I'm reading a book called
Blenheim Strike, by Theo Boiten. For them as don't know, the Blenheims spent most of 1941 making very low-alt attacks on German coastal convoys. They'd come in right on the water and drop their bombs as they pulled up to clear the masts, basically hurling them or skipping them into the ship's side. These Blenheim attacks nearly always suffered staggering losses, very few crews surviving even 4 missions.
Towards the end of 1941, the Blenheims began to be replaced by Bostons. It is in this context that I came across the quote below. It points out an apparent real-world limit on dropping bombs, at least in the Boston, that AH doesn't at present model. I present it FWIW. It's anecdotal evidence, but given the circumstances this guy was in at the time, I doubt he made this up. Make of it what you will. But for whatever reason, the Bostons weren't used for anti-shipping attacks as the Blenheims had been.
When we got the Bostons, we were in seventh heaven. With their much higher airspeed on the attack (330 mph at maximum power for three minutes) and greater maneuverability, we began to feel that we were surely going to have a higher survival rate among the flight crews, particularly with respect to attacking convoys where our losses in Blenheims ran just over an average rate of one-third for each attack. The Blenheim had adapted well, but it could not compare to the Boston. Maximum speed of the Blenheim was 260 indicated airspeed, and it was generally a sloppy aircraft to fly by comparison to the Boston.
While everyone hated the shipping sweeps on account of our high losses, we resolved that we were going to be much happier flying the Bostons. But after the squadrons (226, 88, and 107) had had the aircraft for a few weeks and the Blenheims were long gone, a very important discovery was made at Central Test and Development Unit that sent all 2 Group aircrew into celebrations. It was discovered that the Boston had one fatal flaw during shipping attacks: the bombs could not be released when the fore and aft axis of the aircraft was more than 4 degrees above the horizontal. And, best of all, there was no modification that could be incorporated into the bomb-carrying and release systems that would make it otherwise. It was concluded that the Bostons would be sitting ducks, having to make an almost level, long run-in on a convoy at an altitude of nearly 100 feet above the water. So, we would attack no more convoys, and there was much jubilation about this.
But, our jubilation might have been a bit too soon, because almost immediately rumours (someones idea of a joke?) started that we were going to give up the Bostons and go back to the Blenheims. I never heard that the rumour was denied, so we got nervous again. Anyhow, the rumour faded over the horizon into the land of impossibility, and everyone forgot about it, and we would see no more coastal convoys. The rumour had made sense while it circulated because the Blenheim could release its bombs in a very nose high position, which was necessary when releasing the bombs in an attack on a ship (to clear the top of the rigging of the ship while almost simultaneously releasing the bombs). So the Boston as a ship killer died on the vine. After the Boston struck out and flunked completely as a replacement for the Blenheim on shipping sweeps, attacking convoys became the almost exclusive domain of RAF Coastal Command, and we on 226 Squadron were very happy about that.
By Pilot Officer Bill O'Connell, 226 Squadon, one of the very few who survived much of this sort of work. It's on pages 204-5 of
Blenheim Strike
