Good, just wanted to be sure that gate was closed.
I never was in an ADA unit. I was in a flying unit. My experience with ADA is in knowing how to avoid getting shot down by them. Falls into three main areas. Communications, Electronic ID (IFF) and ID Maneuvers. I also know how this stuff is coordinated between Command entities. Clear enough?
Let's do the easy stuff first.
The Board concluded that ZG710’s IFF had a fault, which was unknown to the aircrew, and that the lack of IFF at the time of the accident was a contributory factor.
We agree, Equipment Malfunction.
8.The Board considered that the instructions available to aircrew
regarding aircraft operating without IFF were misleading and that this was a contributory factor.
We agree, Command Function.
This one we disagree on and here's the whole quote:
7.ZG710 followed the published speed and height procedures for a return to Ali Al Salem. If the position of the Patriot batteries and the likely “arcs” of their missiles had been taken into account in writing the procedures, ZG710 might have taken a different route.
In addition, procedures were in place to deal with a situation where an aircraft’s IFF had failed, but the crew would have needed to know that the IFF was inoperative to employ them.
The Board concluded that airspace routing, airspace control measures and a breakdown in planning and communication were contributory factors in the accident.
You place this on the Patriot crew. This is an area I do have experience in. The published speed and height procedures are usually coordinated between the higher command units. They are handed out to the flight crews in the mission brief. It is indeed a "Command Function". Who planned the route for the crews without knowing the battery locations? It's also a "Mechanical Failure" problem. The crew didn't know the IFF was out.
No way this one goes on the Patriot crew.
The criteria programmed into the Patriot computer were based on the many different Anti-Radiation Missiles available worldwide, and were therefore very broad. ZG710’s flight profile met these criteria as it commenced its descent into Ali Al Salem. The Board considered that the criteria should have been much tauter, based on the known threat from Iraq, and concluded that the generic Anti-Radiation Missile classification criteria programmed into the Patriot computer were a contributory factor in the accident.
To place this on the crew, you need to show that there were other programming criteria available to the crew and that this crew chose to load the criteria used in violation of any instruction from their superiors. In other words, if their superiors directed loading of this criteria, the crew isn't responsible. If the superiors gave no direction, it has to be considered as a "crew option", which is tied to the training issue.
So far, neither the MOD report nor your posts have shown that at all.
The Board concluded that the Patriot Anti-Radiation Missile Rules Of Engagement were not robust enough to prevent a friendly aircraft being classified as an Anti-Radiation Missile and then engaged in self-defence, and were thus contributory factors in the accident.
So you're going with the old "conspiracy theory" here? "Who knows what we told the Brits"? And you admit you don't have enough data? "Again the American AAR is needed especially for the airspeed alt and vector data". Well, tough to put it on the crew then, tinfoil hat and all. Sorry, not buying. I am familiar with ROE, thanks. Every unit has them.
The crew were fully trained, but their training had
focused on recognising generic threats rather than on those that were specific to Iraq or on identifying false alarms. The Board concluded that both Patriot firing doctrine and training were contributory factors in the accident.
Who writes firing doctrine and who writes the training syllabus? It sure isn't the individual Patriot crew. It's a "higher command" function. I don't know who does it in ADA, but in a AF flying unit, it's the Wing Training Branch that designs training to comply with doctrine put out by HHQ.
MOD said they were qualified but the basic doctrine and training were faulty. No way you hang that on the Patriot crew itself. They don't write doctrine and the don't write the training syllabus. The blame has to go upstream a ways.
The Patriot crew were operating autonomously, with a primary role of protecting ground troops from missile attack, but the Rules of Engagement allowed the Battery to fire in self-defence. Because its communications suite was still in transit from the US, contact with the Battalion HQ and other units was through a radio relay with a nearby Battery, which was equipped with voice and data links to and from the Battalion HQ. The lack of communications equipment meant that the Patriot crew did not have access to the widest possible “picture” of the airspace around them to build situational awareness. The Board considered it likely that a better understanding of the wider operational picture would have helped the Patriot crew, who would then have been more likely to identify ZG710 as a friendly track, albeit one without a working IFF. The Board concluded that the autonomous operation of the Patriot battery was a contributory factor.
Of course they were operating autonomously. That's the point the Board made. Their communications suite was still in transit from the US and their voice/data links were through radio thru another battery which had contact with Battalion HQ.
You can't blame the lack of the comm suite on the crew, which is what denied them the direct links to Battalion HQ and denied them the "big picture" SA. And that's what the board said. It's a "Command Function" to go ahead and employ the battery in this manner, without the comm suite and using radio relay.
Investigation showed that the Patriot Battery’s IFF interrogator for Mode 4 was working throughout the engagement period, but that Mode 1 codes were not loaded. The Board believed that autonomous operations without voice and data connections to and from Battalion HQ might have contributed to the difficulty the Battery had in receiving the Mode 1 IFF codes. The Board concluded that the lack of IFF Mode 1 codes increased the probability of the
accident, and was therefore a contributory factor.
The Board says they weren't getting the data from Battalion HQ because they didn't have their comm suite. Can't hang that on the crew either. It's not their fault their comm suite was in transit and unavailable. And "new ROE and new SOP" are once again implemented at a higher level than the individual crew.
Bout sums it up. There really isn't anything in the MOD report that they put on the crew. You can keep trying to, but it simply conflicts with what they did say. Well, you have the conspiracy theory thing, I guess. And you admit you need the ADA after-action report to really determine anything. Which we don't have, of course.
So, I see no vindication for you, sorry.
As to the insults and such, enjoy. I really try to avoid the easy, childish name calling and try to realize it for what it is.
If it makes you feel all manly and strong, that's all that counts. Go for it.
