening.  They are the last stand in the chain of safety.  A well trained, competent, and experienced pilot will in most every instance break the chain and recover the aircraft successfully.  In both of the Max accidents, there was a lack of basic situational awareness and airmanship.  It’s very concerning that a cockpit jumpseater had to coach the pilots on what to do the day prior, with the same malfunction.  The next day, no coach, no safe recovery.

All of the “you guys” with actual experience know the reality of what happened and should have happened.  The rest of “you guys” are certainly entitled to your opinion.

Travel recommendation:  Buyer beware when flying third world air carriers.  Never know who’s sitting in the front office watching over your chain of safety.   :salute
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: FESS67 on July 03, 2020, 05:09:52 PM

Travel recommendation:  Buyer beware when flying third world air carriers.  Never know who’s sitting in the front office watching over your chain of safety.   :salute

Travel recommendation:  Buyer beware when flying flawed aircraft.  Never know who's sitting in the back office initiating a break in your chain of safety.   :salute
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 03, 2020, 05:47:30 PM
The clear, irrefutable fact is that in both Lion Air and Ethiopian, the aircraft was entirely capable of returning to base quite safely.

For that to happen, there needed to be a competent, well trained, experienced crew in the front seats. It's incredibly sad (and damning) that pilots that supposedly had prior Boeing experience and indeed prior experience in other series of Boeing 737s were unable to correctly perform the Runaway Stab Trim procedure (unless prompted by a jumpseat pilot.  :eek: ).

Yeah, Boeing is not blameless. But no failure to document MCAS or train MCAS or add an AOA gauge or whatever would have prevented a competent, well trained, experienced crew from safely recovering those two aircraft.

That's the simple truth of both accidents.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Busher on July 03, 2020, 09:25:25 PM
To Puma and Toad, I have the utmost respect for you gents and anyone else that made or is making a career in the "front office". I never flew the 737 so you are both exceedingly more competent to comment than I am.
But what I see here in this debate is so typical of the everyone is entitled to an opinion which in simple terms is a truth but when it comes to technically complex subjects, no one defers to expertise anymore.
The Max was crucified by the press and by extension so was Boeing. The critical review by the FAA was destined to be an inquisition designed to satisfy not only the Press but also the travelling public. In spite of that, with the willingness these days of people to see conspiracies and evil under every rock, Boeing's reputation as a builder of quality jets will be suspect by many for some time to come.
We all know that no airplane is perfect and none ever will be. Some I recall in my career had some downright nasty behaviour if the crew was careless or complacent.
So in short, do I think you guys are wasting your breath debating these people? Ya, I guess I am. Flying has become so routine that I honestly believe that people have little respect and less understanding of what it takes to make almost 45000 flights a day in the USA so relaxed.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: FESS67 on July 03, 2020, 10:14:31 PM
To Puma and Toad, I have the utmost respect for you gents and anyone else that made or is making a career in the "front office". I never flew the 737 so you are both exceedingly more competent to comment than I am.
But what I see here in this debate is so typical of the everyone is entitled to an opinion which in simple terms is a truth but when it comes to technically complex subjects, no one defers to expertise anymore.
The Max was crucified by the press and by extension so was Boeing. The critical review by the FAA was destined to be an inquisition designed to satisfy not only the Press but also the travelling public. In spite of that, with the willingness these days of people to see conspiracies and evil under every rock, Boeing's reputation as a builder of quality jets will be suspect by many for some time to come.
We all know that no airplane is perfect and none ever will be. Some I recall in my career had some downright nasty behaviour if the crew was careless or complacent.
So in short, do I think you guys are wasting your breath debating these people? Ya, I guess I am. Flying has become so routine that I honestly believe that people have little respect and less understanding of what it takes to make almost 45000 flights a day in the USA so relaxed.

Busher, you are falling into the trap of believing that only those who can fly commercial jets can make reasoned, intelligent and informed arguments on the subject.  That is simply not true.  As to your comment about no one defers to expertise anymore, are you suggesting that the report I referenced was not written by experts? 

As far as the review by the FAA being destined to be an inquisition designed to satisfy not only the Press but also the travelling public, how do you come to that conclusion?  The reviews / reports cite issues and errors at all levels of the incidents from design, oversight, conflicts of interest, maintenance practices, personnel competencies.  What I see is a determination to squarely land fault at the feet of the pilots and I do not think that is a fair assertion.

You state In spite of that, with the willingness these days of people to see conspiracies and evil under every rock, Boeing's reputation as a builder of quality jets will be suspect by many for some time to come.   I am interested as to what you consider to be a conspiracy.  The bullet points in my original post in this thread are, as far as I am aware, not in question.  it is not a conspiracy, it is an uncovering of the truth about what happened.  In any quality root cause analysis if you do not turn over every rock you risk not coming to a full and accurate conclusion.  Why do you think it OK to blame dead pilots but no OK to fully examine and expose the contributions made by the manufacturer?

It is an uncomfortable truth but it is the truth.  I do not agree with the sentiment that these pilots were inherently incompetent and any pilot worth their pay would have flown their way out of it.  I believe the MCAS system defeated them and if it had not been in operation they would have flown their way out of it.

What would I know though?

Here is a letter reportedly written by Sullenberger on the issue.  I am going to assume that you consider him expert enough to have a valid point of view.  It is of course possible that this is not from the famed airline captain but another cog in the consiparacy.

Quote
Letter to the Editor
Capt. “Sully” Sullenberger
New York Times Magazine
Published in print on October 13, 2019

In “What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 MAX?” William Langewiesche draws the conclusion that the pilots are primarily to blame for the fatal crashes of Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian 302. In resurrecting this age-old aviation canard, Langewiesche minimizes the fatal design flaws and certification failures that precipitated those tragedies, and still pose a threat to the flying public. I have long stated, as he does note, that pilots must be capable of absolute mastery of the aircraft and the situation at all times, a concept pilots call airmanship. Inadequate pilot training and insufficient pilot experience are problems worldwide, but they do not excuse the fatally flawed design of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) that was a death trap. As one of the few pilots who have lived to tell about being in the left seat of an airliner when things went horribly wrong, with seconds to react, I know a thing or two about overcoming an unimagined crisis. I am also one of the few who have flown a Boeing 737 MAX Level D full motion simulator, replicating both accident flights multiple times. I know firsthand the challenges the pilots on the doomed accident flights faced, and how wrong it is to blame them for not being able to compensate for such a pernicious and deadly design. These emergencies did not present as a classic runaway stabilizer problem, but initially as ambiguous unreliable airspeed and altitude situations, masking MCAS. The MCAS design should never have been approved, not by Boeing, and not by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The National Transportation Safety Board has found that Boeing made faulty assumptions both about the capability of the aircraft design to withstand damage or failure, and the level of human performance possible once the failures began to cascade. Where Boeing failed, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) should have stepped in to regulate but it failed to do so. Lessons from accidents are bought in blood and we must seek all the answers to prevent the next one. We need to fix all the flaws in the current system — corporate governance, regulatory oversight, aircraft maintenance, and yes, pilot training and experience. Only then can we ensure the safety of everyone who flies.

Capt. “Sully” Sullenberger

 :salute
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 04, 2020, 12:20:15 AM
you know what bugs me, none of you question the points I said before.

-no flight simulator needed
-only thing you needed was an ipad and a video to be certified from the previous version

but when you mention another gadget is not needed.  then why did it have to be a software installed.  shouldnt it have been easier to say hey "dummy" engines will push aircraft up, or down, not being a pilot not sure which way. but they did installed another gadget and with 1200 bucks more there would have been a blinking light saying hey you loser pilot it's malfunctioning.

none of you have questioned that.

semp
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: FESS67 on July 04, 2020, 01:58:45 AM
you know what bugs me, none of you question the points I said before.

-no flight simulator needed
-only thing you needed was an ipad and a video to be certified from the previous version

but when you mention another gadget is not needed.  then why did it have to be a software installed.  shouldnt it have been easier to say hey "dummy" engines will push aircraft up, or down, not being a pilot not sure which way. but they did installed another gadget and with 1200 bucks more there would have been a blinking light saying hey you loser pilot it's malfunctioning.

none of you have questioned that.

semp

'Blinking lights' or any other kind of indicator are only useful if operating and operating normally.  So, the inclusion of an alert would only be useful if it was working.  Now, why would I say something dumb like that?  If it is installed it is working right?  Nope, appears not to be the case.

Quote
Boeing did not acknowledge that the AOA Disagree alerts on an estimated 80 percent of the
737 MAX fleet were inoperative until after the Lion Air crash in October 2018.44

80% of the fleet!! huh?  I am not sure how that can be considered an OK situation.

The massive issue I have with placing the blame at the feet of the pilots are statements like this from the report I referenced above:

Quote
Boeing also withheld knowledge that a pilot would need to diagnose
and respond to a “stabilizer runaway” condition caused by an erroneous MCAS activation in 10
seconds or less, or risk catastrophic consequences.

Quote
Boeing’s own analysis showed that if pilots took more than 10 seconds to identify and
respond to a “stabilizer runaway” condition caused by uncommanded MCAS activation the
result could be catastrophic. The Committee has found no evidence that Boeing shared this
information with the FAA, customers, or 737 MAX pilots.
▪ The 10-second reaction time and the potential for it to result in catastrophic consequences
was discovered early on in the development of the 737 MAX program.46
▪ Multiple Boeing ARs were aware of these findings and never reported them to the FAA

Busher, Toad and Puma would have us believe that any well trained, competent pilot would achieve the correct outcome within the stated 10 seconds and furthermore, any pilot failing to do so is incompetent.  If that is their considered professional assessment then I respect their opinions.  However, Sullenberger stated:

Quote
"I recently experienced all these warnings in a 737 MAX flight simulator during recreations of the accident flights. Even knowing what was going to happen, I could see how crews could have run out of time before they could have solved the problems. Prior to these accidents, I think it is unlikely that any US airline pilots were confronted with this scenario in simulator training,"

Even knowing what was going to happen  He was in a simulator, KNOWING what was about to happen and still struggled.  Those poor bastards doing it for real did not even know the MCAS system existed!! They were fighting an unknown!!  That is certainly true for the Lion Air pilots.  The Ethiopian pilots appear to have known about MCAS and reportedly  followed a Boeing procedure but were still unable to correct the issue.

Consider this statement from the report I referenced above:

Quote
In the aftermath of the Lion Air crash, the FAA conducted a risk assessment based on the
Transport Aircraft Risk Assessment Methodology (TARAM) which calculated that without a
fix to MCAS, during the lifetime of the 737 MAX fleet, there would be an estimated 15 more fatal, catastrophic accidents.  However, the FAA permitted the 737 MAX to continue flying
anyway while Boeing and the FAA worked on designing and validating a fix to the MCAS software. That judgment proved tragically wrong. Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 crashed less
than five months after the Lion Air crash.

I am assuming that the FAA people conducting the TARAM were qualified to do so.  If so, that is a pretty damning statement.

Do your own reading, make your own conclusions however for me 'fly the damn plane' is an OK response except when the damn plane is actively working to put you in to the ground.





Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Busher on July 04, 2020, 10:44:23 AM
Well Fess, all I can suggest is that you make sure all future travel plans for you and your family are on Airbus jets.

Some of your bullet points like
Boeing also withheld knowledge that a pilot would need to diagnose
and respond to a “stabilizer runaway” condition caused by an erroneous MCAS activation in 10
seconds or less, or risk catastrophic consequences.

are ridiculous. 10 seconds is an eternity for memory actionable items like "stab trim runaway". Imagine a jet experiencing engine failure at rotation.. "OK Candidate, you have up to 10 seconds to step on the rudder".
I do agree and have said before that I believe Boeing gave the MCAS far more output force than it should have.
But what was not addressed by the FAA, Sully or apparently any of the investigators are the reported ADC snags that should have grounded the airplane. As I tried to explain that a failure of an ADC renders all of the airplane's automation inoperative and the resulting failures to act; for example to reduce thrust were important contributors to the accident.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 04, 2020, 11:25:33 AM
Here's a simple question for Fess and Semp:

If a 737Max experiences an AOA malfunction that triggers MCAS can the aircraft return to base and land without loss of life?

Yes or No please.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 04, 2020, 02:07:57 PM
no, would you like to know more?


semp
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 04, 2020, 02:24:24 PM
I'll wait until Fess gives a yes/no. Thanks.

I'll put you, Semp, down in the AOA malfunction / MCAS trigger = Renders the aircraft incapable of flight column.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 04, 2020, 02:43:59 PM
I'll wait until Fess gives a yes/no. Thanks.

I'll put you, Semp, down in the AOA malfunction / MCAS trigger = Renders the aircraft incapable of flight column.

well since you asked a specific question.  I believe the answer is no. if you had asked no/yes and explain why,  you must likely would have said no too. maybe it's because i don't know all pilot lingo or perhaps because when I reply it's based on what i read to be accurate.

anyway i believe it's a trick question. and both yes and no would be accurate answers. but you only asked for one, so i chose no.

semp
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: FESS67 on July 04, 2020, 03:03:08 PM
Well Fess, all I can suggest is that you make sure all future travel plans for you and your family are on Airbus jets.

Some of your bullet points like
Boeing also withheld knowledge that a pilot would need to diagnose
and respond to a “stabilizer runaway” condition caused by an erroneous MCAS activation in 10
seconds or less, or risk catastrophic consequences.

are ridiculous. 10 seconds is an eternity for memory actionable items like "stab trim runaway". Imagine a jet experiencing engine failure at rotation.. "OK Candidate, you have up to 10 seconds to step on the rudder".
I do agree and have said before that I believe Boeing gave the MCAS far more output force than it should have.
But what was not addressed by the FAA, Sully or apparently any of the investigators are the reported ADC snags that should have grounded the airplane. As I tried to explain that a failure of an ADC renders all of the airplane's automation inoperative and the resulting failures to act; for example to reduce thrust were important contributors to the accident.

You do understand that those ridiculous words were not mine right?  They came straight from the report and from Boeing.

Your last sentence is perhaps more in line with my sentiment in this discussion.  There are important contributors to the accident and we should not seek to place the blame at the feet of the pilots when other actors were in play.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: FESS67 on July 04, 2020, 03:23:07 PM
Here's a simple question for Fess and Semp:

If a 737Max experiences an AOA malfunction that triggers MCAS can the aircraft return to base and land without loss of life?

Yes or No please.

You oversimplify the issue at hand and seek to prove a point with that oversimplification.  The answer cannot be a simple yes or no because it depends on a number of conditions.  IMO key factors to consider would be when in the flight this occurred, was it in isolation or were there a number tasks competing for attention, how did the crew respond.

You believe this is all on the crew, I think that is unfair.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 04, 2020, 03:42:03 PM
I'll wait until Fess gives a yes/no. Thanks.

I'll put you, Semp, down in the AOA malfunction / MCAS trigger = Renders the aircraft incapable of flight column.

actually my answer was not based on that.  you posted it in a way that the correct answer would be yes/ no/ we can't prove it/disprove it.  any of this i believe would be right based on what i know and how you phrased your question.

semp
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Busher on July 04, 2020, 04:03:07 PM
You do understand that those ridiculous words were not mine right?  They came straight from the report and from Boeing.

Your last sentence is perhaps more in line with my sentiment in this discussion.  There are important contributors to the accident and we should not seek to place the blame at the feet of the pilots when other actors were in play.

Let's be clear, I have no intent to set "blame". It does nothing to advance flight safety. That is why North American pilot write Flight Safety Reports even upon themselves and quite often for might seem like the most innocuous event. Anything to recognize and prevent issues, be they technical or personal, that may affect safety in the future.
All I have been trying to stress is that a non-airworthy 737Max was taken into the air and a combination of that failure combined with others killed people.
No where has anyone asked why the airplane with an open grounding snag was flown... I would like to know if the pilots received insufficient training on the MEL or maybe they faced job reprisal if they refused to fly it. Either way they were set to face handling issues that they did not handle.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 04, 2020, 04:56:40 PM
It's not a difficult or complicated question.

If a 737Max is airborne at any phase of flight...takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, landing...does an AOA failure coupled with an MCAS activation render the aircraft incapable of flight?

Is the aircraft doomed to crash no matter what? Is it impossible to fly the aircraft to a safe landing?

Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 04, 2020, 05:32:30 PM
It's not a difficult or complicated question.

If a 737Max is airborne at any phase of flight...takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, landing...does an AOA failure coupled with an MCAS activation render the aircraft incapable of flight?

Is the aircraft doomed to crash no matter what? Is it impossible to fly the aircraft to a safe landing?

again you are posting a question where the only answer acceptable to you is the plane can land.

but what if the pilot went outside for a smoke and the copilot has a stewardess on his lap?

semp
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: FESS67 on July 04, 2020, 05:43:19 PM
It's not a difficult or complicated question.

If a 737Max is airborne at any phase of flight...takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, landing...does an AOA failure coupled with an MCAS activation render the aircraft incapable of flight?

Is the aircraft doomed to crash no matter what? Is it impossible to fly the aircraft to a safe landing?

Evidence appears to indicate that it could render the aircraft incapable of sustained flight resulting in two crashes.  There was no warning light indicating the erroneous AOA readings and the nose of the aircraft was repeatedly being pushed down by MCAS.  The pilots corrected the issue with the controls on the column but MCAS resets and the issue repeats itself.  They had no knowledge of MCAS, there was no training on it, there was no documentation on it.  They did not know they were dealing with a runaway trim issue as it did not present as such (I will have to go find where I read that, do not have it to hand).

In the Ethiopian crash the pilots reportedly followed the Boeing guidelines however were still unable to prevent MCAS from operating.

Let me play your game.  Yes or no.

Had MCAS not been installed on those aircraft would they have safely flown to their destinations?

Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 04, 2020, 06:34:02 PM
Again, it's simple.

For example, if a wing falls off an aircraft in flight, is it then incapable of flight? Yes, it is.

In this case, if a 737Max experiences an AOA malfunction that triggers an MCAS activation is there any aircraft related reason the aircraft is incapable of maintaining flight?

Semp, I am not positing any unusual situation where the crew is not at duty stations. It's simple: can the aircraft still fly? Are all the systems that allow an aircraft to maintain flight still available and operational? Yes, there is what we call an ABNORMAL in progress but that is all.

Fess, can an aircraft fly without AOA indications? Without an AOA disagreement light? (BTW, the Ethiopian pilots DID NOT follow the Boeing guidelines. Unless you think never reducing power from takeoff thrust and overspeeding the aircraft in a steep climb and turning the Stab Trim Cutout switches back on is Boeing guidelines.)

Sure, without MCAS the flight could have been made safely.

Now to you Fess: Had the MCAS system been correctly disabled after the AOA malfunction, would Lion/Ethiopian have made a safe return?
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 04, 2020, 07:29:58 PM
well I did answer correctly based on how you phrased the question. again i don't know pilot lingo and my answer is again no. i actually believe you can't even take off much less land.

i could have explained why but you only take yes/no.


semp
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Shuffler on July 04, 2020, 08:15:29 PM
Give up Toad. They have no idea.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 04, 2020, 09:22:49 PM
Give up Toad. They have no idea.

well he asked a narrow question with only a yes/no answer.  and basically both answers are correct.

only two cases I have heard both airplanes crashes.  so no is correct.  have i heard of another then yes would be correct.

now for return to base part. I've been to many bases with no runways, so answer no is correct. if base is pilot lingo for proper airport then yes would be correct.

you can say I'm just being obtuse, but I totally believe both answers are correct when only given yes/no options.

that's why i ask would you like to know more.  i also believe no matter what, Toad believes yes is the only acceptable answer. and i agree with him while explaining why no is also correct.


semp
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 04, 2020, 09:33:27 PM
just to point out his question is similar to this

is 2+2=4. answer yes or no.

both answers are correct. learned that when asked a narrow question with only yes/no. both can be correct majority of the time.

semp
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Shuffler on July 04, 2020, 10:39:03 PM
well he asked a narrow question with only a yes/no answer.  and basically both answers are correct.

only two cases I have heard both airplanes crashes.  so no is correct.  have i heard of another then yes would be correct.

now for return to base part. I've been to many bases with no runways, so answer no is correct. if base is pilot lingo for proper airport then yes would be correct.

you can say I'm just being obtuse, but I totally believe both answers are correct when only given yes/no options.

that's why i ask would you like to know more.  i also believe no matter what, Toad believes yes is the only acceptable answer. and i agree with him while explaining why no is also correct.


semp

He even made the question as easy as possible and you still are not capable of answering.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 04, 2020, 11:20:11 PM
He even made the question as easy as possible and you still are not capable of answering.

I answered it and also give reasons why either yes or no would be true.

for example if you ask can a  man fall out of an airplane from 10+ altitude and survive.  the correct answer is yes, people have survive with no parachute.

but you can always argue no.  when if comes down to yes/no.  both answers can actually be true.

but back to his questions, can you land that airplane, answer is yes, however you can also argue that no.  both answers would be correct if only choice is yes/no.

semp
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: FESS67 on July 05, 2020, 01:15:05 AM

Fess, can an aircraft fly without AOA indications? Without an AOA disagreement light? (BTW, the Ethiopian pilots DID NOT follow the Boeing guidelines. Unless you think never reducing power from takeoff thrust and overspeeding the aircraft in a steep climb and turning the Stab Trim Cutout switches back on is Boeing guidelines.)

Sure, without MCAS the flight could have been made safely.

Now to you Fess: Had the MCAS system been correctly disabled after the AOA malfunction, would Lion/Ethiopian have made a safe return?

Most likely yes, it would have made a safe return.  The reason I am saying most likely is that the Ethiopian pilots are reported to have followed the Boeing guidelines for disabling MCAS however as you stated, they left other aspects of the flight uncontrolled which complicated the situation to the point of fatality.

I think that semp brings an interesting and perhaps important factor into the discussion.  We know that MCAS activation has been encountered on 2 aircraft on 3 separate flights.  2 of those incidents proved fatal as it appears that the crews became overwhelmed and were unable to regain proper control of the aircraft.  On the flight which did not crash a third pilot was on hand and they were able to remedy the issue.

There are a number of questions that come out of this:

[li]Have there been any other recorded instances of MCAS activation and subsequent correction by the aircrew under normal (i.e. not test) conditions?
[/li][/list]

As semp said, we know of 3 activations and 2 were fatal.  That is a pretty small data set but it leads us to where we are now which is some think that the crew were the deciding factor whereas I believe it was the system.  I think the fact that the Max has been grounded for so long and the 'upgrade' has faced a couple more hurdles along the way suggests that the system was in fact a major player here. 
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: FESS67 on July 05, 2020, 02:58:36 AM
Give up Toad. They have no idea.

Enlighten me Shuffler.  What is it you think I have no idea about?

I am sure you will give a non committal BS 1 liner comment that shows you invest in nothing but glib comments but I am prepared to be amazed this time.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 05, 2020, 06:54:40 AM
well I did answer correctly based on how you phrased the question. again i don't know pilot lingo and my answer is again no. i actually believe you can't even take off much less land.

i could have explained why but you only take yes/no.


semp

Indeed, you said the aircraft would be incapable of flight.

If you answer "no", that a 737MAX is rendered incapable of flight if it experiences an AOA malfunction coupled with an MCAS activation, then please explain how Lion Air JT043 from Denpasar to Jakarta on Oct. 29, 2018 (the night before the crash of Lion Air 610 which was the same aircraft with the same malfunction).

How did the same aircraft make it to Jakarta with the same malfunction the night before?
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 05, 2020, 07:41:51 AM
The reason I am saying most likely is that the Ethiopian pilots are reported to have followed the Boeing guidelines for disabling MCAS however as you stated, they left other aspects of the flight uncontrolled which complicated the situation to the point of fatality.

In fact, they DID NOT follow the Boeing procedure for disabling the MCAS. They did turn off the Stab Trim switches eventually BUT they re-engaged them later. The Boeing procedure states to leave them OFF.

You have hit the crux of the issue when you say "they left other aspects of the flight uncontrolled which complicated the situation to the point of fatality".

This is where the professional pilots in the industry part company with the Blame Boeing bunch. The Ethiopian crew left the power at 94% (takeoff), were climbing at 1500fpm while overspeeding the airframe with the stick full aft. They did disable the Stab Trim and tried to trim manually (while holding the stick full aft) but the aerodynamic load on the stab while exceeding Vmo would essentially prevent King Kong from being able to manually trim the stab.

That tale of the FDR is NOT the tale of a well trained experienced crew. You can say they were overwhelmed or confused; that's probably true. That's where training and experience come to the fore. When these two Captains had the last chance to break the accident chain...they failed in their duty.

The Runaway Stab Trim procedure really hasn't changed in the Boeing fleet from the B707 up to now. These two Captains supposedly had prior Boeing and specifically B737 experience. If so, they had undoubtedly _experienced_  the malfunction and procedure in simulators multiple times. If not, their training was deficient.

Further, these disasters begin with a simple AOA malfunction. This is another malfunction that they _should_ have seen in training in other aircraft. It doesn't matter which aircraft; AOA malfunctions are initially countered by using normal pitch and power to get to a safe altitude to work the problem in all aircraft. That did not happen in either Max accident.

As to MCAS activation, again I'll point out very basic airmanship. I cannot imagine that these two Captains had never heard or been exposed to the standard procedure, common to all aircraft everywhere, that when you move a secondary flight control (flaps) and the aircraft immediately acts in an unexpected, uncommanded manner, you IMMEDIATELY put that flight control back where it was. Thus, when both crews retracted the flaps and the nose pitched down unexpectedly and uncommanded, the flap lever should have immediately been returned to the previous position. MCAS does not work with flaps extended. Period. So had these Captains done what pilots have been told to do since secondary flight controls were invented, no MCAS, no crashes. Again, this is Airmanship 101. You don't need to know anything about MCAS to do this basic procedure. There are things you just have to know.

I could go on with the fatal flaws in crew performance. This is long enough, however. Clearly, as Puma (and others have pointed out repeatedly) the crew is always in a position to break the accident chain at some point. These two crews did not have what was necessary, be it training or experience or even just the ability to think and act under pressure. The mantra "maintain aircraft control, analyze the situation and take the proper action" was beyond their abilities on those two days.

Now, don't take all this to mean I feel Boeing is blameless. Boeing bears guilt, without doubt.

1) Boeing went to the well one time too many on the 737.  Should have just bit the bullet and built a new aircraft to compete with the Neo.

2) Boeing had to be IDIOTS not to include detailed information on the MCAS system in the docs and training, to include the specific abnormal/emergency procedure.

3) AOA displays should have been standard on the PFD along with the disagree light. Charging extra for those on a modern aircraft is ridiculous. Doubt another gauge would have saved Lion/Ethiopian though. AF447 that went down in the South Atlantic didn't have an AOA gauge; they didn't ground the Airbus for that.

4) This whole debacle isn't over yet. It may well kill Boeing. The continual screwups with the KC-46 Tanker are also damaging the Boeing brand. Together, it makes for deep problems selling Boeing aircraft. With the Max and KC-46 they are looking like the gang that couldn't shoot straight. I place these problems primarily at the feet of management. (While McDonnell built great fighters, they built lousy transports. MD-11 as a prime example. Does the stretching the great DC-9 into the not so great MD-88 presage the stretching of the great 737 to no so great Max? The injection of McD managers into Boeing after the purchase of McD did not improve Boeings transport aircraft.)

Still, despite Boeing's mistakes, both aircraft were flyable. Put the flaps back out, no MCAS activation. Use the Stab Trim Cutout switches, no MCAS activation. Pitch/Power/Performance - no crashes. In the end, the pilots failed to break the accident chain. Neither crew was up to the challenge at that moment on that day.


Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 05, 2020, 07:57:49 AM
Fess you make another interesting point:
Quote
There are a number of questions that come out of this:

Did the jump seat pilot correctly diagnose the issue or did he get lucky?  I say lucky because remember at this stage Boeing had not made the presence of MCAS widely known.

If that 3rd pilot had been one of the regular crew that day and there had not been a third pilot present would he have made the same decision or would he have become overwhelmed as with the other crews?

As to the first, does anyone else find it interesting that the jumpseat pilot has never been identified? It has been stated that he was 737Max qualified. It has been stated that he was interviewed by the National Transportation Safety Committee (KNKT). The KNKT has declined to comment on his role in saving the aircraft.

However, it's been generally acknowledged that the jumpseat pilot got them to turn off the Stab Trim. Isn't this guy a hero? Didn't he save 100+ lives? He's kind of a Lion Air Sully, no? Why haven't we seen him on TV? Why hasn't he commented?

I don't know the answers but I find it damn strange that he's been kept totally under wraps.

Further the KNKT says there's no CVR from that flight. I'm pretty sure the MAX CVR will record the last two hours of operation. I read somewhere that on the jumpseat flight, they flew an hour to Jakarta after the MCAS incident. The Lion Air 610 was airborne only a few minutes. Even with start up and taxi etc, there should still have been CVR data from the jumpseat flight. Things that make you go "hmmmmmmm".

No one will ever know if, had the jumpseat pilot been in command of Lion Air 610, would 610 have crashed. What we do know is that when he was present in the cockpit, he was able to break the accident chain. He knew the answer. This is why I would like to know more about him. What was his experience level? What was his training? What were his prior Type Ratings?

I will say that when the big trim wheel rotates in a 737 cockpit it's very hard not to notice it; almost impossible.

In fact, I'm so curious that I'll pay HT for two months of AH for anyone that can track down and document just who that jumpseat pilot was. I have been unable to do that but perhaps my Google-Fu is weakening with old age.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Puma44 on July 05, 2020, 09:47:33 AM
Very well put, Toad.  If I may, add a fourth step to “The mantra "maintain aircraft control, analyze the situation and take the proper action"”, and maintain situational awareness.  When it hits the fan with a non normal malfunction, the proper action is taken, and control is regained, it’s not time to relax until the aircraft is in the chocks with the engine(s) shutdown.  Both of these Max incidents demonstrated a lack of at least one or all of these four steps by the pilots, with the exception of the unidentified jump seater.  That’s the reality. 

Reading about the Ethiopian event, when the jet hit the ground at 575 mph with a descent rate of 33,000 fpm with the thrust levers at or near the forward stops, makes one wonder.  What explains the reason the thrust levers weren’t simply pulled back as a simple response of basic airmanship and situational awareness.

Boeing has and deserves a bloody nose over the MCAS and KC-46 debacle.  It’s up to them to do it right the first time from now on.

 :salute

Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 05, 2020, 11:06:21 AM
Indeed, you said the aircraft would be incapable of flight.

If you answer "no", that a 737MAX is rendered incapable of flight if it experiences an AOA malfunction coupled with an MCAS activation, then please explain how Lion Air JT043 from Denpasar to Jakarta on Oct. 29, 2018 (the night before the crash of Lion Air 610 which was the same aircraft with the same malfunction).

How did the same aircraft make it to Jakarta with the same malfunction the night before?

no i truthfully answer your question based on the info i had at that time.  and again both yes and no would be correct based on your question.  since my only options were yes and no,  i chose no.

no because only two planes that i know of with that malfunction crashed. i could also have replied yes, because I'm also think they could have landed but for different reasons than you think.

since you asked that question to me, knowing that I'm not a pilot and know nothing about flying. i can truthfully answer either yes or no as to my knowledge both answers are correct.

you disagreeing with me is a different story. but i did answer it correctly based on my knowledge and understanding and how you phrased the question and limited the answer.


semp



Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 05, 2020, 11:52:26 AM
Well Semp at least we completely agree on one thing: you know nothing about flying.

But hey....that night you spent in the Holiday Inn, right?
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 05, 2020, 12:17:59 PM
Well Semp at least we completely agree on one thing: you know nothing about flying.

But hey....that night you spent in the Holiday Inn, right?

that's funny, it's your question to me with two narrow answers.  i explained why both are correct.

is like you asking pilots only if a plane with both wings missing at 30k can land with no loss of life. answer would be no. ask a room full of math nerds and the answer would be yes.

and both answers would be correct.

semp
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Busher on July 05, 2020, 12:30:09 PM
Well Semp at least we completely agree on one thing: you know nothing about flying.

But hey....that night you spent in the Holiday Inn, right?

Toad, the sad and scary part of this discussion is that the Ethiopian accident is not an isolated example of the failure to revert to basic operating skills (fly the jet). The introduction of automation was inevitable with the advances in digital technology. Not a bad thing in my opinion provided that equal emphasis is placed upon both developing and maintaining the basic fundamentals of flying the airplane.
The last type endorsement I completed as my career wound down was conducted almost completely on the automation. It was the most technologically advanced airplane I ever flew. After the Proficiency Check, I asked my young Instructor, "Do we ever get to fly this thing?" He calmly answered "It's discouraged".
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Oldman731 on July 05, 2020, 01:41:56 PM
The last type endorsement I completed as my career wound down was conducted almost completely on the automation. It was the most technologically advanced airplane I ever flew. After the Proficiency Check, I asked my young Instructor, "Do we ever get to fly this thing?" He calmly answered "It's discouraged".


I know a guy who used to be a co-pilot (or First Officer, for you official types) for a local regional airline.  I said, "So what's it like to fly a passenger jet?"  He replied, "I know quite a lot about the autopilot."

- oldman
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 05, 2020, 01:55:13 PM

I know a guy who used to be a co-pilot (or First Officer, for you official types) for a local regional airline.  I said, "So what's it like to fly a passenger jet?"  He replied, "I know quite a lot about the autopilot."

- oldman

well that explains a lot to me.  i like to watch airplane crash recreations. always wondered why a pilot would mess with the autopilot during an event. even seen a few where either failed to activate or set it wrong and airplane crashed.


semp
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 05, 2020, 03:04:14 PM

The last type endorsement I completed as my career wound down was conducted almost completely on the automation. It was the most technologically advanced airplane I ever flew. After the Proficiency Check, I asked my young Instructor, "Do we ever get to fly this thing?" He calmly answered "It's discouraged".

An Airbus by any chance? :)

That AF447 crash as described in Vanity Fair by Langewiesche really highlighted the minimal actual stick time that the AF pilots were getting and the direction to use the autopilot almost all the time per the company directives. Obviously it's not just AF either.

As an aside, AF447 is another example where the crew couldn't handle the abnormal in a completely flyable aircraft.. It also featured numerous incredibly poor design features from the manufacturer. But they never grounded the 330.

Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: TyFoo on July 05, 2020, 03:36:16 PM
Most likely yes, it would have made a safe return.  The reason I am saying most likely is that the Ethiopian pilots are reported to have followed the Boeing guidelines for disabling MCAS however as you stated, they left other aspects of the flight uncontrolled which complicated the situation to the point of fatality.There are a number of questions that come out of this:

  • Did the jump seat pilot correctly diagnose the issue or did he get lucky?  I say lucky because remember at this stage Boeing had not made the presence of MCAS widely known.
  • If that 3rd pilot had been one of the regular crew that day and there had not been a third pilot present would he have made the same decision or would he have become overwhelmed as with the other crews?
[li]

The Ethiopian pilots were in Visual Metrological Conditions, meaning they didn't have the extra burden of trying to keep the airplane upright in clouds with no visual cues. So the Other Apspects of the flight following the Trim Disconnect would have been to reduce the thrust and return to the airport. Or as they say in the Business - Fly the Plane -.

Unfortunately many of these 3rd world airlines put pilots into the plane with very low hours and little hands on flying experience. A good example is the 350hr Right seater on the Ethiopian flight. Mind you, that the average flight student at least here in the U.S. - just to get your Private Pilot license is around 70hrs. Although the FAA allows you to get it in as little as 40hrs. More than 1/2 those hours are with an instructor. To get your commercial license is around 250hr total time, and less if you attend a Part 141 school. Thats 250 to 350 hours total time spread out over 2+ years to attain such time. So, consider how much experience the right seat pilot could have really had and put that into perspective.

With the engines set to takeoff power during the entire event - it is a good indication the crew quickly became overwhelmed. Although they initially performed the runaway trim procedure correctly following the recommended procedure. They spent less than 6 seconds trying secondary trim, and then re-activated the Primary Trim. That is not in ANY manual.

There are two trim wheels sitting next to each pilots Knees the size of a dinner plate blackish brown in color with a big 1" white stripe painted on them. It moves anytime the plane is being trimmed. You wont miss it. When it moves uncommanded, the "Memory" (Immediate action)(No Looking it up in the Emergency Checklist) item for every aircraft is to disable the Primary Trim. Every Pilot is tought this, trained in class on this, given an oral exam on this, and trained in the simulator. It doesn't get overlooked. If it is, then that's on the Airline training department, not the manufacturer.

You say "Lucky" - I say the 3rd pilot studied his manual and offered the proper advice because that is what he was trained to do. It doesn't matter whether the trim malfunctioned or MCAS activated it. The deciding factor is if it moved without pilot or autopilot input.

Since the pilot deactivated the autopilot and was hand flying and getting uncommanded trim, its obvious he recognized a trim problem countering with opposite trim. What isn't obvious is why he waited so long to deactivate the trim - again more than likely he was overwhelmed and input overloaded.

The Ethiopian 350hr right seater was reading through the Emergency checklist taking up valuable "Minutes" on items that should have been quickly looked up and some by memory. This is a strong indication of a lack of thorough training, lack of experience, and a strong indication about the airlines culture as it relates to safety and desire to make money. Having a 350hrs total time person in a jet with sophisticated systems when compared to your Cessna 172 in an emergency situation is about as helpful as 5 year old sitting in a puddle of spilled milk while you try to clean it up.

BOEING handled the entire MCAS situation completely wrong, should be going through what they are going through, and is paying the price - as they should.

And while the Pilots made mistakes in their handling of the events no matter what % it contributed, in your 8 Bullet Points, I did not see anything put onto the airlines themselves, there lack of maintenance and safety processes, or their governing body which should oversee such actions, which BTW owns the airline. The Airlines and their respective Governments are as much a party to these accidents as the manufacturer and they clearly put the desire to make Money over Safety.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Busher on July 05, 2020, 04:38:22 PM
An Airbus by any chance? :)

That AF447 crash as described in Vanity Fair by Langewiesche really highlighted the minimal actual stick time that the AF pilots were getting and the direction to use the autopilot almost all the time per the company directives. Obviously it's not just AF either.

As an aside, AF447 is another example where the crew couldn't handle the abnormal in a completely flyable aircraft.. It also featured numerous incredibly poor design features from the manufacturer. But they never grounded the 330.

No Toad. I was senior enough that I could bid around the Airbus's in our fleet. I refused to fly any of them.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 06, 2020, 07:04:07 AM
Don't blame you a bit Busher; I'd have done the same thing.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Busher on July 06, 2020, 09:22:42 AM
Tyfoo, thank you for that well written summary. Forgive me for asking but it sounds like it was written by an experienced Boeing pilot...
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Puma44 on July 06, 2020, 12:39:40 PM
Don't blame you a bit Busher; I'd have done the same thing.

Ditto!
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 06, 2020, 01:03:32 PM
Tyfoo,

Yes, indeed. Good post. Welcome to the "you guys" club. :)
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: mikeWe9a on July 06, 2020, 02:29:33 PM
get off your high horse.  from my point of view a 1200 gadget could have prevented, in addition to pilots being told no simulating training needed and to qualify and ipad was sufficient.

pilots were so under trained that they had thousands of hours with no accidents. but of course they were lucky.


semp
A "$1200 gadget" may or may not have saved that aircraft from the incompetence of its operators.  On the other hand, it would be another thing to break, and in breaking might cause another set of incompetent pilots to crash their aircraft instead.  Every thing you add to an airplane has the potential to break, be misinterpreted, or be misused.  Some of those results are more likely than the chance of whatever problem it is intended to prevent.

Mike
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Mister Fork on July 06, 2020, 03:09:31 PM
I would like to point out, it doesn't take an active commercial or retired pilot to point the finger at a bunch of issues with both crashes.

Let's see here....

Let's Crash an Airplane Checklist
3rd world country - check
Mechanical issues prior to crash - check
Aircraft would of been maintenance grounded if in North America/Europe - check
Pilots that didn't follow SOP's for standard commercial flying 101 issue - check
Pilots that didn't 'fly the plane' - check
Poorly trained pilots - check
Airline with poor maintenance practices - check
Airline that spends little safety/preventative training - check
Plane with features pilots didn't understand - check
Government known to be corrupt - check
Flying over warzone -
Hijacked aircraft -
Incompetent ATC -
Poor pilot certification programs - check


Two or three checkboxes can crash a plane. These guys almost had most of them .

Final point, just because Boeing had a weak training program on MCAS, it's still ultimately up to the airline and pilots to ensure they properly know all the systems of aircraft they fly to ensure the safety of their passengers.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: guncrasher on July 06, 2020, 04:33:16 PM


Final point, just because Boeing had a weak training program on MCAS, it's still ultimately up to the airline and pilots to ensure they properly know all the systems of aircraft they fly to ensure the safety of their passengers.

wow, actually wt$ is more appropriate.

so grounding the plane was the right thing to do. we have no help from Manu, let's not crash another plane


semp
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: FESS67 on July 07, 2020, 02:16:47 AM
The Ethiopian pilots were in Visual Metrological Conditions, meaning they didn't have the extra burden of trying to keep the airplane upright in clouds with no visual cues. So the Other Apspects of the flight following the Trim Disconnect would have been to reduce the thrust and return to the airport. Or as they say in the Business - Fly the Plane -.

Unfortunately many of these 3rd world airlines put pilots into the plane with very low hours and little hands on flying experience. A good example is the 350hr Right seater on the Ethiopian flight. Mind you, that the average flight student at least here in the U.S. - just to get your Private Pilot license is around 70hrs. Although the FAA allows you to get it in as little as 40hrs. More than 1/2 those hours are with an instructor. To get your commercial license is around 250hr total time, and less if you attend a Part 141 school. Thats 250 to 350 hours total time spread out over 2+ years to attain such time. So, consider how much experience the right seat pilot could have really had and put that into perspective.

With the engines set to takeoff power during the entire event - it is a good indication the crew quickly became overwhelmed. Although they initially performed the runaway trim procedure correctly following the recommended procedure. They spent less than 6 seconds trying secondary trim, and then re-activated the Primary Trim. That is not in ANY manual.

There are two trim wheels sitting next to each pilots Knees the size of a dinner plate blackish brown in color with a big 1" white stripe painted on them. It moves anytime the plane is being trimmed. You wont miss it. When it moves uncommanded, the "Memory" (Immediate action)(No Looking it up in the Emergency Checklist) item for every aircraft is to disable the Primary Trim. Every Pilot is tought this, trained in class on this, given an oral exam on this, and trained in the simulator. It doesn't get overlooked. If it is, then that's on the Airline training department, not the manufacturer.

You say "Lucky" - I say the 3rd pilot studied his manual and offered the proper advice because that is what he was trained to do. It doesn't matter whether the trim malfunctioned or MCAS activated it. The deciding factor is if it moved without pilot or autopilot input.

Since the pilot deactivated the autopilot and was hand flying and getting uncommanded trim, its obvious he recognized a trim problem countering with opposite trim. What isn't obvious is why he waited so long to deactivate the trim - again more than likely he was overwhelmed and input overloaded.

The Ethiopian 350hr right seater was reading through the Emergency checklist taking up valuable "Minutes" on items that should have been quickly looked up and some by memory. This is a strong indication of a lack of thorough training, lack of experience, and a strong indication about the airlines culture as it relates to safety and desire to make money. Having a 350hrs total time person in a jet with sophisticated systems when compared to your Cessna 172 in an emergency situation is about as helpful as 5 year old sitting in a puddle of spilled milk while you try to clean it up.

BOEING handled the entire MCAS situation completely wrong, should be going through what they are going through, and is paying the price - as they should.

And while the Pilots made mistakes in their handling of the events no matter what % it contributed, in your 8 Bullet Points, I did not see anything put onto the airlines themselves, there lack of maintenance and safety processes, or their governing body which should oversee such actions, which BTW owns the airline. The Airlines and their respective Governments are as much a party to these accidents as the manufacturer and they clearly put the desire to make Money over Safety.

All good points and all have been made before.  I agree I was remiss in not mentioning the part the airlines themselves played.

I maintain my stance that whilst the pilots played their part in the issue I do not think it fair to throw them under the bus.  It may be media hype or just Hollywood but wasn't Sullenberger initially vilified for not making it back to the airport as simulations proved he could and it was only due to the fact that he was alive to argue his case that a different conclusion was arrived at?  These guys are not alive to argue their case, they are not here to defend their competency or otherwise.

Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: FESS67 on July 07, 2020, 02:20:39 AM


Final point, just because Boeing had a weak training program on MCAS, it's still ultimately up to the airline and pilots to ensure they properly know all the systems of aircraft they fly to ensure the safety of their passengers.

My understanding was not that it was a weak training program, they actively sought to have no training required, effectively hiding the system from the pilots.  There are plenty of reports from US pilots who were pretty upset once they became aware of the existence of MCAS, not because of what it did but because they were not told it was there.

Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 07, 2020, 08:20:25 AM
This is from the Final Report on Lion Air 610. It details the AOA/MCAS problems on the previous flight. I found it interesting that it really does not highlight the jumpseat pilot as the guy that saved the aircraft as the news reports kind of did. I was also somewhat surprised to see that the jumpseat pilot was a F/O; for some reason I thought he was a Captain.

In any event, it shows what the crew of 610 could have done but failed to do. This I think once again highlights what the "you guys" have been saying. In the end, the crew is the last entity that can break the accident chain. On Lion Air 043 the crew was able to do just that. On Lion Air 610, the crew was unable to do that despite flying in the exact same aircraft with the same problem.


Quote
2.1 Previous Flight Crew (LNI043) Actions

Lion Air flight 043 (LNI043) was from DPS to CGK and was about 1.5 hours long. The  LNI043  flight  crew  was  able  to  successfully  land  the  accident aircraft while experiencing the same conditions as the accident flight. The investigation looked at the flight crew’s situation awareness and handling of flight  deck  indications,  their decision  to  continue  the  flight,  and  their  reporting  of  encountered  issues  after  the flight.

2.1.1  Situation Awareness and Handling of Flight Deck Indications

The Captain’s initial response,as the PF, to the activation of stick shaker during lift-off and subsequent response of numerous caution lights was to continue rotation by maintaining  pitch  15  degrees  and   existing  take-off  thrust. After  the Captain transferred   control   to   the   FO,   he   cross-checked   the   flight   instruments   and determined  his  instruments  were  erroneous.  The  Captain  action  of  transferring  the control  prior  to  crosscheck of the  instruments may have indicated  that  the  Captain generally was aware of the repetitive previous problem of SPD and ALT flags and the replacement of the left AOA sensor on this aircraft

During acceleration and clean up, there were three occasions where the aircraft did not  climb  positively.  Following  the  advice  from  the  deadheading  crew  on  the observer seat that the aircraft was diving down, the Captain commanded the FO to follow  F/D  command  and  re-trim  the  aircraft  to  retain  appropriate  climb  path.  The FO commented that the aircraft is “too heavy to hold back” which suggests and the FO  also  unable  to  trim  the  aircraft  as  intended  where  the  aircraft  started  to  pitch down after nose-up trim  was released.  Observation of the aircraft to the  condition reinforced  the  Captain  to  cut-out the  Stabilizer  Trim.  This  action  made  the  aircraft under  control  and  enabled  the  flight  crew  to  fly  the  aircraft  normally  using  the manual trim.

http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/2018%20-%20035%20-%20PK-LQP%20Final%20Report.pdf

That's pretty much how the problem on 610 should have been handled. Note the use of standard pitch/power. Note the cutout of the stab trim. Same aircraft, same problem...different crew. One lives, one doesn't.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Busher on July 07, 2020, 11:35:55 AM
Toad, did the report that provided that detail for you address how a clearly malfunctioning airplane was dispatched to fly again?
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Toad on July 07, 2020, 12:19:34 PM
Oh, that is a very interesting report Busher.

For example, from the CVR of Lion Air 610:

Quote
22:25:39 The Captain advised the FO that he was having flu. The CVR recorded the Captain coughed   about   15   times   within   an   hour   during   the preflight.

Umm...flying while you are under the influence of the flu? Isn't that what sick time is for?

As for the dispatch of Lion Air 610, the report lays it off on the previous crew the night before. They acknowledge things were not right but blame that crew's inadequate reporting of the problem.

Quote
41.On  the  flight  from  Manado  to  Denpasar  on  28  October  2018,  the  DFDR recorded  the  A/T  disengaged  on  takeoff  roll  and  the  SPD  and  ALT  flags  on the  captain’sPFD  most  likely  had  appeared  after  the  engine  start.  The altimeter  and  speed  indicator  are  airworthiness  related  instruments  and  must beserviceable  for  dispatch.  The  decision  to  continue  the  flight  was  contrary to the company procedure.

42.The   engineer   in   Denpasar   considered   that   the   problem   had   appeared repeatedly and decided to replace the left AOA sensor. Replacement of AOA sensor  proved to  be  the  solution  to  rectify  the  SPD  and  ALT  flags  that  were reported to have appeared on the Captain’s PFD, however the installed AOA sensor was misaligned by about 21° and resulted in different problems.

43.The Boeing test result indicated that a misaligned AOA sensor would not pass the  installation  test  as  the  AOA  values  shown  on  the  SMYD  computer  were out  of  tolerance  and  “AOA  SENSR  INVALID”  message  appeared  in  the SMYD  BITE  module.  This  test  and  subsequent  testing  verified  that  the alternate method of the installation test could identify a 20 or 21° bias in the AOA sensor.

44. Comparing  the  results  of  the  installation  test  in  Denpasar  and  Boeing,  the investigation  could  not  determine  that  the  AOA  sensor  installation  test conducted in Denpasar with any certainty.

45.The BAT LMPM required the engineer to record the test values to ensure that the test results were within tolerance. The engineer did not record the value of the AOA angle deflection during the AOA sensor installation test. Therefore, neither  BAT  nor  Lion  Air  identified  that  the  documentation  had  not  been filled out.

LATER

56.The  insufficient  SMS  training  and  inability  of  the  employees  to  identify  the hazard  might  also  be  indicated  by  the  incomplete  post-flight  report  of  the problems that occurred on LNI043. The incomplete report became a hazard as the  known or  suspected  defects  were  not  reported  which  might  make  the engineer unable to properly maintain the airworthiness of the aircraft.

57.Content of the report did not trigger the Duty Management Pilot to assess this as  a  Serious  Incident  and  enable  a  safety  investigation.  The  risk  of  the problems  that  occurred  on  the  flight  LNI043  were  not  assessed  to  be considered as a hazard on the subsequent flight. TOAD: YGBSM!!

58.The  LNI043  flight  that  experienced  multiple  malfunctions  were  considered caused or could have caused difficulties in controlling the aircraft. According to the ICAO Annex 13, CASR part 830 and OM-part A, the flight is classified as serious incident which required investigation by the KNKT in accordance with  the  Aviation  Law  Number  1  of  2009  and  Government  Decree Number 62 of 2013.

59.The  definition  of  an  aircraft  repetitive  problem  was  different  between  Lion Air  CMM  and  BAT  AMOQSM.  This  difference  indicated  that  the  Lion  Air did not monitor the repetitive problem policy of the BAT as a subcontracted entity.

60.The requirement to report all known and suspected defects is very critical for engineering to be able to maintain the airworthiness of the aircraft.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Puma44 on July 07, 2020, 12:21:19 PM
This is from the Final Report on Lion Air 610. It details the AOA/MCAS problems on the previous flight. I found it interesting that it really does not highlight the jumpseat pilot as the guy that saved the aircraft as the news reports kind of did. I was also somewhat surprised to see that the jumpseat pilot was a F/O; for some reason I thought he was a Captain.

In any event, it shows what the crew of 610 could have done but failed to do. This I think once again highlights what the "you guys" have been saying. In the end, the crew is the last entity that can break the accident chain. On Lion Air 043 the crew was able to do just that. On Lion Air 610, the crew was unable to do that despite flying in the exact same aircraft with the same problem.


That's pretty much how the problem on 610 should have been handled. Note the use of standard pitch/power. Note the cutout of the stab trim. Same aircraft, same problem...different crew. One lives, one doesn't.

Best one out of three. 
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: Busher on July 07, 2020, 12:37:08 PM
Thank you Toad. That excerpt of the report clearly indicates that no safety culture existed at that Airline at the time of the accident. Slipshod attitudes guarantee crashes. Now I can't even see this as an accident.... it was a certainty just waiting for the right time.
Title: Re: Boeing 737 Max
Post by: fuzeman on July 07, 2020, 04:13:15 PM
Only got to page 5, I'm sorry I posted.