Delayed Radiation “Fallout”
The radiation from a nuclear detonation can be classified into two separate categories: Initial Burst and Residual – the latter being fallout. Depending whether the weapon is detonated as an air burst or ground burst, fallout can be either Initial or Long term.
The initial burst is comprised of gamma rays and neutrons, a dose so intense as only to be lethal at a short range within 1.75 miles of the hypocenter. However, this wouldn’t so much be of a factor since anyone within that ring of destruction would be dead or morbid from the subsequent thermal pulse and passage of the shock front. Only over two miles is radiation exposure from the initial pulse down to a relatively insignificant level, at least compared to the other threats.
If the device were exploded on the ground, early or local fallout would be as a result of soil and rock descending from the fireball’s ascension into the stratosphere. Airbursts tend to deliver a smaller radiation dose over a longer period of time, to global populations. The direction of fallout is a misnomer since wind patterns make fallout widely scattered and unpredictable – leaving certain areas hot and others untouched.
Radiation Injury
Most medical estimates of risk are in that of LD/50 or the lethal dose for 50 % of the population exposed. Short-term exposure is rated at 450 REMS with excellent medical care available. That meaning that possible bone marrow transplants would be needed, in addition to whole blood transfusions. Lethal doses for the very young, elderly or those with serious blast and burn injury can be as low as 225 REMS.
Effect If delivered over one week If delivered over one month
Threshold for radiation sicknes150 200
Five percent may die 250 350
Fifty percent may die 450 600
(It doesn’t matter much whether a dose of radiation is received as intense radiation for several hours or at a slower rate over several weeks. What matters is the total accumulated dose.)
Rescue Problems
If the bomb exploded squarely over the center of a city, no rescue services within the area of major structural damage would be able to function. All downtown hospitals would be destroyed, and there would be no electricity, water, or telephone communication in the area served by city utilities. Impassable roads would hamper rescue services from the outside world and the central area of severe damage would be inaccessible.
The number of injured in the peripheral area would be so great that emergency services of surrounding cities would be completely overloaded, as would be any surviving suburban hospitals and all the hospitals of neighboring cities. Even to be seen by a doctor and given analgesics, the injured from one city would need to be distributed among all the hospitals of North America.
The destroyed city would be radioactive. Decisions to attempt rescue work would depend first on a survey of the area by a specialist team with appropriate protection, and then on a policy decision as to how much radiation the rescue teams should be permitted. Willingness of the team members and their unions to accept the risk would be the final factor.
Medical Responses
Medical help of any sort would be virtually non-existent. Medical care, in fact, serves most usefully as an illustration of the impossibility of coping with such a horrific impact. Civil defense estimates suggest that the ratio of surviving uninjured physicians to the number of seriously injured attack victims being somewhere between 1:350 and 1:1500. Looking back, even this calculation is optimistic.
There are no emergency rooms, no operating rooms, and no diagnostic or therapeutic equipment within reach. There are no blood banks left; drug stocks have been destroyed. The number of injured, if they could be distributed throughout the hospitals or North America would occupy something like a third of all beds available – no hospital can deal with such an influx of cases. A whole year's supply of blood for transfusion would be needed immediately, and of course is not available in storage nor could it be collected from volunteers in a few days. The injured that reached hospitals would have to be assayed for radioactivity, for the safety of the staff, which would cause a serious bottleneck and delay in most hospitals.
There might be fifty times as many severe burn cases as there are beds available in all North America. Let me remind you – this is if there was only a 1-megaton weapon targeting a single city.
The true scope of the medical impact of a thermonuclear weapon only becomes clear if you turn to a major nationwide attack. If you can imagine the impact of a single 1-Megaton warhead – just try to comprehend 6,000 Megatons aimed simultaneously at military targets, other basic industries and population concentrations of 50,000 or more.
Survival
In the post-shelter survival period, when fallout has reached an “acceptable” level that allows survivors to emerge for longer times, the problems will change. Tens of thousands of still surviving injured must be nursed. There will be millions of human and animal corpses to be buried or burned. Food will be an overwhelming concern since most of the food stored in shelters would’ve been destroyed. Other food supplies, grain in particular is stored where the population density is least concentrated, on farms. Approximately 99% of the refinery industry would’ve been destroyed; there would be no means to transport the food since there would be no fuel.
Locally food-rich regions may try to fight off any attempt to share their holdings. But throughout this period, the epidemic potential will continue and worsen, probably made more intense by both malnutrition and rampant disease. Since insects are far more resistant to radiation then humans, it is anticipated that cockroaches, mosquitoes, and flies—will multiply unchecked in an environment that is devoid of birds but has ample waste, untreated sewage and human and animal corpses. Trillions of flies will breed in the dead bodies alone.
Disease problems in the survival period may be heavily skewed toward infections. Particularly hazardous epidemics of TB and plague may occur, but outbreaks of flu, amoebic dysentery, rabies, cholera, hepatitis, and bacterial dysentery are also very likely. All of this is in addition to the usual incidence of coronary heart disease, stoke, diabetes, and occurrences or cancer. Antibiotic supplies would be rapidly depredated. Since the pharmaceutical industry will be almost totally destroyed, there will be little chance of replacement. Diagnostic labs will be non-existent. Vaccines and other immunizing agents will be unavailable.
For physicians and other health care workers, all these scenarios are apocalyptic in scale. It will not only raise practical burdens but the ethical as well. Within the shelter or outside…how are health workers to accomplish making life and death decisions on the basic of radiation exposure estimates that may be inaccurate by several orders of magnitude. Shall the demands for euthanasia be fulfilled as opposed to living maybe 3 or 4 weeks? Should antibiotics or narcotics be reserved for those whose prospect for survival is best? For those who survived this grotesque destruction of human beings, it would change the meaning of being human.
References
Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System, Union of Concerned Scientists, April 2000
Arms Control Today: October 2000
The Nuclear Age: Arms Control and Defense Are Back in the News: Brookings Review 1994
NUCLEAR ALMANAC M.I.T. ed. Jack DENNIS 0-201-05331-2 Addison Wesley 1982
SECURITY AND SURVIVAL-THE CASE FOR A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONVENTION-published by IPPNW, IALANA and INESAP(1999), Cambridge, Mass.
CENTER FOR DEFENSE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES (
http://www.cdiss.org)
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