Norwegians at Dieppe. 15 kills, & one Tempest. whoops. Well the Temp was attacking, what can U do?
The North Weald Wing on their second sortie shot down eight of nine unescorted Do 217Es. Returning over the Channel, a frantic "Look out 190 approaching 3 o'clock!" caused Lt. Kristensen, Yellow One, to whip round and fire a short, effective burst. The 190 burst into flames and dived inverted into the Channel -- it was only then that they realised that it was a Typhoon ... R7815 of 266 Squadron, the pilot being killed.
Back at Dieppe, "Vanquish" was going badly. As 226 Squadron's Bostons laid dense smoke screens on the headlands and along the waterfront at 11.00 to cover the withdrawal, Luftwaffe bomber reinforcements arrived in strength and pressed home their bombardment of the beaches and together with the German gunners turned the evacuation into a worse massacre than Dunkirk. At 11.15 43 Squadron's Hurricanes attacked the East Headland, but five minutes later a call came from the beach for more smoke and air support. Again at 11.35 and 11.38, calls came in to the effect that the beaches were under tremendous fire and evacuation was impossible under such conditions. Uxbridge was inundated with calls for more bombing. Hurri-bombers were on the way, but would only arrive at noon.
At Pourville the remnants of the attack on the West Headland were being evacuated under increasing attack from both shore and air. Fw 1 90s strafed while Ju 88s were subsequently reported as "flame thrower aircraft" (early napalm?). The RAF, however, were fully engaged over Dieppe, and could not give cover here.
At last the Hurricane 11Bs arrived over Dieppe at 12.00, and their attacks kept some German gunners' heads down while Spitfires kept at bay the dogged attempts of Ju 88s, Do 217s and a few He 111s to intervene. At 12.43 three Bostons laid a last smoke screen in the face of heavy AA fire from the Royal Navy. Just after 13.00, however, the survivors on the beaches were forced to surrender -- though, as late as 13.45, RAF attacks were belatedly still going in on the Headlands and beaches, killing several Canadians who were now POWs.
Heading for England now were some 200 vessels in close convoy with the inevitable stragglers behind. With a renewed effort, the Luftwaffe tried to inflict more casualties. For the RAF fighter pilots flying their third, fourth or even fifth sorties of the day, this was the last challenge. Tn addition to the general air cover provided, eighty-six additional patrols were put up to intercept specific attacks. Only one incident was to mar what was otherwise a near-perfect essay into fighter cover. At the tail end of the convoy a free-for-all was developing over the last ships getting into station. At 13.08 a section of three Do 217s, though harried unmercifully by Spitfires, pressed home their attack. Just after 13.14, one bomb exploded under the destroyer HMS Berkeley, breaking her back. Her crew were evacuated and she was sunk by a fellow destroyer. By 15.45, the Luftwaffe, realising the futility of further mass attacks, sent single bombers to harass the convoy, using the gathering overcast for protection. But by 20.00 the convoy was nearly home and the RAF had the sky to itself. During the day the Luftwaffe had made scattered raids on South East England. They came again that night: a Do 217 falling to Wing-Cdr. Pleasance's Beaufighter of 25 Squadron. For several nights afterwards, Ju 88s intensified their shipping reconnaisance over the Channel, some falling foul of 29 Squadron.
The raid had failed, the "Reconnaisance in Force" had succeeded, though the high price was unnecessary. The RAF had played its part to the best of its ability. While it had lost more aircraft than the Luftwaffe in the air battle, the Luftwaffe had been defeated on its own doorstep -- prevented by Fighter Conimand from interfering to any great extent with the assault forces.
However, in other spheres the RAF had not been so successful. Aerial photographic reconnaissance had not been properly utilised nor supplemented by adequate ground intelligence. The tactical reconnaissance had not been completely satisfactory, and, in the fields of bombardment and close-support, the RAF had fallen short -- though through no fault of the aircrew involved: emphasis had always been placed on strategic bombing, while fighter and ground attack development had languished since 1918. In the bombardment, there had been too few aircraft and no heavy bombers -- and too many tasks. 2 Bomber Group's accuracy was also found wanting at that time. The main fault, however, lay with their essentially limited destructive potential. In the role of close support, the fighter-bombers' accuracy was out-weighed by lack of effective ordnance. In general, the situation had been too confused and too poorly co-ordinated for the air attacks to be directed on the most important targets at the right times.
Fortunately, the lessons of the raid had been well learnt, and improved methods of bombardment and support were in evidence in subsequent landings. Most important of all, however, the cross-Channel fighter offensive was duly relaxed. Much needed fighter squadrons were transferred to other theatres of operation, and early in the new year -- with more definite plans for a return to the Continent being formulated -- the Allied air offensive took on new meaning in terms of co-ordination, aims and effectiveness.
It is unfortunate that the important facts regarding the air force's part at Dieppe have since become clouded by the controversy of clashing claims. The Luftwaffe has admitted the loss of 48 aircraft, which Leigh-Mallory never believed, against the total raiding force claim (final) of 91. Luftwaffe fighters claimed 97 and Flak some 15 RAF aircraft against a total of 106* RAF aircraft lost that day. However, all historians to date have lost sight of the fact that only 95 of these, at the utmost, fell to the enemy. At least six RAF aircraft were shot down by the Royal Navy and Army AA gunners. One Typhoon was shot down by a Spitfire, two others were lost due to structural failure, and two Spitfires collided during the withdrawal across the Channel.
It would not be worth quoting a statistical breakdown of the almost 3,000 sorties flown, losses, etc., as, without a chapter on their own, these might only be misconstrued. For example, the two Norwegian squadrons claimed 15 confirmed victories, while the five Polish squadrons between them only got 17 kills. The dictum of being in the right place at the right time applies here.
