What do you think about this quote?

[Viking]

Btw. Toad, I never got an answer to what all this has got to do with appeasing terrorists?

[Toad]

Actually, you have gotten the answer. You just don't agree with it. I'll restate it for you though... one last time.

First, I view those actions by the Serbs at Srebenica as terrorist actions. Agree?

The Dutch gave the Serbs what the Serbs wanted from them; no resistance to aggression, much as Chamberlain appeased Hitler at Munich.

Chamberlain surrendered the Sudetenland to Hitler. When Eduard Benes, Czechoslovakia's head of state, protested at this decision, Neville Chamberlain told him that Britain would be unwilling to go to war over the issue of the Sudetenland.

The Dutch surrendered the Muslims at Srebenica; they were unwilling to go to war over the issue of genocide.

Appeasement in both cases.

Hope that helps.

[Viking]

First of all the “terrorist actions” the BSA committed at Srebrenica was done after the Dutch surrendered, so how can the surrender be an appeasement to terrorist acts that have yet to take place?

Secondly I don’t remember Chamberlin being encircled by Hitler for 6 moths or having a shooting war with Hitler for three weeks before surrendering. To me your argument is a bit silly.

[Toad]

To me, your "nothing is worth dying for" attitude is worse than silly.

Indeed, Chamberlain surrendered before a shot was fired or an invasion started as well. But there was no doubt as to the intent.

The Dutch surrendered before a the genocide began but there could be no doubt as to the intent. The Serbs invaded a UN "safe area" , indiscriminately shelled that "safe area" full of refugees, the Serbs refused to withdraw from the "safe area".... all this well before the night of the 11th and the surrender.

You either stand for something or you don't.

The Spartans did, the Dutch didn't. History will long remember both but only one group as honorable heroes.

[Viking]

Originally posted by Toad
To me, your "nothing is worth dying for" attitude is worse than silly.

I'd appreciate it if you'd not put words in my mouth. I never said that, but I guess that how you make your points these days.

Some things are worth dying for. Nothing is not one of them, and that's what the Dutch would have died for if they had fought gloriously to the last man. Nothing.

[john9001]

Originally posted by Viking

Some things are worth dying for. Nothing is not one of them, and that's what the Dutch would have died for if they had fought gloriously to the last man. Nothing.

you are assuming that the dutch would have lost the fight.

[Toad]

Originally posted by Viking
I'd appreciate it if you'd not put words in my mouth.

I'm not putting words in your mouth. I'm commenting on your attitude in general as I see it.

The Dutch would have accomplished much if they had won or lost. Even in losing they would have given relevance to the UN and given it the opportunity to finally become an actual influence on world events.

As it was, they merely proved it's impotence.

[ByeBye]

On a side note:

"The 10 main troop-contributing countries to UN peacekeeping operations as of February 2006 were Bangladesh (10,126), Pakistan (9,797), India (9,290), Nepal (3,510), Jordan, Ethiopia, Uruguay, Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa."


Unless the US gets directly involved, the UN is a worthless fighting force capable of nothing other than standing around with blue helmets and allowing anyone to walk all over them as if they were not even there.

Why did the Dutch even send troops if they did not intend to fight?

[Viking]

Originally posted by john9001
you are assuming that the dutch would have lost the fight.

They had already lost the fight.

[SteveBailey]

and that's what the Dutch would have died for if they had fought gloriously to the last man. Nothing.

An organized and determined show of courage/resistance to the serbs may have deterred them from killing 8000 people.  By standing by, they perpetuated the reputaion of the UN being toothless.

[ByeBye]

Originally posted by Viking
They had already lost the fight.

With that attitude, they lost the "fight" before they even hit the ground over there. Pretty sad attitude.

[ByeBye]

Gsholtz, if 20 armed guys broke into your house and started rounding up your family for slaughter, would you just give up without a fight and help them round up your family?

After all, if you fought back it would only lead to one more needless death. Might as well live to fight another day.....and hope you can sleep at night afterwards.

No use in dying for nothing, as you say.

[john9001]

Originally posted by Viking
They had already lost the fight.

with that attitude i can understand how Germany walked through Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Norway.

sorry, i prefer Churchill's way," We shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender."

[Viking]

Originally posted by Toad
I'm not putting words in your mouth. I'm commenting on your attitude in general as I see it.

Please stick to what I write, not what you think I’m thinking.

Originally posted by Toad
The Dutch would have accomplished much if they had won or lost. Even in losing they would have given relevance to the UN and given it the opportunity to finally become an actual influence on world events.

As it was, they merely proved it's impotence.

I’m sorry, but what you’re saying is just nonsense. The UN didn’t let the Dutch fight. The UN continually denied them CAS and even at the beginning of the 6 month siege the Dutch had only received 16% of their allotted ammunition. The UN proved it’s impotence by not giving Dutchbatt the ability to defend themselves, let alone the civilians.

If I need the opinion of an American I’ll take the opinion of USMC Major Peter S. Bowen who actually did a study on the incident. Your opinions of late have only grown in irrelevance. That goes for you too John.

From the events of the incident several factors can be easily identified:

NATO/UN forces were committed to Bosnia without the firepower required to defend themselves or the Bosnian cities they were supposed to safeguard. Dutch troops in Srebrenica in June 1995 had only 16% of their requested ammunition supply and did not possess any artillery or other heavy weapons.

Because UN/NATO forces did not possess the firepower or UN mandate to adequately defend themselves, nations with forces on the ground in Bosnia were extremely sensitive to the use of any tactic—especially air strikes--which might provoke Bosnian-Serbs or Bosnian-Muslims to attack them or take hostages.

The UN/NATO "dual key" process for authorizing air strikes severely undermined UN/NATO credibility and effectiveness. The only air strike approved for Srebrenica took more than six hours to process and execute. Without heavy weapons and with an unreliable and slow CAS process, UN/NATO commanders on the ground had little effective firepower available and little military credibility.

UN Ambassador Akashi unilaterally denied several requests for air strikes by UN/NATO forces because he believed that the strikes would undermine ongoing negotiations. Bosnian-Serb leaders interpreted this as a sign that NATO and the UN would be reluctant to use air power no matter what threat was posed to UN/NATO personnel or Bosnian safe-havens.
The combat principle of unity of command was violated in every respect, severely undermining UN/NATO credibility and effectiveness. Not only did the "dual key" process require agreement by two different organizations, NATO and the UN, but the organizations themselves were internally divided. Consensus was required among all participating UN and NATO nations before action could be taken by either organization. This frequently led to indecisiveness, the denial of air strikes and the deployment of UN/NATO forces in dangerous circumstances without the ability to defend themselves.

Operations conducted by the UN violated the principle combining authority and responsibility. The UN had the authority to deny air strikes requested by forces on the ground, but had no real responsibility to/for the safety of those forces. When the objectives of the UN ambassador (to keep negotiations active no matter what the cost) conflicted with Dutch forces extreme need for defensive air strikes, the Dutch forces were denied.

Dutch friendliness with Bosnian-Serbs and antipathy towards Bosnian-Muslims probably contributed to an increased willingness by the Dutch commander to trust that the Bosnian-Serbs would conduct a "decent" deportation and a potential reluctance to defend the Bosnian-Muslims.


Institutional-Individual

The Dutch Department of Defense report on the Srebrenica incident found that "Dutchbat cannot be blamed for its role during and after the fall of the muslim enclave Srebrenica." Nevertheless, Dutchbat, LTCOL Karremans and the Dutch Department of Defense received serious criticism for their actions and failures during the Srebrenica incident. On institutional and personal levels, the Srebrenica incident raises some very serious questions:

While the UNPROFOR order clearly tells the Dutchbat commander to protect refugees and forbids him to surrender weapons, given the lack of defensive firepower, what kinds of reasonable measures were available to the Dutchbat commander?

To whom is the Dutchbat commander responsible for his failure to carry out the order—to UNPROFOR or to the Dutch government?

Should the Dutchbat commander have defended Srebrenica and the Bosnian-Muslim refugees?

a. Should the Dutchbat commander have defended the Bosnian-Muslims if it meant possible annihilation of Dutchbat?

b. Was it reasonable for the Dutch commander to expect that the Bosnian-Serbs, given the opportunity, would commit atrocities against Bosnian-Muslims?

c. If Dutchbat had fought to defend Srebrenica, would "bloodying the nose" of the Bosnian-Serbs been enough to cause them to stop their attack?


Did the UNPROFOR commander issue the defensive order to Dutchbat in order to play both sides of the game—issuing a noble order for the forces of another nation to protect refugees in an impossible situation while denying them the defensive capability that might cause soldiers of his own nation to be taken hostage?

If the Dutch government holds the Dutchbat commander responsible for failing to carry out an order from a senior commander from a different nation with potentially conflicting interests, who will hold that senior commander responsible?

If the Dutchbat commander was wrong in allowing the Bosnian-Serbs to enter Srebrenica, were their institutional factors in the Dutch military that contributed to this poor decision? What institutional actions might be taken to prevent such an tragedy in the future?
Lessons Learned

A number of clear lessons can be drawn from the Srebrenica incident.

Forces should never be deployed without the ability to both a) adequately defend themselves and b) accomplish the mission assigned. Forces committed to a contingency must have military credibility. While this principle may seem obvious, it can be tempting to violate it in the particular circumstances of a particular contingency.

Forces should not be committed to a contingency unless the objectives of the operation are clear. The objectives are clear if success or failure of the operation can be defined in measurable terms. Lack of quantifiable objectives puts force commanders in the very poor position of not knowing how to translate political goals into military action. Without clear objectives, military leaders lack a measurement against which they can evaluate the success or failure of forces under their command.

Forces should not be committed unless the international, political and military objectives of the operation are consistent. International, national and diplomatic objectives and the ability of forces to defend themselves and achieve their mission must not conflict. Even though the Bosnian crisis was being handled by allied western nations experienced working together, different nations and individuals in both organizations had objectives that conflicted with the ability of Dutch forces to defend themselves and safeguard Bosnian-Muslims.

Forces should not be committed unless there is a unified chain of command that not only possesses the authority to command but also possesses responsibility for the forces under command.

Military personnel must be trained to act rightfully and decisively in extremely complex situations which have significant moral, humanitarian and international implications. Military units as small as companies, platoons and even squads may find themselves in these situations while under media scrutiny. The Srebrenica incident demonstrates that failure to handle these situations can undermine trust, lead to questions of honor and threaten governments.

[VermGhost]

Originally posted by Viking
They had already lost the fight.

I think the probably with several northern european countries is that they legally enforced compulsory military service, instead of the US which stresses the individuality of a person for honorably putting themselves in the place of another who is not as able to defend their person as the service person is.  Being legally bound to serve in the military, with no choice for a set amount of time is detrimental to an individual's contribution or acknowledgement of a person's sacrafice by enlisting.

It is obvious that is a serious LACK of common morals and principles that are absent from some soldiers and some countrymen like yourself Viking.  I think this display is shameful.

In addition I think you misinterpret the point behind honor and protecting people weaker than you (general you).  Americans don't do it for glory or the honor to a namesake, we do these things because they are: our jobs, our principles, and it gives people less fortunate than us(servicemen and women) the chance to see another sunrise.