f4UDOA, please consider the following:
At the Republican National Convention in August, Texas Governor George W. Bush reminded the audience about two elite Army divisions that were not ready for combat duty. Vice President Al Gore, speaking before the Veterans of Foreign Wars, claimed that the Clinton/Gore administration had reversed the decline in military readiness, and accused Governor Bush of "running down the troops." Thus began the 2000 presidential debate on the state of military readiness.
Under the circumstances, supporting the troops means facing the truth about readiness in the post-Cold War world. The armed forces are one-third to one-half smaller, but deployments have increased by 300% since 1991. The Kosovo air war, which revealed shortages in everything from cruise missiles to carriers, demonstrated the consequences of asking the armed forces to do much more with far less.
The July edition of CMR Notes, titled "Are America’s Armed Forces Better Off Today?" (Part I), discussed the consequences of unprecedented social engineering in the military. This edition (Part II) highlights and summarizes significant news stories that provide real-world insight into the state of morale and readiness in the military.
National defense should not be a partisan issue, but it is absurd to suggest that it is somehow "unpatriotic" to discuss the state of military preparedness in a presidential election year. The voters are about to elect a new commander-in-chief. If not now, when? The American military is still the finest in the world, but there are numerous problems that the next president will have to address. The first step in solving readiness problems is to first admit that they exist. n
INTRODUCTION
To provide an overview of the state of military readiness, this edition of CMR Notes highlights contemporary headlines and summarizes stories from major American newspapers, the military press, and government reports. This compendium of news dispatches from the year 2000 (unless otherwise indicated) is not all-encompassing. Some situations may have changed since these stories were written, but new ones are reported every day. Taken as a whole, the headlines chronicle a worrisome trend of problems that must be addressed by the next commander-in-chief. n
ARMY
"Two Army Divisions Unfit for War – Both Flunk Ratings of Preparedness" – Washington Post, Nov. 10, 1999
"Army Says Strained Resources Leave Troops Unprepared for War" – New York Times, Nov. 10, 1999
The two Army divisions spotlighted by Governor Bush during his acceptance speech were the subject of numerous news reports in November of 1999. The elite 10th Mountain and First Infantry Divisions, based in Fort Drum, NY and Germany, respectively, had received classified ratings of C-4, the lowest ranking for readiness. Evaluation criteria had been established by Congress, in order to measure the ability of U.S. forces to wage two major wars at nearly the same time. None of the Army’s ten divisions were ranked C-1, the highest ranking for readiness.
The low ratings were not the fault of the soldiers, but a consequence of administration policies in the Balkans. Roughly half of the two units in question were deployed to Bosnia and Kosovo—landlocked countries lacking a decent airfield or seaport. Swift re-deployment elsewhere—to train for and participate in a "major theater of war" (MTW) contingency—would be exceedingly difficult.
Army Chief of Staff Gen. Erik Shinseki responded to the news by ordering that personnel vacancies in the Army’s divisions overseas be filled with soldiers from non-divisional support units, including the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).
Nine months later, the two divisions mentioned by Governor Bush have returned to their home bases, and different troops have been sent to the Balkans in their place. Gen. Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has claimed that all ten Army divisions are now fully manned and ready for combat. That may depend, however, on the definitions of "combat" and "ready" for a "two-major-war" contingency. Kosovo and Bosnia are still landlocked, and transportation options remain limited.
In an August 29 response to questions from the Center for Military Readiness, Army spokesman Maj. Thomas Collins said that readiness ratings have improved because "new planning considerations have enabled division commanders to make a more accurate assessment of their units’ ability to support a Major Theater of War contingency when transitioning from a Small Scale Contingency (SSC)….the timelines for deployment of the divisions to a MTW have been adjusted to better enable them to meet contingency requirements."
Defense analyst Dr. John Hillen, an Army veteran of Desert Storm, remains unconvinced. In a message to CMR, Hillen wrote:
"Readiness problems manifest themselves slowly over time and get fixed only slowly and deliberately. The idea that the Army’s well publicized readiness problems of 1998 – late 1999 are suddenly and magically fixed is simply not true. Clearly the Army has used the sorts of accounting tricks that have plagued readiness reporting for thirty years in order to suddenly become ‘ready.’ Language such as [that quoted above] is code for ‘We couldn’t meet the standard so we lowered the bar.’ " n
"Army Training Centers Get Failing Grades – Twelve of 20 Combat Schools Rank ‘C-4’" – Washington Times, Aug. 29
"ROCK BOTTOM - Training Centers Report They Can’t Meet Mission"– Army Times, Sept. 11
According to a confidential report obtained by Rowan Scarborough, 12 of 20 Army combat and support training centers were recently rated C-4—last in terms of readiness. Maj. Gen. Tony Stricklin, Commander of the Army Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, OK, wrote: "In the three-year period since the time I was assistant commandant to now, I have never seen a resource picture so bleak….Let me clearly state the U.S. Army Field Artillery School is nearing an unready state for training artillery soldiers."
In addition to Field Artillery, 12 C-4 grades were given for training in Air Defense, Aviation (including helicopters), Chemical Weapons, Combined Arms, Engineering, Finance, Infantry, Intelligence, Military Police, Communications/Signal Corps, and Transportation. Higher C-3 ratings were earned by Armor, Basic Combat, Language, Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Warrant Officer Career Center training units. Only the JFK Special Warfare and Chaplain units rated as high as C-2. n
"They Weren’t Ready – General Says Task Force Hawk Aviators Unprepared for Challenges in Kosovo" – Army Times, July 5, 1999
A "lessons learned" e-mail memo to Army Chief of Staff Gen. Erik Shinseki from Brig. Gen. Richard Cody, who oversaw Task Force Hawk in Kosovo, affirmed that Apache helicopter missions there last year were hampered by a shortage of pilots and warrant officers. The memo, which was not intended for public circulation, said that aviation officers and soldiers performed superbly under tough conditions, but the unit’s first three weeks in theater were "painful and high risk."
Of the pilots available, 65% had less than 500 hours in the Apache cockpit. In the co-pilot gunner position, none were qualified to use night-vision goggles. Although German restrictions on night flights accounted for some training deficiencies, Gen. Cody noted that "Across the Army, we are seeing the results of many years of declining resources and resource constraints, in terms of funds for training and equipment." Despite a grueling series of mission rehearsal exercises in which two Apaches crashed and two pilots died, Task Force Hawk was never sent into combat. n
Red Ratings for Readiness
According to CNN military reporter Jamie McIntyre, an U.S. Army report released on April 4 indicated that 40% of the helicopter fleet is not combat ready, and concluded that. "Clearly, aviation is headed in the wrong direction." A plan for modernization of the fleet noted that "Just over 40% of the rotary wing is ‘red’ in terms of age and war-fighting capability." The report defined a "red" rating as "cannot perform mission, and/or high risk." (CNN, Apr. 5) n
"Despite Billions for Defense, Lowly GIs Get Obsolete Gear" – San Diego Union-Tribune, Aug. 30
David Wood reported that infantry sergeants in the 10th Mountain division are still waiting for lightweight combat gear that was promised more than two years ago. Many soldiers are using hand-me-down gear so ancient that it is actually on display at the National Infantry Museum at Fort Benning, GA, along with swords and suits of armor. Some soldiers, despairing of ever getting new gear, buy their own. According to a report by the General Accounting Office, the Army lost almost a billion dollars worth of gear in 1998. n
NAVY
"BAND-AID NAVY – How Shortages Are Burning Out Sailors and Wearing Out the Fleet" - Navy Times, May 22
In this cover story, William H. McMichael reported that the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets are so short of maintenance dollars, scheduled heavy shipyard maintenance work for 15 ships was canceled this year. Without additional funds, critical work on 25 other ships, plus 18 more, will be skipped or scaled back next year. Absent proper equipment and shipyard time, sailors are sometimes required to do heavy maintenance work, such as removing rust from anchors and chains with manual sandblasting tools.
The standard for maintenance of submarines is much higher, because there is no room for error. Cramped submarines lack back-up equipment that is common on surface ships. Nevertheless, the submarine community also lacks enough money for spare parts, and lost both of its U.S.-based sub tenders to downsizing. The Los Angeles and Trident classes are no longer in production, so parts must be custom-made or cannibalized from "donor" subs. Parts swapping is especially prevalent on the Tridents, which come in for just 18 days before returning to sea with a fresh crew. n
"Workload Swamps Ship Maintenance Depots" - Navy Times, May 22
McMichael also reported that in 1995, there were three Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity (SIMA) facilities in the Hampton Roads, VA area. Now there is just one. Due to stepped-up deployments, the maintenance workload has drastically increased, but units are seriously undermanned. Commanding officers express pride in the sailors’ hard work, but also know that frustration with the work load hurts morale and contributes to personnel losses. n
"Navy Officer Gives Readiness Warning – Planes Not Fit to Fight" – Washington Times, May 3, 1999
In an unusual "hazard report" submitted to Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jay Johnson, a Navy commandeer warned that shortages of aircraft, spare parts and training hours created a safety threat in his squadron of carrier-based E-2C Hawkeye radar reconnaissance planes. The unnamed commander wrote that "over the past year, we have not been given the tools necessary to do [our mission]. We’ve merely been fighting for survival." He added that the shortage "severely degrades a squadron’s ability to maintain minimum crew proficiency levels….[This is] detrimental to the safety of the lives of everyone involved in launching, flying and recovering aircraft." n
"Keeping Aircraft Flying on a Wing and a Prayer" - Navy Times, May 22
On any given day, one or two of a forward-deployed F-14 Tomcat squadron’s 10 jets are unable to fly because they are in "donor status"—being cannibalized for spare parts. In the non-deployed squadrons, up until a few months before an upcoming cruise, only three or four jets can fly at any given time. According to the Atlantic Fleet Director of Aircraft Material, roughly 10 cannibalizations are performed for every 100 flight hours.
To meet increased demand for aircraft maintenance since January of 1999, personnel at the Oceana NAS Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD) have had to work three shifts, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The workload is especially difficult because some units are short-handed, partially deployed on carriers, or filled with unskilled personnel waiting for school openings. The Oceana AIMD, for example, has only 64% of its full allowance of 424 aviation electronics technicians.
Cmdr. Bill Bergin praised the "mission-oriented" Oceana AIMD for "hiding the pain" by working ten-hour shifts. Still, heavy workloads and equipment shortfalls have affected morale and retention rates.
In a May 29 editorial, Navy Times wrote that the downsizing of the fleet, combined with an extraordinary pace of global operations, can explain but not excuse the sorry state of Navy parts and maintenance funding.
"Simply put, sailors are being short-changed by their leaders in uniform and in Washington D.C., who for too long have failed to adequately fund Navy accounts for spare parts and maintenance. …Congress should give the Navy every cent it needs to get itself out of this hole. Combat readiness demands it. And the sailors on the deckplates deserve nothing less." n
"Navy Readiness Woes Run Deep" – "Cannibalizing Parts, and Yes – People" – Navy Times, May 10, 1999
On April 21, Pacific Fleet Commander Adm. Archie Clemins told Congress that the successes of recent missions "mask serious underlying readiness downtrends that must be reversed." In addition to serious concerns about ship maintenance, Adm. Clemins said that the fleet is so short of Tomahawk cruise missiles—more than 500 of which were fired during the Kosovo air war—crews must spend increasing amounts of time transferring weapons from inbound ships to outbound ones.
During a visit to Lemoore NAS, CA, Admiral Clemins found that 43% of the F/A 18 Hornet strike fighters were "not flyable" due to a lack of spare parts, including 61 fewer engines than were needed to keep all the jets flying. A squadron commander said that when one squadron returned from deployment in December of 1998, six of its jets’ engines were pulled "as soon as we came off the cruise." n
"Danzig Foresees Sharp Cuts in Shipbuilding, Repairs" – Navy Times, July 3
Despite all of the problems reported above, plus a projected shortfall in ship-building to match global commitments, Navy Secretary Richard Danzig recently announced a 7-year Program Objective Memorandum (POM-02) that proposes more of the same, and worse.
According to reporter David Brown, Danzig’s spending plan would reduce intermediate maintenance funds from 95% in 2002 and 2003 to 86% of minimum requirements in the out years (2004-2007). The projected rate of ship-building, 6.5 per year, would also fall well below the 8-10 per year experts say is needed to keep the Navy at the 305-ship fleet size considered to be minimally adequate.
The Danzig plan would also reduce aviation flying-hour goals from 83% for 2002-03 and 78% for 2004 through 2007. Aviation depot maintenance will attain goals for 2002 and 2003, but 19 squadrons will fall below depot maintenance goals by 2004, followed by 90 squadrons in 2007. Aviation spare parts would be funded at 85% for the first two years, and drop to 78% in the remaining years. n
"Shortage of Cash for Fuel Leaves Navy Ships Parked at Pier" – Stars and Stripes, Aug. 28
The Pacific Fleet is running short of gas money. Since May, 7th Fleet ships have officially canceled four visits to Far East ports, and many others have been scrubbed even before they officially were scheduled. Fuel consumption and at-sea days are about 60% of what they were during the summer of 1999, one of the 7th Fleet’s busiest quarters ever.
In addition to higher fuel costs, the Navy has been forced to pump extra money into recruiting and unplanned deployments to places like Kosovo and East Timor. Budget shortfalls have caused Atlantic Fleet commanders to slow down or delay ship repairs, while Pacific Fleet commanders have shifted money from the fuel budget to the spare parts budget. n
"Admiral Warns on Navy Budget" – San Diego Union-Tribune, Aug. 24
In an unusually strong comment, the newly-installed three-star commander of Naval Air Forces Pacific warned that the Navy’s budget is so low that it may become impossible to fulfill all its military commitments. Speaking to about 1,000 sailors and civilians on the flight deck of the carrier Constellation, Vice Admiral John Nathman said that if the Navy is expected to deal with "rogue states and bullies," it is only right that "my naval air force be sustained at levels which support our operations and tempo….There is a fundamental disconnect between the value we provide and the willingness of the richest nation on earth to pay for its demands. It is obvious—the naval service is undervalued. This is the challenge—it must be resolved." n
"Navy Pilots Miss the Mark" – CBS News, Sept. 5
David Martin reported that a recent internal report by the Navy’s Inspector General, completed in April, found that funding shortages are hurting the combat performance of naval aviators. Carrier air wings have had to deploy without sufficient training. As a result, "[laser bomb] strike success rates in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia (are) far below those that should be achievable." The IG found that laser-guided bombs—which cost $25,000 each—are so scarce that the first time most Navy pilots get a chance to drop one is in combat. n
AIR FORCE
"Skill Level of Pilots in Air Force, Navy Seen as ‘Degraded’ " – Washington Times, Feb. 21
"Combat Training Quality Takes Nose Dive" – AF Times, Feb. 28
After touring the Air Warfare Center at Nellis AFB and the Navy’s Top Gun school at Fallon NAS, NV, a senior Senate defense staff member wrote a comprehensive report on training and equipment shortages, including a lack of aggressor (adversary) aircraft. "At our premier air combat training facilities we have too few instructor pilots, too few aircraft for them to fly; and old, sometimes structurally failing aircraft."
Noting assurances from Defense Secretary William S. Cohen that a downward cycle of such problems had been reversed, the staffer found that new money had not trickled down to the two desert bases. Because some suppliers are no longer in business, some spare parts take 18 months to 2 years to arrive, and cannibalization rates are increasing servicewide. The report also said that Air Force pilots are missing normal training rotations because they are on peacekeeping duty abroad. Combat skills are not refined by flying circles in the skies over southern Iraq. n
"Readiness Hits Lowest Level in 15 Years" – AF Times, May 15
Air Force readiness to fight a war slumped in recent months to its lowest level in 15 years, declining 28% since the end of the Cold War. Only 65% of the force’s combat units were operating at the military’s best levels of readiness in December and January. That means roughly 115 of its 329 combat units were not fully capable of performing their mission. The 65% rating compares with 95% readiness in 1989 and 76% at the end of 1998. n
"General Says War Stretches U.S. Forces" – Washington Post, Apr. 30, 1999
"Service to Convert Nuclear Bombs to Avert Cruise Missile Shortfall" – AF Times, May 17, 1999
Gen. Richard Hawley, head of the Air Combat Command, said the Air Force has been sorely strained by the Kosovo conflict and would be hard-pressed to handle a second war in the Middle East or Korea. Hawley said that the accelerated air campaign would increase shortages of aircraft and experienced crews in the U.S.
Five weeks of bombing Yugoslavia left U.S. munitions stocks critically short, not just of air-launched cruise missiles, but also satellite-guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) dropped by B-2 stealth bombers. According to a House Armed Services Committee report, a stockpile of 250 conventional cruise missiles dwindled to only 80 following heavy air strikes in Iraq and Serbia. Congress approved $51.5 million in emergency funds to convert 95 nuclear missiles into conventional ones. n
"WORKED TO DEATH – How Doing Too Much Cost 12 Crewmen Their Lives" – AF Times, Mar. 29, 1999
Bryant Jordan reported that the September 1998 collision of two PAVE Hawk helicopters from Nellis AFB, in which 12 crewmen died, was an accident five years in the making. Investigators found that factors contributing to the disaster included "a high operations/personnel tempo coupled with leadership problems, internal and external training deficiencies…[and] low aircrew experience level." Previous reports from local commanders had warned of problems with the "run-ragged squadron," but nothing substantial was done. Gen. Richard Hawley, Air Combat Commander at Langley AFB, told Jordan that he worries every night about another crash happening, due to stress and a lack of spare parts in combat squadrons. n
"House Panel Gets an Earful on Woes of Overburdened Forces" – AF Times, Mar. 15, 1999
A congressional panel headed by Military Readiness Sub-Committee Chairman Rep. Herbert Bateman (R-VA) heard abundant testimony at a Nellis AFB field hearing about missed opportunities at the Air Force’s Red Flag (air combat training) exercises, and a decline in fundamental land war-fighting proficiency at the Army’s National Training Center. Rear Adm. Timothy Beard, commander of NAS Fallon, said that only 8 or 9 of the 22 F-18 Hornets assigned to the base were available to fly each day. Rep. Jim Gibbons (R-NV) spoke of "a gap the size of the Grand Canyon" between what the committee heard there and what they hear from Pentagon officials in Washington D.C. n
MARINES
"Commanders Compete for Aircraft Carrier" – Copley News, Apr. 4, 1999
The carrier Theodore Roosevelt, ordered to move from the Mediterranean to the Adriatic Sea to join the NATO air war over Kosovo, was the object of a struggle between Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni, commander-in-chief in the Persian Gulf region, and Army Gen. Wesley Clark, the NATO supreme commander. The carrier Kitty Hawk was later sent from Japan to relieve the Roosevelt, which temporarily left the Pacific without a permanently assigned carrier for the first time since World War II. n
"Marines Halt Flights of Aircraft" – Reuters, Aug. 28
The Marine Corps announced it had temporarily halted flights of three different types of aircraft, including all VF-22 Osprey tilt rotor troop helicopters, for safety inspections. In July, 76 Harrier fighter jets were grounded. The flight suspension of all Sea Stallion transport (average age 30 years) and A-1W Cobra attack helicopters (dating back to the 1960s) was described as a precaution following maintenance inspections. The replacement Osprey aircraft is still 15 years away from reaching full operational capability. n
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
"Record Deployments Take Toll on Military" – Washington Times, Mar. 28
The U.S. military was sent on an unprecedented 48 overseas missions in the 1990s to places such as Iraq, the Balkans, Haiti, and East Timor. In addition, troops have performed hurricane and earthquake-relief work in Guam and Central America. By contrast, the military was sent on only 20 such missions in the 15 years between the U.S. exit from Vietnam and the end of the Cold War.
At the same time, the active duty force was shrunk by 800,000 troops, from 2.2 million to 1.4 million—a 40% reduction. The Army was cut from 18 to 10 divisions; the Navy went from 567 ships to just over 300; and the Air Force lost almost half of its 24 fighter wings. n
"Readiness of Armed Forces is Not Improving" – Washington Times, Aug. 28
The Bush administration planned a measured drawdown of 25% in the Defense Department budget over five years. But in 1993, the Clinton administration doubled the planned cuts to $128 billion. The Defense budget has now dropped to about 2.9% of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (down from 4.2% of GDP in 1992)—a depth not reached since before Pearl Harbor. n
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