Originally posted by Stringer
The parellel is neither one had a workable strategy to acheive success for their situation. Winning the war is one aspect, but not the only aspect to achieve the diplomatic aims that caused the decision to go to war in the first place.
How do you know a strategy is unworkable until it has been tried?
Rumsfeld's war strategy was untried; many people, me included, thought the in-theater forces were insufficient for the job. His strategy there proved correct and almost incredibly so.
He had a similar strategy for the peace; most thought it included insufficient forces once again. Then again, there was a presumption the Iraqis would have a little more tolerance for their fellow Iraqis of different Muslim sects. That presumption proved unfounded.
What Rumsfeld was missing was the ability to adjust his post-war strategy. He just didn't seem to be able to admit it wasn't working.
If you insist upon a parallel, perhaps it is there. McNamara never had a strategy that worked in practice. His war-fighting plan was a failure and he never was able to admit it didn't work.
So you can parallel McNamara's unwillingness to adjust his war plan with Rumsfeld's unwillingness to adjust his peace plan.
I'm not buying into the "unworkable from before the start" allegation however.
There's an old saying String: the battle plan is usually the first casualty. I don't know how one
knows a plan is irrevocably unworkable until you give it a try. OTOH, the willingness to re-evaluate and re-plan is essential. Rumsfeld failed to do that after winning the war. McNamara failed to do it throughout the war.