There is no better description of the issues facing the pilots flying the P-38 out of Britain than the letter sent to the 8th AF Fighter Command by Col. Harold Rau. Rau was the commander of the 20th Fighter Group. Here's the full text of the letter.
20th Fighter Group Headquarters
APO 637 U.S. Army
(E-2)
3 June 1944
Subject: P-38 Airplane in Combat.
To: Commanding General, VIII Fighter Command, APO 637, U.S. Army.
1. The following observations are being put in writing by the undersigned at the request of the Commanding General, VIII FC. They are intended purely as constructive criticism and are not intended in any way to "low rate" our present equipment.
2. After flying the P-38 for a little over one hundred hours on combat missions it is my belief that the airplane, as it stands now, is too
complicated for the 'average' pilot. I want to put strong emphasis on the
word 'average’, taking full consideration just how little combat training our
pilots have before going on as operational status.
3. As a typical case to demonstrate my point, let us assume that we have a pilot fresh out of flying school with about a total of twenty-five hours in a P-38, starting out on a combat mission. He is on a deep ramrod, penetration and target support to maximum endurance. He is cruising along with his power set at maximum economy. He is pulling 31" Hg and 2100 RPM. He is auto lean and running on external tanks. His gun heater is off to relieve
the load on his generator, which frequently gives out (under sustained heavy load). His sight is off to save burning out the bulb. His combat switch may or may not be on. Flying along in this condition, he suddenly gets "bounced", what to do flashes through his mind. He must turn, he must increase power and get rid of those external tanks and get on his main. So, he reaches down and turns two stiff, difficult gas switches {selector valves} to main - turns on his drop tank switches, presses his release button, puts the mixture to auto rich (two separate and clumsy operations), increases his RPM, increases his manifold pressure, turns on his gun heater switch (which he must feel for and cannot possibly see), turns on his combat switch and he is ready to fight. At this point, he has probably been shot down or he has done one of several things wrong. Most common error is to push the throttles wide open before increasing
RPM. This causes detonation and subsequent engine failure. Or, he forgets
to switch back to auto rich, and gets excessive cylinder head temperature
with subsequent engine failure.
4. In my limited experience with a P-38 group, we have lost as least
four (4) pilots, who when bounced, took no immediate evasive action. The
logical assumption is that they were so busy in the cockpit, trying to get
organized that they were shot down before they could get going.
5. The question that arises is, what are you going to do about it? It is standard procedure for the group leader to call, five minutes before R/V
and tell all the pilots to "prepare for trouble". This is the signal for
everyone to get into auto rich, turn drop tank switches on, gun heaters on,
combat and sight switches on and to increase RPM and manifold pressure
to maximum cruise. This procedure, however, does not help the pilot who is
bounced on the way in and who is trying to conserve his gasoline and equipment for the escort job ahead.
6. What is the answer to these difficulties? During the past several
weeks we have been visited at this station time and time again by Lockheed representatives, Allison representatives and high ranking Army personnel connected with these two companies. They all ask about our troubles and then proceed to tell us about the marvelous mechanisms that they have devised to overcome these troubles that the Air Force has turned down as "unnecessary". Chief among these is a unit power control, incorporating an automatic manifold pressure regulator, which will control power, RPM and mixture by use of a single lever. It is obvious that there is a crying need for a device like that in combat.
7. It is easy to understand why test pilots, who have never been in
combat, cannot readily appreciate what each split second means when a
"bounce" occurs. Every last motion when you get bounced is just another
nail in your coffin. Any device which would eliminate any of the enumerated
above, are obviously very necessary to make the P-38 a really effective
combat airplane.
8. It is also felt that that much could done to simplify the gas switching
system in this airplane. The switches {valve selector handles} are
all in awkward positions and extremely hard to turn. The toggle switches for outboard tanks are almost impossible to operate with gloves on.
9. My personal feeling about this airplane is that it is a fine piece of
equipment, and if properly handled, takes a back seat for nothing that the enemy can produce. But it does need simplifying to bring it within the capabilities of the 'average' pilot. I believe that pilots like Colonel Ben Kelsey and Colonel Cass Huff are among the finest pilots in the world today. But I also believe that it is difficult for men like them to place their thinking and ability on the level of a youngster with a bare 25 hours in the airplane, going into his first combat. That is the sort of thinking that will have to be done, in my opinion, to make the P-38 a first-class all around fighting airplane.
HAROLD J. RAU
Colonel, Air Corps,
Commanding.
My regards,
Widewing
